Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 27

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, I haven’t even gotten to the Sages yet, even before the medieval authorities (Rishonim). I haven’t even gotten to the Sages, because the Sages introduce something new. The Sages claim that even though I come and give validating testimony, from their perspective it counts as testimony about the act itself, and then they reshuffle all the cards for us. But first I wanted to lay out the cards. Meaning, when I lay out the cards, I say: what happens when there is testimony about the act, and what happens when there is testimony about validation? Ordinary validating testimony. Now the Sages come and say: when there is a lone witness—just a second—when there is a lone witness testifying about his own signature, suddenly they view that as testimony about the act, even though he is seemingly testifying about validation, not about the act. But they view it, at least halakhically, as though there is testimony here about the act itself, and then they reshuffle all the cards for us. We need to examine what happens in such a case. Okay? That’s why I deliberately postponed the discussion of the Mishnah, and first wanted to introduce everything with the cards laid out.

[Speaker B] Okay. Now wait, a second question, and it relates to what you’re saying, because I saw several commentators who really do say this—that even though they are supposedly testifying to their handwriting, really they are testifying here about the act. Some people said that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, that’s what the Sages in the Mishnah say.

[Speaker B] No, fine, but I’m talking about medieval authorities (Rishonim) who said it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) we’ll see different interpretations as to whether they really need to remember the act in order for the Sages to say this, or not. In just a moment—that’s already the medieval authorities (Rishonim). That’s the medieval authorities (Rishonim).

[Speaker B] Okay. Last question: could it be that there’s a difference between a person validating his own handwriting and validation that comes from somewhere else? Because when it comes from somewhere else, it’s absolutely clear to us that this is only validation of the signature, of his handwriting. Nothing beyond that. Right. But when a person testifies, then this whole issue of the Sages comes in here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That he is testifying about the act.

[Speaker B] So I’m saying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he testifies alone, that’s exactly the discussion in our Mishnah, and that’s the novelty of the Sages. If he comes with someone else regarding his own signature, then as I said in the previous class, there is no disqualification of being an interested party when he testifies about his own signature.

[Speaker B] So—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We are in the regular domain of validating documents. Even if it’s I myself testifying to my signature, and someone else comes with me and testifies to my signature, we are in the regular framework of validating documents. You don’t need the Sages for this, and it’s not the amount stated in the document, nothing like that.

[Speaker B] Right, but for example what Maimonides says—that if I don’t remember absolutely anything, but I can still validate my signature, I still can’t testify.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t testify by yourself. In the simple reading of Maimonides, fine—but if someone else comes as well? Because you’re one witness, not because you are disqualified.

[Speaker B] But he doesn’t write that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t write it, but that seems plainly to be what he means. Because otherwise there’s no reason.

[Speaker B] Because he says that the requirement of a witness from the marketplace is only to confirm the writing—or even from somewhere else, where it’s not even a person, from some other document. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Comparison to another validated document.

[Speaker B] Exactly. Whereas the requirement from a person testifying about himself is not just to say, “This is my handwriting.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, requirement? The question is what he knows. There are no requirements here—the question is what he knows, and based on that we assess things. But wait—you’re getting ahead of me, Idit. You’re getting ahead of me. I’ll get to Maimonides and Tosafot; I deliberately don’t want to bring them in here, because otherwise we’ll get completely mixed up. After I lay out the cards, we’ll start shuffling them. But first I… I want to say again, it’s very important to me that we not get confused here, because otherwise the whole thing gets complicated. First of all, if we come and validate a signature, there’s no disagreement—nobody argues. If there are two witnesses on each signature, this is a valid documented loan. It has nothing to do with the amount stated in the document, nothing to do with this whole topic. Even if one of the validating witnesses is the very witness who signed it. I myself. It’s irrelevant. There is no disqualification of being an interested party here. It has nothing to do with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi or the Sages or anything else. Okay? If they come and testify about the amount stated in the document in the real sense—not halakhically considered testimony about the amount in the document, but they actually come and testify about the loan—there is no dispute that the loan is accepted, but it will not be a documented loan. Because the document is not validated. Okay? What happens if they come and testify about the document itself, but I don’t have enough testimony to validate the document? That’s our discussion. If one witness comes and testifies about his own signature, and the second witness testifies about his own signature, the second one’s, then in terms of the laws of validation that is not enough. Therefore Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi indeed says you need to add another witness for each signature, right? But the Sages say that’s enough. Why? Because they claim that this testimony is considered testimony about the amount stated in the document. Now here we need to understand very, very well—this is a subtle point—because the fact that it is considered testimony about the amount stated in the document does not… in the simple sense that does not mean… because they really testified about the amount stated in the document. If they testified about the amount stated in the document, then it’s not considered that—that is testimony about the amount stated in the document. They claim that even if I testify about my signature, halakhically that is considered testimony about the amount stated in the document, and therefore I don’t need to add someone else with me to validate the signature. The great novelty is twofold: first, that my testimony about the amount stated in the document is accepted, even though I didn’t testify about it but about the signature. And second, that the testimony about the signature counts as validation. Because I am only one witness. This must be understood well. After the Rabbis said that the validating witness’s testimony about himself is like testimony about the amount stated in the document, I would have expected them to accept this testimony as two witnesses on the loan, but still it would not be with a document, because after all the document has not been validated. Right? The Sages say it is like testimony about the amount stated in the document. Fine—then let’s take two witnesses who testify about the amount stated in the document. What is the halakhic status in such a case? We have a loan, but an oral loan, not a documented loan. So what about property liens? It is clear that when the Sages say that this witness who validates his own signature is considered as testifying about the amount stated in the document, they mean to say that what we have here is a documented loan. Meaning, it is effective also as validation of the document, not only as testimony about the loan. Otherwise there is no novelty in it. Okay? There would be novelty if they don’t remember—

[Speaker B] And I really understood that aspect of this novelty of the Sages—how can you say such a thing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, the Sages say—what actually happens? I’m reading now before the medieval authorities (Rishonim), before everything. What actually happens when you read the Mishnah and the Talmudic text? Two witnesses who signed the document come, and each one says, “This is my handwriting.” Right? That’s what happens in practice. Now Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: with all due respect to you, there is only one witness here on each signature. I need one more in order to validate the document. If you want to testify about the amount stated in the document, fine—testify about the amount stated in the document, and then it will be an oral loan. But if you want to validate the document and turn it into a documented loan, I need one more witness on each signature. That is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says. The Sages come and say, about that exact same case—they are not speaking about a different case. They are disagreeing with Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi in that same case. Meaning, in the very case that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disqualifies, the Sages say, no, from our perspective this is fine. Why is it fine? Because they are like people testifying about the amount stated in the document. What does that mean? It doesn’t mean they came and testified about the amount stated in the document; they testified about their signature. But this is considered as though they testified about the amount stated in the document. So what? So one might have said: then it is considered as though they testified about the amount stated in the document, and therefore we have two testimonies about the amount stated in the document. Great. But if we have two testimonies about the amount stated in the document, that is an oral loan. But the Sages come to innovate that this loan is also considered a documented loan. Not only do we accept that there was a loan, but the document itself is considered validated. So this fiction… excuse me?

[Speaker E] If they validate their testimony that’s in the document, their handwriting, then the two witnesses of the document are as though their testimony was already given in court.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. But the validation of each signature—there are two here then. No, but the validation of each signature is done only through one witness. Only the witness who signed.

[Speaker E] And also the witness of the document—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again, I’m talking about validating the signature. How do I know that this signature is authentic, that the document is not forged? According to how many witnesses do I know that?

[Speaker E] No, fine, but according to the Sages they say it’s enough that the person testifies to his signature.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? That’s the novelty. It’s a novelty because from my standpoint I don’t trust that the document isn’t forged—leave aside the amount stated in the document for now. Who said this document is not forged? Okay, so the Sages say as follows: the Sages introduce a double novelty. First, when the witness comes and testifies about his own signature, from our perspective this is considered testimony about the amount stated in the document, and therefore he doesn’t need someone else to come with him to testify about the loan, because the second witness, who also testifies about his own signature, he too testifies about the loan. So we have two witnesses on the loan, no problem. But what I’ve said so far is still not enough. Because the Sages claim that not only do I know there was a loan based on two witnesses, this is also a documented loan. Meaning, from my perspective the document is considered validated. Now this is a big novelty. Because on each of the signatures I have only one validating testimony. So how does the document become a validated document? Fine—regarding the loan stated in the document, I have two witnesses testifying about it; okay, then I know there was a loan. But how does this loan become a documented loan? Do you understand what I’m saying? In other words, there is a novelty here that the people testifying about the amount stated in the document then go back and also turn the document into a validated document. It’s not just that through this it became clear to me that there was a loan. It’s not only a novelty regarding testimony from the writing. There is one novelty of “from the…” one novelty. A second novelty: the document itself is also considered validated even though each of the signatures is validated only through one witness. Okay? Is everyone with me, or only Idit? Yael, okay? Both Yaels. Yes. Okay? All right. So that’s the principle. Now it’s very important to understand this already at the Mishnah stage. Meaning, we are really talking about witnesses who testify about the loan; they testify about a signature according to the Rabbis, they are considered as if they testify about the amount stated in the document, but in practice what they say in court is: “This is my handwriting.” And because they are considered as if they testify about the amount stated in the document, that does two things. First, it clarifies to the court that there was a loan. Second, that itself validates the document. The loan is a documented loan. And of course, after I said the second thing, I no longer need the first. Because if the document is a validated document, then the document itself will already testify about the loan, right? I don’t need their testimony about the loan. Therefore in practice, after saying this, I circle back and complete the whole loop, and in the end the novelty of the Sages is only the second point.

[Speaker F] It’s only… why do they need to say that when they testify to their handwriting it is really to testify about the loan itself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because otherwise the validation can’t work—that’s exactly the trick. They claim that the joining regarding the loan comes back and helps me validate the signature. And now I have a validated document, which of course also testifies that there was a loan, because that’s what the document says. But all this testimony about the amount stated in the document is not at all meant to explain why I accept their testimony about the amount stated in the document. That’s not the point. Rather, the fact that I accept their testimony about the amount stated in the document saves them from having to bring another witness to validate the signature. And now, after the document is validated—which is the main novelty of the Rabbis—it follows automatically that it’s also clear there was a loan, because the document says so. So I don’t need the first novelty, that I have two witnesses on the loan. Do you understand what I’m saying? There are two novelties here: one, that there is testimony about the loan even though they are testifying about the signature. But the testimony about the loan is only a device that turns our validation into valid validation. Once the validation is valid… what? Wait, in a moment we’ll see why.

[Speaker F] Wait, in a moment—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see why, but first I’m explaining what the Sages are saying. This is what the Sages are necessarily saying—you can’t argue with that. Because in the end the Sages—

[Speaker C] How do you explain this calculation, that from the fact that they come to testify about the loan, they are thereby testifying about the signature, and then it goes back to the loan? That whole calculation is what isn’t clear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re right, and that already requires an explanation of the reasoning of the Sages. Right now I’m only saying what they are saying. What they are saying—

[Speaker D] And in this case there’s no requirement that they mention the act or not mention the act. Wait, this is… we’re talking only about their testifying to the signature.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly correct; as if the testimony about… seemingly correct. We’ll get shortly to Maimonides and Tosafot, but seemingly correct. Meaning, in practice they come to court and say, “I recognize my signature,” and he says, “I recognize my signature.” That’s what happens in practice, physically. Now the Sages come—

[Speaker C] Then Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi comes and says—the sound disappears sometimes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is it okay now? Can you hear?

[Speaker C] Yes, sometimes it gets cut off kind of intermittently—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, then let me know if it disappears. In short, they come… I’m repeating this again because it’s very important that this be orderly for us. The two signed witnesses come, and each testifies about his own signature. That is all he says in court, that’s it, only that. Then Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: excellent. With all due respect, you really are not considered interested parties, but still there is only one witness here on each signature. It doesn’t work. Bring another witness on each signature. That’s Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Sages say no: we claim that you don’t need another witness on each signature, meaning from our perspective the document is validated. “The document is validated” means: first, there was a loan; second, this loan is a documented loan, there is a lien on property. How does that happen? So I say that it happens in two stages. First stage: the Sages say that when a person testifies about his own signature, unlike any other validator, if I validate my own signature—not someone else validating it—that is considered testimony about the amount stated in the document. And therefore what? Therefore the second one, who does the same thing regarding his own signature, also testifies about the amount stated in the document, and then we have two witnesses on the amount stated in the document. But that is still not enough. What? But that is still not enough, because I am looking for two validating witnesses, not two witnesses on the loan, but two witnesses on the signatures. Basically what the Sages are saying is: because they join together regarding the case, I will also see them as joined regarding the signature, because I no longer have concern… concern that the document is forged. Or in other words, I’ll phrase it like this—and this is already a question of reasoning, I’m just raising possibilities. For example, if a document comes before me, okay? And I know there are two unvalidated signatures here. Now two witnesses come and testify that there was a loan; they are not validating the document, they are coming to testify that there was a loan. Do you understand that there is room to say that I waive the requirement to validate the document? No. Because if there was a loan, and a document is now brought before me, when by strict Torah law there is no concern that the document is forged, and this is only a rabbinic concern—then in a place where all the testimony on the loan is only the document, the Sages come and say: validate the document, maybe you forged it. But in a place where it is clear that there was a loan—we know that from witnesses—and now a document about the loan is also brought before us, it could be that in such a situation I am not concerned that the document is forged. I don’t think so. What, that it’s green on the outside and red on the inside?

[Speaker C] I don’t understand how that helps with the lien on the land, I don’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because if the document is a valid document, then there is a lien—what’s the problem? After all, my assumption is that the document is not forged, so there really was a document.

[Speaker D] And maybe all the testimony about the loan strengthens the document? Exactly. Maybe the document isn’t forged?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it now becomes validated. The Sages—that is what… maybe, according to this suggestion, according to this suggestion, that’s what the Sages are really saying. The Sages are really saying as follows. I’ll offer two suggestions for how this works. First suggestion is what I just said. Once I have two witnesses on the loan, now a document comes before me and it is not validated. But when I have two witnesses on the loan, then I am not concerned that the document is forged. Because a forged document is a concern when someone wants to gain money unlawfully. But here I know it is lawful—there was a loan, he is entitled to the money. Now a document is also brought—why should I suspect that the document is forged? That is already a more remote concern. In such a situation, validation by one witness of his own signature will suffice to validate the document.

[Speaker C] Exactly—if that itself is better. In such a situation I forgot that you don’t need the document if there are two witnesses each coming and testifying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you need the document in order—

[Speaker C] For it to be a documented loan.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, an oral loan doesn’t create a property lien.

[Speaker F] If I have four witnesses—two testify about the loan and two about the document—it’s easier to validate the document without formal validation. If I myself testify about the loan, then obviously I can also say the document is valid.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either I myself, or I myself or another witness can come and validate my signature alone, just him—but only one witness. But I have two witnesses that there was a loan. You understand that this also starts to come close? Right. Not because I myself am testifying, but because there is one witness on the validation, and the fact that it’s me myself only also creates testimony on the loan. That doesn’t happen if the validating witness is someone else. The combination of testimony on the loan plus one witness on the validation is enough, from our perspective, to regard the document as validated.

[Speaker F] Where the witness on the validation is me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. But again, from my standpoint that’s not necessary. Meaning, according to this explanation I would be willing to accept that another witness comes and validates my signature by himself, only him; and a second witness comes and validates the signature of my counterpart, also another witness, not the signed witness. And now two witnesses come and testify about the loan. It could be that this too would be good.

[Speaker F] But then that makes the requirement to validate documents more expensive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it doesn’t make it more expensive.

[Speaker F] Doesn’t it mean that an oral loan is enough? Isn’t that enough to validate the document for me?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course not. Without a document there will be no lien on property, because the buyer will say, “I didn’t hear there was a loan.” I’m not disputing that there was a loan, but I didn’t hear about it.

[Speaker F] But if there is a requirement to validate the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The document—wait, wait—but if I proved that at the time of the loan we wrote a document, I proved that, then if I proved it, the buyer is fine, right? My claim is that according to the Sages this mechanism proves that there was a document at the time of the loan, because I have no reason to assume the document was forged afterward.

[Speaker F] But according to the Sages that’s only if I have only two witnesses in the story, not three or four, only two. I both validate and testify about the loan.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it doesn’t matter, because it’s not—on the contrary, that’s a greater novelty. I’m saying a simpler novelty. I have two witnesses on the loan, okay? Unrelated. I validate my signature and you validate your signature. Would that certainly also suffice? Maybe even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would agree that that’s enough, because the Sages make me perform two functions. They say I validate my signature, and besides that I am also considered a witness on the amount stated in the document. That’s an additional novelty that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not agree to. But if a real witness came and testified about the amount stated in the document itself, maybe Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would accept that too? That’s a smaller novelty. On the contrary, the Rabbis are introducing a greater novelty: that if I testify about my signature, they see in my act two independent functions: first, this is one witness on the signature; second, this is testimony about the loan. The combination of these two together is enough so that we do not suspect the document is forged, and therefore it is valid. That’s one possibility. A second—yes.

[Speaker B] I have a sort of different case of loan, not exactly like his. I have testimony about the loan, and the testimony is oral. Besides that I also have two witnesses of validation on the document. No, not that—I have one validating witness on the document. Can I combine the oral testimony with the single witness on the document and retroactively validate the document?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not retroactively—validate the document. Why retroactively? It’s like validating the document. Validation is always retroactive. The document comes now to court, we show that it was not forged, and therefore two weeks ago a document was written.

[Speaker B] Meaning that it’s not essential that it be this very person?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to the explanation I suggested right now, I think not. I suggested a certain explanation. According to that explanation, my claim is that after the novelty of the Sages, once we have two witnesses on the loan, it no longer bothers me that on each signature there is only one validating witness. Since all this concern is only a rabbinic concern that the document is forged. Right? In principle we do not suspect that a document is forged, so the Rabbis say: look, if I already know there was a loan, and I even have one additional validating witness on each signature, then maybe that’s enough for me. I do not suspect that the document is forged just in order to cheat the buyers, because after all there really was a loan. I know there was a loan. Okay, that’s one possibility. A second possibility is really to say that somehow their joining in the testimony on the amount stated in the document helps as a joining for validation. It is considered as though I have two validating witnesses on each signature, which is some kind of halakhic statement. I don’t see the mechanism that does this, but the fact that both of them testify about the amount stated in the document—where they certainly do join—turns them essentially into a set of two witnesses, and that is considered testimony on a validated document. Meaning, the validation too is done on the basis of two witnesses. To me that sounds less plausible. The previous explanation sounds very logical to me. The practical difference will of course be the case I brought earlier. What happens if two witnesses come and testify about the loan, and they are not me and my counterpart? And now I and my counterpart each validate his own signature, or just some other witness validates my signature and an additional witness validates the signature of the other one. According to this explanation that would no longer be good, right? Because here there is no—here it would no longer help. According to the second explanation I suggested, it would not help, because here I need to join these two validating witnesses so that they will count as two witnesses validating each signature. It’s not the assistance of the proof that there was a loan that does the work, but some kind of joining of the validating witnesses, so that from my perspective there are as though two validating witnesses on each signature. But then I really need specifically those two witnesses to join. If two other witnesses come and testify that there was a loan, then those witnesses are not joined here, right? Okay. Good. So that is the meaning before we enter the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but that is in broad terms what the Sages are saying. And this is a very important point that is very easy to miss, which is why I spent a lot of time on it. The Sages are not introducing the novelty that we testify about the amount stated in the document. The Sages are introducing the novelty that by virtue of that, the document too is considered validated. That is the great novelty of the Sages, okay? Meaning, this is a documented loan. By the way, it could be that on the first novelty Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would also agree, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi only claims that he does not see this as valid validation of a document. Regarding the document, as Noa kept saying all along, I don’t have two validators on each signature here, so the document is not validated. I have testimony about the loan, very good, so there was a loan—but a document is not a validated document. Okay? It could be that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agreed in principle to the claim that this witness is testifying about the amount stated in the document—certainly if he remembers the testimony. According to Maimonides, who requires that he remember the—now I am getting ahead of myself—according to Maimonides, who requires that they indeed remember the testimony, it is very likely that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would not disagree with the Rabbis that there are two witnesses here on the loan. There really are two witnesses on the loan. So what is the dispute? The dispute is over whether this is a documented loan. That is the dispute. Meaning, does this thing then come back and help turn the document into a validated document. Okay? Yael, Yael, one second Yael. Okay? All right. The other Yael I don’t see below on my screen. Okay. Fine. I need to scroll because I only have four pictures here on the screen. Fine. So now I’m moving to Tosafot. Tosafot on the opening words “about their handwriting.” This does not appear on your page, right? This—by the way, do you have Talmuds in front of you?

[Speaker E] Ah, yes, yes, wait, I’ll show for a second.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. In principle I assume we have Talmuds here, yes?

[Speaker E] Yes. “About their handwriting.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So Tosafot says as follows: “About their handwriting they are testifying. It appears that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, even if they say explicitly that they are testifying about the amount stated in the document, it is considered as though they are testifying about their handwriting.” Fine? The first novelty of Tosafot is that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, if the two signed witnesses come and say, “We are testifying about the amount stated in the document,” we will not accept that. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi regards them as though they are testifying about their handwriting—which is a little strange.

[Speaker F] That’s really strange.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Two witnesses come and testify about the loan—why wouldn’t you accept two witnesses on the loan?

[Speaker C] I thought I saw this Tosafot as basically meaning that the point is to create a kind of situation that doesn’t depend on people subjectively. As if—we set some rule, and that’s it. So now according to the rule, it doesn’t really matter whether the witnesses remember, don’t remember, come to testify about—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is what Tosafot says, I fully agree. The only question is what the logic is. After all, two witnesses come to you who remember the case and testify about the case—so what, you don’t accept them?

[Speaker E] As if, because if I have a document, in order to validate it I need testimony about the signatures, right? Right. So either, from what I understand here, once they validate the signature, I can also validate the amount stated in the document. From my perspective, in the logical sequence of the process of enforcing the document, I first need validation of the signature.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if two witnesses come and say, “We are testifying about the amount stated in the document.”

[Speaker E] That doesn’t interest me. First of all, testimony about the signature.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? But they want—what, two witnesses come and testify about something, so what do you mean it doesn’t interest you? You have two witnesses on the loan.

[Speaker E] No, but they are also the amount stated in the document.

[Speaker B] I also need testimony… testimony… someone else can validate that signature. Someone from the marketplace or from somewhere else.

[Speaker E] First of all, validation of the signature.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t understand—then what is Tosafot saying? The two witnesses come and say, “We are testifying about the amount stated in the document.” What does the court say to them?

[Speaker E] Now I need to look for witnesses who will testify about the signatures?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Fine, we don’t have witnesses on the signatures.

[Speaker E] So it’s still impossible to validate the document. Why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The document—impossible. But the loan—possible.

[Speaker E] So I have an oral loan. Why not?

[Speaker C] You do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Yael, you skipped two stations here. Said… second Yael, you didn’t ask. Exactly—that’s the answer to what the previous Yael said. What you asked is the answer. The answer is that what Tosafot says is this: even if they testify about the amount stated in the document, even if they explicitly say they are testifying about the amount stated in the document, it will not help. What does it mean, it won’t help? They are telling you they are testifying about the amount stated in the document. What will you say? Maybe it won’t help because they are testifying from their writing. After all, they are using the signature in order to testify about the amount stated in the document. But then we make some kind of interpretive assumption that they do not remember it independently, but only remember it from the document. But even if they remember it from the document, we said that in Jewish law according to Rabbi Yohanan, it is not disqualified as testimony from the writing. And more than that: if they don’t remember at all, and testify only about the signature, then obviously it makes no difference if they say, “We are testifying about the amount stated in the document”—that is just plain testimony from the writing, right? That is obvious. It makes no difference that they say, “We are testifying about the amount stated in the document”; they don’t remember it even with the help of the document, so it is simply invalid. There is nothing to discuss there. Therefore Tosafot is not speaking about that. Tosafot is speaking about a situation where they also remember the act, or alternatively remember it from the signature, which according to the law also has no disqualification of testimony from the writing. So why does Tosafot not accept this? Why according to Tosafot does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi not accept this testimony? A very simple answer. He accepts the… what, he doesn’t accept the—

[Speaker F] The testimony, or he doesn’t accept the mechanism that makes it revert into making the document also—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly that. He accepts the testimony—it is two witnesses on a loan. But the novelty of the Sages is not that. The novelty of the Sages is that after we have these two witnesses on the loan, that goes back and validates the document. Right. That is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not agree with. Simple. Do you understand why this introduction was so important, what I did before? Because otherwise you can’t read a single line in any medieval authority (Rishon). It will always be: wait, they are testifying about the amount stated in the document, so why don’t we accept their testimony? You have to understand: the discussion here is whether there is a document, not whether there was a loan. When Tosafot says we do not accept their testimony, Tosafot means we do not view this document as a validated document—not that we do not accept the testimony about the loan. If they remember the testimony about the loan, then within the limits of testimony from the writing there is no problem; there is testimony about the loan. If they remember it independently, then of course there is no problem. If they remember it from the document itself, then according to the law—again, the discussion is whether after there is testimony about the loan, this then comes back and validates the document. That Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not accept. Okay? In other words, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not accept the reasoning I suggested earlier—that even if you tell me you are two witnesses on the loan, that will not spare you from also bringing me two validating witnesses on the document. Okay? As witnesses on the loan, fine. But that does not spare you from bringing two validating witnesses on the document. That is what Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says. And now suddenly what Tosafot says seems very simple and clear, right? That itself is the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Sages. Not over whether this is the amount stated in the document, but over whether testimony on the amount stated in the document then goes back and validates the document itself. That is the dispute. And Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says, I do not accept that this comes back and validates in any way, even if you yourselves say that you are testifying directly—say that you are testifying about the amount stated in the document. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: why not? Because my dispute with you is not over whether the witness is considered as testifying about the amount stated in the document. I have no problem with that. My dispute is over whether that then comes back and exempts him from validating the signature. Because he does not accept the reasoning I said earlier, that if I have witnesses on the loan, then I do not suspect that the document is forged. That reasoning Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not accept. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi always wants validation of the document; without validation of the document, there is no document. I don’t care what supportive testimony you bring me regarding the loan itself. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not accept that.

[Speaker D] And therefore I think that’s what you said: for Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, he doesn’t care—do they remember or not remember, are they testifying about the loan or not—in any case it doesn’t come back. Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now look, I’ll already anticipate and say: suppose there is someone who disagrees with Tosafot, and says that if they themselves say they are testifying about the amount stated in the document—if they themselves say they are testifying about the amount stated in the document—then Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would also agree. Agree regarding the loan? No, wait, if not, then he is not disagreeing with Tosafot, because what I’m saying is that Tosafot too says Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi agrees regarding the loan; Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi just does not agree that the document is validated. So if there is someone who disagrees with Tosafot, he will apparently claim that according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, if they come and say “we are testifying about the amount stated in the document,” then that will also come back and validate the document. So where is the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Sages according to this approach?

[Speaker D] Because it’s only in the case where they don’t remember.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. In a situation where they testify about the signature, then according to the Sages that is considered testimony about the amount stated in the document. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not accept that. Here Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not accept the going, not the returning. Do you understand what I’m saying? In other words, according to Tosafot it is quite clear that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi disagrees with the Sages over the return. Meaning, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is prepared to accept that the testimony of these witnesses is considered testimony about the amount stated in the document. In principle he might accept that. He simply does not agree that after this is considered testimony about the amount stated in the document, it also exempts from the validation problem. The going back again, where it returns and turns the document into a validated document—that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not accept. Therefore it doesn’t matter even if they explicitly say they are testifying about the amount stated in the document—what difference does that make to me? It won’t help me for validation. So according to Tosafot it is clear that the dispute is over the return, not over the going. Or in other words, Tosafot probably understood like the reasoning I brought earlier. The reasoning that says that once I have testimony about the loan according to the Sages, I have testimony about the loan, and that strengthens the testimony for validation and exempts me from bringing another witness for validation. That Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi does not accept. Therefore Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: what will it help me that you tell me about the amount stated in the document? Even if two valid witnesses come on the amount stated in the document itself, that still will not help me turn the document into a validated document. Therefore Tosafot says: it makes no difference; Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi will continue to disagree even if the witnesses come and say, “We are testifying about the amount stated in the document.” But if we find a medieval authority (Rishon) who disagrees with Tosafot and says that if the witnesses come and say, “We intend to testify about the amount stated in the document,” and there Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi admits to the Sages—let’s say there is such a medieval authority (Rishon) who disagrees with Tosafot—then let’s work it out: why does Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concede to the Sages there? Because there Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: if I have testimony about the amount stated in the document, then apparently that does strengthen the validation and the document itself becomes validated—in this I concede to you, Sages. So why do you argue with them in the situation where the witnesses do not say they are testifying about the amount stated in the document? After all, there is a dispute there; where is the dispute? The dispute is when the witnesses do not say, “We are testifying about the amount stated in the document.” What is the dispute? The dispute is about the going. If we come and testify about the signatures, without saying that we are testifying about the amount stated in the document, is that halakhically considered testimony about the amount stated in the document or not? That is the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Because if it were considered testimony about the amount stated in the document, then Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi too would agree. He would agree that it would also turn the document into a validated document. His dispute is over the going, not the return. Are you with me or not?

[Speaker E] Wait—if they testify, if they testify about the amount stated in the document, then right now we don’t have testimony about the signatures.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We do—that’s the novelty of the Sages: once we have two witnesses on the amount stated in the document, testimony of one witness on each signature is enough for me, and from my perspective the document is considered validated. I have no concern that it is forged.

[Speaker E] But according to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi—no. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi that does not help.

[Speaker E] Right, okay, fine?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The only question is why, again. I said—and now I’ll summarize again because I want this to sit very firmly in your minds—I said that in the view of the Sages there is a double novelty. One novelty is that when witnesses come and testify about their own signatures, that is considered testimony about the amount stated in the document. A second novelty: after I have testimony about the amount stated in the document, the document itself is also considered validated even though there were not two validating witnesses on each signature. A second novelty. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi can disagree with either of these two novelties, right? Because each of the two novelties is needed in order to reach the conclusion of the Sages. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who disagrees with the conclusion of the Sages, can disagree with either one of their two novelties. According to Tosafot it seems he disagrees with the second novelty. Therefore Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: look, if you tell me that if the witnesses come and testify directly about the amount stated in the document, that also won’t help, because my problem is not with their testimony being considered testimony about the amount stated in the document—I’m prepared to accept that. My problem is that even if there is testimony about the amount stated in the document, I am not prepared to view the document as validated. The return doesn’t seem right to me. That is Tosafot. If there is a medieval authority (Rishon) who disagrees with Tosafot and says not so, he will say that if the witnesses testify about the amount stated in the document, there Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi would indeed agree that the document is validated. What do we learn from this? That Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi has no problem with the return. If there are witnesses here on the signature, on the loan, then the document will be considered validated. He is simply not willing to view witnesses like these as witnesses on the loan, because after all they are not really testifying about the loan—they are testifying about the signature.

[Speaker C] But in that case you don’t need them—it’s not interesting, you don’t need them in that case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the document is validated, then no—

[Speaker C] You need these witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But no—it is validated only if there are two validating witnesses on the signature. I don’t have two validating witnesses—

[Speaker C] On the signature.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The document is not validated here. Here there is one witness testifying to his own signature, and the second witness testifies to his own signature. Only according to the Sages does the document then come back and become validated because I have testimony about the loan. So Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: look, if I had testimony about the loan—according to those who disagree with Tosafot—if I had testimony about the loan, then I would accept that the document too is considered validated. I have no problem with the return. I have a problem with the going.

[Speaker B] The going, yes—I’m doing it with my finger—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And you can’t see. What—

[Speaker B] What you heard earlier intuitively. What? That’s what I heard earlier intuitively.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the point is that Rabbi says: if the witnesses were actually testifying about the maneh in the document, I would be prepared to accept their testimony also as testimony that validates the document. What I disagree with you about is when the witnesses do not come and say, “We are speaking about the maneh in the document”; they testify about the signature. You, the Rabbis, tell me that from your perspective this counts as testimony about the maneh, and I say it does not—I disagree.

[Speaker E] Wait, wait—so he agrees on the way back, but he doesn’t agree on the way there? Meaning, if the witnesses testify about the maneh in the document, he agrees that that also means there is testimony about the document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. On the way back he agrees; the dispute is only about the way there. Correct. And according to Tosafot, the opposite. According to Tosafot, on the way there he can agree. It could be that the witnesses, even according to Rabbi, are also considered witnesses to the maneh in the document; he just claims that this does not then circle back and validate the document itself. On the return trip—I don’t agree. The Rabbis, of course, accept both things, because that’s always the point: once one of the tanna’im has a position that requires two assumptions, it’s worth starting from him. The Rabbis’ position requires two assumptions: first, that there is the way there; second, that there is the way back. So now we can see—we can even predict without reading the medieval authorities (Rishonim)—that there could now be two views among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Either Rabbi disagrees with the assumption of the way there, or Rabbi disagrees with the assumption of the way back. Or with both—but there is no reason to assume there are two disputes between them; there’s no need to go that far. Ockham’s razor. Okay? Let’s continue reading Tosafot. “And similarly according to the Rabbis,” I’m continuing in Tosafot, “even if they explicitly say that they are testifying about their handwriting”—what does that mean?

[Speaker E] They validate the document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even if they come and validate the document, from our perspective the testimony of one witness is enough. Why? Because halakhically this is considered like testimony about the maneh in the document.

[Speaker F] Even if they don’t remember the maneh? Or…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. He says, I don’t know, but apparently it seems so—even if they don’t remember. But then the question really is: that’s testimony from a written text. How is that considered testimony about the event?

[Speaker F] But they’re not testifying about the event; they’re only testifying about the handwriting.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But for the handwriting I have only one witness on each signature.

[Speaker F] But that’s exactly their novelty, no? What? That if I testify about my handwriting, yes, it automatically turns into testimony about the event, and that also…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But how does it become testimony about the event? That’s testimony from a written text. The whole point was that it has to become testimony about the event so that afterward it can circle back and validate the document. How does it become testimony about the event? There’s a problem here of testimony from a written text.

[Speaker F] But that’s their novelty, isn’t it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but there’s still testimony from a written text here. Do they disagree with that principle?

[Speaker F] Their novelty is not that I come and testify about the event; their novelty is that I come and testify about my handwriting and that in practice counts as testimony about the event.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So let me formulate it this way. There is an option to say that we are dealing here with a situation that meets the criteria for testimony from a written text. For example, the case setup where they remember the event as well because of the document. They came to validate the document, but the document reminded them of the event too. Then there is no problem of testimony from a written text. But then it’s a bit empty of content. Because then, if it reminded them of the event, fine—testify about the event. There’s no problem of testimony from a written text; testify about the event, and then it will circle back and everything will be fine. What’s the problem? Right. Therefore it is more reasonable that Tosafot says no: it could be that they really do not remember the event. From our perspective this is considered as if they are testifying about the event. Why? Because really—and now watch, this is upside down on top of upside down—my conclusion now is this: ask me whether there was a loan? My answer is: I don’t know. I don’t know whether there was a loan. What I do know is that I have here a validated document. The document will tell me that there was a loan. The order is reversed. Meaning, the Sages say: these witnesses validate the document, and by force of validating the document it will now become clear to me that there was also a loan—and of course, a loan.

[Speaker F] But how can that be? How do they validate the document if they each have only one testimony about the handwriting?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying. It is considered testimony about the maneh in the document only for the purpose that it validates the document. We will not actually accept it as testimony about the maneh in the document, because it is perhaps testimony from a written text. But here I have—not just that—if it were only testimony from a written text, then I would disqualify the testimony and that would be that. But here I also have a document, and the document can do the work. All I need is just to validate the document. For the purpose of validating the document, it could be that their testimony is enough for me as though it were testimony about the maneh itself. But then it really comes out that it is not “there and back” the way I explained earlier. It’s not that first I have testimony about the loan and then that circles back and validates the document, and then of course I no longer need the testimony about the loan because a validated document does all the work. Here I say no. I do not really have testimony about the loan. I have testimony about the loan only insofar as I need it for validating the document. Now I have a validated document, and that is what actually tells me there was a loan. And then I say: even if this is a situation that could have been disqualified because of testimony from a written text, I do not disqualify it, because here I don’t really need these witnesses for the loan. I need them only in order to confirm the document. The document itself will prove that there was a loan. So that’s why here, although in principle I could have disqualified it because of testimony from a written text, I do not disqualify it. Which is what she actually wanted to say earlier.

[Speaker D] It comes out as though the fact that a person himself signed gives him some kind of ability to testify about the event, even though he doesn’t remember. That projects into the fact that he can validate the document himself.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Basically, his testimony about the event is not accepted,

[Speaker D] Let’s say that if in the end it turns out—I understand. But the possibility that he can theoretically testify about the event, because he is testifying about his own signature, that supposedly adds something.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The practical difference would be, say, if the document somehow became unusable and it would no longer be possible to use it. It wouldn’t be in use? I don’t know, something would happen to it and it would no longer be possible to use it. It doesn’t matter exactly how that happens right now. I do not have two witnesses to the loan. According to the explanation I’m giving now, I do not have two witnesses to the loan, because the witnesses to the loan are testimony from a written text. All the testimony about the loan could only help in order to validate the document. But if I can’t use the document, I have no testimony about the loan. What I said earlier was not like that. What I said earlier was: I have testimony about the loan, and therefore the document also becomes validated. Now if the document is lost, torn, I don’t know, something happened to it, the testimony about the loan still exists. Now I’m saying no. The testimony about the loan does not exist at all. The only reason I view them as testifying about the maneh in the document is only as a mechanism that combines them into testimony that validates the document itself. Therefore, if I cannot use the document, I do not have two witnesses to the loan. That’s testimony from a written text. I cannot use their testimony about the loan itself. Okay? That is the implication of the last formulation I gave as opposed to the earlier formulations. There was…

[Speaker B] Can you repeat that? I just disconnected for a few minutes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again. So I’m saying it like this. What we said in Tosafot at the end—he says the following: if the witnesses come and say, “We testify about our signatures; we do not remember the maneh in the document,” Tosafot says it doesn’t matter; according to the Sages it is still considered like testimony about the maneh in the document. I ask: why? There’s a problem here of testimony from a written text. They are using—they do not remember the testimony about the event at all, and they are only using the document as an aid, and they are considered witnesses about the event? That’s testimony from a written text. So what Noa suggested earlier, I said there is another possibility but not a likely one—that they do remember, because then there is no problem of testimony from a written text and the whole statement of Tosafot is unnecessary. So I’m saying simply: Tosafot is speaking in a case where they really do not remember. Even with the help of the document they do not remember. So then what? Still—so why don’t I disqualify their testimony about the loan because of testimony from a written text? The answer is: I do disqualify it. But I view their testimony as testimony about the loan only for the purpose that they can join as witnesses validating the document. As for the loan itself, they are indeed disqualified because of testimony from a written text. But for the purpose of validating the document—and one must always remember that the validation of documents is only rabbinic, and strictly speaking a document does not need validation; we do not suspect it of being forged—for the purpose of validating the document, I am willing to view this testimony as testimony about the loan even though it is testimony from a written text, and then the document is considered a validated document.

[Speaker C] And isn’t that calculation a little strange? Because we said earlier—or at least that’s how I understood it—that the reason the Sages are willing to accept a signature, or validate the signature, on the basis of one witness, is because they come and are actually coming to testify about the loan itself. And therefore it sort of hangs on the fact that they come to validate the loan; from that we get to the fact that they are actually validating the signature, and now that they validated the signature, it basically circles back to the loan, right? And now we’re saying that even if they don’t remember the content at all, the content of the loan—because then we would have a problem of testimony from a written text if you can’t rely on that—still, according to the Sages, they accept each one’s testimony on his own signature. I don’t understand how that fits with what we said a few minutes ago.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll formulate it this way, look. Suppose we have two witnesses who send written testimony to the religious court that there was a loan. Okay? They send testimony; that’s testimony from a written text, right? Now in addition to that, I have two document witnesses, each of whom testifies to his own signature. Okay?

[Speaker C] Wait—which document?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A document recording a loan. The same case as ours. Reuven comes—Reuven and Shimon are the two witnesses signed on the document. Reuven recognizes his own signature; Shimon recognizes his own signature, okay? So at the moment I still have nothing. Now two other witnesses come and send a letter to the religious court: “We saw the loan,” in writing. That won’t help, right? Because it’s testimony from a written text. But I claim it will help in turning the document into a good document.

[Speaker B] Because it does what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It will turn the document into a good document. If there were no document, I would throw this letter into the trash. But if there were a document, then yes, this testimony is problematic testimony—it is testimony from a written text—but it still gives support to the questionable validation of the document, where there is only one witness validating, and that turns the document into a validated document. My claim is that that is what happens here too. Leave aside the letter I drew earlier—that’s another case; on that perhaps even Rabbi would agree. I’m saying the novelty of the Sages is that you don’t need a letter. When witnesses come and testify to their own signatures, from our perspective that is considered like written testimony about the loan. Written testimony about the loan. Therefore, as testimony about the loan itself it is not accepted, but written testimony about the loan still has some weight that helps the document become validated. Therefore it is considered a validated document, and the document will prove that there was a loan—a loan recorded in a document.

[Speaker C] What are they relying on in order to say such a thing? I mean, that there is some kind of… what? Reasoning. Reasoning? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, everybody just says whatever they want? I mean… you can, the question is whether it makes sense or not. I claim that the amora’im—or at least according to Tosafot, this is what the amora’im thought, the tanna’im or amora’im thought. The claim is that basically this does make sense. Testimony from a written text is a formal disqualification. But clearly it does provide support, right? If a letter comes to the religious court signed by two witnesses, and they send it to the court saying, “We saw the loan,” then fine, it is not accepted as testimony—there are procedural rules—but do you agree with me that it nevertheless strengthens the thesis that there was a loan?

[Speaker C] I don’t know, because if the Torah said that testimony is only by…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and the Torah also wanted two witnesses, right? If one witness comes, is that weightless? I don’t know. It just does not carry enough weight to cross the threshold the Torah requires. Just—understand the logic.

[Speaker C] In general it’s worth zero; that’s exactly the point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In general, if you have…

[Speaker C] if I have only one witness, then I have nothing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you do have something. It’s just not enough to extract money. It can obligate an oath, for example. So you see that one witness has some weight. The fact that they do not give it full force because the Torah requires two witnesses in order to extract money does not mean that one witness is worth nothing. Now here you have to remember: the Torah gives a document force even without its being validated. We have no suspicions. The Sages are concerned about a forged document and want some kind of reinforcement. So the Sages can say: okay, written testimony, although the Torah disqualifies it, is enough weight to reinforce the document.

[Speaker C] But that’s all that… that sounds reasonable. Since this is a rabbinic enactment, they can also, together with that enactment, say that they are willing to accept something that is not one hundred percent.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. By the way, they could enact an enactment that something which is not one hundred percent would also be effective even in a place where… even if validation were Torah-level, it would still be possible to institute a rabbinic enactment that validation in this way would also work. Fine, that too is a rabbinic enactment. Okay? To make things easier for people, because after all the whole point—remember the introduction I gave about documents in general?—the whole point of documents is to make life easier. Not to obligate me to keep my two witnesses attached to me all the time. I want to have evidence readily available. If they require me to validate the document all the time, then how have you made things easier for me? I constantly need to keep witnesses in order to validate the document instead of witnesses who will testify for me about the loan, so what did we gain? So not entirely. It is easier to validate the document because many witnesses can recognize a signature. It’s not like witnesses who saw the loan, which are two specific people. Okay, but still, it is burdensome. So there is room for the reasoning that the Sages are willing to ease things a bit more and accept even written testimony as support. Notice, because I have one validating witness on each signature. As support, I accept written testimony about the loan. So that’s okay. Okay. Therefore, if this document now gets torn or lost, then now I come and want the money. Fine, I don’t have a document, but… but you agree with me that there was a loan?

[Speaker E] Wait, sorry. Yes. Just a small question. Can I accept written testimony as second testimony? Again. Can I accept written testimony when it is a second testimony? Can I accept it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. What I said now—

[Speaker E] You said yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I said that although you cannot accept it by Torah law, it could be that for purposes of validation it gives enough support to the validation of the document. After all, I have validation from one witness on each signature.

[Speaker E] The basic validation that the Sages require—two witnesses who themselves validated the signature, and from here that validates the document, and from here it can create a lien through the document, and so on and so on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That needs two regular witnesses.

[Speaker E] So that’s fine. But if I only validate the signature…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. If a witness comes and validates his own signature—a witness who validates his own signature, yes?—then in that situation overall I have validation, but not full validation, because I need two witnesses. So written testimony about the loan can be considered support that completes the validation.

[Speaker E] Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? I’m just finishing the last words of Tosafot. Rather… wait. “From what we say below.” Do you see it in Tosafot?

[Speaker E] Yes, wait.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “From what we say below.” Tosafot brings proof for his words. “From what we say below: if there are not two but only one, what shall we do?” After all, remember, we saw the Talmudic text. The Talmudic text says: what happens if in fact we have no additional witness? We have only one witness. What can we do? Okay? It implies that according to the Sages, yes? It implies that it would not help for the Rabbis if they explicitly testify about their handwriting. So what’s the problem with testifying about their handwriting? He says no, it will not help if they testify about their handwriting.

[Speaker E] Wait, now I didn’t understand what I thought I understood before. Wait. “Below, and if there are not two…” Is that the case where one of them died?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. If they are testifying about their handwriting themselves.

[Speaker E] Okay, so if only one remains, then he cannot testify about the other one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And if there are not two but only one”—so each one testifies about his own signature and we have no additional witness. Okay? So what do we do? Then—

[Speaker D] There is only one, we can’t do

[Speaker E] anything.

[Speaker D] Meaning—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning that it does not help…

[Speaker D] Which one? One of the two who testified on the document remains?

[Speaker E] Wait, if earlier we said that if—

[Speaker C] “If there are not two but only one, what shall we do,” that implies that it would not help for the Rabbis if they explicitly testify about their handwriting. What does that mean? There is only one witness, and you need another one.

[Speaker E] What can be done?

[Speaker C] Yes, as if what the Sages were lenient about as opposed to Rabbi in this case is the case where two come and each testifies about his own signature. But if there is only one, then no—then there isn’t.

[Speaker E] So it’s like everything from the beginning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait one second, I’m looking here because something seems backward to me.

[Speaker E] “Even if they explicitly say, ‘It is about our handwriting that we testify.’”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What the Talmudic text says is this: when one of them died, okay? And the Talmudic text asks, “And if there are not two”—what does that mean? If I do not have two witnesses on that second signature, the one belonging to the one who died, yes? Rather I have only one witness on his own signature plus one witness on the second signature, but not the signed witness, because the signed witness died. Okay? What do we do in that situation? So Tosafot says: what’s the problem? Let them testify that they are testifying about their handwriting. Even according to the Sages?

[Speaker C] One can testify, but he can’t testify about his handwriting because it’s

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not his hand, it’s somebody else’s handwriting. No, both of them—

[Speaker C] should testify about their handwriting. I didn’t understand—who died? I know my signature and his signature, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now if there is another person who testifies about my signature and his, that is no good according to the Sages. Why is it no good? Because three quarters of the monetary claim comes out on the basis of one witness. It comes out that I testify to the maneh in the document, and he testifies to half of the other maneh, right? From the second testimony. What happens if I now say explicitly: I testify about my signature, not about the maneh in the document? Would that not help? Would that solve the problem? Seemingly it should solve the problem, right? Why? Because I have two validating witnesses on each signature. Right? On my signature I have me and the additional witness, and on the second signature I have me and the additional witness. Why shouldn’t that help? From the Talmudic text it appears that it would not help. Why not? Because according to the Sages, from their perspective he is testifying about the maneh in the document even if he explicitly says that he is testifying about his signature. Okay? He cannot say, no, no, I am testifying only about my signature. Okay? I didn’t understand that non-distinction.

[Speaker C] Right. What? From the perspective of the Sages, since they are testifying about the maneh and not about the signature, it therefore comes out that one witness is testifying about three quarters of a maneh.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And even if he qualifies it and says, leave it, I’m not testifying about the maneh in the document, I’m testifying only about my signature, okay? In that situation, seemingly one more person who recognizes both signatures should have been enough. So then why does the Talmudic text ask, “if there is only one, what shall we do”? What does “what shall we do” mean? Let that witness pull back and testify only about his own signature, not about the maneh in the document. What’s the problem? Then everything is fine. Tosafot says no—even if he pulls back, it doesn’t help. From our perspective he is always considered someone testifying about the maneh in the document, even if he explicitly says he is testifying about his signature. That is the proof from the continuation of the Talmudic text.

[Speaker C] And that is also what we said at the beginning—that both Rabbi and the Sages, each one stands by his rule regardless of the subjective reality, each time, of whether a given witness who comes wants to testify about the maneh or about the signature. It does not depend on his intentions. Exactly. It doesn’t matter. It’s just that according to Rabbi they always testify about the writing, and according to the Sages they always testify about the maneh. That’s it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker E] No, but we saw somewhere that if he says it verbally, immediately, and doesn’t say to him it’s the Taz, it’s the Shakh—I’m not… wait. Yes, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think we’re finishing here—it’s one fifteen. One and two.

[Speaker E] I didn’t understand the last part, but okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll send a summary, and by the way everything is recorded. I’ll send you the recording too, so you can also listen. Just a short summary of what we had today. Suggestions for improvement? Iris is still with us, just silent. Why can’t we hear you? You probably had to deal with your computer microphone.

[Speaker C] Oh, here, chat, wait—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, she left a chat.

[Speaker C] Is she writing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah yes, okay. Okay. So try, Iris, try to solve that problem in the meantime, at least so we can hear you; if not see you, then at least you’ll be able to participate more actively. This way I have to juggle here between the chat and the talking. I’m also not exactly a great star in these things. Other than that, is there anyone else? Suggestions for streamlining or initial conclusions?

[Speaker D] If possible, send a link to the place where you can get the university Zoom.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll try to check with Hagit what to do with this thing, okay.

[Speaker D] In any case, you should also try to check—really, Zoom is more convenient than Skype.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now regarding study pairs, I’m reminding you of what we discussed at the beginning regarding study pairs. Maybe it’s worth, at least for part of the time, doing it in pairs over the phone, or maybe even on independent Zoom meetings like that. You can open Zoom sessions for 40 minutes for free, for anyone who doesn’t know, or through WhatsApp. In short, it’s important that you maintain study contact in pairs, because it’s very hard to learn these things alone, mainly because they are complex and require joint clarification. So let’s go back to what we discussed in the previous class on the topic in Bava Kamma. We are dealing with the rule that a person is always forewarned, right? We saw the Mishnah on page 26a: “A person is always forewarned, whether unwitting or intentional, whether awake or asleep.” We saw that the Talmudic text brings a source for this from the verse, “an injury for an injury,” to obligate him for the unwitting as for the intentional, and for compulsion as for willing action. Now the question arises: is the liability absolute? Are there no cases of complete compulsion in which the person is exempt? Tosafot there discusses this at length. They bring the case of a person who was sleeping, and then his fellow came and slept beside him. In such a case, if the first sleeper injured the second, he is exempt. Why? Because this is considered complete compulsion. So we see that there is a distinction between different levels of compulsion. Nachmanides in Milhamot Hashem also addresses this and distinguishes between common compulsion and uncommon compulsion. This is a very important foundation for understanding the parameters of liability in damages.