Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 26
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- “From their mouths and not from their writing” and the intermediate case in testimony
- The long Tosafot on page 20a and the distinction between a legal document and a memorandum
- One witness in a document, combinations, and the limits of the law of documents
- The validity of a document: with the consent of the obligated party and the proper form of documents
- The Mishnah on page 20b and validation of documents
- An interested party, conspiring witnesses, and the definition of vested interest in validation testimony
- The Talmud: are they testifying about their signatures or about the debt in the document?
- If one of the witnesses died, and the law of “three-quarters of the money emerging on the word of one witness”
- Abaye’s solution: signing on pottery and the danger of using a scroll
- A homily for Parashat Vayishlach: small jars, the holiness of matter, and the struggle with Esau’s angel
- Ten things that undermine trust, and their interpretation
- Embedded advertisements and radio broadcasts
Summary
General overview
The text presents a lecture on the disqualification of “from their mouths and not from their writing,” and the connection between written testimony and oral testimony that relies on writing, through the dispute between Rav Huna and Rabbi Yohanan and the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages regarding validation of documents. It analyzes the long Tosafot on page 20a, explains when writing merely triggers memory and when it is invalid testimony, and distinguishes between a legally valid “document” and a mere “memorandum” or writing made without the consent of the obligated party. It then moves to the Mishnah on page 20b and to the Talmud’s analysis of the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages as hinging on whether the witnesses testify about their signatures or about the debt written in the document, and develops the implications for a case in which one witness died and for the law of “three-quarters of the money emerging on the word of one witness,” including Abaye’s solution of signing on pottery and the ruling in accordance with the Sages. Later, a homily is added for Parashat Vayishlach about the small jars and the struggle with Esau’s angel as a struggle over revealing holiness within material details; after that comes a conceptual passage listing “ten things that undermine trust” and explaining that knowledge of God and individual providence strengthen trust, whereas attributing power to causes and chance weakens it. At the end there are inserted advertisements and radio broadcasts about products, banks, real estate, and sports surrounding the suspension of the NBA because of coronavirus.
“From their mouths and not from their writing” and the intermediate case in testimony
The text states that there are two laws: actual written testimony, and oral testimony assisted by something written that helps memory. It places the dispute between Rav Huna and Rabbi Yohanan about a witness testifying from writing he wrote for himself in an intermediate case where the witness remembers part of it without the writing and the writing completes the memory, because if he remembers everything or remembers nothing there would be no room for dispute. It formulates the point that if he does not remember even after seeing the writing, that is testimony “from their writing,” invalid according to all opinions; but if he is reminded and then testifies orally, one must consider whether the writing counts as a disqualifying factor.
The long Tosafot on page 20a and the distinction between a document and a memorandum
The text brings Tosafot, who explains Rabbi Yohanan as permitting testimony when one remembers by means of the document, and forbidding it when one does not remember at all because of “from their mouths and not from their writing.” It explains that Tosafot cites specifically Yevamot because there the issue is writing that reminds the witness of oral testimony. It presents Tosafot’s question: why do we not decree here as well, lest he forget completely and come to testify from the writing? And it gives the answer that the concern in Yevamot arises from a document handed over by a court, whereas here the witness writes for himself. It brings proofs from tractate Bava Batra’s chapter on simple and folded documents, and from Bava Kamma, about creating a new document when the original was erased or burned, and explains in the name of Tosafot that the problem is when they testify about the event on the basis of what is written rather than about the document itself; testimony about a document is considered like testimony already examined in court, because “witnesses who sign a document are regarded as though their testimony had been examined in court.”
One witness in a document, combinations, and the limits of the law of documents
The text raises Tosafot’s suggestion that if one could bring the writing itself to court, the disqualification of “from their writing” would be solved, and rejects it because “one witness in a document is not considered a document” unless there are two witnesses. It brings the passage that “one witness in writing and one witness orally do not combine,” and presents Tosafot’s explanation of the passage either through witnesses to delivery or through the Jerusalem Talmud’s interpretation of a document signed by two witnesses but with only one signature validated. It concludes that when the witness remembers the testimony, he may send his handwriting to the court without the disqualification of “from their writing,” but one witness outside the framework of a full document does not receive the status of a document.
The validity of a document: with the consent of the obligated party and the proper form of documents
The text presents in Tosafot two approaches explaining why the writing in the witness’s possession cannot be considered a document and thereby escape the disqualification of “from their writing”: either because a document “is only considered a document when made with the consent of both parties,” especially the debtor who undertakes the obligation, or because it is not written “in the proper legal form of documents” but is merely “a memorandum.” It emphasizes that a document is an evidentiary instrument used against the person who wrote it, and therefore its validity stems from the consent of the obligated party, whereas a note a witness writes for himself is just a scrap of paper and not a document even if witnesses signed it. It connects this to the question that arises later regarding the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages when dealing with a valid document that requires validation.
The Mishnah on page 20b and validation of documents
The text explains that in the Mishnah, when each witness says, “This is my signature, and this is my colleague’s signature,” the document is validated because there are two validators for each signature, and that is agreed upon by everyone. It presents the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages in the second clause, where the witnesses say only, “This is my signature.” According to Rabbi, another person must be joined, because each signature requires two witnesses; according to the Sages, “a person is believed to say, ‘This is my signature,’” and no joining is needed. It argues that the leniency introduced by the Sages is not a general leniency allowing validation of documents by one witness, and cites Maimonides, who requires two witnesses for each signature unless the signer himself testifies about his own signature in accordance with the law of the Mishnah.
An interested party, conspiring witnesses, and the definition of vested interest in validation testimony
The text explains that a signer who testifies about his own signature is not disqualified as an interested party, because the outcome of the case does not affect him personally but concerns the debt or act recorded in the document. It gives an example from the laws of conspiring witnesses and explains that the difference is that in such a case the witnesses themselves become the subject of the legal judgment because of “as he intended to do,” and therefore their testimony about themselves is invalid; whereas in ordinary testimony, details about their own presence at a place do not make them interested parties. It cites Maimonides on a son testifying about his father’s handwriting and emphasizes that this is testimony about the writing as evidence and not about the person himself, and therefore there is no disqualification of relatives here in the sense of testimony about the act itself.
The Talmud: are they testifying about their signatures or about the debt in the document?
The text quotes the Talmud as stating that “according to Rabbi, they testify about their signatures; according to the Sages, they testify about the debt in the document,” and explains that this is the key to understanding how the Sages permit it without requiring another witness, even though validation generally requires two witnesses for each signature. It interprets the Talmud’s question “Isn’t that obvious?” as referring to the phrasing “once you say that,” rather than to the explanation of the dispute itself, and explains that the Talmud’s novelty is that one might have thought Rabbi was uncertain whether they testify about their signatures or about the debt in the document, and therefore ruled stringently out of doubt.
If one of the witnesses died, and the law of “three-quarters of the money emerging on the word of one witness”
The text presents the practical difference noted by the Talmud in the case where one witness died, and explains that Rabbi certainly holds that they testify about their signatures, so one witness from the marketplace can join the surviving witness regarding the two signatures; but according to the Sages, that creates a situation in which “three-quarters of the money emerges on the word of one witness,” and therefore two outsiders are needed to testify about the deceased witness’s signature. It brings Rashi, who defines the problem as the need for “half of the matter to come on the word of this one and half on the word of that one,” rather than a situation where most of the extracting power rests on one witness. It notes that the Talmud concludes, “The law follows the Sages,” and explains that this had to be stated because there was a reason to think otherwise, based on the presumption that the law follows Rabbi against a colleague, and even against colleagues.
Abaye’s solution: signing on pottery and the danger of using a scroll
The text brings Abaye, who advises the surviving witness to write his signature “on a shard” and deposit it in court, so that the court can keep it and recognize his signature. In that way the witness will not need to testify about his own handwriting and can join with an outside witness to validate the deceased witness’s signature. It explains that specifically a shard is used and not a scroll, because of the concern that someone might find it, write an obligation above it, and exploit a signature that has already been recognized. It links this to the Mishnah, “If one produces the debtor’s handwriting stating that he owes him, he may collect from unencumbered property,” as the background to the concern about the legal force of handwriting.
A homily for Parashat Vayishlach: small jars, the holiness of matter, and the struggle with Esau’s angel
The passage expounds the verse “ויותר יעקב לבדו ויאבק איש עמו עד עלות השחר” (“Jacob was left alone, and a man wrestled with him until dawn”), and cites Hullin 91 that Jacob returned for small jars. It quotes Rabbi Elazar: “מכאן לצדיקים שחביב עליהם ממונם יותר מגופם” (“From here we learn that the righteous value their property more than their bodies”), and explains the reason: “לפי שאין פושטים ידיהם בגזל” (“because they do not stretch out their hands to steal”), and that everything comes through individual providence for the service of God. It argues that in every object there is a “holy spark” that a person must redeem and elevate, and brings an example from Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai and his son Rabbi Elazar in the cave, who preserved their clothes so they would not wear out, because they were garments for standing before the King of kings. It concludes that the struggle with Esau’s angel was over the point of contact between holiness and the mundane: the angel wanted to separate them, and Jacob struggled until dawn so that it would be revealed that even in the small jars the Holy One, blessed be He, is present.
Ten things that undermine trust, and their interpretation
The text lists: “ignorance of God, exalted be He,” “ignorance of God’s commandments,” the thought that “one’s causes are what help him,” the thought that things happen “by chance,” and the continuation of the list, including the belief that God, exalted be He, does not supervise, cannot save, does not want to save, trust in something other than God such as wealth, wisdom, strategy, strength, might, authority, and helpers, trust in one’s good deeds, and the thought that God, exalted be He, does not have mercy on him. It concludes that “these ten things undermine trust.” It explains that recognizing the Holy One, blessed be He, and individual providence increases trust, and that not knowing God’s will empties the whole idea of trust of its purpose, because trust is meant to free a person for the service of God. It states that a person who forgets that the Holy One, blessed be He, “feeds and sustains all” and attributes benefit to causes loses trust, and that belief in chance prevents reliance, because tomorrow “something else might happen by chance.”
Embedded advertisements and radio broadcasts
The text includes advertisement segments and radio broadcasts about dishwasher capsules, vehicle and real-estate promotions, entry doors, ovens, banking services, the Sapir Prize ceremony, and also a sports report on the suspension of the NBA following a player’s infection and concern about spread to additional teams. It describes the American response as a sharp shift from complacency to “all in,” and the shutdown of the league for at least two weeks, likely more.
Full Transcript
[Speaker A] What got me excited was that this is about written testimony that is submitted to the court as written testimony.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. What Tosafot is talking about is the passage on page 20a. Rabbi Yohanan says: even though he does not remember it on his own. Meaning: but he remembers it by means of the document. But if he does not remember it at all, then no, because “from their mouths and not from their writing,” as we say in the fourth chapter of Yevamot, in connection with the question: why didn’t they institute a date in betrothal? He brings the passage in Yevamot. Why specifically the passage in Yevamot? Because in the end, over there it really is the law of writing that reminds me of the testimony and I testify to it orally. The passage in Gittin talks about actual written testimony—that’s not relevant here. That’s why he specifically brings the passage in Yevamot. And if you say—the second paragraph—then here too, why don’t we also forbid writing testimony on a document, lest he completely forget and then come to testify from the writing, just as we are concerned there? You remember that in the passage in Yevamot it says that we do not write the date, lest they think they are allowed to testify from the writing. So true, in principle this is fine; it is not “from their writing.” But there is still a rabbinic concern that nevertheless they may come to testify, and therefore testify even though they don’t remember, and so they disqualified it rabbinically. Tosafot’s question is: then why don’t we generally disqualify such testimony rabbinically even if I am reminded through the writing? Lest he forget completely and then come to testify from the writing. In other words, it may be that I won’t remember even with the help of the writing, but since it is written there, I trust the writing and will come testify based on the writing. So let the Sages disqualify it rabbinically. Tosafot says: one may answer that there the Sages were indeed concerned, because the court hands him the document and he may think that that is why they handed it to him—so that he should testify even if he does not remember. But here, where he writes his testimony on the document on his own initiative, the Sages were not concerned about that. That is a local answer; it is not important for our purposes. The idea is that there the court gives you the document, so you think maybe that is authorization to testify. Here you yourself are writing written testimony for yourself, and you are supposed to know that testimony is not given out of writing. And that is not important for our purposes. And if you say: why can’t they look at the writing and testify? Why really can’t witnesses look at the writing and testify from the writing? When is that? When even the writing does not remind them of the situation, right? That’s what he said at the beginning of Tosafot, that then it is called “from their writing.” So he says: what’s the problem with that? Why not? Didn’t we learn in the chapter on folded documents: if someone’s promissory note was erased, he brings witnesses regarding it, and comes to court, and they prepare its validation for him. And the Talmud explains there what that validation is. In other words, the Talmud says: if his document was erased, take those witnesses and let them write a new document, okay? Then we can use that as though there were a document. What’s the problem? So the document was erased—let’s produce a new document for him. So we see that witnesses validate that earlier document, and now that earlier document is gone—it was erased. We write a new document based on these witnesses. So you see that witnesses—the validating witnesses don’t know the testimony itself, right? They are not the witnesses who signed the document. They validated the witnesses; they remember that there were witnesses on that document. So we see that it is possible to make a document based on those witnesses. So what’s the problem? This is testimony by witnesses about something that was in a document. That is the first proof. And another proof from Bava Kamma 98, where it says that one who burns his fellow’s documents is exempt under human law. And then the Talmud asks: why should that matter if you burned the documents? Let’s bring the witnesses and produce a new document. Then he hasn’t really lost anything. Again, we see that one can produce a document on the basis of testimony that a document already existed. The details don’t matter for us now. And one may answer that in general we do not regard them as “from their mouths and not from their writing.” And one may answer that in the fourth chapter of Yevamot we are concerned lest they come and testify in a vague way, as though they remember the testimony. But certainly if they were to testify that this is what they saw in their signatures, that is not considered “from their mouths and not from their writing,” because witnesses who sign a document are regarded as though their testimony had already been examined in court. And it is as if they are testifying: we saw testimony that had been examined in court. What does that mean? The concern with “from their writing”—the problem is
[Speaker A] that they
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] will come and testify about the event.
[Speaker A] Meaning,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] they remember on the basis of the document,
[Speaker A] but they
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] won’t say: we saw a signature on the document. Rather, they will testify about the event, because they will rely on the fact that it is written in the document.
[Speaker D] That’s not okay. You can’t testify about the event; you can testify about the document. But if you come to court and testify about the document itself, there’s no problem, because the document itself is testimony that has already been examined in court. Now there is still, apparently, a problem of hearsay testimony, right? Why? Why is it hearsay? They come, and the document is not before us. They come and testify before the court that they saw a document, and now we will write a new document based on what they say. But their testimony is secondhand. It is testimony derived from earlier testimony. But the testimony is about the document; it is not about the event. You are writing—I testify that there was a document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what if there was a document? The document testifies about the event. Fine, but I too can testify that I heard witnesses who saw the event. Why is that hearsay? What’s the difference? Same thing. I’m not testifying about the event. I’m testifying that I heard witnesses testify about the event.
[Speaker A] And that doesn’t work?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course that is hearsay.
[Speaker A] Why can’t they speak about the event or about the document?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because they do not know the event.
[Speaker A] They weren’t there.
[Speaker E] Okay, they don’t know the event. Wait—they don’t know the event because they weren’t there, but they read what was written in the document? They did read the contents of the document? And the contents are known. Yes, they testify about what was in the document, and that there were witnesses signed there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everything is fine. But at first glance that is hearsay. And Tosafot says no. It is not hearsay. Why? If witnesses come and testify in court about a certain event, whatever event, and now two other witnesses come and testify that the first witnesses testified in court—not that they heard from those witnesses about the act, that we once spoke to them and they told us about the act; that would be hearsay—but if they testify about an act of testimony in court, then the first testimony has already been examined in court, and that is not hearsay. Here they are testifying that there was a court that accepted that testimony. Such a thing is not hearsay. Tosafot says: testimony signed on a document—and we have seen this several times—is not just ordinary witnesses. It is like testimony that has already been examined in court; it is not merely like valid witnesses in general. More than that: ah, if it is like testimony that has already been examined in court, and now witnesses come and testify about that, it is like witnesses testifying about testimony already given in court. That is not hearsay. Okay? But all this is, of course, only when they testify that this is in fact what happened, that there really was a document there. But if they come vaguely and testify about the event because they rely on the fact that the document is valid and we rely on it, that is problematic. That’s what Tosafot says. And if you say: here too, even if he does not remember it at all, so what? Even if he does not remember the testimony, why does that bother you? Let him bring his document to court. Let him bring the document itself to court; he wrote it on a document. Let him bring the document itself to court, and let the document speak for itself. You should not be the one telling the court based on the document. In other words, move us from the passage in Yevamot to the passage in Gittin. Bring the document itself. It’s only when I am here that this apparently is not called testimony “from their writing.” That is a certain assumption of Tosafot, right? Tosafot says: bring the document itself to the court. So what? Written testimony is forbidden. Okay. So maybe if I am present together with the written thing, then it is not called “from their writing.” Another possibility is that a document that I bring to court does not have the disqualification of “from their writing.” When a document comes to court, the court accepts the testimony of the witnesses signed on it. There is no disqualification of “from their writing.” That is the whole law of a document. Of course, this depends on the question: when the Talmud says there that a person writes his testimony on a document, does it mean a document in the full legal sense, or does it just mean he wrote it on a note or parchment—back then it was parchment, not notes. But the intention may be not a document in the full legal sense. So it depends on that question; we’ll see in a moment. And one may answer, says Tosafot, that one witness in a document is not considered a document, only one that has two witnesses, analogous to a deed of acquisition. That is exactly what Tosafot says. If it were a real document, then indeed it could be brought to court and everything would be fine. But if someone writes a little note with one witness—only I write my testimony on the document, okay? And I say yes, I recognize this testimony, of course, because I wrote it—then there is here one witness, as it were, coming through writing. That is not a document. A document needs to have two witnesses. There are rules for how a document is written. So for that, the institution of legal documents was not enacted—according to Maimonides it is an enactment; according to the other early authorities it is a Torah law—and here there is a problem of “from their writing.” You cannot bring such a document to court, this little note. Therefore Tosafot says this is not a solution. And that which is said in the chapter on folded documents, that one witness in writing and one witness orally do not combine, which implies that two in writing, even in two separate letters, do combine. Yes—if one witness testifies orally about the loan and the second witness brings a document about the loan, one witness only—a document with one witness—then they do not combine. That implies that if two people each brought a document with one witness, then that would combine. The whole problem is that one is in writing and one is oral. Because why does it say one in writing and one orally? Let it say two in writing. Two orally—obviously that won’t work. No: one in writing and one orally do not combine; that is what the Talmud says. Tosafot asks: why didn’t they speak about two in writing, each in a separate document?
[Speaker D] If one doesn’t combine, then obviously two written ones—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. Why? If there is a law of documents, then you can say: that one is a document, but it only has one witness, so it doesn’t combine.
[Speaker D] That’s what he said before, that this is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the beginning
[Speaker D] of the paragraph—that a document with one witness is invalid; it doesn’t have the legal status of a document. Okay, so? Then if each one brings his own document, obviously it still won’t work. That’s what he’s saying. No, but why is that—this is the opposite of an a fortiori argument. It’s easier, lighter.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? It says one witness in writing and one orally do not combine. That implies that two in writing, even in two separate letters, do combine.
[Speaker D] Fine. So what—what is obvious is that two do not combine in two letters?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Why should that be obvious? A document is regarded as though the testimony had been examined in court. What do you mean?
[Speaker D] A document is not a document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what he says. That’s the claim. The claim is that it is not a document. But on the other hand, at first glance, you can’t just assume the conclusion and say, of course, they didn’t need to exclude it because I already inferred it earlier. But that very conclusion is itself a novelty. Who says it is correct? The Talmud itself should have pointed it out. If it didn’t, apparently two in two separate documents do not combine—sorry, do combine. There, it is dealing with a case where one is in writing and one is oral, and the oral witness is not saying he saw the loan itself, but that he saw the delivery of the document from lender to borrower—or borrower to lender—so it is like two who are signed on a document according to Rabbi Eliezer, who says that the witnesses of delivery create the effect. Never mind, that already gets us into the discussions of delivery witnesses and signature witnesses. And furthermore, the Jerusalem Talmud explains that “one witness in a document” means two who signed a document, and they validated the handwriting of one of them but were unable to validate the handwriting of the second. In any case, even though one witness is not considered a document in the sense that if witnesses come and say, “This is what we saw in the document,” we would treat them as hearsay witnesses, it is nevertheless still testimony, and he can send his handwriting to the court. It is not considered “from their mouths and not from their writing,” since he remembers the testimony. Okay? He says that if two are signed on a document and the handwriting of one of them has been validated but the handwriting of the other has not, then it is not considered a full document, because a document needs two witnesses. But that is not called “from their writing.” Meaning, if this document reaches the court, it counts as one witness. That one validated witness is not disqualified by “from their writing,” and therefore he can combine with the second document, even though it is not considered a full legal document in the full sense of the term, because there is no validation for both signatures. Fine—that is all less important for our purposes. And Rashi, in his commentary on the Torah, explained “from their mouths and not from their writing” to mean that one should not send his testimony in writing to court. That is really the passage in Gittin. I don’t know why he cites only Rashi in his commentary on the Torah. Because he treats it as a novelty that you are not allowed at all to send written testimony to court. He understands the basic case of “from their writing,” the basic disqualification of “from their writing,” as being the case where you make use of writing. Sending testimony in writing is an added novelty—that this too is invalid. He understands the basic disqualification of “from their writing” as analogous to hearsay testimony, which is what we saw in Maimonides’ formulation. Yes? That is evidence for one of the two possibilities I spoke about in the previous lecture. Last time I discussed the question of which is the basic law: is the law in Gittin the basic one and the law in Yevamot branches out from it, or is the law in Yevamot the basic one? From Tosafot it seems that the law in Yevamot is the basic one. You need a further novelty to establish the law of Gittin—that if you send testimony in writing, that too is disqualified. Even though I still don’t understand why he cites Rashi on the Torah and not the Talmudic passage in Gittin.
[Speaker C] That
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] reminds me—there is in Yoreh De’ah, in the laws of honoring one’s father and mother, I don’t remember exactly, but I think the Taz writes there—how does it go there? They discuss whether a person is obligated to honor his grandfather
[Speaker C] or not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is a dispute.
[Speaker C] So
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think it is the Shakh, or Nekudot HaKesef—which is also a work of the Shakh—who writes there, he brings a midrash quoted by Rashi on Parashat Vayigash about Joseph: “And he offered sacrifices to the God of his father Isaac.” From here we learn that a person is obligated to honor his father more than his grandfather. But he is also obligated to honor his grandfather, just less than his father. That’s what you see there. So that is his proof that there is an obligation to honor one’s grandfather. So the Taz comments there—I no longer remember the exact names, but I think this is a comment of the Taz on Nekudot HaKesef, the Shakh’s Nekudot HaKesef—the Taz remarks: why are you citing Rashi? This is a midrash of the Sages. It is a midrash of the Sages—why are you citing Rashi? So somebody there answers—I already don’t remember who—that fine, but people know Rashi better. True, a midrash of the Sages is of course more significant in terms of authority, but people know Rashi; who knows the midrashim? People know Rashi, so he cites Rashi. So here too, by the way, he cites Rashi on the Torah even though this is a Talmudic passage. About the Talmud it is of course a little harder to say that, but anyway, it just reminded me. Fine. Alternatively, says Rabbi Isaac, one witness is effective in a document if there are two documents, each one signed by one witness—then that counts like a complete document. Rabbi Isaac argues that a document signed by one witness has the legal status of a document. Again: it has the status of a document in the sense that we have here one witness, and in that sense there is no disqualification of “from their mouths and not from their writing.” But that still does not mean that we now extract money on that basis. The one witness written in the document is a valid witness; he is not disqualified because of “from their mouths and not from their writing.” In that sense, it is a document. It is not a document in the sense that it now has the force of two witnesses; there are not two witnesses here, only one. Exactly—if another witness comes with another one-witness document, that’s what he says here, if there is another document with one witness in it, then that is perfectly fine. In that sense it has the status of a document: the status of a document in the sense that it is not disqualified by “from their mouths and not from their writing.” But of course that does not turn one witness into two. And in monetary law even disjoint testimony is valid.
[Speaker E] And if you say—I don’t understand the situation—what does the testimony on the second document say? There is one document with one valid witness,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and the second document has one valid witness.
[Speaker E] About what is the document?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The same thing, the same loan. Two documents, each with one witness. Let’s say the two witnesses could not get together, so I had to bring one document to one and a second document to the other. Never mind—it’s a conceptual discussion even if such a case never actually happened.
[Speaker E] Suppose we bought something now and signed in front of the husband while he was in isolation and the wife wasn’t, so we signed before lawyers with the wife and she took one witness.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but in the end that is signed on the same document.
[Speaker E] Yes, but it’s not so far-fetched.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but even if so, we are talking about a conceptual question; it doesn’t matter exactly how it happened in practice. And if you say—I continue in Tosafot—if so, then in our passage, “our passage” meaning our sugya, let him bring his writing to court even if he does not remember at all. So he goes back to challenge Rav Huna and Rabbi Yohanan. After all, what did we see in the passage on page 20a? That if they don’t remember anything at all—even with the help of the document they do not remember the event—then this is certainly disqualified as “from their writing.” Why? Let him bring his writing to court. If even one witness in writing counts as a document and this is not considered testimony “from their writing,” then what is the problem? So Tosafot says: one may answer that it is considered a document only when it is made with the consent of both parties, with the consent of the debtor who is obligated; then it counts as a document. But here, where he writes his testimony without the consent of the debtor, it is not considered a document. We already talked about this—that a document has to be written and signed with the consent of the obligated party. In other words, the witnesses actually do not see the loan at all in the ordinary way. I go to witnesses and say: sign me a document stating that I owe so-and-so money, and I haven’t even yet taken the loan. What are they testifying to? They are not testifying to the loan; they are testifying that I intended to obligate myself. They testify to the intent of the obligated party. The whole idea that a document has legal standing so that one can proceed on the basis of it is only if it was written with the consent of the obligated party. Then the obligated party himself said: I agree that this document serve as evidence against me. Because a document is always evidence against the person who wrote it. I hand the document to someone else so that he can use it against me, and then he will sell me land or give me a loan or whatever it may be—I am giving him a tool to use against me. Okay? Therefore a document receives its validity only if it is made with the consent of the obligated party. Now here we are talking about a person—there is no obligated party here and nothing of the sort. There is a borrower and a lender but that is irrelevant. I am a witness; I write to myself off to the side: I saw Reuven lend money to Shimon. Nobody is undertaking an obligation or anything. I just wrote it for myself. That is not considered a document. It is not called a document; it is called a little note. Now, the one-witness document that Rabbi Isaac says is valid—that is where everything was done with the consent of the obligated party; it just happens that only one witness signed there. But the obligated party came to that witness and said: sign. So that has the standing of a document. But if it is just a random note I wrote for myself, then that is precisely the whole idea of “from their mouths and not from their writing”—if I write it down, that is not testimony.
[Speaker A] What? But even two witnesses—if there are
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] two witnesses, it still will not be a document if there is no consent of the obligated party. The consent of the obligated party is an indispensable condition for a document.
[Speaker E] Right.
[Speaker A] To testify to a loan? But that isn’t—it isn’t a document. It’s just a note I wrote for myself. Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore, according to this Tosafot, it seems that it also would not help if two witnesses who do not remember the event brought one note that both of them wrote for themselves at the time of the loan and both signed at the bottom. That would not help. If they bring it to court, that also would not help. Because such a thing does not have the legal status of a document. But from Tosafot it comes out that if there really were a proper document and two witnesses came, then what would happen?
[Speaker A] Then it would indeed be accepted in court.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—a document of the two of them, with both of them signed on it.
[Speaker A] Of course. What’s the problem? It’s a document. Why? That’s the question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it is not with the consent of the obligated party, that won’t help and it is not a document. But if it is with the consent of the obligated party, then it does help.
[Speaker A] Yes, it’s a document, of course. It’s a document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How does this connect to the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages? That’s where we get to the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages, right?
[Speaker D] That if it is not with the consent of the obligated party, why isn’t it? Because it’s not a document. It’s “from their writing.” Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They do not remember the event. Even with the help of the document they do not remember the event. We are talking about a case where even with the help of the document they do not remember the event. Okay? So this already starts bringing us into Rabbi and the Sages. Okay? We’ll see in a moment. And Rabbi Shmuel of Bourges raised an objection from the chapter “Presumption of Ownership”—fine, leave that, it is not important for us. That is only a question about protest, where they were lenient. And Rabbi Isaac further says that we do not need the consent of both parties; and here he could have brought his document if it had been written in the proper legal form of documents, but here we are dealing with a case where it was not written in the regular form of a document, but merely as a memorandum. Okay, that means he apparently argues that even without the consent of the obligated party—what? Even
[Speaker A] without consent,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there still has to be a proper wording and format of a document for it to have the legal status of a document. Otherwise, how is this different from the earlier answer? Okay? For our purposes, what comes out of Tosafot, at least from Tosafot’s conclusion, is that the reason those people in the passage on page 20 cannot bring the writing itself to court is either because it was not written with the consent of the obligated party, or because it was not written in the proper legal format of documents. But if it had been written in the proper format and with the consent of the obligated party, then in such a case of course it could have been brought to court, right? And that of course raises the question: then what happens in our case, in the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages? Because in the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages we are dealing with a document.
[Speaker C] And now
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the two witnesses to the document come and testify from it; they do not remember, they testify from it. Apparently according to Tosafot, what is the problem? After all, it has the legal status of a document: it was written with the consent of the obligated party, and it was written according to the required legal form of documents. It has full legal force. So why should it matter if we do not remember? I would say the opposite—
[Speaker E] Not only that, that is the whole point of a document. The document is there precisely so that maybe even 200 years later the witnesses will not remember what happened. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But now, of course, the question is what exactly are they coming to testify about?
[Speaker A] Now we’re
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] talking about that question, yes. But the document needs validation. True, rabbinically—first of all, by Torah law; rabbinically it needs validation. So by Torah law, in principle, such a thing really ought to work. The whole question is what happens rabbinically, because rabbinically the document requires validation. And now the whole story of Rabbi and the Sages begins. Okay? So let’s—on the face of it, in a moment we’ll see the continuation of Tosafot. I’m stopping now; there is another paragraph in Tosafot that for the moment I’m not going to read, okay? It relies on the Jerusalem Talmud. But I want first to reach our passage on page 20b, and then we’ll return to the Jerusalem Talmud and the last paragraph of Tosafot. Because meanwhile our conclusion is that Tosafot is talking about Torah law without addressing validation. And the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages does not touch that issue at all, because it is talking about how the document gets validated. By Torah law everyone agrees that you can bring the document to court and everything is fine, okay? The whole issue is validation. In the last paragraph, Tosafot ties this to the Jerusalem Talmud and says: no, no, it is nevertheless connected to the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages. There is a connection between the passages. That’s just the outline. Now let’s enter our Mishnah. We finally got to it. The Mishnah says as follows: one says, “This is my signature and this is my colleague’s signature,” and the other says, “This is my signature and this is my colleague’s signature”—they are believed. Two witnesses who are signed on the document come; the document is in court. Now I remind you: this is our conclusion so far. Apparently this ought to be excellent—what is the problem? Everything is fine. Except that it needs validation, right? And this need for validation is only rabbinic. By Torah law, apparently there would be no discussion at all. No discussion would even begin; by Torah law everything is fine. That is the conclusion of the previous passage. But rabbinically it needs validation. Fine. Now let’s see what happens here. So the validators are the very witnesses who signed, and we have already seen all these games. Now each of the two validates both signatures—his own and his colleague’s. Okay, so in effect we have two witnesses validating each signature. Of course, everything is fine. There is no problem with that, and nobody disagrees.
[Speaker A] Why does he need to validate his colleague’s signature?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because you need two validating witnesses for every signature.
[Speaker A] That’s fixed in stone.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There have to be two witnesses for every signature. Every signature needs two witnesses to validate it. Otherwise one witness isn’t enough, right? So the two of them validate each of the two signatures. The document has been validated; we’ve returned to the Torah-level plane, where a document—as we saw in the previous Tosafot and the previous passage—when a document comes to court there’s no problem of “from their written statement,” the document itself speaks. Provided that rabbinically it underwent validation. So it was validated, everything is fine. On that there’s no dispute. The problem is in the latter clause. One says, “This is my handwriting,” and the other says, “This is my handwriting,” meaning each one speaks only about his own handwriting. “They must join with them another witness,” these are Rabbi’s words. That too seems simple enough, right? Yes—that neither one recognizes the other’s signature; each one recognizes only his own signature. Fine. So we have only the testimony of one witness for each signature. Please bring one more witness for each signature. Fine. And the Sages say: “They do not need to join with them another witness; rather, a person is believed to say: ‘This is my handwriting.’” So the Sages say: if I, the witness who signed, testify about my own handwriting, that this is—
[Speaker E] one plus one, so—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t need to add anyone else with me. My testimony as one witness is enough to validate my signature.
[Speaker E] Which honestly is what I would have thought from the start, like way before the last two passages.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why we first did the last two passages.
[Speaker E] Why is that obvious? Because I know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what if you know? You’re one witness.
[Speaker E] I testify about my signature, and she’ll testify about hers.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How many testimonies do we have on your signature? One. That’s no good; you need two witnesses, because “by the testimony of two witnesses a matter shall stand.”
[Speaker A] “By the testimony of two witnesses a matter shall stand.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, that brings us back to the question whether they remember the testimony itself, remember it with the help of the document, or don’t remember it at all. Okay, that’s why the passages are connected to each other. But on the basic level, it would seem that we’re not talking about a case where they remember it without the signature, right? Rather what? They remember the… they’re talking about the signature; they’re coming to validate the signature. Maybe even because of the signature they don’t remember anything. That’s not the discussion. They’re coming to validate the signatures, that’s all. Therefore the discussion isn’t relevant at all to the question whether they remember the testimony or don’t remember the testimony, because all I need from them right now—I have a document in court—all I need from them right now is only to validate the document. They don’t need to remember the testimony, they don’t need anything except recognizing the signatures. Please give me validation for the signatures, and now I have a document in court. The document does the work of two witnesses, right? Seemingly there’s no need here at all even to raise the question whether they remember the event. It doesn’t matter; they’re not testifying about the event at all. They’re coming to validate the signatures. But if they’re coming to validate the signatures, then you need two witnesses on each signature. I don’t care if it’s both of them together on both signatures, but on each signature there must be two witnesses who recognize it. “By the testimony of two witnesses a matter shall stand,” right? So according to Rabbi this really is simple.
[Speaker A] Rabbi claims you have to bring two witnesses—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One more witness for each signature. Two witnesses for what?
[Speaker A] That to validate this signature, this is Reuven’s signature? About the signature, about this signature, that it is Reuven’s signature. But then how? No, I’m saying, let’s say at the time of the loan, okay, there was a borrower, there was a lender, and there were witnesses, fine? So now, in order to validate the signature, who is supposed to know or who is supposed to testify?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? It says Reuven son of Shimon, that’s the first witness. There are two people who know Reuven son of Shimon and his signature; they say yes, yes, that’s the signature of Reuven son of Shimon, we know it.
[Speaker A] Not about the event. No, no, about the signature, yes. Okay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or we said that validation can also be done by comparison to another document that is itself already validated. That’s also a possibility for validation. Okay.
[Speaker A] So apparently this isn’t connected at all to what we saw in Tosafot.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, we’ll discuss it more, but apparently not. Because the whole discussion is only about validation; it’s not relevant. After all, assuming the document is validated, there’s no question what they remember about the event and what they don’t; the document does the work. There’s a document here that was written with the consent of the obligated party, and it was written in the normal form of legal documents, the way legal documents are written, so according to all the views in Tosafot there should have been no problem here. If the document, these are passages from the Talmud, right? If a validated document comes to court, it does the work of two witnesses. More than two witnesses—two witnesses whose testimony has been examined. Only rabbinically is validation required, that’s all, and that is what creates the problem. Now the witnesses who signed the document come and want to carry out the validation. Rabbi’s view would seem to be the obvious one, right? Very simple: you need two witnesses to validate each signature and everything is fine. If by chance they also remember the act itself, that’s a different issue; that’s the subject of the previous passage, we’re not talking about that here. Here, simply speaking, it seems they don’t remember the act; they’re talking about the signatures. In a moment we’ll see that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) do bring in the question whether they remember or don’t remember the act, but for now I’m reading it straightforwardly.
[Speaker D] Okay? Like we talked about earlier regarding Tosafot, who came to explain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe in one case, yes. So that’s Rabbi. And the Sages say: “They do not need to join with them another witness; rather, a person is believed to say: ‘This is my handwriting.’” That’s a major novelty. So the Sages are basically saying—and let me remind you, we’re talking about a situation where they do not remember the testimony itself, they are not coming to testify about the testimony itself, they’re coming to validate the document. Okay? So if they are coming to validate the document, the Sages come and say: yes, but if the signing witness himself is the one validating his own signature, then he alone is sufficient. There’s no need to add another one with him. That’s a major novelty. Okay? They are innovating against the view… So Rabbi is the straightforward one. The Sages are the ones introducing the novelty, and you know, in the conclusion of the passage, Jewish law follows the Sages. Meaning, practically speaking we rule like the Sages. Now, there are two leniencies that we find in this Mishnah. The first leniency is that a witness can testify about his own signature. Seemingly he is an interested party.
[Speaker E] So—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] so how is he believed at all as a witness? Never mind one witness or two—how is his testimony accepted at all? He’s an interested party. Is that not difficult? An interested party? Yes, he is testifying about himself.
[Speaker E] Yes, but that’s also true if there’s an additional witness testifying about his signature.
[Speaker A] So what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so he himself is disqualified, but the other one—accept the other one. Or would he disqualify the other one under the rule that one of the witnesses was found to be a relative or otherwise invalid?
[Speaker E] But if there are two witnesses, and one of the witnesses is the owner of the signature—
[Speaker A] But that doesn’t exist anywhere else, that we would accept two witnesses when one of them is an interested party. In oral testimony you couldn’t accept that. Isn’t an interested party also the oath of the one who is obligated?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. So, that’s why I said: this actually isn’t difficult at all. Why isn’t it difficult at all? I’ll remind you of something that I think we once talked about in one of the previous years—I don’t remember who was there anymore. A timeout in order to explain why this isn’t difficult. Do you know the law of refutation of witnesses? Right—if two witnesses come and testify that Reuven borrowed money from Shimon, and then two other witnesses come and say, “On that very day, on that very date, you were with us in Australia—you couldn’t possibly have seen it,” then the second pair of witnesses is believed and the first pair is disqualified. But if two witnesses come and say, “Not true, he didn’t borrow; we were also there, he didn’t borrow,” that is contradiction. There is a difference between contradiction and refutation. In contradiction it’s two against two; there’s no way to prefer one pair over the other. In refutation we prefer the refuting pair over the refuted pair. Okay? Why do we prefer the refuting pair over the refuted pair? Seemingly it’s two against two. So there is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). According to the Tur and other medieval authorities (Rishonim), we prefer them because the first pair is testifying about itself. It is testifying about itself that it was at the place of the loan, while the second pair is not testifying about itself; it is testifying about them. Now, witnesses cannot testify about themselves, and therefore they are inferior relative to the second pair, and the second pair is accepted. What happens in contradiction? There either both sides testify about themselves, or both sides—
[Speaker A] do not testify about themselves.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] However you define it, their status is equal.
[Speaker E] But that way of looking at it basically invalidates all testimony, because what we said is that those who are refuted—if they had not been refuted, we would have accepted their testimony. Exactly. The very same status, that they are testifying about themselves, exists in any testimony.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I completely agree. The question that arises here is indeed: what happens in ordinary testimony—leave contradictions and refutations aside. Two ordinary witnesses simply come and testify: Reuven borrowed from Shimon. They are in effect testifying about themselves, that they were in that place, otherwise they couldn’t have seen it. This only comes up later if someone comes to refute them, but it’s obvious that within their testimony itself we even conduct examinations and inquiries. We ask them when it was, from where they saw it, where they were standing. All of that includes details in which they testify about themselves. So how do we accept testimony in such a case at all? The answer is that when a witness testifies about an event, even if embedded in his words he testifies that he himself was there, that is not called testimony about himself. It is testimony about himself, but he is not the interested party, so I don’t care that he is testifying about himself. The identity of the interested party is determined by the practical implication of the legal proceeding. The implication of the proceeding concerns the question whether there was a loan or there was not a loan; it does not concern the witnesses. Therefore the witnesses are not interested parties, so I don’t care that they testify about themselves. That does not disqualify them. Exactly. What happens in refutation? In refutation, once I come and testify, “You were with us,” then not only is their testimony voided and we declare that there was no loan, but now we must do to them “as they conspired to do to their brother.” Meaning, they suddenly become the accused, the subject of the proceeding. The proceeding now has implications for them. Here they are indeed disqualified because it is testimony about themselves. In other words, what matters in determining whether there is a disqualification of interested party is that we have to understand what the definition of an interested party is. The definition of an interested party is someone on whom the result of the judgment will have an effect. That is not the case here, right? Therefore, the fact that we are testifying that this is our signature—even if it weren’t our signature, then someone forged our signature. So what does that have to do with us? Why should we care? What interests the court is whether there was a loan or whether there wasn’t a loan. The witnesses themselves are not what interests the court. The witnesses are only an evidentiary tool for checking whether there was or was not a loan. Therefore it is obvious that the issue of interested party falls away; that isn’t the problem. So the first novelty is not really a novelty. The second novelty is indeed the one disputed between Rabbi and the Sages. The second novelty is really a novelty only according to the Sages: when a witness testifies about himself, then okay, we’ve agreed that he is not an interested party; Rabbi also agrees that he is not an interested party. Rabbi simply claims: fine, he’s not an interested party, but he is one witness. Bring another witness, because on the signature there is only one witness. So Rabbi says, I have no problem with his testifying about his own signature; that’s not being an interested party, I agree. But how did you turn him into two witnesses? That is already an additional novelty, and that novelty exists only according to the Sages and not according to Rabbi. How did you turn this one witness into two? Okay, that is the second novelty, the novelty of the Sages. It might perhaps be possible to say—what, according to the Sages? Yes. But—
[Speaker E] But how is that different from what we said before? If there is one document with one witness signed on it, okay? Then it still isn’t a valid document, but that testimony is valid, and now they bring another document with one witness and that testimony is valid, and then they combine them. Why here isn’t it valid?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand.
[Speaker E] Why isn’t Rabbi’s opinion—no, the opinion of the Sages—like what we said before: there is one document, a document with one witness, which still isn’t called validated because there is only one witness, but we accept—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the testimony as testimony, and there is another document—no, here there isn’t even one witness. On each signature there is validation by only one witness; it’s not that there are two validators on one of the signatures. If there were two validators on one of the signatures, that would be a document with one witness. Tosafot explicitly brings the case; this is a document—
[Speaker A] with two half-witnesses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. So no, it’s two halves; it’s worth nothing. Look at Maimonides on your page in the Laws of Testimony, chapter 7, after Tosafot. Do you see it? “May a relative testify regarding the handwriting of his relative? How so? A document whose witnesses are Reuven and Shimon, and they died or went overseas, and Reuven’s son came and said: ‘This is my father’s handwriting,’ and Shimon’s son came and said: ‘This is my father’s handwriting’—these are like two valid witnesses who are not relatives. And if a third joined them and testified to both of their handwritings, then the document is validated.” Fine. Of course you need one more witness here. Why doesn’t this depend on the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages? You need one more witness here because it isn’t the witness himself who signed, right? It’s another witness, his son. But there is no disqualification of a son testifying about his father here. Why not?
[Speaker A] Relatives. Because it wasn’t about the person, it was—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] only the handwriting. Exactly like I said before. That’s the proof from Maimonides; it is proof that you, the witness, are not considered an interested party in this proceeding. If you were considered an interested party in this proceeding, then your son also could not validate your signature. So it is obvious that even when you yourself validate your own signature, there’s no problem with that. You are not the interested party; it’s just evidence for what I said before. But the second leniency of the Sages, who say that if the validating witness himself testifies, then one validator is enough for us—if the signatory himself, sorry, gives the testimony of validation, then one validator is enough; no additional validator is needed—why is that true? First of all, who says that this is only where there is one validator? Maybe in testimony of validation generally there is some leniency that says one witness is enough to validate a signature. Maybe that is what the Sages mean. Maybe that is what they introduced. According to that, of course, it would follow that even another witness—not only the signatory himself—who comes to validate the signature, if he is one witness, that too would be enough, right? Because they were lenient: the validation of documents is rabbinic; by Torah law, after all, you don’t need it. By Torah law you don’t need document validation. Rabbinically there is a requirement of document validation, so the Sages were lenient and said: fine, even one witness can validate the signature. Wait, I haven’t yet read the reasoning; for now I’m reading the Mishnah and trying to see how one reads the Mishnah, okay? So I’m saying: first, we already saw in Maimonides that he certainly did not read it this way. Right? Because Maimonides says that if the son testifies about his father’s signature, you still need someone else to join him. Meaning, the leniency of the Sages is only when the witness himself is doing the validation. Why indeed shouldn’t we say that this is a special leniency in the laws of document validation, that one witness is enough? How does Maimonides himself know that? Perhaps the reasoning is as follows. First of all, in the Mishnah itself it explicitly says that we are talking only about the witnesses themselves, the signatories, validating their own signatures. Why set it up only in that case? Why set it up specifically that way? The ordinary case is just people validating the signature; let the Mishnah speak generally. If it set it up in this case, it seems that the Mishnah is talking only about this case, even before the conceptual reasoning. We still need to understand the reasoning, but that is how it appears. If so, then this is not a special leniency in the laws of document validation, where one witness is enough, because if that were so then another witness would also be enough.
[Speaker E] Meaning there is a difference when a person testifies about his own signature, that this is my signature—there’s some significance to a person’s signature.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has significance, as it were, with respect to a third party, not with respect to himself.
[Speaker E] No, but afterward that same signature can appear somewhere else, so what—now he’ll say that over there it isn’t my signature and here it is my signature?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. It would need validation there too, of course. We can validate one thing from another validated thing, from an unvalidated thing by means of another thing that is validated—we spoke about that. Okay? But the first one has to be validated. So I’m saying, first of all, from the wording of the Mishnah—in the Mishnah we are really speaking only about the signatory witnesses themselves who come to validate. So from the wording of the Mishnah it seems that this is a novelty only with the witnesses themselves. Beyond that, let me just remind you that we saw in Tosafot on page 28 that “a person is believed to say—”
[Speaker E] “This is my handwriting,” meaning a person is believed to say about himself that this is his handwriting, but then that’s enough.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So from the wording of the Mishnah, first, you see that. You could say a person is believed to say “my handwriting,” because one witness is believed—
[Speaker E] so he himself too.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it’s obvious that if we’re speaking about himself, then from the wording of the Mishnah it seems they mean specifically this case, specifically himself. Beyond that, if you remember, we saw in Tosafot on page 28 that Tosafot said the validation of documents is a rabbinic law only if I do not demand validation. But if I, the borrower, claim that the document is forged—validate the signatures, I’m claiming you forged the signature—then the obligation to validate the document is Torah-level, not rabbinic. Now according to Tosafot at least—not everyone agrees with that, but according to Tosafot at least—it is obvious that you can’t say what we’re saying here. Because document validation is not entirely a rabbinic law except where I don’t demand validation. But then it would come out that the whole law of the Mishnah is true only in situations where the borrower admits that the document is not forged. So you’d need to establish the Mishnah in a particular limited case. But if the borrower claims that the document is forged and you really need Torah-level validation, then there we would need two witnesses for the validation. The Mishnah doesn’t say any such thing. So you’d have to make a limiting interpretation of the Mishnah on that basis. So in practice these are only after-the-fact explanations; look, all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) agree—it is completely clear that we are talking here only about a situation where the witness is validating his own signature, not about one witness in general. One witness in general is not effective for document validation. Okay? Let’s just read Maimonides to close this issue, chapter 7, law 3, the next Maimonides that appears on your page: “A document whose witnesses are Reuven and Shimon, and two came and testified that this is the handwriting of Reuven and this is the handwriting of Shimon—the document is validated. But if one testified about the handwriting of Reuven and the second testified about the handwriting of Shimon, the document is not validated, because there must be two witnesses on the handwriting of each one of the two,” even though he rules in accordance with the Sages against Rabbi. Okay? There is no leniency in document validation that one witness is enough. There is no such leniency; you need two witnesses. “And if there is a third who testifies to the handwriting of both Reuven and Shimon together, the document is validated.” Yes, that is obvious. Fine, so in Maimonides, and so too in all the medieval authorities (Rishonim), it is completely clear that the discussion in the Mishnah is only when the signatories themselves come to validate their signatures. Now let’s move on to the Talmud. And with that the Talmud immediately begins. The Talmud says: “When you think it through, according to Rabbi they testify about their handwriting, whereas according to the Sages they testify about the maneh in the document.” Meaning, the Talmud says that if you think a little, you’ll see that the basis of the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages is the question how we interpret this testimony of the signing witnesses when they come to validate their signatures. From our perspective, is this testimony about the act, or is it testimony of validation like any other testimony of validation? Rabbi holds that it is testimony of validation; consequently each of them is only one witness to his own signature, so you need another witness to testify about it—unless both of them testify about both signatures, in which case there is of course no problem, that’s the first clause. But if not, then you need another witness to complete the testimony on the signature. And the Sages hold: no, it is testimony about the maneh in the document. So what follows? If they were testifying about the validation, they too would agree with Rabbi that it isn’t enough; there is no such novelty that you can validate your own signature alone. But they testify about the maneh in the document, and if I have two instances of one witness on the maneh in the document, then what is the problem? On the maneh in the document there are two witnesses. Therefore there is no need to add another witness for the validation of the signatures. Of course, this by itself cannot stand alone. Obviously if they don’t—soon we’ll see—if they remember, then it’s simple. If they remember, then why would Rabbi dispute it? What’s the problem? I have two witnesses to the act—sorry, to the act itself. So why does Rabbi require another witness? Right? So on the contrary. Fine, so now let us try to understand what exactly is being discussed here. This begins to open the door back to the previous passage: do they remember or do they not remember? Here the story begins. In principle, we would read the Mishnah simply as not connected to the previous passage: the previous passage dealt with Torah law, and this Mishnah is talking about the question how one validates. Except that the Sages here are introducing a major novelty, that on the level of validation it is enough for me to testify to my own signature alone. How can that be? Suddenly the Talmud turns the wheel backward and says: no, no, no—this is not testimony of validation; it is testimony about the maneh in the document. Wait—so now the discussion begins: what kind of case are we dealing with? Do you remember the event? Then what’s the problem? You don’t remember the event? Then “from their written statement” doesn’t help. So what exactly is the case here? This begins the discussion of the connection to the previous passage. So what’s important is to keep in mind the connection between the passages; at this point things start getting mixed together. But before we get into that issue, the Talmud asks: “Isn’t that obvious?”
[Speaker A] What’s the novelty?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the question here? What does “isn’t that obvious” mean? What do the Sages innovate, no? What do the Sages innovate? An enormous novelty. That this is my signature, alone, on my own signature—isn’t that a novelty? We said Rabbi is the straightforward one; the Sages are the novelty.
[Speaker A] The difference is in the meaning, in what they are seeking the testimony about. That is, whether it is about the event itself or about the maneh—or the maneh in the document, according to the Sages. But then there could be oral testimony here. So what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If they know—if they remember the event, let’s say they remember the event without looking at the signatures at all, they remember it on their own—then there is no question; obviously they can come and testify about the event.
[Speaker A] But then I don’t care about the document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Okay. Exactly. So that’s not relevant. We’re probably talking about a situation where they do not remember the event—we’ll soon see—but for the moment this is just an initial analysis. They don’t remember the event, or they are reminded by the document, or they don’t remember even from the document and only come to validate the signature. That is the simplest explanation of the Mishnah: that we are talking about a case where they don’t remember the event. And even after seeing the document they still don’t remember the event, because if after seeing the document they did remember the event, then at least according to Rabbi Yochanan in the previous case there is no problem at all. They can testify about the event, and then we do not enter into the problem of validating documents. Because they can testify about the event itself. Right? And the law follows Rabbi Yochanan. So if that’s the case, then what kind of case are we talking about here? We’re talking about a case where they do not remember the event; they come and validate, they come to validate the signatures, that’s all. And the whole question is in the laws of document validation; it does not belong to the previous passage—that’s what I would seemingly say, right? Except that the Sages innovate that even when they are validating the signature, halakhically that is considered testimony about the maneh in the document—not that they are literally testifying about the maneh in the document. That is the novelty of the Sages. Otherwise there is nothing to discuss here; otherwise what novelty is there? Everything is fine. We’ll see in a moment.
[Speaker A] So then what is the question “isn’t that obvious” about?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a moment we’ll get to Tosafot; we’ll get there soon, and he certainly addresses this. But what is the “isn’t that obvious” question? What is obvious here? On the contrary, it’s a major novelty that according to the Sages, when they come and testify to the validation of the signature, it is considered as though they were testifying about the act and therefore no additional witness is needed. Is that obvious?
[Speaker A] Even though they remember nothing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Is that obvious? Very far from obvious. On the contrary—Rabbi is the obvious one; the Sages are a major novelty. The “obvious” point here, as the commentators explain, is that it is obvious that this is the dispute. It is not “obvious” regarding the view of the Sages or the view of Rabbi; rather, it is obvious that if Rabbi and the Sages disagree about whether one must add another witness, then clearly the dispute is about whether this is testimony about the maneh in the document or testimony about the signature.
[Speaker F] That’s what’s obvious.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s a very strange question. What does it mean, “that’s obvious”? Fine, someone needs to explain it. That’s the dispute; I need to explain it. Obviously. After all, what do you mean it’s not obvious? It may be that I have no other explanation for the dispute because the view of the Sages really does seem strange.
[Speaker G] But—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So should the Talmud not say it? If the explanation introduces a very major novelty, do you expect the Talmud to stay silent and not offer this explanation? Then you’d be left looking at the Sages as though their words were completely incoherent. Obviously I would expect the Talmud to bring this case here. So what kind of question is it to say that the explanation of the dispute is obvious? It’s not a view that is obvious; it’s rare in the Talmud generally to ask this kind of thing. “It’s obvious” that this is the explanation of the dispute? Usually they ask “isn’t that obvious” about a view: this view is obvious, what did you add by saying it? But “isn’t that obvious” about the Talmud itself—why are you telling me the explanation of the dispute, I would have known it by myself? Come on. I think that’s not the point. This bothered me, by the way—you have to be sensitive to the text. In other words, the “isn’t that obvious” question here is really a very strange question. Notice how the passage begins: “When you think it through.” What are those words? What do those two words mean? Let’s read Rashi. “When you think it through, according to Rabbi”—look at Rashi—“when you stand at the end of his words, his reasoning is…” yes? “They testify about their handwriting.” Meaning, if you analyze Rabbi’s language and reasoning very, very carefully, you’ll arrive at the conclusion that this is probably the dispute. About that the Talmud asks: “Isn’t that obvious?” What does this “when you think it through” mean? If you explain the dispute to me, fine, I have no question why the Talmud bothers to explain a dispute among Tannaim; obviously it has to explain. But don’t tell me that this is some kind of novelty that emerged only after deep analysis and after ruling out other possible explanations of the dispute. If you study it very carefully, you’ll see there is no other explanation of the dispute except this one. The Talmud says: that’s obvious—what other explanations could even arise here? Clearly only this explanation is possible. Not that this explanation itself is obvious, but that this explanation is unique. The Talmud is not asking here about the explanation of the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages; it is asking about the introduction, about the phrase “when you think it through.” You gave this dramatic preface, as though after examining and eliminating all the other possibilities, this is the explanation of the dispute. The Talmud says: fine, fine—what possibilities did you eliminate? There are no other possibilities; this is the only possibility. It seems to me that that is the question.
[Speaker E] Yes. And still—why did the Talmud open this way?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly—that’s what the Talmud is asking. So why did you open that way? Now they answer. So what is the answer? “You might have said that according to Rabbi, he is in doubt whether they testify about their handwriting or whether they testify about the maneh in the document. And what practical difference would it make? In a case where one of them died, you would need two people from the marketplace to testify about him. For otherwise, three quarters of the money would be extracted on the word of one witness. And here he is stringent, and there he is stringent. It therefore teaches us that Rabbi was definite about it, both leniently and stringently. For Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav: if two signed a document and one of them died, two from the marketplace are needed to testify about him. In this Rabbi is lenient and the Sages are stringent.” So what does the Talmud say? The Talmud says: yes, there was another possible way to explain the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages. Regarding the Sages, clearly there is no other way to explain them. The Sages hold they testify about the maneh in the document. But regarding Rabbi, there was room to say that he is merely in doubt whether it is about the maneh in the document or about their handwriting—not that it is obvious to him that it is about their handwriting. Why? Because even if he were in doubt, the result would still be that another witness is needed. Since there is doubt whether this is testimony about the maneh in the document, in which case indeed another witness should not be needed like the Sages say, or not. And because of the doubt, you would need to add another witness. There is a big question, by the way, why. Since document validation is only rabbinic and not Torah-level, then if I have a doubt, why wouldn’t one witness suffice? Here I don’t know—I didn’t look enough in the commentators—but the Talmud here assumes that in this doubt we should be stringent, maybe because the forms of testimony are determined in rabbinic law in the same way as in Torah law: whatever the Sages instituted, they instituted in a manner patterned after Torah law. And if in Torah law we would require the testimony of two, then in rabbinic law too we require testimony of two. Okay? Maybe. Or we could establish it in a case where he did demand validation, and then it is Torah-level. But either way, it doesn’t matter. The Talmud answers that we did in fact have another way to interpret the dispute between Rabbi and the Sages. It could be that Rabbi is merely in doubt and not certain about it. Now what does it mean that Rabbi is in doubt? So Rashi says—let’s read Rashi, and “what practical difference would it make?” Did you see the Rashi? It’s long.
[Speaker A] Yes, really long.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “What practical difference would it make between doubt and certainty”—that is, of course, all within Rabbi’s view. There are two possible ways to explain… the Sages do not have two possible explanations. The Sages clearly hold that they testify about the maneh in the document, right? Otherwise it couldn’t be that they don’t require another witness. Regarding Rabbi, there are two ways to explain him. Either he is certain that they testify about their handwriting, and then clearly another one must be added, or he is uncertain whether it is about the maneh in the document or their handwriting, and because of the doubt another one must be added. Okay?
[Speaker A] He’s in doubt—look there at what he says—he’s in doubt through the witnesses and now he—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] asks himself how to interpret the case. How to interpret this case: whether such testimony is considered testimony about the maneh in the document or testimony about their handwriting. But in a moment we’ll get to the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and Tosafot who discuss this. But the plain sense of the Talmud is that this is not a doubt about the facts. If it were a factual doubt, then go check, ask the witnesses. No—the doubt is a legal doubt. They come and validate the signatures. According to all views, we are talking about a case where they validate… because if they testify about the testimony itself, then what’s the question? We have two witnesses to the event. They testify to the validation. The Sages claim that even though they are testifying to the validation, halakhically it is considered testimony about the maneh in the document, and they do not remember. Okay? And Rabbi claims that no—if they do not remember, then if it were testimony about the maneh in the document… rather, it is testimony about their handwriting, and so another witness must be added. Now here there was room to say that Rabbi knows this with certainty, or that Rabbi is in doubt. Those are the two ways to interpret Rabbi’s view. What difference is there between them? The difference, says the Talmud, is in the case where one of the witnesses died. Now the second witness comes and says: I recognize both our signatures. Fine? And now the question is whether I can add one more witness who recognizes both our signatures and that will suffice, or not. If the testimony is about our handwriting, then you can add one more. I have two witnesses on each signature. I join one more person to me, and I testify about my own signature and about the signature of my friend who died. Now a third witness comes and testifies about both signatures. Why is that enough?
[Speaker E] There are—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] two witnesses on each signature.
[Speaker A] Right, that isn’t considered—
[Speaker E] my testimony about myself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is my testimony about my signature. Right, testimony about myself is acceptable testimony, just only as one witness.
[Speaker E] Right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there is another witness who joins—
[Speaker E] a person from the marketplace, who testifies about both signatures, both mine and the deceased’s.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The additional witness always testifies about both signatures in question. Okay? So if it’s about their handwriting, then one additional witness should be enough. If it’s about the maneh in the document, then not. Why not? Because when he validates his own signature, he is then considered a witness to the maneh in the document—on the side that this is considered testimony about the maneh in the document, yes? Yes. As for the second signature, that witness is dead, so clearly there it is testimony of validation. So I and the additional witness validate the second signature. Yes. So in effect, half of the second signature also rests on me. It comes out that three quarters of the force needed to extract the money is coming from me.
[Speaker A] I understand. Yes. Again.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I testify about my signature. On the side that this testimony is considered testimony about the maneh in the document—that’s what we’re talking about, yes?—then in effect I have my own testimony about the maneh in the document. So half—one witness on the maneh in the document—we already have, and that is me. Now the second witness is the deceased signatory. The only way to use him is to validate his signature. I validate his signature—I, the second witness who is alive—together with someone else from the marketplace.
[Speaker E] But if you were to bring two witnesses—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] wait, wait, one second—then of course there is no problem at all. That’s simple. But if there is another witness and I am also involved in the second signature, then what happens is that three quarters of the force for extracting the money rests on me. Yes. I constitute this witness and half of the second witness. The Talmud introduces a rule that “by two witnesses a matter shall stand” does not merely mean that there must be two witnesses in order to extract money; rather, each one of them must contribute at least half to the extraction of the money—or rather, not more than half to the extraction. Let’s say there were my testimony on half and two others who came to validate the deceased’s signature—that would certainly be fine. Yes. Why? But I contribute more than they do. It doesn’t matter, as long as it’s not more than half. One witness may contribute half of the force. That is the Talmud’s assumption. If one witness contributes three quarters of the force, that is no good; we do not have two witnesses. Enormous novelty. Right.
[Speaker A] Okay? Wait, and is this novelty agreed upon by everyone, or is this what the Talmud learns from here, yes?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is what we see in the passage here. And it remains the practical law.
[Speaker A] Really? So that is the practical law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly. It isn’t a disputed novelty, by the way. Because here the Sages are stringent, right? What does the Talmud say?
[Speaker A] They require two more.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? Meaning, the Sages accept this conception, and Rabbi also accepts this conception—on the side that the testimony is about the maneh in the document. But if the testimony is about the signature, then there is no problem. Because I testify about my signature together with one other, on my signature. And on the second signature I also testify together with one other; there are two witnesses on each of the signatures, so I have a quarter from me here and a quarter from me there—together that is half. No more than that. What happens if I testify about my signature and that is considered testimony about the maneh in the document, and now another witness comes and validates both signatures? Then something is lacking, apparently—after all, he contributes a quarter also on my testimony, right? But that contribution is superfluous. Because if this is testimony about the maneh in the document, then I alone am enough to establish my testimony, right? So true, he contributes a quarter, but it is a superfluous quarter, and we ignore it.
[Speaker A] It neither adds nor subtracts.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And on the second signature I have a quarter and he has a quarter. So in effect I’m sitting on three quarters of the force.
[Speaker A] And that’s no good. Wait, so am I forbidden—am I allowed to sit on three quarters? No, no, that is invalid testimony. I’m missing the testimony for the second signature. I have a superfluous quarter. No, but I’m missing the testimony of the second half.
[Speaker E] But does it matter if a second witness from the marketplace comes and testifies about the deceased’s signature, and the extra quarter of the living witness is still there—do we set it aside? Ah, obviously. Obviously.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there are two witnesses validating the second signature, then it doesn’t matter that I also know it. That’s irrelevant; then I simply won’t testify. By the way, as an aside, maybe we’ll still talk about this—in such a case it may be that a quarter could be extracted. Because on a quarter there are two witnesses.
[Speaker A] No, on a half there are two witnesses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, on a quarter.
[Speaker A] What do you mean—what is a quarter?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A quarter of the maneh? Yes. No—why not?
[Speaker A] On—
[Speaker E] the deceased—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] there is only one witness—
[Speaker E] from the marketplace, and there’s also me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So on the half that he is testifying about, there is half from that validating witness and half from me, right?
[Speaker D] And if another validating witness comes on mine? Then there are two witnesses on a quarter of the maneh. I have, as it were, half a testimony; that isn’t enough.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but the Talmud itself makes the comparison, doesn’t it? After all, the Talmud itself says you don’t need two witnesses on the maneh; you need a witness on half a maneh. That’s what the Talmud says, apparently. So the Talmud does not distinguish; whether it slices lengthwise or widthwise, as far as it’s concerned it’s the same thing.
[Speaker D] I didn’t understand. What does “a witness on half a maneh” mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, I would have said: what do I care? I have two witnesses on the maneh, finished. What difference does it make that three quarters of the force is based on me?
[Speaker D] Exactly, so I think the idea here is that if I am a witness on the maneh and he is a witness on the signature, that doesn’t work, because in effect I do not have complete testimony about anything.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, but that’s not what the Talmud says. So that’s your own novelty. Fine, it can be discussed. I’m just saying that the Talmud doesn’t say that. The Talmud says the problem is that three quarters of the force rests on me. In principle it could combine. But that combination means that three quarters of the force rests on me and one quarter on you, and that doesn’t work. Because with two witnesses, each one has to have half the force. No more than half.
[Speaker A] So where is the quarter that can be extracted?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: apparently if you make a distinction lengthwise or widthwise and treat it as the same thing, then what is the problem? So on a quarter of the maneh there really is testimony—or even on a half, if you like. On half of the maneh there is his quarter of force and my quarter of force. So at least give me half of the maneh. I don’t know; I’m asking you—what do you think? Why not?
[Speaker D] On the side of the living witness.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It equals a maneh, as it were. Right, there are two witnesses.
[Speaker D] Certainly there are. No, wait, the point of validating the four—the point of validating the four.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right, but the Talmud itself makes the division as if there’s half a maneh from each one. What is this three-quarter force? As if three-quarters of a maneh rests on me and a quarter of a maneh rests on you. So the Talmud itself divides the maneh.
[Speaker D] But it’s not about the maneh, it’s about the testimony—that there have to be two witnesses. The maneh is a whole maneh. Right, and there are—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here there are two witnesses testifying about a whole maneh. What bothers you? Because one testifies about three-quarters of a maneh and one about a quarter. That’s what apparently comes out of the Talmud. Fine, then at least for the quarter or for the half, give the half.
[Speaker D] But it’s not testimony about half of the maneh.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but halakhically the Talmud claims that it’s like testimony about half of the maneh.
[Speaker D] As if. Okay, so I’ll raise another difficulty for you about the maneh.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The maneh doesn’t get divided with one testimony.
[Speaker D] You need full testimony.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If we are two witnesses, it’s as if I extract half a maneh through one witness. If I have one witness, I’ll extract—okay, I have half a maneh. No, because you don’t have two witnesses on that maneh. The maneh is whole. But when you have two witnesses, then each one testifies to half of the maneh. And still we extract the maneh, because on each of its halves there is one witness. But it’s not that two witnesses—one witness alone on half won’t extract—
[Speaker D] Anything.
[Speaker A] Obviously there are two witnesses; each testifies to the whole maneh, and together—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously in practice they are clearly testifying to the whole maneh. But the Talmud sees it as if there is testimony here on half.
[Speaker A] So why don’t we extract it anyway?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says—come, read the wording of the Talmud. What does the Talmud write? The Talmud writes: אם כן נפיק נכי רבעא דממונא אפומא דחד סהדא (“if so, three-quarters less a quarter of the money would be extracted on the basis of one witness”). What does that mean? Literal translation: we would extract נכי רבעא דממונא, meaning three-quarters of the money—
[Speaker E] On the basis of one witness.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the basis of one witness. So the Talmud is talking about three-quarters of the money being extracted on the basis of one witness. It divides the money. Now again, obviously that is not the content of their testimony. The content of their testimony is about the whole amount. But the Talmud sees it as if there is a division in the money itself here. So according to that, there would have been room to extract at least half a maneh on the basis of this testimony. Fine, that’s just a question to think about for later. Maybe we’ll discuss it further on. All right. No, but if there are two witnesses…
[Speaker A] So I’m saying, then there’s no problem.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, then there’s no problem. Okay. So the point is, once again, the Talmud says we have two possibilities for explaining Rabbi’s view. Either Rabbi was in doubt, or Rabbi was certain that this is about their signatures. The difference is in the question what the law would be if one of the witnesses died. For our purposes there’s no difference. According to Rabbi, they will always add one more witness in order to validate their signatures, right? That’s the law of the Mishnah. That is exactly what the Mishnah says. In this case, both explanations work. And the same practical consequence will follow. On this point there is no difference. And therefore here Rabbi is stringent. He is stringent in the sense that he requires another witness to join so that we can complete things. But in another case it turns out that Rabbi comes out lenient. Why? Because in another case, when one of the witnesses dies, then if Rabbi says with certainty that this is testimony about the signature, Rabbi comes out lenient. Because with testimony about the signature, when I testify about my own signature and my fellow’s signature, and the second witness joins as well, there is no problem at all. The money can be extracted. By contrast, according to the Rabbis, what comes out in such a case? We are testifying about the maneh that is in the document. According to the Rabbis, right? So if one witness dies, will one additional witness joining the living witness be enough? Obviously not. The Rabbis will be stringent in that case, right? Now if Rabbi were in doubt whether it’s the maneh in the document or their signatures, then Rabbi would basically say like the Rabbis stringently, because it’s a doubt. Since Rabbi is speaking from certainty and not from doubt, that’s why here Rabbi is lenient, and it comes out that in the dispute in the Mishnah Rabbi goes stringent and the Rabbis lenient, right? Rabbi requires another witness, and the Rabbis say no, that’s also fine—they are lenient. In the case brought as the practical difference in the Talmud, after we understand that Rabbi is not saying this from the laws of doubt but from certainty, it comes out that Rabbi is lenient and the Rabbis are stringent. That is, if there is an additional witness who died—the second witness died—then according to Rabbi one additional witness will suffice, because Rabbi claims that they are testifying about their signatures. According to the Rabbis, one additional witness will not suffice, because they are testifying about the maneh in the document, and then it comes out נכי רבעא דממונא אפומא דחד (“three-quarters less a quarter of the money comes out on the basis of one witness”). You need to add two more witnesses for the second signature. That is also what comes out in Jewish law, by the way. Since in practice we rule like the Sages, it comes out as follows: if the two witnesses come, both are alive, and each one testifies about his own signature and his fellow’s, that is completely fine. No, that is completely fine. Even I, in my quarter as derived from the other witness’s testimony, although I really do know about the case, am not regarded as testifying about the maneh in the document. Because my testimony about the maneh in the document is through my own signature. What? So why isn’t that considered a document written by two witnesses? Because the document hasn’t been validated. What? An unvalidated document. Why? The witness from the marketplace testifies about the dead witness’s signature, and there is also the testimony that I give about the dead witness’s signature; there are two testimonies about the dead witness’s signature—
[Speaker E] And suppose the witness from the marketplace also testifies about the living one, then there are two testimonies—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he doesn’t… it doesn’t matter, there’s no need for him to testify about the living one.
[Speaker E] So there are two testimonies about the signature.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But three-quarters of it is me—that’s what the Talmud says. I testified to my own signature, since I’m alive, plus half of the dead one’s signature, so three-quarters of the testimonial force is resting on me.
[Speaker E] You’re talking about a different case; you didn’t latch onto the first clause of the Mishnah. Well, you need to understand. What’s the first clause of the Mishnah? It says: “This is my handwriting and this is my fellow’s handwriting”—there’s no problem; witness one testifies about himself and about—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to the Rabbis, according to the Rabbis the first clause is superfluous. I don’t need to testify about both signatures; it’s enough for me to testify about my own signature.
[Speaker E] Yes, exactly. When I read the Mishnah, I really thought the first clause was superfluous, and then you said—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, according to Rabbi, no. According to Rabbi, no. According to the Rabbis the first clause is superfluous, because according to the Rabbis my validation of my own signature alone is enough, so what difference does it make if I also testify about my fellow’s signature? It will of course be valid, but there was no need to say—
[Speaker E] It. It’s superfluous.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They brought it so that we would understand the dispute afterward.
[Speaker E] They brought the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They brought it because it’s the beginning of Rabbi’s words. The whole Mishnah is Rabbi’s words except for the end. All right? So Rabbi says: when it’s this, it’s fine, but if they testify about their signatures then you need one more; the Rabbis say no, no, no—even if they testify about their signatures, that’s also fine. All right? And the Talmud’s reasoning is very strange. All right? It’s strange; we’ll still talk about it. For now I’m saying we agree provisionally according to their wording; I’m only pointing out here that issue of נכי ריבעא דממונא (“three-quarters of the money”) that we will still need to deal with. All right? So Rashi explains—let’s just take a look at Rashi—we won’t have time for much more than that today. ונפקא מינה בין ספק לודאי לשניים החתומים על השטר ומת אחד מהן (“and the practical difference between doubt and certainty is in the case of two who signed the document and one of them died”). You see? Yes.
[Speaker H] You need—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Two people from the marketplace to testify about him, and it is not valid for this one to testify about his own handwriting and his fellow’s and to join one with him who testifies about both. דדילמא (“for perhaps”), if it were a doubt, yes? They are testifying about the maneh in the document; and when this one says, “This is my handwriting,” נפיק פלגא דממונא אפומיה (“half the money comes out on his basis”), and the one who testifies with him about his signature neither adds nor subtracts—he doesn’t need him. And when he then joins—the living witness, yes?—with that one from the marketplace to testify about the dead one’s signature, then again נפיק ריבעא דממונא אפומיה (“a quarter of the money comes out on his basis”)—another quarter comes out on his basis. It turns out that the entire amount, except for a quarter, comes out on his basis: אשתכח דכוליה דממונא נכי רבעא נפיק אפומיה. And we require it to be on the basis of two witnesses: half the matter on the basis of this one and half the matter on the basis of that one. Therefore, when we require two—since it is a doubt—we go stringently here and stringently there. So since for Rabbi it would come out as a doubt, then according to Rabbi—if Rabbi had meant that it was a doubt, in the end that is rejected, but if that had been the explanation of Rabbi’s view, then we would have had to go stringently in both directions. If both are alive, we would have had to add one; and even if one died, we would have had to add one. Because each time we would have to be concerned either for the side that they testify about the maneh in the document or for the side that he testifies about his own signature. All right? And we say they are testifying about their handwriting, and we require two on each and every signature; and where one of them dies, we require two from the marketplace: one to testify about the dead one’s handwriting, and one of them testifies about the dead one’s handwriting and the living one’s. And if it had been obvious to us that they testify about their handwriting—as indeed this is the conclusion of the Talmud according to Rabbi—one from the marketplace who testifies about both signatures would have sufficed, and the living witness too would testify about both, and it would not be that the entire amount except for a quarter comes out on the basis of one witness, because he too needs that outsider to testify about his signature, right? If he is testifying about his own signature and not about the maneh in the document, then his own testimony about his own signature also requires support from one more person, according to Rabbi’s position, right? So there is no problem here: he can testify about both signatures and one other person can testify about both signatures, and that would be fine—we would accept it. But we would require one more person to join him. All right? Because he… But now that we are in doubt—perhaps they are testifying about the maneh in the document, and regarding his own handwriting he is believed and does not need anyone to join him, while we still need him to testify about the dead one’s seal—then three-quarters comes out on his basis. If there are not two from the marketplace, so that this one will not need to testify about the dead one, the Talmud teaches us that Rabbi is certain, and one from the marketplace suffices, and both testify about both. That is the Talmud’s conclusion in the end: it teaches us that Rabbi speaks from certainty and not from doubt. And what comes out? It comes out like this: according to Rabbi, he is lenient in the case where one died and stringent in the case where both are alive. Right? And the Rabbis are the opposite. In practice we rule like the Rabbis; that is the conclusion of the passage. And therefore, if I summarize the law: if both witnesses are alive and each one testifies about his own signature, the document is valid; we extract the money, right? If one of them dies, what is the law?
[Speaker A] Rabbi is stringent and the Sages—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We rule like the Sages, so what is the law in practice? You need two people to testify about the other one’s handwriting. As for me, it makes no difference, because I am testifying about the maneh in the document; but for the other one’s handwriting you need two who are not me, who will testify and validate the other one’s signature.
[Speaker A] And then one more person will testify about my handwriting?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that won’t help. Because I am testifying about the maneh in the document.
[Speaker A] Even when I testify about my own handwriting?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The medieval authorities discuss what happens if I now decide and say, no, no—I don’t want to testify about the maneh in the document; I want to testify only about my signature. So where does that come up? That comes later in the Talmud. Let’s just read the Talmud so that at least we finish the Talmudic text. ואי ליכא תרי אלא חד מאי (“and if there are not two but only one, what then?”). All right? If we don’t have two, but only one living one—we have this situation: one of them died. What do we do? And we don’t have two more witnesses for the other one’s signature. All right? Abaye said: ליכתוב חתימת ידיה אחספא ושדייה בבי דינא ומחזקו ליה בי דינא וחזו ליה, ולא צריך איהו לאסהודי אכתב ידיה, ואזיל איהו והאי ומסהדי אאידך (“let him write his signature on a potsherd and throw it into court, and the court will validate it and inspect it; and he himself will not need to testify about his own handwriting, and then he and the other one can go and testify about the other signature”). Do you understand? He should sign his signature on some shard.
[Speaker A] After the second witness died?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, now—he comes to court, signs his signature, gives it to the court, the court sees that this is his signature, the court validates the signature—not he. And now he is free to validate the other one’s signature together with one more witness. And to this—even the Rabbis would agree. Obviously. Now let’s see what to do in practice.
[Speaker E] I think this solution is ideal from the outset—it would be worthwhile to write documents—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—on the contrary. Now we have arrived at validating the document, and one of the witnesses died, all right? And I have no other witness to validate the other one’s signature. There is only me and one other witness. So if I testify, it will be נפיק תלתא ריבעא דממונא אפומא דחד (“three-quarters of the money comes out on the basis of one witness”). So what do they say? Let’s do a trick so that my testimony on my own signature won’t be needed. I’ll write on a shard, the court will validate my signature, and I will testify with someone else about the second signature. Exactly. And then in fact my signature too operates not by the law of testimony about the maneh in the document but by the law of validating a signature. And in validation there’s no problem: I have two witnesses here and everything is fine.
[Speaker E] But then what is the logic of the continuation saying not to write it on a scroll?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s just a side problem. There is a rabbinic rule, the Talmud says: specifically on a shard, but not on a scroll—דילמא משכח לה איניש דלא מעלי וכתב עילויה מאי דבעי (“lest some unscrupulous person find it and write on it whatever he wants”).
[Speaker E] But if they validate the signature now, what difference does it make what they write on?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter? It does matter. Because if we now sign on a scroll, all right—the validation is done. Now someone will take that scroll… they’ll just throw it away, we’re done with the case, we go home. Then someone will take that scroll, find it, and write above it, “So-and-so owes me money; so-and-so signed below owes me money.” He himself is signed below, and his signature has been validated, so I’ll be able to collect the money from him. You can’t do that on a shard? On a shard, no, because a shard gets broken. A shard is something perishable.
[Speaker A] And you also can’t do it because—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A shard is also not accepted as a legal document. Even if you bring a shard, it’s something bogus; it isn’t accepted as a legal document. So just for the purpose of validating the signature here, write it on a shard. But that doesn’t matter for our issue; it’s only a side remark. And then the conclusion, yes: דתנן הוציא עליו כתב ידו שהוא חייב לו גובה מנכסים בני חורין. אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל הלכה כדברי חכמים. פשיטא, יחיד ורבים הלכה כרבים. מהו דתימא הלכה כרבי מחבירו ואפילו מחביריו, קמשמע לן (“for we learned: if one produces against him his handwriting that he owes him, he may collect from unencumbered property. Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: the law follows the words of the Sages. Isn’t that obvious? In a dispute between an individual and the many, the law follows the many. You might have said that the law follows Rabbi against his colleague and even against his colleagues; therefore it teaches us otherwise”).
[Speaker E] Why do they say that here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a rule.
[Speaker A] No, why—
[Speaker E] Why do they need to say it?
[Speaker A] Seemingly I would have said—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because otherwise, why does it need to tell me that the law follows the Sages? Obviously—they are the majority. No, because if Rabbi is involved in the dispute, there is a rule that the law follows Rabbi against any single opponent. So the initial thought might have been: maybe even against a majority that opposes him? They tell you no—not against a majority. Only against a colleague, not against colleagues. All right? But bottom line, the law follows the Sages. So for our purposes it comes out that if one witness dies, I really cannot testify about my own signature and the other one’s signature. You need two witnesses on the other one’s signature, unless I do this trick with the shard. All right? Okay, we’ll stop here, and next time we’ll continue again from the continuation of the page. I understand that on this page you still have plenty to work with. By the way, keep the pages—the pages I handed out—so that I won’t need to photocopy them again for next time. Look how much noise there is here in my house. Why? What happened? Because it’s nine-thirty. Yes. Great, I think. Good. Very nice. Did you come down? That’s mine, and she has that catalog I made. I opened it a few times when people put papers into it. It’s lying there somewhere where we were sitting. Yes. Sabbath peace. Sabbath peace. If they don’t want to remove it from the system. There are more things like that. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. I’m thinking about the stand. I’m thinking about the stand.
[Speaker A] Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Sabbath peace. Sabbath peace. I got updated; apparently I’ll—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Be at your place on the Sabbath at seven. Maybe that just changed, I don’t know. Yes, right, I had—
[Speaker A] In my head the Sabbath at eight. This time it’s earlier, so that’s what I had in mind. Thank you. Goodbye to all of you. Thank you very much, Ayelet. Good evening. Sabbath peace. Sabbath peace. Thank you. Sabbath peace. Yes, Ayelet, Sabbath peace. Thank you very much. In this week’s Torah portion, Vayishlach, it says: ויותר יעקב לבדו ויאבק איש עמו עד עלות השחר (“And Jacob was left alone, and a man wrestled with him until daybreak”). The Talmud in tractate Hullin 91 says that our forefather Jacob went back for small jars. And the Talmud asks: what did our forefather Jacob see that made him go back for small jars? Rabbi Elazar said: from here we learn that for the righteous, their money is dearer to them than their bodies. And why so? Because they do not stretch out their hands in theft. And one needs to understand the depth of these words. Is money really more important than the body? Rather, the point is that the righteous person understands that everything he has in this world came to him through precise individual providence from the Holy One, blessed be He, so that he could serve God with it. There is nothing superfluous in the world. In every object and every vessel there is a holy spark that a person must redeem and elevate. Therefore the righteous guard their property because they understand that it is a holy instrument. We see this with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, who was in the cave for thirteen years. He and his son Rabbi Elazar would sit in sand up to their necks, and only at prayer time would they put on clothes. Why did they do that? So that the clothes would not wear out. They understood that this garment was the clothing in which they stood before the King of kings; therefore they cared for that garment even more than for their own bodies. That is the secret of the small jars. Our forefather Jacob teaches us that even in the small details of life there is great holiness. The struggle with Esau’s ministering angel was about this very point. The angel wanted to separate the holy from the mundane. He wanted to say that there are things not connected to the service of God. But our forefather Jacob does not give in and struggles with him until daybreak, until the great light is revealed—that even in matter there is spirit, and even in the small jars the Holy One, blessed be He, is present. May we merit to see this every day and every moment in our lives. And the fifth: when he thinks that God, exalted be He, does not watch over him. And the sixth: when he thinks that God, exalted be He, cannot save him. And the seventh: when he thinks that God, exalted be He, does not want to save him. And the eighth: when he trusts in something other than God—money, wisdom, strategy, power, strength, authority, and helpers. And the ninth: when he relies on his good deeds. And the tenth: when he thinks that God, exalted be He, does not have mercy on him. And these ten things destroy trust. So let’s try to analyze these things a little. Notice: the first thing is his ignorance of God, exalted be He. Meaning, the more a person knows the Holy One, blessed be He, the more a person learns about the Holy One, blessed be He, the more a person understands the individual providence of the Holy One, blessed be He, the more his trust grows. Ignorance, lack of knowledge—that is the first thing that destroys trust. A person who does not know how much the Holy One, blessed be He, loves him, how much the Holy One, blessed be He, cares for him, how much the Holy One, blessed be He, is with him at every single moment—then naturally his trust is very weak. And the second thing: his ignorance of God’s commandments. A person who does not know what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants from him. After all, the whole point of trust is so that I can do God’s will. If I do not know what God’s will is—
[Speaker F] Then what is the point of trust? Trust is a tool so that I can be free to serve God. But if I do not know what the service of God is, then naturally my trust is meaningless. And the third thing: when he thinks that his causes are what help him. A person thinks he acts, he does, he goes to work, he earns money, and he thinks that his job is what brings him his livelihood. He forgets that the Holy One, blessed be He, is the one who feeds and sustains all. He thinks that the cause is what acts. And the fourth: when he thinks that things happen by chance. There is no chance in the world. Everything is under precise individual providence. A person who thinks that something—
[Speaker G] Happened to him just like that, then he loses trust. Because if it happened by chance, then tomorrow something else might happen by chance, and he has nothing to rely on. By the way, Sefi, if I put into the dishwasher a pan in which crumb cake was baked? With Fairy capsules, the cleaning is amazing. Even in the dishwasher, nothing beats Fairy capsules. Purim, Purim, great—but not every car dressed up as an SUV is a real SUV. Not four-by-four, not a real SUV. Now during Subaru Days, double promotions and discounts on a variety of real SUV models. March eleventh to eighteenth. Dial star six two six three. Subaru, subject to the regulations. Sharonit Hosen—
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[Speaker K] And on the way home, the little one said he wanted a lollipop. The older one said she didn’t have any money. A long time ago he already took my place.
[Speaker G] Is that the opening sentence of the book that won the Sapir Prize for Literature of Mifal HaPais? Soon we’ll know. The Sapir Prize for Literature ceremony for the year 2019, March fifteenth, Keshet Channel 12. Mifal HaPais—good things start here. Kan Reshet Bet. Kan Reshet Bet. Sports.
[Speaker L] I’d call the segment today Sports Online, right, Aviel Gdalyovitch? Yes, this is definitely a sports tsunami. In the course of a complete shutdown, the NBA was a pioneer in this matter בעקבות the infection of the player.
[Speaker C] The Americans, in many fields, are often a somewhat extreme nation. They go from some state of complacency to an all-in state, going as hard as possible. So the moment Rudy Gobert of the Utah Jazz—and he’s not just one ordinary person, he’s a lot of one person, two meters eighteen of one person—also laughed very demonstratively at a press conference about the coronavirus and ran his hands over all the surfaces and the microphones, as if he passed his hands over everything—
[Speaker L] Like five people got coronavirus, basically.
[Speaker C] Yes, more or less. Now there are concerns—he and the Utah Jazz, of course, met the Toronto Raptors, Boston Celtics, Detroit Pistons, New York Knicks, Cleveland, and those teams of course met other teams—so at the moment there is coronavirus panic in the NBA, and the league is suspended for at least two weeks, but it looks like it will be more than two weeks.