Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 25
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
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Table of Contents
- “From their mouths and not from their writing” in Yevamot: dating in a betrothal document
- Theory versus practice, moral judgment, and religious authority
- Personal responsibility versus command and leadership
- “From their mouths and not from their writing” in Gittin: the disqualification of a mute person and written testimony
- Maimonides: two separate laws in the laws of testimony
- The connection between Yevamot and Gittin and the definition of a “document” versus a “scrap”
- The exposition of “according to” and the distinction between plain meaning and extra wording
- Three states of memory and the passage in Bava Batra 20a
- Rashi: an intermediate state and the disqualification of “reciting from writing” according to all views
Summary
General Overview
The lecture opens with the verse from which the principle “from their mouths and not from their writing” is derived, and with the distinction that it appears in two different passages, in Yevamot and in Gittin, where in each one it functions as a different law. It then becomes clear that in Yevamot the issue is testimony nourished by what is written, whereas in Gittin the issue is a requirement concerning the very form of testimony itself, that it be spoken orally and not written, such as the disqualification of a mute person from testifying. The lecture broadens into the relationship between theory and practice in Jewish law and in society, personal responsibility versus religious authority, and the danger of practical justification by force of command or leadership. It then returns to the issue of testimony based on writing and sets up three states of memory. Finally, it discusses the dispute between Rav Huna and Rabbi Yohanan in Bava Batra 20a, and Rashi formulates an intermediate state to resolve the dispute and establish that a case of saying what is written without actual recollection is invalid according to all views because of “from their mouths and not from their writing.”
“From their mouths and not from their writing” in Yevamot: dating in a betrothal document
The Talmud in Yevamot 34 explains that they did not institute dating in a betrothal document because it is unclear where the document could be kept without creating concern that the woman might erase the date, or that the husband might cover for her if she is his niece. The Talmud suggests leaving the document with the witnesses. But then, if they remember the date, there is no need for the document, and if they do not remember, there is concern that they will look at what is written and testify from it, which is invalid because of “from their mouths and not from their writing.” The lecture explains that in this case the testimony is indeed spoken orally in court, but it relies on the writing rather than on the witness’s own experience and memory. The lecture emphasizes that a date is a strong example of how a document can cause a witness to “believe what is written” rather than actually remember the situation itself, and that makes the problem especially fundamental.
Theory versus practice, moral judgment, and religious authority
The lecturer raises a broad question about judging groups through ideology versus through what they actually do in practice, and argues that there are “outrageous” laws for which people in practice find ways around them. He gives the example of the claim that Muslim scholars oppose “honor killing” and see it as a cultural product rather than a law of Islam, and asks whether such a development within a religion still points to a problem. He compares this to the difficulty of looking at hard commandments such as Amalek and the seven nations, and argues that sometimes it is convenient that these laws are not practically relevant, and even when they are, there are “guardrails” and conditions that narrow their application, similar to examples like the stubborn and rebellious son and interpretations that soften “an eye for an eye.”
Personal responsibility versus command and leadership
The lecturer argues that one can understand how extremists like ISIS or Hezbollah believe they are acting on divine command, and that such a belief may be seen as a mitigating factor in the sense that it does not stem from evil for its own sake. At the same time, he says one must not accept theory as the ultimate justification, because “in the end… you are responsible for what you do.” He describes a meeting in an Arab high school in Ramla with rabbis, qadis, and religious figures, and says that he told the students extremism would lessen precisely if they did not surrender their judgment to leaders, since a single extremist leader can radicalize an entire group. He formulates a demand for critical thinking especially before an extreme act, and for checking sources and other opinions, and says that failing to check does not exempt one from responsibility.
“From their mouths and not from their writing” in Gittin: the disqualification of a mute person and written testimony
The passage in Gittin presents a baraita based on the verse “if he does not tell,” from which is learned the exclusion of a mute person who cannot tell. The Talmud asks why he cannot testify “from writing.” Abaye answers that testimony is different because “the Merciful One said: from their mouths and not from their writing,” and therefore the very form of presenting testimony requires speech and not writing. The lecture emphasizes that the novelty here is that even if the mute person is standing before the court and writing in front of them, this is still invalid as a formal law requiring literally “from their mouths.” From here the fundamental law in Gittin is defined as a requirement that testimony be spoken orally and not sent as a letter.
Maimonides: two separate laws in the laws of testimony
In Laws of Testimony, chapter 3, law 4, Maimonides rules that by Torah law testimony is accepted neither in monetary cases nor in capital cases except from the mouths of the witnesses, “from their mouths and not from their handwriting.” He adds that by rabbinic enactment monetary cases may be decided on the basis of documentary testimony. The lecture explains that the law of a legal document is an enactment allowing writing to acquire evidentiary status when the document is presented and validated properly, unlike an ordinary “letter.” In Laws of Testimony, chapter 8, law 5, Maimonides rules that one who wrote down his testimony, or found it written in his notebook, may testify only if “he remembered on his own, or others reminded him and he remembered.” Otherwise he may not testify, because this is like one who heard from another person and testified—that is, hearsay testimony. The lecture highlights that Maimonides compares testimony from writing, where there is no recollection, to testimony heard from another witness, and asks why the Talmud in Yevamot formulates this specifically in the language of “from their mouths and not from their writing.”
The connection between Yevamot and Gittin and the definition of a “document” versus a “scrap”
The lecture offers two opposite possibilities for the relationship between the laws. One possibility is that the law in Yevamot is a consequence of the invalidity of written testimony in Gittin: if writing itself is invalid as testimony, then certainly one who orally conveys the content of writing is also invalid. The second possibility is that the fundamental law is precisely the invalidity of testimony that relies on writing outside the court, and from that we learn that written testimony itself is not accepted; thus Gittin would be derived from Yevamot. The lecturer defines that a document receives its status as legal evidence when it is presented before the court and can be validated, but outside the court it may be considered merely a “scrap” that has no independent evidentiary force. The explanation is built around the distinction between a case where the document itself stands before the court and speaks by virtue of the laws of documents, and a case where the witnesses merely report what was written in it without the document being presented and examined.
The exposition of “according to” and the distinction between plain meaning and extra wording
A question is raised how the phrase “according to” can be expounded as meaning “mouth,” and the lecturer answers that one must be careful not to project modern Hebrew or foreign-language meanings onto biblical language. He suggests one possibility that “according to” is the plain linguistic meaning in the Bible in the sense of speech, and a second possibility that the exposition rests on redundancy, since the phrase appears extra relative to a formulation that could have sufficed with “by two witnesses or by three witnesses a matter shall stand.” He emphasizes that in various places there are debates whether such expositions are plain meaning or midrash based on extra wording, and that here both readings are possible as interpretive structures.
Three states of memory and the passage in Bava Batra 20a
The passage on 20a opens with a baraita: “A person may write down his testimony on a document and testify from it even after many years.” It is followed by a dispute among Amoraim: Rav Huna says, “provided that he remembers it on his own,” while Rabbi Yohanan says, “even if he does not remember it on his own.” The lecturer sets up three states: a person remembers without a document; a person does not remember, but the document reminds him of the situation; and a person does not remember at all and merely states the written content based on trust in the writing. He shows that understanding the dispute as between independent memory and memory aided by a document does not fit the novelty of the baraita, and that understanding the dispute as between recollection and mere recitation from writing clashes with the law of “from their mouths and not from their writing.” He cites the statement of Rabbah, who learns from Rabbi Yohanan that one witness may remind another witness of forgotten testimony so that he remembers, showing that Rabbi Yohanan is speaking about recollection and not about stating written content without memory.
Rashi: an intermediate state and the disqualification of “reciting from writing” according to all views
Rashi explains “he remembers it on his own” to mean that Rav Huna requires the witness to remember “a little” on his own without seeing the document, and the document merely completes and sharpens that memory. This creates an intermediate state between full memory and full recollection produced by a document. Rashi explains that Rabbi Yohanan permits even where the witness does not remember on his own at all, but after seeing what is written “he takes it to heart and remembers,” in the sense that the document arouses memory of the situation. Rashi states explicitly that the case where the witness does not remember at all and merely parrots what is written is invalid because “from their mouths and not from their writing,” and therefore even Rabbi Yohanan does not validate it. The lecture concludes by saying that further analysis in Tosafot will clarify the definition of “document” here and whether we are speaking of an actual legal document or just a record sheet, and that the continuation will discuss the dispute between Rabbi and the Rabbis within the passage itself.
Full Transcript
[Speaker B] Okay,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re starting with the Mishnah on page 20b. As background—but for our issue, it’s this principle: from their mouths and not from their writing. The verse from which this is learned appears in Rashi in Gittin: “according to two witnesses,” or “two witnesses”—there are several versions there—but the phrase “according to” is understood as: from their mouths and not from their writing. In the Talmud this appears in two passages, in Yevamot and in Gittin. In the two passages, different laws appear. It’s not the same law learned from the same verse, even though both are formulated the same way: from their mouths and not from their writing. So we begin with the Talmud in Yevamot 34, where the first law appears. The Talmud asks: why didn’t they institute dating in a betrothal document? Unlike a bill of divorce, where they did institute a date, either because of produce-rights or because perhaps he might cover for his niece. In a betrothal document they did not institute a date. So the Talmud says: why not? Because we have nothing to do with the document in which the date is written. What good would it do?
[Speaker C] It could do harm.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because if you leave the document with the woman—right?—how shall we do it? “Let us leave it with her”—she’ll erase it. Right, so she’ll erase it if she committed adultery and wants to protect herself, so she’ll erase the date. “Let us leave it with him”—so we’ll leave it with the husband. Sometimes she’s his niece and he’ll cover for her. Meaning, he has a niece who really did commit adultery while married to him, and I assume that makes him angry, but on the other hand she’s his niece, he doesn’t want to kill his sister’s daughter, and in the end she’s going to die for that adultery. What? Not Muslims. Okay, yes. So by the way—what do you mean, not Muslims? You mean not Jews. Jewish law says she’s liable to death. Quite the opposite: that person wants to cover for her against the law.
[Speaker C] But is that true? Like, it’s only—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe emotionally, but the law is the law, like among the Muslims. I mean, again, not exactly, but it’s death.
[Speaker C] But they implement it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And we don’t.
[Speaker C] No, by the way, that’s part—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s very interesting. I’ve written about this more than once on the site—how we judge various groups, not necessarily religious groups, but with religious groups it’s very prominent. Because many times you can judge a group’s behavior through its ideology, and you can judge a group’s behavior through its practice—what it actually does—and that’s not always the same thing. And it’s an interesting question how one ought to judge, or whether there is a more correct or less correct way, because you can see there are lots of laws that are very outrageous, but in practice, on the ground, people don’t really keep them. One way or another—exactly—they find a solution. So is there room for criticism or not? I mean, the same with Muslims, only in reverse. With Muslims, when I spoke a bit with people who know the Quran and Islamic law somewhat, they claimed that there is no such thing as honor killing. That’s an invention of the Arabian deserts. It’s Arab culture, not Islamic law.
[Speaker D] So there the oral tradition is harsher than the written one?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not exactly an oral tradition. It’s more folklore, or social norms that somehow get painted in religious colors for some reason. But their scholars all oppose it—or I don’t know if all, but many of them oppose it. Meaning, that’s Arab culture. Now what does that mean? Does that protect Islam? I don’t know. Because if within Islam something like that can develop, that’s still problematic. So practice versus theory is a very interesting question: how exactly should one judge? What? Does jihad exist? Yes, of course it does. Well, we also have jihad of one sort or another, right? Amalek, the seven nations. Meaning, it’s easy for us to see the blemishes of the other; a person does not see his own blemishes.
[Speaker E] But here, really, with Amalek and the seven nations—it’s actually relevant this week, Amalek. Really, even though we have a commandment and I don’t know, but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not relevant. That’s the most fun.
[Speaker E] We’re always, like, finding the way around it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. No, that’s exactly the question of practice versus theory.
[Speaker E] And if now an Amalekite came to me, would I kill him?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. A lot of people would tell you yes, you have to kill him. But be happy he’s not standing here. There are some who aren’t even happy about that—that’s a different issue—but I’m saying, even if you are happy, fine, but what would you do if he were standing here? So a lot of people would tell you, listen, there’s no choice, it’s emotionally hard, but that’s the law, you have to kill him. Again, I don’t know—we can discuss it—but I’m saying this is not a simple question. The best thing for us is that it’s not relevant and not standing in front of us, and everything is fine—we’re exempt from the issue.
[Speaker D] Well, even when it is relevant, there are so many constraints and so many conditions that have to be met.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like the stubborn and rebellious son, yes, who has to be exactly at that age and all the exact requirements. He ate a tartemar of meat and drank a log of wine.
[Speaker E] “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”—that’s explicitly written in the Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but there there’s already an exposition that transforms it.
[Speaker E] Yes, but that exposition—really, that’s an exposition by people who read it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —and interpreted it in a way that… maybe. That’s an interesting question. Or maybe they really did make an exposition: “under, under,” a verbal analogy. It’s not that they just said it. There’s a verbal analogy there. Now the question is how verbal analogies are made—we don’t exactly know those mechanisms today, so it’s hard to know. But yes, it’s hard to shake the feeling that there was also some moral consideration here, or at least some emotional, human consideration.
[Speaker E] There probably was. I do think it would have been hard to do such a thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. I’m saying that judgment—the other side of the same coin—is like that too. Take all these crazy ISIS people, okay? They murder people in insanely cruel ways, in madness—it’s hard, it’s inconceivable. Okay? But they believe that this is what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded them. I believe them that they believe this. Meaning, I think—yes, it sounds true to me. They’re not fooling me. It’s not some mere attempt to be murderous and hang it on something. They really believe it.
[Speaker E] Maybe except for those who joined them from all over the world, who came and—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So obviously there are all kinds of lunatics there looking for a chance to murder. True. But I’m talking about the basic believers, those with the basic agenda. I believe them that they really think this is what their god commands them. And that happens also in the party—
[Speaker G] Also with Hezbollah. Hezbollah is—okay, Hezbollah—they really believe in what they’re doing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I’m mentioning ISIS because they’re more extreme, but it’s certainly true of everyone. Now the question is, first of all, is that a mitigating circumstance? Because it means he isn’t really an evil person who just wants to murder. It may be very hard for him to murder. But there’s no choice—he’s compelled by the command, so to speak. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, commands him.
[Speaker H] That’s not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —so simple. Like you said: if you stood in front of Amalek, okay, either you’d find a way around it, and if you didn’t? Then I believe there would be Jews who would kill him, right? Let’s put it that way.
[Speaker E] Meaning, it would be a very small minority—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. Not important. But there would be some, and I don’t think those are necessarily wicked people. Rather, they’re people who sincerely believe that this is the Torah’s command. They didn’t find a way around it. If the Holy One, blessed be He, says so, then that’s what they do. So yes, there is also a mitigating factor when you act in light of a theory. On the other hand, I think seeing theory as ultimate justification is very problematic. In the end, a person is responsible for what he does. Meaning, don’t tell me that the Holy One, blessed be He, told you and that He said—at the end of the day, the bottom line, you are responsible for what you do. And I was at—I was—well, we’re drifting a bit, but this really is somewhat connected to the day. I was at an Arab high school in Ramla, ORT Ramla, where there was a gathering of various rabbis and qadis and some Druze and religious figures of different kinds, speaking with the students. Among themselves and with the students. About living together, about peace, about study, about things like that. Yes, yes, in Hebrew. I spoke in Hebrew. No, the others there spoke in Arabic. I spoke in Hebrew and someone more or less translated for me, sat next to me and translated. So when I spoke there—it was Muslims, Druze, Christians, and rabbis. And when I spoke there with the students, I told them: look, in the end, the solution to the problem… The religious leaders there—their religious leaders, Christian or Muslim—some of them said to the students: listen to the rabbis, meaning to the religious leaders, and then everything will be more moderate. And that’s true, I mean—the spiritual leaders really are moderate, also in Islam. There are these wild types who somehow gain status. I know that at Al-Azhar, for example, which is the highest Sunni institution in Cairo, the people there are very moderate. The leading authorities, so to speak, of the Sunnis. They are very moderate. There’s tremendous contempt there for the Muslim Brotherhood and that whole crowd, because they’re gangs. But they can’t do anything. There’s this mob where street leadership took over, and they become these rabbis—leaders too—but they have no backing; they’re not really scholars. That’s how it was explained to me; I don’t know it myself. In any case, I told them: look, I’m telling you the opposite. I told them that extremism will stop, or the world will become more moderate, if you do not listen to your leaders. And I said I tell my students that too. Not because your leaders are no good—that’s not criticism of the leadership. Rather, my claim is that once you listen to a leader, all it takes is one extremist leader and the whole group becomes extreme, because that’s what he says. So true, most are not. Most are not violent. Exactly. In the end, a person has to be responsible for his own decisions. And the fact that your leader tells you something—that is not justification. If you do something wrong, the responsibility is on you. I don’t care what he told you… So check him, ask someone else, think, look at the sources he brings. I told them: that’s what I tell my students too. Meaning, I tell you my opinion—don’t accept it. Whether it points in a moderate direction or an extreme direction, don’t just accept it—check me. If you agree, agree; if you don’t agree, don’t agree. I’m not giving orders. I can give advice, I can help. Let’s think together about what the meaning of—
[Speaker E] I hope that in Judaism too there will be many rabbis who will say—
[Speaker H] —exactly the opposite.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Most of them. Exactly.
[Speaker H] And it’s very dangerous, because not everyone will really open the books and study.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. I’m saying, if they won’t open the books and study, then at least let them ask. But there always has to be—especially when you’re going to do an extreme act—you have to think about it, not first of all but on the second level, develop critical thinking, from the other side. Meaning, first look whether it is really necessary; check whether there are other opinions; look at the sources. You can’t murder because your rebbe told you. Don’t just obey because your rebbe told you. Fine, okay, so you didn’t check it all the way through. Not terrible—you can rely on him, he’s a Torah scholar. But if he tells you to do something extreme, then check. And if you didn’t check, the responsibility is on you. And I think that in the end, if the world is entrusted more to ordinary people in the street, it will be more moderate and less extreme. That’s the law of large numbers. The law of large numbers says that in the end, when you have many people, there won’t be one movement in a single direction—not too moderate and not too extreme. It’ll be a kind of mix balancing itself out. The moment everyone obeys some one leader or some set of leaders, there’s a very great danger that a whole group will go in some wild direction, a pretty crazy direction.
[Speaker D] But that’s kind of the opposite of what you said at the beginning—that Arab culture, with all this killing the daughter who—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That very culture, and there nobody—
[Speaker D] —follows—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sure. But there too it means following certain norms that nobody looks at critically. If they looked at it critically and asked their leaders, then they’d tell them: friends, you must not do this; even according to our law it’s forbidden. They don’t ask. They don’t ask. In that sense, asking the leaders is itself criticism. Criticism of what your society is telling you to do. Check, think again—is this really necessary, is it right, is it a religious command?
[Speaker C] The very thought that the question and the doubt don’t even begin.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why I say: what I tried to do there was to get them to start doubting things. Now, the spiritual leaders sitting next to me were terribly upset. Obviously. Because I’m coming out against da’at Torah. The same thing—it’s really parallel, completely. How could it be? We’re supposed to tell you what’s right; you always have to ask the imam, the qadi, whatever, the leader, the—
[Speaker C] —the priest, the rabbi, whatever.
[Speaker E] To that extent? They understood what you were saying?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. They understand Hebrew. They live in Ramla; it’s not the territories.
[Speaker E] In twelfth grade too they did some meeting in Arabic at Bar-Ilan. They traveled because they had several meetings with a high school in Umm al-Fahm, so sometimes they came here and sometimes they went there.
[Speaker G] They really did it everywhere, the whole school.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even though religious schools are fairly reluctant to do that.
[Speaker E] No, secular ones don’t do it either.
[Speaker G] Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Religious ones do do it. Really? Religious ones did do it.
[Speaker C] A lot do it. Maybe your school didn’t. I don’t remember—in my life I never met a priest, and no—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Today it’s more common. I think today it’s more common. Okay, fine, that’s another discussion.
[Speaker C] No rabbi, nothing. They don’t deal with it, they don’t bring it into—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There was some retired judge trying to organize a meeting in Lod between religious schools and Arab schools. The Arabs are ready—just say the word—and the Jews aren’t willing; the religious ones aren’t willing.
[Speaker I] Maybe because of fear of romantic relationships?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, there are many kinds of fears. Romantic relationships too, yes, all sorts of things, certainly. Now, the Muslims aren’t afraid. They’re entirely in favor.
[Speaker I] Because there it’s obvious no girl would want a Jew.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. But if a boy wants a Jewish girl, then from their point of view that’s fine. Yes, because she usually becomes Muslim. Although even that is not always so—you have to know, these stereotypes are not always accurate. Today all kinds of things happen, so they also have something to be afraid of. There really are things that are not—okay, fine, let’s get back to our subject. I don’t know how we got into all that.
[Speaker G] We were discussing the date—why don’t they write a date in a betrothal document?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So maybe leave it with the witnesses. If we leave the document with the witnesses, then it says: if they remember—if they remember, there’s no need for testimony from the document. They’ll come and testify themselves if they remember the date. And if not, if they don’t remember the date, then sometimes they’ll see it from the writing and come testify, and the Merciful One said: from their mouths and not from their writing.
[Speaker C] They won’t remember the date, they’ll read it in the document, and then they’ll testify to the date in the document. So what’s the problem? After all, it’s the correct date. The problem is that it’s invalid testimony. Maybe a formal invalidity, but that doesn’t matter—it’s invalid testimony: from their mouths and not from their writing. It’s kind of funny, this whole concern—where should they leave the document? Leave it with a lawyer, in the court—what’s the big deal?
[Speaker E] In trust, in their hands, entrusted to them.
[Speaker C] The question is whether that’s even the problem. It’s a technical question—who has the document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re suggesting another solution.
[Speaker E] If there was handwriting or something like that, you put all these documents there and that’s it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember right now. We’d have to look there in the commentators on Yevamot. I’m sure they raise these possibilities, because documents really were placed in court—many documents. But fine, let’s leave that for now because that’s not our topic. What matters for us is the “from their mouths and not from their writing.” And the Talmud is basically speaking here about a case where the witnesses looked at the document, where a date is written, and they’ll testify to the date from what they see in the document. Okay? And that is “from their mouths.” Right, right—in a moment, in a moment, we’ll see it.
[Speaker E] Yes. Isn’t that true testimony?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? It is true testimony in the sense that the date is real, but they do not remember it.
[Speaker C] How do they know it’s real? From the writing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—because it’s in the writing, it’s in the document.
[Speaker G] The document has a date written in it. But if it’s their handwriting, then they know—
[Speaker C] —that they—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is their writing—the signature. The signature is theirs; they are the witnesses on the document.
[Speaker C] But there’s a concern that the woman will change the date, or the man—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—there isn’t, because it’s with them. That’s why it’s a third possibility: leave the document with the witnesses. Then no one can change the date. But the testimony itself, when they come and testify to the date, will be from their writing.
[Speaker C] And not from their memory.
[Speaker E] And not from their memory. Even if they don’t intend it that way—if they see a certain date written there, then the mind naturally kind of doesn’t try—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right. They may even have the illusion that they remember, perhaps—I don’t know. Fine? So by the way—I’ll get ahead of myself a little—date is really a great example of a detail that even after you see the document, you probably won’t actually remember that that’s how it was. Rather, you’ll simply believe the document. There’s a difference. Meaning, if the document testifies—
[Speaker C] Unless that day was a holiday—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, true. Obviously that can happen in certain cases. But generally, in ordinary cases, usually when you see the date in the document, you don’t suddenly remember the date. Usually not. In contrast, if the document says that so-and-so lent to so-and-so, after seeing that in the document you may remember that you saw such a loan. Right? So date is perhaps an especially good example of a situation where the document won’t remind you. Even if you trust the document, you trust it—not that it reminds you and now you remember on your own; you simply believe what is written in the document. But if it’s a date, as someone said—
[Speaker C] Most likely you would remember in context. No, but okay—the date in the document could remind you, oh, in any case—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh, I remember.
[Speaker C] So—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re back again to what you said earlier. I agree—in certain circumstances. But generally we’re speaking in rules. And the sweeping rule is that usually, with an ordinary normal date—not Lag BaOmer, not Rabin’s assassination, nothing like that, okay? An ordinary date. So where would I suddenly remember that it was on the tenth of Kislev? Why would I remember that? It says so in the document, so I’ll say the tenth of Kislev.
[Speaker E] Especially if it was twenty years ago.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. And for most people that really is how it works, unlike the event. Meaning, the event written in the document—after I see it in the document, I may remember that I was at that wedding and that I was a witness, or at that loan, or this… that can happen. So specifically the date is a very good example of how “from their writing” can really be a substantive problem. Because if I truly remember the thing myself after looking at the document, that’s already our next topics, right? But here, with the date, I think the typical situation is that you simply read from the document; you don’t remember on your own with the help of the document. It’s not the same thing.
[Speaker C] Okay, and what if the witnesses said the opposite? Meaning, about the date they say, no, it wasn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At that time? They aren’t bringing the document at all. If they brought the document, then there’s no problem—the document states the date. The document isn’t here; the document was lost.
[Speaker C] And they bring the document—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they don’t bring it. No, the document is gone. But they saw that date in the document, so they say: that was the date, we remember. We’re talking many years later—already after ten years. I’m talking about a situation where a very long time has passed. Who says you even still have the document?
[Speaker C] So the document reminds them, or they remember on their own?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The document reminds them. But this document—now, suppose the document was in front of them a year ago, while the event was ten years ago. If they bring the document, then you can validate the document and the date is written in it—there’s no problem with that. The concern is that we can’t see the document, or validate it. But if there are witnesses, generally we can validate it too. We can’t see the document, but what reminded them is that they saw the document among their things from time to time and remembered: we have a wedding on the tenth of Kislev that we witnessed. Meanwhile, I don’t know where the document got lost. Now the woman committed adultery; we need to clarify the date, when she became betrothed. The witnesses come and say: we remember from the document that it was on the tenth of Kislev.
[Speaker E] And not because we really remember—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Rather, because we saw it in the document. Exactly.
[Speaker E] But there’s something here about human memory itself, like the actual human ability to remember details accurately. When something is written down, assuming it wasn’t erased, assuming it wasn’t tampered with or something… there’s something—maybe from a modern perspective—that’s the more reliable memory aid.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True. But on the other hand it’s dangerous too, because it can also shape the memory, since you don’t remember… But the document isn’t here. Okay.
[Speaker C] So there are two witnesses, and the witnesses don’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The witnesses saw it in the document. They don’t know. What do they know? They don’t remember the situation. Look, there’s a difference. For example, when Rabbi said “it is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah,” and decided to write down the Oral Torah because he saw that things were being forgotten—so that’s an example where if you want things to be remembered, write them down. But there’s a big difference between the situations. Because there I need to remember the information. Here I need to remember the situation. They knew the information. Meaning, if I want them to remember the information “twentieth of Kislev,” the best way is to write “twentieth of Kislev” in the document. That’s the safest way for them to remember the date. But it will remind them of the date, not of the situation. They won’t know that that’s when it happened. Rather, they’ll remember through the document that it was on the twentieth of Kislev. And a witness is required to testify to something that he himself experienced, something that he himself saw. Not documentation. Indirect things are not testimony.
[Speaker C] But they would remember the situation—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They would remember the situation.
[Speaker C] Yes, but not the date.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But all we want from them—
[Speaker C] —what—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —is only the date. That’s the whole discussion. The whole discussion is only about the date. That’s all that matters here. So I’m saying: if I want a means by which they remember the words “twentieth of Kislev,” then just write it down. That’s the best way. But then the price is—and by the way, that’s true of the Oral Torah too—the price is that they become attached to what’s written and have no ability to stop and think: wait, maybe actually not. If a person remembers the situation, you can say to him: wait a second, do you remember whether yesterday was Rabin’s assassination or yes—meaning, do the calculation; maybe you’re not remembering correctly. You’re right, it was the twelfth of Kislev. Mistake. Maybe it was in the evening or something like that. If it’s from the document, you’re bound to the document. You see? And therefore, if all you want is cold, formal, simple information, the best thing is to write it. But if you want testimony, testimony has to be something alive. They need to bring the situation into the court.
[Speaker E] A person who buys a house—okay, say with apartment prices today, which is probably the biggest transaction most people ever make—nobody would rely on the witnesses alone. Everyone writes a contract and signs the contract.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A contract isn’t for remembering.
[Speaker E] A contract is so that if there’s a problem and one side goes and sues the other in court, nobody wants to rely on the fact that there are two witnesses. Suppose there was no contract, okay? The whole transaction was done orally like that. You don’t even need things—it was done orally, there are two witnesses, two valid witnesses, everything is fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A court today would accept that too.
[Speaker E] Fine, they might accept it. The question is whether the litigants—the ones making the transaction—I find it hard to believe there’s anyone today willing to make such a transaction of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Millions, or at least in the millions.
[Speaker E] No—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you’re mixing a few things together. First, the writing itself is final commitment. It’s not only a memory aid. Once we wrote something down, we decided on the transaction. Until then you can say maybe I wasn’t sure, we started, but I changed my mind. Writing is first of all an act of acquisition. Land in general is acquired by document. Second, the document fixes the details. Because with oral statements there can be disputes about what exactly was said, and we want to preserve that. Why is this different? Because I’m saying: even with the Oral Torah, writing has a heavy price. A heavy price. We’re now attached to what’s written in the Talmud. The spirit that accompanied what’s written is no longer accessible to us. And we all see the results. I’m not saying it wasn’t right to write it, because I don’t know if there was a better solution. But it has a heavy price. And witnesses have to bring the situation into court, not the dry details. The situation. Because the dry details are not always correct, and not always relevant. You have to understand what was going on there. Now true, oral witnesses have limitations—all of that is true. If the document reminds me of the situation—not that I read the document and parrot what is written there, but the document helps me remember the situation—that is okay. In a moment we’ll see that further on. Okay? Our concern is that the document will not remind them of the situation, and with a date that is very likely. Rather, they’ll state the date because that’s what is written in the document—not because it reminded them of what happened there. And that is problematic. Testimony is not supposed to be that. By the way, an actual legal document comes precisely to replace that. When two witnesses sign a document, that’s exactly the point: they testify from their writing. But that’s okay because that is the law of documents. That’s what a document is for.
[Speaker C] In this case, if we said the document disappeared—but if the document did exist, then either you wouldn’t need the witnesses, or—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You wouldn’t need the witnesses? Correct. There are two witnesses signed on the document.
[Speaker C] So why—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s with the woman, then certainly there’s concern. But if it’s with the witnesses—
[Speaker C] Meaning the document is with the witnesses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Otherwise there’s a concern that the husband will alter it, the wife will alter it,
[Speaker C] If they brought the document but didn’t testify, that would be enough, because they signed it and the document itself testifies.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Yes. Now, this is the place, yes.
[Speaker C] It’s
[Speaker E] Very strange. Suppose the document disappeared yesterday. Yesterday, not a year ago. Yesterday the document was lost. The day before yesterday, two witnesses were tidying the house, saw the document, and said, wow, right, do you remember that on such-and-such a date this thing happened. Two days later they call them to testify, and precisely then the document disappeared, so they have to testify. Right. And one can remind the other.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, no, that’s something else. We’re talking about the document reminding them.
[Speaker E] But the role of the document is that if they brought that same document to the religious court
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] because the document itself is testimony. But the testimony has to be given in court, otherwise it’s witness-from-a-witness. The document tells them, and then they come to court afterward—that’s witness-from-a-witness.
[Speaker E] By mistake it fell off the couch, that one picked it up and looked at it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You looked, so what if you looked? I heard something from a witness—hearsay testimony, by the way, is disqualified in civil court too—if I hear from a witness something he saw, that’s not testimony. That’s what’s happening here. In the document, the document is the witness to the date, and I hear the date from the document, so it’s witness-from-a-witness. Okay. Even though what’s written in a document is stronger. What do you mean?
[Speaker C] If you had the document, you wouldn’t need the witnesses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Stronger than witnesses who are drawing from the document, not stronger than witnesses who come and testify themselves about the date.
[Speaker C] Why? We said that if these are witnesses who—this is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, if the witnesses actually testify about the date—no, “we were coerced” is something else. But if they testify—two witnesses come and testify about the date—that’s certainly excellent. There’s no problem with that at all.
[Speaker C] And if those witnesses whose names are written there bring the document and say okay, “we were coerced,” meaning they say no, that’s not the date?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so that’s the whole topic of “we were coerced,” okay, we discussed that. I’m not talking about the problems of “we were coerced,” just straightforward testimony, no coercion and nothing. They testify about the date of the kiddushin, and that’s all. So if they testify themselves, there’s no problem at all, two valid witnesses, everything is excellent. If they bring a validated document that has the date in it, also excellent. But if they saw it in a document and the document is now gone, and the document didn’t help them remember, but rather the document showed them the information itself, then they’re testifying about what’s written in the document, not about the date. So then it’s witness-from-a-witness. You’re testifying to me about something else that testifies to something. Okay?
[Speaker G] I want to say now—I admit I looked into this topic—I kept having in mind some kind of testimony, not specifically in a document that’s a legal acquisition or a sale or I don’t know what, but just the fact that I witnessed some event, and I can write it down in shorthand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And whether there’s a difference then between a formal document and writing that isn’t a formal document—to that, Tosafot speaks, at length. Tosafot talks about it; we’ll see it later. Right now we’re talking about a kiddushin document; that’s an actual formal document.
[Speaker G] Kiddushin, not divorce.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In divorce there is
[Speaker G] a date in divorce.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A kiddushin document. So that’s the first topic, the topic in tractate Yevamot. What do we learn from it? What does “from their mouths and not from their writing” mean as it emerges from there? What kind of testimony does that passage disqualify in Yevamot?
[Speaker D] The testimony that the document gives me, reminds me of the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Witnesses who draw from a written document and then come and testify to that content in court. That is called “from their mouths and not from their writing.” This is not the ordinary case of “from their mouths and not from their writing.” The ordinary case is the one that appears in tractate Gittin, where the Talmud there says: Rabbi Zeira said, what troubles me is this teaching: “If he does not state”—excluding a mute person who cannot state. A mute person is disqualified from testimony. They disqualify a mute person from testimony—why? Because he can’t state it. Why not? He can state it through writing. A mute person can write; what’s the problem? Why can’t he testify? The Talmud says: Abaye said to him, are you talking about testimony? Testimony is different, because the Merciful One said: from their mouths and not from their writing. That is the original law of “from their mouths and not from their writing.” When you come to court, you have to speak. If you send the court a letter, that letter is not testimony. The big novelty regarding a mute person, by the way, is that the mute person stands there and writes in front of the court. He isn’t sending written testimony to the court; that’s a bit different.
[Speaker E] There’s no concern that something happened that maybe distorted it or something.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Therefore here it really already looks like some kind of formal disqualification. Because if I send a letter—I know—the court can’t interrogate you about what’s written, because you’re not here, the letter is here, so that really is more problematic testimony. So that’s why I want the witness here. But if the witness is here, and he’s only writing to me instead of speaking to me—
[Speaker E] Basically his mouth is his hand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Basically, his writing is his mouth. Exactly, right, right. And still, the Talmud says it’s disqualified because it says “from their mouths and not from their writing.” It has to be with the mouth, from their mouths.
[Speaker C] Really a formal disqualification.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s discussion about writing as speech; there are discussions about this elsewhere.
[Speaker C] So what do they actually do with a mute person?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is disqualified from testimony.
[Speaker G] Yes, disqualified from testimony.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the fundamental law of “from their mouths and not from their writing” is the question of how the testimony is given, in what manner the testimony is stated—it must be stated orally and not in writing. That is not the law in Yevamot. In Yevamot the testimony is stated orally; there’s no problem with that at all. Witnesses come and testify orally. But they draw from what is written. The terminology “from their mouths and not from their writing” is very poor in that context. It would really be, exactly, “from their memory and not from their writing,” I would say. What does “from their mouths and not from their writing” even mean? It doesn’t make sense. Okay. So first of all, these are two laws. When we look in the Talmud at the references—did you see in Maimonides? The references to the halakhic ruling in Maimonides? So Maimonides, Laws of Testimony, chapter 3, law 4, from the third source on your sheet: By Torah law, testimony is accepted neither in monetary cases nor in capital cases except from the mouths of the witnesses, as it says, “by the mouth of two witnesses”—from their mouths and not from their handwriting. Which law is that? The second one. Right, the one from Gittin. The second law. Okay. But by rabbinic enactment, monetary cases are decided based on documentary testimony. We already talked about this, that the document itself—the witnesses who signed the document are considered as though their testimony had been examined in court even though they’re not here. Rabbinically, validation is needed; not important now, but in principle this testimony is testimony. Why? After all, we sent a document to the court and they didn’t testify orally. That is the institution of the document. According to Maimonides it is rabbinic; that’s what he writes here. We talked about that. But that’s the law of documents. The law of documents is intended precisely to solve this problem, because I can’t keep the witnesses in my pocket. I need some kind of accessible testimony, accessible evidence; that’s why they invented the law of documents. But all that is when the document is made the way documents are made. But if you write a letter and send it to the court—testimony in a letter—that doesn’t help.
[Speaker H] And that’s only in monetary law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not only in monetary law; in bills of divorce and kiddushin as well.
[Speaker H] He says monetary cases are decided. Ah, but he says in capital cases
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] as well.
[Speaker C] Where? Not here though.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes yes, here he is talking—
[Speaker H] In chapter 8, law 3, he writes that it’s a special leniency for monetary law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll still see, we’ll see. It’s not—the law of documents helps in capital cases or elsewhere as well, also in personal-status matters. In any event, the law of documents cancels the problem of “from their mouths and not from their writing,” even though this is testimony from writing, it’s fine. But all that is the second law from Gittin—that the testimony in court has to be given orally and not in writing. The law of Yevamot appears in Laws of Testimony, chapter 8, law 5, in your next source.
[Speaker C] Wait, sorry, here too it says monetary cases are decided. Yes, there’s an emphasis here only on monetary matters.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, because here he is talking about monetary matters, but it is also true in kiddushin and in divorce. In Laws of Testimony, chapter 8, law 5: One who writes his testimony in a document, or if it is found written in his notebook in his own handwriting, “So-and-so testified before me on such-and-such a day concerning such-and-such.” Basically he is using what is written that documents the event. If he remembers on his own, or others remind him and he remembers, he may testify. But if not, he may not testify, for this is no different from someone being told by a trustworthy person, “So-and-so has such-and-such against so-and-so,” and then he testifies—actual hearsay, right? Maimonides compares this thing to hearsay testimony. Okay.
[Speaker C] But how would they know whether he remembered on his own or not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’ll say. He isn’t a liar, so he’ll say. The assumption is that the person is not lying.
[Speaker C] And then he’s forbidden to go testify.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do you know whether a witness is a liar? You ask him.
[Speaker C] Did you remember it on your own or did this remind you?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Think whether you remember the situation.
[Speaker C] Right, it’s very hard for us to know that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, so if it’s hard, then let him say it’s hard for me to answer that. Fine. The laws of doubts are also laws, okay? There’s nothing to do. You ask him and he has to answer.
[Speaker E] Unless he also woke up in the morning and said, ah, I remembered that this and this happened, and then looked at the document and saw.
[Speaker C] And what’s the difference? Exactly that examination is to test him on whether what’s written—and then he’ll say on his own.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if it’s on his own, then fine, the document strengthens the matter, but if he relies—no, but then you don’t need what’s written, then he just testifies and everything is fine. Obviously he needs the document; without the document he can’t, otherwise the discussion wouldn’t arise.
[Speaker C] He can’t say—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I remembered it even without the document? Not even without the document—through the document. The document reminded me of the situation. Not without the document. If I remember without the document, then the document isn’t relevant. Why do I care about the document? Let him testify himself.
[Speaker C] With the document, it’s like hearsay testimony.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. Correct, and therefore it is disqualified. Right.
[Speaker C] Yes. Wait, and going back to—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if the document reminded him—
[Speaker C] If he remembered on his own, there’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, again. There are three situations. We’ll see later—there are three situations. There’s one situation where I remember myself; I don’t need the document at all. Second situation: I look at the document and it reminds me of the situation. Third situation: I look at the document and say what is written in the document; I did not remember the situation, I trust the document. That is the third situation. Okay? The third situation is “from their writing.” Okay? The first two situations are not. In a little while we’ll see this more in the passage on page 20, but meanwhile these are just introductions.
[Speaker E] So Maimonides in Laws of Testimony chapter 3—according to the Talmud in Yevamot they rule that what—one doesn’t write the date in the document because in any case it’s—this isn’t—it isn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but that’s in the laws of a kiddushin document. We are interested in “from their mouths and not from their writing”—that’s our topic. They rule both laws. Both the law that I may not rely on something written, and the law that I may not testify in writing but rather have to testify orally. That is the law in Yevamot, and that is the law in Gittin. Both laws are ruled. The law in Laws of Testimony chapter 3 is the law from Gittin, and the law in Laws of Testimony chapter 8—
[Speaker E] is the one from Yevamot.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is the one from Yevamot. Okay?
[Speaker E] But what difference does it make whether others remind him or whether he remembers from the document? Why is that different?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. If others remind him, it’s no different, it’s the same thing, witness-from-a-witness, forbidden.
[Speaker E] If he remembered on his own, yes? Or others reminded him and he remembered. And he remembered. And he remembered.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And he remembered. And he remembered. And he remembered.
[Speaker E] Let’s not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes yes, leave the conspiracies aside. They reminded him and he remembered the situation. With all the problems, we checked, we tried, we verified that this really is correct—he remembers the situation. That’s it, we have a witness. If he draws from them but does not remember the situation himself, that’s something else—that’s witness-from-a-witness. Maimonides sees testimony from writing, the law of Yevamot, as a law of witness-from-a-witness, not as a law of testimony from their writing. So why is it learned from “from their mouths and not from their writing”? As Maimonides himself says, after all, the same is true even with oral testimony. Right? Even oral testimony is like that. So why—why is that connected to “from their mouths and not from their writing”? Apparently these are two different laws. But not only are they two different laws; it isn’t even clear why the law of Yevamot is learned from this verse at all, “from their mouths and not from their writing.” It’s just witness-from-a-witness, that’s all. Or at least, even worse than witness-from-a-witness, because the first witness is a written witness. So—look, there may be a connection between these two laws, even though they are two different ones. One possibility—and in my opinion the two possibilities are opposite to one another, but both are possible. One possibility: when a witness testifies and uses writing, then my witness is really the writing. Right? After all, he himself—I’m speaking of a case where he doesn’t remember—he testifies out of what is written. So why do I need the witness? The writing is enough. Exactly. Basically, if this document were here, he would be unnecessary, right? So why do I disqualify this? Because it is testimony from writing. Therefore it is “from their mouths and not from their writing.” In other words, after all, when I—when a witness uses something written, okay? Let’s say I even believe him that he saw it written and that is what was written there. It still doesn’t help. Why? Because even if the writing itself were before me, I still would not accept it, because of “from their mouths and not from their writing” in the law of Gittin, the simple law. You have to testify orally, not in writing. So when someone takes the writing, draws from it, and turns it into testimony, that is disqualified by the same disqualification. Therefore it is “from their mouths and not from their writing.” And this is in a kind of a fortiori way: not only is it witness-from-a-witness, but even if we put aside witness-from-a-witness—let’s say I accept your testimony—what do I have here? I have writing testifying before the court, only you are the one bringing that writing to the court.
[Speaker E] We’re talking about Yevamot, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No—Yevamot. Yes, Yevamot.
[Speaker E] So why doesn’t the Talmud say that the reason it’s impossible is not all those reasons it gives, but rather say: no, the document—we don’t want to accept testimony from a document, because a document is writing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Talmud said: from their mouths and not from their writing.
[Speaker E] But the Talmud doesn’t say it that way. It brings three options, one regarding the woman, regarding the man, and regarding the witnesses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re talking only about the witnesses. We’re talking only about the witnesses.
[Speaker E] Yes, but it could have said that the reason one doesn’t write the date in the document is because it simply isn’t relevant, because it doesn’t interest us, we don’t want to accept testimony from a document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but in a formal document the testimony is relevant.
[Speaker E] So I don’t understand the situation. I don’t understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I’ll explain again. If the document appears before the court and it is validated—the kiddushin document—and it is validated, okay? And a date is written in it, then the date is accepted. That is what Maimonides says, because testimony in a document, although it is written, is the enactment of documents. There is no disqualification in document-testimony because it is written. That’s the whole idea of a document. If I send the court a letter—not a formal document, just a letter—“such-and-such happened,” that is written testimony. But if there appears a formal legal document before the court, that thing is not disqualified; it is testimony.
[Speaker C] What is the formal difference between a formal document and a letter?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Come on, there are rules for how a document is made, two witnesses signed, yes, there are rules for how you make a document. There is also responsibility; it is a legal act. Someone who does it improperly will be punished because he is lying in a legal context; he is not just throwing balloons into the air. All the responsibility that accompanies a legal act. Okay? Therefore a document is an exception to ordinary writing. In a document there is no problem of “from their writing.” Maybe only rabbinically according to Maimonides; according to others it’s Torah law—but practically, bottom line, there is no problem of “from their writing” in a formal document. But all that is only when the document appears before the court. Right? Now, what happens with ordinary writing? Then of course it isn’t accepted, even if it appears before the court. Right? That is the second case, the “from their mouths and not from their writing” of Gittin. Second case: a formal document or ordinary writing does not appear before the court. What appears is a witness who saw the document or the ordinary writing. Okay? One might have distinguished between the two. Why? Because the formal document, after all, is admissible testimony. Right? If I’m talking about testimony I saw in writing and I bring it to the court—not in a formal document, just in ordinary writing. I saw a letter, or I wrote myself a note, a little slip, a reminder. Okay? And now I go with this to court. So what I explained before—even if we believe you that this is what was written in your little slip, but a little slip is not testimony, because there is “from their mouths and not from their writing.” Therefore the law of Yevamot is basically an outgrowth of the law of Gittin. Because if “from their mouths and not from their writing” disqualifies written testimony, then of course if someone testifies that there was written testimony, it certainly will be disqualified. Because written testimony itself is disqualified. Wait, but the little slip—wait wait, I’m getting to the document now, one second one second, I’m getting to the document now, wait. I’m getting to the document. The little slip is just a reminder.
[Speaker G] The little slip only reminds me. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But we said earlier that if—
[Speaker G] If it reminds me, there’s no problem.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying if it doesn’t remind me, but rather I report what is written in the little slip. I did not remember on my own, even though you wrote it in the little slip. If I now testify about a formal document, that’s not the same thing. Because the document itself, if it reached the court, would be accepted. So here, when a witness testifies from something written in a document, that is only a problem of witness-from-a-witness. It is not a problem of “from their mouths and not from their writing.” Do you understand why? Because the writing here is a formal document, and a formal document is indeed testimony. So what’s the problem? The document itself does not appear before the court. I brought what is written in the document before the court. That is witness-from-a-witness, says Maimonides. Right? So why does the Talmud call it “from their writing”? After all, there it’s talking about a formal document, a kiddushin document. Why does it call it “from their writing”? I claim that a formal document gets the status of testimony in the place where it is presented in court. But if a witness comes and says, I had a document that said such-and-such—he does not bring the document to court and now comes and testifies about it in court—the document loses its status as a document; it goes back to being a little slip. It is not a legal document. Nobody saw it, nobody can authenticate it, we don’t know anything about it. All you’re telling us is that that is what it said, and we believe you—not that we don’t believe you. You’re a witness, and if there are two witnesses we believe them. We believe you that you had a little slip that said this. So what? The fact that that little slip had once been a formal document is irrelevant. The document becomes testimony in the place where it is presented before the court. But if you do not bring the document to court—you tell the court what was written in the document—that is “from their writing,” because it is not a document.
[Speaker E] A witness who knows about himself that he doesn’t—he has no memory for dates, he simply didn’t remember—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ve gone back to the original question; that isn’t the question that concerns us now.
[Speaker E] But that’s the last case we were talking about just now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s the case, but that’s not the question. The first question you asked earlier was why to disqualify such a thing at all—on the contrary, it helps him remember. We discussed that before. I am now proceeding on the assumption that this is so: we disqualify something that is from writing. Okay? Now the question is why such a thing is called the disqualification of “from their writing,” since a formal document has no disqualification of “from their writing.” And when a witness brings to the court something written in a formal document—not the document itself, but he tells the court what was written in the document—apparently there is no problem here of “from their writing.” All you can say is that there is a problem of witness-from-a-witness. Because I testify about the document, and the document is the witness. That’s also what Maimonides says, right? So why does the Talmud in Yevamot, which deals with a formal document—not with just any little slip—why does the Talmud in Yevamot call this “from their mouths and not from their writing”? I claim that if that document does not appear in court, then it is a little slip. A document has status in the place where it stands before the court. The court can examine it; it becomes a legal act, a legal document, it is confirmed, and then it becomes a legal document. Testimony is not disqualified because it is written. Written testimony in a formal document is fine. Like a recording, say—but that is when it appears here. But if the document is at your house, I don’t care that it once had the status of a document; it’s a slip of paper. And when you testify to me about the document that was at your house, that is a witness from something that is not a witness—it is witness from writing. And therefore it is also relevant to bring what the Talmud in Yevamot says, “from their mouths and not from their writing.” Because witness-from-a-witness does work?
[Speaker C] Because witness-from-a-witness—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is a different disqualification; it does not belong to “from their mouths and not from their writing.” In Maimonides he says it is the same thing, it’s witness-from-a-witness, so why does the Talmud call it “from their writing”? I claim that at the conceptual level it is witness-from-a-witness, but because that document remained at my house and was not brought to court, this is witness from a little slip. It is not witness-from-a-witness. Therefore there is also the disqualification of witness-from-a-witness here, but you don’t even need to get to that. Because the first one is not a witness at all. So why should I care that you are witness-from-a-witness? That isn’t the disqualification. The first one—the first one is already not a witness, so why should it matter that you’re bringing his testimony? The first one is already invalid.
[Speaker G] If this witness is in court, he doesn’t have the document, the document is at home, but he doesn’t have to testify about the document; he can testify about the event.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem. If he remembers, then that is perfectly fine. Then he is a valid witness. We are talking only about a situation where he doesn’t remember, and then he says: I have a little slip that reminded me that such-and-such happened—not that I remembered the situation, but rather it is written on my little slip and I remember that I wrote this little slip. Okay? So in short, one possibility, the first possibility for connecting the two laws is that when someone uses a written document and testifies, in such a case that is also a disqualification of “from their writing.” Why? Because the real witness is the document, not me. I’m only telling the court that there was a document. After all, I don’t remember the situation, I’m only telling you there was a document. But a document is disqualified; it is not a valid witness—“from their mouths and not from their writing.” Why is it disqualified here? I didn’t understand—why is it now called the document? Which case? What is this?
[Speaker E] This case?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of what?
[Speaker E] What you just said now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Yevamot? I am testifying about a little slip? What? When I testify about something written in a little slip, why is that disqualified? It is disqualified because the little slip itself is disqualified. So if I then tell what was in the little slip, then of course it is disqualified. But even if I brought the little slip itself to court, it would be disqualified. Why? Because the one who wrote it has to testify himself, not bring a little slip. In court one testifies orally, not in writing. So now I haven’t even done that. I didn’t even bring the writing to court; I am telling the court that there is something written.
[Speaker E] What? If you brought to court this little slip which is in place of a formal document, but right now—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It hasn’t—it hasn’t received the status—
[Speaker E] No, no, no.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I bring it to court, then it would receive that status. The formal document does not receive that status because it is not in court. If I brought the formal document to court, it would be fine.
[Speaker E] And also a little slip? What? Also a little slip? No, because a little slip—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly the point, because a little slip—
[Speaker E] Here, because the formal document, since it isn’t in court, doesn’t have the status of a formal document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. So it becomes a little slip as long as it is outside. If they bring it, then it will be a witness. Okay? So now, that’s the first direction. In short, what I want to claim is that the law of Yevamot is based on the law of Gittin. Like an outgrowth? Yes. Meaning, if I disqualify a little slip, then certainly I will disqualify someone who tells me about the existence of a little slip. Right? That is certainly only worse. A second possibility could be the opposite. Why?
[Speaker C] Wait, but in Gittin it’s talking about a mute person.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?
[Speaker E] In Gittin it’s talking about the fact that testimony really has to be from a witness’s mouth and not in writing.
[Speaker C] Yes, it doesn’t matter, but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The discussion is about a mute person, but the law learned from there is that one must testify orally and not in writing.
[Speaker C] And here there isn’t this issue of memory.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously not. That’s why I’m asking what the connection is between the two laws. That was exactly my question. After all, these are two different laws. One law says I use a little slip in order to testify. The second law: I send a little slip to the court. Okay? That’s Gittin. When I use a little slip in order to testify, that’s Yevamot. When I send a little slip to the court, that’s Gittin. Right? Now those are two completely different things. Sending a little slip to the court—the problem there is the manner of testifying, the form of the testimony, that I am testifying in writing and not orally. In Yevamot, when I tell the court that there was a little slip, the manner of the testimony is oral. What’s the problem? It’s oral testimony. The problem is the source of the testimony. The source of the testimony is a little slip. Why is that the same law? That’s exactly what I’m asking. What is the connection between them? Why are they both learned from “from their mouths and not from their writing”? So the first possibility I created is: I claim that the law of Yevamot comes out of the law of Gittin. Because if I disqualify the little slip as testimony, then when someone comes and tells the court there was a little slip, certainly that is disqualified. At most, bring the little slip here—that would only be better—and it would still be disqualified. So if you even—therefore it is relevant to say “from their mouths and not from their writing,” even though in fact the testimony is oral testimony, not written testimony. Because fundamentally the disqualification is due to “from their mouths and not from their writing.” The disqualification is the disqualification of the little slip, not of the witness. Okay? The little slip is the real testimony, not the witness who says there is a little slip. Okay?
[Speaker E] Now I have a question that is more basic. Here we’re already in a discussion where it’s obvious that the Merciful One said “from their mouths and not from their writing.” Okay? And I want to ask about what the Merciful One—what the Torah wrote. The Torah did not write—in the Torah the verse or the two—the verses… this is an exposition. “By the mouth of two or by the mouth of three,” “by the mouth of two witnesses or by the mouth of three,” right? Now the exposition is that because it says “by the mouth of” and “by the mouth of,” the intention is specifically by mouth and not by writing. But it was not unavoidable to interpret the verse that way. Why do I say that? If we look, maybe from a modern perspective as we speak today—I did it according to what was written in… say. I want to use precisely this phrase just casually. I carried out the instructions exactly according to what was written in—
[Speaker G] Not “by mouth” but according to an idea, a concept.
[Speaker E] I want to relate to the expression “according to.” Okay? The Torah said “according to,” and indeed in your exposition you interpreted “according to” as “mouth.” But say if we look at other languages, say we look at English—according, languages—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Other languages—say “al pi” is “according.” I’ll tell you two things that have nothing to do with mouth at all. I’ll tell you two things—I understand. Two things.
[Speaker E] First of all, biblical language is one thing and our language is another.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not the same language.
[Speaker E] And many times you have to be careful—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] about anachronism. We project from the Hebrew we speak onto biblical language. In many places in the Talmud they expound “al pi” as “mouth.” “According to the oral Torah,” for example—yes? “According to these words,” that is the Oral Torah, in many places. Now I haven’t of course checked all the way through the Torah whether there is also the “according” meaning in that sense; maybe there is that too.
[Speaker H] Maybe it was born from this expression—
[Speaker E] So I looked for the etymology of “according” and in fact it has nothing to do with mouth; it’s something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, doesn’t matter. But in the biblical sense, in the biblical sense, one has to be careful—it’s not always the meaning of our Hebrew today.
[Speaker E] But again, when you say this, that’s because there is halakhic midrash, and indeed halakhic midrash—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] halakhic midrash, through which the Sages also convey to me a linguistic tradition. They also tell me how to understand Scripture, not only a halakhic tradition. All in all, they were closer to the source, so they also pass on to me the linguistic tradition, and they claim that “al pi” means by mouth. That is one answer. A second answer: there is redundancy in the verse. “Al pi, al pi,” twice. More than that: even one “al pi” is redundant. “By two witnesses or by three witnesses a matter shall stand.” Why “by the mouth of”? Two extra words. So that redundancy—if you understood it as “according,” that explains nothing. I could have said it even without the “al pi.” “By two witnesses or by three witnesses you shall decide the case,” right? Why does it say “al pi”? It’s redundant, and redundancy invites exposition. Then I say: the difference is that the first explanation I offered is not an exposition but the plain meaning. When it says “al pi,” it means by mouth, because that is the plain meaning of the words. The second explanation I offer is an exposition based on redundancy. There are extra words and I have to explain them. According to the suggestion that it means “according,” that would not explain the redundancy. So apparently here they intend to use “al pi” in another sense, one that is not the plain one according to that assumption. In other words, either that is the plain meaning or it isn’t—those are the two possibilities. Okay?
[Speaker C] It’s not really fair to take it into a foreign language, because in Hebrew many things started from one place and today—or over time—they were used because they’re related. Meaning, “al pi” someone really is because his mouth said something specific, and people use it—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] as a borrowed expression, and that’s exactly the issue here… So I said, I don’t know,
[Speaker E] it needs to be checked.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] whether that really fits biblical language or whether that’s what—
[Speaker E] fits other things, I don’t know.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It needs to be checked. I’m saying there are two possibilities. One needs to examine biblical language—whether it really works that way everywhere. I haven’t checked. And then it may be that it is literally the plain meaning. But even if not, it could still be a midrash, an exposition resulting from redundancy. Okay? And by the way, in many places there are disputes whether something comes from the meaning itself or from exposition. It’s not so simple; sometimes it isn’t clear whether a given thing is an exposition or not. So as I said, one direction is to link the Yevamot passage to the Gittin passage. The little slip is disqualified, and therefore anyone who tells me about a little slip is certainly disqualified. The second possibility is to say the opposite. Why?
[Speaker C] This is Yevamot.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I disqualify testimony that comes from the document, meaning based on the document—not that I bring the document, but that I tell the court there was something written in the document. So that is “al pi.” “Al pi.” “By the mouth of two witnesses”—that’s what it’s learned from. No, I mean: I disqualify testimony that is stated based on the document, based on the document.
[Speaker G] Okay. Fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I disqualify it. Now I ask myself why. Now I ask myself why. Why is that disqualified? What’s the problem? After all, a formal document—now I’m talking specifically about a formal document, not a little slip—is a perfectly good document. What’s the problem? After all, they waived—meaning, everything is okay. So why is it not okay that I bring the document to the court? It may be that the reason is that a document outside the court is not a document, but a little slip. And that is the problem. Ah, so from here it follows that testimony in a little slip is not testimony. Then I claim that the Gittin passage is an outgrowth of the Yevamot passage, not the other way around. And that’s what I’m saying. Again: the second possibility I want to claim is that actually the fundamental law is not the law people usually think of first—written testimony—but rather testimony that uses what is written. That is the basic law. Yevamot. There what? I testify about a date that was written in a formal document lying in my house, and that is disqualified. I ask myself why it is disqualified. After all, a formal document is a formal document and it’s fine—what’s the problem? I say: no, because the document is outside the court. And since it is outside the court, it has no status as a formal document; it is just a little slip. So what’s wrong with a little slip? Apparently testimony by means of a little slip is disqualified. Ah, then if they disqualify testimony from the document, then apparently sending a little slip to the court is also disqualified, because one must testify orally and not by means of a little slip. Then I derive Gittin from Yevamot, not Yevamot from Gittin.
[Speaker E] But that assumes that the document is disqualified because it sits outside the court?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s an explanation I’m offering; it’s not an assumption. I see that it is disqualified: when they bring me something written in a document to the court, the Talmud disqualifies it. They learn it from “from their mouths and not from their writing,” so we see that it is disqualified. I ask myself why. It’s an interpretive question; I don’t know why. It’s a suggestion—I don’t have proof, but it’s a suggestion. Maybe that’s how the Sages saw it. I’m proposing an idea. They saw it and said: wait, after all, a formal document is a proper document, so what’s the problem? Because it’s outside the court. So what if it’s outside the court? What’s the problem?
[Speaker G] Because it’s a note.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it’s a note outside the court. Ah, and a note is forbidden? Who said a note is forbidden? Who said you can’t testify by note? From here we apparently see that the Torah says you may not testify by note, that a note is not testimony. And that is the passage in Gittin.
[Speaker E] But here the assumption—I don’t understand—you’re using what you want to prove in order to prove it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not at all. The opposite. I use Yevamot and prove Gittin. Not like before, not like in the previous direction. I don’t know that a note is disqualified at this stage; I have no idea. A note is valid. Fine? Now witnesses come before me. Someone brings to the court a detail that was written in a formal document—they don’t accept it. Fine? That is the law of Yevamot, right? A written law. Okay. I begin to ask myself why. What’s the problem with that? After all, the document itself has the law of a document and is accepted. Why, if someone tells me what was written in the document, is that not okay? So I say to myself: apparently a document is a document only when it appears in court. But if it is outside the court and you tell me what was written in it, then it isn’t a document. Because just as when we read it in court it is a document, if it is not in court then it is just a little slip. Nobody authenticated that document, nobody examined it, nobody knows whether it’s forged—who told me it’s a document at all? I don’t know. Bring it to court, then we’ll see. You’re not bringing it to court, so it is just a note. So what if it’s a note? I continue the line of thought. So what if it’s a note? After all, I don’t know that a note is disqualified. So what if it’s a note? Perforce, apparently the Torah assumes, or shows us, or tells us that testimony in a note is disqualified: from their mouths and not from their writing. Then the move is reversed—from Yevamot to Gittin, not from Gittin to Yevamot.
[Speaker C] Can you explain something that isn’t clear to me in the Gittin case? Who sends, and what do they send to the court? Who sends?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Witnesses. Witnesses saw a loan, or witnesses saw a murder. They send a letter to the court: “We, the two witnesses, saw Reuven murder Shimon.” That’s it—they send a letter to the court. We’re in Australia.
[Speaker C] So they’re only testifying, and that’s what they send to the court. But if they sent a formal document? If they sent a formal document and it were possible—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to validate the two witnesses who signed it, then yes.
[Speaker C] Meaning additional witnesses would come, validate it, and then the document is valid. But what did they send? They didn’t send a formal document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, a letter. They tell you what happened.
[Speaker C] Like an email.
[Speaker G] Yes, exactly. That’s basically the case. Which raises a question. Every time they made a legal document of acquisition, apparently they had to deposit it in court? Meaning, was there such a body where they constantly deposited documents?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There was a practice of depositing documents in court. It’s not a binding law, but the practice was to deposit documents in court. I don’t know whether they always did that.
[Speaker G] But if it isn’t a binding law, and suppose they didn’t always do it, then why don’t we accept a document that isn’t in court?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Bring him to the religious court. No, bring him to the religious court, we’ll check, perfectly fine, we’ll accept him. Now of course, up to this point I’ve assumed—we’re going very slowly today—that we’re dealing with a situation where the person doesn’t remember the incident. More than that: even after the document reminded him of it—well, it didn’t really remind him of the incident; rather, he trusts the document. In Yevamot? Yes, both in Yevamot and in Gittin. Well, in Gittin it’s not really relevant; Gittin is just written testimony. I’m talking about Yevamot, of course. The law that interests us here, by the way, is the one in Yevamot, not the one in Gittin, right? We’re talking here about someone who looks at the document and on that basis produces testimony in religious court. Okay? So right now our assumption is that looking at the document is based on my trusting the document, but not that the document reminded me of the incident. What happens if the document does remind me of the incident? I used the document as an aid. Again, if I go all the way to the opposite extreme: if I remember the incident regardless of the document, then of course I can go testify—what do I care that there’s a document? I’m a witness, I remember the incident, I come and testify. That’s not even a question, right? There’s nothing to discuss. The only issue is this situation where I don’t remember. A loan, a wedding, whatever you want… murder, anything. Okay? Now, I don’t remember the incident. I saw the document, but not only do I trust the document; the document awakened my memory of the incident, and now I want to go to the religious court and testify about the incident. That’s the question dealt with in the passage on page 20. We’re gradually zeroing in on our passage; all these introductions are really just showing me the framework of the discussion. So let’s read the passage on page 20. The Rabbis taught: page 20a, right? The Rabbis taught: a person may write his testimony in a document and testify from it even after many years. Rav Huna said: and that is only if he remembers it on his own. Rabbi Yohanan said: even if he does not remember it on his own. First of all, it says here that a person writes his testimony in a document. It’s not just some note, apparently. If you were in Tosafot, Tosafot questions this—the issue is whether this really means a formal legal document, or whether “document” here just means a note, meaning he wrote it on a sheet of paper. Remember? They didn’t have little notes back then; you took parchment or something, and that’s what they wrote on, so that’s why it’s called a document—but it doesn’t necessarily mean he made a proper legal document according to Jewish law. Okay? So it’s not simple exactly what’s being discussed here; maybe we’ll touch on that when we get to Tosafot. In any case, in principle he can testify from it. But now there’s a dispute among the Amoraim. Rav Huna said: and that is only if he remembers it on his own. Rabbi Yohanan said: even if he does not remember it on his own. Now there are two ways to understand what “remembers it on his own” means. It could mean he remembers without the help of the document—on his own he remembers it. According to that reading, Rav Huna claims that a person can do this only if he remembers the testimony himself, not with the help of the document. And Rabbi Yohanan says that even if he remembers with the help of the document, he doesn’t have to remember it on his own. That’s one way to understand the dispute, right? Yes. A second way to understand the dispute: no, Rav Huna means that when he looks at the document he recalls the incident—that’s called “remembering it on his own”—and only then can he testify. And Rabbi Yohanan says no, even if the document tells me what’s written there and I trust it, but not that the document reminded him of the incident—even that is okay. Where is that? That’s it,
[Speaker C] It’s not written in the document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like we had with the date. He looks at the document and says: I know that Reuven married Leah. Okay? He doesn’t really know, and the document didn’t remind him of it either, but there’s a document and he trusts the document.
[Speaker C] The first possibility—
[Speaker I] He…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In short, there are three situations. The question is whether Rav Huna and Rabbi Yohanan are talking about the first and second, or the second and third, right? The three situations—let’s explain them again. Three situations. First situation: I remember the matter myself; I don’t need the document at all, even without the document. Right. Second situation: I don’t remember on my own, but after reading the document I remembered the incident. Third possibility: no—even after reading the document I still didn’t remember the incident, but I report what is written in the document; I trust the document. Yes. Okay? Now one way to explain the dispute between Rav Huna and Rabbi Yohanan is that Rav Huna requires the first possibility, that you remember by yourself, and Rabbi
[Speaker C] Yohanan says no, even
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if you remember with the help of the document, that’s fine. The second possibility: Rav Huna requires recollection with the help of the document—but with the help of the document, exactly. And Rabbi Yohanan says no, the third one: even if you don’t remember anything, but you say what’s in the document—you don’t remember on your own, you say it from the document—that’s also fine. Neither of those two possibilities can be correct. Three. No, the two possible ways of understanding the dispute between Rav Huna and Rabbi Yohanan—neither one can be right.
[Speaker F] Either he looks and remembers, or he says it from the document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. It can’t be right. Why? Because if Rav Huna requires that the person remember on his own, then a person cannot write his testimony in a document. After all, the baraita says: a person may write his testimony in a document and testify from it. According to Rav Huna, that’s only if he remembers. Situation number one can’t be the subject of the baraita, because if he remembers, then he doesn’t need the…
[Speaker F] So—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then what is the permission to write his testimony in a document and testify from it? If I remember testimony on my own, I go and testify to what I remember. What do I need all this for? Yes, that’s ordinary testimony; it’s just plain ordinary testimony, not testimony from a document, right? So that can’t be what he’s talking about. But if Rav Huna isn’t talking about that, then Rabbi Yohanan becomes difficult for us. So Rav Huna must be talking about the second case, right? That he remembers with the help of the document. But then Rabbi Yohanan would be talking about a situation where he doesn’t remember at all, even with the help of the document? How can that be? After all, that would be “from their mouths and not from their writing.” We’ve already seen that, right? A person cannot testify from a document. More than that—look further on in the Gemara. Rava said—you see this? Rava said: infer from Rabbi Yohanan that if there are two people who know testimony, and one of them forgets it, the other can remind his fellow. There are two witnesses who know testimony. One of them forgot it. Let’s say they were witnesses to a betrothal, okay? A betrothal. One of them forgot it. The other comes and says to him: listen, let me remind you. Do you remember that on such-and-such a day in such-and-such a place, both of us saw the betrothal? Boom—he remembers. That’s permitted; that’s what Rava derives from Rabbi Yohanan. Rava learns this from Rabbi Yohanan. If Rabbi Yohanan is talking about the third case, then how does he derive this from Rabbi Yohanan? After all, the third case means that the document doesn’t remind me of what happened; rather,
[Speaker C] I trust it,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I say what is written in the document. How are you deriving from Rabbi Yohanan this permission for one witness to remind the other witness? Clearly Rabbi Yohanan is talking about the second case, where the document reminds me. Then I say the same thing: another witness can also remind me, right? So we understand that Rabbi Yohanan must be talking about the second case. But Rav Huna can’t be talking about the first case, because there’s no novelty in it. So they’re both talking about the same case. Then what is the dispute? Now let’s see. Did you want to comment, Yael?
[Speaker G] No, I was saying that he learns from the document because the document is a witness.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but that’s testimony from writing, and you can’t do that. I’m telling you what is written in the document.
[Speaker G] Yes, okay, yes, but he told it from a witness.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so what? It’s still invalid. We already saw that. So look at Rashi. I pointed you to Rashi, I told you. Rashi says: “remembers it on his own”—without seeing the document, he independently recalls a little of his testimony. Meaning?
[Speaker H] He remembers the main points?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Part of the testimony. He has some kind of general impression that he remembers without the document, and the document somehow consolidates it or sharpens it. Why does Rashi go into all this—where did he get this from?
[Speaker C] Because it’s like an independent memory of the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Clearly what bothered Rashi was the very question I asked before. If you set up only three cases—and I set up only three cases: either I remember by myself, or the document reminds me, or even the document doesn’t remind me—if those are the only three cases that exist, then you can’t understand the dispute between Rav Huna and Rabbi Yohanan. So Rashi says: Rabbi Yohanan is talking about where the document reminds me completely, and without the document I remember nothing. Rabbi Yohanan says that’s valid. Rav Huna says: only if I remember something from the testimony on my own, and the document just completes it. He had to introduce some kind of intermediate case, because otherwise you can’t understand what Rav Huna and Rabbi Yohanan are arguing about. That’s exactly why Rashi is pushed here into this strange case. Where did he get it from at all? He has no choice; you can’t understand it otherwise. Now let’s continue. The next Rashi: “even though he does not remember it”—that is, “remember it on his own.” “Even though he does not remember it on his own,” Rashi says: rather, after he sees what is in the document. Yes, that’s Rabbi Yohanan’s explanation, right? Rather, after he sees what is in the document, he takes it to heart and remembers, meaning it was not so forgotten that when reminded he cannot recall it. But he does not remember it completely? No! For the Merciful One said: “from their mouths and not from their writing.” In other words, Rashi is telling us: the third case, where you see the document but it does not remind you even after you’ve seen it, and you merely report that this is what is written in the document—that is certainly invalid according to everyone. That’s “from their mouths and not from their writing.” Even Rabbi Yohanan does not validate that. Therefore Rabbi Yohanan is clearly talking about the second case, where the document reminds him—no, reminds you of everything, according to Rabbi Yohanan. And Rav Huna claims no: if the document reminds you of everything, that is still problematic. If you remember part of it and the document only consolidates your memory, then it’s fine. Okay? That’s the argument. Now the truth is, starting Tosafot now—we’re not going to. Okay, basically I suggest: did you go over the Tosafot? Where did you get to on the page?
[Speaker H] Still in Tosafot, right? This Tosafot? Yes. You got this far? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good, so what we’ll do—excellent. If so, let’s summarize this way. Look at this Tosafot—okay, finish this Tosafot, all right, for next time. Next time, by the way, is in another week. It’s Purim. Yes, another week. Tuesday is Purim. Next time, I hope that in light of what we discussed now, what Tosafot says will be clearer. And if you manage with it, then maybe we won’t even read it in class next time; we’ll just summarize what it says. If you want us to go through it anyway, then we will. Okay? Fine. Then we’ll continue. The next stage, of course, is to see our own passage already—Rabbi and the Rabbis, our dispute—which I understand you haven’t reached yet, so that’s the next stage.
[Speaker G] No, you told us in advance that we’d do this slowly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, perfectly fine. I said these are very confusing topics, and we haven’t even started with the confusing topics yet. So far everything is fine—these are the simple things. In a moment you’ll see how this whole business starts getting confusing. Okay? That’s in our passage. And that’s why it was very important to me to do this step by step and give background, so that we don’t get confused here. Did you write it down on the note? Great, then my wife will get in touch with you.