Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 24

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So let’s look at this further in the Ran. It seems that way. Meanwhile, in Tosafot it doesn’t seem that there’s a problem with this.

[Speaker I] In Tosafot no, but theoretically, if the Rabbi is laying out the possibilities, then theoretically you could raise the possibility that this too is something illegitimate. If he gives prior notice, then maybe that also has to be written into the document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the case of Mar bar Rav Ashi that definitely doesn’t work, because Mar bar Rav Ashi says this explicitly only about an accommodation document and not about prior notice. And Rav Nachman seems, in the Ran—we’ll get to the Ran in a moment. But this can lead… he says this according to the Ran. Right now I’m talking about Rav Nachman according to Rashi and Tosafot. Okay?

[Speaker C] The fact that you can write a prior-notice document makes it feel kind of wide open. Meaning, I can say, okay, they coerced me and I regretted it, and then write up something like that before I act.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here there are witnesses who say this is a prior-notice document. It’s not just someone making a claim—that wouldn’t help him. But if he has witnesses, that’s different.

[Speaker C] The Ran also brought

[Speaker H] the option that it was written before the prior notice.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’ll see that in a second.

[Speaker H] And in Mar bar

[Speaker F] Rav Ashi that means that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And according to Mar bar Rav Ashi, if the witnesses here say it was prohibited, they really can undermine the document. He doesn’t accept the principle of Rashi and Tosafot in Rav Nachman—that is, it’s not Rashi and Tosafot; rather, he doesn’t accept Rav Nachman. Rashi and Tosafot themselves would say that Mar bar Rav Ashi does not accept Rav Nachman’s principle. In principle, oral testimony can undermine a document, even if it doesn’t say there is no document, even if it says it was an accommodation document or prior notice. The only reason that in the case of an accommodation document this doesn’t help is because a person cannot make himself out to be wicked. Right? Yes. And I asked, so what does Rav Nachman say about that? Either he agrees, but claims there is an additional principle, and therefore there’s a practical difference in the case of prior notice. Or Rav Nachman doesn’t agree with that at all. Where did we find someone who doesn’t agree with that? We already found such an opinion. What? About what?

[Speaker H] Here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone who doesn’t accept Mar bar Rav Ashi’s reasoning, that a person cannot make himself out to be wicked.

[Speaker H] What we had with Rabbi Meir?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. With Rami bar Chama in the first interpretation, before Rava rejected it, right? Rami bar Chama says: “We were coerced because of money,” not “because of mortal danger.” Why? Because Rami bar Chama claims that according to Rabbi Meir, even in a case of coercion because of money they would be believed. Why would they be believed? Because “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted” solves the problem of “a person cannot make himself out to be wicked.” Even if there is a problem of making oneself out to be wicked, “the mouth that prohibited” solves it. Right, that’s how we understood Rami bar Chama’s first interpretation. Yes. And if that’s so, then maybe here Rav Nachman, who doesn’t accept Mar bar Rav Ashi’s reasoning, also holds that way. After all, they have “the mouth that prohibited,” so what if they make themselves out to be wicked? If you have “the mouth that prohibited,” that solves the problem of making oneself out to be wicked. Therefore he doesn’t accept that reasoning at all; rather, according to his view, you can’t undermine a document through oral testimony, but aside from that, he wouldn’t have been bothered by the fact that they make themselves out to be wicked. Yes. Because “the mouth that prohibited” solves the problem. Right? Yes. That’s one possibility. Or, as I said, he accepts Mar bar Rav Ashi, but says there is another reason too, and he focuses on the second reason because the second reason disqualifies not only the claim “it was an accommodation document” but also the claim “it was prior notice.” Okay? Yes. In contrast, Mar bar Rav Ashi doesn’t accept the principle that a document cannot be undermined by oral testimony, but he says that a person cannot make himself out to be wicked, and “the mouth that prohibited” does not solve the problem of making oneself out to be wicked, as we saw in practice in the previous passage as well. Practically speaking, he is right. Correct? A person cannot make himself out to be wicked, and “the mouth that prohibited” does not solve that problem. And that exists only in the case of an accommodation document, not in prior notice. What about “he cannot retract and testify differently”? If you remember, in that same passage I said that even though both “a person cannot make himself out to be wicked” and “he cannot retract and testify differently” are problems of admissibility, and therefore “the mouth that prohibited” seemingly does not solve the problem of making oneself out to be wicked, so why does it solve the problem of retracting prior testimony?

[Speaker H] Because it turns everything into one statement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, Rashi. Rashi said there that the logic of “the mouth that prohibited” basically says that the two parts of the testimony are one unit. Right? And therefore it’s not called retracting and testifying differently. It’s one long testimony saying: there was a loan, but we were disqualified; or, we signed the document, but we were disqualified. Right? So why not say the same thing here? They’re basically saying: we signed the document, but it was an accommodation document or prior notice, and they have “the mouth that prohibited.” Yet we say that “the mouth that prohibited” doesn’t help in such a case. Why not? So according to Mar bar Rav Ashi, it actually does help. Right? It’s only in the case of an accommodation document, where the issue is making oneself out to be wicked, that it doesn’t help. That’s fine. But Rav Nachman—why, according to Rav Nachman, does “the mouth that prohibited” not solve the problem? Are they retracting and testifying differently? Fine, “the mouth that prohibited” should solve that.

[Speaker C] No, but according to Rav Nachman they don’t have “the mouth that prohibited,” they don’t have it. Why? They do have “the mouth that prohibited.” No—against witnesses.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They do have “the mouth that prohibited.” What? They do have it, because they are the ones validating the document.

[Speaker C] No, so we said that “the mouth that prohibited” doesn’t help, it won’t help the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But they do have “the mouth that prohibited”—whether it’s prior notice or an accommodation document.

[Speaker C] But it won’t help with the document. The document still…

[Speaker F] He has the principle that oral testimony doesn’t help

[Speaker G] to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What’s the difference? Why? It’s just retracting and testifying differently. The witnesses said one thing and now they’re saying something else, so that’s retracting and testifying differently. “The mouth that prohibited” solves the problem of retracting and testifying differently.

[Speaker I] But that’s not his problem. His problem is different—that oral testimony doesn’t stand against…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? Because it’s retracting and testifying differently. You already testified—these are the same witnesses, as you asked earlier. The witnesses testified earlier with their signatures, and now they testify: yes, but it was an accommodation document or prior notice. So what would you say? It’s retracting and testifying differently? “The mouth that prohibited” solves that, and then there’s no problem of retracting prior testimony.

[Speaker F] But in this passage it’s retracting and testifying differently and canceling the document.

[Speaker C] Exactly—the document, exactly the document itself.

[Speaker F] Right, so Rabbeinu Tam doesn’t have that problem, but here this doesn’t cancel the document, because even if he’s retracting and testifying differently, there is still a document. Retracting and testifying differently—okay, fine—but there is a document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore what? And therefore the second testimony isn’t accepted.

[Speaker F] Yes, but that’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] These are the same witnesses, just as you asked earlier. So then what do we say? We don’t accept the second testimony, only the first, so de facto that is retracting and testifying differently.

[Speaker G] And there is no retracting…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and testifying differently—but as for retracting and testifying differently, “the mouth that prohibited” does solve it.

[Speaker E] Wait, I have a second question here. No, that’s exactly what I asked at the beginning; I don’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, I’ve only now, in a didactic way, gotten to that question. I wanted to postpone it so we could go step by step.

[Speaker E] That’s exactly the difference between the previous passage

[Speaker F] and our passage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is? What’s still the whole problem here? After all, there are two witnesses here—the same two witnesses who told you in the document that there was a loan—and now they tell you no, it was prior notice or an accommodation document. Because

[Speaker H] here there really are two parts in which it appears…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah! That’s the answer! This answer says: we are not saying the document is invalid; we are saying something additional. Right? What is this answer really saying? You can call it retracting and testifying differently, but here “the mouth that prohibited” will not turn it into one testimony. Because this isn’t testimony that speaks about the document—it’s another separate testimony. It has nothing to do with retracting and testifying differently. Here “the mouth”—no, sorry—it has nothing to do with “the mouth that prohibited.” Here “the mouth that prohibited” cannot solve the problem of retracting and testifying differently. Because “the mouth that prohibited” cannot turn these two parts into one testimony. How does “the mouth that prohibited” turn the two parts there into one testimony? They say: we signed the document, but we were disqualified. Right? So “but we were disqualified” is simply completing the testimony we gave about the document. And “the mouth that prohibited” says: view all of this as one unit. But once we say “accommodation document” and “prior notice,” then even if we have “the mouth that prohibited,” it does not become one unit; it still remains two testimonies.

[Speaker E] The document is valid, and therefore

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “the mouth that prohibited” doesn’t solve the problem.

[Speaker E] But why can’t we say—for example, according to the one who asks about an accommodation document, sorry, about prior notice—that it really is…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Prior notice is valid.

[Speaker E] Here there are even time gaps. What I want to say is, exactly: why can’t we say about a prior-notice document that the very signing of a document, where the witnesses know—at least according to Rashi—the witnesses know that this is a bill of sale and the seller is under coercion, and he says to them: I’m selling, okay, I’m signing this bill of sale, but I’m under coercion; I didn’t really want to, there was no genuine intent, I didn’t really mean it, I don’t want to sell, in my view. Why can’t we say that in such a situation there is a defect in the sale too? Meaning, there is a defect in the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re back to the Ran.

[Speaker E] But that’s what’s bothering me, like…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Ran notes, but it’s not exactly like that, because it could be that these witnesses signed in order to enable him to stay alive. If they hadn’t signed, that fellow would have killed him. So they say: no, no, there’s no choice, we’ll sign for him, and therefore it is permitted to sign. That’s the Ran’s point.

[Speaker E] And therefore it’s permitted to sign, and so they

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] are not making themselves out to be wicked when they say that this was the situation.

[Speaker E] But therefore now they can retroactively invalidate the testimony.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and therefore they are believed. And therefore they are believed in the case of a prior-notice document. That is exactly what Mar bar Rav Ashi says. In an accommodation document they are not believed; in prior notice they are believed. Hey, are they making themselves out to be wicked? Not at all—it was permitted for them to sign; they are not making themselves out to be wicked, because they saved him.

[Speaker H] That was the Ran’s line of thinking. I want to say something about “the mouth that prohibited,” because for me that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand why there really isn’t “the same mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” There is, there is “the same mouth that prohibited”; it just doesn’t help. There is “the same mouth that prohibited,” since it’s by their own authority that the document was validated, but it doesn’t help. I explained earlier why it doesn’t help: because what it accomplished before, “the same mouth that prohibited,” was that it turned the two parts of the testimony into one unit. So this is not retracting and retestifying; it’s one long testimony. What is the testimony? We signed the document, but we were disqualified. You can’t stop me in the middle. I’m telling you one sentence: I signed the document and I was disqualified. In any case, while I was signing, I was disqualified. Right. So I’m saying that “the same mouth that prohibited” basically tells me: take this whole testimony as one unit. It’s testimony that I was disqualified, so you accept it. That’s not called retracting and retestifying. But here it’s not like that. Why not? Because I signed the document and the document is valid. And now I continue and tell you: yes, but the document was a prior notice of coercion or a trust document. That’s an addition of different testimony; it doesn’t cast a different light on what I signed. What I signed remains as it was. Earlier, when I said, “I signed, but I was disqualified,” the “I was disqualified” is only a completion, to describe to you what happened when I signed. With a trust document and a prior notice of coercion, I’m adding additional testimony. So “the same mouth that prohibited is the same mouth that permitted” does not turn this into one testimony. Therefore this is additional testimony, and that additional testimony cannot undermine a document. Okay? It doesn’t work like retracting and retestifying. All right, let’s continue. Fine.

Okay. Can I ask something unrelated? It’s just been sitting in my head the whole time. There’s this idea of “they coerced him and he sold.” Yes. And then, seemingly, okay, the Ran mentions this a bit later, because the fact is he received the money into his hands, so there was some kind of consent here. “They coerced him and he sold” — but if he gives prior notice, then no. No, from the standpoint of the Talmudic text. Exactly. Giving prior notice comes to remove the rule of “they coerced him and he sold.” If I give prior notice in advance and say, “He forced me” — in advance, before I signed. Let’s say, yes, or while it’s happening. I say to witnesses, I say to witnesses, “Listen, I’m signing this under duress.” I’m signing, but… Yes. But the money is with him. What? But the money is with him. He received the money. Yes, but they forced him. He doesn’t want the money and doesn’t want the document. So let him return it. So he’ll return it. Fine, yes. He’ll really return it, it’s not his. Obviously. He received it under duress and with prior notice, wonderful, okay.

Okay, so according to Rashi and Tosafot, this is what comes out. Plainly, it seems that according to Mar bar Rav Ashi there is no general rule that oral testimony cannot undermine a document. Right? There’s no such rule. The only issue is “a person does not make himself wicked,” and that applies only to a trust document and not to a prior notice of coercion. “The same mouth that prohibited” does not solve the problem of “a person does not make himself wicked.” Mar bar Rav Ashi is self-evident. Everything is fine. According to Rav Nachman there is a big novelty. According to Rashi and Tosafot, oral testimony cannot undermine a document, and “the same mouth that prohibited” won’t help it do so; even if it’s “the same mouth that prohibited,” that won’t help. Why, in a trust document, do we need to reach that? After all, there is “a person does not make himself wicked.” One of two things: either he says that “the same mouth that prohibited” solves the problem of “a person does not make himself wicked,” like the initial assumption of Rami bar Chama; or, true, that could also have been another reason why in a trust document they are not believed, but they bring the broader reason because it is also correct regarding a prior notice document, not only a trust document. But all the same, regarding a trust document he accepts Mar bar Rav Ashi’s reason. Okay, that’s the conclusion of the previous passage; that’s the simpler reading. Fine.

Okay, now I asked you on the page — maybe even according to Mar bar Rav Ashi the rule still exists that oral testimony does not undermine a document? But he holds that testimony about prior notice and testimony about a trust document also come to say that the document itself is no good. And therefore he does not accept the… wait, sorry, wait. No, the opposite. I’m saying, I want to say, with Mar bar Rav Ashi it could be — I asked you on the page — is there a possibility that even according to Mar bar Rav Ashi we could say that oral testimony does not undermine a document? Does he also agree to that principle? Theoretically I could have said yes. And therefore he says: with a trust document I’m coming to undermine the document and I can’t do that. Prior notice is something external, and therefore I can do it. Why is it external? It’s like an additional thing, okay. Prior notice is something else; it’s not the document. But again, even without getting into that distinction, which can also be discussed — in the Talmudic text itself it doesn’t sound that way. Because the Talmudic text itself explains why, in a trust document, they are not believed. Why? Because such documents were not meant to be written. Exactly. It’s not because of the problem of… Right, so in the wording of the Talmudic text maybe one could have set up that position, but from the wording of the Talmudic text you see that this is not Mar bar Rav Ashi. Right. So if so, I’ll summarize: according to Rashi and Tosafot, Mar bar Rav Ashi does not accept the principle that oral testimony does not undermine a document. That’s where we have been until now. Let’s see.

This connects to Rav Nachman — that oral testimony does not undermine a document because a document, at least according to the Sages, needs validation, right? Those who are supposed to… No, a validated document is not undermined; we’re talking about a validated document. Here, after all, the witnesses validated the document. Chicken because… No, the witnesses validated the document. The document is validated. Obviously an unvalidated document does not need to be undermined. An unvalidated document can’t be collected with even without your making any claim against it. We are talking about a validated document. But the witnesses themselves validated the document, because I think there is significance to who validates the document. If the document had been validated from elsewhere, then it would be two against two. But now, since the ones validating the document are the very witnesses who signed it, why do we give them more power in the signature and believe them in the signature, but not give them the power to actually remove the document’s validity? Because this does not remove the document’s validity. That’s what Tosafot says: if they were removing the document’s validity, we would give them that power. That’s when they say, “We were coerced,” or “we are wicked,” or “we were disqualified.” But when they say “trust document” or “prior notice,” they are not actually removing the document. They are saying the document is no good — is that called removing the document’s force? With trust document and prior notice, they are not coming to remove the force of the document. The document is perfectly fine. They are only claiming: don’t make use of this perfectly fine document, because it is a trust document or prior notice. That they cannot do. Once the document is perfectly fine, that’s it. You can’t claim anything against it.

I’m still stuck on what you said earlier, that what matters is this point — that they actually are not validating the document. What? They’re trying not to validate the document. No, no, the document is validated. We signed it, and it is a valid document, and there was intent on the part of the obligated party, everything is fine. There was just a trust arrangement or a prior notice. That is different from “we were disqualified,” where we say that really it isn’t true — there was no document.

Okay, let’s look at the Ran on the Rif. “Witnesses who said: ‘These were our words as a trust document’ are not believed, even if their handwriting does not emerge from another place, as Rav Ashi concluded above from Rav Kahana. And Rav Nachman also holds that ‘these were our words as a prior notice’ — they are not believed, because he holds that since there is prior notice, they are not permitted to write that document for which prior notice was given, for we are not dealing with prior notice because of threat to life, but because of monetary coercion.” Yes. Where is the distinction? What is he explaining? He wants to say that this is not “we were coerced” in a situation where they were allowed to write the prior notice. He is now explaining both prior notice and also Rav Nachman — pay attention. Rav Nachman, who doesn’t believe them either in the claim of prior notice or in the claim of trust document — not because of the foundation of Rashi and Tosafot, not because oral testimony cannot undermine a document. Rather, he thinks that prior notice is like a trust document: that too is forbidden to write. Meaning, the reason that Mar bar Rav Ashi says regarding a trust document, Rav Nachman says also regarding prior notice. So the dispute between Rav Nachman and Mar bar Rav Ashi is only about the question whether it is permitted or forbidden to sign a prior notice document. Unless it’s prior notice in a case of coercion. No, obviously. And therefore he has to say that we’re talking here about monetary coercion, because in life-threatening coercion it is obviously permitted to sign — that was the conclusion of the previous passage. But in monetary coercion it is forbidden to sign. Okay? On the document. And therefore, as we saw in the previous passage about “we were coerced” because of money — here it’s not exactly the same, because the one under coercion was the borrower, not the witnesses. But he says it’s the same idea: you were not allowed to sign such a document. Okay? Because the whole story is only monetary coercion. Therefore you may not lie in order to save someone else’s property. That too is a novelty, by the way. Really — no, but according to Jewish law, you’re forbidden to lie when you’re saving someone else’s money. After all, you’re signing a document where they forced the other party. But we said that a person is obligated to save someone else’s property. Right, but here you have to notice — this is what you pointed out earlier — this prior notice document is talking about a bill of sale, not a loan, right? Someone sold against his will. “They coerced him and he sold.” Right? Now we are not saving his money. After all, he sold the land and received money. His life. Exactly; he just wants the land, he did not want to sell it. For that, we are forbidden to sign falsely. Wait, wait — you can’t infer from here that we are forbidden to sign falsely in order to prevent financial loss. Yes, that’s already an additional conclusion; I don’t know if the Ran says that. What the Ran does say — and this is also a novelty — what the Ran says is that in order to save someone’s land from being sold when he is getting money for it, for that purpose we are forbidden to lie. Is it only land? Doesn’t matter, any property. Usually land is sold with a document, so he brings it as a case of property, not life, because if it were life-threatening then yes, it would be permitted to do this. Literally so; he would be obligated to do it, because otherwise he would die. But what do we see for our purposes? That these are side issues. For our purposes, the Ran argues that even in Rav Nachman’s view there is no principle saying that oral testimony cannot undermine a document. There is no such opinion. According to Rashi and Tosafot, Rav Nachman says it and Mar bar Rav Ashi disagrees. According to the Ran, even Rav Nachman does not say it. He explains it. Because he says it’s like… so there is no opinion that oral testimony cannot undermine a document. Okay? Why? Because there is “the same mouth that prohibited.” What he is basically saying is what you kept asking all along — the Ran is really saying exactly that. After all, there is “the same mouth that prohibited” here, so why should I care whether it goes against the document, disqualifies the document, or whatever? Bottom line, he has “the same mouth that prohibited”; he could have thrown this document to the winds. Why shouldn’t you believe him? That’s what the Ran says. Therefore we must say that the only reason Rav Nachman does not believe in a trust document or prior notice is not because of that principle, but because “a person does not make himself wicked.” And “the same mouth that prohibited” does not solve the problem of “a person does not make himself wicked.” And in prior notice too they are making themselves wicked. Mar bar Rav Ashi disagrees about that. Mar bar Rav Ashi argues that one is allowed to do this, and therefore here they are not wicked. In a trust document they are wicked, not in prior notice. Why? Because in prior notice, even if there is no financial loss, still they forced him to sell the land, and it is your right — or maybe not just your right but even your duty — to do something that saves him, and therefore you are forbidden to sign falsely even though he is not losing money; bottom line, they forced him. According to Rav Nachman, he was forbidden to sign, and therefore he makes himself wicked and is not believed to say he signed this. According to Mar bar Rav Ashi, it is permitted to sign in such a situation — yes, because it is permitted to sign — and therefore the claim is that they are not called wicked. Okay? Even in monetary coercion? Yes. Yes. Even in monetary coercion. And it’s not financial loss, it’s just coercion. Loss… forced sale. Right, like urban renewal, okay? There’s a building, and a contractor comes and wants to buy all the land, but there’s some elderly person who doesn’t want to sell. It’s been his home for fifty years; he doesn’t care if you bring him three million shekels, he doesn’t want to sell. There are people like that. In that neighborhood, talking about high-rises, he doesn’t want to sell. Were those words in Rashi already in the Talmudic text? What, which line? “The reason he did not give the reason and says about the document” — was that written in the Talmudic text itself? Maybe, because after that in my edition there’s a colon and then it starts the opening phrase “regarding the document.” I don’t know. I don’t think so. I don’t have the Talmud in front of me, but I don’t remember that being in the Talmudic text. No, because that’s their explanation. I don’t think it’s a version in the Talmudic text. Do you want to check? Let’s see. In mine it isn’t written; it’s in the commentary font, not the quotation font. Yes, but that would be… No, because these are two subsections within Rashi’s commentary on that phrase, just two parts of the commentary. Rashi wants to say two things in this comment; that’s probably what’s happening. That’s just the printing format. There is one phrase, and on it Rashi wants to say two things that aren’t connected. Now, since there are no punctuation marks in the Talmudic text, if he said everything in one continuous flow you wouldn’t understand that he is saying two different things here, so there’s a colon. No, I don’t think it’s a version in the Talmudic text. Because it’s really puzzling — what about the Ran? How does the Ran not address that? No, because the Ran disagrees with it. After all, there is “the same mouth that prohibited” here. What — you also didn’t agree with it, why is it so difficult? No, exactly, but the idea… Say something about it. He addressed some rationale and doesn’t mention it at all; he doesn’t explain why Rashi’s argument… He doesn’t need to explain — why should he? There is “the same mouth that prohibited” here; what needs explaining? On the contrary, Rashi and Tosafot are the ones who need to explain. Yes, there is “the same mouth that prohibited”; why shouldn’t he be believed? This is a novel claim. By the way, it is not accepted in Jewish law. Even Mar bar Rav Ashi — Rashi and Tosafot also agree that we do not rule like this. They innovate this in order to explain Rav Nachman. But in principle it is a very novel thing. The Ran says: you don’t need to get there; I can explain it simply. After all, if there is wickedness here, we know that “the same mouth that prohibited” does not solve the problem that a person makes himself wicked. So the whole dispute is only over the question whether prior notice too contains wickedness — that’s all. What’s the problem? What appears in the Talmudic text — on the contrary, the only reason that appears in the Talmudic text itself is only Mar bar Rav Ashi’s reason. With Rav Nachman no reason is written. Maybe also the continuation of the Talmudic text — it feels like they’re talking about recognition of the document or not recognition of the document, not about this story with… Recognition of the document is Tosafot; it’s not the Talmudic text. Oh, you mean “there was a condition in our words”? Wait, we’ll get there, step by step, okay? So that’s the Ran on the Rif. According to the Ran, then, the dispute between Mar bar Rav Ashi and Rav Nachman is not a principled dispute; it is a specific dispute about prior notice, whether one is allowed to sign a document in such a case or forbidden to sign a document in such a case.

Now he continues: “And Rashi wrote that it may be written in order to save the coerced person from his coercer,” therefore prior notice may be written. And of course that explanation does not fit the Ran. “And according to this, it seems to me that when are they believed? Specifically when their handwriting does not emerge from another place. But when their handwriting does emerge from another place, no. For although it may be written for this reason — after all, when they say ‘we were coerced because of threat to life,’ all the more so it may be written — nevertheless when their handwriting emerges from another place, they are not believed because it is as if they are retracting and retestifying. But if we explain ‘may be written’ to mean that the document itself is effective, for when one cancels a sale because of prior notice the seller must return the money…” In short, he goes into all sorts of legal details here. “And likewise, if we explain that this ‘may be written’ refers to the prior notice that they have the power to write and to date before the bill of sale, or on that very day, then it is also possible to say that even when their handwriting emerges from another place they are believed, because these are not retracting and retestifying, since they have not yet testified — because they had the power from the outset to invalidate the testimony of the sale.” So this is a novelty only according to Rashi, that one can say it even when their handwriting emerges from another place.

But the Talmudic text later — here it brings in “condition,” and that mixes the whole story up again. Because the Talmudic text says this: “Rava asked Rav Nachman: What if ‘there was a condition in our words’?” Right? What is the law when the witnesses come and say, “There was a condition in our words”? What does “there was a condition in our words” mean? There was some sale or loan with a condition. “Was the reason, in the case of prior notice and trust document, that it undermines the document — and this too undermines the document? Or perhaps a condition is a different matter?” So there is a doubt here whether this is similar to prior notice and trust document or not similar. We’ll soon see what the doubt is. He said to him: “When they come before us for judgment, we say to them: Go fulfill your condition and then come down to judgment.” What does that mean? That the witnesses are believed? Believed to say that this is the condition. Right? That’s how Rav Nachman answers. One must remember that Rav Nachman is the person who said that with neither a trust document nor prior notice are they believed. And regarding him they ask… not incidentally, not incidentally — they ask Rav Nachman whether this is “a different matter.” Wait, we’ll see in a moment. So first of all one has to remember that the difficulty here, the doubt here, is raised before Rav Nachman. Right. Rav Nachman is the one who holds that also in a trust document… why here is he believed? This is not the Jewish law ruling, as most halakhic decisors rule. The halakhic decisors say we rule like Mar bar Rav Ashi. Fine? But the question is asked to Rav Nachman, which itself is already a bit strange. But Rav Nachman, who says that in both trust document and prior notice they are not believed — presumably for Mar bar Rav Ashi it is obvious that in the case of a condition they would be believed. If there is a difference between trust document and prior notice, then condition certainly resembles prior notice, right? Because a condition is obviously permitted. So Rav Ashi, who makes everything depend on whether it is permitted or forbidden, there is nothing to ask him. According to Rav Nachman, who makes it depend on whether one can undermine a document with oral testimony, there is room to discuss whether a condition is like prior notice and trust document or not. What is the question here? Seemingly it is obvious that it is like prior notice and trust document, no? Yes. After all, with prior notice and trust document, how did Rashi and Tosafot explain it? But this is wording — let’s see according to Rashi and Tosafot. We’ll start with Rashi and Tosafot and then the Ran. Everything depends on how you understand prior notice and trust document, right? Whether a condition resembles them or not resembles them. So that depends on Rashi and Tosafot versus the Ran. Let’s do the accounting according to each of them.

According to Rashi and Tosafot, with Rav Nachman — everything here is Rav Nachman — trust document and prior notice are both something external, and therefore the witnesses cannot testify about them. What about condition? That is about the document itself. The document exists and there is something there. So that is really just like prior notice and trust document, no? So what is the doubt? And that’s it, no? The condition is at the time of the signing, no? Yes. I didn’t understand. It is immanent to the document. The signing of the document is conditional. It’s not that the document is separate from the testimony. Meaning, the question is whether, when we condition the transaction, that thing is testimony that is essential to the body of the transaction — unlike prior notice and trust document, which only come to tell you: the document is fine, but don’t make use of it. With condition, it’s not saying the document is fine and don’t use it. It is part of the condition. The document was made conditionally. Okay? That is, seemingly, one side of the coin. The other side of the coin is — perhaps really it is something else, like prior notice and trust document. But all that is according to Rashi and Tosafot, right?

Now according to the Ran this is really not clear. Because I explained why the question is directed to Rav Nachman and not to Mar bar Rav Ashi. Since Mar bar Rav Ashi makes everything depend on the question of wickedness or not wickedness, there is nothing to ask him, right? A condition is certainly not wickedness. Right — but according to the Ran, Rav Nachman too makes everything depend on the question of wickedness and not wickedness. No problem. Right? After all, according to the Ran, even Rav Nachman, who disqualifies the testimony both in a trust document and in prior notice, does so simply because prior notice too, in his view, is wickedness. So a condition is certainly something permitted. So what is the question? Yes — so should we disqualify the condition too? No, we can… What? But in the Talmudic text itself it is a doubt. What is the side, what is the side of the doubt in the Talmudic text? More than that: according to the conclusion, in fact, we do uphold the testimony about the condition, right? After all, in the conclusion that’s what he answers. Not only is there no need to ask anything, even the conclusion is not right — not only is there a question on one side of the doubt that falls away. No, that side also remains in the final conclusion. What does Rav Nachman answer in the conclusion? That the testimony about the condition we do uphold, that we do accept their testimony about the condition, even though neither a trust document nor prior notice do we accept. No, sorry, sorry, sorry, I was mistaken — the opposite. It is only a question about one possible side. After all, in the conclusion it’s fine; that actually does fit, because the testimony about the condition is accepted. Why? Because condition is not an act of wickedness. Exactly, not at all. In trust document and prior notice, Rav Nachman does not believe them because “a person does not make himself wicked,” right? With condition, this is not wickedness, and therefore he accepts it. So there is no question on Rav Nachman’s conclusion; the question is only what the initial assumption was according to the Ran, yes. According to the Ran, what was the initial assumption? Here it’s not about wickedness, and a condition is certainly not wickedness. Yes. According to the Ran it is not clear; the Talmudic text does not fit.

One could say — one could say in the Ran’s view — yes, one could say that the Ran also agrees that for Rav Nachman there is some limit, beyond which documents are not attacked. Meaning, the Ran does not accept Rashi and Tosafot’s approach in Rav Nachman, that trust document and prior notice are something external. Trust document and prior notice mean that the document itself is worthless. So “the same mouth that prohibited is the same mouth that permitted” should have solved the problem — except that because of the wickedness involved, it doesn’t work. Right? That’s what the Ran says in Rav Nachman’s view, okay? But with condition, no. Condition is a kind of thing that is not connected to the document itself at all. Why shouldn’t they be believed in testimony about a condition? It is entirely possible that they would be believed in testimony about the condition. In trust document and prior notice, they come and uproot the document; they say the document is worth nothing, it is a trust document or prior notice. With condition they do not uproot the document; they say that the document was a document written conditionally, that’s all. And if the condition is fulfilled, as it were? What’s the point? As long as the condition is not fulfilled, it is a qualification of the document, not an uprooting of it. If he fulfills the condition there is no problem; we say, fulfill the condition and come to judgment — no problem if they fulfill the condition. But they need to fulfill the condition; without fulfilling the condition it doesn’t help, right?

So if that’s right, then the Ran too does not completely remove the principle of Rashi and Tosafot that external testimony cannot attack a document. Then why is the question only to Rav Nachman? Ah right, one could ask it to Rav Ashi too. There? After all, from his standpoint it comes out of nowhere; there is no issue here at all of oral testimony coming to undermine the document. No — according to Mar bar Rav Ashi you can’t ask it. According to Mar bar Rav Ashi we see that with prior notice you are believed. If with prior notice you are believed, that means clearly he does not have this principle that you don’t attack… condition. But according to the Ran, even with prior notice and trust document it’s all the story of whether they… but not because essentially one cannot attack a document orally. In principle one can, in principle… wait — for Mar bar Rav Ashi it is clear that there is no such principle, exactly. For Rav Nachman it could be that it only applies in more extreme cases, but still, even according to the Ran, it could be said in an extreme case. That’s what I want to say. Okay? Trust document and prior notice are not extreme enough for that, so the Ran is unwilling to explain trust document and prior notice on that plane — that one cannot attack a document — but with condition, yes. Condition could be the place to say that we will not accept their testimony about the condition because condition is something external. There too Rav Nachman would agree; there too the Ran would agree — sorry — that according to Rav Nachman you cannot attack a document on the basis of oral testimony. In the conclusion, you can; that is the conclusion. But in the initial assumption perhaps not. More than that I don’t know; it really is a question. The whole business, if so, is not practical Jewish law anyway, because Rav Nachman is not ruled in practice at all. According to what I’m saying now, maybe here even Mar bar Rav Ashi would agree — I don’t know — if it’s something really external. Mar bar Rav Ashi also perhaps could have agreed to such a thing, and maybe one could have asked this also to Mar bar Rav Ashi. And then the fact that they asked Rav Nachman is just incidental. It’s not that it’s not practical law; it’s that it is practical law — maybe they asked the same question to Mar bar Rav Ashi too. Maybe, I don’t know. If earlier the Rabbi said that Rav Nachman too thinks like Mar bar Rav Ashi on this point, that it could be because there was some transgression here, because of “a person does not make himself wicked.” No, that’s unrelated. “A person does not make himself wicked” is not our issue. I’m talking about the question: in a place where you are not making yourself wicked, is it obvious that you are believed there, or could it be that even there you still would not be believed? So I’m saying that with condition it could be that you still would not be believed. Exactly — and there there are two reasons, so earlier when there was one reason, here the question still remains. What, only the combination of both together does the work? That can’t be, because then why with prior notice? With prior notice there is only one reason and it is enough to… But we said that according to the Ran there isn’t that. With prior notice too, according to Rav Nachman, it is forbidden to do it. Because of the wickedness. Yes. But not because you can’t attack a document. Right, but suppose Rav Nachman has two reasons: one, that it is forbidden to attack a document by… But not according to the Ran. According to the Ran it is only the wickedness. From the Ran, plainly it seems there is no problem of attacking a document. If there is good testimony, it will attack even a document. So with prior notice or with… I’m following the Ran. We’re following the Ran. Right. So then here we… so what extra role does the wickedness play, no? I’m saying that from here it emerges that maybe there is a limit beyond which even according to the Ran there may be the possibility that you cannot attack a document: there is a document standing before me saying that there was a transaction, and suddenly two people come and say there was a condition here. No such thing. You can’t attack the document with a completely unrelated claim. Trust document or prior notice is a claim related to the document. The document itself is a problematic document. Trust document and prior notice are not invalid like “we were coerced” or “we were disqualified”; rather, it is a document, but I say there is something not okay in the document. With condition, the document is perfectly fine, everything is wonderful, use it — it just requires a condition. That’s a big novelty. So why isn’t that condition written in the document? So you cannot come out against a document. In such a case maybe even the Ran accepts the possibility that oral testimony cannot attack a document. In the conclusion, no. But in the doubt presented before Rav Nachman, that was the doubt. And then I return to what I said earlier: maybe the Ran too does not completely reject the principle of Rashi and Tosafot in Rav Nachman — at least as an initial assumption. In the conclusion it falls away. And it is entirely possible that if there were an even more extreme case, then maybe there it would remain even in the conclusion. I don’t know. One has to think what claim could be more remote from the document than “there was a condition in our words.” Okay?

Now the Ran himself asks this further on. He says: “I am astonished — why are they believed more with a condition than with a trust document? For the condition itself is a trust arrangement. What difference is there between trusting him regarding the giving of money and trusting him regarding the fulfillment of the condition? In both cases, he became obligated only on condition that that thing be fulfilled.” In other words, what is the difference between a trust document and a condition? After all, in both cases I basically left a document with him and trusted him. What did I trust him about? That he would fulfill the condition. After all, the condition is not written in the document; he could have cheated — I trusted him. The same thing, I trust him in that too. But what is he really getting at? What really stands behind this? What is the difference between a trust document and a condition? The Ran says — the Ran does not raise here the possibility that the condition is too remote from the document. Rather, the Ran says that a condition too is really forbidden to do with such a document. A document dependent on a condition is forbidden to make, just as it is forbidden to keep a trust document around. But in bills of divorce they do this all the time. Exactly — what do you mean? “On condition that you not marry so-and-so.” No, but there it is written in the document. But to keep a document where the condition is not written, even though the transaction had a condition, that causes someone to stumble exactly like a trust document. You’re basically saying: he will now enforce the transaction and not fulfill the condition, and deny that there ever was a condition. The condition is not written in the document. No, obviously — that’s what I’m talking about. The witnesses say there was a condition even though it’s not written in the document. That is the whole problem. If it were written in the document then there would be no question. Right. Okay? So he says, then what is the difference? So again, you see from the Ran that according to his approach he is not going where I suggested. The Ran does not argue here that it is something remote and therefore the witnesses can be believed even against a document. Rather, the Ran says that condition is like a trust document because condition too involves wickedness. To keep a document in which a condition in the transaction is not described, when the transaction was conditional, is “do not place a stumbling block.” You are still causing him or her to stumble, bringing the person to deny the existence of a condition and enforce the transaction. Yes. So he sets up this case of condition only as a difficulty on Rav Nachman, or also on Mar bar Rav Ashi? In the Talmudic text it is… In the Talmudic text they ask this on Rav Nachman. What? The Talmudic text itself asks it on Rav Nachman. But then according to the Ran here, it is also difficult for Mar bar Rav Ashi, because if it is — because it is like a trust document. Right. Like a trust document. Right. Right. So for example, the Ran is not explaining this on the Talmudic text; the Ran is asking this on the Talmudic text. You are right that his objection to the Talmudic text actually means that really you shouldn’t even have distinguished between Rav Nachman and Mar bar Rav Ashi. It’s the same thing. And he objects even more strongly: it isn’t even specifically difficult on Rav Nachman, so there is no reason not to object equally on Mar bar Rav Ashi. And presumably the objection is not really difficult. So what?

“And it seems to me that this is the reason: for in a trust document, the borrower has not yet become obligated to the lender at all, since it is in his power not to borrow from him, and there is no obligation here. Therefore it is forbidden for a person to keep such a document in his house, because he is keeping a document in which he has no right at all. But with a condition, the borrower does become obligated to the lender — but on condition that he speak about him to the authorities, and the like.” Yes, these are those conditions where one says: I’m willing to obligate myself to you if you intercede for me with the king or something; I need some sort of matter here, a kind of condition, yes? “And in every such case the obligation takes effect from now, against the borrower’s will, since it is in the lender’s power to fulfill his condition, and certainly it is not forbidden to keep this document in his house, since the obligation has already partially taken effect from now — just as it is permitted to keep a document of one hundred although he owes only fifty, for even with a paid document there is an opinion in the Talmudic text that sometimes he keeps it because he needs the scribe’s fee, and it is permitted to maintain it.” Yes, I keep the document even though part of it has been paid, because he still hasn’t paid me the cost of writing the document. Sorry, what does “it is forbidden” mean there? What? What is that? “It is forbidden.” Yes.

He says there is a difference between a trust document and a condition. Why? That was the question. The question was that in both a trust document and a condition, when you keep the document with the lender or with the seller or, not משנה who it is — with the buyer, sorry — whoever it is, you are basically causing “do not place a stumbling block.” So why is there no prohibition in a conditional document but there is a prohibition in a trust document? Because here there is already a right. So he says there is a difference. In a trust document, you actually haven’t borrowed at all, and you are giving him the power to sue you by means of the document. That it is forbidden to do. He will come sue you by means of the document, and that’s it. With a conditional document, what is the concern — that he will come sue? But when I conditioned the transaction, the transaction already took effect. In a trust document I owe you nothing at all; how can I give you a document when I owe you nothing? In a case of a document where I bought a field on condition, I really did buy the field. True, you need to fulfill the condition, but I bought the field. And fulfillment of the condition is in your hands. There is no reason for him to sue me; let him fulfill the condition and everything will be fine. What’s the problem? It’s not in my hands. In a loan, after all, I might now decide not to borrow from you at all, right? I gave you the document, and two days later things worked out and I don’t need the loan. So what then? He’ll sue me for a loan even though he never lent me anything. In a conditional document, after all, he did in fact sell to me or lend to me; the transaction was made. I just wanted to condition my liability on some condition, that he speak for me to the authorities or something like that. First of all, it is in his hands to speak for me to the authorities — let him go do that. What’s the problem? In a loan I can decide not to borrow; that is in my hands, not in his. Okay? Second, with a condition the transaction takes effect, only there is a condition that might later uproot it — but the transaction takes effect — so why shouldn’t I give him a document for that transaction?

I understood that according to the way this is a condition, the matter takes effect only after the condition is fulfilled, and not before the condition is fulfilled — that’s the whole point of a condition; otherwise what is the condition for? That is a good point, and I don’t have time to discuss it, I’ll just note it for two minutes. Rabbi Shimon Shkop actually has an essay on conditions at the end of his novellae on Gittin, and there he begins a long line of argument to show that a condition is not what people usually think it is. Let’s say I give something to someone on condition that he do something — speak for me to the authorities, okay? So I gave it to him conditionally. What does that mean? Usually the understanding is that if he goes and speaks for me to the authorities, then retroactively it becomes clear that I gave it to him; if he did not speak for me to the authorities, then I never gave it to him at all, okay? But in several places you see that it’s not like that. I give it to him in any case; only if he speaks for me to the authorities, then it remains, and if he doesn’t speak for me to the authorities, then it is uprooted. It is uprooted, it is removed. Not that it never was. It is not that a fact became clear retroactively; rather, it is causality from the future to the past. Nonfulfillment of the condition uproots the legal effect that we created, not that it clarifies that it was never effected; rather, it uproots it causally.

I’ll give you one example, one example, one example out of many that he brings there. Wait. Maimonides writes, for example, that if someone gives a bill of divorce to a woman — there are several differences. What happens — no, wait, wait — what happens when I did a divorce on condition, say for a month — a month — can I cancel the condition? Before, during the month. I want to cancel the condition, to turn the divorce into an absolute divorce. Can I? Yes, why not? Who says so? Why not? Because if the condition — once the condition is fulfilled, once the condition is fulfilled, then it turns out retroactively that she was never divorced. So how can I now cancel the condition and say — after all, it happened retroactively; it turned out that there was never a divorce at all. How can I now cancel the condition and turn this into a divorce? But you wanted a divorce — only… If my assumption is that the future event uproots the divorce, not that it reveals there was never a divorce, then I can say: now I remove that mechanism and I don’t allow you to uproot it. So what? But it’s not like that. Meaning, no, that’s exactly how it works. So does it uproot or not uproot? It uproots. There.

Suppose I give a woman a bill of divorce on condition that she not drink wine for a month. Fine? Now, the simple assumption is that if she does not drink wine for a month, then she is divorced. That’s ordinary divorce. If she does drink, then from the very beginning she simply was never divorced. We were just living under a mistake; she was not divorced at all. That is retroactive clarification. If that were the understanding, then after I gave her the bill of divorce, after two weeks I say to her: you know what? This divorce is absolute, without condition. I can’t do such a thing. Not conditional. Even if you drink, even if you don’t drink. Right. Not from now on — from the beginning. Let’s cancel the condition. You can’t do such a thing. Because the condition is not some separate thing; the condition just reveals what was. If she drinks wine, then it will be revealed that she never received a bill of divorce. So what does it mean that now I turn the non-divorce into a divorce? I can’t do that. That already happened. I can’t create something regarding a reality that already happened. If it happened. And if not, then you don’t need the cancellation. Exactly. And if not, then you don’t need the cancellation, so it didn’t happen. No, you do need the cancellation. Suppose it happened in the middle of the month. To cancel the condition, not the divorce. I cancel the condition, not the divorce. Yes, obviously this is all in the middle of the month. So can I cancel it? No. No? Why not? Because at the end of the month it will become clear what was. And she didn’t drink. What do you mean? But she has to refrain from drinking for a month, so if I now cancel the condition for the next two weeks, can I do that? No. He needs to cancel the condition entirely. What does it mean “for the next two weeks”? No, he cancels the condition entirely. No, that everyone agrees he cannot do. Even if she drinks during the next two weeks. He cannot cancel only for the next two weeks. He cannot. Either you do something to the condition as it was stipulated at the time the divorce was given, or you don’t. You can’t now play games. Either you work with what was there or not. After the month, she is already divorced, so nothing will help. No, but if she didn’t drink in the past two weeks… So what? What difference does that make? If she drinks… No, then the month is over… That’s the question… So he gives the divorce retroactively. Then he can cancel the condition and she will be divorced even if she drinks now. Rabbi Shimon asks: how can that be? One can cancel the condition. Rabbi Shimon asks: how can that be? If the condition were only retroactive clarification, then it would be impossible to cancel the condition. There is nothing here to cancel. The condition is not some mechanism that needs canceling. The condition only tells me what was at the time the divorce document was given — whether a divorce was given or not. So what does it mean to cancel the condition? Only if you understand that the condition is a mechanism that uproots the divorce can I say: okay, I now dissipate the mechanism. There is no more mechanism. Fine? Now it can no longer uproot the divorce, and the divorce takes effect in any case. Even if she drinks… Right. Even if she drinks wine, it will be uprooted retroactively. Wait, but why can’t… if she drinks wine, then it turns out she committed adultery. Right. Okay. That is what Rabbi Shimon calls “from now on, retroactively.” Sorry — what is that? From now on, we also look differently at the past. That’s not “retroactively” in the simple sense. “Retroactively” just means, for example, that… one second. Suppose I had a child born while I was abroad. Fine? Now I don’t know if it’s a boy or a girl. I got back home and it turned out it was a boy. Obviously it was a boy from the beginning, not from the moment I found out. I simply lacked information. The simple conception of condition is the same thing. The future event simply reveals to me information that I did not previously have, but it doesn’t do anything. It doesn’t produce anything. It only reveals what the reality was. The Holy One, blessed be He, knew it in advance. I, as a human being, do not know it. After the month passes I see she didn’t drink wine, so it becomes clear to me that she really was divorced. If she did drink wine, it becomes clear to me that she was not divorced, but this only clarifies reality for me; it doesn’t do anything. That is the simple conception. By contrast, Rabbi Shimon says no, it’s not like that. The event of drinking the wine uproots the divorce; it does not reveal that there was never a divorce. It uproots the divorce. And only if you understand it that way can you talk about canceling the condition.

Wait, didn’t you once say some sentence — something that doesn’t take effect on… No, that’s something else; don’t mix categories. Until this month, did the divorce take effect? Yes. Sorry, afterward retroactively no. It’s time travel — literally time travel. Is it known in advance that he can change the condition? What? Why? There is a view among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that one can cancel a condition. According to that view, it is clear that stipulation means… nonfulfillment of the condition uproots the legal effect; it does not reveal that there never was a legal effect. I’ll give you another example, look. What? For all views? No, I said there are such views, not all. According to those views, yes. There is a mechanism here. Right. Afterward he created a condition? What? After it already took effect? No, that in any case is impossible because she is already divorced, finished. But according to both views, throughout that month she was divorced? What? Retroactively she was divorced, and afterward it was canceled retroactively, and she is not divorced even during that month. Wow. There are two time axes. The value of the function at a certain point in time depends on from which point in time I’m looking at it. Do you understand what I mean? The value of the function at a given time point is not single-valued. At the same time point, it depends from where I am looking at that point. If I look at it from that point itself, then the woman is not divorced. If I look at it from some future point in time, then the woman is divorced. But that would be to say that it doesn’t uproot — meaning it only clarifies retroactively. No, why? If it only clarifies retroactively then it doesn’t depend on anything. Then that’s what it was; I just didn’t know it until the stage at which the condition was not fulfilled. I didn’t know, but that’s how it was. But here I’m claiming I knew everything; I lack no information. That was the law until the nonfulfillment of the condition, and after nonfulfillment of the condition the law is different at that same point in time. Suppose a woman committed adultery at that time — in principle, one could execute her. Even though afterward she didn’t fulfill the condition… Sorry. No, but we said — she could commit adultery and afterward drink wine? Exactly. Afterward not drink wine. Don’t drink wine. What? Until fulfillment of the condition, the divorce takes effect. If she drinks wine in the end… It depends again on what I stipulated — whether drinking wine cancels the divorce or doesn’t cancel the divorce; you can formulate it either way. Doesn’t matter. Until fulfillment of the condition, the act done takes effect. Right? Yes.

Take vows, leave divorce aside; divorce is not a good example for this. With vows, for example, there is the Rosh in Nedarim 50. What happens with a vow? I go to a sage and he uproots the vow for me. Fine? The uprooting in a vow is retroactive. But there too Rabbi Shimon proves from the Jerusalem Talmud that it is “from now on, retroactively.” So suppose a person violated his vow, and after a week he went to a sage who uprooted the vow retroactively. If they gave him lashes the day after he violated the vow, they acted correctly. But after a week, you can no longer give him lashes even for the sin he committed a week earlier, because after a week we already see even that earlier time as though there was no vow. Do you understand? Meaning, the value of the function at that point in time depends on from which point we are looking at it. This is connected to time travel; there are many logical paradoxes there, an interesting question. I think one cannot talk about… people make a mistake. People think you can’t talk about time travel because there is some physical constraint. Physics forbids time travel — nonsense. It’s a logical constraint. Time travel is an oxymoron. Because time travel means being on Monday after Tuesday, but Monday is before Tuesday. You can’t be on Monday after Tuesday. To be on Monday and also be on Tuesday is not time travel. I was on Monday now and tomorrow I am on Tuesday — that’s not time travel. Time travel is, after I was on Tuesday, to be on Monday. But if I’m on Monday then I’m before Tuesday. So what does it mean to be on Monday after Tuesday? It’s just nonsense. It’s like a square circle. But maybe… So I’m saying: if you adopt two time axes, then you can. Only that way.

Wait, explain Rabbi Shimon Shkop on vows for a moment. There is a detailed discussion of it on the website; if you want you can read it there. Rabbi Shimon Shkop on vows — please explain. Same thing. He says that one goes to a sage and the sage releases the vow, so the sage uproots the vow retroactively; he does not reveal that I never vowed. Therefore if I violated the vow before I went to the sage and they gave me lashes, and then the sage released the vow, they acted correctly; there is no problem. But after the sage released it for me, and now they come to the religious court and say yes, but he violated the vow before the sage released it — no. But it works retroactively not in the sense of retroactive clarification; rather, it is a causal uprooting of what happened backward in time. The future event — the sage’s uprooting — uproots the vow; it does not reveal that it never was. It uproots it. It existed until I came to the sage and the sage uprooted it. Even though he uprooted it at an earlier point in time. Meaning, it is a future event that serves as a cause for the present.

But how does that work with divorce? What? I understand with a vow, but with divorce I didn’t understand what the effect of the cancellation is. The divorce is uprooted retroactively if she drank wine. But that’s the condition. Right. But the condition means that if she drank wine, the divorce will be uprooted — not that it will become clear that there never was a divorce, but that the divorce will be uprooted. Now if that is so, if it really is uprooting, then one can cancel the condition. Why? Because if I cancel the condition, then there is no mechanism that allows uprooting backward. I canceled it, I dissolved it. If this is not about a mechanism, but rather if she drinks wine then it simply becomes clear that she was never divorced, how can I cancel that? There is nothing here to preserve and nothing here to cancel. It just tells me what will reveal to me the reality of whether she is divorced or not divorced. You can’t cancel a mechanism that reveals reality. You can cancel mechanisms that can perform a halakhic act. I say: I no longer want this mechanism. It can no longer perform that halakhic act.

Now if here in the Talmudic text we see — in this Ran we see — that the Ran apparently understands that the legal effect takes hold in any event even when I establish it conditionally. And therefore, even though it may be that the condition will not be fulfilled and the legal effect will not be realizable, there is no prohibition in leaving the document around even though the legal effect is conditional. Why? Because the legal effect has taken place in any event, and therefore right now the legal effect exists and I may leave that legal effect in place. If the condition is not fulfilled, it will be uprooted — not that it never was, but it will be uprooted. Therefore I may leave the legal effect, leave the document. But this whole conceptual analysis — we still aren’t talking about uprooting; maybe one could still say… Why is that? Because there is a possibility that the condition will be fulfilled, so you can’t say it is invalid. So? No, but on the possibility that the condition is not fulfilled, I don’t owe him anything at all. How can I leave the document with him? That’s exactly a trust document. But still, I don’t know. Fine, and the moment I don’t know, it doesn’t have to be a mechanism. In a trust document too I don’t know — maybe I’ll take the loan. There too I don’t know, and that’s what the Ran asked: it’s the same as a trust document. So he says no, it’s not about not knowing. Here, in any case, the legal effect takes hold. You don’t know — maybe it will be uprooted — but as for the fact that it took hold, it took hold on both sides. Yes, I understood that many things here are tied to realization of the loan, because here the loan is realized, the money is with me. But I don’t owe him, so what does the loan matter? But I don’t owe him if the condition is not fulfilled. So then it changed.

There is such an approach also in conversion, by the way. Also in a trust document, maybe I’ll take the loan, maybe I won’t? Leave that for the other side of time for now. Fine, if you’re talking about two time axes then you’ve arrived at uprooting. It’s suspended — either it will be uprooted, or the legal effect returns and retroactively, as if retrospectively, already… Right, I said there is such a view also in conversion: that a person until the day of his death is still hanging in suspension. Meaning, if he makes some change in his commitment to the commandments, then retroactively either it turns out he was never Jewish, or the conversion is uprooted. There is such a view; it is a view that was not accepted. Not long ago — well, not that recently, in recent years — there was an attempt by certain circles to uproot conversion retroactively, to cancel a conversion. No, one can cancel a conversion, unrelated, but only if it becomes clear to you that at the time of conversion he did not intend to accept the commandments. That is obvious, that is known, but retrospectively retroactively, in my opinion, one cannot. According to all views one cannot; on the contrary, Rabbi Dichovsky wants to argue that even in the first mechanism one cannot cancel. Right, right, right — in my view that is completely untenable. But to say that one can cancel prospectively, that until the day of his death it is still suspended — I don’t know of such a thing. What I saw in a few books — no, that sounds mistaken to me, a very esoteric approach. I don’t know. But there’s no question, and I think that’s what matters. Wait, no, there’s one more small piece and that’s it, and then we’ll leave.