Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 23

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

Rabbi Natan’s lien and the comparison to collection from encumbered property
Documents, evidence and money, and checks as an example
Liens on land, unencumbered property, and personal obligation
The Ran’s innovation: “first collect from the middle party” also in Rabbi Natan’s lien
One who sells his debt document to another and then waives it: Tosafot’s question and answer
The Ran’s answer: where others are harmed, waiver does not work, and the explanation of selling debt documents
Synchronizing the figures Reuven–Shimon–Levi across three scenarios
Fitting the Ran together: when Shimon “drops out of the picture” and when he does not
Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Ran: a contradiction between “the court does not collect through documents” and “it is impossible to waive”
The Chazon Ish’s method and the identification that Rabbi Akiva Eiger is mixing two cases
Closing and the connection to the woman and the ketubah

Summary

General Overview

The lecture concludes the discussion of Rabbi Natan’s lien and presents its basic directions through the Ran’s comparison between collection from encumbered property and collection by virtue of Rabbi Natan’s lien, emphasizing his innovation that if it is possible to collect from the middle party, one does not turn to the third party. The lecture clarifies the status of documents as opposed to land, why a debt document is evidence and not money, and what that means for liens and collection in court. It then examines Tosafot’s question about credibility in the claim that a document is a trust document, based on a migo from the ability to waive, and discusses the dispute between Tosafot and the Ran whether there is a migo or whether there is no ability at all to waive in a case where others would be harmed. Finally, Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question is brought on an apparent contradiction in the Ran, and a structured learning method in the style of the Chazon Ish is described, emphasizing that Rabbi Akiva Eiger mixes two different cases.

Rabbi Natan’s lien and the comparison to collection from encumbered property

The law of Rabbi Natan’s lien is presented in a Reuven–Shimon–Levi structure: Reuven lent to Shimon, and Shimon lent to Levi, and the law establishes that Levi is obligated to Reuven. The Ran compares this to collection from encumbered property in a case where Reuven lent to Shimon and Shimon sold a field to Levi, and that field is encumbered to Reuven. The Ran innovates that just as with encumbered property, if Shimon has unencumbered assets, Reuven does not collect from Levi, so too in Rabbi Natan’s lien, if one can collect from Shimon, Reuven does not go to Levi.

Documents, evidence and money, and checks as an example

The lecture establishes that a debt document is not money but evidence of a debt, and therefore it is called something whose substance is not money and which has no intrinsic value. Using the document enables collection, but what is collected is the debt, not the “value of the document.” A check is defined as an instruction to the bank to pay, not as an object worth money in itself, even though in practice people tend to treat it as money because of confidence and institutional backing, and this spills over into legal questions as well.

Liens on land, unencumbered property, and personal obligation

The “classic” lien is explained as a lien on land, because land is stable, ownership can be tracked, and it can be collected even from a purchaser when it was sold after the loan. Movable property such as a chair is not encumbered in the same way, because it is difficult to determine identity and possession once the object has left the debtor’s possession. In addition, a distinction is presented between a lien on assets and a personal obligation, where the personal obligation is the individual duty to repay, and other assets that are not land are seized by virtue of that obligation and not by virtue of a lien on land.

The Ran’s innovation: “first collect from the middle party” also in Rabbi Natan’s lien

The Ran formulates that Rabbi Natan’s lien is not an automatic mechanism in which Reuven turns to Levi in every case, but rather applies in practice when Shimon does not pay or has no assets. The Ran asks what Rabbi Natan’s lien added if it is similar to an ordinary lien, and answers that documents are not encumbered under ordinary law because their substance is not money, and without Rabbi Natan’s law there would have been no hold on documents.

One who sells his debt document to another and then waives it: Tosafot’s question and answer

The rule “one who sells his debt document to another and then waives it, it is waived” is presented as the basis of Tosafot’s question: if the lender can waive, then he has a migo to say that the document is a trust document. Tosafot answers that there is no migo here, because waiver is worse for him, since with waiver the borrower is truly exempt, whereas with the claim that it is a trust document there is still a chance that the honest borrower will pay, and even a small chance is better than zero.

The Ran’s answer: where others are harmed, waiver does not work, and the explanation of selling debt documents

The Ran rejects Tosafot’s comparison to one who sells a debt document, and argues that in a case where others are harmed and he has no other assets, when they take from this one and give to that one, even if he waived it, it is not waived. The Ran explains that in the sale of debt documents there is room for waiver because the sale of documents is rabbinic according to the Rif, or because the borrower’s personal obligation remains with the lender according to Rabbenu Tam, and therefore the debt remains toward the original lender even after the document is sold. The lecture presents the acquisition called ma’amad sheloshtan as a rabbinic way of selling debt documents, and emphasizes that waiver after the sale can create a tort claim but still takes effect with respect to the debt itself.

Synchronizing the figures Reuven–Shimon–Levi across three scenarios

The lecture distinguishes between three separate stories: Rabbi Natan’s lien when there are two successive loans, collection from encumbered property when Shimon sold land to Levi, and one who sells a debt document when Shimon sells Reuven a document against Levi. An effort is made to keep fixed the order that Levi owes Shimon and Shimon is connected to Reuven, so that in the end Reuven comes “to take something from Levi,” but each time by a different mechanism. This distinction is needed so as not to get confused between a lien on assets, the sale of a document, and Rabbi Natan’s lien.

Fitting the Ran together: when Shimon “drops out of the picture” and when he does not

The lecture resolves that the Ran’s words about a direct obligation of Levi to Reuven in Rabbi Natan’s lien do not contradict his innovation at the beginning that one does not collect from Levi if Shimon has assets. The lecture states that the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien applies only when Shimon has no assets, and then the obligation is direct and Shimon has no ability to waive; but when Shimon does have assets, that law does not “exist” in practice and one goes back to collecting from him. Thus, the condition of “whether Shimon does or does not have” keeps Shimon in the picture only until the point at which the law is activated.

Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Ran: a contradiction between “the court does not collect through documents” and “it is impossible to waive”

Rabbi Akiva Eiger cites in the name of the Ran that from here it is proven that the court does not collect through documents, since their substance is not money, for otherwise others would automatically be harmed and there would be no need for Rabbi Natan. Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks that immediately afterward the Ran answers that one is not believed to say it is a trust document by a migo of waiving, because in Rabbi Natan’s lien he cannot waive, and if so, “this proof falls away,” because if the collection were based on court collection he would be believed by a migo of waiving, and “this requires great examination.” The question is presented as the claim that the Ran himself supplied a tool that explains why one still needs to reach Rabbi Natan’s lien even if documents were collectible, because the central distinction is whether waiver is possible or not.

The Chazon Ish’s method and the identification that Rabbi Akiva Eiger is mixing two cases

The lecture suggests a learning method of orderly review: Talmud, Rashi, Tosafot, and then Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in order to isolate what each one innovated and which case he is speaking about. Within this framework it is argued that Rabbi Akiva Eiger “mixes two cases” in an almost unnoticeable way, in particular mixing between a case of two successive loans without a sale and a case of the sale of a debt document where waiver is effective. The lecture marks that the solution to the difficulty must be found in this distinction between the structure of the case of Rabbi Natan’s lien and the structure of the case of “one who sold a document and then waived it,” and not necessarily in a sweeping assumption that everywhere Rabbi Natan’s lien does not apply, waiver functions in the same way.

Closing and the connection to the woman and the ketubah

The lecture concludes by saying that the next topic, “the woman and the ketubah,” parallels the structures learned here, and it is said that the similarity is “like here.”

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so in the previous lecture we started dealing with Rabbi Natan’s lien, and I want to finish with that today. We still have more… I didn’t understand, does Rabbi Natan’s lien appear in other places too? Yes. There’s still a lot more to discuss about it. What? In Tosafot. And today we saw that… no, no, there are other passages in the Talmud where Rabbi Natan’s lien comes up, there’s still quite a bit to discuss. But okay, here it really comes up kind of in passing, so I’m trying to show the main conceptual directions. I think more or less these are the directions; the rest are all ramifications, so for me this is the basis and it’s enough for our purposes. So we talked about the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, we saw the comparison the Ran makes between collection from encumbered property and collection by virtue of Rabbi Natan’s lien. And he says that if there is… we talked about Reuven, Shimon, and Levi. If, say, Shimon borrowed — meaning Reuven lent to Shimon and Shimon lent to Levi — and Rabbi Natan’s lien says that Levi is obligated to Reuven. Okay? A parallel case is collection from encumbered property. Say Reuven lent to Shimon and Shimon sold a field to Levi. And that field was encumbered to Reuven. So the rule in collecting from encumbered property is that if Shimon has unencumbered assets, then Reuven can’t go to Levi and collect from him. That’s an accepted rule. The Ran says the same thing applies in Rabbi Natan’s lien. There too, if you can collect from Shimon, then Reuven can’t go to Levi and collect from him. In that sense this is an innovation of the Ran.

[Speaker C] I have a question about documents. I mean in this section, what does it mean that documents are themselves money? We had a phrase like that. And why can’t you do it with documents but you can with land?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because documents aren’t money. Documents are only evidence that someone owes me. A document in itself is not property.

[Speaker C] Yes, but because it’s evidence that someone owes me, can’t I go and collect with it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can go and collect with it, but what you’re collecting is not the value of the document. The document is not something that’s worth…

[Speaker C] Why isn’t it the value of the document?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the document has no value. The document has no value. The document itself is not value.

[Speaker C] It’s evidence that there was a debt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Evidence isn’t money. Evidence isn’t property. Isn’t that exactly like a check? Even with a check, by the way, there’s a discussion. A check itself is a halakhic question and also a legal one, by the way. Both halakhically and legally it’s a very complicated topic, the status of checks. We’re used to treating checks — today there basically aren’t checks anymore — but we’re used to treating a check as if it were like a hundred-shekel bill.

[Speaker D] A bill is also a problem. A gold coin. No, paper money became altogether…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We already went through that.

[Speaker D] Why can’t you collect with documents?

[Speaker E] A bill becomes worth something because we as a society decided it has value.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re mixing things up. When I talk about a hundred-shekel bill, its value comes from an agreement, obviously, that’s a convention. But once there is an agreement, that bill is worth money. But I’m not talking about that. I’m talking about an evidentiary document for a debt. There’s a document that says so-and-so owes me money. There’s no social convention that that document is worth money. You can make use of it because it serves as evidence that so-and-so owes, but that’s only a possible use; the document itself has no value on its own. That’s why it’s called something whose substance is not money. By the way, what I said about checks — we’ve become so used to the idea that a check that says one hundred shekels is like a hundred-shekel bill. That’s not true. A check in essence is an instruction to the bank: bank, give him one hundred shekels. The check itself is not worth money. It’s an instruction. In that sense it’s somewhat similar to a debt document. It’s just that because this already has legal force, yes, it’s become this sort of thing that the public has accepted, because the bank stands behind it and not a private person, so it’s something people can assume will be covered. Therefore there is a tendency to see a check not as just a document, not merely as a debt document, but as actual money. But that’s really only a result of the fact that…

[Speaker E] But on the other hand, the bank stands behind it, so in principle even if the bank doesn’t honor it, the bank will investigate what’s going on, or…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The legislator will determine it, and you’ll investigate what’s going on, because the one who gave the money has to stand behind it, and maybe the bank will settle accounts with him, but he has to give you the money. Here we’re already getting into legal questions. But on the conceptual level, because it’s relatively very secure that it has coverage, much more than an ordinary document some private person gives you, there is room to see it as an actual banknote. But a debt document is not like that within this dynamic.

[Speaker C] So if I sell someone land, do I need to make a deed of acquisition? We said earlier not to define it that way. Didn’t we say the assets are encumbered, but the document can’t itself be encumbered? Right, that’s what I’m understanding. I mean, how is the asset encumbered if I don’t have a debt document or a deed?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why do you need a debt document? When I lent you money, at the moment of the loan all the land you owned became encumbered to me. Now if you sell — regardless of what is or isn’t written in the loan document — the loan document encumbers your land; that’s a Torah law. So now if someone proves that this land was yours at the time of the loan, that’s enough and I can collect it.

[Speaker C] Wait, in the end, supposedly I have a document that I took a loan of one hundred shekels. Okay fine, there’s a debt document. Can they now collect land from me that’s worth a thousand shekels based on the debt document?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not one hundred shekels’ debt and land worth one thousand shekels — certainly not. Only what I’m owed. But what I’m owed, I can collect from all the land that is in your possession at that moment, unless of course you pay me cash. But if you don’t pay me cash, then your land is my collateral. Okay? Now if you sold the land to someone else, by virtue of that same lien I go to the other person and collect from him.

[Speaker C] But when I sold, or when I borrowed the money — okay — then a debt document was made, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s say if it was a loan with a document, then yes, a document was written.

[Speaker C] No, is there an option not to?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. “One who admits to a document that was written has to validate it” — that’s about a documented loan. But there are oral loans too, without a document.

[Speaker C] And if it was an oral loan, then I can say it never happened? I can say that to a person?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, unless I have witnesses that I made the loan.

[Speaker B] Is the lien only on land or on assets?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the lien itself is on land. There is also personal obligation — an obligation on the person himself, that he must repay money. We haven’t talked about that until now. That’s his obligation.

[Speaker G] Okay, I understand. Then why did they say only land?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The law of lien they usually talk about is a lien on land.

[Speaker G] Because documents are not themselves money, so why say it’s only on documents and not on all assets as well?

[Speaker D] Why is land yes, encumbered?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Other assets come by virtue of the personal obligation. It’s not that… when we speak about lien in this context, Torah-level lien and all that, it’s always on land. And why? Because, for example, if I have a chair in my possession, then if you take that chair because I didn’t pay you, no problem as long as it’s mine. But if I sold the chair to someone else, you can’t go and take the chair from the other person. That’s only true with land. And there’s a lot of logic to that, because land always stays in the same place, and it’s very easy to know who owned it and who sold it and who bought it and exactly when — it’s a very stable thing. With a chair, who knows? You can always say, what are you talking about, it wasn’t even his chair, it’s a similar chair that I bought from someone else. There’s no way to anchor who the owner was. So you don’t create liens on chairs; you create liens on land. Okay?

[Speaker C] Sorry for derailing things, but I needed to straighten out a few things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it’s fine. So now — the Ran innovates that just as the rule in collecting liens is that if the person has money, first I collect from him and don’t go and take the land from the buyer, the same is true in Rabbi Natan’s lien. Rabbi Natan’s lien is not automatic. It’s not that Levi is now obligated to Reuven and Reuven simply goes to him whenever he wants. If Shimon doesn’t pay, or if he has no assets, then you can go to Levi — but not otherwise. To the point that the Ran therefore asks afterward: okay, so what exactly did Rabbi Natan’s lien add? After all, this is just ordinary lien law. And then he says that documents are not something that would have become encumbered were it not for Rabbi Natan’s law. Okay. Now the question we ended with in the previous lecture is a different question. There is a rule we saw on page 85, and it appears in several places as well: one who sells his debt document to another and then waives it, it is waived.

[Speaker D] Wait, sorry — can you go back for a second to what the Ran adds regarding Rabbi Natan’s lien?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That even documents — which under ordinary law would not be encumbered because their substance is not money — Rabbi Natan’s lien says that they are encumbered.

[Speaker D] I’m jumping ahead for a second, because if I understood correctly, then that’s the Sma’s innovation as opposed to the Shakh, who doesn’t rule that way?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, that’s jumping far ahead. We’ll get there.

[Speaker D] Okay? Not all at once, and that’s why I’m going step by step. No, that’s the Ran’s innovation regarding Rabbi Akiva Eiger. Yes, no, but I thought everyone agreed, so I’m…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we’ll see. That’s exactly the point. So the question we ended with in the previous lecture is Tosafot’s question — exactly — and the Ran asks it there too. The Ran asks the same question: if someone who sells a debt document to somebody else can still waive it, then in Rabbi Natan’s lien, or in our sugya, why am I not believed to say that this is a trust document? Because after all, I the lender am not believed to say that this is a trust document, because I have a lender of my own — I lent to someone else, but there is also a lender who lent to me. And if I say that this document is a trust document, that other lender will have nothing from which to collect. That harms others, so I’m not believed. That’s what the Talmud says — Abaye, right? So Tosafot asks on that: why? Why shouldn’t he be believed? After all, I have a migo that I could have waived it. Right? I have a migo that I could have waived it, and therefore I should be believed to say that this is a trust document. But we said he doesn’t have…

[Speaker B] A migo.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Ah, Tosafot explains that he doesn’t have a migo, but that’s Tosafot’s question. Okay? Tosafot answers that it’s not a migo. Why isn’t it a migo? Because waiving is not convenient for him, because if he waives it, then the borrower is genuinely exempt from paying him. If he says it’s a trust document, the borrower is an honest person, and therefore he’ll pay him even though he could have wriggled out of it. He could have wriggled out of it falsely, but he’s an honest person, so I’m counting on at least the possibility that he won’t wriggle out. If I waived it, then I waived it — then he really doesn’t owe me. Okay? We talked about this in the previous lecture — what are the odds that the borrower will in fact repay? I said it doesn’t matter. Even if the chance is twenty percent, that’s good enough for…

[Speaker B] Better

[Speaker I] Than zero.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So that already knocks out the migo. But from Tosafot’s words we learn that if the person really does waive it, he can waive it. Right? There is such an option of waiving. It just doesn’t create a migo. But if he actually waives it, it works. By contrast, the Ran disagrees with Tosafot, right? The Ran asks the question — I’m now reading from the Ran: “And if you would ask, let him be believed with a migo that if he wished he could waive it? And like Shmuel, who said: one who sells his debt document to another and then waives it, it is waived. One may say that when we say that, that applies in the case of one who sells a document, because by Torah law he does not acquire it, for the sale of documents is rabbinic, according to the Rif, as is proven in the chapter ‘Mi Shemet.’ Alternatively, because the borrower’s personal obligation remains with the lender, according to Rabbenu Tam’s reasoning, as I wrote there. But where others are harmed and he has no other assets, since they take from this one and give to that one by rabbinic enactment, even if he waived it, it is not waived, because he is encumbered to the first one by Torah law and the borrower’s obligation is with him.” So the Ran is basically saying, in direct opposition to Tosafot, not that there’s no migo because it’s not a better claim — there’s no migo because he cannot waive. Tosafot compares this to the case of one who sells a debt document to another; that’s not similar. There you can waive; here you cannot waive. In practice you cannot waive, so the whole migo question doesn’t arise. According to Tosafot, the migo question does exist because in principle you can waive; Tosafot just says that in practice it’s not a migo because it’s not a better option for him. According to the Ran, this isn’t about whether it’s a better option or not — there is no such option. The comparison to one who sells his debt document to another and then waives it is simply a mistaken comparison. What Tosafot says is similar, the Ran says isn’t. Why is it not similar? How did you understand it? Because he transfers the lien also to the person himself. And why is one who sells his debt document to another not like that? What’s the difference? What does the Ran say? Why does the Ran say this is unlike someone who sells his debt document to another? Why here can’t he waive, even though there he can?

[Speaker D] Because if this is part of the pool of his assets that’s encumbered to the first one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Why is that different from one who sells his debt document to another? Because they treat…

[Speaker G] Here the document as though…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s money, and not like testimony about a debt?

[Speaker G] Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said that? On the contrary, in the Ran itself you see that’s not true, because the Ran himself argues that it isn’t. With a document he waives it for him; he basically sells him the document for money…

[Speaker G] He…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t replace the lien, it’s not… he says that he can waive, okay, he can waive. But on the contrary, the Ran says even when I have money he won’t be able to do it; only when I don’t have money. All the more so it looks like it goes through me, right? Yes.

[Speaker G] And according to the rabbis it’s through me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ran himself explains — what does the Ran himself explain? I just read the passage. He gives two explanations.

[Speaker C] The same thing — personal obligation as opposed to lien on…

[Speaker F] Lien on assets. Two different things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First answer: because by Torah law he doesn’t acquire it, because the sale of documents is rabbinic, according to the Rif. Right. The rule is that in principle documents can’t be sold, precisely because their substance is not money. You can’t sell documents. A document is evidence for something, it’s not an asset. You can’t sell evidence. Sell evidence? Either the evidence is evidence or it isn’t. You can sell the debt; you can’t sell the document. Now debts can’t be sold because they have no tangible substance and so on. In short, by Torah law you can’t sell documents. The sages instituted that nevertheless it should be possible — and again, this goes back to the idea of checks. Checks are a very problematic thing, but the market needs it; there’s no choice. So the sages enacted rabbinically that it would be possible to sell, even though in principle, from the standpoint of the essential concepts, it would not have been right to sell documents. But from the standpoint of the way the market functions, it’s very useful, so the sages nevertheless enacted that you can sell them. And this is called ma’amad sheloshtan, by the way — how do you sell it rabbinically, the document? That’s what’s called the acquisition of ma’amad sheloshtan. What does that mean? Let’s say that Idit owes me money, okay? And I want to sell — I have a document — and I want to sell it to Yael. The three of us need to be present together, and we say to Idit: take note, I am selling this document to Yael; now you owe her.

[Speaker B] We didn’t know that, we didn’t know that, that really changes the whole…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter, that’s the acquisition of ma’amad… that’s how you do the acquisition. But it’s only rabbinic; by Torah law it wouldn’t have worked. That’s how the rabbinic acquisition is done — it’s called the rabbinic acquisition of documents through ma’amad sheloshtan. And still, if someone… okay. And still, even though I sold that debt document, I can waive the debt. Why? Says the Ran: because the acquisition is only rabbinic. That’s the first explanation. So what if it’s only rabbinic?

[Speaker G] The acquisition is…

[Speaker E] By Torah law…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore what? So the acquisition doesn’t transfer the personal obligation? So what’s the difference between that and the second answer?

[Speaker E] It’s the same idea that the sages still validated this commerce, kind of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the commerce is fine. But I can sell, and then waive. Afterwards he’ll sue me for damages. Right, we talked about that. Okay, so I don’t come out clean here — he’ll sue me for damages — but the debt is still a debt toward me.

[Speaker E] What did you do to Yael?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? That I damaged her, that I sold her a document and it became just paper — good for corking a bottle, worth nothing, that paper. But what’s the difference, notice…

[Speaker E] But how does she not know that this can happen?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What kind of efficiency is there? What? You knew in advance that he could waive it. You knew everything in advance; you also knew in advance that you could sue him for damages if he did that — you knew that too. The question is what you assume. It all depends on what you assume. But look, there are two explanations here in the Ran, and it’s very unclear what the difference is between them. One explanation is that the sale of documents is only rabbinic; by Torah law you can’t sell documents. The second explanation is that the borrower’s personal obligation remains with the lender. If I lent you money and now I have a document, and I sold that document to someone else, your debt remains toward me. Right? It’s just that the document allows him to collect, but the debt remains toward me. How is that different from the previous explanation? Doesn’t it say the same thing?

[Speaker C] I think maybe I didn’t understand that one earlier either — this document…

[Speaker E] Can you repeat the explanation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says like this — why?

[Speaker E] Because it’s only the sale…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The sale is only rabbinic.

[Speaker E] So still, one could have said the sale is only rabbinic and it includes the lien, I don’t know, kind of…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if it includes everything, then what does it help that it’s rabbinic? Then practically, why can’t he waive?

[Speaker E] Oh.

[Speaker D] Right, that’s…

[Speaker E] Also not logical.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Before asking whether it’s logical, first you have to say what he’s saying, and then decide whether it’s logical or not.

[Speaker D] Didn’t we learn that by Torah law you can’t transfer someone else’s personal obligation? What does that mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By Torah law, you become obligated to me. I can’t sell that to someone else. Yes, exactly. So what? So it doesn’t transfer rabbinically? Even rabbinically it doesn’t transfer to him? If it does transfer to him, then what difference does it make?

[Speaker D] So no, it doesn’t transfer to him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then leave aside Torah law and rabbinic law — you’re just saying it doesn’t transfer to him. Fine. So that’s the second answer. The second answer says the debt still remains — the personal obligation remains toward me, it doesn’t transfer to him.

[Speaker D] That makes sense. Right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so how is the first answer different? The first answer only explains that because it’s rabbinic, that’s an indication that it doesn’t… transfer. So what is the “alternatively” — that it doesn’t transfer? The first answer already said it doesn’t transfer because it’s rabbinic. There are two answers here and it’s not clear what the difference is between them. At the end of the day, what you want to say is that the borrower’s obligation remains toward me even if I sold the document, and therefore I can waive it. So what then is the difference between the first answer and the second answer?

[Speaker D] No, the first speaks about the document itself, the second about the relationship between the three people. I got it. The first speaks about the document itself, that the document is only evidence, it’s not an asset, and I’m returning it to its original essence. And therefore what? Therefore I can waive a document because it’s documents.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Why? But I sold it — rabbinically, after all…

[Speaker D] It was sold.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because by Torah law it’s… so what? But rabbinically it was sold, so now practically was it sold or not? Whichever way you look at it, if this sale leaves the obligation with me, then why did he need to say that the sale of documents is rabbinic? Even if it were Torah law, say what you say in the “alternatively”: since the obligation is toward me, I can waive it. What difference does it make whether it’s rabbinic or Torah law? So the first answer doesn’t want to say that? I also… so what difference does it make whether it’s rabbinic or Torah law? What do you gain?

[Speaker C] I understand that in the first one there is a lien and in the second there isn’t, very simply. The third party has no lien. I got it. Levi, if we’re talking about Reuven and Levi, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Levi owes Shimon money, and Shimon sells the document to Reuven. Okay. Or the reverse. The reverse…

[Speaker C] But in the first case that system exists. Meaning, I could sell Reuven my document and Levi could at some point, on one level or another, collect from Reuven, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The reverse — Reuven would collect from Levi.

[Speaker C] Reuven from Levi. Now, in the second answer, there is no such third side. The fact that I sold to Reuven has nothing to do with my debt relationship with Levi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, obviously not — after all, there is sale of documents; no one disputes that there is such a thing as sale of documents.

[Speaker C] No, but he says the obligation remains only between us.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t transfer. Fine. But the first answer, seemingly, leads to exactly that — that the obligation remains only with me. Because otherwise what good is the first answer? The first answer only explains why it remains with me: because the ability to sell documents does not exist by Torah law, so it’s only rabbinic. So what? So rabbinically, apparently, you sell the document but you can’t change the obligation. Fine, so that’s the second answer. So what does the second answer add beyond what the first says? I don’t understand. But what does “alternatively” mean? “Alternatively” means this is another answer, another explanation. If he had said it all in one continuous line, I would say the beginning is only an explanation for what comes after. But “alternatively” sounds like there are two explanations here. Again, I’m not completely certain, but it seems to me that what he means in the second answer is that he wants to claim this even if the sale of documents were Torah law. Even if the sale of documents were Torah law, I would still say that the obligation ultimately remains with the lender. After all, the obligation is a result of the loan. I lent you money, you owe me money. What difference does it make what business I do with someone else afterward? The Torah obligates you to repay the debt to the one from whom you borrowed. So what difference does it make whether the sale of documents is Torah law or rabbinic? Therefore even if it were Torah law, one could still waive. The first answer says the same thing, only it makes it depend on the fact that the sale of documents is rabbinic. And the first answer says: if the sale of documents were Torah law, then it would also be possible to transfer the obligation to someone else. But that doesn’t happen because the sale of… meaning, the difference is a hypothetical one. At the bottom line, the sale of documents is rabbinic. The difference between the two answers is whether I need the assumption that the sale of documents is rabbinic in order to say that I can waive. The first answer says yes, the second answer says no. It’s not a real practical difference; it’s a hypothetical difference.

[Speaker I] So it’s kind of saying that in a loan it’s not just a monetary issue; there’s also some kind of relationship between lender and borrower that needs to preserve the standing within it, something like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. The document I can transfer, my rights as lender I can transfer, but the borrower doesn’t owe him anything. Meaning, doesn’t owe him anything — on the contrary, he owes me. What do I know? I made a deal with you, I borrowed from you, I return it to you, I don’t know him.

[Speaker I] What we said at the beginning… yes, exactly. I think you said that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The borrower says: I borrowed from you, I owe you the money, the Torah told me to repay you the debt I borrowed from you. Repayment of a debt is a commandment. Now, the fact that you’re doing business with someone — why should that concern me? I’m dealing with you. So of course you can assign it to somebody else, that’s perfectly fine. But ultimately your ability to collect from the borrower stems from the Torah’s obligation toward you. Fine — so if you waive it, then you waive it; it remains toward you. Okay? That’s the second answer. It’s just that the second answer wants to claim that this would be true even if the sale of documents were Torah law. It doesn’t need to reach… it doesn’t need to be based on the assumption that the sale of documents is rabbinic. It’s built into the essence of the concept of debt. A debt is owed to the one who lent me. Why should I care whether afterward he sold the document, didn’t sell the document, whether documents can be sold, whether they can’t be sold — none of that matters. When you sell documents you’re doing all kinds of manipulations, but I owe you. The first answer says: if it were possible to sell a document by Torah law, that would mean that Reuven becomes Levi’s lender. But it isn’t possible; the sale of documents is rabbinic, by Torah law it’s impossible. Rabbinically, of course, no — that’s what the first answer says — the sages did not fundamentally change the relationships or the Torah laws of repayment of debt. Therefore, since the sale of documents is only rabbinic, the ability to waive is still mine, because in the end I’m the lender, and the debt is toward me. But that is only because the sale of documents is rabbinic. If the sale of documents were Torah law, then transferring the document would also transfer the debt, and nothing would remain. Therefore there is no difference between the two answers, except that there is a hypothetical difference about what would happen if the law were that the sale of documents could be by Torah law — which isn’t true. But if it were so, what would happen? That is the difference between the two answers. And since it isn’t so, it’s only a hypothetical difference. Okay? But practically for our purposes, what the Ran is essentially saying is that the debt really remains toward…

[Speaker D] Between Levi and Shimon.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shimon, right? Ultimately. Yes.

[Speaker E] Does that fit with what the Ran said in the very first paragraph?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The obligation remains to Reuven. The obligation remains on the first one, the first one is… without that jump. It’s between Levi and Shimon. Yes, not between Levi and Reuven.

[Speaker E] It fits the second answer, that there is the original lender and the original borrower, which are two different things.

[Speaker E] Between Levi and Shimon. No. Between Shimon and Reuven. Right.

[Speaker D] Levi to Shimon is apparently what needs…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What we add, we subtract.

[Speaker E] Let’s say Shimon… who is the first one? The first one is Shimon.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Levi is obligated to his original lender. Yes. The fact that afterward Shimon assigns it to Reuven is irrelevant. Levi owes Shimon. Certainly. That’s the third one. Because of that…

[Speaker E] This…

[Speaker I] It’s easier with A, B, C.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s Reuven, Shimon, and Levi in alphabetical order.

[Speaker I] Because he borrowed from him.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reuven lent to Levi, Levi lent to Shimon, let’s say.

[Speaker I] Encumbered to Reuven, and therefore Levi could not become obligated, could not switch it and give him the encumbered things. I didn’t understand. Shimon owes Reuven. Fine. I think Shimon is always the one obligated to Reuven, and he can’t give him the debt that Levi owes…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again — we have to synchronize the terminology. We have to synchronize the terminology.

[Speaker I] Shimon and Reuven and Levi.

[Speaker D] Shimon and Levi are always in the middle. Shimon…

[Speaker I] Levi is the borrower.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He borrowed money from Shimon. Wait, wait. He borrowed money from Shimon. He owes Shimon the money. Now Shimon either borrowed from Reuven or sold the document to Reuven. That’s the comparison we’re making here.

[Speaker D] No, we told it differently. We told the money story differently.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All right, so that’s why I’m saying: we need to synchronize the stories. We need to synchronize the stories. Like a broker. From my perspective, always—look, always… wait, wait, give me a second. What the Ran… this is again, now while practicing… one second, one second. What I’m talking about right now, so that we’ll all be synchronized—that’s why I also did this in the previous class—in all the examples, there are several different stories here. There’s Rabbi Natan’s lien, there are encumbered assets, the Ran’s first comparison, there’s “one who sells a debt document to another and then forgives it.” Those are three stories. In all of them I relate to Reuven, Shimon, and Levi like this: Levi owes Shimon. Now Shimon does something involving Reuven. What does he do? That changes. Sometimes he sells him the document, sometimes he borrows money from him and becomes obligated to him. There are all kinds of stories, okay? But I’m saying: the order of the obligations, the order of the obligations, is that Levi owes Shimon and Shimon owes Reuven. And who is the claimant?

[Speaker I] Reuven. Reuven is the claimant. He’s always… money to Reuven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reuven wants to collect money. Reuven wants to collect money from Levi.

[Speaker I] What’s owed to Reuven.

[Speaker D] No, that he gets from Shimon.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reuven… he wants it from Shimon, and then he goes to Levi.

[Speaker D] Yes, yes. Reuven wants to sue Levi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only this is done through Shimon’s mediation. Levi owes Shimon, and Shimon owes Reuven, and now Reuven comes and claims from Levi. That’s the point. It just happens in a lot of different scenarios, so you have to be careful. There’s one scenario with two loans, meaning Levi borrowed from Shimon and Shimon borrowed from Reuven—that’s the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien. Another scenario is… Levi borrowed from Shimon. Levi borrowed from Shimon. Now Shimon takes the document and sells it to Reuven.

[Speaker B] Oh, that’s the other story.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. That’s “one who sells a debt document to another and then forgives it.” Okay? That’s a second scenario. Third scenario… third scenario: Levi owes Shimon money. Shimon—I mean, sorry, wait.

[Speaker I] Why not draw it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because it’s not—one second, you have to know what to draw. Shimon, wait, Shimon borrowed from Reuven, and Shimon sold land to Levi. Now Reuven comes and wants to collect the land from Levi. Okay? That’s collection from encumbered assets at the beginning of the Ran. That’s the third diagram. Okay? The purchaser is Levi. Why? Why do I always call him Levi? To keep the synchronization. Reuven always comes to take something from Levi. That’s the game. Through Shimon’s mediation, but Reuven comes to take something from Levi—that’s always the game.

[Speaker I] The definition—I think the definition is: Reuven comes to take from Shimon, only Shimon gives him what Levi owes him. How do you explain it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reuven comes to the assets—the assets, the story—that’s how you think the definition works. I’m now synchronizing the definitions so that all the cases will be similar.

[Speaker I] Haven’t we been setting it up this way all along?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t—I don’t know about you, I don’t. You personally? I always set it up this way. Reuven comes to collect from Levi; in practice what he wants is to take something from Levi. That’s what happens in all of them. Why is he taking from Levi? Because really he wants something that Shimon owes him, but that something is in Levi’s hands, so he goes to collect from Levi. That’s the game. Now each of the examples—there are three situations here, and in each of those situations it develops differently. The first situation is Rabbi Natan’s lien. What is Rabbi Natan’s lien? Shimon really owes Reuven, and Levi owes Shimon. So Reuven comes to collect from Levi—why? Because he wants what Shimon owes him, but he takes it from Levi. That’s one picture; that’s Rabbi Natan’s lien. A second picture is when Shimon lent to Levi and sold the document to Reuven. Now Reuven comes, okay?

[Speaker I] He sold the document that Levi gave him, sold it to Reuven. Wait, wait, wait—is that like the woman with the ketubah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, wait, I don’t know—there isn’t such a case yet, we haven’t gotten to it. I’m talking about the case of one who sells a debt document to another and then forgives it. Okay? Shimon had a debt document against Levi, and he sold it to Reuven. Why am I assigning Reuven, Shimon, and Levi this way? Because now what happens is that Reuven comes and wants to take something from Levi. Therefore I positioned Reuven, Shimon, and Levi this way. In the end, Reuven always comes to collect something from Levi. Okay, now that’s case two. Case three is collecting from encumbered assets. What is collecting from encumbered assets? Shimon owes Reuven. Notice: Shimon owes Reuven. This one starts differently, the story begins differently. And Shimon sold land to Levi. Encumbered land. That’s the comparison the Ran begins with. Now Reuven, who wants to collect his debt from Shimon, goes to the land that is in Levi’s possession, and once again Reuven comes to take something from Levi, but really he is collecting from him something that Shimon owes him. Do you understand why I always assign Reuven, Shimon, and Levi this way? It looks a little different, but at the end of the day the point is that Reuven comes to collect something from Levi, and he takes that something because Shimon owes him. The lender, the borrower, the debt, the lien, in assets, second case, debt document? A personal lien? Yes. The relationships between borrower—this is between Levi and Shimon…

[Speaker D] Or between Shimon and Reuven?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It depends who the lender is and who the borrower is. That doesn’t answer it. It depends on the question of who the lender is and who the borrower is. A personal lien is always between borrower and lender. Not everyone is a borrower.

[Speaker I] Okay, in the case where Shimon borrowed from Reuven and Levi borrowed from Shimon,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then there is a personal lien of Shimon toward Reuven, and a personal lien of Levi toward Shimon. The borrower is always personally bound to the lender. Between Shimon and Levi? What? Between Levi and Shimon, and between Shimon and Reuven? The ability to collect.

[Speaker E] Regarding the lien, that’s disputed. We’ll talk more.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The ability to collect transfers.

[Speaker E] From the Ran it transfers. It transfers.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, can we go back to the Ran’s last sentence here?

[Speaker E] Yes. But how does each one apply—even “if he forgave it, it is not forgiven.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? “For he is bound to the first one.” To Shimon. “The first one” is Shimon. That’s what I’m asking. “The first one” is Shimon. It’s Shimon. Because Levi… wait, sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry, sorry—this is Rabbi Natan’s lien; in Rabbi Natan’s lien you can’t forgive it. Why can’t you forgive it? Because he is biblically bound to the first one, and the borrower’s lien is held by him. And Levi is biblically bound to Reuven, and therefore Shimon cannot forgive him the debt.

[Speaker G] Why is he bound? I didn’t understand. What?

[Speaker B] What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Natan’s…

[Speaker B] lien. But why is Levi bound to Reuven?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Natan’s lien is learned from a verse. In the case of one who sells a debt document to another, since that’s only rabbinic, he is bound to Shimon, not to Reuven. But in Rabbi Natan’s lien he is bound to Reuven. Again? Again. In the case of one who sells a debt document to another—the difference here between one who sells a debt document to another and Rabbi Natan’s lien, right? In the case of selling a debt document, since the acquisition is only rabbinic, to whom is Levi bound? To Shimon. And the fact that Shimon sold the document to Reuven does not concern Levi; Levi is bound to Shimon, and therefore Shimon can forgive him. But in Rabbi Natan’s lien, Levi is bound to the first one, to Reuven, to the first one in the chain. And since that is so, Shimon cannot forgive. Okay? It is biblical—biblical—that Levi is bound, right?

[Speaker G] Yes, what…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That Levi is obligated—he is obligated to Reuven in place of Shimon. Okay, now let’s work this out together with the beginning of the Ran’s words. Do you remember the beginning of the Ran?

[Speaker D] Wait, wait—if Levi is bound to Shimon, why can’t Shimon forgive? He can.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Levi is bound to Reuven.

[Speaker D] But biblically we said that Levi is bound to Shimon?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the sale of a debt document, not in Rabbi Natan’s lien. Yes, yes—at the end the Ran is talking about Rabbi Natan’s lien, not about the sale of a debt document. In Rabbi Natan’s lien this is biblical, not rabbinic. And biblically it has passed to Reuven, so now to whom is Levi bound? To Reuven. In the sale of a debt document, which is only rabbinic, the lien did not pass to Reuven; it remained toward Shimon, therefore Shimon can forgive it.

[Speaker C] Okay? Wait—Rabbi Natan’s lien is not the sale of a debt document, so what is it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Rabbi Natan’s lien is two debts: Levi owes Shimon, and Shimon owes Reuven. There is no sale here, so this is biblical—we learn it from a verse, right? We saw that in the previous class. So since it is biblical, the Torah said that Levi’s obligation is directly to Reuven; therefore Reuven—therefore Shimon cannot forgive the debt. In the sale of a debt document, it is only rabbinic; in principle you can’t sell such a thing, so the basic lien remains toward Shimon, therefore Shimon can forgive. Okay, that’s what the Ran says. The question is whether this fits with what the Ran says at the beginning.

[Speaker C] Now let’s see, now let’s overturn everything. What was the beginning? What we learned in the previous class.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, both in the novellae and here on the Rif. What did the Ran say there? First of all, the Ran said that without the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, I would not know that the document becomes encumbered, because its substance is not money. Rabbi Natan’s lien says that it does. That can fit, right? Because after the novelty of Rabbi Natan’s lien, it really does say that this document already belongs to Reuven, and Reuven can go directly to Levi. But the Ran at the very beginning said that it is similar to encumbered assets. Meaning that if Shimon has assets of his own, Reuven will not be able to go to Levi, right?

[Speaker B] Only…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only if Shimon has no assets does Reuven go to Levi. So he is saying that there is still some connection to Shimon—that this did not pass directly from Levi to Reuven, right? Wait, what is the question here? To say that in Rabbi Natan’s lien he cannot go directly if Shimon has assets.

[Speaker C] Exactly.

[Speaker G] He…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] can go directly if Shimon has no assets, but the fact that there is a condition, that it depends on whether Shimon has assets or not, says that Shimon has not entirely left the picture. It’s not that now Levi owes Reuven and that’s it, right? Does this fit with what the Ran says here?

[Speaker B] Not that the lien passes—it passes, it begins to pass—meaning that the lien passes only when Shimon has no assets.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or in other words, that’s why it fits: when Shimon has assets, Shimon has not completely left the picture. When Shimon has assets, the Ran says, you can’t collect from Levi; collect from Shimon. And then the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien does not apply at all. When does Rabbi Natan’s lien apply? When Shimon has no assets. In such a case, the lien really is direct from Levi to Reuven, and then Shimon cannot forgive. If Shimon has assets, then indeed Shimon can also forgive and everything is fine; the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien does not apply at all. Rabbi Natan’s lien exists only when Shimon himself has no assets, and then, when Rabbi Natan’s lien exists, the obligation really is direct from Levi to Reuven. So indeed, yes, Shimon cannot forgive. So there is no contradiction to what the Ran says at the beginning. Meaning, you have to pay very close attention here—these are very fine definitions, there are very subtle distinctions here between the situations.

[Speaker C] Wait, who told us that the novelty of Rabbi Natan’s lien is understood to mean that one can approach Levi even if Shimon has money?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So far we haven’t seen anyone like that. Maybe we’ll see later; for now we haven’t seen anyone like that. The whole dispute? No, I said that this is the Ran’s own novelty; one could have said otherwise. I haven’t brought someone here who says otherwise. There are such people, but I haven’t brought them in yet. Okay? But from the fact that the Ran takes the trouble to say it, it seems that he understands there is also another possible side, right? He doesn’t see it as something trivial. Okay? So I’m saying: the Ran’s novelty at the beginning does not contradict what the Ran writes here. Because what the Ran writes here—that in Rabbi Natan’s lien it is an obligation directly from Levi to Reuven—is only in a place where Shimon has no money of his own. If he had money of his own, then the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien simply would not exist. Okay? So it’s not that he says Rabbi Natan’s lien passes through Shimon. It doesn’t pass through Shimon. It’s just that when it exists, that’s how it works; but if Shimon has money of his own, then the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien simply does not exist. That’s all. So it’s very subtle. In other words, Shimon has not left the picture. If Shimon has no assets, then Shimon leaves the picture. That’s… okay. Is there a practical difference for Levi?

[Speaker E] Does it change anything for him? No?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And does it change something for Levi—he is still…

[Speaker E] obligated to Shimon, whether they take directly from him for Reuven or whether they don’t.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, what do you mean he is still directly obligated to Shimon?

[Speaker D] His personal lien?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can Shimon forgive—that’s the practical difference. The Ran says Shimon cannot forgive; the debt is not owed to him, it is owed to…

[Speaker D] Reuven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? He cannot say that this is a trust document.

[Speaker G] Why go to Levi if you can collect from Shimon?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. Why should Reuven…

[Speaker G] go collect?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a hassle—Levi in any event—we spoke about this in the previous class. He’s a more available person, more flexible. Levi in any case has to pay, so let him pay Reuven. On the contrary, why make two collections? Reuven will collect from Shimon, and Shimon will collect from Levi? Reuven goes and collects directly from Levi. Now Rabbi Akiva Eger. Do you see Rabbi Akiva Eger? There: “Abaye said: actually, it is speaking of a creditor, and where he harms others, and in accordance with Rabbi Natan”—that’s a quotation from the Gemara. “See the Ran, who wrote that from here it is proven that a court does not collect debt documents, because their substance is not money. For if not, then in any case it would be considered harming others, and there would be no need for Rabbi Natan.” Right? We saw this Ran. “And they wondered to me”—what happened to this sentence?

[Speaker E] We didn’t understand why Rabbi Natan wouldn’t be needed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Ran…

[Speaker C] said, right? That if…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if debt documents were themselves money, then Rabbi Natan’s lien wouldn’t be needed to explain that he is harming others.

[Speaker D] It would happen automatically, so to speak.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it would automatically be harming others; Rabbi Natan’s lien would not be needed. Why does one need to invoke Rabbi Natan’s lien here? Because debt documents are not themselves money. She is simply stating the Ran’s point, not presenting it as a question and answer but directly as the Ran’s conclusion. Okay, fine? “And they wondered to me,” says Rabbi Akiva Eger. “But immediately afterward the Ran wrote, in order to answer why he is not believed to say it is a trust document with the claim that he could have forgiven it”—you have to get used to the concise language of the later authorities. “He is not believed” to say that this document is a trust document on the basis of a claim that he could have forgiven it—yes, the difficulty of Tosafot and the Ran that we saw. “He is not believed regarding trust”? He is not believed to say “trust document,” yes. He is not believed to say that this is a trust document, even though he has a plausibility claim, because he could have forgiven the document. “With the claim that he could have forgiven it.” The difficulty we saw now in the Ran and Tosafot. Right? So what did the Ran answer? That there is no such claim, because he cannot forgive, right? So he said that in Rabbi Natan’s lien he cannot forgive; see there. Right? That’s what the Ran says.

[Speaker G] Rabbi Akiva Eger says this doesn’t fit with what he said above. If so, then this proof falls away entirely, because if it were merely a matter of court collection, he would be believed with the claim that he could have forgiven, since the court could not collect once he forgave it. And this requires great further analysis.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he had the claim that he could have forgiven, then the court could not collect because… but here he says that… What contradiction does he see between these two statements of the Ran? The Ran’s resolution of Tosafot’s question, versus the Ran’s argument about debt documents not being themselves money.

[Speaker F] What contradiction? Wait.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Between these two statements of the Ran, you can find contradictions and ask whether they fit or not fit. It’s a very, very subtle topic. There is a huge amount here. Fine distinctions.

[Speaker F] I understood him to be saying that if a court can collect debt documents, and if he can be believed with a plausibility claim, then in any case the court cannot collect the… since it was forgiven. So then we don’t need these assumptions of the Ran at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] He says the Ran in one place says that a court cannot collect debt documents. And elsewhere he says he cannot say, “I have a plausibility claim because I could have forgiven it.” So he says: if a court actually can collect debt documents, contrary to what the Ran says, and if Shimon is believed with the claim that he could have forgiven it, then we don’t need at all…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s contrary to what the Ran says. So it’s contrary to what the Ran says. Why are you challenging the Ran on the basis of assumptions contrary to what he says? The question is whether there is some contradiction here between two things the Ran himself says—not theses that are against the Ran.

[Speaker B] You can’t use the claim that he could have forgiven it, because…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ran’s question—what was the Ran’s question, because of which he said that debt documents are not themselves money? Why did the Gemara need to get to Rabbi Natan’s lien? Right? Even without that, this should be considered harming others. Because the person can collect from my borrower by way of encumbered assets. You don’t need Rabbi Natan’s lien. That was the Ran’s difficulty at the beginning. Rabbi Akiva Eger says: what kind of difficulty is that? Without Rabbi Natan’s lien, I could have forgiven. It is only under Rabbi Natan’s lien that one cannot forgive. Had I not needed the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, and the collection had instead been because of encumbered assets, then I could forgive that lien. Therefore the Gemara needed to base itself on Rabbi Natan’s lien. An ordinary lien can…

[Speaker I] basically be forgiven—that’s what… a document!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It can be forgiven—what do you mean, a lien? The document can be forgiven. Let’s say there were no Rabbi Natan’s lien here—what did the Ran ask? Let’s say the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien did not exist in the world, okay? Still, the Gemara could have said that the person is not believed to say this is a trust document because he is harming others. You don’t need Rabbi Natan’s lien to say that. Why? Why is he harming others? Because others can… Reuven can collect from Levi even without Rabbi Natan’s lien. Simply because there is a lien on the document. Therefore, says the Ran, the document is not itself money, and there is no such lien. You needed Rabbi Natan’s lien in order to let him collect. Right? What? He needs…

[Speaker F] But Reuven can’t just go to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter—then through the court. What difference does that make?

[Speaker F] And if the court doesn’t collect?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why wouldn’t it collect? The court collects—of course it collects. A court does not collect debt documents. That is exactly what the Ran says in this case. Therefore the Ran says you have to say that debt documents are not themselves money. His difficulty was that without this, it isn’t clear why one needs the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien. Right?

[Speaker F] So what? Rabbi Akiva Eger says that’s not correct?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then you don’t need it at all… Right. Rabbi Akiva Eger says that even in the conclusion, you don’t need the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien.

[Speaker E] I didn’t understand… just a second, please. On this point, Rabbi Akiva Eger presents what the Ran says about the court not collecting these debt documents as the Ran’s teaching, when in fact that is the Ran’s conclusion from the passage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s say debt documents are not themselves money, okay? Let’s say debt documents are not themselves money. Until now you’re saying that then one cannot understand the Gemara? Right? That’s what the Ran says. Let’s say debt documents were themselves money—then the Ran says no, then one cannot understand the Gemara that way, right? Rabbi Akiva Eger says: not true, let me show you that you can understand the Gemara. Debt documents are themselves money, and still, without the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, you would not be harming others. Why? Because you could forgive the document. You could forgive the document, so you can’t tell me that I’m harming you, that I’m not believed to say this is a trust document because I’m hurting Reuven. I’m not hurting Reuven; even without that, I could have forgiven the document and Reuven could not collect. So why do you need to get to the claim that debt documents are not themselves money? Even if debt documents are themselves money, still this is harming others. Still this is harming—what? So for…

[Speaker F] that, according to this, we need Rabbi Natan’s lien? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Therefore there is a contradiction between the Ran’s two statements, at the beginning and here. If the Ran says that there is a difference between Rabbi Natan’s lien and collection not by way of Rabbi Natan’s lien—namely, that under Rabbi Natan’s lien Shimon cannot forgive, but if it were ordinary collection by way of a lien, then Shimon could forgive. Right? That’s the difference the Ran says. If that difference exists, then I can explain the Gemara even if debt documents are themselves…

[Speaker I] money. And it is still clear why Rabbi Natan’s lien was needed in order to explain the Gemara.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Natan’s lien is a mechanism that does not allow him to forgive.

[Speaker I] You can’t—that’s it—you can’t insert forgiveness there in the middle, because… and because of that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the Gemara needed Rabbi Natan’s lien. It’s this axiom that you can always take from…

[Speaker I] Reuven can always…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] take from Levi, no matter what. Of course—the Ran himself said that even without Rabbi Natan’s lien, Reuven can collect from Levi. The Ran said that himself, right?

[Speaker E] He encumbers everything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because a document is not itself money, and without Rabbi Natan’s lien one could not collect.

[Speaker E] The Ran brings this idea—that these documents cannot be collected in court—as an axiom. That’s his axiom, and therefore…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not an axiom. He proves it from the Gemara.

[Speaker E] But Rabbi Akiva Eger explains that this is the Ran’s conclusion, whereas when the Ran presents it, he says: since the court cannot collect debt documents, then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the answer; he proves it from the Gemara here. The Ran says this explicitly, by the way. Read the language of the Ran: “and from here this is proven.” The Ran says, “and from here is the proof,” right? The Ran himself writes that, and from here is the proof, and afterward he brings another passage that proves it, with two people who each produced a debt document against the other.

[Speaker B] Although one could infer more precisely that he proves there that when something is not itself money, they do not collect from it with debt documents of Avnei Pachmiah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what he wants to prove from our Gemara. Rabbi Akiva Eger says that our Gemara proves nothing. From our Gemara, even if debt documents were themselves money, one could still explain it. Why? Because what was your question? Why does our Gemara need Rabbi Natan’s lien? Even without that, it could manage. I’ll show you that’s not true. Even if debt documents are themselves money, if you do not accept Rabbi Natan’s lien, then this is not harming others. Why? Because when I said, “This is a trust document,” I did not hurt you in any way. Even if this document were not a trust document, I could have forgiven it,

[Speaker I] unless we accept Rabbi Natan’s lien.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Fine, but that’s on the Ran, obviously.

[Speaker I] Because Rabbi Natan’s lien essentially gives up on Shimon’s mediation, and therefore he has no ability to forgive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, that’s what the Ran himself said. So Rabbi Akiva Eger says: if you tell me that this is the difference between Rabbi Natan’s lien and collection by way of an ordinary lien, then why do you need to make an additional distinction between documents that are themselves money and those that are not themselves money? Even if documents were just like land—something that becomes encumbered, and itself is money, and everything is correct—still it matters a great deal whether this comes by way of Rabbi Natan’s lien or by way of ordinary collection from liens. Because if it comes by way of Rabbi Natan’s lien, it cannot be forgiven. Therefore the Gemara needed Rabbi Natan’s lien in order to say that this is harming others.

[Speaker I] That’s the move. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s literally the last sentence. This is a classic Rabbi Akiva Eger move—you have to keep your head clear in the accounting.

[Speaker I] But what would the Ran answer him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He leaves it as requiring further analysis. If Rabbi Akiva Eger doesn’t know, I’ll know? We’ll soon see. He leaves it as requiring further analysis on the Ran—he says there is a contradiction in his words.

[Speaker E] Analysis like this—until he brought the second option, that it is possible, that one can forgive. Yes. So if one really could collect the documents, then why do I need this lien there? Because he can’t forgive.

[Speaker G] No, because if he can collect, then he can forgive,

[Speaker E] and then it’s not harming others. What do you mean, not harming others? Who doesn’t lose? The first one. Reuven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shimon says to Levi—he has a document against Levi, in our Gemara. Shimon produces a document against Levi, and Shimon himself, the lender, says: this is a trust document. The Gemara says: you are not believed to say this is a trust document, because you have a creditor of your own, Reuven, who will have nothing from which to collect; by your admission you are hurting him. This is an admission against interest; ostensibly you should have been believed, but no—you are obligating him. Right? That’s the claim, therefore you are not believed. The Ran asks: why do you need to get to Rabbi Natan’s lien in order to explain that you are harming others? Even without that, you are harming others, because Reuven could, even without Rabbi Natan’s lien, collect from Levi, and if you say this is a trust document, he will not be able to collect. Right? That’s how the Ran asked. Rabbi Akiva Eger says: not true. Since without Rabbi Natan’s lien, you are not considered to be hurting Reuven. Reuven won’t be able to collect because you said it’s a trust document, but even if you had not said it was a trust document, he still could not collect—if you wanted to prevent him from collecting, you would forgive the document. That’s all. Only Rabbi Natan’s lien says that you cannot forgive the document, because under Rabbi Natan’s lien the obligation is directly from Levi to Reuven. And one cannot forgive that. So what’s the problem? Therefore, what was the Ran’s original difficulty? Even if debt documents are themselves money, one can still explain the Gemara perfectly well.

[Speaker B] And why does he say it requires great analysis if it’s so simple?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the contrary, the great analysis is on the Ran’s difficulty—why is the Ran asking the question? The Gemara is so straightforward—why is the Ran asking? And the Ran is forced to prove that debt documents are not themselves money; there’s no need to get there. Even without that, everything in the Gemara is clear.

[Speaker B] Maybe he thinks that’s what the Gemara is saying—he thinks debt documents are not themselves money and that’s what there is?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the Ran answers this within a question, as an answer to the question.

[Speaker B] He says, “and from here we learn…”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He began with a difficulty. I’m asking: what is the difficulty? Leave aside now whether debt documents are themselves money. You asked a question—what is the question? There is no question. You ask: why do we need Rabbi Natan? Simple: because without Rabbi Natan’s lien one could have forgiven, therefore we need Rabbi Natan’s lien. What is the Ran’s difficulty, in short? Afterwards he answered the difficulty by saying debt documents are not themselves money. I’m asking: what is the difficulty? There’s no need to get to that answer.

[Speaker E] With all the Ran’s assumptions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. But that is the Ran.

[Speaker E] The Ran’s assumptions.

[Speaker D] The Ran’s difficulty is: why do I need Rabbi Natan’s lien?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is really an exercise in thinking—just a bit of accounting. Now I asked you step one.

[Speaker D] Wait a second—in the first class, that’s exactly what I asked on the Ran, that from his perspective Rabbi Natan’s lien comes out like an ordinary loan, like an ordinary lien.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then in fact it is more than an ordinary lien; even if debt documents are themselves money, on the contrary. It’s not like an ordinary lien even if debt documents were themselves money. It’s not like an ordinary lien, because that one can’t be forgiven. Can we take one more step?

[Speaker F] Wait, and a property lien also can’t be forgiven. Why? You can forgive the document. If the document is the thing that is encumbered, you can forgive it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only Rabbi Natan’s lien cannot be forgiven. My next question is: what direction would you use to resolve Rabbi Akiva Eger? What—what do you resolve? How do you resolve Rabbi Akiva Eger? What? Which direction should one look in? What—this difficulty seems carved in stone. Where is he introducing an assumption here that is not trivial, one that can be examined? He identifies two things here that it’s very easy not to notice, but there is a certain jump here. Wait, again… this takes a bit of practice in keeping your head in a complex calculation. We really don’t usually get to this level of complexity, but still… I mean, what…

[Speaker I] What is the missing link here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is some jump in Rabbi Akiva Eger’s difficulty—almost imperceptible, but there is a jump there.

[Speaker G] Go on. When he says that forgiveness doesn’t work—that under Rabbi Natan’s lien one can’t forgive—

[Speaker D] when they transfer the obligation through the court, then you can no longer forgive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker C] No, the court…

[Speaker D] Even if… the court…

[Speaker C] cannot collect if it was forgiven. Is he saying, as it were…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll do that in a minute, I just want…

[Speaker C] Is he saying that if it were by way of court collection, he would be believed with a plausibility claim—maybe he is speaking here about Tosafot, not about the Ran.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the Ran too—it’s the same thing. Both of them raise this question. Tosafot says it’s not a valid plausibility claim, and the Ran argues that one cannot forgive. Yes.

[Speaker C] I mean, what’s the formula—I want… maybe especially with the Chazon Ish…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Chazon Ish.

[Speaker I] Wait, if…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll give you a tip from the Chazon Ish, a tip from the Chazon Ish. When the Chazon Ish learned a passage, especially a passage like this, so it is told, when he learned a passage he would first say the Gemara and explain it. Then he would read Rashi, go back over the Gemara, and say: the Gemara says this and Rashi says this. Then he would read Tosafot and say: the Gemara says this, and Rashi says this, and Tosafot says this. Then he would read Rabbi Akiva Eger on Tosafot and say: the Gemara says this, Rashi says this, Tosafot says this, Rabbi Akiva Eger says this. After you do it that way, you understand exactly what each one added, and you understand exactly where a resolution might be found. And that’s the point here. A lot of this is not only a matter of keeping your head clear; it’s a matter of diligence. Meaning: to go back all the time from the beginning—what did he say, what did he assume, which case is he talking about—so that it is absolutely clear before your eyes which cases are being discussed here. And you’ll see that Rabbi Akiva Eger is mixing together two cases here. Wow.

[Speaker G] What? I didn’t understand. With the court he says that the court, when someone…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] made a jump. Yes. Okay, so now you have a challenge—a bigger challenge. You know what the challenge is? To let your husbands do laundry.

[Speaker C] Oh. Yes. Rabbi Akiva Eger is easier. Since I got married, I never knew how to do laundry, and he learned from my mother. Okay. Actually I would say…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If anything, cooking goes together with it. And over cooking, he got in trouble.

[Speaker F] Wait, or…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to do it in parallel with the laundry—decide, one of the two. You can choose the challenge.

[Speaker F] Or is it the couple’s laundry, or the children’s laundry? There are lots of Gush lectures that I listen to while cooking on Friday, and it’s a little…

[Speaker E] That’s when I learn while cooking. Okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very good. The question is to what level of complexity you can get into while doing that.

[Speaker E] The question is…

[Speaker C] Not those lectures—that’s something basic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In short, let’s now do the… do you want a marker?

[Speaker C] From the Gemara? Let’s go back a second. What is he mixing together?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not in the sense of Gemara, Rashi, and so on. I mean going back carefully: what is the Ran’s distinction, what was the Ran’s question, what is the Ran’s distinction, what does Rabbi Akiva Eger say. Can we make a chart? Huh?

[Speaker C] It won’t be a chart—I don’t know how to do it as a chart. Maybe a flowchart.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A flowchart too—that’s the best. There are no markers, but let’s start with Abaye.

[Speaker C] Wow, how did you do that?

[Speaker I] You caused it.

[Speaker C] Now Rabbi Akiva Eger—what indirect causation? That was direct, without any rabbinic issue…

[Speaker I] No, because that’s the goal and we praised it on that side, so what?

[Speaker C] Fine, the answers, right? Wait, sorry. What do you mean, I listen to things from Gush?

[Speaker E] Yeshivat HaGush, Yeshivat Har Etzion.

[Speaker C] No, wait, okay—what? Which radio station is that?

[Speaker D] Not on the radio—on YouTube. Today all the yeshivot upload lectures, there are…

[Speaker E] lots of lectures, whether on the weekly Torah portion, or Gemara, or Jewish law. Not on the radio—on YouTube.

[Speaker D] Yes.

[Speaker C] Do you put it on the computer?

[Speaker E] Yes,

[Speaker D] I also sometimes do that. Earphones. Earphones are a problem while cooking. No, I put it on full volume.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, that’s the most important thing. To my mind that’s more important than everything that follows. I want us to work through this in an orderly way because it’s good training in analytical learning. Okay? So let’s begin like this: there is the Ran’s difficulty. Why not start from the Gemara? Huh?

[Speaker G] Yes,

[Speaker C] you’re not going back over the Gemara?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We already did from the Gemara, but okay.

[Speaker C] If Chazon Ish, then Chazon Ish.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So let’s start from the Gemara. Marker.

[Speaker C] Fine, the case where Reuven produces a document…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] against Shimon, and he says it’s a trust document. A document against—as if… trying to extract money from him? Shimon owes him money.

[Speaker C] When we say this, it’s not a bill of sale… it’s a debt document, not a sale document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A debt document, a sale document?

[Speaker C] A debt document.

[Speaker I] And they tell him: you are not believed, not believed. Oh, sorry, sorry—Shimon against Levi.

[Speaker G] Shimon… oh, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reuven lent to Shimon,

[Speaker D] okay? And he claims, and then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Shimon claims against Levi; Shimon says: this is a trust document. He is really hurting Reuven, because Reuven has nowhere to collect from—the trust arrangement of Shimon with another person, and so on, all stands, okay? He can collect only from Levi. And therefore Shimon is not believed.

[Speaker D] Who is saying that—wait… Shimon wants to collect from Levi, but Reuven says to him, no, this is a trust document.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The law is: Shimon is not believed because of Rabbi Natan’s lien. You know what? Wait—the law is that Shimon is not believed; the reasoning is Rabbi Natan’s lien. And the question is why that reasoning is needed.

[Speaker I] Okay? That’s the Gemara.

[Speaker C] Wait.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, so that’s the law and that’s the reasoning.

[Speaker I] And the question is why that reasoning is needed. And now comes the Ran. That’s the law, that’s the reasoning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is that reasoning needed—Rabbi Natan’s lien? Okay? Basically, there is a determination of a lien. One could have made the law depend on an ordinary property lien. Here we’re dealing with a document, right? A document. No.

[Speaker G] An ordinary property lien doesn’t work.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not?

[Speaker F] A document, a document.

[Speaker I] How would he treat a document?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re in the middle of a difficulty, right?

[Speaker I] With an ordinary lien on property, that means that Reuven, who didn’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there were no law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, and Shimon has a promissory note against Levi, then yes, Reuven can go to Levi and collect from him, because that note is liened to Reuven just like all of Shimon’s assets. It’s one of Shimon’s assets, that note, right? So Reuven can take that note just like any other asset.

[Speaker I] So—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then why do you need Rabbi Natan’s lien?

[Speaker I] So what’s the difference? Why? Because notes aren’t money. What’s the difference between Rabbi Natan’s lien—

[Speaker E] —and this?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t need a special source for Rabbi Natan’s lien; this is just an ordinary lien on assets. Not “he owes him and he owes him.” If I lent you money, all your assets are liened to me. That’s the source of the law.

[Speaker E] What’s the difference? That’s what the Ran says. Maybe that’s exactly what the Ran wants to say. The Ran wants to say that a note like this is an asset just like any other asset.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ran doesn’t say that. The Ran says it about loans. So that’s exactly the question: why do you need this? All the assets are liened. There is a lien on assets corresponding to a loan. Why do you need a special law about loans and notes?

[Speaker E] The Ran gives an answer: a note—the difference between a note and this—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A note is not money; its body is not itself money.

[Speaker E] One second—until the Ran gave this answer, did courts collect notes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not the issue.

[Speaker E] So because of that you could say what I wanted to say before. Is the Ran saying there’s something here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ran didn’t invent this. This could be an answer that was already said from the days of the prophets. But the Ran asks a question and gives an answer. That answer was always true. It’s not that until him people didn’t act this way and he came and innovated it.

[Speaker E] So he explains why not? He learns some innovation, that it’s not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It can’t be the Ran’s own innovation, because the Ran is explaining the Talmud that way. Meaning, he assumes that already in the Talmud they acted that way. After all, why did the Talmud need the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien? In the Talmud they could have used this. The Ran assumes that this is the explanation in the Talmud. So okay.

[Speaker I] If a note is not money, then does Rabbi Natan’s lien also apply to notes?

[Speaker D] Basically no, you need it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Natan’s lien introduces the rule that even notes become liened. Okay? Under the regular law of lien on assets, they would not have been liened.

[Speaker F] Yes. And there’s the second innovation too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s it. Up to here, that’s the Talmud. Okay? Now separately we have another story in the Ran. The Ran asks: why isn’t Shimon believed with a migo, since he could waive the debt?

[Speaker D] And there’s no—

[Speaker I] —migo.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s also in the Ran.

[Speaker I] What’s the connection between the two questions? There’s no connection.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Two questions. Rabbi Akiva Eiger creates a contradiction between them. That’s why I’m saying this step by step.

[Speaker E] Tosafot basically brought this idea, that someone can be believed with a migo because he could waive it. Without that Tosafot, you wouldn’t have asked this question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, why? The Ran himself also asks the question.

[Speaker D] Which came first? Do we know? Tosafot was earlier, obviously, before the Ran.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.

[Speaker E] Or at least the authors of Tosafot, I think—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —were before him, maybe all of them. No, but it doesn’t matter. The Talmud itself doesn’t connect them. Wait, I didn’t say that. I said that these two things are said in the Ran without any connection. Rabbi Akiva Eiger connects them. Rabbi Akiva Eiger connects them. In a moment we’ll see. Step by step. Don’t jump. Step by step. We’re going according to the method of the Chazon Ish, right? Step by step. Okay?

[Speaker I] Another parameter that gets added here is waiver.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now notice what’s in the background here. This is an important point. In the case of a seller—someone who sells notes can waive them. Right? That was the assumption.

[Speaker I] So if that’s the case, with Rabbi Natan’s lien, with ordinary lien on assets—wait. Do these parentheses belong here, to ordinary lien on assets? No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That will be in stage four. There I’ll argue that it doesn’t fit. That’s the point Rabbi Akiva Eiger jumps on. But just a moment. We’re going back.

[Speaker C] Meaning that here too, someone who sells a note, which isn’t necessarily specifically a promissory note—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, a promissory note. We’re talking about a promissory note. Forget sale documents and those things; that’s not relevant for us.

[Speaker C] No, no, okay. But I’m saying, here you’re saying that in the background we have this datum, this possibility—that I can waive, that one can waive a promissory note.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, correct. And therefore, the Ran asks: so why in the case of Rabbi Natan’s lien as well can’t he waive it, right?

[Speaker C] In the case of Rabbi Natan’s lien he can’t waive it. Yes, okay. Wait.

[Speaker I] The answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re distinguishing between seller—no no no, wait, don’t jump, Iris.

[Speaker I] Fine, I’m not jumping, I just want to understand what you said before.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, it’s really not worth it, not worth it. I’m deliberately saying not to skip. Step by step. At each stage we deal only with that stage. We don’t know anything around it—that’s the whole idea. The whole idea is that once you start jumping, you start losing it. I want to understand each step.

[Speaker D] We’ll end up in the honored place together with Rabbi Akiva Eiger.

[Speaker B] The answer is—

[Speaker D] because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it’s impossible—no, the answer is because it’s impossible—

[Speaker D] —to waive because of Rabbi Natan’s lien.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Rabbi Natan’s lien you can’t waive.

[Speaker G] Fine, but why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What?

[Speaker D] Because the obligation—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he says: because the obligation remains; the obligation goes directly to Reuven. No—not that it harms another party, because Levi’s obligation is directly to Reuven and not through Shimon. It’s as if we remove—because this is Torah-level and that is rabbinic, and all that we discussed.

[Speaker I] Yes. So here the issue is waiver, and the parameter is waiver. And unlike Rabbi Natan’s lien, here you can’t waive, because we said you don’t need Shimon’s mediation in the middle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where can you waive? In the case of someone who sells a promissory note, right? That conflicts with this. Right? There’s a contrast between these two cases. In someone who sells a promissory note, apparently he can waive it; and in Rabbi Natan’s lien, he can’t waive it. Right?

[Speaker C] In the case of selling a promissory note, the definition is between those two.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The answer comes to say: you assume it’s similar to that—not true. It’s different from the case of Rabbi Natan’s lien. Here you can waive, and there you can’t. Right, that’s what he says.

[Speaker C] Thank you. In the case of selling a promissory note, there’s no significance at all to Rabbi Natan’s lien.

[Speaker F] But didn’t we say in the previous class that there was an innovation of the Ran that first they collect the debt from Shimon? Right? If Shimon has no money—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re talking about a case where Shimon has no money. Okay. This whole discussion is about a case where Shimon has no money. Okay. Now Rabbi Akiva Eiger comes and says the following. We have the Ran here and the Ran there. In the middle Rabbi Akiva Eiger comes and asks about a contradiction between these two sides. Okay? And he says like this. First I’ll explain and then we’ll write it down. If you say that in Rabbi Natan’s lien you can’t waive, then I don’t understand this question. Or in other words: why do you need this answer? Forget the answer—why? What’s the question? The question was: why do you need the rationale of Rabbi Natan’s lien? As if even without that rationale this would still count as harming another party. He said no. Because without that rationale, without Rabbi Natan’s lien, he could have waived it, and then this would not have counted as harming another party. Rabbi Natan’s lien is exactly what makes it impossible for him to waive, and therefore it does count as harming another party. That’s why you couldn’t base the law on ordinary lien on assets. The law of harming another party.

[Speaker I] Yes. It’s like two different questions before two different answers. Why is he taking the answer from there and asking it on the question?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because according to the answer there, this question isn’t difficult. Why? Because this question says: why did the Talmud need the rationale of Rabbi Natan’s lien? Even without it this would still be harming another party. Right? And without it, Shimon would still be hurting Reuven. His admission counts as harming another party. Right? Rabbi Akiva Eiger says no. According to what the Ran wrote there, if there were no law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, then when Shimon comes out and says, “This was a note of trust,” he’s hurting Shimon—sorry, he’s hurting Reuven. As if without this, Reuven would have been able to collect, and now because of this he can’t collect. Not true. Even without this he couldn’t collect. Because if I had wanted to prevent him from collecting, I could have waived the debt. Rather, once there is Rabbi Natan’s lien—that’s what the Ran says—then you can’t waive, and only because of that does it count as harming another party. So what’s the question, why do you need the rationale of Rabbi Natan’s lien in order to say that he is harming another party? It’s obvious why you need it.

[Speaker I] Meaning, this answer contradicts that question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. If you accept the answer there, then this question isn’t difficult. Or in other words, you don’t need this answer. Even if the note were money, there still wouldn’t be any difficulty here, so you can erase this answer. This answer is not necessary. It may be true, but it isn’t necessary.

[Speaker G] Wait, if there is Rabbi Natan’s lien, does that only mean that he doesn’t have—what we discussed with the migo? Ah, and then this isn’t harming another party?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This answer is: I could have prevented him from collecting even without saying, “This is a note of trust.” I could have waived the debt.

[Speaker G] Because once Shimon has it, he has a migo, he has a migo because he doesn’t—and then in that case he’s believed. He can cause him a loss.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s believed even though it’s harming another party, because it’s not called harming another party. He can cause him a loss. The migo turns it into a case that is not harming another party. Why?

[Speaker C] Because “harming another party” means—wait, are we talking here about harming another party, meaning?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The question was why Shimon isn’t believed. Because he’s harming another party, right?

[Speaker C] He’s not believed—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he’s harming another party, namely Reuven. Right? He harms Reuven; therefore he isn’t believed.

[Speaker C] Okay, now—and here—

[Speaker G] Wait, if there is no Rabbi Natan’s lien, that means the migo comes into play and then he is believed?

[Speaker C] No, now I’m confused.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. If there is no Rabbi Natan’s lien, then he can waive it. And if he can waive it, then he is not harming another party. Yes, exactly. And then Shimon is believed. Therefore you need Rabbi Natan’s—

[Speaker E] —lien in order to explain why Shimon isn’t believed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When he can waive, then is he harming another party? What? No, the opposite. He is not harming another party when he says, “This is a note of trust.” Why? Because if he hadn’t said, “This is a note of trust,” and the note had remained valid, then Reuven would have been able to take the money from Levi. To which Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: what do you mean? Even if I hadn’t said this was a note of trust, I could have waived Levi’s debt, and Reuven still would not have been able to take the money from him.

[Speaker E] But then he would have lost out—Shimon would have lost out. Exactly. It still would have been harming another party even if he had said that it was this note—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s harming another party when he says it’s a note of trust.

[Speaker E] That’s true, but the second thing is also true.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s why it’s not called harming another party. Because Reuven would lose either way. So you can’t say that by saying “note of trust” I harmed him. He would have been harmed anyway.

[Speaker E] Ah, that’s something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing. That’s called not harming another party. He would have been harmed in any case. He didn’t lose because I said “note of trust.”

[Speaker E] It makes it more definite, rather than it not hurting—It’s not Shimon’s act that causes him to lose.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So therefore, when I say this is a note of trust, you can believe me. It doesn’t hurt Reuven. Reuven would have been harmed anyway.

[Speaker E] So why isn’t this an admission of a litigant?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is an admission of a litigant; it’s just not harming another party. Correct. So now Rabbi Akiva Eiger is basically asking—yes— in light of this answer, the question isn’t right. Okay? He challenges the Ran’s question, this question of the Ran, because obviously you do need Rabbi Natan’s lien in order for it to count as harming another party. Without Rabbi Natan’s lien, Reuven loses whether Shimon claims “note of trust” or not, because he could waive it. Okay? Wait, now this answer of Shimon, so that there should be—so that there should be—

[Speaker G] Without Shimon—Reuven.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The contradiction is between the answer here and the question there. Of course, once you knock out the question, then you also don’t need the answer. That already follows. But it’s easier to see the contradiction against the question. “He can waive”—that is understood from here.

[Speaker C] Okay, did you understand? So go back, there’s time, read it again and again and again and again.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ve reached Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s first question. No—the only one.

[Speaker C] No, why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question contradicts—no, that is Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question. Now the final step in the analysis—down below you’re saying: where is the jump here? A note as opposed to—

[Speaker I] Money, in the context of lien on assets. What do you mean? You said that was the missing link, that a note is not money. Meaning, sorry, someone who sells a promissory note can waive it—but maybe—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, this is already getting good.

[Speaker I] No, because you said someone who sells actual money—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, what distinction is the Ran making here? Between which two cases is he distinguishing? Between someone who sells a promissory note and Rabbi Natan’s lien. Right. Here waiver works? Right. Waiver works?

[Speaker G] And there it doesn’t. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is the case here? What are the two cases here? Why do you need Rabbi Natan’s lien—that is, what would there have been without Rabbi Natan’s lien? Notice that here, in every case, Reuven lent to Shimon, and Shimon lent to Levi. Right. There’s no sale here. The whole question is whether you’re coming under the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien or under the law of ordinary lien on assets. Those are the two options the Ran is comparing here, right? And the Ketzot also assumes that when Reuven lent to Shimon, and Shimon lent to Levi—yes?—if you don’t use Rabbi Natan’s lien, then it’s the same thing as Shimon selling Reuven the note he has against Levi. Who said so? One side of the comparison—wait, wait—one side of the comparison is indeed Rabbi Natan’s lien. That’s true. The other side of the comparison is not the same case. Here, when he said waiver works, he was talking about the sale of a promissory note, where Shimon sells a promissory note that he has against Levi to Reuven. And in that case waiver works: “One who sells a promissory note and then goes back and waives it—the waiver is effective.” But here we’re talking about Shimon having lent to Levi and not having sold the note to Reuven; rather, he borrowed from Reuven, just without Rabbi Natan’s lien, only under the ordinary law of lien on assets. Right? That’s the second case being discussed here. Who said that this is the same as a sale, where waiver works?

[Speaker I] So the emphasis is on the difference between a note and an asset?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The difference is in the case. Here, the two cases the Ran is comparing are within the same scenario: Reuven lent to Shimon, and Shimon lent to Levi. The comparison is between a situation where the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien exists and a situation where the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien does not exist and there is only ordinary lien on assets. But the case is always two successive loans. The case is the case of Rabbi Natan’s lien. The whole question is only whether this law of Rabbi Natan’s lien was newly introduced or not. Here, by contrast, it’s a comparison between two different cases. Here Rabbi Natan’s lien is Reuven—the case is Reuven lent to Shimon, and Shimon lent to Levi. This case is not like that; this case is Shimon lent to Levi and sold the note to Reuven.

[Speaker I] Loan as opposed to sale.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Now here waiver works. Who says waiver works here—even without Rabbi Natan’s lien? In this case, without the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien. The Ketzot assumes that if in Rabbi Natan’s lien waiver does not work, then without Rabbi Natan’s lien, in all these three-party cases, waiver always works. Even if it’s two loans, as long as there is no law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, waiver works. That’s what the Ketzot assumes. Who said so? Something here doesn’t fit.

[Speaker G] Wait, and why? When we asked Tosafot, and then the answer was obviously he can waive—if when he sells it he can waive it, then all the more so here he can—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —waive it.

[Speaker G] I didn’t understand. The question is whether it’s correct to say that Shimon can always waive Levi’s debt—sorry. I mean, I remember that when we talked about Tosafot, we said that obviously if he sold the note, he can still waive it, so then also when the note is still in his possession, he can waive it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not obvious at all. Not obvious at all. If he sold the note, then there’s no act of lending vis-à-vis Reuven; I owe Reuven nothing, right? But Levi certainly owes only me, so why shouldn’t I be able to waive it? Not from the standpoint of how much damage I’m doing to Reuven—in that regard, maybe it’s an a fortiori—but the ability to waive does not stem from the question of how much this harms Reuven, but from the question of to whom the loan is directed. So if someone borrowed from me and I sold the note to someone else, it’s obvious the loan is to me; the fact that I sold it to him is irrelevant. But if he borrowed from me—sorry—and I myself borrowed from someone else, then his loan is liened to Reuven. The Torah imposed that lien, not that I sold it. So who says I can waive it?

[Speaker C] Fine, but I want to understand the second option. Can he waive it to Levi?

[Speaker G] Me, as Shimon? No, Shimon who wants to waive Levi’s debt. Right. Why, if he hasn’t sold the note yet, would there be any reason to say that Shimon can’t waive it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he has another loan from Reuven that he owes him, and all his assets are liened to Reuven. Can he sell land? Shimon, I mean—when he owes Reuven money? Levi owes Shimon money. Fine? Can he sell land? Of course he can. The land is liened, and I can still take it. Why not?

[Speaker D] He sold it to someone; it’s a liened asset.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Same thing with a note. You want to sell—

[Speaker D] So that’s why Rabbi Akiva Eiger compared this to that and not this to that.

[Speaker C] Yes, but I want to say there’s a picture here—

[Speaker D] —that I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] He says Shimon lent to Levi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he did business, whatever.

[Speaker C] And Shimon sold to Reuven. Here, this is our case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Shimon sold Reuven Levi’s promissory note, and that has nothing to do with Reuven.

[Speaker C] Shimon lent to Levi. Reuven owes Shimon. Right. Right.

[Speaker D] Levi’s promissory note—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He sold it to Reuven.

[Speaker D] Exactly. Like the Ran says. Exactly, exactly. And then they tell us that Shimon, after he sold Reuven the promissory note, can waive it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s not going to the study hall and doing whatever you decide.

[Speaker G] Something that is permitted to sell.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s really only permitted to sell on a rabbinic level, not on a Torah level, as the Ran said.

[Speaker D] Fine, so it’s permitted to sell.

[Speaker C] Wait.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Before all the reasoning, I just want you to understand and follow the flow. Forget the reasoning. First of all, do you understand what happened here? There was a jump. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: you made a comparison between Rabbi Natan’s lien and another case, where in Rabbi Natan’s lien waiver does not work, implying that in the other case it does. But notice that the two cases the Ran compares there are not these—sorry—they are not the two cases being compared here.

[Speaker D] Right. Right. Very good.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the fact that one side of the comparison includes Rabbi Natan’s lien is nice. The question is: what stands on the other side of the comparison? And here there are two different cases standing there. Right. Fine. Now we need to look for reasoning. About reasoning you can argue, but I’m saying this is the direction, the direction in which we have to look for the solution. The solution is definitely there. What is the reasoning? Think about it. But first in the conceptual analysis, this already gives us an indication. Now we have to think about the reasoning: how can one distinguish between these two cases? Is it possible or not possible? That’s already more technical work. But this analysis tells us immediately where to look, or what to look for, in order to resolve the difficulty. Okay?

[Speaker G] I don’t understand why this isn’t—maybe I don’t understand the answer—why this isn’t the answer to the migo question. There’s a question why there is no migo. And you asked why there is no migo. I can say that this is the answer. And that’s what the Ran answers.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ran answers the question of why there is no migo by saying that he cannot waive it.

[Speaker G] No, in Rabbi Natan’s lien—but not in the case of three parties with two different loans.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Indeed, there there is no migo. Indeed there there is no migo, and he really is not believed to say “note of trust.” What do you mean?

[Speaker G] But suppose that’s not what Tosafot answers. Tosafot answers that there is a migo.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot doesn’t ask on that. Tosafot asks about Rabbi Natan’s lien.

[Speaker G] Tosafot assumes that indeed—

[Speaker I] —he can waive, but he doesn’t pay.

[Speaker G] Right.

[Speaker D] Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Right.

[Speaker I] That’s not true at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This whole discussion, the whole discussion, is within the Ran’s framework. It has nothing to do with Tosafot.

[Speaker I] Very good indeed. Why in a sale can he waive? What? Why in a sale?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Ran explained: that in a sale, basically the debt remains toward me. And therefore only rabbinically can I actually waive it. In principle, on a Torah level you couldn’t sell it at all. The rabbis enacted that you can, but the debt remains toward me. You borrowed from me. You are the owner of this whole discussion. If you borrowed from me, then when you repay, you repay me. You don’t know him and the business I do with him. You borrowed from me; your obligation to repay is to me. But why does a sale work? Because you owe me—so why shouldn’t I be able to waive it? You owe me, so I waive it for you.

[Speaker I] Shimon waives it to Levi. Yes. Why not? It’s very strange.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Distinguish between the two things. You can debate the reasoning, but first of all do you understand where the jump is here. Good. Now we need to look for reasoning. That’s already another analysis. I tried to show here how you do the analysis in order to know what to look for. Now I need to look for a reasoning that distinguishes between these two cases. I think one can find such reasoning; one can debate it. That’s not the lesson I’m focusing on right now. Okay? And why in an endorsement does waiver not work? That’s Rabbi Natan’s lien. No, but why doesn’t it work? Because in Rabbi Natan’s lien, Levi owes Reuven directly. Levi owes him. It is the Torah that obligates a person to repay debts. The basis of the matter is that repaying a creditor is a commandment. That’s also an answer to you. The basis of the matter is that repaying a creditor is a commandment. Okay? Isn’t this lien on the person? Yes, all of it, it doesn’t matter—the point is there is an obligation to repay. Fine? So if the Torah obligates Levi to repay Shimon, and obligates Shimon to repay Reuven, then it is certainly possible that the Torah would obligate Levi to repay Reuven. Possible? Then he is obligated. He isn’t obligated at all. But if you want to raise a question, the burden of proof is on you, not on me. I’m giving answers, not asking questions. Wait. Not sale—sale of loans.

[Speaker I] In a sale—wait, I meant in waiver.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. The moment the debt is no longer to me, I can’t waive it. The Torah determines to whom you owe, not you. But when I lent someone money and he owes me, and now I—if so, the debt remains toward me. And if the debt remains toward me, I can waive it.

[Speaker E] How did it change in the explanation that you can waive a debt—a debt—without transferring the lien? I can’t manage to understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What’s the problem? On a Torah level you can’t sell at all.

[Speaker G] Yes, but in the case of a rabbinic lien, where Shimon is the one who can waive—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, the one to whom he owes it in the end—

[Speaker G] —can always waive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Shimon then won’t be able afterward to come and collect the debt from Levi, because Reuven already waived it. That’s the other side of the coin. And what you said is actually to say that Shimon is—once everything is governed by Torah law, the reasoning less suggests that it depends on me. What do you mean, I can waive? The Torah said he owes a debt, and the Torah said I owe a debt. So now all of a sudden I can waive? The Torah determines who owes whom here and who doesn’t.

[Speaker G] The Torah also said—why can’t he waive?

[Speaker E] No—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only if he owes you. But if you owe someone else, then who says you can waive it? Because in the case where you happen to have no money, Reuven won’t be able to collect other money from you, because that’s the sort of situation we’re talking about, right? You have no money. So you want to waive it—yes, I can waive it. But what about Reuven? All that is when Reuven has a claim against you by force of Torah law, because you borrowed from him. If you have business dealings with Reuven and you sold this, then let him sue you afterward, fine, business is business; the Torah doesn’t intervene. Business is our decisions. A loan is Torah law; it is a commandment to lend, and the obligation to repay is also a commandment.

[Speaker I] Okay, so up to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here. Thank you very much. We’ll see each other next week, Tuesday.

[Speaker I] A woman and the ketubah and all that—that’s like here too, right? It’s here.

Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 23

Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Rabbi Natan’s lien and the comparison to collection from encumbered property

Documents, evidence and money, and checks as an example

Liens on land, unencumbered property, and personal obligation

The Ran’s innovation: “first collect from the middle party” also in Rabbi Natan’s lien

One who sells his debt document to another and then waives it: Tosafot’s question and answer

The Ran’s answer: where others are harmed, waiver does not work, and the explanation of selling debt documents

Synchronizing the figures Reuven–Shimon–Levi across three scenarios

Fitting the Ran together: when Shimon “drops out of the picture” and when he does not

Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Ran: a contradiction between “the court does not collect through documents” and “it is impossible to waive”

The Chazon Ish’s method and the identification that Rabbi Akiva Eiger is mixing two cases

Closing and the connection to the woman and the ketubah

Full Transcript

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Table of Contents

Summary

General Overview

Rabbi Natan’s lien and the comparison to collection from encumbered property

Documents, evidence and money, and checks as an example

Liens on land, unencumbered property, and personal obligation

The Ran’s innovation: “first collect from the middle party” also in Rabbi Natan’s lien

One who sells his debt document to another and then waives it: Tosafot’s question and answer

The Ran’s answer: where others are harmed, waiver does not work, and the explanation of selling debt documents

Synchronizing the figures Reuven–Shimon–Levi across three scenarios

Fitting the Ran together: when Shimon “drops out of the picture” and when he does not

Rabbi Akiva Eiger on the Ran: a contradiction between “the court does not collect through documents” and “it is impossible to waive”

The Chazon Ish’s method and the identification that Rabbi Akiva Eiger is mixing two cases

Closing and the connection to the woman and the ketubah

Full Transcript

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