Ketubot Chapter 2, Lesson 22, Part B
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- [0:00] Opening: Ran on the Rif and the first novel point
- [3:46] The answer of “protesting” and Rabbi Natan’s lien
- [5:52] Debt documents and whether they are collectible assets
- [21:11] Two answers to one question
- [25:34] Maimonides’ wonderful point – one prohibition does not take effect on top of another
- [26:52] Differences between the prohibition of meat and milk and milk alone
- [28:20] The panel at the National Library – benefiting without loss
- [29:57] A promissory note, sale, and waiver – tort law
- [36:26] Tosafot – migo and whether there is waiver
- [37:55] A trust document – is it really a debt?
- [46:55] A trust document – is it valid and what follows from it
Summary
General Overview
The discussion closely reads the wording of the Ran in order to clarify what exactly the question “And if you say that even without Rabbi Natan he would still be harming others” is aimed at, and what the relationship is between the Ran on the Rif and the Ran’s novellae. From there it works out two different directions for answering Rabbi Natan’s lien. The explanation sharpens the concept of “protesting” as a prior condition for collection without Rabbi Natan’s lien, while on the other hand presenting an answer that the novelty is the ability to collect something whose substance is not money, such as a document. Later the topic is linked to Samuel’s rule: “If one sells a promissory note to another and then goes back and waives it, it is waived,” and to Tosafot’s question why there is no migo in the claim of “a trust document,” together with Tosafot’s answer that the migo claim does not arise because “perhaps he does not intend to waive and lose his debt,” since it is still possible that the borrower will repay.
The precise wording of the question in the Ran on the Rif and in the novellae
The reading argues that the Ran is not asking, “What is Rabbi Natan’s novelty?” Rather, he is asking against Abaye why he needed Rabbi Natan in order to say “he harms others,” since even without Rabbi Natan he harms others. This distinction shows that the question is directed at the Talmudic discussion and not at Rabbi Natan’s novelty itself, and therefore the question can be asked even without the Ran’s introduction. Comparing the Ran on the Rif with the Ran’s novellae shows that in the novellae the Ran skips the introduction and starts directly with the question, so at first it seems as though there are two different questions even though the wording of the question is identical. The reconsidered reading suggests that it is the same question with two different answers, or else that there are differences of version and editing between the works and their manuscript transmission.
The concept of “protesting” without Rabbi Natan’s lien
The explanation defines the situation as follows: without the rule of Rabbi Natan’s lien, Reuven cannot collect from Levi until Shimon sues Levi and a religious court rules that Levi owes Shimon money. Then Reuven can come and take it, because it is “Shimon’s money.” “Protesting” is explained as depending on Shimon insisting on his debt and demanding it; without that, Reuven has no power to extract anything from Levi. With Rabbi Natan’s lien, this protest is not needed, because the rule itself allows a more direct collection, though later the discussion narrows and refines exactly how to understand “he owes me, he doesn’t owe you” in contrast to situations where Shimon has other property. It is also noted that not every action must go through a religious court; if the parties agree, payment can be made without a legal proceeding, and only in the absence of agreement do they go to court.
The Ran on the Rif’s answer: documents are not collectible assets
The Ran on the Rif answers: “One can say that documents are not collectible assets, for their substance is not money, and anything whose substance is not money the religious court does not collect for him,” and he says that “we learn this from here.” The explanation formulates it this way: without Rabbi Natan’s lien, Reuven could not “take the document from Shimon,” because a document is not money but rather evidence and a legal claim. So this is not an asset that can be collected in and of itself. Rabbi Natan’s lien introduces the novelty that when necessary one may collect by taking the document for purposes of collection, even though its substance is not money. That also explains why this rule was needed in the Talmudic discussion of “harming others.” The Ran strengthens this from a discussion on folio 110 about two people who produce debt documents against one another, and from there proves that if documents were collectible assets, there would be room to take the document itself in place of collection and the whole procedure would collapse. He therefore brings additional proofs, since “some medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagree with him.”
The limits of the novelty according to the Ran and the need for the introduction
The discussion sharpens the point that according to the Ran, even after the answer, Rabbi Natan’s lien does not mean that Levi “now owes Reuven” in every situation. If Shimon has money, Reuven does not go to Levi. The novelty is described instead as the ability to take a document, which is not itself collectible, in order to collect through it Levi’s debt to Shimon, not as a substantive transfer of Levi’s obligation directly to Reuven. The clarification sums it up as “taking the document for the purpose of collecting, and now collecting with it,” and this describes a legal conception in which one payment can discharge two links in a chain of debt.
Economic illustrations and the question of real value and obligation
The discussion uses Leah Goldberg’s parable about “three nuts” to illustrate how value is created by agreement and can circulate payments without anyone apparently losing. It continues with the analogy of futures trading and barrels of oil “in the year four thousand” in order to argue that in the end there is a real point of redemption, so it is not just “hot air business.” The example of the bank and liquidity is rejected as a different issue, and there is also a comparison to Bitcoin and Ethereum through the distinction about computing power and solving a puzzle in order to create value, and to the cancellation of the gold standard at Fort Knox as an explanation for “virtual” money. The discussion concludes with the argument that frauds like Madoff collapse in the end, and that you cannot simply double the value of a currency by declaration without underlying productive output and GDP to support it, because inflation will restore purchasing power to its previous level.
The answer in the Ran’s novellae: the dispute between the Rabbis and Rabbi Natan and dependence on a claim
In the Ran’s novellae a different answer appears: “One can say that the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Natan, hold that a religious court does not descend to collect his debt as long as he has not been protested to by him,” and the explanation interprets this as a condition that one does not take from one person and give to another without the original creditor first making a claim. The picture is that without Shimon suing Levi, Reuven cannot extract from Levi; only after Shimon “protests” and makes his claim can Reuven take it. The reading describes how the difference between the two answers initially gave the impression that the two questions were different, but later raises the possibility that it is really the same question with two answers, or else differences of wording and manuscripts, including the suggestion to check whether the phrase “harms others” appears in the original manuscripts of the novellae.
A methodological note about changes of view across works and manuscripts
The discussion argues that there is no difficulty in one work containing one answer and another containing an additional answer, because these are works written at different times and the author may have later developed a different idea. Examples are given of contradictions between the Rashba’s novellae and his responsa, and between Maimonides’ responsa and his rulings or his Commentary on the Mishnah. Manuscripts of Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah are described that contain erasures showing that he changed his mind. The formulation illustrates a conception of “early Maimonides and late Maimonides” as “Maimonides 1 and Maimonides 2,” and this is compared to Wittgenstein.
A fine point from your father and Samuel’s rule about waiving a debt document
The Talmudic passage is quoted: “Rava said to the son of Rabbi Chiya bar Avin: Come, I will tell you a fine point that your father used to say,” and it is presented as a particularly clear statement that impressed them. Samuel’s rule is cited: “If one sells a promissory note to another and then goes back and waives it, it is waived… and even an heir can waive it,” and this is described as “a very bizarre law” yet still valid, because the debt remains owed to the original lender and the document is only evidence. The explanation concludes that the buyer can sue the seller in tort for the fact that the note lost its value, and this is defined as a separate tort-law question of direct causation versus indirect causation.
Tosafot’s question about migo in the claim of “a trust document” and their answer
Tosafot ask: “And if you say, let him be believed by a migo, since if he wanted he could waive it? For if one sells a promissory note to another and then goes back and waives it, it is waived.” Their point is that since the lender can waive it, perhaps he should be believed in saying “this is a trust document” by virtue of a migo, since in any event he could have waived it and caused others to lose. The explanation adds in the name of the Rosh that this is called “it is in his power,” and that is even stronger than a migo, because he can actually bring about the result without lying. Tosafot answer: “This is not a migo, for perhaps he does not intend to waive and lose his debt, because now that he says it is a trust document he loses nothing, since the borrower is not a robber.” The discussion explains that it is still possible that Levi will repay even if the court invalidates the document, whereas with an actual waiver he certainly will not be paid. The explanation sharpens the point that a migo is evaluated from the standpoint of the lie, and the lie of saying “trust document” is preferable for Shimon to actual waiver, because it leaves open the possibility of repayment. Therefore this is not a strong enough claim to believe him.
Internal clarification of the point of confusion: a trust claim versus waiver
The discussion distinguishes between two planes: the basic credibility of the claim “a trust document,” and the creation of a migo that would decide the issue despite the implausibility. It argues that the lack of credibility stems both from the prohibition on a trust document and from the implausibility that a person would “commit legal suicide” and create evidence against himself. The explanation keeps returning to the point that Tosafot are not discussing whether the trust claim is actually true, but whether, on the assumption that the claim is false, there is a migo from waiver. Their answer is that the alternative of waiver is worse for Shimon, because it certainly makes him lose, whereas the trust-document claim still leaves some chance of repayment. The discussion ends at a stopping point, noting that for now “we’re done with this Tosafot,” and signals that the continuation of the topic will be learned later.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Second, in the Ran’s wording the first novel point is written. Look: “And if you say, even without Rabbi Natan…” — and “if you say” here, I mean the Ran on the Rif. First let’s start with the Ran on the Rif, and after that— “And if you say that even without Rabbi Natan he would still be harming others.” What is he asking? He’s not asking what Rabbi Natan’s novelty is.
[Speaker C] He’s asking, maybe, maybe from here—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ran on the Rif, the beginning of the Ran on the Rif.
[Speaker C] Maybe the Mishnah is resolving Abaye, and maybe the second paragraph—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The paragraph “And if you say,” that’s the second half of the Ran. “And if you say”— no, not the Ran’s novellae, I’m reading the Ran on the Rif, “And if you say…”
[Speaker D] After the introduction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says: “And if you say that even without Rabbi Natan he would still be harming others.” Right.
[Speaker D] If you thought that without Rabbi Natan you could explain—
[Speaker C] You can say, so what’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The question?
[Speaker D] The question—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Is it on Rabbi Natan or on Abaye?
[Speaker C] On Abaye! Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says—
[Speaker C] Not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is not asking what Rabbi Natan’s novelty is. He is asking why you, Abaye, needed Rabbi Natan in order to say that he harms others. Even without Rabbi Natan he harms others. So he means the second question, not the first. But the second question doesn’t need the introduction.
[Speaker F] Fine, so we need to—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Say that the introduction is correct regardless, and the question really wasn’t asked because of the introduction. He stated the introduction because it is true, and afterward he asks the question.
[Speaker D] Maybe he saw that people weren’t understanding Rabbi Natan properly, so he wanted to settle the matter and explain.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right. But according to this precise reading, it turns out that the question does not rest on the Ran’s introduction. You can ask this question even without the Ran’s introduction. The question “what is Rabbi Natan’s novelty” — for that you need the introduction. Because without the introduction it’s obvious what Rabbi Natan’s novelty is. Okay? Now look at his wording in the novellae. What’s this? Because he protested to them? Wait, wait, one second more. “And if you say that even without Rabbi Natan he still harms others.” Here too the wording is a question on the Talmudic discussion, not on Rabbi Natan’s novelty. I don’t know — somehow I missed that. I thought he was asking two different questions in the novellae and in the Ran on the Rif, but no, it’s the same question.
[Speaker D] The second paragraph in section b. What, what? The first paragraph in section—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] C.
[Speaker D] No, it’s the same thing, the same sentence. In the second paragraph there are things that have— where? What, in the answer? Let’s start with the novellae. There he starts straight with the question and skips the introduction, that’s all. So is there supposedly a dispute between Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis? Where? In the novellae? Yes, when he says “And if you say.” In the novellae? Ah, right, he says— we’re doing a step-by-step comparison.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Step one is the opening, step two is the question, step three is the answer. Okay? Now we haven’t yet read the answer — neither in the Ran’s novellae nor in the Ran.
[Speaker D] And maybe what’s going on in the first paragraph of the Ran on the Rif—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in both of them. I read each stage like that: I read the Ran on the Rif and I read the novellae.
[Speaker D] Maybe he omits the introduction here in the first one, in the Ran on the Rif — I didn’t read the Rif — but maybe he’s coming to dispute something.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe the Rif understood— no, no, no, it’s not difficult, no need to hunt for answers. He says it because that is what is correct; he wants to make clear that this is the law. That’s fine. But according to this, it turns out that the question really did not need that introduction. The introduction was brought because it is true, and afterward there is a question unrelated to the introduction — if I’m right in this precise reading, that it’s a question on the Talmudic discussion and not the question “what is Rabbi Natan’s novelty.” But now look at the answer. Ah, maybe you were only asking about this “protesting” — what is this “protesting”?
[Speaker C] Look, the point is that in both of them there is “protesting.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right. What do you mean? No, the answers — we’re not at the answers yet, we’re still on the question.
[Speaker C] The idea of “protesting.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is the idea of “protesting”? It means, let’s say there is no rule of Rabbi Natan’s lien. Okay? If there is no rule of Rabbi Natan’s lien, then Reuven can collect from Shimon only after Shimon comes and sues Levi. Because once Shimon comes and sues Levi, the court has basically ruled that Levi owes him money. Now Reuven can come and take that money, because it is Shimon’s money. Fine? Before that, I don’t know — maybe there are negotiations, maybe Shimon will forgo it, maybe. But if Shimon insists that he wants that debt, then that means it is his, and Reuven can take it from him.
[Speaker G] That’s the “protesting,” that’s without Rabbi Natan. Without Rabbi Natan that’s how it would be.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, and with Rabbi Natan it doesn’t matter. Right — with Rabbi Natan you don’t need that protest, because that’s Rabbi Natan’s rule. He owes me, he doesn’t owe you. Meaning, without Rabbi Natan, Levi owes Shimon and Shimon owes Reuven. Reuven can take from Levi only if Shimon asks Levi for what is coming to him, and then I say okay, now I’ll take it in your place. But if you didn’t ask him, I can’t take it. Under Rabbi Natan’s lien you don’t need to protest; I take it from Levi. Okay?
[Speaker G] So how many legal fingers are there here, basically?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s say — yes, that’s another way to explain it. Fine? Now look at the answers. The answers look different.
[Speaker G] No, because sorry — because everything goes through a religious court, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not that he— no, if they agree. No, taking the law into your own hands is a different matter. He can — if both agree, he can take it. If both agree? If both agree and no one is arguing, then they don’t go to court. Reuven goes to Levi and says, give me the hundred shekels you owe Shimon. Fine — if he gives it, everything is fine. If he doesn’t agree, they go to court. It doesn’t have to be in court. So look: in the answers there is a difference. Look at the Ran on the Rif. “One can say” — okay? “One can say that documents are not collectible assets, for their substance is not money, and anything whose substance is not money, the religious court does not collect for him. And we learn this from here.” And from this discussion it comes out exactly so, because this is a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim); there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with him, the Tur and others disagree with him. So the Ran says: from this discussion it follows that documents are not things that stand for collection — for collection, yes? Exactly. So what is he basically saying? If there were no rule of Rabbi Natan’s lien, Reuven would not be able to go to Shimon and take the document from him. The document is not money. The document is an asset, the document is the possibility of claiming a debt. If I have actual money, you can take it from me; but taking my document is irrelevant. A document’s substance is not money. A document is proof that the other person owes me. The document itself does not owe; it is not worth money, it is not a thing, it is not money.
[Speaker D] Like a check, really — like in the past, a negotiable check, or a security check or something like that, a security document — to activate it you had to do a legal act, and only then could you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Fine? So the Ran says as follows: if there were no rule of Rabbi Natan’s lien, and we were relying only on the ordinary laws of collecting a debt from encumbered property and so on — exactly — you couldn’t take it, you wouldn’t be able to take the document. Rabbi Natan’s lien introduces the novelty that you can take the document even though its substance is not money. That is Rabbi Natan’s novelty. Okay? Does that also answer the question? What? Does that also answer the Talmud’s question? Why does that answer the Talmud’s question?
[Speaker E] Because in the case of Rabbi Natan’s lien, if it weren’t there—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He couldn’t — it doesn’t matter whether he has money or doesn’t have money, the document you can’t take, right? So that answers both questions. Okay? What does the Ran say? And then he brings the Talmud on folio 110 — doesn’t matter — there are two people there who produced debt documents, meaning Reuven brought out a debt document that Shimon owes him a hundred shekels, and Shimon brought out a debt document that Reuven owes him a hundred shekels. They both owe each other. The Talmud says they collect from one another.
[Speaker D] Basically they don’t collect anything.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they collect from one another. “They collect from one another” means it has consequences. The Talmud discusses there at length — I’m not getting into all the details — the Talmud discusses whether certain debts are collected from inferior land and other debts from intermediate-quality land, so I’ll take inferior land from him and he’ll take intermediate land from me, meaning it doesn’t completely cancel out. Okay? But he says that from there it is proven that documents are not collectible assets. Why? Because really, if documents were collectible assets, then no one would take anything. I would take the document and in effect I would be taking my own land back to myself. I wouldn’t be doing anything. So that is the proof from the Talmud there, but it is less important for our purposes.
[Speaker D] But why, just in terms of his wording, does he first say “we learn this from here” — fine, he wants to derive this rule that documents are not collectible assets and that this is learned specifically from our discussion. So why does he need to bring another discussion at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He is bringing supporting proof, that it is also proven in that discussion. He brings proofs because he knows there are those who disagree with him. Meaning: from the discussion here it is proven so, and from the discussion on 110 it is also proven so.
[Speaker D] So according to this answer, Rabbi Natan’s novelty is that you can also take a document? And here Rabbi Natan’s lien—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Without Rabbi Natan I wouldn’t know that. Fine? Rabbi Natan says that you can collect even a document. But you can collect even a document only if the other one — only if Shimon has no other money. Everything he said earlier still remains true. Fine? Meaning, Rabbi Natan’s lien basically says: you can take the document. But it’s not that Levi now owes you — that’s not true. Because if Levi owed you, then I could go to Levi even if Shimon had money. Is there money?
[Speaker F] So that’s why he needed the introduction, in order to say this now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, though, that you have to understand that even in his answer the introduction has not disappeared. There is a slightly complex point here. Meaning, Rabbi Natan’s lien according to the Ran is not that Levi now owes Reuven the money. No. Because if Shimon has money, I can’t go to Levi. The great novelty is that even a document, which is not collectible, I can take — why? Because through it I am basically taking Levi’s debt to Shimon, that’s all. Fine? Next.
[Speaker D] When he says—
[Speaker E] A document—
[Speaker D] That it’s not collectible — does he mean you can take the document or collect? What does he mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Take the document for the purpose of collecting, and then collect with it. So that’s the Ran in—
[Speaker C] In that case, if I take from Levi, then basically both Levi and Shimon no longer owe money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both are discharged and everything is fine, right?
[Speaker C] No, but like, with one payment—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Both. Do you know the story of A. Goldberg? What, you know Leah Goldberg’s story about three nuts, right? Yes. A wonderful story. That story is basically a parable about money. You know there’s — never mind — some dwarf who has three nuts. Then someone comes to chop down the tree he lives in. Ah, a certain value? Exactly. So agreement between people gives it value, and that makes it work all the way. Meaning, you can now buy with it and sell with it and keep rolling it forward forever. In the army, for example, whenever someone was getting discharged and was missing some equipment, he would take it from the guys who were staying.
[Speaker C] Yes, that’s how it is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you take from the guys staying behind — let’s say you’re missing fatigue pants — you take from the people there, you turn in everything, all fine. Now they’re missing something, and when they get discharged they’ll take it from the next person still there. When the messiah comes and they dismantle the army, one pair of fatigue pants will be missing. Meaning, no one loses from this; it’s win-win. Okay, apparently no one loses from this, so what’s the problem? The problem is that in the very end, this note probably does come due. It’s like today when people trade barrels of oil that will be pumped, I don’t know, in 2022. Okay? There are futures commodities; whole markets of futures commodities. So what’s the issue? Talk about barrels of oil that will be pumped in the year four thousand. Fine? And now trade in that. There’s nothing — nobody will be pumping by then, there won’t be any oil there at all. But what difference does it make? We’ll buy and sell and sell and everything will be fine and everybody— except that in the end, ownership of those barrels will eventually reach the year four thousand.
[Speaker G] Not only the year four thousand — today, if we all withdrew from the bank the money we supposedly have there, there isn’t any. There’s no money in the bank.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s something else. That’s a liquidity question. I’m talking about futures commodities, not a liquidity problem.
[Speaker G] No, it’s like Bitcoin, like Ethereum. A virtual currency — what is it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not exactly. Because in Bitcoin one of the things that gives it value is that there’s a puzzle you have to solve in order to mine Bitcoin. To generate Bitcoin you have to solve a puzzle.
[Speaker D] Seriously? Computing power.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, fine, but it’s not something that demands from you some special ability in exchange for something tangible. It’s like how in the past, in the United States, dollars had to be backed by gold. In Fort Knox there was a gold reserve corresponding to the whole value of U.S. money, because there had to be some value behind the money. At some stage they canceled that, and now money is completely virtual. There is no value behind it. Where is the money sitting, somewhere?
[Speaker C] In Fort Knox.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So in short, this field of economics is very amusing. There’s a lot of hot air business in it, but somehow the whole thing works — that’s just a fact. And there is right and wrong there. It’s not that you can do whatever you want, because in the end it will collapse. Meaning no — if you do something that isn’t true, it looks like a lie. In the end there is truth. Someone who cheats and inflates things and so on eventually sits in prison, like Madoff.
[Speaker C] The 2008 crisis was the correction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly. In the end 2008 arrives, the financial crisis of 2008. Because if everything were just hot air business, then what’s the problem? We’ll decide that the nuts are now worth a hundred thousand dollars — what’s the problem? And we’ll buy with them. If everyone agrees, everything is fine. But in the end, someone has to redeem that note. The year four thousand comes and someone has to actually receive those barrels of oil. And if he won’t receive them, then even in the year 3900 he won’t buy them, and then already in 3800 they have no value, and so on. Meaning, it rolls backward. It’s not hot air business. There is something real in the background. That’s exactly the point; that’s what’s hard to grasp here. The Madoff affair? Ah yes, exactly. Madoff tried to turn it into hot air business, and in the end he sits in prison because it isn’t just hot air business.
[Speaker G] Forget that he’s in prison — how many institutions collapsed because of him?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, of course, they really collapsed. And it’s like the question people always ask: why doesn’t a country just declare that its currency is now worth twice as much, from now on, just double — that’s it? Its purchasing power doubles, everything’s wonderful. What’s the problem? It’s just a declaration, right? So why not do it? Obviously because there has to be some backing behind it. The amount of things you produce, your GDP, has to somehow back the value of the currency. If you double the value of the currency — exactly — there will be inflation that pushes purchasing power back into line with the quantity of goods. So it isn’t hot air business. It looks like hot air business, but it isn’t. The clever fraudsters try to play on the hot-air side, hoping that as long as that stage is still with them, no one will notice. They’ll notice only later — they always notice in the end. But they’ll notice only later, when I’m no longer in the business, and I’ve already made my profits. The trick is to catch the fraudsters at that stage and not wait until the year four thousand, when it turns out there are no barrels at all, or there are autonomous electric cars and no one needs oil. Oil has lost its value. Okay. Now the Ran in the novellae says something else. “One can say.” Do you see it?
[Speaker C] Wait, wait, one second. In which section, two? Is it documents or what? “The Rabbis”—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “One can say that the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Natan” — do you see? Yes. “Hold that a religious court does not descend to collect his debt so long as he has not been protested to by him, and that is what we say, that one does not take from one and give to another in any circumstance; as long as the lender has not claimed from him, one does not extract from him except with the consent of the one who lent to him.”
[Speaker G] What’s he saying here? You can’t directly have the transfer made from Levi to Reuven. You also need Shimon’s agreement — that he protests.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That he protests to him — what we talked about before. Shimon has to demand the money from Levi.
[Speaker C] Right, Reuven demands the money—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he doesn’t demand it. Reuven demands from Shimon, and Shimon is Levi’s lender. And Shimon demands the money from Levi, and only then can Reuven take it. Without Shimon demanding the money from Levi, then there is no money — there is nothing here to take. What does this answer?
[Speaker G] Shimon is the middleman. Yes, yes, Shimon is the middleman. Right, because Shimon is the lender—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if he has—
[Speaker G] A trust document, then really no money is owed to him at all. Right, he is the lender.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He borrowed from Reuven, and he is Levi’s lender. There is the first borrower and the second borrower, and the first lender and the second lender. Fine. Now look, there is something strange here. It doesn’t make sense at all. Why?
[Speaker G] That’s why he isn’t believed when he says “it’s a trust document.”
[Speaker I] He doesn’t sue the borrower at all—
[Speaker G] Because it’s a trust document vis-à-vis Reuven. But with Levi, Reuven can claim it from Levi.
[Speaker I] No, but we said that Shimon first has to claim his money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Without Rabbi Natan’s lien, right.
[Speaker I] He claims his money, and then Levi — Reuven takes from him. Right. In our discussion Shimon says it is a trust document, so—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then really no money is owed to him at all. Exactly. Therefore you need Rabbi Natan’s lien. That is why you need Rabbi Natan’s lien in order to explain our Talmudic discussion.
[Speaker C] But what does it mean here that it’s a trust document?
[Speaker G] But if it really is a trust document?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We said there is no such thing. It is forbidden to make a trust document.
[Speaker G] But really it’s not a promissory note.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you did it, that’s your problem. Levi’s problem too?
[Speaker G] Everybody’s problem.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whoever did it committed a prohibition.
[Speaker C] But what good does it do—
[Speaker G] What good does it do that he isn’t believed, and they demand money from him? Again, I didn’t understand. What do they require in order to prove that this document really is a debt note? They don’t need to. You cannot make the claim called “trust document.” You can’t make that claim.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t make that claim.
[Speaker G] But where is the proof that Levi really owes him? From the document?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the document is not a trust document, then it is a genuine document.
[Speaker G] But what if it is a trust document?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But we are not concerned that it is a trust document. Prove that it is a trust document, and I’ll accept it. How do you prove such a thing? You need proof.
[Speaker G] You need proof. So what is the proof?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Bring two witnesses that it is a trust document, I don’t know — if you have witnesses. But that really won’t happen. He doesn’t have that. That’s why it is forbidden to do such a thing. Then Levi and whoever did it are wicked. That is why it is forbidden to do such a thing. Also—
[Speaker G] It’s still not clear why people would use it at all. They don’t use it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if someone wants to claim, “I did it anyway even though it’s forbidden,” we tell him: no, you didn’t. I don’t believe you that you did.
[Speaker C] And even if you did, that’s your problem.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if you did, it’s your problem, exactly.
[Speaker C] And also, if the borrower has a trust document, then it’s not okay that he keeps it in his house. Yes, exactly. I gave you a document. Wait, let’s drop for a second the whole saying— this is a different novelty from Rabbi Natan. What is written here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. What is written here is different from the Ran on the Rif, right?
[Speaker C] Yes, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is written here is different from the Ran on the Rif.
[Speaker G] Right. So what is the later Rabbi Natan’s novelty?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning that even without protesting — right? Meaning this is a different answer from the answer the Ran gives on the Rif to the question, right? Because at first I thought, as I told you before, that the answer is different because the question here was different. The question here was: what is Rabbi Natan’s novelty? Let’s say, suppose that the question in the Ran’s novellae — not the Ran on the Rif — in the novellae, is: what is Rabbi Natan’s novelty? Not a question on the Talmudic discussion. What is Rabbi Natan’s novelty? Yes. And Rabbi Natan’s novelty is that even without protesting, I can take from Levi. Even though if Shimon has money I still can’t; the first point remains. But even without protesting I can take it. Okay? But then that answers the question of what Rabbi Natan’s novelty is, not the question in our Talmudic discussion of why Rabbi Natan was needed. And therefore at first I understood that the Ran’s novellae ask one question and the Ran on the Rif asks another question, and that is why the answers are different too. The answer that the Ran on the Rif writes resolves our Talmudic discussion — and of course also the novelty itself — but our Talmudic discussion. And the second answer resolves only the question of what the novelty is. It seemingly doesn’t touch our Talmudic discussion, not at all. He doesn’t write, “and therefore he harms others.” Rather, seemingly he is only explaining what Rabbi Natan’s novelty is. What is the novelty? That even without the other person protesting, you can go to Levi. That’s what Rabbi Natan introduced. So it turns out that the Ran — the Ran’s novellae — is writing here what Rabbi Natan’s novelty is; he is not explaining the Talmudic discussion as to why this is “harming others.” Therefore when I first read it, I thought that the question in the Ran’s novellae, even though it looks similar to the question in the Ran on the Rif, was not the same question. The Ran’s novellae asked what Rabbi Natan’s novelty is, and to that he answered: what is the novelty? That even without protesting, you can go to Levi. The Ran on the Rif asked why the Talmudic discussion needed Rabbi Natan to explain that this is “harming others,” and to that he answered: because otherwise the debt document is not collectible — without Rabbi Natan you couldn’t do it. Okay? But then it really comes out that they are different approaches. But when we reread it now — this is the thing that just now became clear to me — when you read the questions, they do look the same. Both questions are questions on the Talmudic discussion: why does the Talmudic discussion need Rabbi Natan in order to say that he harms others? Then we need to understand whether this second answer in the novellae also resolves that question, or whether it only resolves the question of what Rabbi Natan’s novelty is. What? And also a hint from the Talmud itself, that’s all. Why? Because Rabbi Natan— ten lines earlier. Right, exactly. Meaning, in the Talmud itself the case is that Shimon says this is a trust document. Right? So in effect, Shimon is not protesting to Levi. Right? If Shimon is not protesting to Levi, then Reuven cannot collect from him. Right? Reuven cannot collect from him, and therefore this is harming others. Therefore the claim of “trust document” is harming others: you are preventing Reuven from collecting from you. Right? Without Rabbi Natan’s rule you wouldn’t know that. Why? Because without Rabbi Natan’s rule, only if he protests can I collect. If I don’t protest, he can’t collect from me anyway, irrespective of whether it is a trust document or not. Okay? So that’s why I’m saying, I now think — though I’m still a bit uncertain — that it probably is the same question, and there are simply two different answers to the same question. Maybe the versions too… possible. It’s possible, because from the wording of the answer it really does look like he is coming to explain Rabbi Natan’s novelty, not why this is “harming others” in the Talmudic discussion. And maybe this is just a formulaic expression. Sometimes, by the way, these are manuscript problems. I mean, it’s the Ran and it’s the Ran — so they copied that Ran, and the question in the Ran’s novellae was copied from the Ran on the Rif. And exactly, the phrase “harms others” perhaps did not appear here at all originally; they just completed it from the Ran on the Rif. We’d need to see with, I don’t know, Talmud scholars who check the Ran’s manuscripts and see there whether the phrase “harms others” appears in the novellae in the original, better manuscripts. Okay? I wouldn’t be surprised if not. Why are there two answers? That’s why I say: seemingly this hints that there were also two questions. But if there were not two questions, then he is writing two different answers here to the same question. Fine. Fine? Okay. Here one thing occurred to him, and there something else occurred to him. No problem, it’s not terrible, because these are works written at different times. So here he had this answer, and afterward he thought of another answer.
[Speaker D] There are things that contradict each other — once he thought one thing and now he thinks something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no — two different answers to the question. Right, right. Yes, this happens a lot, by the way, it happens a lot. In the Rashba’s novellae and the Rashba’s responsa there are also many contradictions. Or between Maimonides’ responsa and Maimonides’ rulings, or Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah. There are contradictions, because at different periods you think differently, so you give different answers. Or additional answers, and you don’t retract the earlier one — that’s also possible. In Maimonides, by the way, in manuscripts of the Commentary on the Mishnah, we actually have manuscripts in Maimonides’ own hand. In his own handwriting. In his own handwriting. So there are many erasures there. You can see that he changed his mind. And many things that appear in our printed editions of the Commentary on the Mishnah are crossed out in Maimonides’ manuscript. Meaning, that was copied from some earlier manuscript before Maimonides changed his mind. And after Maimonides changed his mind, it turns out that what is written in our Commentary on the Mishnah is not correct. What do I mean, not correct? It is not Maimonides’ final view. It was Maimonides’ view when he first wrote it. Since “Maimonides” is a book and not a person, that’s not interesting. Okay. Early Maimonides and late Maimonides, like Wittgenstein. Right — when you have a manuscript you can use the corrected Maimonides book. No, it’s Maimonides, so these are two different books, not “the corrected Maimonides.” It’s the broken Maimonides book and the corrected Maimonides book — simply two books, Maimonides 1 and Maimonides 2. So the same person wrote them; so what? He wrote two books. Fine. Now the Talmud — later in the Talmud — until here this was the Ran’s approach.
[Speaker G] Later in the Talmud, on folio 85—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s on side b, by the way—
[Speaker G] By the way, not a.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Oh really? On my page it says side b, so maybe we just got mixed up.
[Speaker G] You copied it wrong.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so here you see how different versions get garbled. Even in my own copy-paste it got messed up. I don’t know, because usually what I do is, I write up the lecture and then I copy it and strip out all the text, leaving only the sources and the guiding questions. And that’s how I build the sheet.
[Speaker C] So maybe you corrected it on your end.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, yes, it could be that I really did correct it for myself afterward, after… right, could be, could be. Okay. “Rava said to the son of Rabbi Chiyya bar Avin: Come, I’ll tell you an excellent thing that your father said.” Let me tell you some particularly clear idea that your father said. Who’s his father? Avin. Rabbi Chiyya bar Avin. Avin is his father.
[Speaker D] No, he was speaking to Avin’s son.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sorry, right. Sorry. Rabbi Chiyya bar Avin is the father. Rabbi Chiyya bar Avin is the father, Avin is the grandfather. Yes. So he says: I’ll tell you something nice. By the way, this is just an interesting point—there was some argument on my website recently with someone. I claimed that the sages of our time are sharper than the earlier generations. Could be, yes, I told him—I don’t even remember exactly. So someone there got really upset at this heresy of the fundamentals. So I gave him a few examples, I brought two, and now I see this is also an example. One example: there’s Maimonides in his commentary on the Mishnah on Keritot. Maimonides there—this is what’s called “the wonderful point.” That’s what they call it in the yeshivot: Maimonides says, let me tell you a wonderful point. It’s called Maimonides’ wonderful point. That’s what he writes in the commentary on the Mishnah in Keritot, and there he says regarding “one prohibition does not take effect where another prohibition already exists.” So he says there—we once learned this when we studied tractate Pesachim years ago—the practical rule is that every prohibition of eating also includes a prohibition of deriving benefit, unless there is a source that permits deriving benefit from it. Now the prohibition of benefit is only—
[Speaker H] Except for meat and milk, no?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, every prohibition of eating is also a prohibition of benefit, unless there’s a special source permitting benefit from it; there are many things where there is a special source permitting benefit. Yes, exactly. So Maimonides says: essentially the claim is that the prohibition of eating is the actual prohibition written in the Torah. The prohibition of benefit branches off from it. We learn that anything forbidden to eat is automatically also forbidden for benefit. Why is that important? Because in the topic of “one prohibition does not take effect where another already exists,” the rule is that if, say, I mix forbidden fat—the forbidden fat of the animal—with milk, all right? So now we have the prohibition of meat and milk and the prohibition of forbidden fat.
[Speaker G] So the question is whether I violate—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —two prohibitions when I eat it, or only one prohibition. So the rule is that one prohibition does not take effect where another already exists.
[Speaker G] If there was a prohibition of forbidden fat here before I mixed it with milk, then after I mixed it with milk there’s still only one prohibition. Isn’t forbidden fat considered meat?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s meat in terms of its source, but the prohibition in it is the prohibition of forbidden fat. Yes, the prohibition of forbidden fat. Because one prohibition does not take effect where another already exists. But if the second prohibition is broader than the first, then it does take effect. Then he violates two prohibitions. If it adds further legal consequences, if the second prohibition, for example, also forbids benefit, or the second prohibition also forbids sale, not only eating—then since it is broader, it takes effect over the first prohibition and there are two prohibitions on the item. That’s the rule. So Maimonides says: then why does someone who eats forbidden fat cooked in milk violate only one prohibition? Meat and milk is forbidden both for eating and for benefit, while forbidden fat is forbidden only for eating. So the prohibition of meat and milk should have taken effect over forbidden fat. So he says no, because the prohibition of meat and milk is itself also really only a prohibition of eating. Everything forbidden for eating automatically has a prohibition of benefit branching off from it, and when I examine whether it takes effect, it is fundamentally a prohibition of eating. After the prohibition of eating takes effect, then it also expands to benefit—but I say the eating prohibition cannot take effect, because one prohibition does not take effect where another already exists. Now the details aren’t important, but this pilpul really excited me—it’s called Maimonides’ wonderful point. This is a perfectly reasonable analytical move that you would find three times in any decent article by an average kollel fellow today, and Maimonides got excited about it as though he had never seen anything so brilliant in his life. Another example: once there was a panel at the National Library, and they invited me there to some panel, and we were talking, and I suggested that we study the topic of “this one benefits and that one does not lose.” And that topic begins there with: “Come and hear the excellent things that were said today in the study hall.” Yes: one who lives in another person’s courtyard without his knowledge—does he need to pay rent or not? That’s the question of “this one benefits and that one does not lose.” What was he so excited about—these “excellent things” said in the study hall? I claim he was excited because this is an Acharonim-style conceptual analysis. The Talmud here is doing an Acharonim-style inquiry. It says: when you pay, there is benefit here and there is loss here. Say you lived in my courtyard and that courtyard was available for rent. So you benefited because you got a place to live, and I lost out because I couldn’t rent it to someone else. So you have to pay me. The question is whether you pay me for the fact that I lost, or you pay me for the fact that you benefited. Are you paying for the benefit or for the loss? That’s a conceptual inquiry, really an Acharonim-style inquiry. And what’s the practical difference? If this one benefits and that one does not lose. Then there is benefit, but no loss. If payment is for the loss, then you don’t pay. If payment is for the benefit, then you do pay. Or the reverse case: this one does not benefit and that one does lose. Those are two practical ramifications.
[Speaker B] Nice. So everyone learned to do these kinds of conceptual distinctions because it comes from the Talmud.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, it’s not important, I’m not getting into the question of their genetics right now—that’s not the point. I mean in practice. Obviously it’s a dwarf on the shoulders of a giant, but still, in practice—there he got terribly excited about it. And again, it’s something we do three times in every class. The question whether it’s a law of this or a law of that—that’s elementary analysis. Here it’s the same thing. Look: “Come see the excellent thing your father said.” Look what an amazing, exceptional thing your father said. “For Shmuel said: One who sells a promissory note to his fellow, and then forgives it—the debt is forgiven.” Forgiven. “And even an heir may forgive it.” And “that Shmuel admits”—that part is less important. What is he saying? This is an amazing law, by the way. Yes, a known law, right? Yes, right. Very bizarre. Yes, very bizarre. Wait, wait, in a second, one moment, don’t panic. Slowly, slowly, everything will work out, don’t worry. What’s actually written there? It’s a bit similar to the situation here, yes? Let’s say Shimon lent Levi money. Fine? Now he has a note, a document that Levi owes him money. Now he goes and sells that note to Reuven. Sells it to him. Usually, by the way, people sell it for less, yes. The question is whether you’ll succeed in collecting it and so on. Eighty percent, doesn’t matter, he sells it for less. Okay, he sells him this note. Fine? Good. Now Reuven can take this note and collect from Levi. Now Shimon comes and forgives Levi the debt. A righteous man. Yes, he forgives Levi the debt. Now Reuven comes with the note—he has nothing to collect. So: one who sells a promissory note to his fellow and then forgives it, it is forgiven.
[Speaker C] Wait, and there’s a question. Now Reuven comes to Levi and says: I have a note here. A note has two witnesses on it, doesn’t it? Right. But why should Levi care?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They believe you that there was a loan; the witnesses say there was a loan, obviously. And now I forgave it.
[Speaker G] Now I have a question: if I forgave it, then I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —need to take it back from Reuven—
[Speaker G] before—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —before witnesses, for the sake of the discussion.
[Speaker G] But if I forgave it, then I need to take the note back from Reuven.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait. Right. Exactly. Now there’s a damages claim here. Yes, correct.
[Speaker G] That’s something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reuven can come and say to him: you damaged my note. I had a note worth one hundred shekels; now I have a note worth zero. Yes? So you damaged my note. That’s a different question, a damages claim. That can be discussed separately. But the forgiveness is valid. Why is it valid? Because if Levi’s debt was owed to Shimon, then Shimon is the creditor, the debt is owed to him. The fact that you give him the note—the note is evidence of the debt. But the debt is owed to me. Wait, you gave him the note—do what you want—but this is what you were really asking at the beginning. After all, I borrowed from you, I owe you, I don’t know him, okay? So if the debt is owed to me, then I can also forgive it. The fact that I sold him the note—let him sue me for damages for what I did to him with respect to the note. But still, transferring the note to him does not mean the debt is owed to him; the debt is owed to me. Okay? That’s what is written there in the Talmud.
[Speaker C] Between Shimon and Levi—that is, Shimon forgave Levi, okay. And what happens with Reuven?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Reuven got a note, and that note is just a shard of pottery. Right? A potsherd, like broken pottery. So he can sue Shimon for the damage he caused him. Maybe there’s room here to discuss whether this is direct causation or indirect causation.
[Speaker C] That’s a complicated story.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Indirect? Is it indirect? On the face of it, it’s direct causation. Let’s leave that. It’s a complicated story in its own right. Okay. But that’s already a damages question, less important for our purposes. So that’s what’s written there in the Talmud. Okay. Now Tosafot here says as follows: “And where, for example, he causes liability to others.” Here in our topic, yes.
[Speaker G] Why aren’t you reading this from the case of the woman and her husband and the…?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because that’s less important for us right now. There’s also a woman in Tosafot. Yes, but not from there. That’s in Ketubot, it’s something else.
[Speaker C] We’re going back to 19b. Yes, but where exactly?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To “and where, for example, he causes liability to others” in our topic. In Tosafot?
[Speaker C] Yes. Ah, okay, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And if you say: then let him be believed by a migo, since if he wished he could forgive it? For one who sells a promissory note to his fellow and then forgives it—the debt is forgiven, as stated later on 86a.” What is he asking?
[Speaker C] Why isn’t there a migo here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That same person who claims “this is a trust note”—Shimon says to Levi, bringing out a note against Levi, and says this is a trust note. Fine? They say he is not believed. Why? Because he causes liability to others. Because he has a creditor, Reuven, who lent him money. So he is causing him loss, and therefore his admission is not accepted; it is not a trust note. Okay? Tosafot asks: why not? He has a migo. He could have forgiven the note. I can forgive you the debt, right? Once I forgive you the debt, you no longer owe me anything.
[Speaker G] This is also a triangle of three people. What would he have said? What would he have said?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not said—done. What would he have done?
[Speaker G] You see this note? This note is forgiven. Yes, this note would have been forgiven, not a trust note.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I forgive you the debt now. Forgive it. That’s all. So since that’s the case, believe me by a migo when I say that the note is a trust note, since according to Shmuel I could have forgiven the debt. True, right now this harms you, but Shmuel isn’t bothered by the fact that it harms someone else; I can forgive it. So here too apparently he can forgive it. Well then, if he can forgive it, when I claim “trust note,” really believe me by a migo that I could have forgiven it. By the way, just a parenthetical remark—I think I pointed this out when we learned the third chapter of Bava Batra—the Rosh writes there that something like this is called “it is in his power.” That’s stronger than a migo. Migo means: if I wanted to lie, I could have lied better. “In his power” means I can bring about the result with my own hands. Don’t say, one day it will happen—bring the day now, so to speak. You can directly produce the result yourself. You don’t need—after all, it’s permitted, and it’s also immediate. Yes, after all it’s permitted and it’s actually permitted. Meaning, I forgive you the debt; the debt is owed to me; I forgive it; I don’t need to lie. Migo says if I wanted to lie I could have lied better. Here I’m saying, forget lying or not lying—I can simply do it myself. Moving on—
[Speaker B] Say here that really not what—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What are you worried about? You’re worried that I’m lying, and you’re basically saying: this note is a valid note, and I want to stick it to Reuven, right? If I wanted to stick it to Reuven, I would forgive Levi the debt. Rather, what? So in fact it really is a trust note? Believe me—it really is a trust note; I’m not doing it in order to stick it to Reuven. If I wanted to stick it to Reuven, I would simply forgive the debt and then he wouldn’t be able to chirp a word. Right, that’s Tosafot’s question. But Tosafot says there is no forgiveness here. There is no forgiveness here, but Tosafot assumes it’s the same thing. It is permitted to forgive, and the claim is that the original lender is the holder of the debt, even if he transferred it onward, even if someone else is his creditor, or if he sold the note to someone else—which are different cases—but still, the claim is that Shimon is Levi’s creditor. And therefore he can also forgive it. So if he can forgive it when he sold the note, he can also forgive it when the note is still with him. Then certainly all the more so he can forgive here. Because here the note is actually with me; the debt is owed to me. The fact that someone else can collect—why can he collect? Because the money is owed to me. So here I can certainly forgive it. So what’s the problem? Is that a migo or not a migo? That’s what Tosafot asks. Yes, seemingly it is a migo. Why don’t you believe him?
[Speaker B] Since the money is his, then that’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —as if it’s a sufficiently good claim for him. It’s in his power.
[Speaker B] It’s stronger than a migo.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tosafot calls it a migo, but really it’s a much stronger kind of migo—“in his power.” Yes. Fine, that’s certainly the appearance. “And one may answer that it is not a migo, because perhaps he does not wish to forgive and thereby lose his debt, for now when he says ‘trust note’ he does not lose anything, since the borrower is not a thief.”
[Speaker H] This is amazing, this thing really is wonderful.
[Speaker D] So what, are you basically saying that once he says “trust note,” then it’s already written in the court records that this is a trust note, and now he can’t go collect the debt with this note? Right, right. Now he’s relying on the fact—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that Levi is an honest person, and if he borrowed money he’ll pay it back.
[Speaker D] But all our discussions are always revolving around the fact that people generally do try to get out of things—so suddenly now Shimon assumes, “Fine, Levi is perfectly decent and he’ll pay me back”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, there’s a logical mistake here. I’m not building on the assumption that Levi will repay me, but to say “trust note” is still a better claim than forgiving him the debt. That’s the point. Therefore there is no migo here. Because there is some possibility that Levi will repay me. Maybe not, but if I forgive him the debt then certainly he will not repay me. So even the 20% chance that he will repay me—even if it’s only 20%—is still better than forgiving him the debt. Therefore it’s not a migo. In a migo, the second option has to be better. Here it isn’t better; it’s worse.
[Speaker G] How much worse—that depends how righteous Levi is. But why, if I say it’s a trust note, does that mean the court erases the note?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The court erases it, but Levi knows he borrowed. So he’ll repay me—he’s righteous, no? But if they erase it then he won’t be able to get any note? He won’t get any note. If Levi doesn’t pay me, I won’t be able to do anything to him, because they erase the note and I have no proof against him. But there is a chance that Levi will be honest and pay me, since he does owe me the money. But he also won’t know that I forgave him, because I could at this very moment decide to forgive him. No—if I say “forgiven,” then now I’ll tell him it’s forgiven and he won’t pay me. What does it mean that it’s a trust note? Now I’ll tell him it’s a trust note. Tell him it’s a trust note, and he’ll still repay because he knows there was a loan. But if indeed when Shimon forgives Levi—“trust note” doesn’t mean there wasn’t a loan. If the loan was erased, Levi no longer feels obligated. He really isn’t obligated. But in the case of a trust note, the truth is that he is obligated. I’m lying when I say it’s a trust note. That’s the difference: in truth he is obligated, it’s just that he lied about the note. Why is he not obligated if it’s a trust note? If it’s a trust note then he never owed me anything. Obviously, but if it’s not a trust note? Then I’m lying. I’m lying; it’s not a trust note. Fine, but if it really were a trust note, then he really doesn’t owe me? Obviously—but it’s not a trust note. But that whole concern—what are you thinking? Why don’t you believe him that it’s a trust note? You’re saying: you’re lying, it’s not a trust note. On the side where he is lying, then indeed Levi will repay him. If it really is a trust note, then there’s no problem. But can’t he also say “forgiven” as a lie? The Talmud says that to say “forgiven” falsely is worse than to say “trust note” falsely. If there are witnesses, then there are witnesses? No, no, you can falsely forgive. But if he says it’s a trust note, then Levi also won’t repay him because it was only a promise that in the future… Levi is perfectly fine; he knows he got the money. There’s confusion here: it was not a trust note; he’s lying and saying it is a trust note in order to hurt Reuven. But Levi knows there was… but if it is, it isn’t. Amazing. A trust note is like something between me and you. After all, we’re both here—I wink at you; we both know I’m lying when I say it’s a trust note. You’ll pay me because you’re an honest person. But both of us, Iris—that’s the suspicion—wait, wait, wait, wait—that’s the actual suspicion, that you really got money; that is our suspicion. The collusion here, on the other side—we’re talking about the suspicion. Iris, we’re talking about the suspicion. We suspect him of lying. Okay? That’s what we suspect. Maybe not. We—wait, wait—we suspect him of lying, right? Now he says: wait, believe me that I’m not lying, because if I were lying then I would already have forgiven it. They say to him: no, if you were lying, it’s preferable for you to lie and say “trust note” rather than forgive. That’s all. Therefore it’s not a migo. But why don’t we believe a trust note? Couldn’t it be true? We’re not saying “trust note” because it’s impossible. Not that it’s impossible. It’s possible, but it’s far-fetched, and it’s also forbidden. People don’t do this because they’re not suicidal—you don’t hand someone evidence when he doesn’t owe you anything—and it’s also forbidden. Okay, say it’s forbidden, but suppose there is some possibility that it’s true. Fine? Fine, so what? But most likely it isn’t true. Wait, wait—so I’m saying that even in the possibility that it is true, Levi still doesn’t owe him money in that situation because it’s only a trust note. Obviously, because there was no loan; it’s a trust note. What’s the question? Obviously. Who was talking about that? So why is that better than saying— It isn’t better, nothing is better. I’m not talking about the case where it’s true, I’m talking about the case where it’s false. Because it isn’t better, it isn’t more— Iris, you’re completely mixing two planes. A person comes and says: this is a trust note. Fine? We don’t know whether it really is a trust note or not. We have no idea. Okay? Wait, open Genesis—what does “trust note” mean? A trust note means there was no loan. There was no loan and he wrote it for him because maybe in the future… right. We don’t know what the truth was, whether it really was a trust note or whether he’s lying. Right? The Talmud says he’s lying. We don’t believe him. Fine? That’s what the Talmud says. Tosafot asks on this: wait, why? Believe him that he’s not lying. Why? Because if he were lying it would have been better for him to forgive the debt. If he were lying—that is, the comparison is between two lies. One lie is falsely saying “trust note,” and the second possibility is to forgive. Now the question is which of them is better? Because righteous Levi will pay him back. Right. In a case where it’s forgiven, he certainly won’t pay him back. Right. Now in the case of “trust note,” why would he pay him back? Because it’s a lie—he took it, it’s a lie. He didn’t take it; they made a collusion between them. But maybe he didn’t take it; maybe he just gave him a trust note. Iris, listen— I’m listening. Iris, you’re not listening. A trust note is not given— wait, wait, listen, listen again. I understand the question perfectly well, I completely understand the question, and it doesn’t even get off the ground. And I’m explaining to you—listen, I explained before and I’ll explain again. It is not a trust note. The person says that it’s a trust note. We say to him, wait, listen—you’re sighing before I even finished— Iris, no, because we don’t know the truth. That’s what it means not to listen, Iris. Listen, I’ll explain. Fine. The person says: this is a trust note. The Talmud says: the man is a liar. That’s what the Talmud says. I don’t know why, but that’s what it says. Fine? Now the person comes to deal with that accusation. Okay? He says like this: let’s assume, for the sake of discussion, that I am a liar. Fine? That’s what he says. Let’s assume I’m a liar. Do you understand that if I were a liar, then I would already have forgiven it and be done with it? They say to him: no, because if you were a liar, you would prefer to lie and say “trust note,” relying on the chance that he’ll still pay you. Fine? That’s it. Now let’s see if I understood that move… Understood. I hope. I understood it. Let’s see what you say. Then we’ll know. What I’m asking is, the missing link for me is why saying “trust note”… after all, according to Tosafot we’re relying on the fact that righteous Levi will return the money to him. No! No. You’re mixing levels. Why don’t we believe it’s a trust note? Because it’s forbidden to make a trust note, and it’s not plausible that a person would make a trust note, because a person is not suicidal—he doesn’t give someone evidence when he owes him nothing. That’s why we don’t believe him. Period. That’s it. So there is a reason we don’t believe him? Good. Now Tosafot comes and says: I understand that there are reasons not to believe him, but let me give you a reason to believe him. Because if he were lying, then it would have been better for him to forgive. I say no: if he were lying, it would not be better for him to forgive. Because if he were lying, then in the “trust note” lie he would still get the money from Levi, on the assumption that he’s lying. Because he’s lying. On the assumption that he’s lying, meaning that really this is a valid note, Levi owes it, and he’ll collect from him. Right. But the court at that moment erases his note, if it’s a trust note. But Levi—he took out a note and he’ll repay the debt. The debt exists. As for what the court— But say now he forgives in court. Levi isn’t there. A trust note in court and “forgiven” in court—in either case Levi doesn’t know about it now. He’s in America, he doesn’t know about it. But Levi knows, Levi knows there was a loan. Yes, but if it’s forgiven, how will he know? I’ll tell him—I come to Levi. But they can’t tell him—he knows there was a loan, so what will they tell him? He knows there was a loan, so they’ll tell him there was no loan? Forgiveness is unrelated; there was a loan and I forgave you. I tell you that I forgave you. That is in my power. I can’t tell a person that now it’s night when he sees it’s day. Wait, but if he’s lying in that, if he has a migo, then he is believed? That’s what Tosafot asked. Therefore Tosafot says he has no migo, because the option of forgiving is not a better option than lying and falsely saying it’s a trust note. Okay, we’ll stop here. How far did you get on the sheet? Up to here. Up to here? Okay, so in short, that’s what we’ll do on Tuesday, which is the last day of the year. But we have two make-up classes for Hanukkah. Ah, the make-up between semesters. Yes. Wait, but Tosafot—we didn’t finish this topic. Where? Tuesday, not Thursday. Who said? No, but it’s not a migo. Ah, it’s not a migo regarding… where are you reading? Ah, no, no need, no need. Leave it. Are we done with this Tosafot? For now, yes, yes. Ah, not to continue? Yes. Is that the question we just learned or the next question? That’s it, he’s very… I finished the whole thing. He brought from all the Talmudic passages, from all the… Wait, but we learned—I only showed you Tosafot’s question, no? Only that, yes. Rabbi Natan’s lien, which we explained up to here. Wait—the lien of a debt, whether your money is really found with me, if I… right. And Rabbi Natan’s lien—that isn’t.