Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 22, Part A
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- The three Amoraic explanations and Abaye’s novel point regarding the lender
- Rabbi Natan’s lien as a mechanism of causing loss to a third party
- The Ran on the Rif: the biblical source and the qualification, “we do not take from this one and give to that one”
- The parallel to liens on property and the conceptual difficulty
- The legal definition according to the Ran: Levi as a kind of guarantor, not a direct debtor
- The Ran’s question: “Even without Rabbi Natan, it would still be causing loss to others”
- Two separate questions: Rabbi Natan’s general novelty in law, versus why our passage needs it
Summary
General Overview
In the previous lecture, three Amoraic explanations were given for why one is not believed to claim “this is a trust note,” depending on who is making the claim. Here the focus is on Abaye, who frames the case as one where the lender himself owes money to someone else, so his claim becomes “an admission of a litigant in a situation where it harms others.” The Talmud links this to the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, because the note is a potential means of collection for the lender’s lender. The Ran on the Rif bases the law on the verse “and he shall give it to the one to whom he is liable,” and adds a qualification: collection from Levi is possible only when Shimon has no other assets. From this emerges a fundamental dispute in how to understand the rule: does Rabbi Natan’s lien create a direct obligation from Levi to Reuven, or does it merely place Levi in the position of a kind of guarantor? From that distinction arise two different questions: what is Rabbi Natan’s general novelty in the legal system, and why does our passage need to invoke this rule at all to explain “harming others”?
The three Amoraic explanations and Abaye’s novel point regarding the lender
The lecture assumes that three Amoraic explanations have already been presented for why one is not believed to claim “this is a trust note,” depending on whether the claimant is the borrower, the lender, or the witnesses. Abaye deals with the lender and asks why he should not be believed if he admits there is no dispute and he is waiving collection. Abaye answers that the lender himself borrowed from someone else, and therefore when he says “this is a trust note,” his admission harms not only himself but causes a loss to his own creditor. That is defined as “an admission of a litigant in a situation where it harms others.”
Rabbi Natan’s lien as a mechanism of causing loss to a third party
The Talmud ties this idea of “harming others” to Rabbi Natan’s lien, because the note in the lender’s hand is a potential collectible asset from which the lender’s lender can be repaid. The setup is illustrated through Reuven, Shimon, and Levi: Levi owes Shimon, and Shimon owes Reuven. Shimon brings out a note against Levi and then claims, “This is a trust note,” thereby cutting off Reuven’s source of collection. The idea is that by force of Rabbi Natan’s lien, “your creditor can collect from your debtor,” and so invalidating the note directly affects a third party.
The Ran on the Rif: the biblical source and the qualification, “we do not take from this one and give to that one”
The Ran on the Rif explains the derivation from the verse “and he shall give it to the one to whom he is liable,” emphasizing that it says “to the one to whom he is liable,” not “to the one who lent to him,” and “liable” refers to the principal, “as we say in the passage about robbery,” and so on. The Ran rules that Rabbi Natan’s law applies “when the borrower has no assets from which payment can be made except this debt,” but “if he does have assets, we do not take from this one and give to that one,” because “this debt is like encumbered property, from which one does not collect where there are free and unencumbered assets,” and he cites proof from “the chapter of the ox that gored four and five.” “Free assets” are defined as assets that are not encumbered and remain with the borrower himself, not in the hands of a purchaser.
The parallel to liens on property and the conceptual difficulty
The lecture explains that the Ran’s comparison between a lien on property held by a purchaser and Rabbi Natan’s lien is not at all obvious. In the case of a purchaser, it makes intuitive sense to exhaust collection from the borrower before harming someone who made no deal with the lender. But under Rabbi Natan’s lien, Levi already owes money to Shimon, so at first glance it would seem no injustice is done if Reuven bypasses Shimon and collects directly from Levi even when Shimon has money. That raises the question why collection from Shimon should be preferred. The discussion also notes that if the time for repayment has not yet arrived, collection is impossible, and the assumption here is that the due date has arrived; and even if payment is in installments, collection follows the payment schedule that was set.
The legal definition according to the Ran: Levi as a kind of guarantor, not a direct debtor
The lecture formulates the Ran’s view as follows: Shimon’s obligation to Reuven remains Shimon’s obligation; it does not become a direct obligation of Levi to Reuven. Only when Shimon does not pay may one turn to Levi. In that sense Levi is described as a kind of “guarantor,” or as one holding encumbered property, and therefore “you do not go to the guarantor when you can take the money from the borrower.” The lecture notes that one could have defined the law differently, according to which “Shimon drops out of the picture” and “Levi owes money to Reuven,” in which case the Ran’s qualification—that if Shimon has money one cannot collect from Levi—would disappear.
The Ran’s question: “Even without Rabbi Natan, it would still be causing loss to others”
The Ran asks: “And if you say that even without Rabbi Natan it would still be harming others,” because even if “we do not take from this one and give to that one” as long as Shimon has assets, still, when the creditor “complains in court,” this debt should be collectible just like other assets. In the Ran’s novellae a similar formulation appears: “Just as the court descends to the assets of a borrower, so too it descends to this promissory note in order to collect through it.” The lecture sharpens the point that there are really two possible questions here: what is Rabbi Natan’s novelty in general, and why our particular passage needs Rabbi Natan’s rule in order to establish the category of “harming others.”
Two separate questions: Rabbi Natan’s general novelty in law, versus why our passage needs it
The lecture distinguishes between a general question about Rabbi Natan—why the law is needed at all if even without it one could view the debt Levi owes Shimon as an asset belonging to Shimon that can be collected—and a local question about the Talmud’s move here—why Abaye needs to invoke Rabbi Natan’s lien at all in order to establish “harming others.” The lecture argues that the second question remains even if one disagrees with the Ran and understands Rabbi Natan’s lien as allowing Reuven to collect from Levi even when Shimon has money, because one could still have framed a case where Shimon has no money, in which case the admission “this is a trust note” would harm his creditor even without invoking Rabbi Natan. The lecture concludes that the fact that the Ran first introduces the comparison to encumbered property shows that his difficulty is aimed mainly at the first question—what exactly Rabbi Natan added to the legal system—because without that introduction, those who disagree with the Ran would have no question about the very novelty of the law.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, in the previous lecture we talked about three Amoraic explanations for why someone is not believed to claim that this is a trust note: one time it’s the borrower, the second time it’s the lender, and the third time it’s the witnesses. Starting from Abaye, who speaks about the lender, the question was: if the lender says this is a trust note, then fine, good for him—there’s no dispute here, so what are we even talking about? So Abaye suggests that maybe we’re dealing here with a case where this lender himself borrowed from someone else, he owes money to someone else, and when he says this is a trust note, then in effect it’s an admission of a litigant in a place where it harms others, because his own lender will have nowhere to collect from—assuming he doesn’t have the money, then there’ll be nowhere to collect from—and that’s why it says he is not believed. When he owes others—if he owes him? He’s making others liable. He’s harming others.
[Speaker B] He’s making the others liable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, his admission affects others and not only himself, so that’s significant. Now, within the Talmudic discussion, they brought the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien and tied to it the point that he’s harming others, because this note is really a potential means of collection for his own lender. So if you say this is a trust note, you’re basically saying there was no loan here, and then you’ve caused your lender a loss. Why? Because by the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, your lender can collect from the one who owes you. That’s what the Talmud says. And on that the Ran says—the Ran on the Rif, yes—the Ran says as follows: “And he shall give it to the one to whom he is liable,” and it doesn’t say “to the one who lent to him,” but rather “to the one to whom he is liable,” and “liable” means the principal, as we say in the passage about robbery, and so on. Fine, so he’s just explaining how this comes from the verse. “And Rabbi Natan’s rule applies when the borrower has no assets from which payment can be extracted except this debt; for if he does have assets, we do not take from this one and give to that one, because this debt is like encumbered property, from which one does not collect where there are free and unencumbered assets; and so it is proven in the chapter of the ox that gored four and five.” The Ran says: let’s give them names so we can handle this more clearly. So we have Reuven, Shimon, and Levi. Levi owes Shimon, and Shimon owes Reuven. Okay? Now Shimon produces a note against Levi, and then he says: this is a trust note. The moment he says this is a trust note, he is in effect claiming that Levi doesn’t owe him any money. So Reuven, who is looking for somewhere to collect from, has nowhere to collect from. Therefore this is the picture of harming others: his admission harms another person, it harms Reuven. Now the Ran says that the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien really says—first of all, about the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien itself, aside from our specific case—when Shimon borrowed from Reuven and Levi borrowed from Shimon, then Reuven can collect from Levi. But, says the Ran, Reuven can collect from Levi only if Shimon has no other assets. If Shimon has other assets, you can’t go to Levi—collect from Shimon. The Ran’s inspiration for saying this comes from the law of encumbered property that I mentioned in previous lectures. When someone borrows money from me, he has a debt to me, and in addition to the debt there is also a lien on his land. And for example, if he sells the land to someone else—that’s the purchaser—then if he doesn’t pay me, I can take the land from the purchaser. But of course I can take the land from the purchaser only where I have nothing to take from the borrower himself. But if I can take from the borrower himself, then what did the purchaser do wrong? Okay? So here too the Ran is basically saying the same thing regarding Rabbi Natan’s lien. Also under Rabbi Natan’s lien, what Reuven can take from Levi is only if he has nothing to take from Shimon. He compares it to the case of a lien. That’s a very non-obvious statement. Why? It’s non-obvious because—just think for a moment about the case of a purchaser. In the case of a purchaser, it’s very clear logically: the purchaser bought land, he didn’t make a deal with you, he doesn’t owe you anything. True, there is a lien on the land, but obviously any option I have to collect without hurting the purchaser, I’ll use that option. If there’s no choice, then the collateral the lender received—then he takes from there, exactly. It’s a last resort. So he has security that if he can’t collect, then he takes from there, but obviously it’s a last resort, like with an ordinary guarantor too, by the way. The money. So why? Because there’s no justification to collect from the other person—he doesn’t really owe me, right? But with Rabbi Natan’s lien, that’s not the case.
[Speaker D] He does owe, just not to me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So what difference does that make? After all, elsewhere he owes Shimon, so if I take it from him, then he has repaid the debt to Shimon—and in any case he needs to repay it to Shimon. Here no injustice is caused if I go to Levi, right? So first of all I’m saying this at the level of rationale, at the level of simple logic.
[Speaker E] But what’s the difference between the examples? I don’t—
[Speaker D] understand.
[Speaker F] Because—
[Speaker E] Levi owes the money anyway; it’s not coming out of his pocket in addition.
[Speaker D] But with encumbered property—what, I bought land—
[Speaker F] why should I care that you owed someone else?
[Speaker E] Why should that be harmed? He doesn’t owe me, I don’t owe you money.
[Speaker F] Exactly. But since that happens—right, she owes Shimon. No, Levi doesn’t owe Shimon. Shimon owes Reuven; Levi doesn’t owe Shimon, he just bought from him encumbered land.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly, exactly—so why take his land if I have another option? But here it’s not like that. Here he really does have a debt; in any case he needs to repay the debt. So what’s the problem? So I’ll just take from Levi directly and hand it straight to Reuven. I haven’t harmed Levi at all, in any way.
[Speaker E] That sounds like the simple thing to do. What? It’s relatively simple logic to say: he owes this one, he owes anyway, so let’s skip this middleman in between—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No need for him.
[Speaker D] Unless we’re treating it as a personal obligation of the borrower—
[Speaker E] the borrower’s body, so to speak.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? That it obligates him personally?
[Speaker D] So what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there’s also a lien on assets, so what difference does that make?
[Speaker D] No, he didn’t enter into it by choice. Who?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What are you talking about—Rabbi Natan’s lien? Yes. Under Rabbi Natan’s lien, Levi borrowed from Shimon and Shimon borrowed from Reuven, so what? But he owes money. So I take from him the money that in any case he has to pay. That doesn’t harm him. It’s not like a purchaser, where you’re going after someone and taking from him something that is rightfully his—what do you want from him? Now I understand the logic that says first exhaust the possibilities of collecting from the borrower himself. If you have no choice, then you go to the purchaser. But here one could have said it’s not comparable. One could have said: after all, in any case he owes him, so what’s the problem? Even if I can take from Shimon, but I feel like taking from Levi—why not? What difference does it make? Why do two legal actions if I can skip and do one? After all, in any case he has to pay. It’s not like I’m taking money from him that he didn’t need to pay anyway and just making trouble for him. No, no—it’s talking about a case where the due date has arrived. If the due date hasn’t arrived, you can’t take. We’re talking about a case where the due date has arrived. Okay? So therefore the comparison the Ran makes, which at first glance might sound reasonable, is really not simple at all. Meaning, the Ran is in effect assuming a parallel between the case of a purchaser and the case of Rabbi Natan’s lien, or between a lien on assets and the case of Rabbi Natan’s lien. And this can be put first on the level of rationale, the logic of the thing. In terms of the formulation itself, what the Ran is seemingly claiming is that when Levi—one might have said that Rabbi Natan’s lien basically means Levi owes Reuven. True, he borrowed from Shimon, but in the end now he owes Reuven; the original debt falls away. He effectively owes Reuven. If that were so, then what the Ran says would not be correct.
[Speaker G] Because the Ran says Reuven only if he complains and goes to court—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we’ll get to the complaint in a moment—that’s another question—but for now I’m setting that aside; that hasn’t yet been mentioned—
[Speaker G] That’s later.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But for now it hasn’t been mentioned yet.
[Speaker H] So theoretically, theoretically, you really could erase this Shimon from the equation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Basically, Levi owes Reuven. Fine. So if that’s true, then why should I care whether Shimon has money or doesn’t have money? I want to shorten the process—I’ll take the debt from Levi. Why should I take from Shimon and then Shimon take from Levi? I’ll just go straight to Levi and take it, and that’s it. Why should I care that Shimon has the money? So what?
[Speaker C] That’s only if I know there was actually a transaction between Shimon and Levi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I know—obviously.
[Speaker F] Without that I’d say—what’s the difference between this and the purchaser if the rule is exactly the opposite? We said that with a purchaser you’re not allowed to collect from Levi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the Ran says that here too it’s forbidden to collect. The Ran is making the comparison, and I’m asking why—why does he compare them? That’s what I’m asking. In effect I’m saying—it can be formulated in two ways. You can formulate it at the level of logic. The logic says that with a purchaser it makes no sense to harm him if you have a way of collecting without harming him, because it does harm him—he bought the land lawfully. Here it doesn’t harm him. So at the level of logic it’s not clear to me why to define Rabbi Natan’s lien the way you define an ordinary lien. Certainly at the level of logic you could define it so that you can take directly from Levi even if Shimon has money. Now at the level of definition, I’m saying, these are two different things. That is, the legal definition of the matter—until now I was talking about motivations, about the justice of the case; now I’m talking about legal definition. In terms of legal definition, what the Ran is telling me is that the one who owes Reuven is Shimon, not Levi. Because if the definition were that Levi already owes Reuven, then Shimon is out of the picture. Just transfer the whole thing. Levi now owes Reuven; Shimon has nothing to do with it. If that were so, then even if Shimon were a millionaire, Reuven could go to Levi and take the money—Levi owes him money. Why should I care that Shimon is a millionaire? The Ran assumes that the debt to Reuven is Shimon’s debt, not Levi’s. There’s just some rule saying that if Shimon doesn’t pay, then Levi is a guarantor. Meaning, Levi is not the borrower himself in relation to Reuven; Levi is the guarantor on Shimon’s debt to Reuven. Okay? And therefore he says: if Shimon can pay, take from Shimon. You don’t go to the guarantor when you can take the money from the borrower. So the definition—the Ran assumes here a definition according to which even after Rabbi Natan’s lien, Reuven’s borrower is Shimon, not Levi. Shimon owes him the money, and therefore the obligation to repay rests on Shimon. True, if Shimon has nothing to pay with, then there is a lien and you can go to Levi, but Levi is a kind of guarantor, or a kind of purchaser, or someone holding encumbered land. But it isn’t really correct to define it as though Levi now owes Reuven. And that’s the Ran’s novel point, because one could have said otherwise. One could have said that the law of lien—precisely because of the logic I mentioned at the start—the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien basically means Shimon is erased from the picture; Levi owes Reuven money, that’s all. So that’s the Ran’s opening, and now the Ran goes on and asks the obvious question. In light of what he said, that is exactly the obvious question. That’s why I asked you what role this opening plays in the Ran. This opening is basically the foundation on which his question is built. Because what does he ask now? “And if you say”—what?
[Speaker C] And what do they mean here by free assets?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not encumbered. Assets that are not encumbered, assets that are in the owner’s possession. Land? Land that remains with the borrower himself and not with a purchaser.
[Speaker C] No, they’re referring to land and not people. Okay, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “And if you say that even without Rabbi Natan it would still be harming others—for although we do not take from this one and give to that one so long as the borrower has assets, nevertheless when the creditor complains in court, why should they not collect this debt for him just as they collect his other assets?” What does that mean? What’s the question?
[Speaker D] Seemingly we would bypass Shimon in the middle.
[Speaker E] “Even without Rabbi Natan”—without the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien—we would think that without Rabbi Natan, even if one couldn’t take from Levi and give to Reuven before suing—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The opposite. If that were the point, then everything would be perfectly fine; the Talmud would be perfectly fine. The Ran says: even without Rabbi Natan, what did Rabbi Natan add? After all, even without Rabbi Natan, I now—Reuven—go to Shimon, who owes me money. Shimon has a debt that Levi owes him. Okay, let’s say there’s no law of Rabbi Natan’s lien. But I can collect from Shimon’s assets. If he doesn’t pay me, I collect from his assets. One of his assets is the debt that Levi owes him. Right? You don’t need Rabbi Natan’s lien for that. Now why does he ask this? Without his introductory assumption, without his introduction, there would be no room for this question. Because without his introduction, what do you mean? True, but where Shimon has money, you can’t go to Levi, right? If it’s just an ordinary lien, and the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien is coming to teach that even where Shimon has money you can go to Levi, because Rabbi Natan’s lien really means Levi is the one who owes you. That’s the novelty of Rabbi Natan’s law. So if I understood Rabbi Natan’s lien in that way, there would be no room for the Ran’s question. Therefore the Ran first says: that is not the correct understanding of Rabbi Natan’s lien. Rabbi Natan’s lien is like a lien on assets. Shimon is the one who owes Reuven, not Levi—Shimon. But you can collect from Levi if Shimon has no money. Now the Ran says: if that’s the understanding, then what novelty is there in Rabbi Natan at all? I don’t understand. It’s like any other lien—you can go to Shimon’s assets and collect them. If the understanding were not as he set out in the first paragraph, but rather that I can go straight to Levi even if Shimon has money, then certainly that would be a novelty—a major novelty. Because truly, without the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, I couldn’t do that. Only perhaps if Shimon himself had no money would I go to Levi. But without Rabbi Natan’s lien I would not know that I can go straight to Levi. But if Rabbi Natan’s lien doesn’t really let me go straight to Levi, and it’s only when Shimon has no money, as the Ran said at the outset—if so, then I really don’t understand what he added. So what did Rabbi Natan add? That’s the situation that existed even without him. That’s why there’s a connection between the first part of what the Ran says and his question. In a moment we’ll see that it gets a bit more complicated. But before that—
[Speaker J] And with assets it really is clearly that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One does not collect from encumbered assets where there are free and unencumbered assets. That’s the rule. The Ran claims that the same rule exists also with regard to Rabbi Natan’s lien. That’s not explicit in the Talmud—the Ran is claiming it. Okay? As for an ordinary loan and an ordinary lien, that’s explicit in the Talmud.
[Speaker E] Free assets means the borrower’s assets.
[Speaker C] Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Free assets are the borrower’s assets that are not encumbered. Right. So after the Ran shows that it’s not correct to understand Rabbi Natan’s lien as meaning that Levi owes Reuven directly, but rather it’s some kind of lien, he says: fine, I already know the laws of liens on my own; I don’t need Rabbi Natan to teach me that. So what is the novelty learned from the verse “and he shall give to him that to which he is liable,” and so on? Why do we need that? What’s the problem? That was the situation even without Rabbi Natan’s law.
[Speaker C] Great question. “Liable” here doesn’t mean a guilt-offering, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in the sense that he is liable to someone, yes—
[Speaker C] Someone owes, someone is liable to him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Now look at the Ran’s novellae. In the Ran’s novellae he raises the same difficulty too. Okay? And he says as follows: “And if you say, even without Rabbi Natan it is also harming others. For although we do not take from this one and give to that one, nevertheless when the creditor complains in court, they will extract this debt from his possession. For just as the court descends to the assets of a borrower, so too it descends to this promissory note in order to collect through it.” The truth is—I thought, now that I’m looking at it again, I missed something here. No, there’s no difference. I think there’s no difference; I was mistaken. That’s my mistake. I’m suddenly seeing now that it’s not—let me tell you what the point is, because it will matter later on. One could have asked this question in two ways. And I thought one form appears in the novellae and one in the Ran on the Rif, but now I see I was mistaken. He’s asking different questions. There are really two questions that one could ask here, and both could have been asked. One question is: what is Rabbi Natan’s novelty in general, aside from our passage? What does Rabbi Natan add? That Reuven can collect from Levi? I know that even without Rabbi Natan if Shimon is—
[Speaker G] How do you know that? That’s exactly it—how do you know that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From logic. Simple reasoning. No—not only from logic, but from the law of encumbered assets. After all, I can collect from the encumbered assets of the borrower. One of his assets is the loan that the second borrower owes him.
[Speaker C] Rabbi Natan is talking about a note.
[Speaker J] He’s collecting a note, not an asset. A note is an asset.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what you said at the beginning. He takes the note, but really it’s the debt embodied in the note.
[Speaker J] But there’s a difference between that and collecting an asset.
[Speaker D] He writes that notes aren’t actual money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the Ran’s answer, but we’ll see. In any case, that’s one question. One question has nothing at all to do with our passage. The question is: what is Rabbi Natan’s novelty? Okay? Why do we need Rabbi Natan’s law? The second question is a question about our passage. Rabbi Natan’s law may indeed be needed, I don’t know. But why does our passage need to invoke Rabbi Natan’s law? Abaye’s point—that if I owe someone else and I say this is a trust note, then it’s an admission of a litigant in a place where it harms others—that could have been said even without Rabbi Natan’s law. Again, again—
[Speaker C] Because Abaye says the lender—he’s talking about the lender. Right. Now say again the sentence you said, sorry.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said that in our case, Abaye says that if the lender claims this is a trust note, and the lender himself has another lender—meaning he borrowed from someone else—then he is not believed, because it’s an admission of a creditor in a place where it harms others. Why? Because there is the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien. Because the lender of—let’s say—the first lender himself is Shimon, and he has another lender, namely Reuven.
[Speaker C] Abaye says they’re hiding it from him. No, here he’s making someone else liable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the challenge, the Talmud said they’re hiding it from him. Abaye answers that. Abaye says no, we’re talking about a case where he himself also has a lender—he owes someone else money—and therefore here his claim that this is a trust note has significance.
[Speaker J] If he waives it, then it’s the money—if he doesn’t waive it, then it’s his money. He’s not collecting a note, he’s collecting money. I didn’t understand. He’s collecting money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.
[Speaker J] If he doesn’t waive the note, then the middle person—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean waive it? He says it’s a trust note. Yes. So that means—
[Speaker J] that the second person is collecting money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there is no money.
[Speaker E] There’s no money—it’s a trust note. There was no loan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the borrower has no money. There’s nowhere to collect from. Shimon has no money.
[Speaker E] Collect from whom? He has no land, no money.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has nothing at all. That’s it. All you have is the debt.
[Speaker E] And if he doesn’t waive it, then in effect he collects from Levi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Now imagine—
[Speaker E] imagine that if he had collected the money from Levi, now that he has the money, now you can extract the money from Shimon and transfer it to Reuven. That’s the full operation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if Shimon has money—
[Speaker E] If Shimon has money, then without shortcuts—Shimon has no money, he collects the note, meaning his debt, from Levi, now he has money, now you can collect from him and pass it to Reuven.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s certainly true, but Rabbi Natan’s lien says you can do it in one step.
[Speaker E] Without the detour. So now Rabbi Natan is coming to teach that you can skip the middle stage.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And one could ask about that: why do we need Rabbi Natan at all? Let’s say we didn’t know Rabbi Natan. It would still be the same. Why? Because after all, if I have no assets, then my lender has nowhere to collect from, right? So if I admit that what’s owed to me is really a trust note, then I am harming my lender even if there were no law of Rabbi Natan’s lien. Because even without Rabbi Natan’s law he loses money because of this. True, he won’t be able to go directly to Levi, but it’s still my money, which he’ll be able to take from me when it reaches me. So saying this is a trust note still harms my lender, even without Rabbi Natan’s law.
[Speaker D] Harms the lender? Yes, it’s like he loses. Right—he’s not exactly making him liable, he’s preventing him from receiving the money—
[Speaker E] mine, let’s say. It damages him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Harming” here means causing loss to another—that’s the meaning.
[Speaker E] Causing loss to another, yes, causing financial loss, hurting another, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Harm here means damage, yes. Causing a loss. So do you understand that these are two different questions? Yes, right. One question is just a general question about Rabbi Natan, with no connection at all to our passage: what is Rabbi Natan’s novelty, why do we need him at all? Okay? For example, one could answer that you need him to say that I can go to the borrower—to Levi—even if Shimon has money. I’m speaking now without the Ran. Okay? That would be the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, because Levi owes the money directly. Without that, you wouldn’t allow such a thing, right? Because otherwise it’s just a lien, and one does not collect from encumbered assets where there are free assets. So therefore you need the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien.
[Speaker F] Wait, but that means Rabbi Natan’s lien isn’t only when Shimon has nothing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the Ran says, and I’m saying now: leave the Ran aside for the moment. Without the Ran, I could answer why we need the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien.
[Speaker F] No—Rabbi Natan’s lien isn’t only when he has nothing, right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, only the Ran introduced that.
[Speaker F] You’re saying that after the fact.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the Ran’s whole novelty in the first paragraph: the Ran says it works like a lien on assets, and therefore here too, if he has money, you can’t take the note.
[Speaker F] That doesn’t make sense. Why? If Shimon has money, I’ll take his money. That’s not right—why not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Levi owes it—what’s the problem?
[Speaker F] That money isn’t Shimon’s—Shimon owes. Why not? Levi owes—what’s the problem?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That money isn’t—Shimon owes. So what? Levi also owes. What difference does it make?
[Speaker F] So why—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] do I need to go to Shimon and then Shimon will collect from Levi?
[Speaker F] Maybe that’s not what—
[Speaker J] With assets—that’s not the Ran’s point.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then I don’t understand—so what—
[Speaker J] It could be that here there’s no loss to that person. This lien of debt is not multi-directional—meaning, it’s just between two parties, and I can’t start transferring liens.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t need to transfer liens. After all, the moment—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again—even without the law of Rabbi Natan’s lien, I could say: I, Reuven, now want money from Shimon. Shimon has no money—or he does, it doesn’t matter, let’s say he has no money for the sake of discussion. Fine? He has no money, so I say, all right, what do you have? You have a debt owed to you. That debt is your asset. So I collect from you that debt. Like eating the fruits—yes, it sits exactly on that model for us. My assets and my slaves—rather, the—
[Speaker J] I’m not talking about your assets at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking about your money. I collect Shimon’s debt. Not land, this isn’t a purchaser case. Don’t mix up Rabbi Natan’s lien with a purchaser. There’s no encumbered land here. I take Shimon’s note. Shimon has an asset: this note is one hundred shekels, right? It says here that you owe Shimon one hundred shekels. So there’s a note here that is worth one hundred shekels, basically, okay? Now I go to Shimon and collect from him those hundred shekels. That’s one of Shimon’s assets, right? I can collect it—what’s the problem? The note is in his possession. Of course, the note as the expression of the debt, okay? It’s in his possession. So that’s his asset, and I collect that asset.
[Speaker F] Wait, a question. When there is a loan, doesn’t there arise a lien on the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s something else. It doesn’t concern us here; it’s irrelevant here.
[Speaker F] I wanted an example, and explain to me how what you just said makes sense. Suppose Reuven lent Shimon a million dollars, okay? And Shimon lent Levi a million dollars. Levi is a poor simple person for whom a million dollars is huge, and he wants to pay it back slowly in installments and all that. Shimon is a billionaire who—how does it make sense that I wouldn’t collect from Shimon a million from the other millions he has? First of all, what you’re raising—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you’re raising a question of justice, while we’re talking about the legal question. On the legal question, if Shimon owes Reuven and Levi owes Shimon, then Rabbi Natan says Levi owes Reuven.
[Speaker F] Even if he doesn’t want to?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. From the due date onward, of course. From the due date onward.
[Speaker F] But if the due date—I committed to pay it in installments?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem. Then every time a payment date arrives, I can collect it according to the repayment schedule you set. And at the time you set, you owe Shimon that money, and that’s the money I want to take.
[Speaker F] So why encumber Levi? Levi owes the money anyway; it’s just that Shimon is no longer in the middle.
[Speaker C] If it’s not all at once, then what you do is offset these debts against each other, and this one pays directly to the first lender instead of to the second lender.
[Speaker F] So—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, let’s return for a moment to the difficulty.
[Speaker F] No, but wait—then why not take from Shimon if he has more?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why should we? Why do two debt-collection actions? I take directly from Levi. Levi owes Shimon and Shimon owes Reuven, so let Reuven just take directly from Levi. What’s the problem?
[Speaker C] Because—
[Speaker F] you think Levi is the poor guy.
[Speaker E] Levi isn’t the poor guy—Levi owes this money. Fine, but Shimon isn’t the poor guy either; Shimon has money. Doesn’t matter. No, because the money Levi owes Reuven—no, it’s not Shimon’s, it’s Reuven’s. No, there is—why are you saying there isn’t? That’s what the Ran says. No, think that Shimon has money. He does, so what if he does?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter.
[Speaker E] So what if he has it? Reuven’s money is not Shimon’s. It’s not in Shimon’s legal possession, even if he’s holding that money; possession of that money belongs to Reuven. It doesn’t matter that Shimon has lots more money besides the money that belongs—what’s the question?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t quite understand where we’re stuck.
[Speaker E] We’re stuck on the issue of justice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the justice is fine too.
[Speaker E] I—
[Speaker F] I just don’t understand: if Shimon has other assets, why not take from them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because I want this asset. What’s the problem? What? Because I want to collect from it. He also owes—what’s the problem? I feel like it. If I don’t want to, I won’t collect; I feel like it. I want one hundred shekels, so I take his hundred shekels, that’s all. Those hundred shekels are Shimon’s hundred shekels, so I take them. What’s the problem? Those are the hundred shekels Levi owes him.
[Speaker C] On Rabbi Natan’s assumption.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—what’s the problem?
[Speaker F] Because Shimon has more. So what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—
[Speaker C] because Levi never wanted any relationship with him in the first place.
[Speaker F] So what if he didn’t want to?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He didn’t want to, fine, so he didn’t want to.
[Speaker F] Levi doesn’t want a business relationship with—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t want to, fine, his problem. He doesn’t want to. If he had made that a condition—
[Speaker F] Why do people not hand over checks, not agree to pass checks along? He didn’t know this—
[Speaker E] But here you can’t—
[Speaker F] you can’t take and transfer the obligation—Levi was obligated under Rabbi Natan only to the lender. Right, for example.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the analogy doesn’t match the case. The analogy doesn’t match the case. Because when you pass along the check, what happens is that I get payment from you that may not actually be honored. Right? Because if the person holding the check—when you give me a check, I trust you that there will be funds. But if you give me a check that someone else gave you, I don’t know him—maybe there are no funds. But here it works the other way around. Here I, Levi, am paying you. Why should you have a problem with my paying you? Are you worried I won’t pay? I’m happy to pay you.
[Speaker F] Maybe you’re a mafioso and I don’t want to pay a mafioso?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? You’re paying.
[Speaker F] If you don’t want to, then give—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then give. The law is the law for everyone, for the whole system.
[Speaker F] You could have—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To say, “I have dealings only with you,” you can write a condition into the document. Yes. For the lender alone, exactly. No problem—if you want to make a stipulation, you can stipulate whatever you want in monetary matters. But there are laws that are the default; as long as no condition was made, that’s the law. So why is there any need to say this at all? Say what? What’s the novelty? That’s what the Ran asks. That’s what the Ran asks. In short, these are two questions, and I want to sharpen the difference between them. One question is the question about Rabbi Natan; it’s not connected to the passage here: what is Rabbi Natan adding? Rabbi Natan tells me that Reuven can collect from Levi; even without Rabbi Natan’s law, Reuven could collect from Levi. So of course one can answer with the Ran’s answer, that only when… one could also answer with a different answer, not like the Ran. You could say that if we held not like the Ran, then this could be resolved, right? Because you could say that Rabbi Natan’s law allows me to collect from Levi even when Shimon has money; I wouldn’t know that without Rabbi Natan’s law. Fine? That’s one possibility. There’s another question, and that is… there’s another question, and that is a question about the flow of our Talmudic discussion. In our Talmudic discussion, Abaye, in order to say that I am harming others, brings Rabbi Natan—Rabbi Natan’s law. And the question is why he had to get to that. You can explain that I am harming others even without Rabbi Natan’s law. Okay? Now here, regarding this question—even if you don’t accept the Ran—there will still be an answer. That’s the difference between the questions. Let’s say I don’t accept the Ran, okay? That Rabbi Natan’s lien means I can collect from Levi even when Shimon has money, and without Rabbi Natan’s lien I can’t. Okay? Still, Abaye could have said that without Rabbi Natan’s lien, in a situation where I have no money, I can go to the second one, right? So why do you need Rabbi Natan in order to say that I am harming others? You don’t need to get to Rabbi Natan.
[Speaker I] What could we have said?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We could have explained Abaye’s answer in the Talmudic discussion even without relying on Rabbi Natan. How? I would have said: from the ordinary law of liens. Right now, Shimon owes me money, Levi owes Shimon, and now I, Shimon, say: this is a trust note. You want to show me that this harms others. Why does it harm others? Because of Rabbi Natan’s lien. Not true. Even without Rabbi Natan’s lien, it harms others. Why? Because at least when you have no money, I could have gone to Levi. Now when you tell me, “This is a trust note,” you block my ability to collect from Levi. So that is harming others, and your admission harms me.
[Speaker E] But that is Rabbi Natan, basically.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Rabbi Natan says that even when I have money. I’m saying, leave aside Rabbi Natan’s novelty. Leave aside Rabbi Natan’s novelty. Still, as far as the Talmudic discussion is concerned, you can explain the Talmudic discussion even without Rabbi Natan. You can say: in a case where Shimon has no money, okay? Then if he says, “This is a trust note,” he harms his creditor, because his creditor will not be able to collect from Levi. True, if he has money then you need Rabbi Natan in order to say that, but you could make it an interpretive limitation, or say that in most cases you make it an interpretive limitation where he has some creditor—say he has some creditor, but he himself has no money. You don’t need Rabbi Natan for that. And if there is a Tanna who disagrees with Rabbi Natan, would we be stuck in the Talmudic discussion here according to that second Tanna’s view?
[Speaker I] No.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That second Tanna could also explain the Talmudic discussion here, right? That’s a different question. And what indicates that this is a different question? Because the first question I could resolve if I did not accept the Ran. The Ran says that even with Rabbi Natan’s lien, I go to Levi only if Shimon has no money. Let’s say I don’t accept the Ran’s view, meaning: if Rabbi Natan’s lien means I can go straight to Levi even if Shimon has money.
[Speaker D] But he’s preventing me because he says it’s a trust note.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, I go straight to Levi. Fine? So what novelty is there in Rabbi Natan’s law? No problem understanding that. The novelty is that even when you have money, I can go to Levi. Without that I wouldn’t know it, right? That answers the first question. If you don’t accept the Ran, you would resolve the first question. Right? That’s why the Ran prefaced his introduction in order to ask the first question, okay? But the second question—what’s happening in the Talmudic discussion—there it doesn’t matter; even if you disagree with the Ran, it’s still difficult for you. Why do you need to get to Rabbi Natan? You could have set it up without Rabbi Natan, in a case where Shimon has no money. Then in effect you still prevented Reuven from collecting from Levi, and you are harming him. Meaning, your admission affects Reuven—you are harming others. Even without assuming Rabbi Natan’s law.
[Speaker C] But on the other hand, he leaves Reuven able to collect only from him and not to bypass him. Meaning, wait until I have money and I’ll pay you back, or I don’t know what. Meaning, he sort of—exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not “on the other hand”; that’s the very side I’m talking about.
[Speaker C] That’s the premise you thought Abaye was saying. Huh? Well, you said that he’s limiting Reuven.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s limiting Reuven because Reuven can’t collect from Levi if Shimon has money.
[Speaker C] Yes. It could come out that Reuven won’t get his debt. He will get it, but from him, not from Levi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine, but it still limits him. So your admission is an admission that harms others, and therefore you are not believed. After all, precisely the point is that in order to show that I am harming others, it is enough that there is some case in which I am harming others. In order to say that there is no novelty in Rabbi Natan, you have to show that in all cases it comes out the same with and without Rabbi Natan. Do you understand the difference? These are different questions. The question “What is novel in Rabbi Natan’s law?” assumes that in all situations you won’t find anything Rabbi Natan introduced—the law would be the same even without Rabbi Natan. So if I show there is one situation where the law is not the same, then I’ve solved the question. The situation where Shimon himself has no money. No problem—I solved the problem. But in the second question I’m asking about the Talmudic discussion. The Talmudic discussion could have explained to me that this is a case of harming others even without relying on Rabbi Natan. For that it is enough that there is one case where there is similarity between Rabbi Natan and without Rabbi Natan in order to ask this question. Here it won’t help to say: I disagree with the Ran and therefore I resolve it.
[Speaker E] But would we have understood this whole case of Reuven, Shimon, and Levi without Rabbi Natan? We wouldn’t have needed Levi here. Again: would we have understood that we’re dealing with… would we have understood? What do you mean, would we have understood? The question is why Abaye doesn’t say it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but the question is why. Abaye could have given the same answer without relying
[Speaker E] on Rabbi Natan and then explained it to us if we don’t understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To give credit to Rabbi Natan? No, no—not because he is the source, but rather without Rabbi Natan’s law at all; not just without relying on Rabbi Natan the person. Rabbi Natan’s law is unnecessary here; you don’t need it. Do you understand the difference? No, but it’s like now we’re… it’s like the reverse of what we demonstrated with theft.
[Speaker E] Like, right, two lessons ago, I don’t remember who it was anymore, there were two Amoraim, one said “really,” so why not… why did you need to… you’re like Rabbi Meir.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, here they’re saying the opposite. Abaye…
[Speaker E] No, here—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not the same thing because he’s not saying the same thing. He says to him: why are you bringing Rabbi Natan? You don’t need Rabbi Natan’s law—not that you should tell me Rabbi Natan’s law without mentioning him, but rather you don’t need Rabbi Natan’s law. “Rabbi Natan’s lien” here is the name of a legal rule; it’s not the name of a person. So then it’s not the same thing as over there. Because over there I say: you’re saying the same thing anyway. Right, so say: I rule like Rabbi Meir. Why are you telling me “I rule such-and-such”? Just say: I rule like Rabbi Meir; Rabbi Meir already said it. Here it’s the opposite. I’m asking: Rabbi Natan said a certain rule; you bring Rabbi Natan as though you need that rule in order to state your answer. You don’t need it. You could have stated your answer even without that rule. Not without Rabbi Natan, but without the rule. The rule is unnecessary. So it’s completely different; it doesn’t resemble what was there at all. The question isn’t personal—why are you bringing this in the name of Rabbi Natan? Bring it in someone else’s name.
[Speaker D] I have a difficulty, and I think it’s even harder, because actually when Abaye says that basically the creditor says this, that’s not precise, because really he says it as a debtor. He says it as, “You have nowhere to collect from me, because that note I have there is really a trust note, it’s not real.” He’s not saying it as a creditor. He says it—right, relative to him I am a creditor,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the note is a note in which I am the creditor—what do you mean? This note is a note with respect to which I am the creditor. No, the point is that what Abaye says is that always
[Speaker E] you can think of a creditor saying, kind of, he’s being generous, he’s willing to give it up, to say it’s a trust note. No no, maybe he’s willing to give it up because maybe he has some other kind of… yes, I understand, maybe I turn him into a creditor-holder and then he becomes a debtor. Meaning, by virtue of the fact that he’s a debtor, he can speak as a creditor. Maybe he admits it, he says it’s a trust note because he doesn’t want… he speaks as a creditor and says, “This is a trust note.” Right. If not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he had not borrowed from someone else, if he were not a debtor to someone else, then he would also be believed, and that would also be obvious. Why should I care if you say this is a trust note? Fine by me, you’re not taking your money and that’s it. I need to present him also as a debtor in order to show that he cannot say, “This is a trust note.” Because if he is also a debtor, then when he says “this is a trust note,” he harms his creditor, and then it is already an admission by a litigant in a place where it harms others—you are not believed. The opposite: in order to explain why he is not believed, I need his being a debtor. Without that, he is certainly believed. To the point that it’s obvious—why? You’re giving up your own money; you say this is a trust note—fine, health and happiness. Suppose there were no Rabbi Natan rule in the world, okay?
[Speaker H] No Rabbi Natan rule at all, meaning that you can’t collect from a third creditor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Still, it would be possible to collect.
[Speaker H] We would understand Abaye.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It would still be possible to collect when Shimon has no money, right? It would be possible to collect because it is Shimon’s property. Unrelated to Rabbi Natan. Only you wouldn’t be able to go directly to Levi; rather you would have to wait until Shimon had no money and only then go to Levi, right? But here— no, that’s the Ran.
[Speaker K] No, the opposite—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s if you don’t accept the Ran.
[Speaker K] The Ran says that only when he has no money do you go to him, doesn’t he?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Rabbi Natan’s lien. Yes, but without Rabbi Natan’s lien, the Ran says, it is obvious that only when he has no money—that has nothing to do with the Ran; that is clear and agreed upon. The ordinary law of collecting from encumbered property is only when there are no unencumbered assets. The Ran’s novelty is that this is also true in Rabbi Natan’s lien. Now, let’s say I don’t accept the Ran, okay? In Rabbi Natan’s lien I go straight to the debtor, to Levi. Okay? Even if Shimon has money. Without Rabbi Natan I need Shimon to have no money in order to go to Levi. Rabbi Natan introduced that even if Shimon has money, I go to Levi. Okay?
[Speaker D] No, so according to the Ran, why do I need this at all, generally?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, that’s not—this is without the Ran. Let’s say I don’t accept the Ran’s rule. Then I say as follows: with an ordinary lien—this is the Talmud’s law, it has nothing to do with the Ran—with an ordinary lien, I cannot go to encumbered property if there are unencumbered assets. If the debtor has money, I do not go to the buyer, right? That’s obvious; it has nothing to do with the Ran. The Ran only wants to claim that the same applies in Rabbi Natan’s lien. Also in Rabbi Natan’s lien, Reuven cannot go to Levi if Shimon has money. Now let’s say I don’t accept the Ran. I don’t accept the Ran, and that means: with an ordinary lien it remains ordinary because that isn’t the Ran. But in Rabbi Natan’s lien it means that even if Shimon has money, I go to Levi. That is Rabbi Natan’s novelty. So we have the novelty. What did Rabbi Natan introduce? That’s the novelty. Will that explain our Talmudic discussion? The answer is no. In our Talmudic discussion we can still manage without Rabbi Natan. Why? Because we’ll say that this is a situation where Shimon has no money other than this note. And then what? Then when he says, “This is a trust note,” and he does in fact have a creditor who lent to him, “this is a trust note,” then he harms his creditor. Why? Because when he has no money, then his creditor can go to Levi even without Rabbi Natan’s lien. Because I have no money, so from encumbered property I take that thing, right?
[Speaker D] So according to the Ran, what is the novelty in Rabbi Natan’s lien at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why did they need Rabbi Natan’s lien?
[Speaker D] No, not generally—exactly, in the world.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—again, that’s the first question. What is the novelty in Rabbi Natan’s lien? That’s the first question.
[Speaker D] But according to his explanation, his second question makes the whole concept of Rabbi Natan’s lien unnecessary, because according to the Talmudic discussion itself I don’t need Rabbi Natan’s lien. I go according to the law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either I didn’t understand, or it’s completely mixed up. We are talking about two things. There are two conceptions here of Rabbi Natan’s lien. There is the Ran and there is, I don’t know, someone else who disagrees with him. Fine? The Ran introduces that even in Rabbi Natan’s lien, you go to Levi only if Shimon has no money. It’s like an ordinary lien.
[Speaker F] So why do I need this concept?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the Ran’s novelty. Fine. Whoever disagrees with the Ran says that you can go to Levi even if Shimon has money.
[Speaker F] Then there is a novelty.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the novelty, exactly. Now wait, wait—those are the two views even before the questions; those are the two views. Now I raise two questions, and we’ll check according to each of the views which of the questions gets resolved. The first question is: what did Rabbi Natan introduce in the world at all, okay? What did he introduce? According to the Ran, that’s a good question, because Rabbi Natan’s law is the ordinary law. Exactly, and that is the second question. And that may be what the Ran is asking. According to those who disagree with the Ran, there is no question. Rabbi Natan introduced that even if Shimon has money, you can go straight to Levi—something I would not know without Rabbi Natan. Right, fine, good. What happens with the second question? The second question is a question about our Talmudic discussion, not about Rabbi Natan. Rabbi Natan, I understand what he introduced. I’m only asking why our Talmudic discussion needed Rabbi Natan’s novelty. Even without Rabbi Natan’s novelty, couldn’t you have explained this statement—Rav Pappa’s? How? So it depends. According to the Ran, there’s no room for that. Right? The question is what happens according to those who disagree with the Ran. According to those who disagree with the Ran, we resolved the first question. Can we also resolve the second question according to those who disagree with the Ran? My claim is no. The second question is difficult both according to the Ran and according to those who disagree with him.
[Speaker F] But if the creditor has money, if he has
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if he has other money, then you are not harming others. Because your creditor Reuven hasn’t been hurt; you have money, he’ll take it from you. But if you have no money,
[Speaker F] he wants to take—wait, specifically if he is harming others,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking why it is harming others at all. Who loses from the fact that I admitted this is a trust note?
[Speaker F] No, when he says “harming others,” that’s not in every case; it’s a situation where, sort of, he doesn’t have any.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Don’t think—“harming others” means that when I said this is a trust note, I caused someone a loss; that is called harming others. Now I’m saying: if I have money, then I didn’t cause anyone a loss, so it’s not harming others. He can take from me, not from Levi—what difference does it make? Only if I have no money did I cause him a loss. Right, so set it up in a situation where I have no money.
[Speaker F] But only if I have money do you need Rabbi Natan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait—so set it up in a situation where I have no money, and then even without Rabbi Natan you can explain the Talmudic discussion. Because essentially, if I have no money, then even without Rabbi Natan, if I say this is a trust note, Reuven has lost his debt. Since he has nowhere to collect from, because I have no money and to Levi I say he doesn’t owe me anything at all, he has nowhere to collect from, so I caused him a loss. So it is an admission by a litigant in a place where it harms others, without relying on Rabbi Natan. That’s a question on our Talmudic discussion.
[Speaker D] Right, on that we already learned that he is not believed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmudic discussion says he is not believed because he is harming others. I am only asking: how does a situation arise in which he is harming others? Do you need Rabbi Natan’s law for that? My claim is no. I can draw a situation in which he is harming others even without relying on Rabbi Natan.
[Speaker D] Okay, now we’re asking about the Ran. Now about the Ran.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: according to those who disagree with the Ran, the question on the Talmudic discussion is still difficult too. That I understood. The first question is not difficult for them. On the Ran, both difficulties apply. Right.
[Speaker F] But couldn’t you say the reverse—that if the Talmudic discussion did use Rabbi Natan, then that means that in the “harming others” case he does have, he does have other money?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s you—the second one asking the question. So in effect you’re saying that the Ran is right.
[Speaker F] No, if—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you’re raising a difficulty on those who disagree with him, it is always difficult for them no matter how you move it.
[Speaker F] Why is the Ran right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because according to those who disagree with the Ran, there is a difficulty on the Talmudic discussion. Because according to those who disagree with the Ran, it comes out that in fact one could have relied—you didn’t need to rely on Rabbi Natan in order to explain that he is harming others.
[Speaker F] No, and according to the Ran, what happens now according to the Ran?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let’s think now according to the Ran. According to the Ran, both difficulties are difficult. Both the difficulty of what Rabbi Natan introduced, and the difficulty of why the Talmudic discussion needed Rabbi Natan’s novelty. Both difficulties are difficult.
[Speaker J] Do you mean the difficulties up to the word “his assets,” or in general? What? I didn’t understand. On the Ran?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As if he here
[Speaker J] is talking about the fact that notes are something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s the answer. He said—yes, certainly. I’m talking at the stage—we have read only his difficulty. Let’s try to understand whether he meant difficulty number 1 or difficulty number 2. If he meant difficulty number 1, then that is a difficulty only according to his own view: what is Rabbi Natan’s novelty? Yes. If he means difficulty number 2, to challenge the Talmudic discussion, then he doesn’t need his introduction for that. That difficulty applies even if I didn’t accept his introduction. So apparently, from the argument I made before, the very fact that the Ran prefaced his introduction seems to show that the difficulty is based on that introduction, right? So what does that mean—which difficulty is he asking? No, on the Talmudic discussion you can ask even without any connection to his introduction.
[Speaker C] Since we already know Rabbi Natan. That’s what Rashi says, that we already know Rabbi Natan from earlier.
[Speaker J] Right. Right. I understood that Rabbi Natan’s novelty is that notes are something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the answer. Right now I’m talking at the stage of the question.
[Speaker J] That means that in fact Rabbi Natan’s novelty is not what he said in the introduction. Meaning, because it means that it’s true even when he has money, but notes are something else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s the same thing. Notes are something else, and therefore when he has no money there is a practical difference here. It’s the same novelty: because notes are something else, therefore a different consequence emerges here when he has no money. It’s not two novelties; it’s one novelty. So again, if the Ran needed his introduction, okay? What does that mean—which of the two difficulties did he intend to ask? About the Talmudic discussion, or about what Rabbi Natan’s novelty is?
[Speaker B] What Rabbi Natan’s novelty is. Right? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What Rabbi Natan’s novelty is, because if he is asking the question on the Talmudic discussion, he doesn’t need this introduction. The question on the Talmudic discussion can be asked even without this introduction. The question of what Rabbi Natan’s novelty is—that requires the introduction. Someone who disagrees with the Ran can’t even think that question, because for someone who disagrees with the Ran, it won’t be difficult according to his view what Rabbi Natan introduced. He introduced that you can collect even without having— even if
[Speaker C] you have money.
[Speaker B] From the side of