Ketubot Chapter 2, Lesson 21
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- The authority of religious courts, feelings of hurt, and immersion not in the presence of judges
- Finding your way through the sources and study guidelines
- The definition of a trust document and its prohibition
- The claim of a trust document against a document and the presumption that people do not do this
- Opening the Talmudic text: “One who says, ‘This is a trust document,’ is not believed” and the three possibilities
- The mnemonic signs in the Talmud and the oral framework
- Rava’s answer: establishing it in the borrower and connecting it to the law of “one who admits he wrote the document”
- Abaye’s answer: establishing it in the lender, “for example where he harms others,” and Rabbi Natan’s lien
- Rav Ashi’s answer: establishing it in the witnesses, “do not let injustice dwell in your tent,” and “a person does not render himself wicked”
- Comparing trust to paid, the question of the borrower’s credibility, and the dispute between the Shulchan Arukh and Giddulei Terumah
Summary
General Overview
The text presents a conversation and a lecture in Jewish law that begins with an argument about feelings of hurt and paternalism surrounding the authority of religious courts in matters of immersion and conversion, and continues with study guidance against “racing” through sources. The lecture then moves to a Talmudic discussion of a “trust document,” the prohibition against making one based on “do not let injustice dwell in your tent,” and the dispute over how to treat the claim that a document is a trust document when it is produced for collection. The Talmud examines who says, “This is a trust document”—the borrower, the lender, or the witnesses—and rejects each possibility until three interpretive resolutions by Amoraim are presented, while integrating concepts such as “one who admits he wrote the document,” validation of documents, “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” “one cannot retract and testify differently,” “a person does not render himself wicked,” “harms others,” and Rabbi Natan’s lien. Finally, a later dispute arises between the Shulchan Arukh and Giddulei Terumah regarding the borrower’s credibility in claiming trust when he himself validates the document, along with the Shakh’s comment, ending with the note that the matter requires further analysis.
The authority of religious courts, feelings of hurt, and immersion not in the presence of judges
This is not a matter of “the suffering of the many” but of “the weakness of the many,” and the discomfort arises when people understand that the situation is “different.” The authority here is not like that of a doctor, because ideology is added to it, and there is a feeling of paternalism over the observance of my commandment מצד the religious court, even though it is said that the religious court is entrusted with and responsible for conversion by virtue of Jewish law, not from a lust for power. A question is raised whether there is a solution for immersion not in the presence of the judges, and it is said, “I think so,” while distinguishing between speaking about the religious courts themselves and speaking about the feeling of hurt, and it is said that the feeling of hurt “has no basis,” and that it is incorrect to interpret the situation as an element of power.
Finding your way through the sources and study guidelines
It is said that one has to know “who’s to blame here” and clarify where they are in the sources—“after the Shakh, up to the place between the Shakh and Giddulei Terumah”—and names appear such as the Ran and Giddulei Terumah. It is said not to race in order to cover sources but to learn, and that if they did not manage, then they will do it in the lecture, because racing through sources is a “disease,” and that is why sources are usually not given in lectures. It is said that the page counts roughly as “one and a half” lectures.
The definition of a trust document and its prohibition
A trust document is described as a document that looks like an ordinary debt document with witnesses, but is given to the lender before the loan is actually handed over, out of trust, so that the document will already be in his possession for convenience. It is said that “there is no such document in Jewish law” and that it is forbidden to make one, and the prohibition is explained by “do not let injustice dwell in your tent” and the concern of “do not place a stumbling block,” causing the lender to stumble into theft if he collects without having given a loan, or if heirs find the document after death. An illustration is brought from a security check/deposit check that looks like a regular check in order to be effective, and it is said that when this is anchored in a contract that prevents future problems, it is permitted, because one is not causing someone to stumble.
The claim of a trust document against a document and the presumption that people do not do this
A case is presented in which Reuven produces a document against someone and that person claims the document is a trust document, and it is said that as a matter of law it is “clear” that the religious court will rule the document valid, because that is what the document means. Even validating the document does not solve the problem, because the witnesses are real and can be validated. It is said in the name of Rashi that this is “not common,” meaning there is a presumption that a person does not give a trust document, and the presumption is strengthened by the fact that this is forbidden, because “there is a presumption that a person does not violate prohibitions,” which turns the majority into a stronger halakhic presumption. It is explained that a document is written “with the intent of the obligated party,” and the obligated party is the borrower.
Opening the Talmudic text: “One who says, ‘This is a trust document,’ is not believed” and the three possibilities
A teaching is brought: “Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rav: One who says, ‘This is a trust document,’ is not believed,” and the Talmud asks, “Who is saying it?” and presents three possible parties: borrower, lender, and witnesses. Regarding the borrower, it says “obvious” and “does he have such power?” because if a borrower were believed, the entire meaning of a document would be emptied out and every document could be claimed to be a trust document; it would even create a migo, since he could have claimed trust. Regarding the lender, it says, “A blessing should come upon him,” and therefore that cannot be what “he is not believed” means. A side discussion is brought about the theoretical possibility of a dispute between “righteous people,” similar to the midrash about Alexander of Macedon and the African king, but it is said that a court dealing with monetary law does not sit to judge where there is no claim about violated rights; at most this would be a question of ritual law about truth and the concern for theft. Regarding the witnesses, a distinction is examined: if “their handwriting emerges from elsewhere,” it is obvious they are not believed, because there is no “mouth that prohibited” and there is “one cannot retract and testify differently”; and if “their handwriting does not emerge from elsewhere,” the question arises, “why are they not believed?” apparently because of “the mouth that prohibited,” and so here too there is difficulty in establishing the teaching.
The mnemonic signs in the Talmud and the oral framework
The question is asked, “What is the meaning of the mnemonic sign in the Talmud?” and it is said that the Talmud often gives mnemonic signs in order to remember complex passages that were transmitted orally. In this case the sign is unusual, because it is a sign based on the names of the Amoraim rather than their first letters, and it is meant to distinguish between possibilities in which letters would otherwise repeat.
Rava’s answer: establishing it in the borrower and connecting it to the law of “one who admits he wrote the document”
Rava establishes it as “really, it is the borrower speaking,” and connects it to “as Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: one who admits he wrote the document does not need to validate it,” so the borrower’s claim of trust is not accepted, and the lender can collect without validation. Two understandings are presented of what the novelty is: either the novelty is the law itself—“one who admits he wrote the document does not need to validate it”—or the novelty is that the law applies also to a claim of trust and not only to a claim of paid. This is connected to the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot from the previous topic, where Tosafot challenges Rashi because “what is my debt document doing in your hand?” does not fit a trust document, and Rashi has to explain that in trust the claim is rejected because it is an implausible claim or “not the normal way” to do such a thing.
Abaye’s answer: establishing it in the lender, “for example where he harms others,” and Rabbi Natan’s lien
Abaye establishes it as “really, the lender is saying it,” but only in a case “such as where he harms others,” and brings “as Rabbi Natan” from the verse “and he shall give it to the one to whom he is guilty,” from which is learned the rule that a creditor can collect directly from the debtor of his debtor—Rabbi Natan’s lien. The picture is explained in which the lender admits that the document is a trust document in order to block collection by another creditor from him, and his admission is treated as “the admission of a litigant,” which is not believed when it “harms another,” and the possibility of collusion is mentioned. It is said that the Rif skips the section because it is not the practical law, and that the discussion in Abaye fits practical law because Rava is only interpreting a teaching according to Rav, which is not the practical law.
Rav Ashi’s answer: establishing it in the witnesses, “do not let injustice dwell in your tent,” and “a person does not render himself wicked”
Rav Ashi establishes it as “really, the witnesses are saying it,” and resolves the difficulty of “why are they not believed?” through the statement of Rav Kahana: “It is forbidden for a person to keep a trust document in his house, because it is said: ‘Do not let injustice dwell in your tent.’” A deduction is brought from Rav Sheshet son of Rav Idi that witnesses who say, “Our words were trust,” are not believed, because “they would not sign on injustice,” and this is explained as an application of “a person does not render himself wicked,” since the witnesses are testifying about themselves that they signed something unjust. A parallel is drawn to the previous topic between “coerced because of money,” which connects to “a person does not render himself wicked,” and other situations, which connect to “one cannot retract and testify differently.”
Comparing trust to paid, the question of the borrower’s credibility, and the dispute between the Shulchan Arukh and Giddulei Terumah
A possibility is raised in which the borrower himself validates the document and then claims trust, so that apparently he has “the mouth that prohibited,” while on the other hand it is argued that perhaps this should be rejected because of “a person does not render himself wicked” or because the claim is implausible. It is said that this is not explicit in the Talmud because the discussion there revolves around Rav Huna in the name of Rav, which is not the practical law; but according to practical law, following Rav Nachman that “one who admits he wrote the document must validate it,” there is room to discuss whether trust has the same status as paid. It is said that the Shulchan Arukh rules, surprisingly, that the claim is accepted, and Giddulei Terumah disagrees and objects based on “a person does not render himself wicked,” and it is said that the Shulchan Arukh’s answer to the objection requires analysis. An argument is brought that the Shakh proves from the Talmud in accordance with the Shulchan Arukh, because otherwise the teaching could have been established in the borrower, and it is said that Giddulei Terumah can respond that the Talmud was dealing with Rav’s position, which is not the practical law. The conclusion is: “Thank you very much.”
Full Transcript
[Speaker A] No, this isn’t the suffering of the many, it’s the weakness of the many. You can be in that same place differently. As soon as you understand that you feel
[Speaker B] that it’s different, then you understand the discomfort that’s created. No, I’ll tell you what the difference is—it’s not like a doctor, because here ideology also gets added to it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A doctor simply wouldn’t have been a doctor.
[Speaker B] No, but what? What ideology is added to it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here there is, כביכול,
[Speaker B] you agree with that, fine. But it’s not ideology. He’s saying, as it were, Jewish law was entrusted to us, we are the religious court. Right, fine, that does create a feeling of some kind of paternalism over my observance of the commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s true, that’s true, everybody says that. The religious court is entrusted with conversion—what do you mean? The religious court is responsible for the conversion. What, that’s not true? Now the question is whether there’s a solution for immersion not in front of the judges. I think there is. But what do you mean? They’re not taking some power for themselves out of a lust for power. They understand that this is their role; that’s Jewish law.
[Speaker B] Wait, I wasn’t talking about them, I was talking now about the feeling of hurt. So on top of that there’s also some element of power.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The feeling of hurt has no basis—there’s no basis for that feeling. It doesn’t come from there, and it’s not right to interpret it that way. Okay, fine. After I finished defending the religious courts—you made me do things I didn’t think I’d ever do.
[Speaker D] Okay, that wasn’t me, I didn’t start. No, what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s move on. I want to move on, because where are you up to?
[Speaker D] No, wait, you have to say who’s to blame here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we—what is this? Where is that? What is 12?
[Speaker F] After the Shakh, up to the place between the Shakh and Giddulei Terumah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, Giddulei Terumah, yes.
[Speaker F] The Da”sh, Giddulei Terumah. The Geda”sh, clean. Okay, fine, so that means everything we understood is a decade, as they say.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay, that’s how we got there.
[Speaker A] Fine, good. You were humiliating us.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? The Ran—you still haven’t seen the Ran?
[Speaker A] What we said was, if you ran this fast to get here, then apparently we didn’t understand anything.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Don’t run. In general, don’t run. I’ll say it again, it’s important. Don’t run just in order to cover sources—learn. These sources are some kind of track according to which I recommend that you learn, but actually learn. Don’t run just to see the sources and be on top of things for the lecture—I’m against that. If you didn’t get to it, that’s perfectly fine, then we’ll do it in the lecture. If we reach a stage where you didn’t manage, we’ll do it in the lecture. Don’t run. It’s a disease. By the way, I usually don’t give sources in lectures that I teach. This is an exception here. Usually I don’t give sources precisely because of this—that people race through the sources instead of learning. Learn, and afterward we’ll talk in the lecture.
[Speaker E] I thought this page was for two lectures.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, no, it’s not for two lectures, but it’s for one and a half, let’s say. Yes, fine. So, after the discussion about one who admits he wrote the document, the Talmudic text starts discussing a trust document. We already encountered this in Tosafot in the previous passage, where they challenged Rashi. I also mentioned it in the page I sent you. A trust document is a document that the borrower—again, I’m presenting it as if this were one of the types of documents that exist in Jewish law. There is no such document in Jewish law; it’s forbidden to do this, okay? But that’s the name of a kind of document that people may make, or might make, even though it’s not okay to do so. “Do not let injustice dwell in your tent,” as the Talmud says.
[Speaker D] You don’t sign something that is injustice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Meaning, in general—why? Well, in a moment.
[Speaker D] A trust document is a kind of trust arrangement, like a deposit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Something like that.
[Speaker D] Like I give you a check and trust that you won’t use it if I pay it back.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right, something like that. Of course afterward—again—in a place where you anchor this in a contract, and the contract says I gave you a document, then it’s fine, because I can show by force of the contract that this check is a deposit check. If you cash it improperly, I’ll take you to court and get the money back. That’s why it’s permitted when I prevent future problems—then I’m not causing the person to stumble.
[Speaker D] The check is security—meaning the check itself isn’t really the document. There has to be another document, and then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s a contract, a contract.
[Speaker D] And this document looks like a regular document, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, a document like a security check—that’s a good example. Meaning, here I’m basically writing a promissory note. It doesn’t say here “trust document”—no, because otherwise if it said “trust document,” it also wouldn’t function as a trust document, because the whole purpose of a trust document is to turn into a debt document in the end. If it said on it “trust document,” you couldn’t use it. Therefore it’s written like a regular debt document: I, so-and-so, borrowed such-and-such an amount from so-and-so, that’s all, and two witnesses sign, and that’s it. But I give it to him without his having given me the loan yet, so that, for example, if the scribe is here now and then leaves and later I can’t get hold of him for one reason or another, I write the document now for greater security, and in the coming days I’ll come take the money. But the document will already be with you, so you can relax, and I trust you not to misuse it.
[Speaker A] I could have written the document while the scribe is here and the witnesses are here, but kept the document with me.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but if you traveled somewhere, for example, and the money is here, then I say: your children will give me the money, but the document is already with you. It doesn’t matter—there are circumstances where it’s easier to do it this way, and if I trust him, then I trust him. Okay? It’s like—by the way, similar to another thing. For example, there is a prohibition against lending someone money without witnesses.
[Speaker E] Yes. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because if I lend someone money without witnesses, then afterward he may be tempted to deny the loan. There are no witnesses. Okay? And then basically I won’t be able to collect the money from him, and I will have caused him to stumble into the prohibition of theft, even though it was his initiative. But I’m giving him the easier option of denying it and violating the prohibition of theft, so I’m not allowed to put a person in that kind of situation. This is similar. A trust document basically causes the lender to stumble in such a way that he might produce the document even though he never gave me the loan at all, and try to collect money from me.
[Speaker H] And what happens if he dies and the heirs find it in the house?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example. So that can create a great many problems. And therefore, basically, “do not let injustice dwell in your tent”—don’t make such a document, okay? You trust the lender—very nice. But don’t put people, even if you trust them, don’t put them to the test. Why get yourself into trouble? But that is the concept of a trust document. Now of course, what happens with such a document when—as I asked you—what happens if Reuven produces a document against me, and I claim against this document: this is a trust document. I gave him this document only out of trust; really, he hasn’t even given me the loan yet. What’s the law—what will the religious court rule in such a situation?
[Speaker D] First of all, you validated the document. You said you wrote it.
[Speaker E] It will rule that it’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] valid. Obviously. Right? Because that’s what a document means. Why do I give you a document? What? Exactly. It couldn’t function as a trust document if I couldn’t produce this document and be believed. What did it help me that you gave me a document? It only helps me if producing the document really works—if it’s effective. We’re even talking about validation—they’ll validate the witnesses, because the witnesses who signed are real witnesses, and they can be validated. So validation also doesn’t solve the problem. Okay? And then basically it’s clear that as a matter of law you can’t claim against a document produced against you that it’s a trust document. Right? That’s not a claim that will be accepted.
[Speaker E] It’s not common for people to do that.
[Speaker G] That’s Rashi.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I—
[Speaker E] I’m asking whether one can say there’s a presumption that a person won’t give one. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the meaning. “Not common” means there is a presumption that a person does not give someone else a trust document. Only there the presumption is based not only on the fact that you’re harming yourself, because then you could say, fine, I trust him, he’s my friend. But also on the fact that it’s forbidden. Once it’s forbidden, that prohibition builds the presumption. Because once it is already forbidden to do this, now there is a presumption that a person will not do such a thing. Before there was a prohibition, the presumption would only say: listen, why would a person take the risk and give a document before receiving a loan? Fine—because I trust him, and it was convenient for me because the scribe was here and then left, so I have explanations for why I gave it to him. That’s not enough to create a presumption. The Sages say there is now a prohibition against doing such a thing, and that’s an additional explanation. The prohibition on doing it—beyond the fact that it is “do not place a stumbling block” and you can cause him to stumble into theft—the purpose of the prohibition is to create a presumption. Because once there is a prohibition, now the presumption that a person does not do such a thing is of course stronger. Because now I am basically testifying about myself that I violated a prohibition. That’s implausible. There is a presumption that a person does not violate prohibitions.
[Speaker I] Why is the distinction we said from a majority to a presumption? It sounds like one is that most people won’t give a trust document, and the other is a presumption.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. It turns the majority into a presumption, very good. It turns the majority into a presumption in halakhic terminology.
[Speaker J] Why wouldn’t he just keep this debt document in the borrower’s house?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said—let’s say it’s inconvenient for him; it doesn’t matter, for one reason or another. There can be reasons.
[Speaker J] No, but didn’t we say that the lender is the one who sees to writing the document?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—the borrower. Always the intent of the obligated party. The document testifies to the intent of the obligated party. The obligated party is the borrower. Who is obligated? Who does the document say is obligated? The borrower. So the intent of the obligated party is the borrower’s intent. A document is always written with the intent of the obligated party.
[Speaker D] But why also shouldn’t a trust document be some other kind of document, and then he wouldn’t need to claim “this is a trust document and not the real document”? I mean, if there were such types of documents.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s impossible. If there were—what, it would be written at the top “trust document”? And then after I give the money—I now lent you the money, and now I want to collect with the document—then you won’t pay me back, and you’ll say, ah, this is a trust document. No, that doesn’t solve the problem. You have to present it as a regular document. It has to look like a regular document. Like a check. It has to look exactly like a regular document.
[Speaker B] Like a check with nothing written on it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like a check. It’s an evidentiary document.
[Speaker D] No—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, it’s an evidentiary document.
[Speaker D] It’s like a security check where I don’t write “security check” or something like that, it’s just a check. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The moment he wants, he’ll cash it. Because if you write there “deposit document,” then when he takes it to the bank they won’t honor it. Right. Same thing with a trust document.
[Speaker A] And also not a postdated check. Exactly. You don’t give a postdated check if you want to give security to the landlord.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This check has to look like a regular check, otherwise it’s ineffective.
[Speaker A] Yes, yes. You’re basically trusting the landlord not to cash it.
[Speaker D] It’s like some kind of deposit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so that’s the basic datum. That is a trust document, and that is basically the basic law of a trust document. A trust document is a document in every respect, and a trust document is not a type of document, but rather a type of claim. Rather, it is a claim about the document. The claim is that the document was given to you in trust, not because of—not in exchange for the money you lent me. Okay?
[Speaker A] And still, we’re moving ahead at this stage, but the Shulchan Arukh surprisingly does rule that one accepts this, even though it goes against everything the Talmud says.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—we’ll see in a moment, we’ll see, we’ll see. It’s not so simple, because there he himself validated the document, so he has “the mouth that prohibited.” Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rav: One who says, “This is a trust document,” is not believed. That’s what it says in the Talmudic text, right? He says, “This is a trust document,” and he is not believed. “Who is saying it?” asks the Talmud. In short, when someone pulls out a document against me claiming money, and the claim comes up that this document is a trust document—the claim is not accepted. The Talmud asks: who is raising this claim? There are three possible parties here, and the Talmud rejects all three. Lender, borrower, and witnesses. And then three Amoraim come, each one explaining why it is nevertheless possible to say that it’s the lender, or the borrower, or the witnesses. Okay? But why did you say that he’s not believed? What? Yes. In order to say he’s not believed, you have to explain in what cases. So the Talmud says like this: Who is saying it? If you say the borrower says it—obvious. Does he have such power? The borrower will say it’s a trust document? Obviously he’s not believed. Why is it obvious? Because if a borrower could say it’s a trust document, then you’ve basically emptied every document of meaning. About every document you could say that it’s a trust document. The whole force of documents would collapse.
[Speaker A] You’ll always say, yes, you have a document, but not really.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than that: now if I claim “paid” or I claim “forged,” I’ll have a migo, because I could have said “trust document” and I would have been believed. Right? There’s no such thing. Obviously it can’t be that the borrower can claim against a document with witnesses that it is a trust document. What I said earlier.
[Speaker D] What’s the literal explanation in context of “does he have such power?”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Does he have such power”—what, does he have the power to do such a thing? How could that be?
[Speaker D] What do the words mean—how do the words say that? Because I see the explanation given there, and I don’t understand why those words say that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Does he have such power” means: does he have the power? Why does “such power” mean power?
[Speaker I] And like, can he here?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the intention is: does he have the power to do it? “Does he have such power”—as if to say, is it all from him? Is it in his power? Is it from him? “Such power” means from him. I honestly never thought about how it works literally, but “does he have such power” means: is it in his power? How can that be? It’s that kind of rhetorical question.
[Speaker E] He can’t claim against a document that has—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] witnesses? Maybe that’s a hint to it, I don’t know. Interesting question. Maybe it hints that if it really were through his own power—if he were the one validating the document—then maybe he actually could do it. And here the Talmud asks: are we relying on his own power that he should be believed? Like a hint to “the mouth that prohibited.” That’s it, that’s it. It’s like what we said in the Mishnah: we do not live by their mouth. A hint that if we did live by their mouth, then there would be “the mouth that prohibited,” and she would be believed. Okay? I don’t know, one has to think about it. So it can’t be the borrower, right? Borrower—if you give the borrower credibility to claim this is a trust document, you empty the concept of document of all content. And if not, then is it the lender saying it? So what are you going to tell me—that it’s the lender who says it? The Talmud says: a blessing should come upon him. If the lender says this document is no good, then what’s the dispute about? There’s no conflict.
[Speaker K] But why is he not believed? So if we were saying that it’s the lender—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s the difficulty. Therefore it’s clear—obviously he is believed. Here the law itself is already wrong. In the first case, the point was that the law is so correct that it’s obvious. In the possibility of the lender, the law can’t be correct. Meaning, it simply can’t be. No, it can’t be right. We’ll see in a moment—it can’t be right. Now this is just a side comment: we spoke about this in previous years, I no longer remember in what context—maybe could it be that the borrower claims it’s a real document and the lender claims it’s a trust document? Then there is a dispute—who said there isn’t?
[Speaker D] Like in that city—exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the midrash I already brought before about Alexander of Macedon in Africa. Alexander of Macedon got there, heard great and wondrous things about the African king. So he wanted to hear who this enlightened and wise king was. So he invited him to his court—the king also judged there. So he invited him to court. Two people came before him. One sold the other a courtyard—okay, or a ruin, I don’t remember; I think a courtyard—and a field. And the other plowed the field and suddenly there was some pit there and he found a treasure in it. So the one who bought the field says: I didn’t buy the treasure; I want to return it to the seller. And the seller says: what are you talking about? I sold you the field, everything in it. If you found a treasure, the treasure is yours. Two righteous people arguing with each other. And then the African king says: do you have a daughter? Do you have a son? Let them marry each other and take the treasure. Wonderful, such a wise man. Now the Litvak comes and says: okay, you’re a very wise man, but what’s the law? He has no son and that one has no daughter. What do you say—what’s the law? And yes, the Litvak doesn’t accept midrashim, so he skips over midrashim and studies only laws, not midrashim. So what really is the law in such a case? The borrower claims it belongs to the lender, and the lender claims it belongs to the borrower.
[Speaker L] That’s where they built the Temple.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all, the lender says this is a trust document—really I’m not owed any money. The lender says no money is owed to me. And I’m saying the borrower would say: no, this is a real document, you lent me money, maybe you don’t remember—you lent me money, money is owed to you. So they have a dispute. I want to give it to him and he doesn’t want to take it. Exactly like with Alexander of Macedon. I don’t know—they should check what the law is. So maybe—maybe that’s what this is talking about. Why does the Talmud rule out the possibility that the lender says it and he is not believed, because the borrower has an admission of a litigant that he really does owe the money, and therefore the borrower is believed and the lender is not believed to say it is a trust document. What’s the problem? Look—that could work, couldn’t it? No, because then—
[Speaker E] we’re back to needing a ruling.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? “Not believed”—that’s what the Talmud says. Because the borrower admitted in court. Because I want to give it to him and he doesn’t want to take it. I’m dragging him to court—what do you mean? Let them force him to take it.
[Speaker G] A blessing should come upon him.
[Speaker A] So they tell him he’s not believed. “A blessing should come upon him,” so they say to him: very nice, well done, we believe you. Right. So they don’t say he’s not believed. And therefore it doesn’t fit. He is believed. He is believed to say that it’s a trust document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t fit the heading. It does fit—
[Speaker G] certainly not—
[Speaker K] believed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Not believed” means we do not accept your claim—
[Speaker A] that this is a trust document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that it is not a trust document, it is a real document. Okay? No—“a blessing should come upon him” means: yes, it’s a trust document, everything is fine, we accept it. So he is believed. That is not “not believed.” “Not believed” means you say it’s a trust document, and we won’t accept that, we won’t believe you.
[Speaker A] But “a blessing should come upon him” means we do accept it. But I could explain that at this stage of the Talmud, in this part—not before the Amoraim—in this part the Talmud brought some general statement—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it doesn’t know whom Rabbi Yehudah in the name of Rav meant, and now it’s checking. Is it the borrower? That’s obvious. Is it the lender? No, it’s not the lender, because good for the lender that he said that. And therefore what?
[Speaker A] Therefore the lender is believed; he is believed. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Rav Huna says he is not believed. Because the teaching says he is not believed, and you’re telling me the lender is believed, so that can’t be it.
[Speaker A] So it’s not talking about the lender. Right. Yes.
[Speaker D] This whole section—
[Speaker A] where they say why not—
[Speaker D] it makes sense that Rabbi Yehudah said it in that wording.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] With the borrower it can’t be, because although the law is correct, it’s obvious. With the lender it can’t be, because the law is incorrect. That is not the law. So I say—wait, who said so? Maybe it’s talking about a case where the borrower claims it’s a real document, the lender claims it’s a trust document, and what it says is that the lender is not believed. The ruling is that it’s a real document. More than that—if the borrower remembers that he borrowed, and the lender doesn’t remember that he lent, it’s likely that the borrower remembers better. Right. And more than that, there’s also an admission of a litigant. So why not? So maybe that’s what it’s talking about, and therefore the lender is not believed. The borrower will validate the document, and then the court will validate it—what difference does it make? The borrower will validate it. The borrower will bring witnesses to validate the document. Let’s keep the whole righteous-people scenario going. The borrower will validate the document? Yes.
[Speaker A] The very validation of the document says nothing at all about whether it’s trust or not trust. Because a document can be validated and still be a trust document. Validation of the document doesn’t speak about the past; it only speaks about the document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Completely clear, right. No, still, in order to collect with it you have to validate the document.
[Speaker A] Fine, but that really doesn’t help.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Noa said that not because it helps clarify reality, but what’s the point? After all, if the lender doesn’t validate the document, then they’ll hardly collect with it. So what difference does it make that we believe the borrower that there was a loan? They still won’t collect with it, it won’t matter, it won’t be realized. That was her question—not because it’s a problem of credibility. But if he admits, then the borrower will validate the document and they’ll collect with it too. Look, the intuition behind your wording is what I kept saying in the context of Alexander of Macedon—I don’t remember when I talked about it, whether this year or in previous years. But the point is this: a court does not sit to judge a case like that. If each one wants to give the other gifts and the other one doesn’t want to receive them, work it out yourselves—what do you want from us? A court sits only where someone comes to court and says: my rights were violated, protect me. Your rights were violated because you want to give gifts? You want to give gifts and he doesn’t want to receive them. What do you want from him? You have no violated right. You don’t want to keep stolen property because in your eyes this money is stolen? Donate it to charity. Why should I care now? That’s not your business. A person who does not demand his rights—the court does not sit to protect him. The court protects someone who petitions the court and asks for protection. Therefore in a case like this you will not find a law in monetary law about this story. Why? Because it is not a law the court would adjudicate. It is an interesting question, by the way, from the standpoint of Jewish law. In ritual law there is room to ask and write about such a question. Not in monetary law. Monetary law deals with the question of protecting rights. Ritual law asks: what is the truth? Am I holding stolen property if I keep this money or not? Maybe I am very bothered by the question of theft, so I want the rabbi to tell me whether I am a thief or not. I claim there was a loan, and he claims there was no loan. So now I ask the rabbi: tell me, what am I supposed to do with the money? If he tells me to give it to charity, I’ll give it. But if he tells me no, I don’t want to give the money to charity. If it really is mine, I’m not going to give it to charity; I’ll keep it. I want to know whether I’m a thief or not. But that is a question in Jewish law; it is not a question for a court in monetary law. It is a question in monetary law as a halakhic discipline—go to a rabbi, not to a court. Okay? In monetary law this won’t appear. Therefore the Talmud here says that if it is the lender saying this is a trust document, then all honor to him. I asked: and what if the borrower says no—then a conflict could arise. That’s not monetary law. It’s not relevant. So that is certainly not what we are talking about here. The Talmud says: rather, it is the witnesses who say it. Meaning—I’ll add another point—it is much stronger than what I said before. Earlier I said you won’t find such a law in monetary law. Now I’m saying: look, we already found such a law, there is no other way to interpret it, and still the Talmud is unwilling to accept it. Meaning, it is so clear to the Talmud that there cannot be a ruling in monetary law in such a situation, that not only does it not bother discussing it, but even if something appears to be discussing it, the Talmud rejects that interpretation. It says: impossible. Meaning, it’s that strong. That is much stronger than just speculating why we didn’t find a discussion of it. We didn’t find a discussion because it didn’t interest them. But here it’s much stronger—they say, we already found something, you have no escape; it can’t be the borrower, it can’t be the witnesses, so why not simply explain that it’s the lender? No such thing—I’m not willing to explain it that way, because monetary law does not deal with questions like that. Okay? Monetary law does not deal with righteous people, only with thieves. That’s the principle. Meaning, if everyone is righteous, it’s not monetary law; go somewhere else. Go study Rebbe Nachman of Breslov. Fine. The Talmud says: rather, it is the witnesses who say it. Fine, so it’s not the borrower, not the lender—maybe it’s the witnesses? And in fact we saw later, yes, witnesses who said: it was trust, this is a trust document, right? That’s a discussion in the Talmud. Yes. So maybe it’s the witnesses? So the Talmud says: what kind of case are we talking about with the witnesses? If their handwriting emerges from another source, then it is obvious that they are not believed. Meaning, if they do not have “the mouth that prohibited,” the document is validated even without them, then they are not believed. Obvious. Why? Why is that so obvious?
[Speaker G] Because they don’t have “the mouth that prohibited.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what?
[Speaker G] So it’s known from elsewhere.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So we are not living by their mouth. What? The document will be validated. The document will be validated—two against two, no? What?
[Speaker A] Why is it obvious that he’s not believed?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because they were already examined. No, the opposite. Ah—well, it’s about the document. Two against two, no? There are the witnesses on the document, and now we say this is a trust document—two witnesses—so it’s two against two.
[Speaker G] Why is it so—
[Speaker F] obvious that he’s not believed?
[Speaker I] Who said it’s two?
[Speaker F] The witnesses to the document? The witnesses to the document. But we said we validate only when we don’t have the document’s own witnesses; the court sees something else, we don’t have the document’s own witnesses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here we do have the document’s own witnesses?
[Speaker F] Here we have the document’s own witnesses?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s simply that the document’s own witnesses themselves come—
[Speaker F] and say it.
[Speaker A] But if it—
[Speaker F] comes from elsewhere, what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the validating witnesses are others.
[Speaker F] It—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s when there was “the mouth that prohibited.” But the witnesses to the document themselves—
[Speaker A] If the witnesses to the document themselves validate the document because they come in person to court, then basically there is “one cannot retract and testify differently”—that’s what we said, that we don’t believe them. Okay. So here too we don’t believe them?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, here it is validated through another validation, validated by other witnesses.
[Speaker M] From a third party. But then it’s “what is my debt document doing in your hand,” no? I mean, it’s the document against witnesses who are contradicting it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Two against two, no? “What is my debt document doing in your hand”? “What is my debt document doing in your hand” tells you: what is my document doing by you? Trust document. What do you mean? “What is my debt document doing in your hand” is exactly the argument that cannot stand against a trust document—that’s what Tosafot asks against Rashi. But if they validate it— I didn’t understand. If they validate it, it’s like they are incriminating themselves.
[Speaker F] If they validate it, that’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From another place—I just read it now—we’re talking about a case where it’s validated from elsewhere. So the Talmud says: then it’s obvious that they’re not believed. Why is it obvious? It’s two against two. I’m reminding you again of the Talmud. On page 19, where it talked about the witnesses who validate the document and those who disqualify it being two different groups, not the witnesses who signed it—they died. Right? That’s the topic on page 19. There the Talmud says that this really is a case of two against two, right? Do you remember that? We talked about the fact that the witnesses signed on the document—19, 19. No, because it was on 19.
[Speaker A] Right, 18 is our topic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On 19b that’s the case.
[Speaker A] We’re on 19a now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but when we discussed the topic on 19b, the topic there dealt with a situation where there are three groups of witnesses. There’s the group that signed the document, there’s the group that validated the signatures, and there’s a third group that said: these are disqualified, or minors, or coerced, or something like that. Okay? The Talmud there says this: if there’s a third group that validated the document, then basically this is a case of two against two. Why? Which two against which two? The two who validate—the third group—the first group versus the second group. Against the court’s own presumption.
[Speaker G] Yes, so please—three groups.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because we say these witnesses are validated; these witnesses are fit. Fine, so it’s two against two. But I said that all of that is only in the case on page 19b. Why? Because there, the witnesses coming now are not the witnesses who signed the document—they died. Okay? But in the case on page 18, in the Mishnah, the witnesses coming now are the very same witnesses who signed the document. You can’t say this is two against two; it’s us against ourselves. So here you have to decide. And if it’s validated from elsewhere, then your first testimony was that there was a loan. Now you’re coming back and testifying that it was a trust document. One cannot retract and testify differently.
[Speaker A] But the first testimony—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you have here “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” that exempts us from the problem of retracting testimony, right? Rashi told us that because “the mouth that prohibited” turns the two testimonies into one, that exempts us from retracting testimony. But when there is no “mouth that prohibited” in the latter clause, then indeed they won’t be believed, because there is no retracting and re-testifying. That’s why it says here that it’s obvious they’re not believed. Okay? Because we’re talking about the actual group of witnesses itself. If it were really a different group—not the signatories, but another group—then it would be two against two. It wouldn’t be that they’re not believed; it would be a case of two against two.
[Speaker A] So that’s why it’s not the case here—I don’t understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here the case is that there are two groups of witnesses.
[Speaker A] Right—no, here it’s the signatory witnesses themselves who come. Why? But after all, the document is already validated.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Validated—but they say it’s a trust document. They’re testifying about themselves: when we signed, we signed a trust document. So now what are you going to say—that they’re retracting testimony in what sense?
[Speaker A] And not on a loan document? What does “trust document” mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—there was no loan; it was just a trust arrangement.
[Speaker A] Again: when the witnesses sign the document, what are they testifying to? They testify to the existence of the document itself—that Shimon wrote a document to Reuven. But halakhically that’s considered testimony about the loan. Right, you’re correct. Halakhically, witnesses signed on a document are treated as though their testimony had already been investigated in court.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why do they need to say such a thing—that it’s a trust document? They didn’t need this whole discussion here. I don’t understand.
[Speaker A] Because once I have a document with witnesses, and let’s say it’s validated one way or another, doesn’t matter, then they’re testifying about the loan, so you can’t make the claim of trust document—you can’t make that claim at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At all.
[Speaker E] Why can’t you?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the witnesses are the ones making the claim?
[Speaker A] Why can’t you? Why not? Because if we say that the Jewish law is—or that Jewish law understands—that ultimately the witnesses’ signatures on the document testify to the loan—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But they themselves are now coming as two witnesses against it, testifying that it’s a trust document.
[Speaker A] What do you mean “against it”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They can’t claim there was no loan.
[Speaker A] They themselves are saying: true, we signed—but it wasn’t really a loan.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, right, exactly. So now there are two witnesses against the document. When there are two witnesses against the document, you’re not going to collect money with it. When I claim “it was paid” or “it was forged,” and there’s a document against me, nothing helps me, because the document is like two witnesses. But if there are also two witnesses standing against the document, then it’s two against two. Wait, but that’s—
[Speaker E] Isn’t it “if the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Huh? No—“if the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?” is completely irrelevant to this topic. Because a trust document has nothing to do with “if the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?”
[Speaker A] But this whole idea that the document is like two witnesses—that’s the claim.
[Speaker E] Right, but not because of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “If the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?”—I distinguished between the two things. The fact that a document is like two witnesses means: two witnesses that there was a loan. “If the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?” is an argument that there was no repayment. Otherwise, what is the document doing with me?
[Speaker I] But if the witnesses who are the document’s witnesses later come and testify that it’s a trust document, then they’re saying they’re wicked.
[Speaker A] They’re testifying about themselves that they’re wicked.
[Speaker F] Yes, they make them—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Themselves—they make themselves wicked. Fine, that’s the continuation of the Talmud; we’ll see it in a moment. At this stage the Talmud is still ignoring that.
[Speaker F] Wait, wait. If their handwriting emerges from elsewhere, meaning the document is validated. Just a second—wait—but it’s not the signatory witnesses who say, no, that’s ours. No, but now the claim you were making—no, there are—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Other witnesses who validate the document. But now the signatory witnesses themselves come and say: yes, that’s our handwriting, but it’s a trust document. Wait.
[Speaker F] Why, why—meaning the document’s witnesses are arguing against these two-against-two?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Against the document, not against the two-against-two. They claim the document is a trust document. True, it’s validated and it’s our signatures—but we say it’s a trust document. Now, if we ourselves were also the ones validating it, then we’d have “the mouth that prohibited,” because we could simply have refrained from validating it altogether. But if the validators are other witnesses, then we’re certainly not believed. And I asked: why? Even if the validators are others, seemingly it’s two against two. It’s the document’s two testimonies against the two who say it’s a trust arrangement. I said no, because if it’s the document’s own witnesses saying that this is a trust arrangement, then that parallels the topic on page 18, not the topic on page 19. On page 19 it’s two against two. But on page 18, where the document’s own witnesses come out against the document, that’s a case of no retracting and re-testifying. You accept their first testimony and throw out their second testimony.
[Speaker E] That’s the topic here. The Mishnah, yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? So that’s why here it’s obvious. He continues reading: “And if their handwriting does not emerge from elsewhere, why are they not believed?” So why shouldn’t we believe them? After all, they have “the mouth that prohibited.” And we already saw that “the mouth that prohibited” solves the problem of no retracting and re-testifying, right? Like the latter clause of the Mishnah on page 18. Okay, so again in short: even with the witnesses, it doesn’t work. You can’t interpret this as referring to the borrower, nor the lender, nor the witnesses.
[Speaker A] So up to this point we’re basically saying that Rav Yehuda’s statement—you can’t say it’s the borrower, the lender…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. We’re not managing to understand it.
[Speaker A] We tried to set it up with the borrower, and there’s no novelty there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the borrower—but there’s no novelty, so clearly he wasn’t talking about that. So bottom line: we don’t understand the statement. Okay. Now, there are three amoraim here, and each of them will resolve it: borrower, lender, and witnesses.
[Speaker A] Wait—the question was, what’s the meaning of the mnemonic sign in the Talmud? Since when does the Talmud give mnemonic signs? Very often.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very often. When there are complicated discussions where one explanation is brought and rejected, then another is brought and rejected, and another is brought and rejected, they usually give some kind of sign in order to remember them—an acronym.
[Speaker A] So it’s like a way of keeping the whole statement in mind?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have to remember that the Talmud was transmitted orally until it was written down, so that was the way they remembered it.
[Speaker A] Yes, so for Rav Yehuda they didn’t give them mnemonic signs?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes—well, that’s like the ten plagues. But here, by the way, in this case it really is unusual, because here the sign is a sign made up of the names of the amoraim. It’s the names of the amoraim. Usually the mnemonic signs are the letters that begin the baraitot themselves or the cited statements themselves. Here it’s the names of the amoraim, and it’s not even the first letter of their names. It’s just simply to help remember.
[Speaker E] It’s just because there are two bets and two alephs.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly, so you have to change it somehow, but it’s… okay, with these mnemonic signs you also need to remember a mnemonic for what the mnemonic means. But that starts getting too complicated, yes. Still, there’s no choice—when it’s oral, you have to make it work.
[Speaker M] A question about “the mouth that prohibited” regarding the signatory witnesses. The “mouth that prohibited” should apply here, right? What exactly is “the mouth that prohibited” here? We could have…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s Rashi’s explanation. We could have stayed silent and not validated the document. But in any—
[Speaker M] case there’s some kind of… so what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But we as witnesses could have stayed silent and not validated it. It’s a migo of “if we wanted, we could have remained silent” for witnesses; it’s not a migo for a litigant.
[Speaker M] Why? But the discussion is already in—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The discussion, yes—but the witnesses could have remained silent. Not come? Yes. They could have simply not come and not validated the document, and then it would have been worthless. They did validate it. The migo is “if we wanted, we could have remained silent.” True, there’s a case here because the borrower and lender are litigating, but from the witnesses’ perspective it’s a migo of “if we wanted, we could have remained silent.” Not a migo for a litigant. It’s not that the witnesses had to come here and say something to a litigant. They could simply have not come and not validated the document, and then the document would have been worthless.
[Speaker M] Because it’s not that they ask the witnesses, what did you say? So they come… yes,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They could have just not come. What do you want from us? I don’t know what you want.
[Speaker M] And also, Yaniv, even if they do have “the mouth that prohibited,” that’s only according to the rabbis—that is, only if we require validating the document. We say you need—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbinically, not “according to the rabbis.” Rabbinically. Yes. On the Torah level there’s no need to validate a document, and obviously then this isn’t “the mouth that prohibited.”
[Speaker M] Ah, no, no, I meant only according to the rabbinic requirement to validate.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. You mean: “if one admits that he wrote the document, it need not be validated”? In just a moment we’ll see—we’re already getting to that. Rava said: Actually, he is referring to the borrower, and in accordance with Rav Huna. For Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: If one admits that he wrote the document, it need not be validated. So what is Rava saying? Basically, we’re talking about the borrower, right? And what? The borrower says: this is a trust document. So then what? What was our question? What’s the novelty? What’s the novelty? So what does he answer?
[Speaker F] That he says like Rav Huna.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what’s the novelty of the statement?
[Speaker F] First of all, that it applies also to a trust document—that when he says that this document—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously he admits he wrote it, but I’m asking: our question about the borrower—you always have to remember what the question was, what the difficulty was that they’re trying to solve. With the borrower, the problem was simple: what’s the novelty? So he has to explain to me a novelty. What’s the novelty? That he argues he couldn’t have repaid him. That “if one admits that he wrote the document, it need not be validated”—that itself is the novelty. Meaning, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav in order to teach the rule that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated. That very novelty—that Rav Nachman is not correct—
[Speaker A] Against what we already ruled according to the sages?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but that’s only the order of the Talmud; in terms of historical sequence, it doesn’t have to be that way. It was just arranged like this. I’m saying: he came to teach the very rule that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated. Now remember—pay attention—
[Speaker I] But he doesn’t admit to the document that stands here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, that’s always true.
[Speaker I] And because it need not be validated, he can’t invalidate it. What? And because it need not be validated, then he also can’t invalidate it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it need not be validated, then he doesn’t have “the mouth that prohibited,” yes? So note one more point. What?
[Speaker I] I still don’t really understand why that’s connected.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What does “if one admits that he wrote the document, it need not be validated” mean? You produce a document against me, and I say: it was paid. Paid, right?
[Speaker D] A trust document is like saying it was paid.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A trust document basically means saying: this document is real, but I don’t owe the money.
[Speaker D] So “it need not be validated” means it doesn’t matter what you said—we take the document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. The lender can use the document and collect the money from me, even though I made a claim that I basically don’t owe it. Yes. Yes. So the novelty is really the rule itself—that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated. That is what they came to teach. That’s one possibility. A second possibility is that they came to teach that the rule “if one admits that he wrote the document, it need not be validated” also applies to the claim of trust document, and not only to the claim of “it was paid.” You might have thought that in the case of a trust document perhaps he would have to validate it,
[Speaker N] because it’s kind of like claiming the document is forged.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, or something like that. And then it could be that when I make that claim, yes, the sages—you remember, for example, according to Rashi, who says: why is it that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated? Because the enactment requiring validation of documents—which is only a rabbinic enactment—exists only where the borrower says “it’s forged,” not where the borrower says “it was paid.” But maybe when the borrower says “it’s a trust document,” they also enacted it there, because after all he’s still challenging the document. So that is what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav comes to teach: no—if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated even for the claim of trust document, and not only for the claim of payment. Then it turns out that there really is a specific novelty here—not only the novelty that Rav Nachman is wrong, but the novelty is that “if one admits that he wrote the document, it need not be validated” applies also to the claim of trust document and not only to the claim of payment.
[Speaker E] And that doesn’t fit the opinion of the sages.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which sages? The ones who said it does need validation. Fine—we’re talking about Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, Rav Huna said in the name of Rav, okay. More than that: after all, this is Rav’s opinion in any case. Right. Rav Huna says these things in the name of Rav: if one admits that he wrote the document, it need not be validated. And here Rav Yehuda is also speaking in the name of Rav. So this isn’t even really an interpretive setup. Meaning, one could ask: after all, we don’t rule this way in Jewish law. If one admits he wrote the document—in practice it does require validation. But here it’s a statement of Rav; Rav certainly follows his own view even if it isn’t accepted in practice. There’s no big novelty here. What do you mean there’s no big novelty? Right? Meaning, in any event, this is Rav’s position. Fine, so this statement comes to give Rav’s position. Okay? That’s what would come out from what he said earlier. So one of two things: either the novelty here is the very rule that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated; or it is that this also applies to a trust document and not only to the claim of payment. There’s a third possibility. Maybe. That if one admits he wrote the document, then even according to the one who says it does need validation, in the case of a trust document it need not be validated.
[Speaker O] But why would that be? Specifically in—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then seemingly it would come out better, because then it would also fit the practical Jewish law. After all, in practice we rule… except that it isn’t reasonable, because a trust document is more a case requiring validation than a claim of payment. Right, that’s not reasonable. More than that: it’s also unreasonable because Rav is the speaker here. And Rav, after all, holds that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated. Therefore that option seems totally unreasonable to me. So in short we have two possibilities: either the novelty is the rule itself—that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated—or that this applies also to a trust document. Now I go back to Rashi and Tosafot from the previous topic. Tosafot, if you remember, challenged Rashi. Rashi explained the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Nachman as hinging on the question, “If the document is in your hand, what is it doing there?” Right? Rashi—I mean Rashi on our topic, not Rashi elsewhere. Okay? Rashi on our topic. And Tosafot rejects that. Why? Because with a trust document, you can’t say such a thing. After all, our Talmud here implies that Rav Nachman and Rav Huna also disagree about the law of a trust document, and therefore the Talmud says here that this statement follows Rav Huna. Because Rav Nachman apparently really would not accept it, since he says that if one admits he wrote the document, it does require validation, so he would say that also in the case of a trust document. According to Rashi, that’s not correct. According to Rashi, in the case of a trust document there is no question of “if the document is in your hand, what is it doing there?” So seemingly even Rav Nachman should admit that here it would not need validation—sorry, that here it would need validation—sorry, that here Rav Huna too should admit that the document requires validation. Right? In the case of a trust document.
[Speaker P] Because yes—because “if the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rashi, why does Rav Huna claim that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated? Because of “if the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?”—what you said earlier. But in the case of a trust document there’s no such argument. In the case of a trust document, “if the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?” is no question; I’ll tell you what it’s doing there—it’s a trust document. So according to Rashi it’s hard to understand Rav Huna’s position in the case of a trust document. Yet the Talmud claims that Rav Huna says it need not be validated even when the borrower claims it’s a trust document. That’s Tosafot’s difficulty against Rashi. That’s how Tosafot rejects Rashi’s option.
[Speaker A] Against Rashi, what exactly is the difficulty? The difficulty is that if you think what you said before, it doesn’t fit with what the Talmud says now. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that is the explanation of Rav Huna’s opinion—that the lender need not validate the document because of the advantage he has from the mere fact that he holds the document—that may be good for the claim of payment, but in the claim of trust document he has no advantage from holding the document. I can explain why you’re holding the document: because it’s a trust document; I gave it to you.
[Speaker A] But what does Rashi say here? Why does it need—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, one second, before what Rashi says. So I’m saying: that is Tosafot’s difficulty on Rashi. Therefore Tosafot rejects Rashi and explains differently. Right?
[Speaker A] That was the Tosafot from yesterday.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right. Now according to Rashi, it’s clear what the novelty is in Rav Huna said in the name of Rav. You would have thought that here Rav Huna would say that if one admits he wrote the document, it does require validation. Because with a trust document there is no argument of “if the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?” You would have thought that here Rav Huna concedes.
[Speaker E] Comes—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rav Yehuda to say: no, even here the rule applies that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated. Why, really? After all, there’s no argument here of “if the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?” Have you seen Rashi? Yes. What does he say? Because it’s not the way people conduct themselves; it’s not normal practice. Because it’s an implausible claim. Okay? So that’s the novelty of Rav Huna said in the name of Rav. According to Rashi there is a good novelty in this passage. What Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav comes to teach is that Rav Huna’s view—that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated—is true even against a borrower who claims trust document, not only a borrower who claims payment. That’s the novelty according to Rashi. So according to Rashi it’s clear why there is a novelty here.
[Speaker N] It’s not because “if the document is in my hand,” but because it’s not normal. Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In general it’s because of “if the document is in my hand, what is it doing there?” Here, in the specific case of a trust document, it’s because this is an implausible claim. Okay?
[Speaker A] According to Tosafot—sorry that I bothered so much about Tosafot before—it’s the same thing. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Tosafot it’s not like that. According to Tosafot, trust document and payment are the same. For both reasons, if one admits he wrote the document, it does require validation. Why does it require validation? Because of what we said earlier. Either because the migo is a weak migo—right? Since it’s a migo based on saying “it’s forged,” and you’re afraid to say “it’s forged” because maybe witnesses will come. Or because of what Rashi elsewhere says: that the enactment requiring validation of documents was stated only where the borrower claims forgery, not where the borrower claims payment. Okay? So according to Tosafot, the case of a trust document is basically the ordinary case. So what’s the novelty here?
[Speaker E] By the way, he has a migo that it’s forged, and I’m saying it’s a trust document, so I have a migo—I could have said forged.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So why, according to Tosafot—what’s the novelty here according to Tosafot? According to Tosafot this is the ordinary case. Trust document or not trust document—it’s the same case. The novelty, according to Tosafot, must be the rule itself. The very rule that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated—that is the novelty Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav wanted to state.
[Speaker E] What you said before—that’s in the case of trust document according to Tosafot. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rashi—those two possibilities I mentioned earlier—the first possibility is according to Tosafot, and the second possibility is according to Rashi. According to Tosafot, the novelty of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav is the very rule that if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated. According to Rashi, the novelty is that the rule “if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated” applies also to the claim of trust document and not only to the claim of payment. Okay? The two possibilities I mentioned earlier for explaining Rav Yehuda’s novelty depend on the dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. Okay? So that was Rava. By the way, in Shitah Mekubetzet—I mentioned this to you, I brought you the Shitah Mekubetzet—he writes this. But why does he think the novelty is… he already said it earlier. What do you mean earlier? Earlier in the Talmud? That doesn’t matter—he said it in two cases, so it’s not… When there’s a Mishnah, then you ask: as an amora, what are you coming to teach me? There’s already a Mishnah that says it, or a baraita. But when it’s an amora, the amora states his view on this case and on that case too—it’s okay. Especially since this is Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav, and that is Rav Huna in the name of Rav. So each of them brings Rav’s law in a different case, though it’s the same law.
[Speaker A] Why here, in the case where Rava says we’re dealing with a borrower who isn’t believed, don’t we say that he has “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted”? After all, he could have claimed forgery, right? And in that he would have “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” so why don’t we accept that here? Wait—
[Speaker F] Again. Instead of saying trust document—
[Speaker E] We said he has a migo.
[Speaker F] He has a migo.
[Speaker A] He could have claimed forgery, but he made a worse claim—he claimed it was a trust document.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so we said that. So what’s the question? I don’t understand. Exactly. What’s the question? Isn’t that just like “if one admits that he wrote the document, it need not be validated”? You’re asking why it need not be validated? So we explained in—
[Speaker A] I’m asking why
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he isn’t believed.
[Speaker A] It’s the same thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don’t understand. The borrower not being believed to say “this is a trust document” means that the lender won’t need to validate the document—he can collect with the document. That’s the point. Basically you’re asking why, if one admits he wrote the document, it need not be validated. On that, there are the three explanations of Tosafot in the previous topic. Either because this migo is a weak migo—if he says it’s forged, the other side can come validate it. Or because the enactment requiring validation of documents was not said in the case of a borrower who doesn’t claim forgery. Or Rashi, who says “if the document is in your hand, what is it doing there?”—which doesn’t work here, so Rashi gives another explanation.
[Speaker M] But even if he claimed—I mean, the way the migo falls apart is this: if he claims forgery, and according to Tosafot’s first answer, he claims forgery—I’m afraid to claim forgery lest witnesses come—so I’ll say it’s a trust document. Exactly. Also if they come and say about the document that it’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. If you said “forged,” you can’t then go back and say “it’s a trust document”; you said it was forged.
[Speaker M] The witnesses come—wait—
[Speaker E] Wait—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Stop. I didn’t say forged—I’m saying trust document. As though it’s not a real document. There’s no such thing. He retracts and changes his claim. The point of the migo, as you’re saying, is not what he actually said was forged—it’s what he could have said. If in practice he said forged, then once witnesses come, he’s finished. He can’t say, wait, wait—
[Speaker A] Stop—it’s a trust document, not forged.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no such thing; there’s no “going back and making a different claim.” Once you made one claim, you can’t make another. “Cannot retract and claim differently” applies to the litigant, while “cannot retract and testify differently” applies to witnesses. So that’s the first answer. The second answer is Abaye’s. By the way, this is very interesting here, because it’s a dispute between Abaye and Rava. Seemingly, the Jewish law should follow Rava, but here Rava is not going according to the final Jewish law; he explains it in accordance with Rav Huna said in the name of Rav, which is not the Jewish law. Right? And Abaye actually is the one ruled in practice. Abaye’s answer explains it according to everyone. It is ruled that way in practice. How is it that in a dispute between Abaye and Rava we rule like Abaye? Because it’s not that Abaye is the majority opinion, but because Rava is not stating his own opinion; he is explaining that Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, speaking according to Rav’s position, which is not the practical Jewish law. Rava also agrees that it is not the Jewish law. He is only explaining the statement of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav. He’s not making a halakhic claim; he’s only making an interpretive one, and Abaye offers an interpretation that also remains valid in practice. Okay, so it’s not… The Rif skips this whole passage entirely. The Rif? Of course, because it’s not the practical Jewish law. Right. Abaye said—so now Abaye explains that this is the lender. Rava spoke about the borrower. Abaye said: actually, it means the lender, and it is a case where he harms others, and this follows Rabbi Natan. As it was taught: Rabbi Natan says, from where do we know that if one person is owed a maneh by his fellow, and that fellow is owed a maneh by another fellow, from where do we know that we collect from this one and give to that one? Scripture says: “And he shall give it to the one to whom he is liable.” So he has a verse. Rabbi Natan is essentially stating the following rule, which I can already see will be the topic of the next class. Rabbi Natan says the following: if Shimon owes Reuven money, and Levi owes Shimon money, then Reuven can go to Levi and collect the money from him. And the claim, essentially, is that Levi’s obligation is directly to Reuven, not by way of Shimon. We’ll see that next class, but that’s the basic principle. Does it matter whether we’re talking about two loans? Let’s say for the sake of discussion. We can discuss other cases later. The topic of Rabbi Natan’s lien is a complicated topic; I won’t deal with all of it, but we’ll touch on it next class. Does it matter what the amounts of the loans are, or what is owed? What is owed, yes. It’s not the same loan anyway; that’s not the issue. It’s just a matter of what can be collected—however much I’m owed. So he’s setting up an explanation for how it could happen that the lender would not be believed. Wait—so now, that’s Rabbi Natan’s rule in the background. For our purposes, Abaye says: if so, I have the option to speak about the lender. When the lender says, “This is a trust note,” what did we ask? Why do you say he isn’t believed? Fine, let him say it’s a trust note—great. But no, it could be that he is not believed because he harms someone else. After all, he himself is admitting, as a litigant’s admission, that this is a trust note—he’s shooting himself in the foot, right? That’s a litigant’s admission. We saw in the previous class that a litigant’s admission, where it harms others, is not believed. You can admit something about yourself, not about others. What is the case where he harms others? Let’s say there is someone to whom I owe money, and now I come with—I produce a note against someone, but I say: this is a trust note, he doesn’t owe me money. Why, what comes out of that? That now the person I owe has nothing from which to collect, because this debt, I claim, is not really owed to me. But in this case the lender too—the one they’re coming to—also loses out. We drew this picture, but then he’s really only hurting the first creditor, but he’s also hurting himself. No, he’s not hurting himself, because if he would collect it… So what? Now he said it was a trust note; now it’s written in court that it was a trust note—now go… Is it the same thing? Will he now go back and claim it wasn’t a trust note? No, no. Let’s compare the two possibilities. Suppose I didn’t claim it was a trust note, okay? Then I would collect the hundred from him and pass the hundred on to the second person, the one I owe, and I would remain with zero. Now I said: this is a trust note. What do I remain with? The same zero. Right, zero. So really he’s only doing it in order to hurt the other guy. Right. But he doesn’t lose. That’s called harming someone else. No, why does he remain—what is that called? Harming someone else. Right. He’s a swindler. Really, if it’s a real debt note, I remain with a hundred. No, he remains with zero, because the other one will collect the money from me. Because what? He’ll collect the money from me. Who will collect? Let’s say I’m Shimon, okay? I’m Shimon, and I produce a note against Levi. Now I myself say that the note is a trust note. Okay? I owe Reuven money. I, Shimon, owe Reuven money. Now if I say this is a trust note, Reuven has nothing from which to take money from me; I have no money other than this money. Wait, but Shimon lent—meaning, he lent to Levi—he’s also a borrower, he also owes. Did he lend, or only pretend to lend money? Yes. Now he claims that the note saying people owe him money is a trust note, that they don’t really owe him money. Right, but really it’s not a trust note, it’s a real note—let’s say that’s a possible case—and then it comes out that I don’t repay him the debt, but tomorrow I can collect from Levi. No, it’s a trust note. Once you said it’s a trust note, that’s it; you can’t collect with it. Why should I care? But you can’t collect with it, because you admitted it’s a trust note. You lost the ability to collect with it. You ruined it for yourself. You ruined it for yourself. If you say, “This is a trust note,” it’s gone for you—you burned your own note. Isn’t there a problem here of “a person cannot render himself wicked”? Why, what wickedness? No, I mean, first of all he has a trust note. No, that’s in the third answer; at this point there’s no wickedness yet. Wait, but what happens in court? Do they take that note and write on it, “This is only a trust note; it has no value”? So what are they saying here? I thought that… So that’s what he’s saying: in such a case this is indeed a litigant’s admission, because I am admitting that they don’t owe me, a litigant’s admission—but it is a litigant’s admission that affects a third party. I am not believed to admit something in a place where I am harming someone else. Remember the story of collusion? After all, it could be that Shimon and Levi made a deal. I’ll say this is a trust note, we’ll get Reuven out of the picture so he won’t be able to collect money from me, and afterward you’ll give me fifty. You really owe me a hundred; give me fifty, and then both of us profit. You profit fifty, I profit fifty, and Reuven gets nothing. That’s why he isn’t believed. What? So why don’t we believe him? Wait—so I’m saying: in such a case he is making a litigant’s admission, but he harms someone else. Since that’s the case, we don’t believe him. Because a litigant’s admission is accepted when you hurt yourself, not when you hurt others. That’s what the Gemara says. And what is the practical implication of not believing him? That we don’t believe him that this is a trust note; it’s a real note. And then Shimon will collect from Levi and pay Reuven what he owes him. But what if it really is a trust note? Then what did Levi do wrong? He has a problem. In an ordinary case too, where between two people one claims, “This is a trust note,” what did the other guy do wrong? Nothing at all, but that’s what there is. If the note is valid—if you have no evidence, make sure you do have evidence, or if you trust someone and he’s not trustworthy, then you got burned. Don’t trust people if you haven’t checked it carefully. Meaning, he has no interest in preserving the note for himself, really? After he said, “This is a trust note,” there is no longer any—it’s gone, he burned his own note. Okay? So that’s the second answer. And about that we’ll speak—that is Rabbi Natan’s lien. Third answer: Rav Ashi said, actually, it is the witnesses who are speaking. Until now we saw the borrower, the lender; now it’s the witnesses. And then what did we ask? We asked: if their handwriting does not appear from another source, then they are believed, because they have “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” If their handwriting appears from another source, then it is “cannot retract and testify differently,” right? So the Gemara says: and as for what you said—why are they not believed? It is in accordance with Rav Kahana, for Rav Kahana said: it is forbidden for a person to keep a trust note in his house, as it is said: “Do not let injustice dwell in your tents.” And Rav Sheshet son of Rav Idi said: infer from Rav Kahana that witnesses who say, “Our words were a trust arrangement,” are not believed. What is the reason? Since it is an injustice, they would not sign an injustice. So what does Rav Ashi say? We are dealing with the witnesses. We had a difficulty: what case is this? If their handwriting appears from another source, they aren’t believed. If their handwriting does not appear from another source, then they are believed. So that option—where their handwriting does not appear from another source and they are believed—is not an option here. Rather what? Their handwriting does not appear from another source, okay? Then why shouldn’t they be believed, after all they have “the mouth that prohibited”? So the ruling would come out wrong, because why does it say they are not believed? So he says: because of “Do not let injustice dwell in your tents,” they are not believed. Even though they have “the mouth that prohibited,” we do not accept that claim. I ask: why not? Because a person cannot render himself wicked. Exactly. That’s why I told you to read the continuation too—the “infer from Rav Kahana”—that’s not part of the answer, but it clarifies it. Essentially, on the face of it this is difficult, because on the face of it, two witnesses come and say that this note is a trust note. Okay? Fine, so “Do not let injustice dwell in your tents” means that it’s improper. Exactly. About that the Gemara later says: no, not only is the one who keeps injustice in his tent wicked. Those who sign a trust note are also wicked. And therefore they are not believed to say it was a trust note. A person cannot render himself wicked. What? A person cannot render himself wicked—they cannot testify about themselves that they signed it. Exactly. And since they are rendering themselves wicked, and a person cannot render himself wicked, therefore it says they are not believed. Why not just say that? Why not say that? What do you mean? If they are wicked. If they admit they made such a note—we already got there. No need to get there. If it’s the borrower, then he isn’t believed regardless of the fact that he renders himself wicked. He simply isn’t believed because it goes against the note. But what about the lender? The lender, exactly—why is he not believed? Why not say that? Because with the lender—no, with the lender you can’t say that. Because if the lender says, “This is a trust note,” then what are we going to say to him? “We don’t believe you because you render yourself wicked,” and therefore what? I’m going to give you money against your will even though you don’t want it? Bring a proof that there was a loan—it’s irrelevant. But we’ll talk about the meaning… And therefore what? We’ll force him to take money even though he doesn’t want to? He isn’t claiming the money. In what way is the lack of credibility expressed? Yes. Therefore this can only be with witnesses. Okay? That’s essentially what Rav Ashi is saying, and therefore it is because a person cannot render himself wicked. And notice, this transition is very parallel to what we saw in the previous passage. Because in the previous passage we spoke about coercion due to money versus coercion due to threats to life. Coercion due to money is “a person cannot render himself wicked,” right? Coercion due to threats to life is… sorry, coercion due to money is “a person cannot render himself wicked.” Coercion due to threats to life is “cannot retract and testify differently.” Here it’s exactly the same transition. The Gemara initially starts with this—it says the witnesses. So the Gemara says: why, why shouldn’t they be believed? After all, they have “the mouth that prohibited,” right? So the Gemara says: no, they are rendering themselves wicked. That’s like “we were coerced because of money.” Because “Do not let injustice dwell in your tents” plays the same role. Essentially, you are rendering yourself wicked. But why discuss this issue at all if it is both forbidden and an injustice? Fine, someone is making that claim. The question is what the law is in such a case: do we believe him, do we not believe him? They said it’s an injustice and forbidden. They said it’s an injustice—that’s not the point. The person says about himself: I did an injustice. So what? But I’m still owed money. So judge me afterward for violating the rabbinic prohibition of “Do not let injustice dwell in your tents,” but practically speaking, am I owed the money or not? That’s a legal question. A forged check, a forged check is forbidden… No, with a forged check the problem is not that it’s forbidden to do it; with a forged check the problem is that you are not owed the money. The fact that it is forbidden to do it, that’s civil law… that’s ritual law. I’m asking whether you are actually owed the money. That’s a completely different question. For example, take a security check in a rental apartment. Let’s say the landlord really did collect… you gave a security check in case you cause damage, exactly. So let’s say there was no damage. He may claim there was damage, but let’s say there wasn’t, even theoretically, and now he deposited the check. You come to court: he owes me money; he should not have cashed that check. I gave it to him as a trust arrangement. So what would the law be? Now here I don’t know, meaning… Again? No, but if I tell you: sorry, it’s forbidden in the first place to give a security check. Exactly, so the discussion is over. The discussion is not over, Iris, I explained before. The fact that it is forbidden to give it is not the point. If in practice I gave it, there is room now to discuss whether I am owed the money or not. Afterward they can punish me for violating that prohibition. If someone comes with interest, can he come to court? I gave forged notes or whatever, and now I have some claim. I did something forbidden—why would they discuss it at all? What does that have to do with anything? But you didn’t pay me money; you really owe me money, so bring the money. As for the fact that you did something forbidden by giving me a forged note—for that the police can punish you; I want my debt. Can someone who lent on interest come to court and demand his debt? In principle yes, but the court will not adjudicate it. Right. As for taking the interest back out—fixed interest is recoverable by the judges; they return the interest to the borrower. But non-fixed interest, no. In any case, for our purposes, I just want to finish with one more point: what happens with the borrower? You asked earlier about the previous cases—“a person cannot render himself wicked.” There is one case where this can indeed come into play. If the borrower, not the lender, says “it’s a trust note,” and his signature does not appear from another source. Okay. And then he himself validates the note; he admits the note. Fine? In such a case of admitting the note—in such a case the borrower ostensibly should be believed, right? Because he has “the mouth that prohibited.” “The mouth that prohibited.” Ah, but he renders himself wicked, because he says that he signed a trust note and gave a trust note. So ostensibly I could have explained it as a case where the borrower is speaking, right? And he has “the mouth that prohibited.” So they ask: then why isn’t he believed? He has “the mouth that prohibited.” The Gemara says: no, because a person cannot render himself wicked. No, not his handwriting. He validates the note. The borrower admits that the note is real. Not “our handwriting”—that’s like the witnesses. The borrower says: the note is real, but it is a trust note. So since the borrower is the one who validated the note, he has “the mouth that prohibited.” Right? So if he has “the mouth that prohibited,” then ostensibly he should be believed regarding a trust note, right? So about that it says… So about that I would say: no, he is not believed, because he renders himself wicked, and therefore Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav that he is not believed. Let’s set it up in such a case: the borrower himself admits the note. Now let’s see. If this is according to Rav Nachman, that one who admits a note he wrote must still validate it, then he really does have “the mouth that prohibited,” right? If it’s according to the one who says no validation is needed, then it doesn’t help, because he does not have “the mouth that prohibited”; he isn’t the one validating it, since no validation is needed. So according to Rav Huna said in the name of Rav, that is not the option. But now I’m asking: according to the practical Jewish law, what really is the ruling? In the Gemara they discussed it according to Rav Huna said in the name of Rav—that’s not… But according to the practical ruling, which follows Rav Nachman, that one who admits a note he wrote must validate it, here there is room to discuss it, because on the one hand he has “the mouth that prohibited,” right? If I am the one validating it, then I should be believed. We just saw this in the Gemara, that according to the one who says a note one admits writing must be validated, if I come and say “it was paid,” I am believed—I have “the mouth that prohibited,” I validated the note. So the same should ostensibly be true with a trust note. Okay? Then one could say—not to explain the statement of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav, because that goes according to Rav, Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav. But as a practical matter I am asking: what is the law in such a case? And on this the Gedulei Terumah and the Shulchan Arukh disagree. Okay? Why? If I had said “it was paid,” then according to Rav Nachman I am certainly believed, because in principle it needs validation, and if I helped you out and validated the note, then believe me also that I paid it. But with a trust note, it could be that even Rav Nachman would agree that I am not believed. For example, like Rashi said earlier, because it is not plausible. But why not? Or because a person cannot render himself wicked. Yes? So one could have explained it that way. Let’s say also that their enactment regarding notes was that I would not be believed if I claim it is a trust note. Again. So here too validation of notes is required. Yes, all the explanations we gave earlier. No, that is according to Rav Huna. No, that is according to Rav Huna, who said that one who admits a note he wrote does not need to validate it, but for a trust note maybe he would need validation. But according to Rav Nachman, even for “it was paid” it needs validation, so for a trust note certainly it needs validation. Right. But with a trust note I am really undermining the entire credibility of the note from the outset. Right, but the note is validated; I am validating the note. So I have “the mouth that prohibited.” But I had to validate the note in order to use it. I validated it for you, so accept from me also the claim that it is a trust note. According to Rav Nachman I am ostensibly believed to claim that it is a trust note—why not? Right, I have to be believed. So this is the dispute between the Shulchan Arukh and the… Right, the Shulchan Arukh rules that he is in fact believed. Exactly like the claim “it was paid.” But the Gedulei Terumah says no. Why not? What is the difference between a trust note and “it was paid”? After all, he has “the mouth that prohibited,” doesn’t he? A person cannot render himself wicked. “A person cannot render himself wicked,” like with the witnesses. What would the Shulchan Arukh say to that? After all, that is what the Gedulei Terumah asks against the Shulchan Arukh. Right. So what—why, what would you say to that? After all, a person cannot render himself wicked. What did the Shulchan Arukh answer? Yes. I don’t know. It needs further analysis. It could be—I didn’t search enough, but so far I haven’t found an answer. It could be—I thought of something that may be right, I don’t know. When the witnesses come and say, “This is a trust note,” they are rendering themselves wicked, and we do not accept their testimony, because they cooperated with an act that is forbidden. The borrower may have made the trust note because he needed money. Now true, it may be forbidden to do that, but you can’t say that a person who does this is wicked to such an extent that I will not accept the fact that he renders himself wicked. Maybe—and that could perhaps be an explanation. Now in the Gemara itself, the Shakh argues against the Gedulei Terumah that from the Gemara itself it is proven like the Shulchan Arukh. How is it proven like the Shulchan Arukh? That a trust note is like “it was paid.” The borrower is believed to say “trust note” just as he would be believed to say “it was paid.” I think he means exactly what I said earlier. Because if that were not so, then the statement of Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav could have been explained as referring to the borrower. Then we would say that the note does not need validation. Wait, sorry, wait. No, then it’s impossible. Impossible. The fact is that the Gemara does not explain it as the borrower—why? Because apparently with the borrower he really is believed, and we do not say “a person cannot render himself wicked.” That is the proof for the Shulchan Arukh. What would the Gedulei Terumah answer to that? That we do not rule in practice like Rav. Exactly. We are looking for an explanation of Rav’s view; Rav holds that for a trust note, with a note in his own handwriting, it need not be validated, and therefore they did not explain it as referring to the borrower. So what does that prove? Okay? That is the practical ruling according to Rav. Thank you very much.