Ketubot, Chapter 2, Lesson 6

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. No, I’m asking the question: what options are available to the religious court? And then he used the “the mouth that forbade” principle to decide between the two. But what are the two alternatives facing the religious court? Both of them… like in migo, only… no. No, no, no. They accept half of what you said. Exactly, that’s the difference. The two alternatives facing the religious court are either to accept half of what I’m saying or to accept all of what I’m saying. And I’m saying to the religious court: listen, I had the alternative of saying something else entirely, so I’m asking you to accept everything I’m saying, right? That’s what I’m asking. And not just half. In migo, the two alternatives the religious court is struggling between are either not to accept what I’m saying or yes to accept what I’m saying. So I’m saying—in other words, you, the religious court, in any case intend to accept half of what I’m saying. So what kind of thing is it to accept the half that goes against me and not accept… either I’m lying or… if I’m lying, then don’t believe me that it belonged to his ancestors either. I’m a pathological liar. So it didn’t belong to his ancestors, there was nothing.

[Speaker D] I saw in “the mouth that forbade” a kind of cause and effect. I told you both the fact and what happened. Meaning, I gave you a credible story that has a process, that has a chain of events. Okay. In migo I don’t have that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In migo it’s… it’s the same thing I’m saying here. In other words, you’re basically saying: don’t accept the first stage of the chain of events without accepting the second stage. Same thing.

[Speaker D] That’s what I said.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you just presented it to me a little differently. Okay. So that’s one formulation. It could also be formulated… in my opinion it’s the same thing, but in a slightly different way. Look. I admitted that it belonged to his ancestors only on condition that you also accept that I received… that I bought it. Yes, more precisely I’m saying: if you don’t accept that, then I retract my admission. In other words, my whole admission is a package deal. I’m willing to admit that it belonged to his ancestors as long as that’s part of the story. The story is that afterward I also took it from them, I bought it from them. If you don’t accept that I bought it from them, then I also don’t admit that it belonged to his ancestors. In other words, I… as to what exactly I admitted: you can’t take more out of my admission than what I admitted. Can I retract the admission? What? No, obviously not. This is all a hypothetical process.

[Speaker C] Here the two things depend on each other. Here it’s either-or. Here it’s a choice. In migo…

[Speaker E] Also, why should the religious court take only the half that goes against him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, there is a certain logic to that—just a second—there is a certain logic to it, because what goes against me is a litigant’s admission, so the religious court accepts it, and what goes in my favor—why should the religious court accept that? I’m not deemed credible regarding what works in my favor. It’s not as implausible as I made it sound before. But still, that’s the idea of “the mouth that forbade.” The idea of “the mouth that forbade” is that I never made a litigant’s admission at all that it belonged to his ancestors. A litigant’s admission is an admission—let me put it differently—a litigant’s admission is an admission where a person comes to hurt himself, right? And I’m saying: who hurts himself? If you hurt yourself, apparently you’re really telling the truth, because a person doesn’t lie in order to hurt himself. But here I made the litigant’s admission not in order to hurt myself. After all, I admitted it in order to win. I said: it belonged to his ancestors, and I bought it. So if you don’t see that as a litigant’s admission, then don’t accept any of it. What I said here is like “whoever says, ‘I did not borrow,’ is as though he said, ‘I did not repay,'” which we talked about in one of the previous classes. After all, I didn’t really come to hurt myself; I said, ‘I didn’t borrow at all.’ In the end it turned out to hurt me because I admitted that I didn’t repay after witnesses came that there had been a loan, but when I came, I did not come with the motivation of hurting myself. So that consideration doesn’t apply here—that I must really be telling the truth because a person does not just hurt himself. I didn’t hurt myself. I made a claim by virtue of which I was supposed to win. Now you want to take from that one part that I admitted and accept it, and another part not to accept. But that part I would never have said at all—I said it as part of a story meant to make me win, so therefore you

[Speaker D] are not supposed to accept it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s basically the idea—one possible way of explaining the idea of “the mouth that forbade.” And it also seems to me that this is actually different from migo in that, as we said, migo can be used from the outset, and the person knows that if he uses migo, then he will win.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So here, basically, that option doesn’t exist. What does that mean? Why? Why? Using a migo here gains him nothing from speaking. With a migo, he gains something if he knows in advance that if he says it—why? In the end he gains, he’ll win that way. Because a person knows that with migo, the weaker claim is actually strong because he has a migo in his favor. And here he has “the mouth that prohibited” in favor of the weaker claim—what’s the difference? No, but if I say nothing at all, that’s even better for me. Fine, so he said: what’s better for me, to say “it’s mine and I bought it,” or to say nothing at all? I’m saying it could be that precisely because saying nothing would have been better for me than saying “it’s mine,” that’s exactly what creates the migo. It could be that I’m doing a double-reverse and saying: no, no, I’m making the less advantageous claim because I know that the consideration that I could have made a better claim will work in my favor as a migo. Now I’m already sticking with this line, which is a different line; I’m saying that the very consideration that exists in migo seemingly exists here too. No, what did I gain by speaking? By the fact that now I have evidence in my favor. If I had said nothing, then he would have been against me and I would have won, but I would have won without being sure I was right. If I had said nothing, one of us would have been lying; I’m in possession, so I win, right? That’s how I would have won. Now there is “the mouth that prohibited,” which proves that I’m also right. I win because there’s evidence that I’m right. That’s better—I come out better than if someone had simply said nothing.

In Rashi there might perhaps be room to hesitate, because in Rashi I could have kept quiet, and if I had kept quiet no one would have said I was lying; the discussion would never have opened at all, he wouldn’t have sued me. So in Rashi maybe there is room to say that in “the mouth that prohibited” this consideration that exists regarding migo doesn’t really appear at all.

So what does Maimonides really mean in his complete claim? That yes, he’s telling the truth, he’s telling the truth—we’re right. I said, as I said before, that I gave Maimonides’ explanation of migo according to the third explanation there, and the fourth explanation maybe fits even more naturally. I’m saying that in the end Maimonides is basically saying that with migo I’m using migo to allow a person to tell the truth—to avoid forcing him to lie. I’m saying to him: here, don’t worry, we’ll accept your testimony in full. Say all the details, everything is fine, we’ll accept everything that—you won’t lose out by adding details. Why? Because we accept the testimony in full. Meaning: here, you added details for us, and you didn’t lose by that, okay? We accept everything, there’s no problem. Fine, that too can be said in Maimonides here.

In any case, that’s the additional explanation. You need to understand: in the explanation—what’s the difference between the previous explanation and this one? In the previous explanation, “the mouth that prohibited” does not grant credibility. It’s not like “the mouth that prohibited.” It says: don’t use the power he received from me against me. That’s a procedural consideration. The whole victory of possession—so I say: victory by possession is a procedural victory. So he says: here procedure can’t operate against me; after all, I established that procedure, right? That was the previous explanation. So that doesn’t mean I’m right. There’s no proof here in my favor, yes? It only says that procedure here has to work in my favor and not in yours.

This explanation also has a conceptual dimension. It says: look, what do you think? If I’m lying, then don’t accept the first part either; therefore that proves that you’re supposed to conclude that I’m telling the truth about everything. That’s a consideration that can also be understood on the evidentiary plane. It clarifies reality—yes, exactly—or clarifies, as it were, that I’m speaking truthfully. We spoke about migo as speaking about the person and not about reality, but yes, it’s some kind of evidence in my favor, unlike the previous explanation, which only says: look, you can’t use power against me. Here it’s not that you can’t use power against me; it’s evidence in my favor. Because either way—if you decide that I’m lying, then I’m lying about everything, so then it also wasn’t his father’s, and again I win. And if you think I’m telling the truth, then accept everything I say, so I bought it, and again I win. So either way I win. Logic says—it’s simply a logical consideration—that in any case I win. Okay.

Nechama, you wanted to comment on something earlier? No, I thought it was a bit tangential. Because here it’s clear—the moral principle is really very strong here, because in principle there’s no reasoning that says you can’t split testimony. There is “we split the statement,” but in principle there’s no—we do have “we split the statement,” but in principle testimony is specifically not split. There isn’t half-testimony. And in “we split the statement,” that’s what the medieval authorities (Rishonim) write: “we split the statement” when I testify about myself, then the part I testified about myself is not said at all. Only in that case. Only in that case. If I testify, for example, about a relative—half the testimony—and half the testimony about someone else, there is no splitting of testimony. Either all of it is accepted or all of it is not accepted. On the contrary, the rule is that there is no half-testimony. But the question here is whether this is testimony or not testimony—we spoke…

Yes, okay, once I see this on the evidentiary plane, then I relate to it as some kind of type like testimony—obviously not testimony—but wait, Rabbi Akiva Eiger says something else. Wait, we’ll get to that in a moment. Rabbi Akiva Eiger speaks about an oath, not about the case of land. We’re talking about land right now. No, I was referring to the fact that we’re discussing what “the mouth that prohibited” is at all… No, the reverse, the reverse—Rabbi Akiva Eiger talks only about prohibitions and not about monetary law. What I just said is only about monetary law. Yael? No, from this explanation of “we split the statement,” yes… No, what I’m saying is that here, what I’m really claiming in the last explanation is that “the mouth that prohibited” basically says: don’t split my words. Either you accept all of them or you accept none of them. Now if you accept none of them, I win. And if you accept all of it, I win. So either way I win. You are choosing this bizarre option of accepting one part and not the other, in a way that leaves me stuck. What’s the idea?

Now here it’s a logical consideration, not a power consideration. Either you accept it or you don’t accept it; it’s a logical point. Either way. But the court has no more reason to believe one part than… Exactly. Either you believe everything or you believe nothing. Why are you selectively choosing what to believe and what not to believe just in order to nail me? Now here it’s a logical consideration—that’s one side.

So Nechama said: wait, but there is a topic in the world called “we split the statement.” The topic of “we split the statement” is that many times there’s a situation where a person makes some claim or gives some testimony, and we accept part of the testimony and don’t accept the second part. Okay? For example, someone testifies: “So-and-so lent me money at interest,” and as the borrower at interest I make myself wicked. It’s forbidden to lend at interest, not only to borrow. Okay? So the question is whether to accept the testimony, in which case I’m accepting testimony about himself—but a person cannot make himself wicked—or not to accept it at all, in which case I also won’t accept the testimony that he lent at interest, not even regarding him, because the testimony has two parts: if you don’t accept the first part, don’t accept the second, and vice versa.

So there the Talmud says that we do “we split the statement.” We accept the testimony about him but not the testimony about me. Meaning, he lent at interest—but not to me? To someone else, I don’t know. But what’s this dynamic? Why in that mechanism do we believe one part—or half—and not the other half, whereas here in “the mouth that prohibited” we don’t? But why? So that’s what I’m talking about; I’m explaining it now. That was exactly Nechama’s comment: why here do we divide under “we split the statement,” and here in “the mouth that prohibited” I say, wait, either way—what are you dividing? Either believe everything or believe nothing. That goes against “we split the statement.”

I’m saying: first, here he is a litigant and not a witness; this is a claim, not testimony. And second, “we split the statement” is in the laws of testimony, not in the laws of claims; here I’m making claims. But beyond that—it’s much more so. Because with “we split the statement,” let’s say I had said: “So-and-so lent my brother money at interest.” Now I’m not believed even on the part about my brother, because I’m his relative. I can’t testify about my brother. Here they would not do “we split the statement.” Here they would invalidate everything. Because if part of it falls, all of it falls. If part of the testimony is invalid, all of it is invalid. We don’t divide testimony. So why when I testify about myself do we? So the Ra’avad and the Rosh explain, in one of the explanations in Makkot, one of the Rosh’s explanations is that when I testify about myself, it simply isn’t entered in the protocol. It isn’t testimony at all. It wasn’t said in court. Only the second half remains. It’s not that half was invalidated. Half isn’t testimony at all. When a person speaks about himself, that isn’t testimony. You speak about your brother—that is invalid testimony. Once half is invalid, everything is invalid. But when you speak about yourself… about yourself, that’s a claim, not testimony. So here you have half claim and half testimony. So it isn’t that one invalidates the other; rather, half isn’t accepted, isn’t entered into the protocol as testimony. Only the second half remains, and that second half is accepted.

And from that we see that the Ra’avad and the Rosh say that in principle we really do not divide claims and testimonies. Here specifically, because half is not testimony at all but a claim, it is simply erased from the protocol, it isn’t entered. But in a place where something composite is entered into the protocol, we have to decide about the whole thing; we don’t divide. Either all of it is believed or none of it is believed. So now we come back to our case of “the mouth that prohibited.” Therefore here too it’s the same. But here too the possessor of the land is a litigant in a very… No, obviously—I said the similarity is external. We don’t enter it at all as testimony, we enter it as a claim. But all of it is claim. There’s no half-testimony and half-claim here; all of it is claim. So why not enter nothing—not the beginning and not the end? We enter it as a claim, not as testimony. In the protocol there appears what the parties are claiming, and also what testimonies there were. But if here it’s entered as one unit, then in that sense here too I won’t divide it—just as testimony that is entered, I don’t divide. Only where one statement is half testimony and half claim do I say, fine, the testimony half I can accept, because the claim half is unrelated; it isn’t measured by the same terms of evidence, of testimony. So the topic of “we split the statement” proves the opposite. It proves that in principle we do not split a statement. Only specifically there, in that particular case, do we make a division. And if so, then that is exactly “the mouth that prohibited” here. Meaning, either you accept my claim or you don’t accept it; you can’t accept half and reject another half. Okay?

Okay, so this is “the mouth that prohibited,” and his claim is weak because I’m not… Is the fact that I claim “it was his father’s” because of the plaintiff? Yes, because of the plaintiff. I didn’t understand. The fact that I say that the land belonged to the father—I’m basically repeating the plaintiff’s words. Correct, but what I say has evidentiary weight. When I admit that it belonged to his father, that is admission by a litigant. When he says it belonged to his father, that is a claim. He can claim that, and I can also claim that the moon belonged to my father—so what? That says nothing to the court. We don’t know that it belonged to his ancestors—he says it did. Okay, so he said it.

Wait, but your admission that it belonged to your father—here too, why believe the first part? Why yes? Believe me—you believe me that it belonged to his father? Because if you wouldn’t believe me, then the fact that he says it means nothing. It doesn’t make him the prior owner. Only because I admit to him, by admission of a litigant, that it belonged to his father, do you believe him that it belonged to his father. So believe me also that I bought it from his father. But didn’t we ever say whether admission by a litigant is like a claim or like testimony? It’s neither. There’s a dispute about that. I mentioned it—the question is whether it’s credibility or some other mechanism.

Meaning, if someone comes and I say, yes, it belonged to your father, does it immediately pass to him? Not pass to him, but he becomes the prior owner. Now we need to discuss evidence, but in principle he becomes the prior owner, meaning he has the power to win if there is no evidence. But he got that from me. The fact that he makes claims does not make him the prior owner. He said it belonged to his father—so what? He becomes the prior owner, and then if some third party comes, then he is the prior owner? Yes, if the prior owner brings two witnesses. If not—if I admit by admission of a litigant, admitting that it belonged to his ancestors—then now it is established as having belonged to his ancestors. And suppose that my claim that I bought it from his ancestors is not accepted for some reason; somehow they did split it, they did not accept my “mouth that prohibited.” Now someone else comes and claims the land from him. He will now have the status of prior owner because he now has evidence that it belonged to his ancestors—my admission by a litigant. It’s not entirely smooth; here I’m fudging a little because this is an admission by a litigant that harms others, so it’s a bit problematic, but never mind—in principle, yes. Okay?

Good. So you have to understand that the first two explanations—I brought four explanations for the advantage of “the mouth that prohibited.” The first explanation is that it has a stronger “why would I lie.” The second explanation is that it succeeds in generating possession even against stable possession. That relates to the plane of the power of the claim. The first two explanations see “the mouth that prohibited” as an upgraded migo—either in the power of the claim or in its “why would I lie.”

The second two explanations that I brought—the third and the fourth—do not look at “the mouth that prohibited” as migo. Rather, it is either an argument of “don’t use the power I gave you against me,” or an argument of “either way, either accept everything or accept nothing.” Those are not mechanisms of migo, but completely different mechanisms. And that is exactly the discussion of the Machaneh Ephraim and many later authorities (Acharonim) deal with it. Even though there is very little proof either way—I don’t really accept the proofs they usually bring to this inquiry—but it’s an inquiry that many later authorities make on the question of whether “the mouth that prohibited” is an upgraded migo or something else. What they mean is basically whether one of the first two explanations is correct or one of the second two explanations is correct. Is “the mouth that prohibited” an upgraded migo—that’s the first two explanations—or not, is it a completely different mechanism apart from migo, of course. In “the mouth that prohibited” there is also migo, that is obvious. The first two explanations are certainly true. The question is whether they are the whole advantage. Clearly it is also migo. In other words, there is no dispute about that. The question is whether it is only migo or whether there is something more there beyond that.

Another point—perhaps in Rashi; I also noted this. On the one hand Rashi says that “the mouth that prohibited” is only a migo of “I could have remained silent.” Meaning: when you don’t know to sue without me, then if I had remained silent and said nothing, you wouldn’t have come to sue at all. That’s not exactly migo. It’s actually somewhat questionable how far this really is migo, just by definition, even before the explanations. Because migo means that a case was opened and I could have lied better. Here I’m saying that it was in my power not to open the case at all. One could perhaps see this as a very strong migo, but it is highly doubtful how much this is migo, because it is not an alternative claim through which I would have lied and gotten the power of that claim or something of that kind, or that it proves something. Rather, I created this discussion—what do you want from me?

I’ll just bring one example for the matter. The Rosh in tractate Bava Batra, chapter three, speaks about “it was in his power.” “In his power” means if he can with his own hands create it—say someone comes and says, “Your pure foods became impure.” Your terumah is impure. Now that’s a big loss because he can’t use the terumah—say he’s a priest or something, yes? So he can’t use the terumah because it is impure. So they say there, there is a possibility to say that he is fully believed, even though this is one witness and apparently he is causing monetary loss to the priest—but he could have made the terumah impure himself, simply by taking something. If he wanted to cause the priest loss, he could have just done it with his own hands.

The Rosh writes there that this seems like migo, right? If I wanted to make the pure foods impure, I would have made them impure by hand. It’s not that I could have lied, but that I could have achieved the result in another way that depended only on me, okay? A bit like power of claim. The Rosh says this is a stronger migo than ordinary migo. In ordinary migo you still need the court—you would make the other claim, and the court would rule in your favor. Here you could simply create the situation with your own hands, independent of the court. So that is a much stronger claim. The question is whether such a thing is called a stronger migo, or whether it is a completely different mechanism. Once I created the situation, then I am the all-powerful ruler over it—as it were, I did everything here, I can do everything here, I’m the only master of the house. If I’m the only master here, what are you beginning to discuss whether I am believed or not believed? We’re not even in that arena. I could have done whatever I wanted here; everything is in my hands. Okay?

So here, in a certain sense, the later explanations—according to Rashi—the migo of “I could have remained silent” is to some degree this. After all, I could have—I couldn’t have argued some other claim in court that they would have ruled in my favor. I seated the court here altogether—you and the court together. Without me you wouldn’t even be here.

It reminds me a little—you know in legal systems there’s a controversial tort claim called wrongful life. Meaning, if I want to sue my parents for not having an abortion. I was born very sick, I suffer all my life, I don’t know, all kinds of such reasons, and I sue my parents: why didn’t you have an abortion? And let’s say the doctor told them and they decided not to have the abortion—because there are also suits against doctors: why didn’t you tell my parents this was the situation, and they would have had an abortion? I’m suing the doctor. In many legal systems in the world they accept—not all, but some legal systems accept—a kind of such tort claim against the doctor if he didn’t tell the parents. But there are a few legal systems in the world that even accept a claim against the parents: why didn’t you abort me?

Now one of the arguments against that suit is an argument of “the mouth that prohibited.” Meaning, it basically says this: if your parents had aborted you, you wouldn’t be here. The fact that you are standing here suing them is only because they didn’t have an abortion—they constituted you. Meaning, they are the ones by whose merit you are here. And now you want to saw off the branch on which you are sitting—actually standing—not sitting, standing here in court. It’s a kind of argument. It’s not migo; understand that it’s not migo. It’s not migo of “I could have…” What could I have? Nothing. But what, do the parents have a migo that they could have not brought you into the world? But that is what you wanted—that they not bring you into the world. What kind of migo is that? It’s not a migo argument, but an argument that says: if I created you, you can’t use that against me. What—you can sue me using the power that I gave you, your very existence in this case, to sue me? After all, it’s because of me that you are even here and able to sue. Meaning, if I hadn’t done that, you wouldn’t be here and able to sue. That’s the third explanation, but not morally—right, exactly.

And here it comes up—I’m saying Rashi’s explanation of the migo of “I could have remained silent” connects in a certain way with the third explanation that says: listen, it’s not only that you got the power from me; I created you, ex nihilo. You wouldn’t be here without me—you wouldn’t be here legally, of course, without me. If I hadn’t said that it belonged to your parents, you yourself wouldn’t have known that, you wouldn’t be here. This is really wrongful life. I created the discussion. Created you, and now you raise a sword against me. Okay?

But if, say, a person admits he owes money from some kind of positive emotional place, and afterward—as if, meaning no one knew this, right? He volunteers this information on his own—can one now demand of him that he prove that he didn’t, I don’t know, do whatever? No. No. “The mouth that prohibited”—exactly “the mouth that prohibited.” He could have not testified about the murder at all. Therefore you can’t now suspect him of being the murderer. “Bring evidence that you’re not the murderer.” Because if I hadn’t come and said that there had been a murder, you wouldn’t have begun asking me and investigating; there would have been no discussion. Is that true legally too? Certainly, certainly—legally. Yes, yes, correct. If there’s no… What do you mean legally? In Israeli law? I’m not expert in the legal world, but in Jewish law that’s how it works. In Jewish law that’s how it works. I don’t know. If there’s no body or if there’s no… in front of our eyes? What? If there’s no reconstruction. Otherwise maybe it’s not “the mouth that prohibited.” That’s Rashi and Tosafot, depends. It has nothing to do with a body at all.

Wait, I have a question. The very fact that, say according to Rashi, the very fact that a person didn’t speak. Fine, suppose he didn’t speak. Okay. He is silent, doesn’t raise the issue at all. Does that fact contain some mark of migo? Meaning, he remains… If he had remained silent, then no migo would be needed at all; he would simply win because there would be no claim. Okay. The migo always happens when he does not remain silent, because I could have remained silent. That gives me the migo. But if he had actually remained silent, he would win because there is no claim.

So you’re claiming, as it were, a better claim. If Bibi hadn’t brought the recording of Nir Hefetz, there would have been no Case 4000. Okay. Okay, so what. So you’re asking whether he has “the mouth that prohibited” there? Because it’s evidence, basically. No, he doesn’t have “the mouth that prohibited” there. Why? Simple. Because he took the bribe. Come on, what are you saying? Right, because he took it. Because maybe what the testimony says… The question is excellent. Let’s sharpen the point. Why doesn’t Bibi have “the mouth that prohibited”? After all, he brought the recording—how can you accuse him on the basis of that recording? Because it’s evidence. But it serves as evidence against him. Exactly. Meaning, after all, when I told you “it belonged to your ancestors,” I also said—it’s a note with its cancellation alongside it—I also said that I bought it from them. Fine, it belonged to your ancestors, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t mine. I only have to prove that I bought it. So if I’m the one who creates the burden of proof against myself, don’t impose the burden of proof on me—I claim that I bought it.

Bibi isn’t making a claim that exempts him. He’s saying “it belonged to your ancestors,” period. Bibi says: I made a deal and it’s a legitimate deal. That has to be examined on the legal plane—whether it’s a legitimate deal or not. But assuming that legally the deal is not legitimate, it doesn’t help that you brought the evidence. That’s exactly what I said in the previous class: if this were on the evidentiary plane, there would be no room for the third explanation. Because on the evidentiary plane, if we… if you bring me evidence that it’s yours, then why should I care that you brought it? Here it is, it’s yours; there is evidence that it’s mine. That’s exactly the point. Good—that’s a beautiful proof. That’s “the field belonged to your ancestors.” That’s saying “the field is mine because I bought it from them.” Exactly. Without saying that you bought it from them. Exactly. Right. Exactly. So I say: then we won’t use it because I said it? There’s no such thing. It’s like possession without a claim. It might make me a possessor, but I’m not claiming anything. It belonged to your ancestors—and what? Fine, then take it. Therefore Bibi said, “I brought you the recording.” Right, good for him. But what does the recording say? The recording says you gave a bribe. Or not—I’m saying that has to be examined legally. But if legally they reach the conclusion that it is a bribe, then it doesn’t help that there is “the mouth that prohibited” here. That’s exactly the point. And it has to be…

What? And that doesn’t help either. There is no “the mouth that permitted” here. Exactly. No, there is no “the mouth that permitted.” The rule is: “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” That is exactly—not, again, another nice point. The rule is: “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” Therefore don’t accept only the prohibition of the mouth and not the permission of the mouth. But with Bibi you have the mouth that prohibited and you do not have the mouth that permitted—he did not permit. So we accept the mouth that prohibited, and there is no “either way,” for example. What will he say? “You accept the testimony but you don’t accept what?” Your legal interpretation? Your legal interpretation is irrelevant. We will decide what the correct legal interpretation is. That’s unrelated.

If he had claimed some claim—yes, “I recorded this recording, but I fabricated it. It doesn’t reflect the truth at all. It’s edited.” That would be something else. That would be “the mouth that prohibited.” Because then we would say: ah, if you yourself who brought the recording say that it’s fabricated, we can’t use the recording against you. But if you say, “I brought the recording and therefore acquit me”—what do you mean? The recording says that you took a bribe. Or gave a bribe, sorry.

What’s the difference from when someone was a witness to a murder and they want to examine whether maybe you were a partner in the murder? What’s the difference? Because I say that I wasn’t a partner in the murder. That already says… No, no. He says nothing. He says nothing. Wait, Iris. Iris, he says nothing. What do you say? Did you murder or not? You… he has to claim no, that’s it. So you say: but maybe you collaborated? Maybe you didn’t do it? You collaborated? You collaborated? What do you say? He has to give a version.

Okay. The first Mishnah—on the contrary, Rabbi Yehoshua always says, “We do not live by his mouth.” Yes, correct. But in “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” we do live by his mouth… Exactly, exactly, exactly. I said—I said this in the class before last—that “the mouth that prohibited,” meaning “we do not live by his mouth” in the previous Mishnayot, exactly precedes Rabbi Yehoshua’s concession in “the mouth that prohibited.” He comes to say: with migo, “we do not live by his mouth,” therefore I disagree with you. In contrast, in the next Mishnah I concede to you in “the mouth that prohibited,” because there we do live by his mouth. And that really, I think, is a very strong expression in favor of the last two explanations. Because in the last two explanations it is really exactly the claim: by my mouth you live—how can you use that against me? After all, I gave you this ammunition. And the expression is very, very strong in that direction. Okay?

Good. Now the Talmud on page 22a—there is a Mishnah there, and here again it’s the same idea. “A woman who said: I was a married woman, and I am divorced, is believed, because the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted. And if there are witnesses that she was a married woman, and she says: I am divorced, she is not believed.”

Again: the woman prohibited—she made herself into a married woman—and afterward says, yes, but I got divorced. So “the mouth that prohibited” and the mouth also permitted. Now the question is what to do with this—again, all the “either ways,” all the explanations I have given until now, exist here too, right? In the Mishnah on page 22. Yes. “She said: I was taken captive, and I am pure”—same idea. “I was taken captive,” I assumed she is impure, but since she is the source for the fact that she was taken captive—we didn’t see, we have no witnesses that she was taken captive—so she also says that she is pure; it’s the note with its cancellation alongside it. So if she prohibited and she permitted, then everything is fine. “She is believed, because the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted. And if there are witnesses that she was taken captive, and she says: I am pure, she is not believed.” Why? Because there are witnesses that she was taken captive, so “we do not live by her mouth.” Exactly, right, that’s exactly the idea of “we do not live by her mouth.” We know that she was taken captive on the basis of witnesses, so she is no longer the mouth that prohibited, and therefore we do not accept the permission she gives. Okay?

There the Talmud says: Rav Assi said, from where in the Torah do we know “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted”? As it is stated: “I gave my daughter to this man as a wife.” “To a man” prohibited her; “this” permitted her. Right? “I gave my daughter to a man”—“to a man” basically means some man, which could be anyone. What? No, no, no—it turns her into a married woman and she is forbidden to the whole world. Right? Not only that—we also don’t know to whom she is forbidden. Right, he hasn’t yet said to whom. Then suddenly he says, “to this one.” So he permitted her to that specific husband; to others she is forbidden. And from this the Talmud says: if he was believed to prohibit—because if there were witnesses that she is a married woman and now he says, yes, and married to this one, that would not be “the mouth that prohibited.” But if he is the source of the information that she is married at all, and he also says she is married to this man, that is really “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” Okay?

So also in the phrase “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” and also in this example, you very, very strongly sense this “either way.” You cannot accept my words by halves; either you accept everything I say, or you accept nothing I say. Right. Now here, notice, it’s not so much the third explanation; it’s more the fourth explanation. The third explanation, which says “don’t use what I gave you against me”—here it’s not a question of against me or not against me; here we aren’t speaking about against me or not against me, but rather: don’t accept my words by halves. Meaning, if you accept the “to a man,” accept also the “this,” or don’t accept either of them. I think the fourth explanation comes out very strongly from here—also in the wording “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” So either you accept what this mouth says or you don’t accept it, but you can’t accept the prohibition and not accept the permission. Okay?

On that the Talmud says: why do I need a verse? It’s logical. It’s logic. He prohibited her and he permitted her. Why do we need a verse? You’re learning it from a verse? It’s simple logic. I would say that even without the verse. By the way, one could discuss here—fine, the verse teaches this logic, what’s the problem? When there is a verse, does that mean there is no logic? If we learn it from a verse, fine, but the verse says it—why did it say it? Apparently there is also some logic in it, otherwise why would the verse say it? So the fact that there is—but when there is a verse, it makes it stronger, Torah-level… Everything is Torah-level; logic too is Torah-level. Yes. That is the Talmud’s assumption: why do I need a verse? It’s logical. Otherwise there would be no question. “Why do I need a verse?” To make it Torah-level? On the contrary—that’s what the medieval and later authorities bring as proof from this question: that something that emerges from logic has the status of Torah-level, because otherwise this question has no place. Why do I need a verse to make it Torah-level? What do you mean why do I need a verse? Meaning then why… why not? I mean…

The Talmud asks “why do I need a verse? It’s logical.” The Talmud says: true, rather, the verse was said for something else—slandering a yavam, not important—and this indeed comes from logic. That is the Talmud’s conclusion. Why is it Torah-level? What? Why is it Torah-level? Because logic is Torah-level. When we interpret a verse, we use our reason. And if we say this is not from a verse but from logic—the reasoning that if he prohibited her, then he permitted her—that’s reason. This logic tells me how judicial procedure is conducted. It says, “Judge your fellow with justice.” What is justice? How do we judge? So these rules interpret the verse “Judge your fellow with justice.”

Now, a verse never says anything without the interpretation attached to it. Meaning, a verse has content only when you interpret it. Therefore you cannot disconnect your interpretation of the verse from the verse itself. If only the verse itself were Torah-level but the interpretations were rabbinic, there would be no Torah-level laws in the Torah. When there is a verse—but if there is no verse? But there is a verse here: “Judge your fellow with justice.” We just understand through logic what “justice” means. Justice is, for example, “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” You don’t need a verse that teaches this principle itself. You need a verse that requires judging justly, according to the laws of evidence, according to fair and reasonable rules. So “justice” is logic—as if, when I use reason? Morality, legal logic, yes. And that’s called from the Torah? Yes. Therefore this logic is logic that explains to me what it means to judge justly—but the Torah says to judge justly. So therefore this is interpretive logic. Okay?

I’m saying: there is logic that creates laws, not interprets existing laws, and there it’s not at all clear whether it’s Torah-level or rabbinic—that’s a more complicated story. But here I think the assumption is that it interprets the verse “Judge your fellow with justice.” But you don’t need a verse telling me the principle of “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.” That’s what the Talmud asks. Obviously, it’s very logical that this is so—that’s what it means to judge justly. So what’s the problem? It’s already written “Judge your fellow with justice”; why do I need another verse? So as I said: even something that has logic—even something written in a verse, sorry—that doesn’t mean it has no explanation. It has a verse because it is true for some reason; therefore the verse says it. That is true. But if this is logic interpreting “Judge your fellow with justice,” then we already have the verse “Judge your fellow with justice”; we don’t need another verse for this. Therefore the Talmud asks: so why do we need the verse “I gave my daughter to this man”? No—it asks why; it says that from “I gave my daughter to this man” they really learn something else; they don’t learn it from there. So why a verse, why at all? You don’t need this verse. It is enough that it says “Judge your fellow with justice.” Why do I need that verse? But still, then they ask: why do I need a verse—it’s logic. Right. So it says: rather, when the verse is needed, it is needed according to Rav Huna, for something else. They learn something else from this verse. Why do I need a verse? Why? It does answer. You really don’t need the verse, only the logic. “The mouth that prohibited” comes from logic. He asks: what do we do with the verse? The verse teaches another law.

I wanted to say—not the whole verse, this extra word. “This,” yes. Fine, that’s what we’re talking about. But it’s the reverse. As if—if why—because I don’t see that the verse is about something. Why? If the verse is extra, then you have to learn something else from it. Not the whole verse, only one word from the verse. It doesn’t matter; I call that “a verse.” That word in the verse is extra. So if it’s extra for here, then we need to find what to do with it, and so we learn another law from it. What’s the problem? Very often in the Talmud it works like that. Isn’t it usually the other way—I derive from the verse something I wouldn’t derive from plain logic? Here too it’s the same. I learn from the verse the law that one cannot slander a yavam. I learn another law. Right? That other law is not something I would have derived from logic. It doesn’t matter. I have to do something with this verse that doesn’t come from logic alone. That “something else” can be either my own principle in a context that doesn’t come from logic, or another principle for which I have no other source. It doesn’t matter; there are many examples in both directions.

Okay. So that’s what the Talmud says, and therefore in the bottom line it comes from logic. This is also an interesting comment regarding the source of migo. If you had seen the Beit Yaakov—I brought you the Beit Yaakov; we’ll speak about it in a moment. But there is first of all a comment here that Rabbi Akiva Eiger makes. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says that in the case of “I was taken captive and I am pure,” which is not a monetary case but a case of prohibition, right? Not the monetary one. He says: here there is something completely different. Since the basis for why we accept her words at all, that she was taken captive, is not by virtue of testimony—she is not witnessing to that matter—but rather because of self-imposed prohibition. Meaning, a person who prohibits something upon himself, or prohibits himself, is believed. Why? Believed not in the sense that we accept that this is the fact, but rather if he wants to prohibit himself, let him prohibit himself; we won’t stand in his way.

Why is that not like “a person cannot make himself wicked”? It’s basically the same idea—he is saying something about himself. No, but this isn’t wickedness. It isn’t wickedness. But “a person cannot make himself wicked.” Right—that’s the difference. That’s the difference. A person cannot make himself wicked, but if a person prohibits himself or prohibits something upon himself, self-imposed prohibition—a person who prohibits this upon himself, am I going to tell him by force that it’s permitted to you? You prohibited it, you prohibited it—be well. Why should I interfere with you? And say she secluded herself with another man? Now she is forbidden to him. Even if it later becomes clear that she was right and he wasn’t wicked and nothing happened—he didn’t make a vow, he only said that she wasn’t okay—so he prohibited her to himself. It’s like admission by a litigant. You admit that she is forbidden to you? Fine, then act with prohibition. Fine, if that’s what you admit, what do you want us to do? Okay?

So on that Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks: yes, but here that doesn’t work. Because here she didn’t admit that she is forbidden. She said, “I was taken captive and I am pure.” So I’m not forbidden—she did not come to prohibit herself to herself. So how can we accept from her the fact that she was taken captive? Here Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: you don’t need to get to “the mouth that prohibited” in order to believe her that she is pure, because there isn’t even “the mouth that prohibited”; this isn’t testimony. Is he arguing on the Mishnah? As if he’s objecting to the Mishnah? He’s not arguing on it; he’s asking: why does the Mishnah say this belongs to “the mouth that prohibited”? That’s a difficulty. Okay?

He says: why does the Mishnah connect this to “the mouth that prohibited” at all? Let’s say there is someone in the world who does not accept “the mouth that prohibited,” just for the sake of argument—even so, he would agree with this Mishnah, because if a woman did not prohibit herself, how can you say self-imposed prohibition? What do you answer? I didn’t understand that at all, I didn’t understand that at all. Her goal was to permit herself? Exactly. Self-imposed prohibition means this: you want to prohibit something? To act with prohibition in something? Fine! Act with prohibition—what does that have to do with me? But that is when a woman really says: “I was taken captive.” Period. That’s it. You yourself want to put yourself into the status of a captive woman? Fine, who are we to stand in your way? But this woman did not come to prohibit herself. She is giving background, but in the end she comes to permit herself. She says, “I am pure.” No—that’s not “the mouth that prohibited.” Rabbi Akiva Eiger says that you don’t need to get here to “the mouth that prohibited”; she didn’t prohibit herself at all.

So when do you ever need it? “The mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted” is a type of credibility. After she prohibited herself and turned herself into a captive woman, and in that she is believed, because of “the mouth that prohibited” we will nevertheless believe her that she is pure. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: here we won’t believe her at all that she was taken captive. You don’t need to say she is pure; she isn’t believed that she was taken captive at all. But there was a certain delta-t where she said “I was taken captive.” No, no—it was one statement. One statement. It doesn’t matter; it was one statement. As if he doesn’t accept that she can testify about herself? Right. Self-imposed prohibition is self-imposed—it’s not… this is in prohibitions, not testimony. If you say that a person’s credibility about himself is by force of testimony, that’s another discussion. But he assumes this is like a vow. Meaning, as if—you want to prohibit yourself? Fine, we won’t interfere. But here the person didn’t prohibit himself—what do you want? She didn’t come to prohibit herself; she came to permit herself. The statement is “I was taken captive and I am pure.” He understands “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted” to mean: we believe you that you were taken captive. Right? We believe you that you were taken captive. Since you were the one who prohibited, we will also believe you that you were purified. Right?

Wait, wait, wait. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: no, what do you mean? We don’t believe… wait, we don’t believe you that you were taken captive at all. Why should we believe you? Why not? Why yes? You are a litigant! If you say only “I was taken captive,” then I would believe her. Why? Not believe her, but I would accept that she has to act with prohibition. Self-imposed prohibition—she imposed a prohibition upon herself, so let her act accordingly. But that’s not credibility; I don’t believe her that she was taken captive. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says: fine, but that certainly doesn’t exist here, because she didn’t prohibit herself. So what’s the problem? There is no credibility, and she didn’t prohibit herself, so why is “the mouth that prohibited” needed at all? There is nothing here.

Is being in captivity not a matter of prohibiting herself? No. No—did she come to prohibit herself? But if she said “I was taken captive and I am pure,” then she didn’t prohibit herself; she says she is permitted. She came to say that she is permitted—that’s what she came to say. The point is important.

In light of the explanations I gave earlier for “the mouth that prohibited,” his question is not correct. Right, because that’s exactly the idea of “the mouth that prohibited.” It’s not… He assumes that “the mouth that prohibited” means I accept the part that “it belonged to his ancestors,” and I believe you in order to extract from that. I said: no, insofar as you don’t believe me to extract, I don’t know at all that it belonged to his ancestors. I’m not prepared to concede at all that it belonged to his ancestors if you won’t accept the qualification that I also bought it from them. That’s the whole idea of “the mouth that prohibited.” Meaning, Rabbi Akiva Eiger assumes that “the mouth that prohibited” is evidence that works on a double plane: first of all, they believe you in what you prohibited; since you were the one who prohibited, then the fact that you permitted takes out from what you created in the prohibition. Like: I created for you the possession, the whole framework, because I said that it belonged to your ancestors. Since I was the one, I am believed to remove from you and say I bought it from them. Then he is right, because there that doesn’t work that way; there this isn’t credibility. But according to what I’m saying now, it doesn’t belong to the issue at all. Even if there it isn’t credibility and here it is.

First of all, even in self-imposed prohibition there are views that it is credibility. But even if it isn’t credibility, it doesn’t matter, because here too it works the same way. Here too we do not believe the part that it belonged to his ancestors; we do not accept his admission that it belonged to his ancestors, because his admission that it belonged to his ancestors did not come to incriminate himself; this is not admission by a litigant, it doesn’t go against me. It goes in my favor. So we don’t believe it. The nice point that comes out of this is that they don’t really believe it. They don’t believe that it belonged to his ancestors and then believe that I bought it. They do not accept my admission that it belonged to his ancestors at all. Because insofar as it belonged to his ancestors, I also bought it. And if not, then it didn’t belong to his ancestors at all. So there is no point—we do not accept that matter at all. Okay? We do not accept from him the admission that it belonged to the other person’s ancestors at all. That is the point.

And that’s also what is written in the second Mishnah. Here I can’t not believe her that she was divorced. I didn’t understand. Do we have to establish her with the presumption of being divorced? I can’t not believe her? No—if she says not. I don’t believe her that she was a married woman except insofar as she was divorced. To the extent that… beyond the qualification. And I’m prepared to give her the status of a divorced woman, but there is no stage… no. There is no stage in which she was a married woman and afterward I need to believe her that she got divorced. There’s no such thing. She is a married woman only insofar as I accepted that she was already divorced. Not one millimeter beyond that. If I don’t believe her that she got divorced, then the first part, that she was a married woman, is also irrelevant. Exactly. Then the part that she had been a married woman also won’t be accepted. No, all that she is a married woman is only insofar as she got divorced. Meaning, it’s not… it’s not like you said that there’s some moment when I say, “Okay, it belonged to his ancestors; since that came from me, believe me to remove it from them.” No. Everything I accept is that it belonged to his ancestors only in order to accept the claim that I bought it from him. Only until… only up to that point. What’s the idea? What’s novel here? It’s the explanation I gave earlier. Okay, and therefore I say that Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s difficulty is not difficult. I gave the earlier explanation in advance, so you don’t understand Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question. But the simplest… No, that means this can only be the fourth explanation, not, for example, an explanation where… Right. Right. Right. And therefore what matters here is that it be within the span of speech, so that it will be as if… Maybe. Exactly. This now begins the discussion of “within the span of speech,” which will come in a moment—and I hope it will come in a moment.

Okay, so that’s Rabbi Akiva Eiger. The Kovetz Shiurim enters the question whether this is credibility or not credibility. He says that Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s difficulty doesn’t work unless you understand self-imposed prohibition as a kind of vow, not as a kind of credibility. As I said now—that’s not correct. That difficulty is resolved even if you say it is credibility, whether you say it is… like a vow. It’s not really a vow, it’s like one.

Okay, now within that discussion, by the way, the Kovetz Shiurim brings in the question of what happens if witnesses came after she said “I was a married woman and I am divorced,” or “I was taken captive and I am pure,” and then witnesses came that she was taken captive or that she had been a married woman. That’s the last topic I added for you today on the sheet. What happens if witnesses came—before the court permitted her, or before—or after, I don’t know. They didn’t come. They didn’t come. But after… in any event, after she already spoke. Okay? Why does he bring it in? He brings it in according to his approach, because he of course understands it as… yes, exactly. But if it’s as I’m saying, as I said earlier, then it’s irrelevant. Fine—to that we’ll get in a moment at the end of the class.

Another note: the source of the law of migo. So the Beit Yaakov asks… yes, the Beit Yaakov says: from where do we know “the mouth that prohibited”? Apparently it is difficult, for migo is from the Torah, as Tosafot wrote earlier on page 18. And it is known that “the mouth that prohibited” is preferable to migo. And we already brought examples of why “the mouth that prohibited” is preferable to migo. Since a verse is needed for “the mouth that prohibited” according to the current initial assumption, then even if there is a verse for “the mouth that prohibited,” still from where do we know that migo is from the Torah?

Fine. What does the Talmud… The Talmud on page 22 asked: why do we need a verse for “the mouth that prohibited,” right? After all, we have logic. And you tell me that “the mouth that prohibited” is stronger than migo, right? Let’s say that “the mouth that prohibited” comes from logic. Fine? That is also the Talmud’s conclusion on page 22, right? It’s not a verse; the verse goes for something else; this comes from logic. So where does migo come from? Migo is a weaker logic. Or alternatively, if it comes from the verse and not from logic… In the initial assumption they brought a verse. Afterward they rejected it because they said there is logic. At the first stage they thought it was a verse, right? Once it is a verse, Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks: then where does migo come from? The verse tells you “the mouth that prohibited” because it is very strong. But migo, which is weaker—who said it exists? The subtext is: you should have known from the start that this is logic, because migo certainly comes from logic and not from a verse, and in fact they do accept migo. So what is the Talmud even hesitating about with “the mouth that prohibited”? That is the other side of the same coin. Yes? That’s basically what he asks.

Why did they continue… Could it not be that “the mouth that prohibited,” which is stronger, is stronger because it comes from a verse, while migo is weaker because it comes from logic and not from a verse? No, because we said that logic is Torah-level, so there is no difference. Torah-level—the exact same thing. He asks: how could the Talmud in its initial assumption think that “the mouth that prohibited” comes from a verse—and migo, where does that come from? After all, migo does not come from the verse; it comes from logic. So if migo comes from logic and it is weaker, then “the mouth that prohibited,” which is stronger, certainly comes from logic. So what initial assumption is there to learn it from a verse? Why look for a verse at all? Why wasn’t migo enough for us to begin with? Exactly.

Now of course one can always answer that this is exactly the Talmud’s answer. Right—in the initial assumption maybe the Talmud thought that “the mouth that prohibited” comes from a verse and migo does not exist in the Torah. It won’t have a basis… The Talmud says no—that’s not true; it is logic. What logic? The logic of migo. The logic of “the mouth that prohibited” is logic, and therefore both migo and “the mouth that prohibited” come from logic, and the verse is needed for something else. That is the Talmud’s answer itself. He asks a question on the question. He says: maybe the question is a good one—but that itself is what the Talmud answers. When the Talmud finally answers that “the mouth that prohibited” comes from logic, one can say that migo also comes from logic, so what’s the problem? In the initial assumption it really is difficult that they thought a verse was needed for it. Fine—not terrible. A difficulty on an initial assumption is a weak difficulty, because you can always say that this itself is what was newly taught in the answer.

But I’m saying more than that. After all, “the mouth that prohibited” is stronger than migo, right? But it also does more than migo. It does more than migo. After all, “the mouth that prohibited” can extract from someone in possession, for example. Migo cannot extract from someone in possession. And several other things, right? We saw several things—to exempt from an oath and some other things. So wait—what does that mean? Look, there’s a slightly subtler issue here.

Suppose that “the mouth that prohibited” comes from a verse. So the Beit Yaakov asks: then where does migo come from? If there is no logic, and “the mouth that prohibited” comes from a verse, then I have no source for migo, and a logic weaker than “the mouth that prohibited” certainly wouldn’t work—so there should be no such thing as migo in the Torah at all, right? Answer: not true. If you are talking about migo to extract, then you are right, because “the mouth that prohibited” used to extract comes from a verse. But if you are talking about migo to maintain possession, that could come from logic even in the initial assumption. After all, “the mouth that prohibited” is not only stronger than migo, but also has more power in court than migo, and that has implications for its force. It could be that all the Talmud asked was not “from where do we know that the mouth that prohibited is from the Torah” in the sense of where do we know the logic of “the mouth that prohibited,” but rather: from where do we know that such logic, which we understand regarding migo—but regarding migo it cannot extract—who says that in “the mouth that prohibited” it can also extract? So on that the Talmud says: there is a verse. And then the Talmud rejects that: no, it comes from logic—even for that you don’t need a verse. But then there isn’t even a difficulty on the Talmud’s initial assumption. That’s what I’m saying.

It’s true that “the mouth that prohibited” is stronger than migo, but it is also used for something stronger than migo. On the one hand, yes—I would formulate it this way: if I knew migo from logic, I would still need a verse for “the mouth that prohibited.” That doesn’t contradict anything, because I would learn by a fortiori reasoning that “the mouth that prohibited” is also effective, right—but only to maintain possession. But “the mouth that prohibited” is also effective to extract—how do I know that? That is what the Talmud asks. And to that it says: for that there is a verse. For the extra little edge—that it can extract, the advantages that “the mouth that prohibited” has over migo—that is what needs a verse. Not the basic logic. The basic logic—you are right—“the mouth that prohibited” is stronger than migo, and if migo comes from logic, then “the mouth that prohibited” certainly comes from the same logic; no problem there. But the Talmud asks: from where would I know that “the mouth that prohibited” is also stronger than migo and can extract? That is the question.

And even according to Maimonides, who holds that migo also works to extract, still “the mouth that prohibited” has advantages over migo according to Maimonides, in that he concedes to Rabbi Yehoshua—yes, there are advantages to “the mouth that prohibited.” So where do we know that from? For that there is a verse. Therefore, in my opinion, the question is not difficult in any case.

In any event, he says that in “the mouth that prohibited”—sorry—there is also an element of weakness compared to migo, and that is the novelty. In “the mouth that prohibited” there is an element of weakness compared to migo; therefore a verse was needed. Why? Because in “the mouth that prohibited” you are basically saying the claim that obligates you, and afterward you say the claim that exempts you. Once you said the claim that obligates you, it has already been accepted—admission by a litigant. Now the second claim—who says it helps? In migo, after all, I don’t say the claim that obligates me; I say the weaker claim and I could have made the other claim. Here I say both things. So the first claim that I said—I am believed to obligate myself, and that’s it. Now who says that afterward I can come with another claim and say, wait, wait, but believe me that I could have not said the first claim? The first claim has already been said—it’s gone, that’s it, it has been said. And they can stop you in the middle of the sentence and say: that’s it, we won’t hear more from you. No, I’m saying more than “we won’t hear more from you.” I’m willing to hear everything; I just won’t believe the second part. Why? Because this is what Tosafot in Bava Batra call—whoever learned chapter three of Bava Batra—retroactive migo. The migo says: look, if I had been a liar yesterday, I could have claimed something else. We do not say such a migo; that is retroactive migo. Only now do I have a migo. Meaning, if now I could have made another claim instead of this claim, that gives me a migo. But if now I make a claim where now I no longer have another alternative—only I no longer have another alternative because of something I did yesterday—and then I say: wait, if I were a liar, then yesterday I wouldn’t have done what trapped me today—that is retroactive migo, and we do not say that. The migo has to be an option available to me now, at the time I make the claim.

Now in “the mouth that prohibited” it is retroactive migo, because she says: “I was a married woman.” Now she has boxed herself in; she can no longer say, “I am not a married woman,” right? Now she says: “I am divorced.” After you said that you were a married woman, now you claim that you are divorced. Once you claimed that you are divorced, you could no longer say “I’m not a married woman”—you already admitted that you are a married woman. That’s retroactive migo.

And that’s exactly the opposite of the logic of “the mouth that prohibited”—as if, it’s exactly the opposite. Obviously—that’s what he says. Therefore he says, unlike everything we’ve said until now—that “the mouth that prohibited” has strengths compared to migo—there is also something weaker in “the mouth that prohibited” compared to migo, because “the mouth that prohibited” is a retroactive migo. At the stage when you make the weaker claim, you can no longer switch it and not make the stronger claim, because you already made that stronger claim earlier. True, it was one second earlier—not important—but still earlier. And here enters the whole discussion of “within the span of speech” and everything…

The stronger claim here would be that I was never married. To whom? Yes. Exactly. Or to remain silent, depending on Rashi, depending, yes. Okay? So he says: I already made that claim. Now I come and claim “I am divorced” or “I am pure.” Now I can no longer say “never happened,” because a moment ago I said I was a married woman or that I was taken captive. But that’s really weak—what do you mean? Because obviously here, on the side of “the mouth that permitted,” he’s acting as though only the mouth… No, but “the mouth that prohibited” was said first; “the mouth that permitted” was said afterward. But it’s as if he doesn’t accept the rule… No, it matters, because at the stage where you say the side of permission, you no longer have a migo. You no longer have a migo. You say, “I was a married woman and I am divorced”… what is it that you want to be believed about? About “I was a married woman,” you are certainly believed—you don’t need migo for that. About that you are certainly believed. You want to be believed about “I am divorced,” right? But the credibility of “I am divorced” is by force of a migo that I could have said “I’m single.” But you couldn’t have said that—yesterday you said that you are a married woman. Today you can’t say that you are single.

But if on one day, in one utterance—not one day—and you say “I am divorced,” that’s what you say. Of course that includes that you were married, but once you say “I am divorced,” you could also have said “I am single,” because there was no prior stage where you disclosed that you were already a married woman and boxed yourself in. Therefore you have a migo. If you do it in two stages, you no longer have a migo at the second stage. And you need the migo at the second stage. And that is what the verse teaches: that even though the mechanism of migo is not here because it is retroactive migo, the verse teaches that in “the mouth that prohibited” it will nevertheless work. In a case where there is a time gap. Yes. But “the mouth that prohibited” always has a time gap, because if you didn’t prohibit, what is there for me to permit? I understand. Also the case of the land, okay? Where he said “it belonged to your father and I bought it”—it’s the same thing. No. Why? I could have said “I bought it from your father.” Well, if I said “it belonged to your father”… No. No. That contains the two pieces of information, but they were said together. In such a case I do have a migo. If I say “I bought it from your father,” then when I say “I bought it from your father” I could also have said “single”—that it never belonged to your father at all, right? But if I say “it belonged to your father and I bought it from him,” seemingly I said the same information, but because I said it in two stages, then after the first stage I can no longer say “it didn’t belong to your father.” So when I say “I bought it from him,” I no longer have the migo that I could have said “it wasn’t his.”

So then what’s the difference between… No, if I were to say… “I was a married woman and got divorced”—that’s at the same time. What’s the difference? It’s the same thing. It’s not at the same time; it’s one after the other. No, I’m giving a case where it’s at the same time. Not at the same time—it’s always one after the other. You want to say “remember” and “observe” in one utterance? What? It’s one word after another. I asked for an example where a day had passed. Right—even if one second passed, what difference does it make whether it’s a day or a second? The difference between saying… wait, wait. She doesn’t have to say “I was a married woman”; she can simply say “I am divorced.” So that’s what Noa asked earlier, and I said: in that case the Beit Yaakov would say that indeed you don’t need the verse. That is “the mouth that prohibited” from logic. It is learned by a fortiori reasoning from migo. But “the mouth that prohibited” also works if I said it in two separate utterances. And that I would not know without the verse. That’s what he wants to say. Right, there is also a form of “the mouth that prohibited” for which you don’t need the verse—but there is also this type, and that is enough for us to need the verse.

Of course, he limits it to “within the span of speech.” His assumption—his assumption—is that only “within the span of speech” can it work even after the verse. But still, even within the span of speech, were it not for the verse, perhaps I would not have said it. That’s his claim. Right, there was separation, the migo was gone. Yes. Why? That’s a completely real difference. What do you mean? A completely real difference. She doesn’t have a migo in the second part of the statement. What do you mean? Really, she doesn’t have a migo. No, “I was a married woman and got divorced.” Does “got divorced” have a migo? But “I was a married woman and got divorced”—when I say the words “and got divorced,” there is no longer a migo. So is “the mouth that prohibited” stronger than migo? Yes. Right—that’s what he says. But then that doesn’t fit with Rabbi Yehoshua, who doesn’t accept… No, no, no—it does fit, it does fit. It fits because it is weaker than migo in the sense that it is retroactive migo, and stronger in all the aspects we said before. He says: if there were no verse, I wouldn’t know whether to learn it from migo or not to learn it from migo. The verse comes and says: no, no, this is perfectly fine, this too works—and therefore all the strengths now continue.

Of course, afterward, in the conclusion that everything comes from logic anyway, there’s nothing to talk about—then it remains that everything is stronger, so there is no problem at all. Why in the end is it stronger? Because all the explanations we said before remain in place; it is stronger. There is a certain side from which it is weaker; the verse rules that out. That side does not interfere. You said that because of the time gaps, it comes out as retroactive migo and therefore weaker. And despite the strengths of “the mouth that prohibited,” still we would not have said it. Then the verse comes, and then we know that no—that’s not a problem, and now all the strengths that existed before transfer to “the mouth that prohibited.” Exactly. Correct.

But as I said before, I don’t think his whole move is necessary. I don’t think we need that. In my opinion, the need for the verse is because “the mouth that prohibited” knows how to do other things that migo doesn’t know how to do. The question is where I would know that from. If I had learned “the mouth that prohibited” from migo, I would never have imagined that “the mouth that prohibited” can extract. On that the Talmud asks: from where do we know “the mouth that prohibited”? What does “from where do we know the mouth that prohibited” mean? From where do we know that “the mouth that prohibited”… So now he gave two explanations for the Talmud’s initial assumption. First, because migo is stronger. Second, because migo is weaker. Right. Right. And the third thing—and the third possibility—is that maybe in the initial assumption he is right, but the Talmud’s conclusion is simply not like that. Right—in the initial assumption he is right, good difficulty. That’s exactly what the Talmud answers: that everything comes from logic, and that’s it; truly no verse is needed. Okay.

Now, the question whether “the mouth that prohibited” is migo or not. So the Machaneh Ephraim—by the way, where are you holding with the sheet I sent? We finished. And you? I said we should give her more assignments. Okay, no, but the others. Yael, where are you holding? No, we got to… I’m on page thirteen. What does “thirteen” mean? In the words? I’m before that. Did you see the Machaneh Ephraim? No, not yet. Fine. We’ll continue a bit more in the next class—or half, I assume it will still take up half of the next class—and continue onward. Whoever finished the sheet, I already added one more section on this sheet; I’ll expand it before the next meeting, the continuation of the Talmud, yes.

Okay. I still want to complete it a bit, because these are really foundational matters. So, okay. Pass me the radio. Just kidding—some communications adviser is sitting there saying all kinds of things that… What are you saying? He says to him, I don’t know, because listen, it’s really exactly like bari and shema. So first of all, I said, how nice—I understand what he’s saying. And second, the announcer didn’t understand what he was saying. Avi, he didn’t understand what he was saying. And besides that, you can see he’s a Torah scholar. He knows what bari and shema means. That’s already an expression in Hebrew—bari and shema. Some Channel 14 commentator—over such a thing you need to count seven clean days. That’s what he said to him, right? Right, he didn’t understand what he was saying. Fine. Be well, all of you. Yes.