Ketubot Chapter 2, Lesson 3, Part B

Table of Contents

• Migo of brazenness as a weak migo in Nimukei Yosef
• No clear decision whether Nimukei Yosef disagrees with the Rivam about migo used to extract money
• Migo from one monetary claim to another in Nimukei Yosef, and the distinction between “why would he lie” and the power of a claim
• A third answer in Nimukei Yosef: psychological convenience and the collapse of the migo
• Nimukei Yosef’s contribution to the views that do say migo can be used to extract money
• Nachmanides: we do say migo can be used to extract money, and rejecting the proof from Bava Metzia
• Nachmanides’ answer in the cloak passage: preserving the relation of credibility between the claim and the result
• A difficulty in understanding Nachmanides, and a proposal to read it as “the power of credibility”
• Why we do not say migo can be used to extract money: a fundamental difficulty and Tosafot’s explanation
• Interim summary and continuation to the passage in Ketubot

Summary

General overview

The text presents an analysis of migo in the cloak passage at the beginning of Bava Metzia, and examines why someone who claims, “Half of it is mine,” is not believed to receive half on the basis of a migo, since he could have claimed, “All of it is mine.” The analysis presents three answers of the Nimukei Yosef for rejecting the migo, and emphasizes that none of them clearly proves his fundamental position on whether we do or do not say migo can be used to extract money. It then brings Nachmanides’ position that we do say migo can be used to extract money, and that Nachmanides rejects the proof against him from the passage in Bava Metzia by offering a different explanation for why the migo there does not help. Finally, the text sharpens the conceptual difficulty in Tosafot’s position that “we do not say migo can be used to extract money,” and suggests that the way to understand it is that migo is not evidence strong enough to extract property from someone in possession, but at most strengthens a claim or credibility within an already existing framework of possession.

Migo of brazenness as a weak migo in Nimukei Yosef

The text explains that the claim “Half of it is mine; I also grabbed it” is easier from the standpoint of discomfort than lying to someone’s face and claiming, “I grabbed the whole thing,” and therefore this is defined as a migo of brazenness. Nimukei Yosef rejects the migo as a “weak migo,” because the dimension of “why would he lie” is weakened, and from this it follows that in his view a migo of brazenness is effective neither for money nor for an oath. The text notes that this is a novel point relative to the assumption until now that a migo of brazenness might not exempt from an oath, but could still help in monetary matters.

No clear decision whether Nimukei Yosef disagrees with the Rivam about migo used to extract money

The text presents one possibility, namely that Nimukei Yosef accepts the Rivam’s first two assumptions, that the picture here is one of migo used to extract money, and disagrees only with the Rivam’s third assumption, “we do not say migo can be used to extract money,” but still rejects it here only because this is a migo of brazenness. It also presents the opposite possibility: that Nimukei Yosef does not accept that where “both are in possession” this is called extracting, or that he does not accept one of the first assumptions, and therefore he needs other answers without deciding the fundamental issue. The text concludes that from Nimukei Yosef’s words it is not clear which of the Rivam’s three assumptions he disputes, and therefore one cannot derive from him proof of a consistent position on the question of migo used to extract money.

Migo from one monetary claim to another in Nimukei Yosef, and the distinction between “why would he lie” and the power of a claim

The text brings a second answer in Nimukei Yosef: that we say migo only “regarding that very same matter,” and not “from one matter to another,” and this is called migo from one monetary claim to another. Nimukei Yosef defines even different halves of the same cloak as two separate monetary claims, and therefore the migo of “I could have claimed the other half” does not help for the first half. The text argues that this answer makes sense only if migo is understood as the power of a claim that creates possession with regard to the specific property in question, and not as “why would he lie,” because “why would he lie” should have worked even if we were dealing with other property.

A third answer in Nimukei Yosef: psychological convenience and the collapse of the migo

The text brings a third answer in Nimukei Yosef: that if he were going to receive more, it would be “more comfortable to say ‘half of it is mine’” and receive his whole claim than to say “all of it is mine” and receive only half. The explanation is that the lie “Half of it is mine” lets the claimant appear truthful and receive exactly what he asked for, whereas the claim “All of it is mine” would end with a ruling giving him only half and making him look like someone who claimed too much. The text uses this to show that the logic of migo can be undermined by the very fact that the claimant plans to use the migo to improve both his image and his outcome.

Nimukei Yosef’s contribution to the views that do say migo can be used to extract money

The text states that even if we cannot know Nimukei Yosef’s position on whether migo can be used to extract money, his answers create “ready-made answers,” so that a position that explicitly says migo can be used to extract money will not get stuck on the passage at the beginning of Bava Metzia. The text explains that one can still say that migo generally works to extract money, and only here it does not help because it is either a migo of brazenness, or a migo from one monetary claim to another, or because of the convenience of the claim.

Nachmanides: we do say migo can be used to extract money, and rejecting the proof from Bava Metzia

The text presents Nachmanides as a clear source for the view that we do say migo can be used to extract money, and explains that Nachmanides argues that the proof against him from the beginning of Bava Metzia “is no proof,” because there is another explanation for why the migo there does not help. The text emphasizes that for Nachmanides the starting point is the opposite of Nimukei Yosef’s, because Nachmanides sets down the principle that a migo is a migo even for extracting money, and therefore he cannot answer like Tosafot, “we do not say migo can be used to extract money.” The text notes that Rashba also follows Nachmanides and accepts that we do say migo can be used to extract money.

Nachmanides’ answer in the cloak passage: preserving the relation of credibility between the claim and the result

The text explains that Nachmanides grounds the rejection of the migo in the fact that if with the claim “All of it is mine” he would receive only half of his claim, then with the claim “Half of it is mine” by force of that same migo he also should not receive more than that same ratio, and so he would receive half of what he is now claiming, namely a quarter. The text emphasizes that the comparison in Nachmanides is not between the two litigants, but between two possible claims of the same person, and with migo one cannot receive more force than would have been received through the alternative claim. The text highlights that Nachmanides does not say, “there is no migo,” but rather that the migo is “excellent,” except that it cannot give more than the quarter that follows from it anyway.

A difficulty in understanding Nachmanides, and a proposal to read it as “the power of credibility”

The text presents a conceptual difficulty in Nachmanides’ explanation, because from the standpoint of “why would he lie,” the absolute amount should be what matters and not the proportion, and even from the standpoint of the power of a claim it would seem that the migo should grant good possession over the half. The text suggests that the only way to understand Nachmanides is through a conception of “the power of credibility,” in the style of Kovetz Shiurim, where the migo transfers “half the power” from the alternative claim to the present one, and therefore the result is preserved proportionally and not by amount. The text adds that perhaps, with some strain, one could bring this closer to the third answer of Nimukei Yosef, but Nachmanides’ language does not sound like a psychological reason of ease or discomfort.

Why we do not say migo can be used to extract money: a fundamental difficulty and Tosafot’s explanation

The text sharpens the point that if migo is evidence—even weak evidence—it ought to tip the scales in a situation of evidentiary balance, because possession is just the default when there is no determination. The text concludes that according to Tosafot one has to say that migo is not evidence that determines reality, but at most a mechanism that strengthens a claim in order to leave money in the hands of someone already in possession. The text offers another formulation: that migo is “evidence about the person himself and not about the matter itself,” and therefore it only makes the litigant’s claim into “a good claim,” but “with claims alone you cannot extract from someone in possession” without external evidence.

Interim summary and continuation to the passage in Ketubot

The text concludes that Nachmanides must reject Tosafot’s assumptions in order to uphold the view that we do say migo can be used to extract money, either by seeing migo as stronger evidence, or by determining that even a litigant’s own credibility can extract money. The text says that this summary will be repeated at the beginning of the next lecture, and then it will move into the passage at the beginning of Ketubot and to “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted.”

Come on, right to the face in an uncomfortable way. To say it like this: “Half of it is mine; I grabbed it too.” I didn’t notice whether it was a little after you or not, so I can somehow get out of this; it’s not such extreme brazenness toward the other litigant. Because I’m saying: no, half of it is mine, I agree that you grabbed it too, but I grabbed it together with you, and I didn’t notice, let’s say, that I grabbed it a little later—assuming I’m lying. It’s easier for me to lie with that lie than to lie with a lie where I tell you to your face: get out of here, you’re a complete liar, what are you even doing here? I grabbed the whole thing. So that’s a migo of brazenness. Right? So according to the Nimukei Yosef, that’s why it doesn’t help. He says this is a migo of brazenness. A weak migo. Okay? And a weak migo—we already saw that a migo of brazenness, maybe the question is whether it helps to exempt from payment, helps to exempt from an oath. Tosafot says it’s a migo of brazenness and therefore it doesn’t help. The Nimukei Yosef, sorry. What does that mean? That a migo of brazenness apparently, in his opinion too, does not help in monetary law, not just with an oath. Right? Because here we’re talking about the money, not the oath. Which is an interesting claim in its own right. We haven’t yet encountered such a view. We saw a view that says it doesn’t help exempt from an oath in the case of one who admits to part of a claim, but for money the assumption was always that yes, it does help. Here you see in the Nimukei Yosef: no, even in monetary law it doesn’t help—a migo of brazenness—because it’s a weak migo. And the Nimukei Yosef apparently understands migo only as “why would he lie,” and once you have a migo of brazenness, that dimension of “why would he lie” is gone, so the migo is worth nothing—not for money, not for an oath, not for anything. That’s the first explanation of the Nimukei Yosef. Parenthetically, one could have said something else. But if you say there’s also the second dimension, except that it isn’t strong enough in this migo—then why yes? Then why yes? Because if it helps neither for money nor for an oath, then leave it—de facto it’s not interesting, so there’s nothing there. Fine, it changes nothing. Look, one could have said otherwise. One could have said that the Nimukei Yosef argues like Tosafot in this sense: that this is called extracting. He accepts assumption A of Tosafot, assumption B of Tosafot. And what he says is that regarding assumption C, he does not accept Tosafot—that is, Riva”m. What he says is that we do say migo to extract. Here this is a migo of brazenness; a migo of brazenness used to extract, we do not say. So for that reason, regarding migo of brazenness, he disagrees with the second assumption? What? If we go with the first explanation in the Nimukei Yosef, does he disagree with the point that this is a migo used to extract at all? No, no—on the contrary, he accepts the first two assumptions. He says this is a migo used to extract, because both of them are in possession, and when both are in possession, the migo is a migo used to extract. He doesn’t accept the third assumption of Riva”m, that we do not say migo to extract. He thinks that we do say migo to extract. Only a migo of brazenness doesn’t help because it’s a weak migo; but if there had been a good migo here, then we would say it even to extract. And then indeed, if I interpret it that way, then the Nimukei Yosef really does disagree with Riva”m for our purposes, on whether we say migo to extract or not. But that isn’t necessary. It could be that Riva”m doesn’t accept the first assumptions of Tosafot at all, and what he says is really that the other one is not in possession at all; we do not say migo to extract. But this is not called possession. So why doesn’t the migo help? Because it’s a migo of brazenness. Yes, that’s what I thought. If he says it’s a migo of brazenness, then he says it’s a migo of brazenness. Now the question is: on which of Riva”m’s three claims does he disagree? You can say any one of the three, and for our purposes that’s very important. Why? One could have said he disagrees with one of the first two assumptions, and then from his point of view such a case isn’t called a migo used to extract. Meaning: migo to extract would help, right? But such a case isn’t called migo to extract. Sorry—migo to extract would not help; he agrees with Riva”m, migo to extract does not help. Only here it isn’t extraction—what do you want? The migo should have helped. And to that he says: yes, but this is a migo of brazenness, so it’s no good—not because it’s extraction. Where do you see that he agrees? I don’t see it. That’s one possible interpretation. A second possible interpretation: no, he accepts Riva”m’s first two assumptions and he claims that indeed such a case is a migo used to extract. He disagrees with Riva”m’s third claim because he says that we do say migo to extract. Except here it’s a migo of brazenness. A migo of brazenness used to extract, we do not say. The difference between these two interpretations of the Nimukei Yosef is whether the Nimukei Yosef disagrees with Riva”m in principle that we do not say migo to extract. It’s not clear from the Nimukei Yosef’s words. Right? Fine. That’s the first answer of the Nimukei Yosef. A second answer: also, we only say migo regarding the very thing itself that he is claiming or denying, but not from one thing to another. This is what the medieval authorities (Rishonim) call migo from one asset to another. Yes. No, no, wait—migo from one asset to another means I want to prove: I claim that you owe me one hundred shekels, okay? Now, I could have sued you over some other debt you owed me and extracted a different hundred shekels from you, so believe me that I’m not lying in not suing you over the other debt. That’s not it. The fact that you could have claimed some other money is uninteresting. If you could have prevailed with another claim regarding this very money over which we’re disputing, that’s migo. But a migo where I could have extracted different money from you, or a different object—that’s called migo from one asset to another, and we do not say it. Says the Riv”a—says the Nimukei Yosef—here this is migo from one asset to another, because I am claiming that I could have claimed from you the other half of the cloak, so believe me that this half belongs to me. Even though it’s within the same cloak, still it’s a different half. So he says this is migo from one asset to another. Different halves of the cloak are like different objects, and therefore we do not say such a migo. That’s the second answer of the Nimukei Yosef. We need to understand this answer—it’s a difficult answer and needs explanation. Why? Because this is one cloak. No, beyond the fact that it’s one cloak—that’s another question—but even on that I’m prepared to accept it. Why indeed do we not say migo from one asset to another? After all, the claim that if I wanted to lie I could have extracted a different object from you is a good claim. So believe me that I’m not lying—what difference does it make that it’s a different object? Seemingly, the Nimukei Yosef’s first explanation sees migo as “why would he lie,” and therefore says: this is a migo of brazenness; there’s no “why would he lie” here. The second answer of the Nimukei Yosef sees migo as the strength of a claim, not as “why would he lie.” Because if it were “why would he lie,” why should I care that it’s from one asset to another? Bottom line, there’s proof that I’m telling the truth, because if I wanted to lie I would have attacked you from a different angle. So what if it’s a different angle? The logical consideration still stands: believe me that I’m not lying, because otherwise I would have done it differently. That’s a good claim. If you say that migo as strength of claim gives me possession-status over the asset, then there’s no problem: if I could have won something else, that doesn’t make me in possession of this asset, right? But if you say it’s “why would he lie,” that exists even regarding a different asset—what difference does it make? Meaning, in the Nimukei Yosef’s second answer he is working specifically on the plane of strength of claim, not on the plane of “why would he lie.” Okay? You need to see that what we’ve discussed until now is the subtext behind the different answers of the Nimukei Yosef. Can you explain again how it’s strength of claim here? Why, if I see migo as strength of claim, can I understand why we don’t say migo from one asset to another? Because the fact that I could have won the cow while here we’re disputing a donkey does not give me possession-status over the donkey. I could have won the cow—how does that make me in possession of the donkey? The claim that if I wanted to lie I would have extracted a cow from you is indeed a good claim, because really, why am I not doing that? Apparently I’m telling the truth. What difference does it make that this is a cow and that is a donkey? But in terms of possession-status—if you say migo is something that gives me possession-status, then it’s possession-status in the thing in which I could have prevailed. But if it was something else, how does that give me possession-status over the donkey? The fact that I could have won the cow—what does that have to do with it? I’m in possession of the cow; when I argue over the cow I’ll be considered in possession of it; but when we argue over the donkey, how am I in possession here? Therefore in the Nimukei Yosef it seems that his second explanation works on the plane of strength of claim, not on the plane of “why would he lie.” He argues that I have no strength of claim here; I’m not considered in possession of the first half, because what I could have won was the second half, and therefore that doesn’t give me possession-status over the first half. Okay? There are more problems here, but I don’t want to get into them too much. The third explanation: also—and by the way also in… fine—and also, had he taken more than half, it would have been easier for him to say “half of it” and take his whole claim than to say “all of it” and take only half. A somewhat pilpul-style explanation, a bit similar to Nachmanides, but not exactly the same. This is what I tried to say earlier: meaning, I am claiming only half—this is what is due to me—why should I claim the whole thing? No, I’m talking about a lie. Again, assuming I’m lying, why would I lie about half? I might as well lie about the whole thing. What you’re saying is exactly “why would he lie.” Believe me that I’m telling the truth. I am telling the truth. So that’s “why would he lie.” I’m saying no—he says as follows: even if you were lying, it still isn’t true that it would be more convenient for you to lie and say “it’s all mine.” Why? Because if you lied and said “it’s all mine,” you would only get half, right? We would split it equally. So in effect you would come out looking a bit like a liar. You claimed it was all yours and the religious court gave you only half. As opposed to that, it is much more convenient for you to claim “half of it is mine” and receive what you claim, than to claim “all of it is mine” and receive only half. Because that way you come out looking a bit like a liar, whereas this way you come out looking fine. Therefore you have no migo, and you’ll get a quarter, not a half. But if he claims “half of it is mine,” then he doesn’t get the half. Doesn’t matter—but he thinks he’ll get half. Why does he say “half of it is mine”? He thinks he’ll get half. And I’m saying it is more convenient for him to claim half and receive what he claims, than to claim “all of it is mine” and receive only half. Therefore he has no migo, and consequently, without a migo, he gets only a quarter. But if he doesn’t know that he would get only half then—no, he knows he would get half; he just doesn’t know he’d get a quarter. Why doesn’t he know that? He doesn’t know. He thinks that if he claims “half of it is mine,” he will get half, just like the other one gets half—like Yael’s reasoning in your earlier argument. “Half of it is mine” and he’ll get half, just like the other one gets half, like Yael’s reasoning in your earlier argument. That’s what he thinks. So what? So he says to me: believe me that half of it is mine; I want the entire half. Why? Because I have a migo that I could have claimed “it’s all mine” if I were a liar. But if he doesn’t know that he would claim “it’s all mine”? Well, he knows I’m saying it’s all his. So then the one who says “it’s all mine” also comes out looking like a liar, because he also gets only half. Same thing—both of them are lying. Right. He said “it’s all mine.” He said “it’s all mine.” So he comes out looking like a liar. So he comes out looking like a liar—so what? But that’s what he said. He comes out looking like a liar but profits, and is it right that this one shouldn’t profit? No, no. No, no. Listen, Yael, listen carefully. You’re missing something here. I’m talking about the one who says “half of it is mine,” on the assumption that he is a liar. On the assumption that he is a liar—the religious court makes the calculation. Assuming he’s lying, if he’s lying, why didn’t he say “it’s all mine”? With the one who says “it’s all mine,” we have no discussion—he’s not talking about migo or anything. He said “it’s all mine,” let’s say that’s what he said. I don’t care right now whether he’s a liar or not; that’s what he said. But the one who says “half of it is mine,” we make the calculation. After all, if he were a liar—look, he claims: believe me that I’m telling the truth, because if I were a liar I would have said “it’s all mine.” So we, the religious court, start making the calculation. Wait a second, let’s assume he’s a liar when he says “half of it is mine.” Why does he say “half of it is mine”? Because he wants to get half. Wait, wait—but if he were a liar he would say “it’s all mine.” Not true. Because if he said “it’s all mine” and got only half, then he would come out in religious court looking a bit like a liar. The religious court would not accept his claim. But now that he says “half of it is mine,” and he thinks he’ll receive the entire half that he asks for, then he understands that he’ll get everything he asks for. That’s more convenient for him. Therefore he has no migo. If he has no migo, he’ll get a quarter. This is not—it’s not—it’s not absurd. It’s simple. He says “half of it is mine” because that is really what he wants to get. That’s what he wants to get when he says “half of it is mine.” Wait—he says: believe me that half is mine, give me half. Why? Because if I wanted to lie, I would say “it’s all mine.” Not true. Because you’re claiming “half of it is mine” and you want to receive “half of it is mine” by means of migo, right? You want to get the whole half, not the quarter, by means of migo, right? And that is more convenient for you than claiming “it’s all mine” and getting only half. Psychologically? Yes. Yes, because when you claim half and get half, then it comes out that what you said was pure truth. But if you say “it’s all mine” and get half, then the public can think maybe he lied—we don’t know. After all, he said “it’s all mine” and he got only half. Therefore the claim “half of it is mine” is more convenient for you. You have no migo. That is basically the difficulty I mentioned at the end of the previous lecture. At the end of the previous lecture I said: after all, there was a difficulty here. If I have a migo, then in effect, the very acceptance of the migo by the religious court destroys the logic of the migo. Because I’m making the weaker claim in order to be believed, by means of migo, that I could have made the stronger claim, right? That’s exactly what he says here. He says: I am claiming “half of it is mine” and I want to be believed by means of migo. What does it mean to be believed by means of migo? That you should give me the entire half that I am asking for, not just a quarter, right? That’s what I want, right? So the religious court says to me: you’re a liar, or we have a doubt that you’re a liar. What do you mean? If I were a liar I would have said “it’s all mine.” No—because it’s possible that you are a liar, and you say “half of it is mine” in order to get the whole half through migo, and then you’ll come out righteous. You say “half of it” and receive everything you want. You know that if you had said “it’s all mine” and received half, you would come out looking like a liar, so it is not comfortable for you to do that. So if that’s the case, you have no migo. And therefore you also won’t get the half; you’ll get a quarter. You have no migo because you planned to use it. Exactly. You have no migo. Now here, unlike in the other cases, you have no migo because you planned to use the migo, and in the end that really also comes out better, because you’ll get half as someone telling the truth and not as a liar. One hundred percent of what you asked for. Exactly. Okay? It’s not like the regular migo. So therefore the Nimukei Yosef says that’s why this migo doesn’t exist. For our purposes, beyond all the explanations in each of the Nimukei Yosef’s answers, in all of them I can make the calculation I made in the first answer of the Riv”a. You can’t know from the Nimukei Yosef what his view is regarding migo to extract. One could have said that he argues that we do not say migo to extract, and therefore he disagrees with Tosafot. If so, then he needs other answers—so why don’t we say here that the one who claims “half of it is mine” should be believed through migo? So he has these answers. One could have said no—he agrees with Tosafot that we do not say migo to extract, except that in his view here this is not migo to extract, it’s migo to retain. Therefore he needs answers other than Tosafot, and he brings his three answers. Bottom line: according to none of the Nimukei Yosef’s three answers can I know what his view is regarding migo to extract. The question is which of the Riv”a’s claims he does not accept; he doesn’t write it, so I don’t know. There are two interpretive possibilities—even three. And the Nimukei Yosef—is he on Riva”m, as it were? He is addressing Tosafot’s difficulty, to which Riva”m answered. The difficulty, yes? The Nimukei Yosef is later; he comes after Tosafot; he probably knew Tosafot. It is a commentary on the Rif. Fine. So in the Nimukei Yosef there is a basis for the view that says we do say migo to extract. We do say migo to extract, because the fact is, I have other explanations here; I don’t need to arrive at “we do not say migo to extract.” But you can’t conclude that the Nimukei Yosef actually holds that. It could be that the Nimukei Yosef agrees with Tosafot that we do not say migo to extract. So why does he need other answers? Because he thinks that here this is not called extraction. Okay? And it could be that the Nimukei Yosef really does disagree with Tosafot; he holds that we do say migo to extract, and therefore he needs other answers. Two possibilities. I don’t know what to say about the Nimukei Yosef. Okay? In what you asked on the page: he doesn’t see the case here as migo to extract? He doesn’t see the case here as migo to extract, but rather as brazenness. No—as migo… It’s not migo to extract because you are not in possession. This is not called my coming to extract from one in possession, because both of us are holding it. Why assume that you are in possession? I too am in possession. Everything I said was that Riva”m assumes three assumptions. And the question is which of them the Nimukei Yosef disputes. Maybe he disputes the first or second, and not the third. Or maybe he disputes the third—I don’t know. Either way he needs other answers. And the third means that there is such a thing as migo to extract, but not in this case? Right. No. The first says there isn’t one here because… Again. Riva”m’s assumptions are three. A: both are in possession. B: Riva”m’s second assumption is that even when both are in possession, if I come with a migo this is called migo to extract. That’s not a simple assumption; it could be that both of us are in possession, and if both of us are in possession, then this is not migo to extract. No—Riva”m argues that it is migo to extract. Riva”m’s third assumption: we do not say migo to extract. That is a halakhic assumption. Okay? The Nimukei Yosef does not accept Riva”m’s answer, and therefore he needs other answers. But the fact that he needs other answers—it’s not clear why. Is it because he doesn’t accept assumption A, or because he doesn’t accept assumption B, or because he doesn’t accept assumption C? I don’t know. Any one of these assumptions—if he doesn’t accept any one of them, that is enough to explain why he needs another answer. Right? Therefore I cannot know whether the Nimukei Yosef disagrees with Tosafot on the question of migo to extract. He may agree with Tosafot, he may disagree with him—I don’t know. And for our purposes, after all, that is what matters. We are not interested in the passage in Bava Metzia; we are interested in the question whether there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) who say that we do say migo to extract. So I’m saying: from the Nimukei Yosef I have no proof. Because everything he says relates only to that passage. Exactly. And in that passage it could be that this isn’t migo to extract. It could be that in that passage this is not migo to extract, and therefore he says it’s fine—but maybe, truly, migo to extract we do not say. Okay? I don’t know. So therefore I… but there is one thing the Nimukei Yosef did contribute to me. If there is someone who says that we do say migo to extract, there will be no difficulty against him from the passage here. Because we already have ready-made answers as to why the migo does not help here. Okay? Even though we do say migo to extract, still here it won’t help because it’s a migo of brazenness, because it’s migo from one asset to another—all the Nimukei Yosef’s answers. That the Nimukei Yosef does contribute to us. Meaning, if I have a position that says explicitly, “I hold that we do say migo to extract,” there will be no difficulty against it from this passage at the beginning of Bava Metzia. Because the Nimukei Yosef has already given us answers. Who is that position? Nachmanides. Right? Nachmanides says as follows: “And the one who says ‘half of it is mine’ is not worth less than a quarter”—yes, it appears on the page I sent you. Nachmanides. “Some ask: let him swear and take half, by migo, since if he wished he could have said ‘it is all mine,’ and he would have half with an oath, as stated in Bava Batra,” never mind, and so on. So that is Tosafot’s difficulty. I move to the second paragraph. “And this is not a proof.” What does that mean? He disagrees with Tosafot. Nachmanides’ point of departure is completely different from that of the Nimukei Yosef, even though they are going in the same direction. Nachmanides says: from the passage on page 3 they brought proofs that we do not say migo to extract, because otherwise there is a difficulty from that passage. Nachmanides says: that is not a proof. Before we understand what Nachmanides says as to why it is not a proof, what is his point of departure? He says: we do say migo to extract. We do say migo to extract. A migo is a migo. What difference does it make whether it is to extract or to retain? We say migo to extract too. You want to bring a proof against me from the passage at the beginning of Bava Metzia? Because then why don’t you say the migo for the one who says “half of it is mine,” that he should have a migo and it should help—and after all, we also say migo to extract. You can’t answer with Tosafot’s answer that we do not say migo to extract. Nachmanides says: we do say migo to extract. He says: I have other answers for why the migo is not said there. In Nachmanides, unlike the Nimukei Yosef, it is clear that he disagrees with Riva”m’s third assumption. Because for Nachmanides the entire context of the discussion is that he is coming to defend the view that we do say migo to extract. They challenged him from the passage in Bava Metzia, so he brings a different answer. Yes? Meaning, the way he frames the discussion is different from the Nimukei Yosef. Not the content of the discussion, but the point of departure. The Nimukei Yosef, in his point of departure, said nothing about his opinion regarding migo to extract. He has a difficulty in the Gemara there, and he discusses how to resolve it. Therefore it can be understood either way. Nachmanides says very clearly: I am telling you, we do say migo to extract; that is my starting point. For those who brought a proof against me from the beginning of Bava Metzia—this is not a proof, because I have another explanation for why the migo there doesn’t help, and then I remain with the view that we do say migo to extract. Right? In Nachmanides it is written explicitly. Okay, now what is the explanation? Why doesn’t the Nimukei Yosef bring this explanation? Why not avoid all these dramas? Everyone gives his own answers; I don’t know. By the way, even if he gives the other answers, even if he holds differently, he doesn’t bring the discussion of migo to extract, since here this is not migo to extract. So why bring it? He simply doesn’t think that here this is migo to extract. So how can he bring Tosafot’s answer? He disagrees that such a thing is called extracting. But on the conceptual level he accepts that we do not say migo to extract. Here he doesn’t bring that answer because he doesn’t accept that such a case is called extracting; on that he disagrees with the Riv”a. Okay? So in Nachmanides, the whole context, or point of departure from which he enters the discussion, is different from that of the Nimukei Yosef. For him the basic assumption is that a migo is a migo; if there is a migo then it also helps to extract—why not? You challenge me from the Bava Metzia passage; from there there is no challenge, I have an answer. And of course he cannot say that the answer is “we do not say migo to extract,” because he is coming to defend the thesis that we do say migo to extract. Okay, so how does he explain it? He could of course have gone in the directions of the Nimukei Yosef, but for some reason he doesn’t. And by the way, that’s an interesting question, because Nachmanides is one of the teachers of the Nimukei Yosef—his teachers’ teachers, meaning the Nimukei Yosef belongs to the school of the students of Nachmanides. Okay, and then the question is why the Nimukei Yosef… he is later than Nachmanides… so the question is why the Nimukei Yosef didn’t bring Nachmanides’ answer; I don’t know. But fine. But why didn’t Nachmanides bring the Nimukei Yosef’s answer? Simple—he didn’t think of them; the Nimukei Yosef is later. Okay. Why didn’t the Mordechai bring what the Rashba held…? The Rashba too is like Nachmanides: we do say migo to extract. The Rashba says this in a responsum and in other places. Therefore I said that the sages of Spain follow Nachmanides; and Nachmanides himself, in fact, moved to Spain—he moved from Provence… exactly, from Provence to Spain; the Rosh also moved; there were several medieval authorities (Rishonim) who moved. I think that for them this division into Spain and France wasn’t really known in our sense. Right. Who didn’t know? They themselves. Of course they knew—it’s a fact. The fact is that the school of the students of Nachmanides is a school that thinks differently from the students of Tosafot. So now we call it “the sages of Spain” and “the sages of France,” that doesn’t matter—but still there are two schools of thought here that think differently in many matters. Okay. So Nachmanides says—how did you understand Nachmanides’ answer? So why indeed don’t we say here the migo of “half” through the migo of “all”? Because he holds some kind of mathematical idea there. He says that they have the same degree of credibility; we don’t need to believe one more than the other, and therefore we have to divide what they claim—whatever each one claims, he gets half of it, because he doesn’t have more credibility than the other. Why? But I have a migo that I could have said “it’s all mine” and won half. So why don’t you give me half now too, when I say “half of it is mine”? No, because if we give you half, it will come out that we believe you more—you got one hundred percent of your request, so it will come out that we believed you more than the one who got fifty percent of his request. But Rashi… No, no, no. I agreed with you all the way until the end. The comparison is not between me and the one opposite me; the comparison is between me with the claim of half and me with the claim of all. If I had made the claim “it’s all mine,” how much would I have gotten? Half. Half of my claim. Now that gives me the power to claim “half of it is mine,” and you want that with “half of it is mine” I should get all that I ask. But the claim on which I rely, which is what gives me the power, is a claim that would only have been accepted halfway. That is what Nachmanides argues. Not that we believe me more than we believe the other side, but that with the claim of half I want to receive proportionally more than I would have received with the claim of all, in my alternative claim, which is my migo. But the migo cannot give me more than what is in it. After all, if I had claimed “it’s all mine,” I would have received half of what I claimed. Now I want that with the claim “half of it is mine” I should have the same power as if I had claimed “it’s all mine.” What does “the same power” mean? That here too I should receive half of what I ask—meaning a quarter. Therefore he says the migo doesn’t help. Fine. What happens to the one who claimed “it’s all mine” in that case? What’s the problem? So he gets the remaining three-quarters. I get a quarter. Yes, but that’s on the assumption that we assumed that with regard to credibility between the two claimants—and the Rabbi is saying the credibility is between me and my two possible claims. Exactly. It’s not a comparison between how much I’m believed and how much you’re believed. Why should that matter? In every legal case one side is more believed than the other. There is no rule that the two sides always have to be believed to the same degree. I have a migo and he doesn’t—so what’s the problem if I am more believed than he is? That’s exactly the claim: I have a migo. Nachmanides says: no, but migo is a comparison between two situations—what you would have claimed and what you claim now. He says: so I have to do the same thing. If you had claimed that, you would have received half of what you claimed, so even if we give you the power by force of that claim, here too you will receive half of what you claim. Now you claim half, so you get a quarter. Okay? Now this—look. An answer to why I can’t say by migo here, because to receive half means to receive everything I ask for. And in the alternative claim I would have received half of what I ask for. So it cannot give me the power to win everything I ask for. This is if we are holding together, and I am making a claim of togetherness; that gives me power of possession only over half. We need to preserve the ratio. Not possession-status—to win in practice half of the ratio between what you claim and what you receive. In my two possible claims we need to preserve the ratio, the proportion between what I receive and what I ask. Never mind. It’s not the absolute sum that determines the relation between the claims or the migo, but the relation between what I receive and what I ask. And the question is why. But the person doesn’t care whether the ratio, the proportion of what he receives, will be the same proportion. What he cares about is receiving the sum. That’s what you started asking now. And the question is what the logic is behind this. It has no logic. It has no logic. What do you mean? What is this hocus-pocus? I could have gotten half, right? “Why would he lie” certainly exists here. If I wanted to lie, I would have claimed “it’s all mine” and gotten half. True, that would have been half of my claim there—so what? But I would have gotten half. So what difference does it make? Believe me now by migo and believe me for the half that I ask for; give me all that I ask for. What difference does it make that here it is all that I ask for and there it would only have been half? Bottom line, the absolute amount is what matters for the logic of lying, right? Then that is a less good claim, “it’s all mine”? What? A better claim. No, it’s a less good claim, because there I would get half and here I get a quarter. No, that’s a question on all migo, like we said earlier. Every migo: if you believe me by force of that claim for this claim, now this claim is no less good—so we already answered that in the previous lecture. If you preserve exactly the same ratio. No—that’s the point, it’s not logical. Why should I care about getting half? Right, so what? So what? I want it in meters. “I believe no more,” but “believe no more” only relatively. Bottom line, he is not receiving more. He would have received half; he also receives half now, so what? Where did this hocus-pocus come from, that the proportion of belief has to be preserved? What has to be preserved is the amount. If I wanted to lie, I would have made the claim “it’s all mine” and gotten more. So I do have “why would he lie” here. So what? That is our difficulty. So from the start too, the possession-status is really half-and-half. I only have half. Right, obviously. But that’s the migo. Here you want to give me a quarter. Why? Had I made the other claim I would have gotten half. So believe me by migo and now too give me half. But the consequence of what he receives is according to what he… Yes, the credibility of his words. Fine, but what’s the mechanism? Believe me that I’m not lying, because if I wanted to lie I would have claimed “it’s all mine” and gotten half. That would have been better than now, where I get a quarter. So there is “why would he lie” here. Why does it matter that the proportion of trust is not the same? Why is that important? What matters is the absolute amount. Yes. So why doesn’t the migo work? That is Nachmanides’ question. What does his answer mean? Why doesn’t the migo work here? It’s a good migo. So what if the proportion isn’t the same proportion? That’s the question. Now look. Let’s do the calculation for a moment. “Why would he lie” definitely exists here. It could be that Nachmanides says “why would he lie” doesn’t help; only strength of claim helps. Only perhaps “why would he lie” is too weak, and you need strength of claim in order to win. But seemingly I should have strength of claim here too. Also because I am in possession of half. After all, I could have won half. So regarding that half I am in possession. What’s the problem? Why not give it to me? Right? Both strength of claim and “why would he lie” exist here; even here the distinction between “why would he lie” and strength of claim won’t help—both exist. Nachmanides’ argument is completely unclear. Why, though, am I in possession of half? But it’s his half. No, the migo makes me unchallenged. That is exactly the… I was challenged because both of us are in possession together. The migo turns me into sole possessor. Because after all, I could have extracted that half from you; you couldn’t have done anything against it if I had said “it’s all mine.” Right? The Kehillot Yaakov’s reasoning. After all, with another claim I could have extracted it from you even if you were in possession, right? So I am in possession of it alone. Regarding that half, only I am in possession. Because after all, I could have extracted it from you if I had said “it’s all mine.” So we begin with the fact that both of us are in possession, and therefore it is challenged possession-status. Now I have a migo: after all, I could have said “it’s all mine” and gotten it. That turns my possession-status over the half into good possession-status. So give it to me. That’s migo as strength of claim, right, according to the Kehillot Yaakov? But I’m not claiming that I have half; only the migo says I have half. Right—why not? I claim that I have half. I claim half. That half is mine. I could have won this half if I had said “it’s all mine.” No, wait—I say that I have half, but I’m not in possession of half; I’m in possession of a quarter. No, I am in possession of half together with someone else. Call it what you want. Exactly. Good. And the migo turns—right—and the migo turns me into absolute possessor. Why? Since if I had said “it’s all mine,” I would have received the half even though we are both in possession together. I would have gotten it, right? So I am in possession alone over that half. That’s how migo works when I don’t have someone else… No, no, the opposite—precisely when I do. Migo takes a challenged claim, or challenged possession-status, and turns it into good possession-status. Why? Because what is possession-status? Possession-status means the one who could have prevailed in court and needed nobody. If I had said “it’s all mine,” I would have prevailed in court; I would have received this half even though you are in possession of it together with me, right? So if I can win it by force of an alternative claim, then I am in possession of it now too, alone, not with you. The migo—we are both in possession, but the fact that I have a migo strengthens my possession-status and turns me into the sole possessor. So give it to me now; that is exactly migo as strength of claim. And that is Nachmanides’ difficulty: why doesn’t the migo work? That is Nachmanides’ difficulty: why doesn’t the migo work? Yes, and it’s not clear what he answers. Why should he care that it’s half the proportion of his claim? That is a weaker claim; it should hold up for me. No, migo as strength of claim means it turns me into one in possession, because I could have won with the alternative claim, so it is as if it is in my hand. Because I could have won. Why should I care that you are also holding it? Even if you are also holding it, if I had said “it’s all mine,” you would have given it to me, right? So why should I care that you’re holding it? Bottom line, I am the one in possession. That is basically the Kehillot Yaakov’s explanation of migo as strength of claim. Why should I care that you are in possession together with me? After all, I had the option of saying “it’s all mine,” and then the religious court would not have cared that you are in possession together with me; I would have gotten this half, right? Even though you are in possession of it together with me. So this migo turns me into sole possessor, makes your joint possession with me irrelevant, because I could have neutralized it with the second claim. So now I am considered sole possessor over this half. Give it to me. Okay? Therefore both migo as “why would he lie” and migo as strength of claim are present here; it is not clear what Nachmanides is answering. It seems to me that the only way I manage to understand Nachmanides is through force of credibility. That third, strange approach of force—right, Nachmanides is a crushing proof for that view. You can’t understand him any other way. Not that I understand it—this is a strange view and I have no explanation for it—but in Nachmanides it’s really as plain as day. Meaning, if that claim would have been believed at the level of receiving half of what you say, then that gives you the power to win half of what you say in this claim too. Why? It doesn’t work with possession-status, and not with “why would he lie”; it’s some kind of hocus-pocus. But that’s what Nachmanides says. Meaning, from here there is very good proof for the formulation in Kovetz Shiurim. Not that I understand it—I don’t understand its logic—but it seems to me that otherwise it is very difficult to understand Nachmanides’ answer. Why is it the same as “plain as day”? Because Nachmanides is basically saying this: if that claim gives you the ability to win half of what you would ask for, then that same power carries over to your claim now. Not that you become one in possession, and not all the understandable mechanisms of “why would he lie” or strength of claim. No—it’s some sort of hocus-pocus. The half-power you have in that claim gives you half-power on this claim. That’s it—that’s what he says. Because the same strength you have in that claim you have in this claim. And then one can understand what he says—that here too you will receive… Understand: Nachmanides is basically saying that in truth you really do have a migo—not a weak migo, but a good migo; you have a migo. It’s just that the migo gives you only a quarter, because it gives you half of the claim you are making. He doesn’t say there is no migo, or that it is a weak migo like the Nimukei Yosef says. He says: no, no, it’s an excellent migo; it’s just that all this migo can give you is what you get anyway—the quarter. The migo won’t give you more than what you get anyway. Meaning, it’s a completely different direction from the Nimukei Yosef. The Nimukei Yosef explains in three ways why this migo is not a good one; Nachmanides says: no, this migo is a wonderful migo, only all it can give you is what you get anyway, so it doesn’t help. You cannot extract from this migo more than the quarter that you get anyway. Okay? So I can understand that only with force of credibility. With difficulty maybe one could say that somehow he really meant the Nimukei Yosef’s third explanation. What the Nimukei Yosef says there, after all, is that it’s more pleasant for me to win half—to ask for half and to win my whole claim—than to ask for the whole and win half. It doesn’t seem so from Nachmanides’ wording. Why should I care whether it’s pleasant or not? No—that’s a migo of brazenness. No, it’s very logical. A migo of brazenness. That’s the idea. It’s a migo of brazenness and a completely logical idea. Fine. But it does not appear from Nachmanides’ wording that this is what he means. But I’m saying—the Nimukei Yosef is his student, or his student’s student. That perhaps strengthens the possibility that maybe there was some corruption in the text; perhaps he really means the Nimukei Yosef, because you need to understand: this is a very difficult explanation, this force-of-credibility idea, this “electricity.” It’s strange—but it’s the only way to understand Nachmanides. Fine. For our purposes, in any case, one way or another, Nachmanides really is the clear source—and also the Rashba who follows him—that we do say migo to extract. The Nimukei Yosef opens such a possibility, but I don’t know—you can’t know. Okay? Now the question is: why, really? Why doesn’t migo to extract work? What is the logic behind it? If there is a migo, there is a migo. I’ll sharpen the point further. If you saw there what I referred you to: the accepted approach is that migo is a weak proof and therefore it doesn’t help extract from one in possession. Beyond the question of why that is a weak proof—it’s not such a weak proof—and beyond the point, maybe after I… okay, it’s because it doesn’t help the litigant, not because it is a weak proof, but rather proofs belonging to the litigant don’t help. But why isn’t it a good consideration? It’s a good proof. If you already say it’s a proof, then why is it weak? You can say that proofs don’t help in such a case, but why is it a weak proof? You can say it is proof about the person, not about the matter. Fine, but it’s a good proof, not a weak proof. Therefore this is the accepted explanation; all the other explanations you saw there—I don’t understand them. “It’s a biblical decree”—that kind of explanation, I don’t understand. Weak proof I do understand; I just don’t understand why migo is a weak proof. Secondly, we need to understand—one second, I want to at least finish this section. The point is that this is much more difficult than it seems. Because usually when I come to extract from one in possession—and certainly when both are in possession, that’s much worse—in such a case basically the situation is balanced. Evidentially both sides control equally, and also there is no majority rule of “what is under a person’s hand is presumed his,” as I said earlier, because that applies to objects generally, not objects in dispute. Who says that I’m the liar rather than he is the liar? So what if he is in possession? Why not assume that I am lying? Not at all. So on the evidentiary level they are completely balanced. Now, I understand that even if they are completely balanced, you leave it in the possession of the one holding it, because the court will not act if it has no reason to act. Right, that’s how we explained it. But if there is even the slightest consideration tilting in favor of the plaintiff, that should be enough. Even if it is weak proof. Because after all, without this proof the situation is completely balanced. The whole reason I give preference to the one in possession is simply a default. If it is completely balanced, I leave the situation as it is. But if that is truly the concept of possession-status, then any decision, however slight, should have been enough to help. The moment it is a proof, even if it is a weak proof, it should have helped. Right? Because the rule of following the one in possession is a default rule. If you have no way to decide, do nothing; leave the situation as it is. If he is holding the money, let it remain with him. But all that is only when the situation really is completely balanced apart from possession-status. But if the plaintiff now brings a migo in his favor, then it is not completely balanced—even if the proof is weak. Let’s say I accept that it is weak, but still, he has some kind of proof and the other has nothing. So why not give him the money? The preference of the one in possession is only a preference by default. If we are completely balanced, I leave the money where it is—why should the court do anything? But if we are not balanced, any tilt whatsoever is enough to give the money to the one who has the migo. What difference does it make whether I am the plaintiff and not the defendant? Right? The question is much stronger: why do we not say migo to extract? It won’t help to say simply that it is weak proof. What you just heard was to say that we do say migo to extract. That’s what I’m asking—why do Tosafot say that we do not say migo to extract? What is the logic of that? There is a migo and it is proof; it upsets the equilibrium, the balance between plaintiff and defendant. Why, in such a situation, go after possession-status? Going after possession-status is the default when they are balanced. But the moment there is some tilt in favor of one side, there is no need to resort to possession-status, because I have decided it based on evidence. Possession-status is a decision when there is no evidence. And everything we said at the beginning of the lecture—now, is it a biblical decree? Because we said at the beginning of the lecture that migo is not proof and therefore… Wait, wait—no, that’s just… I’m getting there, getting there. So I’m saying: on the face of it, this thing—that we do not say migo to extract—is very difficult. Because simply speaking, migo is proof; and even if you say it is weak proof, still it tilts the scale. And if it tilts the scale, why follow the one in possession? Following the one in possession is a default when it is balanced. But once there is a migo, even if it is weak proof, it tilts the scale, so why in the world follow the one in possession? So according to Tosafot, it seems to me that the only way to understand why we do not say migo to extract is really to understand that migo is not proof. That’s what I said earlier. Another explanation, another reason why we need to say that migo as such… because if it had any evidentiary dimension, there is no reason in the world to assume that we do not say migo to extract. Rather, we are forced—at least according to Tosafot—to reach the conclusion that in migo there is no evidentiary dimension at all. If there is no evidentiary dimension at all, then what are you telling me? You’re telling me that migo can change possession-status. Strength of claim—it works from the side of strength of claim. What are you talking about? If you are in possession and your claim is reasonable, the fact that I have a migo will not turn me into the one in possession at your expense. Therefore we do not say migo to extract. When can migo help determine possession-status? When you are holding the money; only you have a weak claim. And that is as though possession-status without a claim. The migo reinforces the claim again and leaves you as the one in possession—the money is with you. But if the money is with someone else and I bring a migo—migo to extract—the migo cannot turn me into the one in possession at his expense. Migo does not change possession-status. Migo can leave you in possession if the money is with you and there is some problem. Fine? But where the migo comes to turn me into the one in possession at your expense—that, no. That we do not say. Therefore we do not say migo to extract. But we said that migo can on the one hand—not on the one hand, it can both strengthen the possessor and also generate possession-status. I said: generate possession-status in a case where I am holding the money, only I was not considered in possession because my claim is problematic; so the migo restores my claim. But the migo cannot take the money out of your hands into mine and turn me into the one in possession. That migo cannot do—according to Tosafot, that migo does not do. But what—this is all by logic, on what is he… This is all Tosafot? It’s all logic, all logic. That’s why the game here is all logic, and therefore you need to understand everything in terms of logic. There is no Torah source for this yet; we’ll see more later. Okay, so “the burden of proof rests on the one who seeks to extract from another,” but migo is not proof. Migo is not proof at all, regardless of migo to extract. Migo is not proof at all. Why does it help to retain? It helps to retain because it turns the one making a weak claim into someone making a good claim, and if he is in possession then he wins by force of possession-status, not by force of the migo. But migo to extract tries to extract from one in possession. That migo cannot do. Why? Because it is not proof. If it were proof, it would extract too. It is not proof. It can turn me into one in possession—it cannot turn me into one in possession out of nothing. That migo cannot do. He is holding the money, and all in all his claim is a reasonable claim. It’s not an unreasonable claim. If his claim were unreasonable, I would understand. His claim is reasonable. So I have a migo—fine, so my claim is also good. Both of us have good claims, and he is in possession, so he remains in possession. Not replaced; it is not that it turns me into the one in possession. I am in possession anyway… only that migo can do. But the other one has… that’s what I’m resolving, what I’m explaining. Meaning, migo can turn me into one in possession when I am already in possession, only I have a problem because my claim is weak. It cannot turn me into one in possession at your expense, when you are the ordinary possessor with a reasonable claim and everything is fine. That is the meaning of “we do not say migo to extract.” In another formulation I would say it this way. The migo is basically proof about the person, not about the matter. Right? Why? This is what I said at the beginning of the lecture. Migo is proof about the person, not about the matter. If it were proof about the matter, now I’m saying that there is indeed “why would he lie” in migo, not strength of claim—therefore this is not the previous direction I gave. Migo is proof. So why doesn’t it extract? After all, migo—migo should be able to extract, because possession-status is only a default. If I have proof in my favor, then this is not a balanced situation. Why give it to the one in possession? The answer is: proof in my favor does not help. It is proof about the person, not about the matter. It only turns my claim into a good claim. Into a credible claim. Fine—but a good claim is very nice, yet claims cannot extract from one in possession. A litigant who makes claims cannot extract from one in possession—not because I suspect him of lying, but because he needs to bring evidence, and he has not brought evidence. He has only made a good claim. Fine, so what? One does not extract from one in possession on the basis of claims. It is not the same… it is very similar to the explanation I gave earlier, but it is not the same explanation. The earlier explanation assumed that migo has no evidentiary dimension. Here I am saying that migo does have an evidentiary dimension, but that evidentiary dimension is proof about the person and not about the matter, and proof about the person does not help to extract. Okay? No, this is Tosafot. Up to here I explained Tosafot, who says we do not say migo to extract. Nachmanides argues that we do say migo to extract. So what does Nachmanides really say? Nachmanides basically understands one of several possibilities. Either Nachmanides argues that migo contains evidentiary force and is not only strength of claim. For Nachmanides, you have to reject all Tosafot’s explanations if he disagrees with him, right? If each of Tosafot’s explanations is enough to lead to Tosafot’s position, then he has to reject both of them. So first, he says that there is proof in migo, right? Second, he can say either that this is proof about the claim itself, about the matter itself, and not about the person. It is generated through the person, but in the end it also gives me proof. According to Nachmanides, this is proof about the matter, not just about the person. It is built through the person, but in the end, if you ask me whether this is really what happened, the answer is yes. So in practice I also have proof about the matter. Therefore it extracts. Another possibility in Nachmanides is that even proof about the person can extract. Who says not? Who says one cannot extract by means of claims? If my claim is more plausible, then I will extract from you. Fine? What then about “money lying in doubt is divided”? Yes—if your claim is a very good claim, then yes. Against everything I said earlier, that all this does is… but in any case I have to say this in Nachmanides. Okay? Now I’ll summarize this at the beginning of the next lecture. I see we haven’t finished yet. That was too fast. I’ll send you the summary, and I’ll also go over it again at the beginning of the next lecture, although fine, in the next lecture you’ll already start with the passage—I’ll give you the… but I’ll still devote a segment at the beginning of the next lecture to summarize this issue, so go over it well, and then we’ll enter into the passage at the beginning of Ketubot and “the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted,” and so on. Okay.