The General Principles of Melachot – Lesson 22
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The Mishnah on 105a: one who tears in anger or for his dead, and all destructive acts are exempt
- The picture of a destructive act and the difficulty according to Rabbi Shimon
- The possibility that labor not needed for its own sake is not destructive, and the opposite possibility
- The Or Sameach: no constructive result and no destructive result is also called destructive
- One who tears in anger: satisfying one’s impulse as a benefit that is not a repair in the object
- The practical question: is there even such a thing as “plain tearing” that is not mere inadvertence
- The Talmud on 106a: all destructive acts are exempt except wounding and kindling
- Connecting the topic to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, and the surprising reversal
- A methodological note: does a verse teach a rule or an exception, and the contradiction within the same passage
- A proposed alternative reading for the daughter of a priest: a prohibition on punishment on the Sabbath, not a prohibition on kindling
- Rashi: the first clause follows Rabbi Shimon and the latter clause Rabbi Yehuda, and the connection to labor not needed for its own sake
- Returning to the central difficulty: when is there a destructive act that serves no purpose at all
Summary
General Overview
The text raises a difficulty in understanding the Mishnah in Sabbath 105 and the Talmud on 105–106 regarding the relationship between the exemption for a destructive act and the exemption/liability for labor not needed for its own sake in the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. It sharpens the point that according to the Talmud, tearing in anger or for one’s dead depends primarily on the dispute over labor not needed for its own sake and not on the definition of a destructive act, while “all destructive acts are exempt” appears to be an agreed rule. Later, a baraita of Rabbi Abbahu appears that excludes wounding and kindling, and Rabbi Yohanan rejects or narrows it to a case where one needs it for his dog or for its ashes, and the Talmud ties the gap to the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon through derivations from circumcision on the Sabbath and the burning of the daughter of a priest. Rashi proposes that the latter clause of the Mishnah is according to Rabbi Yehuda and the first clause according to Rabbi Shimon, and from this a surprising reversal emerges in which Rabbi Shimon becomes the stringent one regarding wounding and kindling as destructive acts. In the end, everything returns to the troubling question: when is there even a realistic case of a “destructive act” that does not involve some purpose or mere inadvertence?
The Mishnah on 105a: one who tears in anger or for his dead, and all destructive acts are exempt
The text explains that the Mishnah exempts destructive acts, and understands that “one who tears in anger or for his dead” is presented as a novelty relative to the first clause of the Mishnah, which is also exempt. The Talmud explains that the exemption for one who tears in anger or for his dead is specifically according to Rabbi Shimon, who exempts one for labor not needed for its own sake, but according to Rabbi Yehuda, one who tears in anger or in mourning, and likewise for his dead, is liable, because in his view one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake. The text argues that according to the straightforward reading of the Talmud, the dispute regarding tearing is not about a destructive act but about labor not needed for its own sake, whereas “all destructive acts are exempt” appears to be an agreed law and not the focus of dispute between them.
The picture of a destructive act and the difficulty according to Rabbi Shimon
The text suggests that the simple case of a destructive act is plain tearing, without anger and without mourning, because there is no benefit in the object itself. It asks: according to Rabbi Shimon, even without the law of destructive act there would already be grounds for exemption on the basis of labor not needed for its own sake, so it is not clear what the exemption for destructive act adds, or why it is needed at all. It formulates the point by saying that a destructive act seems like “labor not needed for its own sake squared,” because in labor not needed for its own sake there is still some alternative constructive result, whereas in a destructive act there is not even that.
The possibility that labor not needed for its own sake is not destructive, and the opposite possibility
The text raises the possibility that labor not needed for its own sake can exist without destruction, for example, one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt, where the hole itself is not necessarily damage but simply something he does not care about. On the other side, it asks whether it is possible for a labor to be needed for its own sake and yet still be considered destructive, so that the law of destructive act would be an independent exemption not swallowed up within labor not needed for its own sake. It presents as a test case the fact that according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds one liable for labor not needed for its own sake, the exemption of destructive act becomes essential where there is real damage, whereas according to Rabbi Shimon it still remains unclear why there is any need for an additional category at all.
The Or Sameach: no constructive result and no destructive result is also called destructive
The text mentions the Or Sameach discussed in the previous lecture, who holds that if an action is neither constructive nor destructive, that too is called destructive, because liability on the Sabbath depends on a properly constructive act. It formulates the question whether “destructive” means there is no labor here at all, or whether there is labor here but with a special exemption for destructive action. It sharpens the point that if one adopts the Or Sameach, a difficulty arises regarding one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt, because one might then exempt even according to Rabbi Yehuda on the basis of destructive action; but the text suggests that the need for the dirt counts as a constructive result that neutralizes the destructive aspect of the hole within that very same action.
One who tears in anger: satisfying one’s impulse as a benefit that is not a repair in the object
The text brings the Talmud’s language that one who tears in anger gives “satisfaction to his impulse,” and understands this as creating a kind of benefit that explains why this is not just plain destruction. It notes precisely that the benefit is psychological and not in the object, so from the object’s perspective the tearing remains destructive, but the person derives a different kind of benefit, which places the case in the realm of labor not needed for its own sake in relation to the tearing in the Tabernacle, which was done in order to sew. It contrasts this with cases like one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt, where the second product of the action can be considered a constructive result that removes the label of destructive act, even though the hole itself is not the goal.
The practical question: is there even such a thing as “plain tearing” that is not mere inadvertence
The text argues that it is hard to imagine “plain tearing,” because a person performs an action for some purpose, and if there is no purpose then it looks like mere inadvertence or mistake, not an intentional act of labor. It brings an example from the laws of muktzeh in the name of the Ran, regarding a utensil whose primary use is permitted that may not be moved “for no need at all,” and cites the Arukh HaShulchan’s question: what does “for no need at all” mean? It suggests that it means for a post-Sabbath need. It concludes that regarding destructive action, an explanation like “for tomorrow’s need” does not help, because the very fact that the action is constructive in the future would stop it from being considered destructive in the present.
The Talmud on 106a: all destructive acts are exempt except wounding and kindling
The text presents the baraita taught by Rabbi Abbahu before Rabbi Yohanan: “All destructive acts are exempt except wounding and kindling,” from which it appears that wounding and kindling are liable even when they are destructive. It brings Rabbi Yohanan’s response, “Go teach that outside,” and, if one insists, “wounding where he needs it for his dog, kindling where he needs its ashes,” which explains that liability for wounding and kindling exists only where there is benefit, so they are not really destructive acts. It emphasizes that this sharpens the difficulty even more: what is the case of wounding or kindling that is supposedly “destructive” without any purpose at all? Once again the question arises why a person would do such an action with no goal.
Connecting the topic to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, and the surprising reversal
The text cites the Talmud’s challenge from the Mishnah, “But didn’t we learn: all destructive acts are exempt?” and the answer, “The Mishnah is Rabbi Yehuda, the baraita is Rabbi Shimon,” and notes that this is surprising, because usually Rabbi Shimon is lenient and Rabbi Yehuda is stringent, and here it appears to be the opposite. It brings the Talmud’s reasoning for Rabbi Shimon’s view: since a verse was needed to permit circumcision on the Sabbath, this implies that ordinary wounding is liable; and since the Merciful One prohibited execution by burning in the case of the daughter of a priest, this implies that ordinary kindling is liable. It then brings Rabbi Yehuda’s answer through Rav Ashi: “What difference is there between repairing circumcision and repairing a utensil, between cooking a wick and cooking dyes?” meaning that circumcision counts as a constructive act, and therefore it is not a destructive act from which one would have grounds to exempt.
A methodological note: does a verse teach a rule or an exception, and the contradiction within the same passage
The text formulates a general question: when is a verse understood as an exception that teaches that the general rule is the opposite, and when is it understood as a model for a general rule? It brings a rhetorical example, “Whatever Sarah tells you, listen to her voice,” to illustrate the logic that “if the Torah commanded it here, that is a sign that ordinarily it is not so.” It compares this to the derivation that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition from tzitzit and shaatnez, and asks why there we learn a rule rather than saying, “The novelty applies only to that case.” It emphasizes that in this very same passage, the Talmud uses two opposite directions: in the case of circumcision, it concludes that without the verse it would have been forbidden and therefore ordinary wounding is liable, while in the case of the daughter of a priest it concludes from the prohibition of burning that ordinary kindling is liable as a broader principle.
A proposed alternative reading for the daughter of a priest: a prohibition on punishment on the Sabbath, not a prohibition on kindling
The text notes that the lecturer wrote an article arguing that the prohibition regarding the daughter of a priest is not a prohibition of kindling but a prohibition on administering punishment on the Sabbath, similar to the prohibition on holding court on the Sabbath, and that even if kindling were permitted it still would have been forbidden to carry out a death penalty on the Sabbath. He notes that this understanding would change the entire derivation from which the Talmud concludes that kindling is liable even when destructive. He adds that this also has implications for wounding in the context of lashes, because there too the problem may be punishment on the Sabbath rather than the labor of wounding as such.
Rashi: the first clause follows Rabbi Shimon and the latter clause Rabbi Yehuda, and the connection to labor not needed for its own sake
The text brings that Rashi cites an explanation that “Rabbi Yehuda holds that destructive wounding is exempt, but it is not explained where,” and then Rashi himself writes, “But it seems to me,” that everything depends on the dispute over labor not needed for its own sake. It explains according to Rashi that for Rabbi Yehuda, wounding where he needs it for his dog and kindling where he needs its ashes are liable because they are a “repair for another purpose,” even though the damage is in the labor itself, and therefore one who destroys and does not produce any constructive result is exempt; accordingly, the latter clause can indeed follow Rabbi Yehuda even though the first clause was set up according to Rabbi Shimon. It explains that according to Rashi, for Rabbi Shimon there is no case of wounding or kindling that is not destructive, because benefit for some external purpose is considered labor not needed for its own sake, for which he exempts, and therefore in order to justify the need for verses regarding circumcision and the daughter of a priest, one must say that wounding and kindling are liable even when they are destructive.
Returning to the central difficulty: when is there a destructive act that serves no purpose at all
The text concludes that according to this line of thought, in the laws of destructive action it comes out that Rabbi Yehuda is actually the lenient one regarding destructive wounding and kindling, while Rabbi Shimon is the stringent one, because of the way labor not needed for its own sake affects whether an external benefit counts as a “constructive result” or not. It returns and sharpens the point that the more broadly one recognizes an external need as a constructive result, the harder it becomes to find a case of genuine destructive action, because if there is no need at all then it looks like mere inadvertence, and if there is some need then it is no longer destructive. It ends by saying that the riddle of how to picture the exemption for destructive action remains unresolved and only grows sharper throughout the sugya.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Mishnah on page 105 we saw that the Mishnah says destructive acts are exempt. One who tears in anger or for his dead—that’s apparently a novelty relative to the first clause of the Mishnah, which is also exempt. And in the Talmud it is explained that this is only according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that one is exempt for labor not needed for its own sake. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, one who tears in anger and in mourning—yes, for his dead—is liable. Why? Because according to Rabbi Yehuda, one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake. No, that’s labor not needed for its own sake. One who tears in anger or for his dead—apparently from the Talmud it seems that this is a dispute about labor not needed for its own sake. Meaning, it’s not connected to destructive action. Besides, afterward it says that all destructive acts are exempt, and that looks like an agreed rule. Okay, so it comes out that there isn’t here—at least for now—that there is no dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding destructive action. There’s just the regular dispute we know about labor not needed for its own sake, and besides that there’s another rule that destructive action is exempt. When is something considered destructive? What is the situation being discussed? Seemingly I would say it’s when he just tears for no reason—not in anger and not for his dead, just tears. Okay, so that’s destructive; there’s no benefit at all in that. Except that this raises a question both according to Rabbi Yehuda and according to Rabbi Shimon, because if you tear not in anger and not for your dead but just tear, yes? So according to Rabbi Shimon, if there were no law of destructive action, what would I say? It would be exempt anyway, right? It would be exempt anyway because it’s labor not needed for its own sake. So why do I need the exemption of destructive action? Every destructive action is really labor not needed for its own sake squared. In labor not needed for its own sake there is still some other constructive result that you’re producing; here there’s nothing at all, only the damage, meaning only the very thing that…
[Speaker D] But according to the end of the Talmud, our Mishnah is only according to Rabbi Shimon, so that’s a problem in itself, because that’s the Mishnah that talks about destructive action.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right,
[Speaker D] if destructive action isn’t relevant and the Talmud stitches together…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who is the Mishnah according to in the first place? So according to Rabbi Shimon it’s not at all clear what the picture of destructive action is.
[Speaker A] Yes, but—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, there is a Torah-level prohibition in destructive action. It could be that in Jewish law we’d say that here it’s even permitted, not merely exempt. So does it come out that the whole novelty of the law of destructive action is only on the rabbinic level—to tell you that there’s not even a rabbinic prohibition here? Is that the novelty of destructive action? Obviously not. And you also see later that from the fact that the Torah had to permit circumcision on the Sabbath and so on, the law of destructive action is a Torah-level law. Okay, so that’s the first point according to… What? We’ll get to circumcision in a moment; that’s later in the Talmud. So first of all, it’s not clear why according to Rabbi Shimon we need the exemption for destructive action at all. When would it ever apply? Whenever we have a case of destructive action, there will in any case first of all be an exemption because it’s labor not needed for its own sake. Or in other words: is it possible to have a situation where you would be considered destructive even though the labor is in fact needed for its own sake? It’s labor that is needed for its own sake, but still you would be considered destructive. Can there be such a situation? So one could say that maybe really there is no separate exemption of destructive action. The exemption of destructive action branches off from the exemption of labor not needed for its own sake. It’s just an extreme case of labor not needed for its own sake; that’s called destructive action, where there isn’t even the alternative constructive result. When there is an alternative constructive result, that’s labor not needed for its own sake. When there isn’t even that, then you’re left with plain destructive action, so the exemption of labor not needed for its own sake squared. Maybe the practical difference would be that in fact there would not even be a rabbinic prohibition, but it would be completely permitted. But there wouldn’t be a special exemption of destructive action—or as I said before, that’s a bit difficult. You roasted meat and by mistake burned
[Speaker D] it, you over-roasted it, so then it’s no longer labor not needed for its own sake because you were trying, as it were…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s just something you didn’t intend at all.
[Speaker D] Maybe mere inadvertence, but that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That won’t help us here, because you’re taking us to a place that isn’t relevant to the prohibitions of labor at all. So that’s the first note regarding Rabbi Shimon. One could maybe say that perhaps we are talking about a situation that is labor not needed for its own sake—say, one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt, okay? Labor not needed for its own sake. But the aspect of digging the hole is not damage. It isn’t damage; it’s just that I’m not doing it for that. I’m doing it because I need the sand, the dirt. Okay? So I’m saying—so I’m saying—there could be such a case, first of all. No, it’s not at all certain; I’m just testing it now. The question is whether there can be
[Speaker D] a case of labor not needed for its own sake that is not destructive.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That first of all does seem possible. One who digs a hole and needs only the dirt—that’s labor not needed for its own sake. Why? Because you’re not doing it for the hole but for the dirt. That doesn’t mean the hole you made is damage. Meaning, it could be in the ground—you don’t need it, that’s not why you did it—but it’s not damage. Ground where you don’t care whether there’s a hole there or not, okay? But maybe—so what happens in such a case? What? Yes, yes, in another moment I’ll project it, because when I need the sources; right now we’re just… So that’s one direction. What happens in the other direction? Meaning, can there be a situation where the labor is needed for its own sake, but you would still have an exemption of destructive action? Until now I was talking about labor not needed for its own sake that is not destructive.
[Speaker D] Exempt.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Labor not needed for its own sake is needed—yes. That’s obvious, because—well, not obvious, but according to this suggestion. Because it could be that there wouldn’t be an exemption of destructive action here, and there still would be labor not needed for its own sake here, and according to Rabbi Yehuda maybe he would even be liable, because he holds one liable for labor not needed for its own sake. The question is whether the opposite can happen. Can there be a case where the labor is not needed for its own sake but it is not destructive? Sorry, the opposite: needed for its own sake, but still destructive. And then you need specifically the exemption of destructive action. According to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds one liable for labor not needed for its own sake, there it’s clear that you need the exemption of destructive action, because from the standpoint of labor not needed for its own sake there wouldn’t be an exemption. So there would be an exemption of destructive action. For example, one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt—according to Rabbi Yehuda he is liable. What happens if by making the hole you ruin the ground? There it could be that you really would be exempt by the law of destructive action, because he doesn’t have the exemption of… But according to Rabbi Shimon, since there is the exemption for labor not needed for its own sake, the question is why the exemption for destructive action is needed at all. Now, true, one could say that one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt, and the hole itself is neither constructive nor destructive. I’m not doing it for the hole, I don’t need the hole, it’s not destructive, I don’t care whether there’s a hole there or not, it doesn’t interest me, I need the dirt. Okay? According to the Or Sameach that we saw in the previous lecture, it could be that even such a thing is called damage. Why? Because the Or Sameach said that if there is something that is neither constructive nor destructive, that too is called destructive. Because an action for which you’re liable on the Sabbath has to be a constructive action. If there is no constructive result, there doesn’t have to be damage; if there is no constructive result, that alone is enough for the thing to be considered destructive, because that labor is worth nothing, you don’t need it. You don’t need damage; you need there not to be a constructive result, okay? We talked about this—the question whether destructive action means that there’s no labor here at all, or whether destructive action is an exemption. If you say that in order to be liable for labor there must be a constructive result, then when there is no constructive result this is not labor at all. You don’t need damage in order to exempt it; you only need there not to be a constructive result. If you understand that you need actual damage—not enough that there’s no constructive result—then the simple view is that the destructive act exempts. Meaning, the labor is defined as labor even when there is no constructive result, but if you are destructive, that exempts you. Okay? So in our context, what about one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt? There, if there is no constructive result and no damage, according to the Or Sameach that too is considered damage. Right? Now if that too is considered damage, then the opposite question arises. How can Rabbi Shimon exempt it because it’s labor not needed for its own sake? Let him exempt it because it’s destructive. Or according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds one liable for labor not needed for its own sake, let him exempt it because it’s destructive. Right—but he ruins the hole. Okay. So according to Rabbi Yehuda, do you want to tell me that Rabbi Yehuda says that the constructive result—namely that he needs the dirt—solves the problem of the damage too? Not only the problem of labor not needed for its own sake, which doesn’t exist according to Rabbi Yehuda, but that “not needed for its own sake” also turns it into something non-destructive. Fine, that’s already an answer, okay. You basically want to say that this turns it into a constructive act, sorry. We’ll see this further on. But according to Rabbi Shimon, labor not needed for its own sake is exempt, right? Let him derive the exemption from the fact that it’s destructive. Why do you need the exemption for labor not needed for its own sake? Every labor not needed for its own sake is really destructive, right?
[Speaker D] In that example, for instance, it’s not so clear that you’d be liable for it. Say if someone erases not in order to write but just to make the writing or the page look nicer—there was too much there, he wants that word not to be there—so that’s some kind of constructive result. The action itself is constructive regardless, but the exemption would be only because it’s labor not needed for its own sake. You can’t exempt it as destructive. You can say that after I know the category of labor not needed for its own sake, now I’ll ignore the constructive result he produced because it’s a constructive result not needed for the body of the labor—but that only works if I already have the logic of labor not needed for its own sake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the “needed for its own sake”—is it destructive or not destructive? The “needed for its own sake,” not the purpose for which you did it. The purpose for which you didn’t do it—is it destructive or constructive?
[Speaker D] In a case like that, where it’s one action and you can’t split it into two things, then you need the logic of labor not needed for its own sake in order to say that there is any distinction here at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but then you’re really telling me—and I agree—but then basically even with digging a hole I can say the same thing. The act of digging the hole is one action: I remove the dirt and at the same time create the hole. You can’t say it’s destructive because there’s the constructive result of the dirt.
[Speaker D] That’s definitely constructive, because here there’s something you broke and there’s also a constructive result. But it’s damage; meaning, there is an action here that in itself can be defined as damaging. But here, when you erase, there’s nothing that is—I’m just saying, with one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt, maybe you could sort of slip between the raindrops and say it’s different because the digging itself is harmful.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not sure about your definition, because what you’re really claiming is that if I erase in the way you described, then I’m doing one thing, not two. Is such a thing even called labor not needed for its own sake? Labor not needed for its own sake is where you have two outcomes: the prohibited outcome you don’t need, and you want it for the permitted outcome. Okay, but you’re not liable because that’s not erasing, because only erasing in order to write is labor.
[Speaker D] No, it is erasing; physically it is erasing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in the laws of Sabbath labors, it isn’t defined that way.
[Speaker D] The logic of labor not needed for its own sake—he doesn’t call it that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, because it enters into the definition of the labor. Again: because here, within the definition of the labor itself, this logic of labor not needed for its own sake enters in, and that’s simply how the labor is defined: erasing is prohibited only when it is erasing in order to write.
[Speaker D] There’s a logic that even in the definition of the labor you can’t make that distinction without this logic. You need the logic of labor not needed for its own sake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like you say, that’s how it was in the Tabernacle—they erased in order to write. What do you not need for that?
[Speaker D] In order to bring in that “in order to,” you need the logic of labor not needed for its own sake; otherwise in the end you can’t distinguish among all these things. You can say a thousand times it has to be this way and not that way, but you can’t distinguish between them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? I can say that in the Tabernacle they did it in order to write.
[Speaker D] When a person does the labor, in the end you can’t distinguish between the two labors. In reality, halakhically, in the end there’s no difference, there’s no way to distinguish between them if you don’t say there is such a thing as labor not needed for its own sake. Meaning, there is a performance that is—why not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. If in the Tabernacle they selected refuse from food and not food from refuse, then we say that only refuse from food is prohibited. Why? What’s the difference? In the Tabernacle they erased in order to write, and therefore only that is what was done.
[Speaker D] But the “in order to”—that’s the point, that you inserted “in order to.” Yes. In order to say “in order to,” you need the logic of labor not needed for its own sake, because otherwise in the end—okay, then let him be liable, because he performed that labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he didn’t perform it, because he didn’t erase in order to write.
[Speaker D] Only erasing—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in order to write is the labor. But he erased! So what do I care? There is no prohibition of erasing; there is a prohibition of erasing in order to write.
[Speaker D] Yes, but the “in order to” exists only in his intention.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To say that there is some defect also in the intention—
[Speaker D] you need the logic of labor not needed for its own sake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see why. It can be defined that way because that’s how it was in the Tabernacle. Erasing in order to write—according to Rabbi Yehuda, you don’t need erasing in order to write? It still won’t be defined as erasing in order to write. It is—simply yes. Even though Rabbi Yehuda holds one liable for labor not needed for its own sake. Because specifically in erasing, that is the definition of the labor. Because he is liable—
[Speaker D] for labor not needed for its own sake, but he still recognizes the logic that there is such a thing as labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but at that point I don’t know what’s left of that. So if you hold one liable for labor not needed for its own sake and still accept that erasing in order to write is necessary, and without that you wouldn’t be liable for erasing, then you have separated it from the logic. I don’t see the… Fine. So in short, the question is how we understand one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt, where the hole is neither constructive nor destructive. According to the Or Sameach, that too is destructive. If that too is destructive, then he should have been exempt even according to Rabbi Yehuda, and according to Rabbi Shimon he should be exempt as destructive, and there’s no need to get to labor not needed for its own sake. Here apparently we need to say that unlike one who tears in anger—and about that we’ll talk more later—because with one who tears in anger, what comes out here is only a tear. Right? But there is another benefit, because it calms his anger or something like that. Here, in the very object itself, in the reality itself, the action created two results. Meaning, it created the hole and the dirt. In such a case, the second need—the need for the dirt—repairs or neutralizes the dimension of damage. Meaning, you can’t say that the hole in itself is damage, even though it has no benefit, because there is the benefit of the dirt. After all, you created the hole in order to extract dirt. It is the very same action. So an interesting thing comes out here: the benefit of the “not needed for its own sake,” meaning the need for the dirt, actually solves the problem of destructive action. Right? Now according to Rabbi Shimon it will still be exempt—why? Not because it’s destructive, but because it’s labor not needed for its own sake. There is no destructive action here, because the need for the dirt means it isn’t destructive. According to Rabbi Yehuda he would indeed be liable, because there is no destructive action here, and labor not needed for its own sake is liable. Therefore one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt is a dispute in the laws of labor not needed for its own sake. And even according to the Or Sameach, who says that when there is neither constructive result nor damage that is considered damage, in the case of one who digs a hole and needs only the dirt that is not true. Because there you have the benefit of the dirt, so it is not considered something with neither damage nor constructive result. Even though from the standpoint of the hole itself there is neither constructive result nor damage, there is the constructive result of the dirt. So that repairs things from the standpoint of… it solves the problem of destructive action. But it doesn’t solve the problem of labor not needed for its own sake, for which according to Rabbi Shimon he will be exempt. Now with one who tears in anger or for his dead, the Talmud says this is to give satisfaction to his impulse. Right? So what does “to give satisfaction to his impulse” mean? That basically means it’s not destructive, right? Because you’re satisfying your impulse. So why is it labor not needed for its own sake? Tearing in the Tabernacle was in order to sew—
[Speaker A] and not in order to kill. And if the constructive result—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is not in the body of the object, the question is what that does here. When the constructive result is not in the body of the object. One who tears in anger—there is some constructive result here, right? But it’s not… it’s only in the psyche, not in the object.
[Speaker F] Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, the tear itself—from the standpoint of the object itself—it was not repaired. The object is damaged. But I have a use for it, because it calms my anger. Okay? So in such a state that… yes, so it covers over the damage, but it’s still not needed for its own sake. Meaning, it still… yes, it’s still not the action. You tear in order to sew—that is needed for its own sake. Okay? Okay. That’s the picture… it’s not… it’s not the purpose in the Tabernacle…
[Speaker A] In the Tabernacle it’s not here it’s not… yes, so therefore, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now, what is the regular picture of destructive action, which Rabbi Yehuda also agrees is exempt, even though labor not needed for its own sake is liable? Rabbi Yehuda also agrees it’s exempt. So maybe someone who tears not in anger and not for his dead, but just tears. Maybe that’s the explanation, right? Just tearing. So the fact that it’s labor not needed for its own sake—meaning, he didn’t do it in order to sew or something like that—that doesn’t bother Rabbi Yehuda, okay? But on the other hand, there is plain damage here, and therefore as destructive action he would be exempt. It just raises the question: whenever someone does something, he does it for some purpose. What do you mean, “just tears”? What is “just tears”? Just tears—what, absentmindedly? Then that’s mere inadvertence.
[Speaker G] He tears by mistake. So that mistake is mere inadvertence.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not… I’m asking when this would be, when there would be an exemption of destructive action here. What is the picture of the exemption for destructive action? “Just tears” doesn’t seem to be a thing at all. What is “just tears”? What? Someone who tears when he’s upset—that’s one who tears in anger. We’re talking about someone who tears not in anger, just plain tears. Maybe destructive action… he wanted to tear for some reason… “just tears”—if he wasn’t paying attention, then that’s mere inadvertence. Maybe he wanted to do the action and then it turned out to be destructive. Again? He wants to do the prohibited action, the forbidden labor, and then it turned out to be destructive. But why does he want to? Why does he want to? He thought there would be some constructive result—what? Yes, he thought there would be some constructive result. What? He wanted to sew and then changed his mind? What? Something else happened here. But then that doesn’t mean anything, because it was tearing in order to sew. The fact that afterward he changed his mind—so what? This is a little reminiscent of the… There is a Ritva in Chullin where he discusses an interesting question and gives interesting answers. Is a person obligated to eat the apple in order to save the blessing from becoming a blessing in vain? So the Ritva says no. If you don’t feel like eating, don’t eat. But even that itself can be understood in two ways. Some later authorities understood from the Ritva: don’t eat, because there is no obligation to rescue violations that have already happened. You’re forbidden to commit a violation, and if you already did something, you have no obligation to do something that will save it and turn it into something that isn’t a violation. Okay? But I think if you read the Ritva, that’s not what it says. What it says there is that such a thing is not a blessing in vain at all. Because if, when you intended—when you made the blessing—you intended to eat, then it is not a blessing in vain, even if in the end you didn’t eat, because what determines whether it is a blessing in vain is what your intention was at the time of the blessing. And if at the time of the blessing you intended to eat, it isn’t a blessing in vain. So if afterward you don’t feel like eating, then don’t eat.
[Speaker C] Meaning, that’s not exactly…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now yes, once I thought—what happens with a woman, a woman who was divorced conditionally, okay? On condition that she not drink wine for ten years. Okay? Then she went and got married, had children. Okay? Now she feels like drinking wine. Now she feels like drinking wine. No, not at the wedding—even after the wedding. She feels like drinking wine. If she drinks the wine, her children from the second husband are mamzerim and his relations with her are illicit relations, right? Because the divorce is retroactively void, so she’s the wife of the first one, and all the relations of the second one are illicit and his children are mamzerim. Is she forbidden to drink the wine? Why? She was allowed to marry; she was divorced.
[Speaker G] Maybe because these are rabbinic-level doubts.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re talking now about the law in principle. Is it permitted to drink? This brings us right back to the Ritva. No, no, only a perpetual bond—that’s not valid severance. That’s why I said ten years, not forever. So I argued that she is allowed to drink the wine. She is allowed to drink the wine; her children will become mamzerim and the relations are illicit, because there is no obligation to rescue violations that have already been done—that is, to repaint them retroactively in colors that make them not a violation. Ideally, if she had drunk the wine before, then clearly all those relations would be forbidden, because they are illicit relations; there is a prohibition. But if she already had the relations, and now she turns them retroactively into illicit relations—is there a prohibition against turning relations retroactively into illicit relations? There is a prohibition against having illicit relations. Okay? So that will depend on what I said earlier about the Ritva. Obviously there is an interpersonal problem, meaning that by making the children mamzerim she’s ruining their lives forever. Fine, but right now I’m speaking
[Speaker D] about forbidden sexual relations and the laws of forbidden sexual relations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? It’s not connected. Of course there is.
[Speaker D] What’s he supposed to do? Ruin the blessing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, when he eats afterward, then he ate without a blessing.
[Speaker D] No, he’ll make an interruption and then eat.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he ate without a blessing. Let him make the blessing again. Fine. The practical difference is only that he has to make the blessing again. No, no, I think they’re careful about it so they won’t eat without a blessing.
[Speaker D] Fine, also as an obligation, as it were, people who don’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] want to—but in any case, according to that, if he blesses again after making the interruption, nothing happened. Everything is apparently fine, yes. No, it depends on how you understand the Ritva, but the plain meaning of the Ritva’s wording really does seem like that. According to what I’m saying, there is a problem here, because I’m claiming that what the Ritva says is that such a thing is not a blessing in vain at all. I’m claiming that even if it were a blessing in vain, there is no obligation to save blessings from being in vain; that is, there is no obligation to rescue violations. No, an interruption is indeed problematic. I didn’t understand.
[Speaker D] To preserve the blessing, to save the blessing—the only reason not to interrupt and then bless again is to save the blessing you already said. Right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there is no obligation. I can say: fine, I don’t have the energy, now I want to arrange myself again. There’s no obligation on you—but the blessing will be a blessing in vain. There is no obligation on you to save it. No, the Ritva says that it is not a blessing in vain at all.
[Speaker D] Because if you intended to eat, then it is not a blessing in vain at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. According to this explanation, it is a blessing in vain.
[Speaker D] Right, but there’s no problem in doing that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there’s no problem in doing that; there’s no obligation to save it. But if someone doesn’t want to have uttered a blessing in vain, then of course he has to be careful not to interrupt, because otherwise he’ll be called to account in Heaven for a blessing in vain. I’m only claiming: fine, I’ll be called to account in Heaven for a blessing in vain, but I have no obligation to do a rescue action. I won’t be called to account for not having saved the blessing from being in vain. I’ll be called to account for the blessing in vain, not for failing to save it. Okay? Finished. The woman, when she drinks the wine, she’ll be called to account for that the relations took place without sustenance—well, no, that’s not what I’m claiming; I’m not claiming she won’t be called to account. I’m only saying she won’t be called to account for the fact that she drank the wine. She has a right to drink wine. She didn’t want to save the illicit relations—fine, she’ll be called to account for them, but okay.
[Speaker C] And if a person said he swore that he would not sleep today?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a Talmud in Tractate Nedarim. There—it’s a dispute there in the Talmud in Nedarim, and I argued that the dispute is on this very point. Nedarim 15, I think, or something like that.
[Speaker C] If he sleeps today, is he allowed to sleep?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. The Talmud there says it’s a dispute, a dispute between Amoraim. I argued that the dispute of the Amoraim there in Nedarim is a dispute on this point: whether there is an obligation to rescue violations. Okay, how did we get here at all? I don’t remember. In any case, for our purposes, the question is: when someone just tears, okay? Is there such a thing? When does a person do an action that has no purpose at all? There is—we did find something like that. There is the Arukh HaShulchan, or before the Arukh HaShulchan, in the Ran on Sabbath it says that someone who moves—
[Speaker D] there is a prohibition on the Sabbath in and of itself to do things for no reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Itself, just to do things for no reason.
[Speaker D] Ah, in Maimonides, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be. But the Ran says specifically, for example regarding moving muktzeh. So he says—not muktzeh, a utensil whose primary function is prohibited. He says a utensil whose primary function is prohibited may be moved only for its own use or its place; it is permitted for its own use or its place, but forbidden just because of the sun, or just like that. And a utensil whose primary function is permitted may be moved even because of the sun. What about a utensil whose primary function is permitted, just like that? You’re moving a utensil whose primary function is permitted just like that—not because of the sun, you have no need at all. So in the Ran it says that it is forbidden. Fine, he discusses there the rods in the Temple with the showbread. Could be. No, he says it there from the laws of muktzeh. Also a utensil—within the whole decree of Nehemiah son of Hachaliah, where they later permitted a utensil whose primary function is prohibited, and one whose primary function is permitted—he says this case they did not permit. It is from the laws of prohibition, not from the laws of exertion on the Sabbath; from the laws of muktzeh, not from the laws of exertion on the Sabbath. In the laws of muktzeh too, even a utensil whose primary function is permitted is muktzeh if you do this with no need whatsoever. The Arukh HaShulchan asks: what is “with no need whatsoever”? Then why is he doing it? A person doesn’t just do things; he has some goal. So there they explain it—I think that’s what he says—he says this means for a need not of the Sabbath but of after the Sabbath. That is called “with no need whatsoever.” But obviously he didn’t just do it for nothing. When a person does something, he does it for some purpose, okay? That’s basically the claim.
[Speaker D] Meaning, the assumption isn’t correct. As long as he’s
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a human being—
[Speaker D] he doesn’t…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he behaves like a zombie, then it’s not mit’asek. Exactly—no, I’m saying, if he behaves like a zombie then it is mit’asek. No, that assumption is correct. Totally correct. Mit’asek. A completely correct assumption, because if a person isn’t doing—well, maybe a person will do it, but then he’s mit’asek. You don’t need to talk about… yes, there’s no action. What? What about the laws of muktzeh?
[Speaker D] Mit’asek isn’t relevant here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker D] There’s no exemption of mit’asek in muktzeh. Meaning, there’s really no exemption of mit’asek at all here; it’s unrelated to the prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, so what’s the problem? Exactly—in muktzeh just like in any other labor, if you’re mit’asek, you’re mit’asek, nobody talks to you. What do you want? A practical difference maybe for a master regarding his slave, like Rabbi Akiva Eiger says.
[Speaker D] In any case where a person does something for no reason, you wouldn’t be able to get to him beforehand and say, “Don’t do this thing,” because it’s not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying. No, the assumption that a person acts for no reason means there’s some deliberate action he’s doing for no reason, and then you really could come to him in advance and say, “Wait, wait, stop, it’s forbidden.” And that’s what I’m asking—there’s no such thing. If it’s deliberate, then there’s some reason he’s doing it; otherwise why is he doing it? Unless it’s just absentminded like that—but then it’s mit’asek. So either way, how can there be a case that… So I’m saying like this: if you tear for some purpose, like one who tears in anger or over his dead relative, then those are our passages. So what could there be? Something far-fetched and irrational. Meaning—what does that mean? He’s not doing it to drive out demons. What? To drive out demons? What?
[Speaker D] Maybe to drive out demons. But something like driving out demons maybe would count the other way around. That’s what he thinks, right? But something where he’s supposedly trying to avoid—say he puts something here because he’s afraid the ceiling will collapse—something completely far-fetched that can’t happen. Maybe in that case not… something that he himself knows is… meaning, there’s some reason he’s doing something, where he himself knows it doesn’t help. So why is he doing it if he himself knows it doesn’t help? So it’s the same question. A very, very far-fetched reason that he’s also aware is far-fetched. So why is he doing it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he’s aware, then there’s no reason. What?
[Speaker D] No, but that’s what
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] happens—he has
[Speaker D] very great anxiety.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or something like that, but
[Speaker D] it could be something we just don’t take into account. What, is he under duress?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see
[Speaker D] another category here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s just doing something for no reason, even though he knows there’s no such thing as the spirit of Elijah. Yes, really.
[Speaker D] He’s afraid of it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that’s for a psychiatrist. That’s for a psychiatrist, not for the laws of the Sabbath. It’s a situation
[Speaker D] where you… it’s not a purpose. No one would make a blessing over that.
[Speaker C] I don’t
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] know who said that. No
[Speaker C] one would make a blessing over that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Really? I claim he also shouldn’t eat.
[Speaker D] On Yom Kippur it’s certainly all forbidden in such a case; by Torah law it’s forbidden.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Half a measure is forbidden by Torah law. He’ll make a blessing—what can you do?
[Speaker D] Let’s hope Yom Kippur atones for him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there’s a Talmudic discussion in Shevuot about whether sins committed on the very day itself are atoned for by Yom Kippur—maybe not at its beginning, maybe at its end, meaning… Anyway, in any case, so I’m saying: in the case of a utensil whose primary use is permitted, you can tell me there’s such a thing as “not for any need at all.” How? If you do it for Sunday, not for a need on the Sabbath. But for us that explanation won’t help. When you say destructive, you mean you’re doing an action only for Sunday’s need. If you do an action for Sunday’s need, that’s constructive, not destructive. It doesn’t matter whether the need is on Sunday or the need is now, as far as the question whether you’re defined as destructive or not. In practice, the action is an action that repairs. I don’t care if the repair will only become relevant on Sunday. Right? Therefore, regarding muktzeh it can be relevant; regarding destructive labor it cannot be relevant. Fine, so for now I’m leaving that aside. We’ll come back to it in a moment. The Talmud later on—he gave up on me—the Talmud on that same Mishnah, okay, fine, yes. So the Talmud says like this: “And all who act destructively are exempt.” Remember the Mishnah? “One who tears in his anger or over his dead relative, and all who act destructively are exempt.” Okay? So until now we spoke about one who tears in his anger or over his dead relative—that’s the Talmud on 105b. Now this is the Talmud on 106a. And there the Talmud deals with “all who act destructively are exempt.” True, there what we saw wasn’t related to destructiveness: one who tears in his anger or over his dead relative is just the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding labor not needed for its own sake, okay? Now we move to the continuation of the Mishnah. What does the continuation say? “And all who act destructively are exempt.” Okay? Seemingly agreed upon by both Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon alike. Right? They have a dispute about labor not needed for its own sake, but on destructive labor everyone agrees he is exempt. So what comes out so far is that the Mishnah is split. “One who tears in his anger or over his dead relative” is a discussion about labor not needed for its own sake, and “all who act destructively are exempt” is a discussion about destructive labor. The first part is the dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, and what is written—“one who tears in his anger or over his dead relative is exempt”—that is Rabbi Shimon; Rabbi Yehuda disagrees. And “all who act destructively are exempt”—now we have to check what that is. Is that also Rabbi Shimon? Maybe not. It doesn’t seem so. Meaning, it’s unrelated to labor not needed for its own sake; it’s the law of destructive labor, which everyone agrees on. So it could be according to everyone. The Talmud says: Rabbi Abbahu taught before Rabbi Yohanan: “All who act destructively are exempt, except for one who wounds and one who kindles.” So one who wounds… one who wounds and one who kindles is liable? The Mishnah says all who act destructively are exempt, without qualification, right? It doesn’t say that one who wounds and one who kindles are not. Fine? So that’s difficult. Seemingly difficult. Meaning, for now before the question: for now, Rabbi Abbahu says “except for one who wounds and one who kindles,” where even though you’re destructive, you’re liable. Notice: one who wounds and one who kindles—even though you’re destructive, you’re liable. Why are you destructive in wounding and kindling? So kindling—you’re apparently destroying the wood, right? If you ruin the wood, burn it. And wounding—again, that’s destructive. You wound an animal or a person, so you’re just damaging. Okay? In these two cases, for some reason—it’s unclear why, and this is the baraita that Rabbi Abbahu brings—in these two cases, even though you’re destructive, you’re liable. But in general, those who act destructively are exempt, right? So Rabbi Yohanan said to him: “Go teach that outside. Wounding and kindling are not Mishnah. And if you insist it is Mishnah, then wounding is where he needs it for his dog, and kindling is where he needs the ashes.” So Rabbi Yohanan says to him: leave it, it’s not right. What do you mean? If wounding and kindling are destructive, then they too are exempt. Why should wounding and kindling be exceptions? You want to tell me that wounding and kindling are liable, meaning they’re not like destructive acts? That’s simply because we’re not talking about a destructive situation. Rather we’re talking about one who wounds because he needs it for his dog—he takes the blood and gives it to the dog—or one who kindles because he needs the ashes. And then what? Then he’s not destructive. But there’s nothing different about wounding and kindling from all the other labors. If you’re destructive, you’re exempt; if you’re not destructive, you’re liable. And if you say that one who wounds and one who kindles is liable, that means because there it’s not destructive. Okay? Again, you can ask: so when are wounding and kindling actually destructive? The same question I asked above. When he doesn’t need it for his dog or for the ashes, right? Then why is he doing it? For some other purpose? So what’s the difference between that purpose and needing it for his dog or for the ashes? What, no purpose at all? Do people perform actions with no purpose? Just like that? That’s the question, right? This sharpens it—and now we’re already talking about actual destructive labor, not labor not needed for its own sake, huh? You can say that destructive labor is a result of purposeful labor. Fine, but it’s the same thing. Okay. So therefore it sharpens the question even more. You see here too that even where you need the thing for some other purpose, that’s called not destructive. So it sharpens the question even further: then when is it destructive? When you do something and don’t need it for any purpose at all? If you don’t need it for any purpose, then why did you do it? How can such a case exist? Okay? So the Talmud says: “But didn’t we learn in our Mishnah: all who act destructively are exempt?” What sort of challenge is that? Meaning, there is a dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan regarding one who wounds and one who kindles when he does not need it for his dog or for the ashes, right? The dispute is: Rabbi Abbahu says liable, Rabbi Yohanan says exempt. Fine? No distinction: if you’re destructive, you’re exempt even in wounding and kindling. Now the Talmud asks—up to this point it’s a dispute of Amoraim. Now the Talmud asks: “But didn’t we learn in our Mishnah: all who act destructively are exempt?” Against whom is that raised? No—Rabbi Yohanan agrees. All who act destructively are exempt, including one who wounds and one who kindles, right? But if you say that one who wounds and one who kindles is liable, that’s only because it’s a situation that’s not destructive. But all who act destructively are exempt. So they challenge Rabbi Abbahu. Rabbi Abbahu wants to say that one who wounds and one who kindles—even in a situation where you are destructive—you’re liable. Why? But all who act destructively are exempt. Also one who wounds and one who kindles. Why do you say they’re exceptions? So the Talmud says: “The Mishnah is Rabbi Yehuda; the baraita is Rabbi Shimon.” Suddenly they bring Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon into the issue of destructive labor. We already know that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree regarding labor not needed for its own sake. We know that in the first clause of the Mishnah we already attributed the dispute to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, right? “One who tears in his anger or over his dead relative”—that’s labor not needed for its own sake, unrelated to destructiveness. Now we’re going back to talk about destructiveness. What is destructiveness? Again, let’s draw the map. “One who tears in his anger or over his dead relative” is seemingly like one who wounds and needs it for his dog, or one who kindles and needs the ashes, right? It’s labor not needed for its own sake, and at least according to Rabbi Yehuda he would be liable, right? But if you don’t need it for its own sake—not for the ashes and not for the dog—then there you seemingly remain merely destructive. And what is the law there? A dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan. Rabbi Yohanan says if you’re destructive, you’re exempt. Rabbi Abbahu says no, no—in one who wounds and one who kindles, even if you’re destructive, you’re liable. Meaning, not all destructive acts are exempt; in wounding and kindling, no—only the other destructive acts, but not these. Wounding and kindling. And that is already a dispute in the laws of destructive labor, not in the laws of labor not needed for its own sake. A dispute of Amoraim, not a dispute of Tannaim. Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan disagree—an Amoraic dispute—what is the law in destructive wounding and kindling. It has nothing at all to do with labor not needed for its own sake, nothing. So why does the Talmud force in the dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon? What’s the connection? Why is our Mishnah, which says “all who act destructively are exempt,” Rabbi Yehuda, and the baraita of Rabbi Abbahu, which says that one who wounds and one who kindles is liable, Rabbi Shimon? More than that—it’s also reversed. Because the Mishnah says that one who wounds and one who kindles is exempt, and that’s Rabbi Yehuda. And the baraita that says one who wounds and one who kindles is liable—that’s Rabbi Shimon. Usually it works the opposite way: Rabbi Shimon is the lenient one, Rabbi Yehuda the stringent one. If you somehow tie this to the dispute about labor not needed for its own sake, then the whole thing doesn’t work—they reversed the views. So the Talmud itself explains it. It says: “What is Rabbi Shimon’s reason? Since a verse is needed to permit circumcision, apparently ordinary wounding is liable. And since the Merciful One prohibited execution by burning in the case of a daughter of a priest, we may infer that ordinary kindling is liable.” What does that mean? The Talmud learns from the verse “on the eighth day,” meaning in every case, even on the Sabbath—always on the eighth day. So the Talmud says: you see a verse is needed to permit circumcision on the eighth day. Why do you need a verse? Because without the verse I wouldn’t perform the circumcision. Why wouldn’t I perform it? Because it is wounding. But wounding is destructive—why should he be liable?
[Speaker G] Wait, but that’s already your question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A question—first let’s understand what the Talmud is saying. Why would one who wounds be liable? Why do you need a verse to permit it? Apparently because one who wounds, even though he is destructive, is liable; therefore you need a verse to permit circumcision. And you see that wounding is exceptional.
[Speaker G] And here we move to wounding—if we were to say that circumcision is for the sake of repair, then we would say no, it’s not every case of wounding, only where its purpose is for repair.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re returning to our question; we’ll get there in a moment, hold on. At the moment the Talmud says wounding is basically an exceptional labor. How do we know that even though wounding is destructive, he is liable? From the fact that a verse was needed to permit circumcision on the eighth day. You see that without a verse I would not circumcise on the eighth day when it falls on the Sabbath. Why not? Because I would be concerned about the prohibition of wounding. What are you concerned about? It’s destructive. No, you see that in wounding there is no exemption of destructive labor; it is exceptional. That is Rabbi Shimon’s position. And Rabbi Yehuda says: “It is a repair,” as Rav Ashi said: “What difference is there between repairing by circumcision, repairing a utensil, cooking a wick, and cooking dyes?” Circumcision is a repair, not a destruction—exactly your point. Your comments are basically what Rabbi Yehuda says. Rabbi Yehuda says: what do you mean? When you wound for the sake of circumcision, obviously that’s a repair, not a destruction. That’s why, if there weren’t a verse permitting me to circumcise on the Sabbath, I wouldn’t circumcise. Why? Because the circumcision itself turns this wound into a repair. You’re doing it for the sake of circumcision. Therefore I wouldn’t circumcise, because it’s a repair and not a destruction. The question of course remains as it was: what does this have to do with Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda? Why suddenly attribute this to a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda? Who brought Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda in here? It’s not that we found Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda disagreeing and now we’re explaining what they disagree about. No—we found a dispute of Amoraim, Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan. The Talmud suddenly attributes it to a dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon—apparently the Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon of labor not needed for its own sake. But when it explains it, it just explains the reasoning: does a person understand circumcision as repair or as destruction? What does that have to do with the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon about labor not needed for its own sake, and why is it reversed? So here I just have one note—or really two notes—both about circumcision and about kindling. When the Torah has to permit circumcision on the Sabbath, we learn from here that wounding is prohibited, and the Torah permitted circumcision here. I could say otherwise: from the fact that the Torah permitted circumcision. In the case of the daughter of a priest it works the other way; we’ll see in a moment. From the fact that the Torah permitted circumcision, I could understand that in general wounding is permitted, and circumcision was permitted specifically. Why? Say that from the fact that the Torah permitted circumcision, it is a paradigm case teaching that all wounding is permitted. Exactly—maybe it’s even the source for the law of destructive labor. There, that’s exactly why they really permitted circumcision on the Sabbath—because destructive acts are permitted. What’s the problem? This brings us into the well-known question: does every verse teach the opposite of what it says? That’s the accepted view—yes, that’s what people commonly think in the yeshivot. In the yeshivot it’s commonly thought that every verse teaches the opposite of what it says. What’s the example? Think of some dear kollel fellow arguing with his wife. A kollel fellow arguing with his wife. And his wife says to him: it says, “Whatever Sarah tells you, listen to her voice”—you have to obey me, whatever I say. The foolish kollel fellow says to her: you fool, why did the Torah need to tell Abraham, “Whatever Sarah tells you, listen to her voice”? Since ordinarily a man doesn’t need to listen to his wife, there had to be a special obligation here for Abraham to listen to his wife. Or in other words, when the verse tells someone to listen to his wife, that proves that a person does not need to listen to his wife. Meaning, every verse teaches the opposite of what it says. What? Yes, and there’s also a verse that teaches that a woman can throw her husband out of the house. In Abraham’s case, by the way, he threw a woman out of the house—Hagar. Yes, but look, when you obey one wife and throw out the second one, now really there’s something to discuss. In any case, the question is a good one. There are places where—like here—the Talmud really assumes that every verse teaches the opposite of what it says. Meaning, if it says it is permitted to circumcise on the Sabbath, that is a sign that wounding on the Sabbath is prohibited. Why? Maybe that itself is what the verse teaches—that wounding on the Sabbath is not prohibited, and therefore circumcision on the Sabbath was permitted, or even mandated, right? Why? There are places where not. There are places—for example, a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, at the beginning of Yevamot. They learn it from tzitzit and shaatnez in tzitzit, right? From the juxtaposition of shaatnez and tzitzit you see that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Why? From the fact that it was necessary to permit tzitzit involving shaatnez, you see that ordinarily a positive commandment does not override a prohibition, so the Torah had to permit shaatnez in tzitzit to tell you that here it does. Why there is the assumption that if something is written, it is a paradigm case for a general rule, and from it you learn the general rule? And here the Talmud says no: if it’s written, that’s a sign that the general rule is the opposite, and here a special permission was needed. Okay?
[Speaker D] “You shall do no occupational labor,” meaning…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But it’s destructive—what do you mean?
[Speaker D] No, according to Rabbi Shimon the assumption is that this is a labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then why is it destructive? He wants to say that even though it’s destructive, they are liable—that it’s an exception. Why? The logic says that because it’s destructive, they’re exempt, and that’s what the Torah wrote when it said “and on the eighth day he shall be circumcised.” Right?
[Speaker C] Say tzitzit—it’s a standard case of a positive commandment overriding a prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is that a standard case? Maybe that itself is the novelty.
[Speaker C] Just ordinary wounding—then we say that from the fact that here a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, it’s probably different. If it wanted to tell you that all wounding is prohibited, it could have said so about wounding itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not only about wounding, but about all wounding—that’s exactly the general rule.
[Speaker C] Destructive labor—if it wanted to tell you that destructive labor is exempt, it could simply have said that destructive labor is exempt. Why did it permit specifically this?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that’s what a paradigm case often is. They give you an example and from it you make a paradigm. It says, “If one man’s ox gores the ox of his fellow,” he has to pay. How do you know that if his dog bit his fellow’s chicken
[Speaker C] he also has to pay? What’s the connection? Fine, exactly—why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because this is a positive commandment overriding a prohibition… no, in circumcision it isn’t—this has nothing to do with a positive commandment overriding a prohibition, because it’s a positive commandment versus a prohibition and a positive commandment that carry karet. It’s not that—a positive commandment does not override a prohibition and a positive commandment, certainly not when they involve karet, stoning. In circumcision that’s not the point.
[Speaker D] Why do you think that… if you think it’s destructive—ordinary wounding is destructive—why should it be prohibited? Why do I really need… what? That’s what I’m asking. Why do I need a verse to permit it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t need a verse to permit it—you need a verse to tell you that destructive acts are exempt. You’re saying
[Speaker D] that this would be the verse.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is the source for the law of destructive labor. And wounding is just the example, not the exception—on the contrary, wounding is the source of it. It’s like—you know, Maimonides says that in a Torah-level doubt we rule leniently, right? Only rabbinically do we rule stringently, but by Torah law a doubt is treated leniently. Okay? So I think the Pnei Yehoshua asks him—if I remember correctly, not sure anymore—in Shev Shema’tata; in the first shema’tata he brings this and asks against Maimonides from the law of a mamzer, where the Talmud says: “A certain mamzer, but not a doubtful mamzer,” right? Why was it necessary to innovate that a certain mamzer is included but not a doubtful mamzer? According to Maimonides, by Torah law every doubt is treated leniently. Do you know what the answer is? Maimonides, in a responsum, brings that very Talmudic passage as the source for his view. Not only is it not a question—that’s the very source he brings. From there he learns that law. What—why does the Talmud say “a certain mamzer, but not a doubtful mamzer”? Rather, clearly all Torah-level doubts are treated leniently—from there. The yeshivot didn’t invent this idea that every verse teaches the opposite of what it says. Here, it’s explicit in the Talmud. But there are other Talmudic passages where it’s not like that.
[Speaker I] The question
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] is when you treat the example the Torah brings as an exception that teaches you that the general rule is actually the opposite—and therefore this exception had to be taught—and when you say no, this is a paradigm case, an example from which we learn that the general rule is also like this.
[Speaker C] So why, then, when the Torah says it is forbidden to do labors on the Sabbath, isn’t that a paradigm case teaching that it’s forbidden to do labors all week?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Same question—why not, really? Maybe it’s just tradition, maybe
[Speaker A] it’s something that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so; it’s not tradition. You can see that the Sages say this based on reasoning. It’s not… I don’t know. At one point I thought it depended on what the reasoning says. I’m not sure that works in every place. And if the reasoning… if the reasoning would have given that law anyway, then the question really does arise: so why did the Torah write it?
[Speaker I] So
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] maybe it wrote it to say that this really is an exception and the reasoning is incorrect.
[Speaker I] “A derivation from an exception to teach…” as they call it. Huh? No, no, this isn’t that principle.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s always some novelty. Always it’s something that I would have… but the question is what the novelty is. You have to check what you would have said without the novelty, and based on that you can understand what the novelty is doing. If without… if without the novelty I would have said… Again, here too there are possibilities that I don’t know how to decide between. You could say, if… say I’m learning the rule that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. Fine? What would I have said by reasoning, had tzitzit and shaatnez not been written? What would I have said by reasoning? Let’s say the reasoning would have led me to say that the positive commandment does not override the prohibition. Right? I think that’s what most people would say—that the prohibition would prevail. I’m not… I wouldn’t fulfill the positive commandment at the cost of violating a prohibition. Now the Torah comes and says this about tzitzit—so what would I say? I’d say the Torah is coming to say that tzitzit is an exception. Why should I uproot the original reasoning? Meaning, the reasoning remains in place, that the prohibition is stronger, and tzitzit is the exception. That’s why it wrote tzitzit—to tell you that here it’s not like that. Okay? On the other hand, if the reasoning says that a positive commandment does override a prohibition, then I would say that the Torah says tzitzit in order to tell you that this reasoning is correct. Then you’ll ask: so why say tzitzit at all? I would have said it even without that. It could be that the reasoning isn’t strong enough; without a verse I wouldn’t have relied on it, I wouldn’t have established the rule. So the verse comes to tell you that the reasoning is correct.
[Speaker D] Or maybe it has a rule from another source regarding lashes… what? Or maybe it has a rule…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know… I don’t know of anything like that here, but it could be there really is.
[Speaker F] I don’t know. I’m just raising the question; I don’t know the answer. If halakhah and midrash are just upholding…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if halakhah and midrash are upholding, there is a midrash that upholds and a midrash that doesn’t.
[Speaker F] So you have to decide. So if this verse is an upholding midrash, then part of what was passed down in tradition is also whether it’s an exception or a paradigm case—all those things.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if it was passed down in tradition, then I don’t need all these dialectical flourishes. Just tell me the tradition and that’s it. Ah—that’s a question about all these conceptions that midrash merely upholds. What does “midrash that upholds” mean? If you already know the law, why are you playing around with the derivations? You already know the conclusion. It can’t be meant literally. Fine, so in practical terms—leave the tradition aside—in the end it comes out of the verse. I don’t care if two conflicting traditions came down. In the final analysis, you decide it based on what emerges from the verse. Now the question is: how do you decide? Do you see the verse as an exception, or do you see the verse as a paradigm case—as an example that generates a rule? That’s the first note. Fine, here the Talmud says that one who wounds is apparently an exception, for some reason that isn’t completely clear to me. The second note is about the daughter of a priest. From the fact that the Torah had to forbid burning the daughter of a priest on the Sabbath, I learn that one who kindles is also in fact prohibited. To prohibit—let’s
[Speaker E] reverse the move.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, it’s reversed. To forbid burning… the Torah learns to forbid burning the daughter of a priest at the beginning of Parashat Vayakhel. The Torah learns to forbid burning the daughter of a priest. And then what… why forbid it? Notice, here this is seemingly the opposite move, right? If you say “to forbid”—if the Torah comes to forbid burning the daughter of a priest, that implies that ordinarily burning is permitted. It only came to forbid burning the daughter of the priest, right? No—here they go the other way. Here in and of itself it goes the other way. Right?
[Speaker A] In the burning of
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the daughter of a priest, what are they telling me? If they forbade burning the daughter of a priest, that’s a sign that apparently burning is forbidden. Meaning, they don’t see the daughter of a priest as an exception teaching that the general rule is the opposite, but the reverse: the daughter of a priest is the example that tells you all burning is forbidden, including burning the daughter of a priest. Yes, here they do take the burning of
[Speaker J] the daughter of a priest as a paradigm case and not an exception. Meaning, in the Talmud itself you see that in the two examples it brings, one of them it sees as an exception that teaches the general rule is the opposite. In one case the kollel fellow is right; in the other the wife is right. Right? In both…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember, maybe. But this is in the Talmud itself in various places. It’s just that here… it really stands out, because in the same Talmudic passage they use two sources in opposite ways. Meaning, one source they use as a paradigm case for all—as with the daughter of a priest—and in circumcision, there, it’s an exception, apparently the general rule is the opposite. Fine, so you’re saying they’re playing games.
[Speaker A] You’re saying the derivation is just playing games, huh?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but what I’m saying also doesn’t mean it’s a game. I don’t want to claim in any case that the Sages are playing with the verses because the result was already obvious to them.
[Speaker D] No, no, she didn’t mean painting the target after the shot.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not claiming that, I’m not talking about upholding midrash—you didn’t understand me correctly. What I’m saying is this: if the rule is a sound one logically, then the logic says that the rule is probably correct, and to dislodge that logic I need evidence. Now, if you have an example where the Torah says that there you have to do the opposite, then it teaches no more than its own novelty. So I say: the Torah said it here, but the general rule remains in place. Not that I’m saying I’m playing a game and simply generating what I wanted to reach in advance. No—I use reasoning to understand what this derivation teaches me, and that’s fine; I always do that. Okay? So therefore I say here—look, I once wrote an article about the burning of the daughter of a priest. In the simple understanding—and I can bring several proofs for this—when they forbade burning the daughter of a priest, it’s not at all a prohibition of kindling. They forbade administering punishment on the Sabbath. A court may not punish on the Sabbath, just as it may not judge on the Sabbath. They weren’t talking about all kindling; they were speaking specifically about the death penalty of the daughter of a priest, whose punishment is burning, yes? So the prohibition has nothing at all to do with the prohibition of kindling. Even if kindling were entirely permitted, yes? You still could not burn the daughter of a priest—not because you transgress the prohibition of kindling, but because you are carrying out a punitive act on the Sabbath; that is what is forbidden. Now I could have learned that very thing from the verse, right? I’m just supplying content to the option the Talmud doesn’t choose. Yes? The Talmud here says: from the fact that a verse was needed to forbid punishing the daughter of a priest, yes—what does that mean? Apparently burning is forbidden; otherwise why forbid it? Otherwise what is forbidden about burning the daughter of a priest? Clearly burning is forbidden. What do you mean? Here I have a very good explanation of what is forbidden. What is forbidden is administering punishment on the Sabbath. Burning itself is completely permitted, no problem at all—it’s not even one of the primary categories of labor, okay? But still it is forbidden to punish on the Sabbath, not even because you’re doing it as labor. What? I didn’t understand. Right, that principle is good in Parashat Vayakhel, if I remember correctly. What? Should we learn from this that lashes are also forbidden? Seemingly, if that’s the conception, then yes—it is forbidden to punish on the Sabbath. Now that incidentally takes us from kindling back to wounding. Lashes are wounding, yes? So there too, with wounding on the Sabbath, the problem would be whether it’s a problem of the prohibition of wounding or the problem that it is forbidden to punish on the Sabbath. That’s the issue. Okay? So now here in the Talmud it says not like that. I don’t even remember whether I bring this Talmudic passage in that article. Here the Talmud says not like that. Here the Talmud says that it really is forbidden because you transgress the prohibition of kindling on the Sabbath. And from here they really learn that apparently kindling, even though it is destructive, is still prohibited on the Sabbath, right? But I’m showing you that there was another possible way to learn. The Talmud chose this option, and in the case of circumcision and wounding it chose the opposite option, even though there too there was another option. Meaning, within the Talmud itself there is an internal opposite choice between the options: do you learn the Torah’s example as a paradigm case, or do you learn it as an exception that indicates that the general rule is the opposite? Yes? “That which went out from the general rule to teach about itself and not about the whole rule.” Yes? That the general rule is the opposite. This is already among the hermeneutic principles: “A matter that went out from the general rule did not go out to teach about itself, but to teach about the entire rule.” What does that assume? That the example comes to teach you the broader rule; the example is only a specific case—that’s a paradigm case, right? By contrast, there are principles where the rule went out to teach only about itself and not about the whole rule, and that the general rule is actually the opposite. And the matter that went out of the rule came to teach about itself and not about the rule—or to teach that the rule is the opposite. Yes? Like “two verses do not teach.” Why do two verses not teach? When the Torah wrote two exceptional examples, that means the general rule is the opposite, right? So there are later authorities who want to claim that when two verses do not teach, it’s not only that they don’t teach—they teach the opposite. No, no, that’s impossible—they teach the opposite. You could say that two verses do not teach and therefore the question remains open. Here there are two verses—these two verses. They teach the opposite. If there are two verses that say something, that is a source that the general rule is the opposite. The question doesn’t remain open; the question is closed. The two verses teach that the general rule is the opposite. And basically that’s the same question I’m asking here. Okay? Anyway, for our purposes, the question still remains open. What does this have to do with the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon about labor not needed for its own sake? Why bring Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon in here? I understand the two positions—I understood the two positions, fine. Rabbi Abbahu claims that one who wounds and one who kindles—we have sources from circumcision and from burning the daughter of a priest—that these are exceptions, and even if destructive he is liable. Rabbi Yohanan says no. How is that connected to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon? Why does the Talmud attribute it to Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, such that the Amoraic dispute is actually a Tannaitic dispute? Meaning, Rabbi Shimon basically holds like Rabbi Abbahu, right? That one who wounds and one who kindles are exceptions and liable. So Rabbi Abbahu holds like Rabbi Shimon, yes. And Rabbi Yohanan holds like Rabbi Yehuda. Why? Leave it as a dispute of Amoraim. Explain that Rabbi Abbahu learned it from circumcision and from burning the daughter of a priest, and Rabbi Yohanan didn’t learn it from there. Why are you mixing in Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda? What do they have to do with this? So Rashi—I mentioned this in the class on labor not needed for its own sake last semester—Rashi says as follows: “Our Mishnah is Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that destructive conduct in wounding is exempt, though it is not explained where.” Meaning, he says outright that Rabbi Yehuda holds that destructive wounding is exempt. Fine, he doesn’t accept Rabbi Shimon’s derivations. But where is that written? It has nothing to do with Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding labor not needed for its own sake. So where is it written that they also have a dispute about destructive wounding? Why does the Talmud assume this? “It is not explained.” So he first brings it like that—apparently some explanation he heard. But he himself doesn’t agree. He says, “But it seems to me”—Rashi says—“that our Mishnah is Rabbi Yehuda, who says one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake.” So it really is connected to the dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon over labor not needed for its own sake. Why? “Therefore, the case of liability for one who wounds because he needs it for his dog, and one who kindles because he needs the ashes, can be found, for even though it is destructive with respect to the labor itself, it is reparative with respect to others. And according to Rabbi Yehuda, in such a case it is considered labor because of the repair of others. But one who is destructive and does not repair is exempt. And although in the first clause of the Mishnah we established it as Rabbi Shimon, for it says ‘one who tears over his dead relative is exempt,’ the latter clause is Rabbi Yehuda.” What is Rashi saying? He’s saying something very interesting. He says: according to Rabbi Yehuda, one who wounds because he needs it for his dog, and one who kindles because he needs the ashes—that is labor not needed for its own sake. Right? And regarding labor not needed for its own sake, Rabbi Yehuda rules liable. Right? So you ask me: why did the Torah need to permit circumcision on the Sabbath? What do you mean, why? Because otherwise I really would not have circumcised. Why would I not have circumcised? Because circumcision would be wounding as labor not needed for its own sake. Right? But according to Rabbi Yehuda, labor not needed for its own sake is liable. Therefore a verse was needed to permit circumcision. Now if so, you cannot learn from here that destructive wounding is liable. Because how does Rabbi Shimon learn from there? Let’s take Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon says: look, every destructive act, even if it’s not needed for its own sake, would still be exempt, right? Labor not needed for its own sake. So why was a verse needed to permit circumcision? What would I have thought without it? In any case, even if I do it for some purpose, it’s still a purpose not needed for its own sake, so it’s permitted. So what is the initial assumption to forbid circumcision? Why do you need a verse to permit it? That is Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning. And that is only Rabbi Shimon according to his own approach. Because only Rabbi Shimon says that in any case it is permitted, even when it’s not needed for its own sake. So no verse should be necessary. From the fact that there is a verse, apparently destructive wounding is liable. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, he has another explanation for why the verse is needed—even without assuming that destructive wounding is liable. No—destructive wounding is exempt like all other destructive acts. So why is a verse needed in circumcision? Because without it I would forbid it since Rabbi Yehuda also rules that labor not needed for its own sake is liable. So it would be labor not needed for its own sake, but I would still rule him liable, and I would not circumcise on the Sabbath. A verse is needed to permit it. The verse comes to permit it because of the prohibition of labor not needed for its own sake, not because of the prohibition of destructive labor. And that is why the positions are reversed. Meaning: according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that one is liable for labor not needed for its own sake, then there is no question why a verse is needed to permit circumcision. Because without the verse I would not permit circumcision, since it is labor not needed for its own sake and would be forbidden. A verse is needed to permit it. So what is the proof from there that one who wounds is an exception—that even if he is destructive, he is liable? What are you talking about? He is exempt. Only in a place where he repairs. So why do you need a verse to permit circumcision? Because in circumcision I would forbid it even if it is for another purpose, since labor not needed for its own sake is liable. And that’s all. Rabbi Abbahu’s whole approach doesn’t even get off the ground according to Rabbi Yehuda. It is only Rabbi Shimon who can formulate this approach. Is what I’m saying clear? Again: what was Rabbi Abbahu’s approach? Rabbi Abbahu said this—let’s focus right now on circumcision. Since it’s the same in wounding, let’s focus on circumcision. He says like this: the Torah permits circumcision on the Sabbath, right? The question is why the Torah needs to permit it. That implies that without this permission I would forbid it. Why would I forbid it? It’s destructive. Right? It’s destructive. Why would I forbid it? I would forbid it because it’s not destructive. I have another need there—the need of the circumcision itself. Right? So no, no—that too is destructive. Why is it destructive? Because another need doesn’t count as the relevant need. Ah—if so, then that works only according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that labor
[Speaker D] not needed for its own sake is exempt. No, the opposite. He will say that in kindling it is labor not needed for its own sake and he is exempt. Labor needed for its own sake—he is exempt; and labor not needed for its own sake—then he will be liable. If he kindles for the sake of the kindling itself, then he will be exempt, because it is only destructive. But if he kindles with some other completely defined need external to the kindling, then he obligates. So this is a labor that exists only in a case where it is not needed for its own sake. Right? No, then it’s totally different from all the others… clear.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s what comes out here, and it isn’t absurd. If you have a need, you’re liable; if you have no need at all, you’re destructive and exempt. No, because in this labor that is called the need of the labor itself. It is called the need of the labor itself because that is the ordinary need.
[Speaker D] He just doesn’t recognize…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says this too—it’s like we’re going back to what we discussed earlier. Erasing in order to write, or tearing in order to sew—is that labor not needed for its own sake? No, that is the very need of those labors.
[Speaker D] You said—and I agree—that there
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it is the definition of the labor…
[Speaker D] No, but here he won’t say that kindling is “in order to…” He says… it says explicitly in Rashi that no, kindling is only “for the sake of…” The labor needed for its own sake is for the sake of the kindling. And Rabbi Yehuda obligates only when he invents some reason—only when he introduces some new rationale that isn’t part of the labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Where do you see that in Rashi? “Because of the repair of others”—that is the labor…
[Speaker D] He says that with respect to the labor itself it is destructive. He says that the labor itself is always destructive. Right. But it repairs not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore the definition of the labor is when the repair is with respect to others.
[Speaker D] No, he doesn’t say that that is the definition of the labor. He says the definition of the labor is destructive, and he repairs only outside the labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To me that’s semantics. No. In the end, if you obligate him for it, then he’s saying that de facto it’s like tearing in order to sew.
[Speaker D] Even though he obligates because there is labor here, in principle you’d be exempt for it—but because you did it, you added some external rationale to the labor, and Rabbi Yehuda says that’s enough to obligate. But he doesn’t say that this rationale is part of the…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In my view that’s semantics. He can say it this way and he can say it that way—I don’t see any difference at all. No, in the final analysis, this labor is defined only for situations where you have some other need.
[Speaker D] And in the end he doesn’t… the question is whether he obligates you if you do the labor… First of all, the question is whether he calls it labor not needed for its own purpose. In two words: no. Of course this is labor not needed for its own purpose. According to Rashi, you can’t say that he says…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Shimon, it is labor not needed for its own purpose, but according to Rabbi Yehuda, no. No, according to Rabbi Yehuda, this is the labor itself. That is the definition of the labor.
[Speaker D] He doesn’t say that Rabbi Yehuda changed the definition of kindling…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is de facto what he’s saying. I don’t see a difference. That’s what he says in the end. For that you are liable, and that’s the only need there is here, so what’s the problem?
[Speaker D] So you don’t need to say because it repairs something for others.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because here the repair…
[Speaker D] He should have said: according to Rabbi Yehuda, for labor not needed for its own purpose you’re liable. It’s not connected to labor not needed for its own purpose; rather, he holds…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is connected. Again.
[Speaker D] Why not according to Rabbi Shimon?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if it’s not connected to labor not needed for its own purpose, then why not according to Rabbi Shimon? Because it is labor not needed for its own purpose! It’s just that according to Rabbi Yehuda, de facto, since he holds you are liable for labor not needed for its own purpose, then from his perspective right now this labor itself can be defined in such a way that it will always be not needed for its own purpose, and that’s fine. That’s the definition of the labor.
[Speaker D] Wait, is it not needed for its own purpose, or is that the definition of the labor?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same thing. I start from the reasoning that for labor not needed for its own purpose, one is liable. Therefore according to Rabbi Shimon the whole move is incorrect. According to Rabbi Shimon, this is labor not needed for its own purpose, for which he would be exempt; yes indeed. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who in principle says that for labor not needed for its own purpose you are liable, then you ask yourself: okay, and in kindling, when are you liable? There is only a case of not needed for its own purpose, so that is the definition of the labor in the labor of kindling. De facto, that’s what comes out.
[Speaker D] So why wouldn’t he simply say, as with erasing, that this is the definition of the labor?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he had said that, if he had said that, then you would think that Rabbi Shimon also agrees. It all starts from the dispute about labor not needed for its own purpose.
[Speaker D] Wait, wait, I’m talking about Rabbi Yehuda, not Rabbi Shimon. Why? But Rashi explains the reasoning.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Yehuda doesn’t need anything; Rashi explains Rabbi Yehuda.
[Speaker D] He explains why—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi explains Rabbi Yehuda this way. He explains the logic. Why? Because he wants to tell you—
[Speaker D] that this is only Rabbi Yehuda’s logic, and you shouldn’t think that it’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] also Rabbi Shimon.
[Speaker D] That’s what Rashi is coming to say.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But according to Rashi, why do we need to get to the point that Rabbi Yehuda says one is liable for labor not needed for its own purpose? Exactly, I’m explaining to you why. Let him say it’s like erasing. No, no. That’s what I’m explaining. If he doesn’t hold that one is liable for labor not needed for its own purpose, why can’t he say it’s like erasing? Because otherwise it would come out that Rabbi Shimon agrees too. Wait a second. No, I’m not waiting—Rashi comes to explain that for this reason.
[Speaker D] No, but fine, but I don’t need that. But according to the way Rashi chooses to explain it, I don’t need the reasoning of labor not needed for its own purpose, according to what you’re saying, rather it’s… No, but it starts from labor—from the reasoning of labor not needed for its own purpose. He’s talking about changing the definition, so why do I need at all…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What did Rashi help me with? Why do I need this method? Can I just repeat once more what I said?
[Speaker D] We’re repeating ourselves. In the end I’m saying this: what Rashi forces us into is Rabbi Yehuda’s position that one is liable for labor not needed for its own purpose. Right, obviously. Why? According to what you said, according to Rashi this could be not Rabbi Yehuda but Rabbi Meir, just some random person who says this is the definition of the labor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the end, instead of putting a question mark, just put an exclamation point, because you just explained exactly my position. Exactly—that’s what I’m saying. There is a dispute whether for labor not needed for its own purpose one is liable or exempt. Whoever says that for labor not needed for its own purpose one is exempt—there is no case of kindling at all; there simply is no such case of kindling. Therefore Rabbi Shimon says it must be that the labor of kindling…
[Speaker D] Wait, therefore—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Shimon, the labor of kindling is only destructive action, and there is a novelty that even though it is destructive, one is liable. And now the definition of the labor of kindling is a destructive labor.
[Speaker D] Why would he say that is the definition of the labor? Why does Rabbi Shimon say that? That Rabbi Shimon would agree with Rabbi Yehuda according to Rashi, according to the way you explain Rashi, that Rashi says we changed the definition of the labor…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We didn’t change it; de facto, that’s what comes out. Again: according to Rabbi Shimon, for labor not needed for its own purpose one is exempt, so there is no such thing as kindling at all, none. So Rabbi Shimon says as follows: apparently there will be… Wait, no, there isn’t, there isn’t. He says that for labor not needed for its own purpose one is exempt; on that he does not give in.
[Speaker D] Fine, but labor not needed for its own purpose is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Erasing, it’s kindling in order to… wait, wait, wait, one second.
[Speaker D] So—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says: since I have a permission regarding circumcision, I learn that even though kindling is destructive, the novelty is not that in kindling, even if it is not needed for its own purpose, one is liable; rather, that in kindling, even if it is destructive, one is liable. You can now choose which of the two novelties the Torah is teaching. So he says: I claim that the Torah is teaching that destructive action—its exemption does not exist in kindling, because otherwise there is no case of kindling. Rabbi Yehuda says: not true, it doesn’t have to be that way. It could be that the Torah comes to teach that even when it is not needed for its own purpose, one is liable in kindling. It’s not a question of destructive action; destructive action would remain exempt, even within labor not needed for its own purpose. That’s all.
[Speaker D] But the Torah did not teach that what is not needed for its own purpose is liable, because here according to Rabbi Yehuda the Torah is really defining the labor—that it is defined only for this kind of need.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re repeating ourselves; you’re repeating the same question and I’m repeating the same answer, I don’t know what to say. But I argue that we begin with the dispute over labor not needed for its own purpose. According to Rabbi Shimon, he could have said that this is the definition of the labor; he chose, for one reason or another, to say that the Torah introduced a novelty to eliminate the exemption of destructive action and not the exemption of labor not needed for its own purpose. And Rabbi Yehuda has no such option, because for labor not needed for its own purpose one is liable. So since that’s the case, there’s no reason to assume that the Torah introduced a novelty to cancel the exemption of destructive action.
[Speaker D] Around the question of labor not needed…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously, it starts there.
[Speaker D] No, according to what you’re saying, it doesn’t revolve around that; it revolves around whether you want to define that this is the labor… What do you mean, want? This reasoning… and then you say because of labor not needed for its own purpose, so there will be an exemption because I don’t want to define…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, I don’t want to define? Of course! What is this? I don’t know where it starts and where it ends. It depends on the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon whether for labor not needed for its own purpose one is liable or exempt.
[Speaker D] But it doesn’t depend on that, because if Rabbi Shimon had agreed…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he had—but he doesn’t!
[Speaker D] It doesn’t depend on that; it depends on this decision Rabbi Shimon made, when he said that it’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Rabbi Yehuda agrees with that decision as well.
[Speaker D] No, the opposite, Rabbi Yehuda says… no, Rabbi Yehuda agrees with that decision.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Yehuda would—
[Speaker D] say: listen, Rabbi Yehuda would say that if labor not needed for its own purpose were exempt, he too would agree that this comes to permit destructive action, to obligate destructive action. He just claims there’s no need to get there, because in my opinion for labor not needed for its own purpose one is liable. So I’m not in the dilemma Rabbi Shimon finds himself in—whether the Torah came to obligate destructive action or to obligate labor not needed for its own purpose.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Shimon is in a dilemma because he thinks labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt. So he says, okay, now the Torah imposed liability in circumcision—what is it coming to cancel? Is it coming to cancel labor not needed for its own purpose in kindling, or is it coming to cancel destructive action in kindling? So by reasoning he says: destructive action.
[Speaker D] Wait, wait, wait. It comes to cancel destructive action. According to Rabbi Yehuda there is no dilemma.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This dilemma, from now on, is not correct. There is a third possibility: that it defined this as the definition of the labor. This is the definition of the labor—that’s the first possibility I mentioned. No, that it comes to cancel labor—
[Speaker D] not needed for its own purpose in this labor. This is the definition of the labor when it is not needed for its own purpose; that is the labor. That’s not a third possibility, that’s the first one I mentioned. Meaning, the dispute starts from the fact that Rabbi Shimon has to say two things in order to create the dispute. Right. First of all, that this is not the definition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly.
[Speaker D] And that doesn’t sound like Rashi. In Rashi it sounds like this is compelled by the dispute over labor not needed for its own purpose.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, it is compelled if you accept that assumption.
[Speaker D] And I also emphasize, according to Rabbi Yehuda, that destructive action here is that it repairs something for others, so even in the conclusion it only repairs something for others; it doesn’t repair within the labor itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, exactly—that’s the point.
[Speaker D] But according to what you’re saying—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not repairing something for others; it’s repairing within the labor itself. No, the repair for others is the definition of the labor. That’s what he says.
[Speaker D] It’s not repair for others; it’s repair within the labor itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the repair for—
[Speaker D] others is the definition of the labor of kindling.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not repair in the wood and the fire, but it is the repair that is defined in the labor of kindling. Okay, what you’re saying is that when he says the last line—
[Speaker D] he is only destructive toward himself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he is not destructive toward himself; he is explaining exactly what he says.
[Speaker D] I don’t understand what you’re saying. On the contrary, he says that he repairs something for others; he only—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] comes to explain to you why this thing is the definition of the labor even though it is destructive—because it repairs for others. The labor is defined differently. No, he didn’t say that in the first line or the last line. He says it in the overall context of his words. After he reaches the conclusion that in this situation one is liable for labor not needed for its own purpose, de facto it comes out that according to Rabbi Yehuda the definition of the labor is when it is not needed for its own purpose. That is the definition of the labor, de facto. Now you say, no, that’s not the definition of the labor; rather, there is just a novelty that even though it is needed…
[Speaker D] What does not needed for its own purpose have to do with it? The definition of the labor is something prior to the whole question of whether it is needed for its own purpose or not. First of all, if you haven’t defined the labor, how can you tell me needed for its own purpose or not needed for its own purpose?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You haven’t defined the labor? Of course I have. You’re saying to me, wait, before we define the labor, should it be for the sake of the labor or not? First define the labor, and then I’ll tell you whether it is labor needed for its own purpose. The definition of the labor is what happens when you read the Mishnah in its simple sense. What is the definition of the labor of kindling? Lighting wood. That’s the simple definition. In Rashi he says, no, here it’s not like that, because here in the labor itself it is destructive. So what? There is a need for others. So with regard to need for others, Rabbi Yehuda says: fine, then apparently the definition of the labor here is only when it is done for the sake of others. That is the definition of the labor. Why is there—
[Speaker D] an addition here? It’s connected to need for others, but not connected to labor not needed for its own purpose… First define the labor for me, and then I’ll see that it’s not connected to labor not needed for its own purpose. If it’s not prior, then it’s the conclusion.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, we’re repeating ourselves. Fine, this is Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Shimon, and the baraita is in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, who says that for labor not needed for its own purpose one is exempt; therefore you have no wounding and no kindling that is not destructive. There is no case of wounding or kindling that is not destructive. Why? If he does it for another need, then it isn’t destructive. Yes, but another need is labor not needed for its own purpose. Wounding and kindling that are needed for their own purpose are always destructive, right? So there is no choice but to say that in wounding and kindling, destructive action is liable. Right? And that is all according to Rabbi Shimon. “And even one who kindles wood for his pot, it is destructive with respect to the wood, and what he repairs elsewhere is not considered significant by Rabbi Shimon, for it is labor not needed for its own purpose; rather, it is only because in wounding and kindling destructive action is liable, as stated later.” So what comes out from Rashi is this: first, that the dispute between Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan really is a dispute among tannaim—it is “shall we say this is like a tannaitic dispute?” Rabbi Abbahu goes with Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yohanan goes with Rabbi Yehuda. Okay? It is a tannaitic dispute. Of course, it also comes out from here that the positions of the tannaim are reversed. Meaning, Rabbi Shimon is the one who obligates in destructive action in kindling and in wounding. Why? Because according to his view, labor not needed for its own purpose is exempt, so the Talmud’s question then arises: why do you need a permission for circumcision, or liability in the case of burning the daughter of a priest? But according to Rabbi Yehuda, who obligates in labor not needed for its own purpose, the question does not arise why the Torah exempts in circumcision—sorry, says to circumcise—and prohibits burning the daughter of a priest. Right? Since that is so, it is clear that Rabbi Yehuda agrees that destructive action is exempt even in wounding and kindling. Meaning, it specifically comes out as exemption according to Rabbi Yehuda. From the fact that he obligates in labor not needed for its own purpose, it follows that there is exemption in destructive action. In other words, in the laws of destructive action Rabbi Yehuda is the lenient one and Rabbi Shimon is the stringent one. Okay? According to Rabbi Yehuda there is no novelty at all in circumcision regarding the laws of destructive action. Regarding destructive action, even in wounding, destructive action is exempt. Why do you need to permit circumcision? Because without that I would not have seen it as destructive action at all; I would have seen it as labor not needed for its own purpose, and therefore liable. Ah—you are damaging the object itself and the benefit is in something else—fine, labor not needed for its own purpose, where the benefit is in something else, is also considered a benefit of the labor. According to Rabbi Yehuda. So it is not called destructive action. Meaning, labor not needed for its own purpose radiates onto destructive action, and this once again sharpens even more what I said earlier. If that is really so, if that is really so, then when are you considered destructive? What is the case of wounding that is in fact destructive? After all, benefit for someone else, according to Rabbi Yehuda, is not destructive, right? Rabbi Yehuda says that even in wounding and kindling, destructive action is exempt, right? Why not in circumcision and in the burning of the daughter of a priest? Because there there is some other need, and there is indeed a need, right? Meaning, another need is not destructive. One’s own need is certainly not destructive. So when is it destructive? When there is no need at all—just burned or wounded for no reason, without needing anything? This riddle that has accompanied us throughout the whole lesson becomes much sharper here. Because now we have ruled out even the possibility that we are talking about another need. Destructive action is when it is destructive here even though there is a need for something else. No—that can’t be, because according to Rabbi Yehuda, if there is a need for something else, that too is not destructive. So when is it, yes? So what is destructive action—when you do something for no purpose at all? What? Yes, but then that’s unintentional involvement, exactly the question we talked about earlier. Okay, I’ll stop here simply because we need to.