The Laws of the Melachot – Lesson 23

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why do you need circumcision and the burning of a priest’s daughter? Learn it from the very fact that this was in the Tabernacle and it’s a primary category of labor. And that’s the point,

[Speaker C] which is what Rashi says: the moment you tell me that one is liable for wounding and kindling, then since I hold that for a labor not needed for its own sake one is exempt, I have to understand that the category of destructive action doesn’t apply here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, but why do you need circumcision and the burning of a priest’s daughter? You can learn it from the Tabernacle. It’s the same thing.

[Speaker C] You want to learn it from the Tabernacle, that it was there,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the very fact that it is a primary category of labor, it was in the Tabernacle, it’s a primary category of labor. Since it’s a primary category of labor, then how can that be? There’s no other case where it isn’t destructive. Therefore, destructive action is liable in wounding and kindling. And it’s like all the things that were in the Tabernacle and teach me there—for example, remember winnowing and the wind helping him? Since winnowing is done by means of the wind, and winnowing appears in the list of primary categories of labor, it’s obvious that here the fact that it’s done by the wind does not exempt, because that’s how one does winnowing. Otherwise winnowing wouldn’t be in the list of labors. Okay, so that’s basically what he wants to claim here. But that question is mistaken. Why? This is a point people get confused about a lot. How did the Mishnah know that wounding and kindling are liable? You’re bringing me proofs from the Mishnah. How did the Mishnah know? From the Tabernacle. What—

[Speaker N] Suddenly?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Tabernacle they also walked. So why didn’t they say that walking is also a primary category of labor? Obviously, in the Tabernacle too they didn’t take everything that happened there and make it a primary category of labor. We talked about that in the classes at the beginning of the first semester. Obviously there were considerations: which labors were central, which labors were distinctive, how to split up the labors. Not everything that was in the Tabernacle automatically became a primary category of labor. There’s no such thing. They breathed there, they walked there, they did lots of things in the Tabernacle, and all those things are not primary categories of labor. Right? So why did they choose wounding and kindling? The Mishnah, which brings wounding and kindling as two of the primary categories of labor—I’m asking about that. Why are you bringing me proofs from the Mishnah? I’m asking why it appears in the Mishnah. How did the Mishnah know that wounding and kindling are liable? After all, they’re destructive acts. How did the Mishnah know that there are such primary categories of labor as wounding and kindling? The answer is: from the burning of a priest’s daughter and from circumcision. That’s what the Talmud explains here. Bringing proofs from the Mishnah doesn’t help. I’ll ask the Mishnah itself the question I’m asking about Rabbi Shimon. What?

[Speaker J] There’s no prohibition in the Torah,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no prohibition in the Torah on wounding and kindling. The fact that it was in the Tabernacle doesn’t mean it’s a primary category of labor. The Sages decided that wounding and kindling, which occurred in the Tabernacle, would also be primary categories of labor. There are things that occurred in the Tabernacle and were not included among the primary categories of labor. And about that decision of the Sages I’m asking: why did you decide that? Wounding and kindling are inherently destructive. Why did you put them into the list of primary categories? Because of the burning of a priest’s daughter and circumcision. What, the burning of a priest’s daughter—is that

[Speaker K] in the Tabernacle?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—the burning of a priest’s daughter and circumcision. From the fact that the Torah prohibited burning a priest’s daughter, you see—you see that this kindling is a prohibited labor; otherwise why would the Torah prohibit it?

[Speaker K] When it permitted it on a weekday, they would burn her in the Temple.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There was—no, what does that have to do with the Temple?

[Speaker K] In the Tabernacle it wasn’t a labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course not. So what? It’s unrelated; it doesn’t have to be in the Tabernacle.

[Speaker K] No, but you said the thirty-nine labors—these are labors of the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. But wounding and kindling were done in the Tabernacle, not the priest’s daughter. There was wounding and kindling in the Tabernacle from all sorts of other things. What difference does that make? They transferred fire there. They used fire there, right? So they did it in the Tabernacle. That’s not the point. Since it was in the Tabernacle, it appears in the list of primary categories of labor. I’m only asking why the Sages decided, from the fact that it was in the Tabernacle, to include it among the primary categories of labor. There are things that were in the Tabernacle and were not included among the primary categories of labor. So I would have expected that wounding and kindling, since they are inherently destructive, and since labor not needed for its own sake—according to Rabbi Shimon—also does not incur liability, should not appear on the list at all. Then I ask: wait, so why does it appear on the list? And to that the Talmud says: because of the burning of a priest’s daughter and circumcision. From there we see that even though these two labors are not constructive—they are destructive—still the Torah in fact prohibited them, and permits circumcision. So since the Torah relates to them as prohibited labors, and since this existed in the Tabernacle, it will count as a primary category of labor. The actual burning of the priest’s daughter itself does not need to have happened in the Tabernacle. That doesn’t matter. From the fact that the Torah tells us not to burn a priest’s daughter on the Sabbath, that means that from the Torah’s standpoint kindling is something prohibited on the Sabbath. Now I ask why. Right—it was in the Tabernacle, but it’s destructive. Why does the Torah think kindling is prohibited? Because in kindling there is no exemption for destructive action.

[Speaker K] Ultimately, it could be that all sorts of labors, if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you had proof that you combine the labors—no. Again, kindling and wounding were in the Tabernacle. I am not combining things that were not in the Tabernacle. It’s only that even though they were in the Tabernacle, I would have expected them not to be included. Not that something not in the Tabernacle gets included—that doesn’t exist. Something that was in the Tabernacle may still not be included. For example, labors that were in the Tabernacle but are destructive acts. So I wouldn’t include them. Okay? Exactly. So that’s what you asked earlier, whether this is an archetypal derivation. We talked about that in the previous class, whether this is an exception or an archetypal derivation for everything. Fine? But here it doesn’t matter. What we said in the previous class, we said. Still, you should learn it not from the burning of a priest’s daughter but from the Tabernacle itself. Afterward you can ask why this is not an archetypal derivation, but that doesn’t matter; it’s not relevant to us. So therefore I think that’s incorrect. But ask this: if it really is entirely not needed for its own sake, then what did they do with it in the Tabernacle in the case of wounding and kindling? On the technical level, who says this happened in the Tabernacle? And if it happened in the Tabernacle, why did they do it there? They did it for some reason. If they did it for some reason, then apparently there was some benefit, otherwise why do it? That benefit would be the labor needed for its own sake and the constructive aspect of wounding and kindling. So apparently we have to say there was some need there, but that need is still considered not needed for its own sake.

[Speaker K] Or for example you could say there was a need for the altar.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or a need for the altar, or a need to burn spices, or all kinds of things of that sort. But it may be that this is not called the need of the kindling itself—you are destroying the wood. Right, you need the fire in the end, for example when you cook. We’ll see this later in the class. When you cook, okay? You destroy the wood, but obviously you need the fire in order to cook over the fire, right? That would still be called destructive. Why? Because the labor of cooking is not the labor of kindling. From the standpoint of the labor of kindling, this is a destructive labor. You’re right that here there will be a prohibition under the labor of cooking, which truly is the constructive act regarding the pot. But the improvement of the pot does not turn the kindling of the fire into a constructive act. In itself it is destructive. Otherwise cooking and kindling would not be two different primary categories of labor. Cooking and kindling would be the same thing: you kindle in order to cook. The cooking is just the need of the kindling. You see that it isn’t, because in the Mishnah cooking appears as one primary category of labor and kindling as another, right? What does that mean? That you can’t say the need of kindling is the cooking. If the need of kindling were the cooking, then cooking and kindling would be the same category. So what is the need of the one who kindles? There is no need for the kindling itself; basically there isn’t. And therefore the question is really why you made cooking and kindling two primary categories of labor. You should have made it one: cooking. In order to cook you need to kindle, but really there should have been only one primary category of labor. And the primary category of kindling itself really is done without any constructive result. It is complete destruction. From what—from people coming to warm themselves? No, that’s a different passage; we’ll still see more about warming oneself. Fine, that’s something else; that’s the question of labor not needed for its own sake. According to Rabbi Shimon, one is exempt.

[Speaker M] But—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Shimon, for labor not needed for its own sake one is exempt, okay? He makes ash, he burns wood, but it’s still labor not needed for its own sake. He will not be liable under the category of kindling—not that there’s no need to do it; do it if you need ash—but it won’t count as violating the labor of kindling according to Rabbi Shimon. According to Rabbi Yehuda yes; according to Rabbi Shimon no, because it is labor not needed for its own sake. From what did they make—

[Speaker K] They would make ash? They sometimes needed the ash.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, fine, I’m saying it could be they did it for the ash. But I’m only saying: if so, then in the Tabernacle they did it for the ash, so why is that called not needed for its own sake? That’s the need for which they did it in the Tabernacle. So what would count as needed for its own sake in this case? There is no such thing as needed for its own sake in this case. Okay, so for wounding and kindling, according to Rabbi Shimon there really is no such thing as needed for its own sake, because essentially these are destructive labors. But nevertheless one is liable for them, nevertheless one is liable for them even though they are destructive labors. That’s the whole novelty. Okay? You have to understand there’s a whole line of reasoning here about understanding primary categories of labor in general and their relationship to the Tabernacle. Meaning, it’s not that when they kindled in the Tabernacle they did it for no reason, just because they felt like it and there was no need. Obviously there was a need—for example, the need for ash. Okay? Fine, but the need for ash is called not needed for its own sake according to Rabbi Shimon. So it turns out that kindling in itself is really labor not needed for its own sake. So why is it nonetheless a primary category of labor? Because in kindling there is no exemption of labor not needed for its own sake, or no exemption for destructive action. Okay. Good, now let’s move to Tosafot. Tosafot there, “except for wounding and kindling,” “he said to him: go teach it outside.” Rabbeinu Shmuel explained that Rabbi Abbahu holds like Rabbi Shimon, who said that destructive action in wounding is liable. And Rabbi Yohanan holds like Rabbi Yehuda, who said that destructive action in wounding and in kindling is exempt. And if he needs it for his dog or for its ash, that is not considered destructive, and he is liable even according to Rabbi Yehuda. And so too it seems below from Rashi’s explanation. According to this, basically the dispute of the Amoraim is like the dispute of the Tannaim, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda. And that is difficult, because if so, why did he say to him, “go teach it outside”? Just because he holds like Rabbi Yehuda, do we silence someone who taught like Rabbi Shimon? So what does that mean, what is he saying to him? “What nonsense are you talking? Go teach it outside.” You hold like Rabbi Yehuda—that’s your right. He holds like Rabbi Shimon—what do you want from him? In other words, it seems that Rabbi Yohanan is unwilling to accept an opinion like Rabbi Abbahu’s. Not that he says, “this is like a tannaitic dispute; we are arguing within a tannaitic dispute.” If that were the case, he wouldn’t silence him. He would say: I don’t rule like you, fine. But you can’t say, “What kind of nonsense is this? This isn’t a Mishnah; go teach it outside.” It’s a tannaitic dispute. What do you say? A good difficulty against Rashi. Rashi is basically saying that if the dispute of the Amoraim is like the dispute of the Tannaim, it’s not clear what Rabbi Yohanan is saying to Rabbi Abbahu. A good question. I didn’t understand this question at all. I don’t understand this question. We’re at a different stage of the passage. At this stage nobody had even imagined that this was a tannaitic dispute. Rabbi Abbahu said one thing: that destructive action in kindling and in wounding is liable. And Rabbi Yohanan said: what are you talking about? Exempt. Who spoke here at all about a tannaitic dispute? There is a dispute on this question. So Rabbi Yohanan says, what—why say exempt? What do you mean? Why say liable? It’s destructive; destructive action is exempt, right? After that the Talmud asks: but we said all destructive acts are exempt, regarding Rabbi Abbahu. Then they answer: he needs it for his dog or for its ash. Then we say the explanation is that this is Rabbi Shimon and that is Rabbi Yehuda. Now the tannaitic dispute arises. Now Rabbi Abbahu says: what do you want from me, Rabbi Yohanan? I hold like Rabbi Shimon and you hold like Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yohanan himself never imagined that Rabbi Abbahu was disagreeing with him based on a tannaitic dispute. Whenever you say that an Amoraic dispute is like a tannaitic dispute, it’s always a question in the Talmud: “Shall we say this is like a tannaitic dispute?” Meaning: why are you arguing on your own? Just say: I hold like Rabbi Yose and I hold like Rabbi Shimon. That’s all. You don’t need to tell me the opinions again; the Tannaim already disputed it. Same here. There’s a whole notion of “shall we say this is like a tannaitic dispute?” Rabbi Yohanan says that to Rabbi Abbahu. What, are you disagreeing with me with a tannaitic dispute? It’s not a tannaitic dispute. You’re making a claim, and it’s the wrong claim. The Talmud says: no, no, there really is a tannaitic dispute here. That’s the answer. The dispute of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda—this one is Rabbi Shimon and that one is Rabbi Yehuda. That’s the Talmud’s answer. You can’t ask what the question was, because there is an answer. Fine? After this question comes the answer. No, maybe he knew there was a tannaitic dispute, but he didn’t think that he—he knew there was a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda about labor not needed for its own sake. But he never imagined that Rabbi Abbahu was speaking according to a different tannaitic position. You’re talking nonsense.

[Speaker M] You’re not talking nonsense.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why am I talking nonsense?

[Speaker M] After all, there is a tannaitic dispute. That’s the answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After he says it—no, not from the very fact of the way he addressed him.

[Speaker M] But I’m saying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The answer is: he didn’t know that he was hanging it on another Tanna. He thought he was speaking according to his own Tanna. What happened? What are you all saying? That’s what he tells him: you’re talking nonsense. So he says to him: no, what do you want?

[Speaker M] I’m disagreeing with you within a tannaitic dispute.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—what kind of tannaitic dispute? You want to tell me that you hold like Rabbi Shimon? Then leave it—don’t tell me “all destructive acts are exempt except for wounding and kindling.” Just tell me: I hold like Rabbi Shimon. That’s all. Why are you reinventing the wheel for me now? Rabbi Shimon already said it. Rather, you’re not merely repeating Rabbi Shimon’s opinion; you’re stating your own opinion. Your opinion is nonsense. You want to talk in terms of the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda? That’s the Talmud’s answer, and by the way it’s a forced answer. It’s a forced answer because usually “shall we say this is like a tannaitic dispute?” is a question. To say that Amoraim are disputing the same dispute as the Tannaim is problematic. The Talmud usually doesn’t like that. Here, because of the difficulty—and therefore it really was a difficulty—the Talmud is compelled to say that the Amoraim disputed a tannaitic dispute. But that’s only because of the difficulty. In any case Tosafot does ask this question. Therefore it seems that Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan dispute within Rabbi Shimon’s view. He disagrees with Rashi. He says no, that’s not correct—it is not a tannaitic dispute. Both Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan are speaking within Rabbi Shimon’s position. And in Jewish law we generally rule like Rabbi Shimon, except for Maimonides, who rules like Rabbi Yehuda regarding labor not needed for its own sake, but ordinarily the ruling is like Rabbi Shimon. Therefore I basically place both Amoraim within the halakhic position, the view of Rabbi Shimon. So what is the dispute? Rabbi Abbahu held that wounding and kindling, even though one does not need it for his dog or for its ash, are still liable according to Rabbi Shimon, because he derives it from circumcision and the burning of a priest’s daughter, what we’ve seen until now. Meaning, Rabbi Shimon learned from the burning of a priest’s daughter and from circumcision that wounding and kindling do not have the exemption of destructive action, and apparently also not the exemption of labor not needed for its own sake. That is Rabbi Abbahu’s view within Rabbi Shimon. And Rabbi Yohanan does not hold like Rabbi Yehuda as Rashi says; Rabbi Yohanan disagrees with him within Rabbi Shimon’s view, and he says: Rabbi Yohanan held that even Rabbi Shimon only imposes liability when there is at least some constructive aspect, such as where he needs it for his dog or for its ash. What Rabbi Yohanan says is: I’m willing to accept that wounding and kindling are liable only where he needs it for his dog or for its ash. Why? Because even when you impose liability for destructive action, there has to be some constructive element. If he does it just like that, he would be exempt even in wounding and kindling. The whole novelty of the Torah in wounding and kindling, learned from circumcision and from a priest’s daughter and so on, is only where there is some level of constructive result. And notice, this is according to Rabbi Shimon. Where there is some level of constructive result, then one is liable; and if he needs nothing at all, then he is liable for nothing. And if so, then it’s perfectly clear what Rabbi Yohanan says to Rabbi Abbahu: you’re talking nonsense—even within Rabbi Shimon’s opinion you’re wrong. Leave Rabbi Yehuda aside—even within Rabbi Shimon’s opinion you’re wrong. There is no such opinion; there can’t be such an opinion. What—liable with absolutely no constructive element at all? Why would he be liable? What are you talking about? There has to be some level of constructive element. Therefore he explains it as a case where he needs it for his dog or for its ash. “Needs it for his dog or for its ash” does not come to explain Rabbi Yehuda in order to turn it into labor needed for its own sake. No. This is speaking within Rabbi Shimon’s opinion, for Rabbi Shimon holds that one is exempt for labor not needed for its own sake. Even so, if you want to make destructive action liable, you can only do so where there is some level of constructive result. True, that constructive result is not for its own sake; “needs it for his dog or for its ash” may be a constructive result not for its own sake or something like that. But still, you need some constructive result in order to impose liability.

[Speaker G] So in the Talmud, instead of writing “exempt,” should it have written “not destructive”? Again—instead of writing “exempt,” should it have written “not destructive”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where should it have written not exempt? Where? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker G] The answer is that they’re speaking only about the law of destructive action and not about the law of labor not needed for its own sake, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the answer—that according to Rabbi Shimon it’s the same thing. Destructive action is a particular case of labor not needed for its own sake, but in wounding and kindling destructive action is liable. A specific novelty regarding wounding and kindling. But when is it liable? Only when there is some level of constructive result, like circumcision. This is not a general rule about destructive action. I’m saying: under the general rule of destructive action he is exempt, even when there is a slight constructive element he is still exempt. Why? Because it is still labor not needed for its own sake, and so on. In wounding and kindling there is a special novelty that there those exemptions of destructive action and labor not needed for its own sake and so forth do not apply. But even there you still need some level of constructive result. Meaning, if there were a destructive act with no accompanying constructive element that is not for its own sake, you would be exempt even in wounding and kindling. But when, in wounding and kindling, despite the fact that it is destructive, are you liable? When there is some constructive element which admittedly is not needed for its own sake, and therefore if this were not wounding and kindling Rabbi Shimon would exempt because of labor not needed for its own sake—but in wounding and kindling it was newly established that he does not. But it was not newly established in every case. Complete destructive action is exempt. Rather, labor not needed for its own sake is liable—but if it is completely destructive, there he would be exempt even in wounding and kindling. And by the way, that gives us some distinction between the exemption of destructive action and the exemption of labor not needed for its own sake—from the opposite side, from the side of liability. I asked earlier: according to Rabbi Shimon, the exemption for destructive action is superfluous, because it is a particular case of labor not needed for its own sake, right? But regarding liability in wounding and kindling, it flips around, because the exemption for destructive action remains in wounding and kindling; it’s only when it is labor not needed for its own sake that I’m not bothered by the fact that it is destructive. Then there will be no exemption either for labor not needed for its own sake or for destructive action. By the way, what would happen if there were a case of wounding or kindling that was not destructive in itself—if we manage to find such a case—but it was not needed for its own sake? Yet the thing itself is also not destructive. I’ll give you an example—we’ll see later—Maimonides’ view that heating metal is also a form of kindling. Heating metal does not destroy anything. Refining it—it doesn’t burn, it doesn’t consume wood, right? So there is no destruction there. Still, you need it not for the burning itself—you need it in order to warm yourself, to cook, I don’t know, to do something else. So there it’s an interesting question what would happen, because there there is a constructive result and it’s not destructive. It’s just ordinary labor not needed for its own sake. You’re not damaging the metal. So it’s simply labor not needed for its own sake; it’s not destructive, right? But labor not needed for its own sake that is not destructive would be liable in wounding and kindling.

[Speaker M] Who says that if it is for warming oneself, the prohibition is the kindling or the result of warming, and that is the constructive result?

[Speaker O] Again—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again?

[Speaker M] Is the prohibition the act of kindling itself, or is kindling something unnecessary and really what is needed is the result?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The primary category of labor is kindling. If there is no need for it, then one may be exempt.

[Speaker M] Now I’m asking, but again, this is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the definition of the labor. But now you need to discuss whether it is needed for its own sake and whether it is destructive. So I’m saying: if you heat metal for some other purpose, okay? For the need of burning a priest’s daughter, I don’t know, for some other purpose—you simply heat metal—then you are not actually causing destruction to the object, but it is labor not needed for its own sake. Would one be liable in such a kindling of a priest’s daughter? Kindling is ignition. Yes, kindling is ignition.

[Speaker N] Labor—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not needed for its own sake—the novelty is that the exemption of labor not needed for its own sake was not said regarding wounding and kindling. Right? It was not said. So even if there won’t be—meaning, whether it is destructive or not destructive—you would be liable in wounding and kindling. The fact that it is not needed for its own sake doesn’t matter; there is no exemption of labor not needed for its own sake in wounding and kindling. But the exemption for destructive action does exist even in wounding and kindling. That’s Tosafot’s position. Again: the exemption for destructive action exists even in wounding and kindling. When are you liable? When you are not destructive because there is some other constructive result. Fine? But if you are destructive and there is no other constructive result, what will happen there? You will be exempt even in wounding and kindling. You need some kind of purpose, as Tosafot said, right? And if there is no purpose at all, then the exemption for destructive action remains even in wounding and kindling. Only because there is some other purpose, therefore there is no exemption for destructive action here. That is the Torah’s novelty. Fine? And here there will be neither the exemption of destructive action nor the exemption of labor not needed for its own sake. Right? But destructive action with no other purpose would indeed be exempt. What about labor not needed for its own sake that is not destructive? Certainly that would be liable. Because—

[Speaker L] Even—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if even destructive action is liable, then if it is not destructive, labor not needed for its own sake would certainly be liable. Right? No—according to Rabbi Shimon. Because for wounding and kindling it was newly established that there is no such exemption. Right? So it turns out that according to Tosafot, this whole liability we learned for wounding and kindling is liability for labor not needed for its own sake; it is not liability for destructive action. Right? That is exactly the implication of what I said earlier—that according to Rabbi Shimon the exemption for destructive action is superfluous. It is really just a particular case of labor not needed for its own sake. And here is the expression of that. What is the expression? That in wounding and kindling, where they said that destructive action is liable, that’s not really correct. It’s labor not needed for its own sake that is liable. But if he is actually destructive, he will be exempt. Destructive action where there is some other need that is not for its own sake—there you would be liable. Because the aspect of labor not needed for its own sake does not exempt. Therefore this is basically called not destructive. But if you are destructive and there is no other need, then that exemption remains even in wounding and kindling. The exemption for destructive action remains even in wounding and kindling according to Tosafot. The only thing newly established is that there is no exemption for labor not needed for its own sake. What? There are several views. Here, here. According to Rabbi Yohanan. Yes. Fine? Yes—Rabbi Yohanan, who says he needs it for his dog or for its ash. For circumcision and burning there is a slight constructive aspect, namely the need of the commandment. Meaning, circumcision and burning, from which we learned this whole matter—even there there is some constructive aspect, namely the need of the commandment: either to burn the priest’s daughter or to circumcise the child. So all this is according to Rabbi Shimon. This is a dispute of Amoraim within Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Shimon says that in wounding and kindling a destructive act is not exempt, and Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan dispute what was newly established there. Was it newly established there that there is no exemption for labor not needed for its own sake? Or was it newly established there that there is no exemption for destructive action? According to Rabbi Abbahu, what was newly established is that there is no exemption for destructive action. Therefore even complete destructive action in wounding and kindling would be liable; you don’t need even a slight purpose. And Rabbi Yohanan argues against him: not correct. It is an exemption from labor not needed for its own sake; it is not an exemption from destructive action. Destructive action itself remains exempt even in wounding and kindling. So that is all within Rabbi Shimon. Two Amoraim within Rabbi Shimon. But according to Rabbi Yehuda, even if he needs it for his ash or for his dog, he is exempt, because this is not considered a significant constructive act, since it is not the normal way to wound one’s fellow. Now here the picture flips completely. Rabbi Yehuda says that labor not needed for its own sake is liable, right? So if he needs it for his dog or for its ash—no, since he needs it for his dog or for its ash, it’s not merely labor not needed for its own sake. That doesn’t bother Rabbi Yehuda. Labor not needed for its own sake is liable. Rather, this is such a bizarre kind of purpose that one doesn’t normally do such a thing—burn or kill some animal in order to give its blood to a dog. You don’t destroy animals for that. So that’s what he says: it is not a significant constructive act, for it is not the way to wound one’s fellow in order to feed his dog, or to burn a stack for its ash. Even though every slaughtering act is destructive, as we say in the first chapter of tractate Hullin—this is already a side discussion. So it turns out that according to Rabbi Yehuda, “he needs it for his dog or for its ash” is not ordinary labor not needed for its own sake. According to Rabbi Shimon, it is ordinary labor not needed for its own sake—he needs it for his dog or for its ash. And in wounding and kindling, if there is labor not needed for its own sake, one is liable. The novelty is that labor not needed for its own sake does not exempt, right? We saw that. And the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Abbahu is whether you need at least some slight purpose, or whether there is an exemption for all destructive action and not only for labor not needed for its own sake. But certainly for labor not needed for its own sake there is no exemption, right? Rabbi Yehuda says no. “He needs it for his dog or for its ash” is not labor not needed for its own sake at all. It’s worse than that. It is complete destructive action. Why is it complete destructive action? Because “for his dog or for its ash” is an unreasonable need; it is not the sort of need for which people normally do this. Therefore it doesn’t even count as a need not for its own sake. Because “not for its own sake” means a significant need, only not for the labor’s own sake but for some other purpose. Here that other purpose is not significant. So in the final analysis this is just plain destructive action. That’s his argument.

[Speaker M] Yes, obviously, right, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I was speaking according to Rabbi Shimon. So the claim is that there is a difference here between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon on the question whether “he needs it for his dog or for its ash” is ordinary labor not needed for its own sake, or whether “he needs it for his dog or for its ash” is some lesser kind of need. Now understand that there is a problem of interpretation in the Talmud here, because according to Tosafot it comes out that there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda that has nothing to do with their dispute about labor not needed for its own sake. It’s simply the question whether “he needs it for his dog or for its ash” is a significant need or not. For everyone this is labor not needed for its own sake; the only question is whether this is really labor not needed for its own sake—that’s Rabbi Shimon’s view—or whether Rabbi Yehuda says no, no, this is a labor not really needed for its own sake. The “other need” is a minor need, not a significant one. Now this has nothing to do with the dispute over whether one is liable or exempt for labor not needed for its own sake. It’s simply the question whether such a need is significant or not. So why did they bring in Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda here? Who told you there is a dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda on this question? We know they dispute regarding labor not needed for its own sake. How did the Talmud bring Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda in here? Why do you attribute this specifically to those Tannaim if the issue is whether this need is significant or insignificant? Say that it’s a dispute—I don’t know—of Amoraim. Why are you mixing Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda into this? So that was the basic question. And that is probably what forced Rashi into his whole move. Rashi had to connect it to the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda regarding labor not needed for its own sake. Because if it were not connected to Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda on labor not needed for its own sake, then what are they doing here? Who told you they are even speaking about destructive action? Why do you assume they are even speaking about destructive action? Tosafot is forced on this point. Tosafot wants to say that Rabbi Abbahu and Rabbi Yohanan are both speaking within Rabbi Shimon, and Rabbi Yehuda is something else—he disputes regarding the case of needing it for his dog or for its ash, saying that it is not a significant need. Who told you that? What, this is yet another dispute between Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda that has nothing to do with the dispute about labor not needed for its own sake? Where do we find this dispute? Who says there is such a dispute at all? From where did the Talmud invent that Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda dispute this issue? If this is the dispute about labor not needed for its own sake, I understand—it’s a known dispute. And if indeed everything depends on that, then of course I understand why the Talmud brings Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda in here. But according to Tosafot it is very strange. Therefore, in my opinion Rashi’s position is simpler. Even though it’s surprising, it’s simpler. And we also saw why the questions against it are not really such strong questions. Rabbeinu Tam explains that the reason Rabbi Yehuda considers “he needs it for his dog or for its ash” to be destructive is because the constructive result does not come at that very moment. He goes in Tosafot’s direction. But Tosafot said earlier: why is “he needs it for his dog or for its ash” destructive according to Rabbi Yehuda? Because it is not a significant constructive result, right? That was his claim—not because it is some other constructive result. Labor not needed for its own sake does not bother Rabbi Yehuda; he is liable. Rather, the claim was that this other purpose is not significant. Rabbeinu Tam says no—not because of that. It is because the constructive result does not come at the same moment, but only later. For only after the wound is made does the blood come, and only after the kindling is finished does the ash come. There is a constructive result that happens afterward; it is not a constructive result produced at the moment of the labor, but one that occurs afterward. You kindled, and the final outcome is that ash was produced. But kindling is the stage where you lit the fire. The fact that the fire then burns and ash results—that is already a later consequence. The act of lighting the fire itself is the labor of kindling, and that happened earlier. So this is another explanation of why these things are considered destructive. Meaning: according to the earlier Tosafot, why is it destructive? Because the constructive result of the dog or the ash is not significant. According to Rabbeinu Tam, it is destructive because the constructive result comes later, and therefore it is not considered a constructive result at all. All these are answers to what I asked earlier: how can there be a case that is destructive according to Rabbi Yehuda? How can that be? After all, either way—if you do it for some other purpose, then labor not needed for its own sake is liable, right? So according to Rabbi Yehuda that is not destructive, because another need is also a need. And if there is no other need, then why did he do it? It is destructive in that sense, and there is no other sense in which he needs the labor, so why did he do it? For what purpose does a person do it? Did he just do it pointlessly? Is he merely occupied without intent? Why did he do it? So here are the answers. Why is it nonetheless destructive? Two opinions in Tosafot. One opinion: because although he did it for a purpose—his dog or its ash—that is a small purpose, not a significant one. Fine? Therefore it is called destructive. But there is still a reason why he did it. It’s no longer an action a person does for no reason at all. And according to Rabbeinu Tam, it’s even better in that respect. He says there is definitely a purpose; it’s just that the purpose comes later. A purpose that comes later is still called destructive, because the act itself caused damage. Later there are certain consequences, but they do not turn the act itself into a constructive act. It remains an act of destruction. Yes, so he says: but in slaughtering, at the moment of the damage the constructive result comes to him, because it removes the animal from the category of a limb from a living animal. Yes, basically by the slaughter itself you repaired the animal. Why? It still isn’t ready to eat, right? It still needs to be cooked and so on, meaning that is also in the future. He says no, because the moment you slaughtered it, it already left the category of a limb from a living animal. In principle it is permitted to eat; you do not need to cook it. We cook because we don’t like eating it otherwise, but in terms of permission, the slaughter created the permission. So the constructive result happened at the time of the act, not afterward. Yes, and one who tears in order to instill fear in his household—that is, one who tears in his anger, yes, one who tears over his dead, or not in anger but in order to instill fear in the members of his household—this too Rabbi Yehuda considers a constructive act, because at the moment of the destruction the constructive result comes to him. Yes, immediately—it is not afterward in the sense of causation, but afterward only in the sense of sequence in time. Meaning, temporally it happens at once: I tear, and everyone gets very frightened. I have instilled fear in my household. Likewise in killing harmful creatures, and so forth, where the constructive result comes at the time of the destruction, and so on. Fine.

[Speaker G] A question: in the general rules of cooking, do you violate it the moment you put the food into the boiling water, or only after it cooks?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a condition that it actually cook. But you committed the prohibition when you put it on the fire. But there is a condition that it cook, because otherwise placing it on the fire isn’t considered cooking. But you’re asking: at what moment did you violate the prohibition? When you put it on the fire. Placing it on the fire. A practical difference, for example, would be what happens if you put it on the fire a minute before the Sabbath ends, and it cooks after the Sabbath? You would still be liable. And you would be liable because you committed the prohibited act, and after the Sabbath it became clear that what you did on the Sabbath was cooking. You did cooking on the Sabbath. If the prohibition were a prohibition on the result, you would not be liable, because the cooking happened after the Sabbath; I only put it on the fire during the Sabbath. Okay, there is some discussion of this. Chesed Le-Avraham and Aglai Tal talk about it a bit.

[Speaker G] Would this also be the case according to Rabbi Yehuda? What? That it wouldn’t be considered a result that comes later—you put it there and then wait.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he says—that the result is later. But even without after the Sabbath—even if the cooking happens during the Sabbath itself—it still would not be called a need, because the constructive result comes later in time, even within the Sabbath. That’s an even bigger novelty. You don’t need to get to a case where the constructive result occurs after the Sabbath; even on the Sabbath itself you would not be liable, because the constructive result happened later, so the act is still a destructive act.

[Speaker G] So with cooking that won’t work? Under the law of destructive action? Yes. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And here, in the next Tosafot, is the answer to your question. “And if you say: as for Rabbi Abbahu, who obligates even when one does not need the blood for his dog, since he has no need for it at all, this is a labor not needed for its own purpose. For even though Rabbi Shimon obligates in the case of destructive wounding, nevertheless it still requires that it be needed for its own purpose, as we say at the beginning of ‘These Are the Strangled Ones.'” According to Rashi, apparently not. According to Rashi, Rabbi Shimon, who exempts—that is, who obligates in the case of destructive action—also wasn’t bothered by the issue of a labor not needed for its own purpose. He would still be liable, because destructive action is only a particular case of a labor not needed for its own purpose. Tosafot here makes the distinction—I told you this is a dispute between Rashi and Tosafot. Here Tosafot makes the distinction. He says: even Rabbi Abbahu, according to Rabbi Shimon, who says that destructive wounding incurs liability—even when one does not need the blood for his dog, okay? even when he does not need the blood for his dog he is liable—but it still has to be needed for its own purpose. So if he doesn’t need the blood for his dog, then why would he be liable? Let that already be excluded on the grounds that it is a labor not needed for its own purpose. That’s Tosafot’s question. According to Rashi, that’s not a question. Right? Tosafot sees a labor not needed for its own purpose and destructive action as two different exemptions, so he says: with regard to destructive action, there was a novel ruling that one is liable. Where was it ever newly taught that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own purpose? It still must be needed for its own purpose. There is still a requirement that it be needed for its own purpose in order to incur liability. As for destructive action, fine, I don’t care—but it still has to be needed for its own purpose. So he says, as we said in ‘These Are the Strangled Ones,’ and so too it appears in ‘The Great Principle,’ and one can say that even in complete destructive action you can find a case where it is needed for its own purpose. For example, one who wounds or kindles with items from which benefit is forbidden, where he thought he could give it to his dog or cook a pot with it. What does that mean? Say I have an animal from which benefit is forbidden, or I slaughtered it in order to give the blood to my dog. Usually I don’t destroy an animal in order to give blood to my dog. But this animal is forbidden for benefit. So I haven’t lost anything; I have no use for this animal anyway. Okay? So in such a case there is a way to slaughter the animal. So the improvement involved in “he needs it for his dog” is a significant improvement. Okay? And therefore he says that in this case it is called a labor needed for its own purpose, since he can give it to his dog and needs it for baking, even though it is destructive. And in such a situation, that is indeed what was said: that in the case of wounding he would be liable. Because destructive action is not an exemption, but needed for its own purpose still has to be for its own purpose. Okay? That is basically Tosafot’s claim. “And Rabbi Abbahu—even though the need of a commandment is not considered an improvement, nevertheless it is considered needed for its own purpose.” Meaning: the fact that you need it for the sake of a commandment does not turn the labor into an improvement, because a commandment is not an improvement. Improvement has to be a physical improvement, not for the sake of a commandment. But in terms of whether it is needed for its own purpose—yes, it is needed for its own purpose. If you do it for the sake of a commandment, then I need it for itself, for the sake of the commandment. The fact that the commandment is not a benefit for me means that it is considered not an improvement—it is destructive—because the benefit is spiritual benefit. But if you ask whether it is needed for itself, yes, the need of a commandment is also for its own purpose. Like when you perform circumcision. Right? When you perform circumcision, you do it for the sake of a commandment, right? So is that needed for its own purpose or not needed for its own purpose? The answer is that it is needed for its own purpose when you perform circumcision. Why? Because you do it for the sake of the circumcision; you need it for the sake of the commandment. Are you asking whether it is an improvement? No, it is destructive. Why? There is an improvement in terms of the commandment. A commandment is not an improvement; a commandment is a spiritual matter. Improvement has to be a physical improvement in the thing itself. Meaning, the commandment plays a different role here with respect to destructive action and with respect to needed for its own purpose. The requirement of needed for its own purpose is solved by the commandment. The issue of destructive action is not solved by the commandment. And there is a lot of logic in that, because when you ask yourself—after all, commandments were not given for enjoyment—when you do something for the sake of a commandment, it is not really considered that you benefited from it. It is not that it repaired something for you. Okay? But are you interested in this thing? Certainly you are interested in this thing; you want to perform a commandment. So that is indeed called needed for its own purpose, even though it does not turn the destructive action into an improvement. I didn’t do it for some other purpose; I did it for the sake of the thing itself. I need it for the commandment. So you can’t say it is for another purpose; it is for its own purpose. The only thing you can discuss is whether it is destructive or constructive. Since the improvement is a commandment, that is not considered an improvement; it is destructive. Again, this is another answer to the question: so why do people do it if it is destructive? Right? I asked earlier, if it is completely destructive, then why do people do it? The answer is: they do it for the sake of a commandment. And that does not remove it from the category of destructive action. It remains destructive, but they do it for the sake of a commandment. What? There is a dispute here, from what we just saw—there is a dispute over whether a labor not needed for its own purpose and destructive action go together. According to Rashi, destructive action is a particular case of a labor not needed for its own purpose. According to Tosafot, the fact that we impose liability for destructive action does not mean that we no longer require it to be needed for its own purpose. The two do not go together. It could be that this is connected to the dispute we saw in the first class: the question whether destructive action is a rule that exempts, or whether something destructive is not labor at all. You don’t need to exempt it; there is no liability in the first place—it simply is not called labor. Okay? Why? According to Rashi, destructiveness is an exemption. Not that if it is destructive then it doesn’t need to be labor. Destructiveness is an exemption. Therefore it belongs to the family of a labor not needed for its own purpose. A labor not needed for its own purpose is a kind of exemption. You did the labor, but if it is not for its own purpose, then you are exempt. Destructive action is part of that. According to Tosafot, destructive action is not called labor at all. So if you tell me that in the case of wounding I don’t care whether it is destructive, then wounding is indeed labor. But that has nothing to do with the question whether there is an exemption here of a labor not needed for its own purpose. There would still be an exemption here of a labor not needed for its own purpose, because that is an exemption. Okay? I want a little more. There is, yes—Rashi says that every act of kindling, for him, is destructive. We saw this in Rashi: every act of kindling is basically destructive because you are destroying the wood. And as I said earlier, the support for Rashi is this: so why are you kindling? Because you want to cook. For example, to warm yourself, to cook, or something like that. And still, that does not mean that the burning of the wood is not destructive, because the burning of the wood is destructive; the cooking is another primary category of labor. There is a primary category of labor of kindling and a primary category of labor of cooking. If you look only at the kindling, then the kindling is destructive. If you look at the cooking, there is another primary category of labor here—cooking—and that does not repair the primary category of labor of kindling. That is Rashi’s conception. But Nachmanides—what?

[Speaker J] According to Rashi, is kindling and cooking a labor needed for its own purpose?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. According to Rashi, if it is destructive then it is a particular case of a labor not needed for its own purpose, yes. A labor not needed for its own purpose is more severe—more lenient, meaning, more exempting. Look at Nachmanides. “And likewise, what Rashi of blessed memory himself said, that you have no kindling that is not destructive—even one who kindles wood in order to cook a pot—this is not correct, for he needs the actual fire itself. And likewise one who kindles in order to warm himself, where his benefit and its burning are equal. And plowing and its derivatives—his benefit is not in them themselves directly, but they are part of the world’s practical use,” and so on. What does “for he needs the actual fire itself” mean? For cooking. So because of that, the act of kindling is also not destructive—not like Rashi says. Why should I care that he needs the fire in order to cook? There is a primary category of labor of cooking, but the primary category of labor of kindling is essentially destructive. Nachmanides says no—exactly what you said earlier. It is true that cooking is another primary category of labor, but it can also serve as the goal of the primary category of labor of kindling. If you kindle and cook, you will violate two prohibitions: kindling and cooking. Is this act of kindling destructive? Not true, because the cooking, aside from the fact that you violated the primary category of labor of cooking, also serves as the improvement of the kindling, and that is the improvement achieved through the kindling. Okay, that is basically Nachmanides’ claim. Nachmanides is of course following the approach of Tosafot.

[Speaker O] Two acts for one action, kind of?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is an action and a result, but yes—you violate two primary categories of labor.

[Speaker O] You violate—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The primary category of labor of cooking and the primary category of labor of kindling. Both.

[Speaker O] According to Rashi it’s kind of destructive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. This will depend somewhat on what we saw above: if an improvement that appears afterward—for example, cooking is an improvement that appears afterward relative to the kindling—then it will depend on the dispute between Tosafot and Rabbeinu Tam. Right? The question is whether a future improvement can turn the destruction into improvement, or whether a future improvement does not count.

[Speaker O] Is the initial action what determines it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At the time of the action, yes. So “he needs the actual fire itself”—what does that mean? It means that… But according to Maimonides, in the case of kindling he will be liable only when he needs it for its own purpose. If he does not need it for its own purpose, he will not be liable, like Tosafot. According to Rashi, you do not need to get to that, because according to Rashi, if destructive action incurs liability, then even not needed for its own purpose also incurs liability. Even if he does not need it for its own purpose, he is liable. So Rashi does not need to say that there has to be an improvement; the cooking will serve as the improvement for the kindling. Even if it is another kind of improvement, it is not needed for its own purpose—so what? In kindling there is no requirement that it be needed for its own purpose. And Maimonides follows the approach of Tosafot, yes. However, there is a bit of room here to connect this to a well-known dispute: first, with regard to the labor of kindling itself, there is a dispute among the later authorities as to whether the labor of kindling is the consumption of the wood or the creation of the fire. This is apparently the dispute between Rashi and Maimonides here. Okay? So there is the Shulchan Arukh HaRav and the Avnei Nezer—they also disagreed about this. For this they bring Maimonides, whom I mentioned earlier, in chapter 12, Jewish law 1. He says: “One who kindles any amount is liable, provided he needs the ash,” and so on. “Likewise, one who lights a lamp or wood, whether to warm himself or to provide light, is liable. One who heats iron in order to temper it in water—this is a derivative of kindling and he is liable.” So it is clear that kindling is not the consumption of the wood. If it were the consumption of the wood, then heating iron would not be kindling. Right? And indeed the Ra’avad objects to him here. He says: “This is a derivative of kindling and he is liable.” Said Abraham: why not because of cooking? The question is whether he means also cooking, or whether he means no, this is not kindling but cooking. Why is it not kindling? Because kindling is the consumption of the wood; when you kindle iron, you are not consuming anything. So I don’t know—with the Ra’avad, the question is whether he comes to dispute Maimonides or only to add that it would also be cooking. Maimonides? Here, you can see him.

[Speaker C] No, in the Ra’avad, the line here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. So now there is also another discussion in the Talmud in tractate Beitzah, and I already need to hurry. In tractate Beitzah 22, the Talmud discusses someone who takes oil from a burning lamp. So he violates the prohibition because of extinguishing. Tosafot and the Rosh disagree about why he is considered to be extinguishing. One opinion says he extinguishes because when he takes the oil, the flame becomes a bit weaker. So there is some conception there that apparently the amount of oil determines the intensity of the fire. I don’t think that is true, but there is such a conception there. And therefore you somewhat extinguish the fire, and therefore it is forbidden to take oil from the lamp. There is another conception that says no—once you remove the oil, then with regard to the lamp, that is only indirect causation, but the oil itself that you removed, you extinguished. Because it really was burning. Meaning, the conception is that once the oil is here and the fire is here, all of this oil is burning. It is only a matter of time until it is consumed, but all this oil is burning. Now when you removed a little oil, you basically extinguished the oil that you removed, because now it is no longer burning—not because of what you did to the flame. Now you understand what the difference is. The question is whether extinguishing means removing the fire, or whether extinguishing means saving the wood, saving the fuel. Which is exactly the mirror image of the dispute regarding kindling. If kindling means consuming the fuel, then extinguishing means saving the fuel. If kindling means creating the fire, then extinguishing means weakening the fire or neutralizing the fire. Right? It is really the mirror image of the same dispute. I still want to get to just one more thing. There are a lot of examples here; afterward you can see them in the summary—I won’t get to them now. I want to make one more comment about something enduring. The medieval authorities write regarding several categories of labor that it has to be something enduring. It seems connected to destructive action; something enduring means there is some significant improvement here. Now the source in the Talmud regarding something enduring is with respect to tying—that a knot has to be a permanent knot. Right? Now what is a permanent knot? The medieval authorities discuss this: one day, a week, until after the Sabbath, I don’t know—various views among the medieval authorities. We also find this regarding dyeing, writing, and sewing. And there are medieval authorities who turn this into a general principle. They turn it into a general principle. Now on the face of it, there is room to connect this to the rule of destructive action. Why? Because if labor that does not improve is not labor at all, then something enduring is a requirement in order for you to be liable, right? Because otherwise the labor did not improve anything. That is what “something enduring” means. And then it would indeed be a general principle in all categories of labor—that all categories of labor have to be something enduring, because without improving, it is not considered labor at all. It is a general rule that something that does not improve is not labor. We talked about this: is there a requirement of improvement in order to incur liability, or when there is destruction does that exempt? This too is connected to the position of Rashi and Tosafot that we discussed above, okay? I spoke about this in the first class. But if the claim is that destruction is something that exempts, then say I did something non-enduring. Okay? Say I made a knot that is not permanent, fine? A knot that is only for half an hour. Did I destroy anything here? I didn’t destroy anything. There just isn’t an improvement, right? But I didn’t destroy anything. Okay? Now if I understand that destruction is needed in order to exempt, then there is no destruction here. If you need there to be improvement in order to incur liability, then you are right—there is no improvement here, because only a permanent knot is an improvement. Right? Now if I understand that destruction is something that exempts, and we saw that this is a dispute among the medieval authorities, then what is the meaning of this requirement that it be something enduring? Even if it is not enduring, that is not destruction—it is just not improvement. So why should there be such a requirement of something enduring? So I want to claim that there are certain categories of labor—and we find this in various passages—there are certain categories of labor in which enduringness is not some external condition. If the thing is not enduring, then it is not a knot at all—you did not make a knot. A knot that remains for half an hour and then comes undone—you did not join two things at all; that is not called joining them. The issue is not whether there is destruction here or whether there is no improvement—that is not the point. Simply, no knot was created. Because a knot is only something that ties two things to one another. Tying two things to one another means tying them for a significant amount of time. Meaning, that is part of the definition of the labor of tying. But then indeed this is not a general principle, and it has nothing at all to do with the rule of destructive action—no connection to the rule of destructive action. Rather, in those cases where the product of the labor is defined as being only something of that sort, something that has permanence, then in those categories of labor we will indeed require something enduring. But not that there is a general requirement in all categories of labor that it must be something enduring. If this comes from the laws of destructive action, then I understand—then in all categories of labor it must be something enduring, because otherwise it is not labor that has been done. And then it comes under the law of destructive action, and then it applies to all categories of labor—but that can be said only if I understand that improvement is a requirement for liability. But if I understand that destruction exempts—not that without improvement there is no liability; there is liability, only if it is destructive then I exempt—then if it neither improves nor destroys, are you liable or not? That is the practical difference. Right? It neither improves nor destroys. Fine, so that will be the practical difference. If you need improvement in order to incur liability, then you will not be liable. But if you need destruction in order to exempt, there is no destruction here, so you would not be exempt. Okay, and we saw that this is a dispute among the medieval authorities. Now I am saying: according to those medieval authorities who say that improvement is needed in order to incur liability, then I understand why something enduring would be a requirement in all categories of labor. Because if it is not something enduring, there is no improvement here. But according to the medieval authorities who say that destruction exempts, then where does something enduring come from? You have to say that it is only a requirement within the definition of a knot or of the labor of tying. But then it will be true only in those categories of labor where enduringness defines the labor. It is not a general requirement in the laws of the Sabbath. It comes from the laws of the labor of tying; it does not come from the laws of intentional labor or from Sabbath law generally. Simply, the labor of tying has that character—you didn’t tie. Exactly. Or you didn’t sew, or things of that sort. But then it applies only in those categories of labor and is not a general rule. And we find distinctions like this in very many laws. For example, I mentioned earlier winnowing with the wind assisting him—we discussed that last semester. In winnowing with the wind assisting him, the wind helps separate the kernels from the chaff, right? I throw it into the air, the wind blows away the chaff and the kernels fall, and then I have kernels without chaff. So I selected by means of the wind. Rashi in Bava Kamma 60 learns from here that there is a general rule that indirect causation on the Sabbath incurs liability. Because the Torah prohibited intentional labor. Because here it is only indirect causation—the wind is doing it. You only threw it into the air; the wind took it. You merely caused it; you did not do the selecting, right? Only the wind did. So it is indirect causation. The Rosh says no—there is no general rule that indirect causation incurs liability; indirect causation is exempt even on the Sabbath. Rather, specifically in winnowing, the labor of winnowing is defined in such a way that even if it is done with the help of the wind, you performed winnowing, because that is the normal way to do winnowing. So here is exactly an example of the same distinction I was talking about here. And the fact that the assistance of the wind does not exempt is not a general law in Sabbath law, as Rashi understands it—that this is indirect causation, and indirect causation incurs liability on the Sabbath. No. It is part of the definition of the labor of winnowing, that specifically in the labor of winnowing, even if you make use of the wind, you are liable. But that is only in that labor, or in several particular categories of labor where that happens. It is not true in all categories of labor. An ordinary labor that is done in the normal way with the hands—if it is done with the help of the wind, then indeed you would be exempt, because indirect causation is exempt even on the Sabbath. The same distinction: very often there are certain laws that some medieval authorities understand as broad principles that apply to all the laws of the Sabbath, while others say that these define particular categories of labor, because that is simply the nature of the labor. Okay, we’ll stop here. I am done with destructive action. Whoever wants—I will upload a summary to…