The Laws of Melachot – Lesson 24

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The water acts through his force. He is, by his force, pouring the water, but the water puts out the fire only indirectly. It cuts off the oxygen, and the fire goes out on its own. So in principle, one could have said that the discussion about indirect extinguishing—say, someone who holds that indirect extinguishing is liable—is not because in his view indirect causation is generally liable, but because specifically with regard to the labor of extinguishing, even if you do it indirectly, that still falls within the definition of the labor, because ordinary extinguishing done directly by hand is itself basically a kind of indirect causation. Therefore, with the labor of extinguishing itself, the rule of indirect causation—the exemption for indirect causation—was not said. As we saw, if you remember, regarding one who acts unintentionally in wounding and kindling, he is liable. Why? Because within the parameters of those labors there is no exemption for one acting unintentionally. And don’t learn from there that one acting unintentionally is generally liable. That discussion is about the parameters of the labors of wounding and kindling, not about the rules of acting unintentionally. Okay? So here too, the same thing. When we see a dispute about indirect extinguishing, one could have understood—for example, Rabbi Yosei, who forbids it—one could have understood that he forbids it not because in his view indirect causation is forbidden, but because within the parameters of the labor of extinguishing, even if you do it indirectly, that is included in the definition of the labor. There is no general rule that indirect causation in Sabbath labors is liable, or that indirect causation everywhere in the Torah is liable. Rather, this is a specific rule regarding the labor of extinguishing. Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas, who says that indirect extinguishing is permitted—there it is harder to find a reason why that would be specifically about extinguishing. I don’t know. But at least in Rabbi Yosei’s view there was room to say this. But from the Talmud’s question here later on, what do we see? That this is not correct. Why? Because otherwise the Talmud would not have raised objections from indirect extinguishing to indirect erasure of the divine name. What do you want? Those laws are specific laws of the labor of extinguishing. I didn’t state some general rule that indirect causation is forbidden or that indirect causation is permitted. Specifically, this is a discussion within the labor of extinguishing. So what does that have to do with indirectly causing the erasure of the divine name? Why would a law said about indirectly causing the erasure of the divine name be a challenge to indirect extinguishing? What’s the connection? If the Talmud uses that as an objection, then the Talmud apparently understood that the dispute between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas is not a dispute about the parameters of the labor of extinguishing, but rather a dispute over whether indirect causation is permitted or forbidden. More than that: the Talmud also understood that the dispute is about whether indirect causation throughout all of Torah is permitted or forbidden, not only in Sabbath labors. Because indirectly causing the erasure of the divine name is not talking about the prohibition of erasing in the laws of Sabbath, the labor of erasing. There it certainly is not erasing for the sake of writing, so it certainly is not a Torah prohibition of erasing. Rather, indirectly causing the erasure of the divine name is talking about a weekday. It is forbidden to erase God’s name not because of the labor of erasing on the Sabbath. So this is not even a discussion in the laws of Sabbath. And if the Talmud connects the dispute over indirect extinguishing to indirect erasure of the divine name, then we learn something even more far-reaching from here: not only is this discussion not specific to the labor of extinguishing, this discussion is also not a discussion in Sabbath labors. This is a general discussion in Jewish law. Is indirect causation forbidden or is indirect causation permitted? And therefore the Talmud says: wait, if so, we have a contradiction here—Rabbi Yosei against Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas against Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas. Because regarding erasure of the divine name we find one way, and regarding extinguishing we find another way. So from the very fact that the Talmud sees a difficulty here, we already learn something: that the dispute over indirect extinguishing between Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas is really a dispute over the law of indirect causation in general. It is connected neither specifically to the Sabbath nor certainly only to the labor of extinguishing. Okay. What does the Talmud answer? “There it is different, because the verse says: ‘And you shall destroy their name from that place; you shall not do so to the Lord your God.’” Direct action is what is forbidden; indirect causation is permitted. What does that mean? It means there is a special derivation in the prohibition of erasing the divine name, that this prohibition applies only if it is done in a manner of direct action, meaning by a direct act. But if it is done indirectly, then it is permitted. What does that mean? It basically means that when Rabbi Yosei permits indirectly causing the erasure of the divine name, that does not contradict the fact that he forbids indirect extinguishing. He forbids indirect extinguishing because indirect causation in general is forbidden, including in the laws of Sabbath. The exception is erasing the divine name, because regarding erasing the divine name I have a derivation from a verse that indirect causation is permitted there, so it is exceptional. But everywhere else in the Torah, including all the Sabbath labors and certainly extinguishing, indirect causation will indeed be forbidden according to Rabbi Yosei. That is of course the answer to the contradiction in Rabbi Yosei’s view. Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas. So, that’s the contradiction in Rabbi Yosei’s view. Meanwhile I’ll draw your attention to one more thing. It is clear that the prohibition being discussed here is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition on indirect causation, because if it were rabbinic, then it would make no sense to derive from a verse that in the case of erasing the divine name it is permitted. A verse does not come to teach that there is no rabbinic prohibition. And it is pretty clear that the prohibition is a Torah prohibition, a prohibition of indirect causation, where such a prohibition exists. Okay? And therefore we need a verse here to say that in the case of erasing the divine name it does not exist, it is not there. That is just a side note, maybe an interesting anecdote. I once saw a question from Rabbi Akiva Eiger. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says there is a Talmudic passage in tractate Sanhedrin that says we require the verse as written. What does that mean? When we carry out the verse, we have to carry it out as it is written. If it is impossible to carry it out as written, then it does not apply here, so there is no obligation. In what context is this said? Among other things, there are several examples there, concerning the burning of an apostate city. In an apostate city, if they find a mezuzah in one of the houses, then the law of an apostate city is voided. Why? Because after all, one has to burn all the property of the apostate city. Now the mezuzah cannot be burned, because it contains the divine name—erasing the divine name. Since it is impossible to burn all its property, the law of an apostate city does not apply here, because we require the verse as written. You have to do the verse exactly as it says. If you cannot do it that way, then the law does not apply. That is what the Talmud says. Rabbi Akiva Eiger asks about this: why not burn the mezuzah indirectly? After all, we saw that indirectly causing the erasure of the divine name is permitted; there is a verse that says indirect erasure of the divine name is permitted—“you shall not do so to the Lord your God,” right? So if this is indirect causation, if you can burn it indirectly, then there is no problem: burn all the property of the apostate city, burn the mezuzah indirectly, and then you actually can fulfill the verse as written, just as it is written. Why does the Talmud say that here one cannot carry out the verse as written? That is Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s question. So it seems to me that he leaves it unresolved; I don’t remember whether this is his answer or my answer. As I remember it, it is my answer, but I am not one hundred percent sure, so I don’t want to sin by attributing a statement to the wrong person. But it seems to me that once I wanted to resolve it as follows: if you are, say, burning all the property of the apostate city, and the mezuzah you burn indirectly—but if you burned the mezuzah indirectly, then you did not fulfill the commandment of burning the property of the apostate city, because you performed the commandment indirectly. So it turns out that you cannot fulfill the commandment of the verse as written, to perform the commandment on all the property of the apostate city. Because if I do it indirectly, then true, there will not be a prohibition of erasing the divine name, but there also will not be the commandment of burning the apostate city. Just as indirect causation is not a prohibition, it is also not a commandment. Because an act done indirectly is not an act. And therefore the Talmud says that if there is a mezuzah, they do not burn the apostate city, because it is not the verse as written. It is impossible to carry out the burning of the property of the apostate city. Because Rabbi Akiva Eiger asked: burn the mezuzah indirectly. I say: that does not help. It does not help because if you burn it indirectly, you still have not burned all its property, because you did not fulfill the commandment of burning with respect to the mezuzah. But notice that from the Talmud here, at least at this stage, it seems otherwise. It comes out that I was wrong. My study partner—now I remember, yes, this really is my answer, not Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s—because when I told my study partner this answer, he said to me: look, apparently you made a double mistake. After all, Rabbi Akiva Eiger leaves the Talmud unresolved. If you are resolving Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s unresolved difficulty, then obviously he also thought of what you said. He certainly didn’t miss that. So if you say something that resolves his question, then apparently you also erred about that. So you have Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s mistake, that he didn’t understand the Talmud, and you have another mistake in that Rabbi Akiva Eiger didn’t answer it with what you answered, so you reached the same conclusion as the Talmud, but only because you made two mistakes rather than one. They just canceled each other out. Yes. His assumption, of course, was that it is impossible that Rabbi Akiva Eiger would miss something that I’m saying. Yes, the gap in level is such that—it just can’t be. Well, maybe that’s true, maybe not, I don’t know. In any case, for our purposes, let me suggest an explanation to my study partner of what I missed here. What did I miss? After all, the Talmud says that indirect causation is not a general exemption. It is only an exemption in destruction, in erasing the divine name, because there it says “you shall not do so to the Lord your God”—direct action is what is forbidden; indirect causation is permitted. What happens in commandments or prohibitions where the word “action” was not written? There, indirect causation will count like actual action, right? So in the burning of an apostate city, the word “action” was not written, and therefore there there will not be this exemption of indirect causation. Meaning: there one cannot say that if you burned the mezuzah indirectly, then you did not fulfill the commandment of burning the property of the apostate city, because there direct action is not required; all that is required is that it be burned. Even indirect causation is fine. And if so, then Rabbi Akiva Eiger is right.

[Speaker C] Wait—regarding indirect causation in rabbinic commandments, can you do it? In terms of fulfillment—for example, to burn the leaven indirectly, from a distance or something like that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the difference between rabbinic and Torah-level? I don’t understand.

[Speaker C] If at the Torah level—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s impossible there, then why would it be possible for rabbinic law? What’s the difference? “Whatever the rabbis instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law.” Right. What exists in Torah law exists in rabbinic law, unless it was explicitly stated otherwise. But the simple assumption is that the definitions in rabbinic laws are like the definitions in Torah laws. Fine, so let me get back to us. So it comes out that this was said only about indirectly causing the erasure of the divine name. Only with erasing the divine name is there an exemption of indirect causation, because there it says that this must be an act. Notice, this is all in Rabbi Yosei’s view. In Rabbi Yosei’s view, basically even through indirect causation you are… forbidden, except for indirect erasure of the divine name, because regarding erasing the divine name the word “action” was stated. That’s what comes out in Rabbi Yosei’s view. Of course, maybe in the background we should remember one more thing. The Talmud says: direct action is what is forbidden; indirect causation is permitted, right? From where did they infer that indirect causation is not direct action? Direct action is what is forbidden—but indirect causation too is an action. That comes from logic. You cannot derive that from the verse. Right. The Talmud assumes logically that indirect causation is not direct action. So notice: even the one who forbids—after all, Rabbi Yosei forbids indirect causation, right? Rabbi Yosei forbids indirect causation except in the case of indirectly causing erasure of the divine name, where because of the verse he says it is permitted, or at least there is no Torah prohibition, but generally he forbids even indirect causation, Rabbi Yosei, right? And still, Rabbi Yosei himself also says that indirect causation is not direct action. Because if in his view logically indirect causation were direct action, then even regarding erasing the divine name you would have no source to exempt indirect causation. It says “action,” but indirect causation too is action. Who says indirect causation is not action? After all, one could have said—why does Rabbi Yosei say that indirect causation is forbidden throughout the Torah? In what does he disagree with Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas? One could have said: because in his view indirect causation is also action. Right? Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas says indirect causation is not action, and Rabbi Yosei says no, indirect causation is also action. But that cannot be correct. Because if that were the dispute, and Rabbi Yosei held that indirect causation is also action, he would have had to forbid indirect causation even in indirectly causing the erasure of the divine name. Because the fact that with erasing the divine name it says “do” means it requires an action—fine—but in his view, indirect causation too is action. So you see something interesting here: even Rabbi Yosei, who forbids indirect causation, does not dispute that indirect causation is not direct action.

[Speaker B] He—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He only forbids it even when there was no direct action. Why? Because that was said only in those places where direct action is not required. And Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas, who exempts indirect causation, claims that even in places where direct action is not required, indirect causation is exempt. Why? Maybe because even in places where direct action is not explicitly required, the assumption is still that direct action is needed. The Torah didn’t write it, but the assumption is that direct action is needed. Though then, of course, we need to ask ourselves: so why does Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas forbid it in indirectly causing erasure of the divine name? But that is difficult in any case. Fine, let’s leave that for now. But this is an important point, and it will matter for us later as well. Meaning: even Rabbi Yosei, who forbids indirect causation, agrees that indirect causation is not direct action. Therefore, in places where direct action is required, even he will exempt indirect causation. Everything he says—that indirect causation is forbidden—is only in places where direct action is not required. And Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas, who exempts indirect causation generally in all places, apparently understands that indirect causation is not direct action, and therefore it is exempt—and this exemption applies even in places where the Torah does not say “action,” because apparently the assumption is that everywhere direct action is required, and this thing is not direct action. Okay? So they actually do not disagree about how to conceptualize the notion of indirect causation. They have a halakhic dispute over whether indirect causation, which is not direct action, exempts. In other words, they disagree over whether when the Torah does not require direct action, direct action is still required or not. But both agree that indirect causation is not direct action. Their only dispute is whether direct action is required or not required. The Talmud asks: if so, here too it is written, “You shall not do any labor.” Direct action is what is forbidden; indirect causation is permitted. You’re telling me this about erasing the divine name, but on the Sabbath too it says action. So if Rabbi Yosei says that indirectly causing erasure of the divine name is permitted because there it says action, he should have permitted indirect causation on the Sabbath as well, because on the Sabbath too it says action: “You shall not do any labor,” “You shall not do any labor.” Therefore this cannot be the resolution of Rabbi Yosei’s view. And again, by the way, we see that the Talmud understands Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas to disagree generally in Jewish law, over indirect causation in Jewish law in general, not specifically in the law of extinguishing or in Sabbath labors or anything like that. They are not talking here specifically about extinguishing, but about the Sabbath in general. And since on the Sabbath direct action is required—direct action is also required as with erasing the divine name—then if that is the reason Rabbi Yosei permits indirect causation in erasing the divine name, he should also have permitted indirect extinguishing. And the fact is, he does not permit indirect extinguishing. Rabbi, a question.

[Speaker D] Yes. So why is there a difference between new vessels and not new ones? If—why specifically with new vessels is there… after all, even if I take old vessels, there’s still some kind of indirect causation in the end, isn’t there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there isn’t. Old vessels do not burst from the fire, so there won’t be extinguishing. Old vessels don’t burst at all; new vessels burst. But if they don’t contain water, then the fact that they burst doesn’t matter, and if they do contain water, then that’s why only new vessels with water are forbidden. So actually this conclusion can be understood in two ways. The Talmud says: if so, then even on the Sabbath, after all it says action, and according to your approach this should have been permitted. So what follows? Apparently the exemption of indirect causation regarding erasing the divine name is not because it says action there, because otherwise such an exemption should also exist in the laws of Sabbath, also in indirect extinguishing. So what then? One could have said—one could have said that really the exemption of indirect causation was said only in places where direct action is required, and it exists both on the Sabbath and in erasing the divine name. But of course that doesn’t fit Rabbi Yosei, right? Because Rabbi Yosei forbids indirect extinguishing.

[Speaker C] It’s not clear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Huh?

[Speaker C] It’s not clear. What’s not clear? Rabbi Yosei—what does extinguishing have to do with action? That’s what I’m—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m saying. If the conclusion is ultimately that everywhere direct action is required, indirect causation is indeed exempt—that’s what we learn from this Talmudic passage in the end—then it’s not clear why Rabbi Yosei forbids indirect extinguishing. Exactly. Right? Seemingly, that possibility for understanding the Talmud’s conclusion does not fit Rabbi Yosei’s view. A second possibility: after we saw that on the Sabbath too there is a verse of action, and nevertheless Rabbi Yosei still imposes liability there for indirect causation, then apparently in indirect extinguishing too it is not because direct action is required that he forbids it, so it must be for some other reason. We have to look for something else here. Indirect causation is a general exemption, and Rabbi Yosei does not have it for some reason. What happens with extinguishing? That is a separate topic. So now the Talmud says at the next stage: “Because a person is anxious about his property”—I’m skipping a bit—“if you permit him this, he will come to extinguish.” What does that mean? Indirect extinguishing is forbidden because when a fire breaks out a person panics, and therefore Rabbi Yosei forbids even extinguishing. And with indirect causation, if you permit him to extinguish indirectly, then he’ll already start extinguishing directly by hand. There is pressure; in a fire there is pressure. Yes, it’s a specific case. What? Exactly.

[Speaker E] A specific case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. This is a bit reminiscent of—it’s rabbinic, that’s no difference.

[Speaker B] What? So it comes out that this is rabbinic, not Torah-level. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a minute you’ll see. But in any event, the claim is like what we find, for example, at the beginning of this chapter, the chapter “All Sacred Writings.” There there is a discussion about extinguishing a fire that breaks out in my house on the Sabbath. The fire is about to consume my whole house and all my earthly possessions. The Talmud forbids extinguishing the fire, even though that extinguishing is a labor not needed for its own purpose. Not only that—the Talmud even forbids rescuing objects from the burning house. Why? Because a person is anxious about his property, and if you permit him this, he will come to extinguish. You are forbidden to rescue things, because once you start dealing with rescue, you enter the panic of the fire and you will also come to extinguish. Fire is a pressure situation, and therefore in such a situation they set up high fences. They put very clear safeguards in place. And that is why Rabbi Yosei basically forbids indirect extinguishing. Now notice: if this is really the situation, then we can return to the possibility I mentioned earlier. Basically the claim is this: Rabbi Yosei—I don’t know what his general view of indirect causation is. That remains an open question. In a case where it says action, there indirect causation will certainly be exempt. Right? Either with erasing the divine name or on the Sabbath. It says action, so indirect causation will be exempt. And therefore, indeed, concerning indirect erasure of the divine name, Rabbi Yosei says it is permitted. On the Sabbath, indirect extinguishing in principle should have been permitted because it says action, but because a person is anxious about his property, and if you permit him this he will come to extinguish, they nevertheless forbade it rabbinically.

[Speaker E] Because of a decree.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, a rabbinic decree. And then it comes out that fundamentally Rabbi Yosei permits indirect causation. He has a special rule on the Sabbath, and even that is only rabbinic. The whole question, of course, is why and where he permits indirect causation. Does he permit indirect causation only in places where it says action—“direct action is what is forbidden; indirect causation is permitted”—but not everywhere? Or have we completely moved away from this whole issue of action? Rabbi Yosei altogether permits indirect causation fully, like Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas. He permits all indirect causation. Specifically in extinguishing, indirect causation is forbidden because a person is anxious about his property. Anxious about his property. And then the question is whether this difference between places where it says action and places where it does not say action remains in the final conclusion, or whether once that dropped out, we drop the entire distinction. There is no need to get into that. Because Rabbi Yosei holds that indirect causation is permitted throughout the Torah, so why do we need the derivation from the verse in erasing the divine name that only direct action is forbidden but indirect causation is permitted? Indirect causation is permitted everywhere. So therefore one could have said that in the final conclusion, after that was dropped, Rabbi Yosei indeed holds that indirect causation is permitted throughout the Torah, like Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas. He has a specific dispute with him in indirect extinguishing, because there he has a rabbinic decree due to a person being anxious about his property. Another possibility is to say no: “direct action is what is forbidden; indirect causation is permitted.” Rabbi Yosei says indirect causation is forbidden throughout the Torah. Indirect causation is permitted in those places where it says action. Only in those places. But those places include both indirect erasure of the divine name and indirect extinguishing. Except that in indirect extinguishing there is the rabbinic concern because a person is anxious about his property, so he still forbids it. In short, the question is whether according to Rabbi Yosei, in places where it does not say action, indirect causation is also forbidden—or whether indirect causation is forbidden or not forbidden there. That is basically the question. Sorry—whether indirect causation is permitted there or not permitted there. That’s the question. Yes, the question is whether the distinction between places where action is written and places where action is not written remains in the Talmud’s conclusion, or whether once it fell away and we don’t use it here, it basically fell away altogether. Meaning: we have no reason to deal with it, and there are no differences between a place where there is action and a place where there isn’t.

[Speaker B] Unless there is a decree.

[Speaker E] What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A decree. Yes, with a rabbinic decree, obviously.

[Speaker B] But then why rely on the verse if there is a rabbinic decree according to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This explanation?

[Speaker B] What? Why rely on the verse if there is a rabbinic decree? Wherever there is a decree he decrees, wherever there isn’t he doesn’t decree. No, there is no verse. Which verse are we relying on?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: if we assume—

[Speaker B] That it still depends on the verse, that’s strange, because we move to a rabbinic level, and it can’t be that it depends on a verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? If I say it depends—there are two possibilities. The question is whether in general Rabbi Yosei holds that indirect causation is forbidden throughout the Torah, and we need a verse to per—, forbidden at the Torah level. And we need a verse to permit it, a verse that says action. In those places where there is a verse that says action, it really will be permitted. But on the Sabbath, because regarding indirect extinguishing—sorry—because a person is anxious about his property, even though it says action, there is still a rabbinic prohibition. That’s one possibility. A second possibility: no. According to Rabbi Yosei, there is no prohibition of indirect causation at all, and no verses are needed, nothing is needed. The verses—drop the verses from here, there are no verses. There is no prohibition of indirect causation according to Rabbi Yosei anywhere. And therefore no verse is needed regarding erasing the divine name to permit indirect causation. That is what we thought at first; that dropped out. On the Sabbath there is a rabbinic prohibition because a person is anxious about his property. Those are two possible ways to understand the conclusion according to Rabbi Yosei. The difference between the two possibilities is whether there is a prohibition on indirect causation in places where action is not written. A Torah prohibition, in places where action is not written. So far we have discussed the contradiction in Rabbi Yosei’s words, right? Rabbi Yosei says indirect extinguishing is forbidden, and indirect erasure of the divine name is permitted. In the end, the difference is that in extinguishing a person is anxious about his property; that is only rabbinic. At the Torah level, in both cases it is permitted. There is a rabbinic rule that a person is anxious about his property, and therefore they forbade even indirect extinguishing. What is the law regarding indirect causation in places where action is not written? I don’t know—that remains open. So that resolves the contradiction in Rabbi Yosei’s view. There is also a contradiction in Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas’s view: in indirect extinguishing he says it is permitted, while in indirect erasure of the divine name he says it is forbidden. That is the next stage in the Talmud. “If so, there is also a contradiction among the rabbis themselves?” And if there, where a person is anxious about his property, it is permitted—Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas says it is permitted, so he is not troubled by indirect extinguishing; he is not worried about the fact that a person is anxious about his property—even though there is reason to be stringent, that a person is anxious about his property, still he permits it. So here, in indirect erasure of the divine name, all the more so it should be permitted. And then the Talmud says later—it doesn’t matter right now, there are all kinds of transitions. In the end, it is simply that the question of whether Rabbi Yosei says you are allowed to enter or forbidden to enter—the dispute is not about indirect erasure of the divine name at all, but about whether you are allowed to stand naked before the divine name. Is one allowed to immerse with the divine name there? Because one is forbidden to stand naked before the divine name. And if it is an immersion for the sake of a commandment, then place reeds over the divine name not in order to prevent erasure, but so that your nakedness should not be before the divine name. It has nothing to do with the prohibition of erasure at all. And if that is so, then what comes out? Until now we discussed Rabbi Yosei’s view. What comes out in Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas’s view?

[Speaker C] That indirect causation is permitted—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, apparently throughout the Torah, not only on the Sabbath and with erasing the divine name. And everything he forbids regarding erasing the divine name is simply not because of the erasure, but because of the prohibition on standing naked before the divine name. But as far as indirect causation is concerned, Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas says there is no prohibition. One might perhaps have said that he says there is no prohibition only regarding erasing the divine name and on the Sabbath, because there it says action, and he does not accept the reasoning that a person is anxious about his property. But in the rest of the Torah, where action is not written, perhaps Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas would also forbid indirect causation at the Torah level. That is possible. So here too there is the same dilemma we saw with respect to Rabbi Yosei. Is the whole field of discussion only in places where action was stated, and only there are we talking? Or no—did this whole business of action versus no action drop out entirely, and now we are discussing exemption or liability for indirect causation generally throughout the Torah, in all Torah prohibitions? Opposite this sugya there is another sugya in tractate Shabbat on page 47, at the end of the chapter Kirah. Let’s summarize for a moment. So far this is what we got: according to Rabbi Yosei, indirect causation is permitted at least in places where it says action, such as erasing the divine name and the Sabbath. On the Sabbath there is a rabbinic prohibition because a person is anxious about his property, though in principle by strict law it is permitted. What happens in those places where it does not say action? It is not clear. It may be that indirect causation is really forbidden there, and forbidden at the Torah level now, because if it is forbidden then it is forbidden at the Torah level, because then I need the action to say that in those places there is no prohibition of indirect causation, which implies that where the prohibition does exist it is a Torah prohibition. A second possibility: no, according to Rabbi Yosei there are no prohibitions of indirect causation in the Torah at all. Throughout the Torah this whole thing of action versus non-action is not the issue. Specifically on the Sabbath they forbade it because a person is anxious about his property. Two possibilities. According to Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas, likewise. And Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas basically disagrees with Rabbi Yosei about erasing the divine name, but not in the laws of indirect causation; rather, because a person cannot stand naked before the name. So that is not relevant to indirect causation. Their dispute about indirect causation is only regarding indirect extinguishing. In indirect extinguishing, Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas permits it. But there too he permits it only because in his view a person is not anxious about his property, or at least that is not a reason to forbid extinguishing indirectly. Everything else may remain the same as Rabbi Yosei. That is, there may be a prohibition of indirect causation in the Torah altogether; only on the Sabbath there is action and therefore it is permitted, and there is no decree because a person is anxious about his property. And it may be that throughout the Torah there is no prohibition of indirect causation, not only in a place of action. And regarding erasing the divine name, what they forbade was because it is forbidden to stand naked before the divine name. So the same uncertainty that we have in Rabbi Yosei’s view we also have in Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas’s view. Okay. Now let’s move to the sugya that—this is the first sugya. Let’s look at the second sugya in the chapter Kirah. The Mishnah says: “One may place a vessel under a lamp to catch sparks, but he may not put water into it because he thereby extinguishes.” So I place a vessel under the lamp—why? Because the sparks of the lamp—yes, what are they called, bits of fire—what do you call them, I forgot—sparks.

[Speaker E] Sparks, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The sparks of the fire can, say, fly onto the table or something and ignite it. So to protect against that I place some vessel under the lamp so that when the sparks come down they fall into that vessel. So it is permitted to place a vessel there. But the Mishnah says not to put water into that vessel. Why not? Because if you put water in the vessel, then you extinguish, because the sparks that fall into the water will be extinguished. And that is forbidden. The Talmud says: “and he may not put water into it because he thereby extinguishes.” Shall we say that an anonymous Mishnah follows Rabbi Yosei, who said that indirect extinguishing is forbidden? What is this? How do you understand that? Even according to our final conclusion, indirect extinguishing is indeed forbidden, but not because of the general sugya of indirect causation; rather, it is a rabbinic rule because a person is anxious about his property, and therefore they forbade even causing extinguishing. Okay? So the Talmud says: if so, the Mishnah here seems to hold like Rabbi Yosei, because it forbids putting water there “because he thereby extinguishes.” Now it is clear that this extinguishing is not extinguishing directly by hand; it is indirect extinguishing. And still they forbade putting water there. So you see that the Mishnah here holds like Rabbi Yosei, that indirect extinguishing is forbidden. Let me stop here a second. Do you agree with this question? Yes.

[Speaker B] I’m wondering whether the decree still applies in this case.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not?

[Speaker B] Because with a decree about sparks, this isn’t a burning fire that he wants to extinguish.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] More than that—there aren’t even sparks yet. What do we have now? No sparks. Right now we have a lamp burning. When a lamp is burning, nobody is under pressure, right? There’s no panic from the fact that a lamp is burning in my house. When there is a fire and I am engaged in extinguishing it, then there is pressure and who knows what may happen. But when a lamp is burning, nobody is under pressure. So I place the vessel with the water so that the sparks won’t ignite a fire. Once they don’t ignite a fire, the panic will never arise. So what is the problem? On the contrary, if I forbid you to place the water, what will happen then? Then the sparks can start a fire, and if they start a fire, panic will arise and I’ll come to commit prohibitions. So the very reason for which Rabbi Yosei forbids indirect extinguishing—here I would permit indirect extinguishing because of that. Right. I would even obligate him to put it there, I would say.

[Speaker E] So as not to get into that situation in the first place.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. Meaning, once we understand that the Talmud’s conclusion in our sugya is only a rabbinic prohibition because a person is anxious about his property, then the connection the Talmud in the chapter Kirah makes to that Mishnah there is not clear. Right. Now, we should remember: the question is not all that difficult. We should remember that it is not as though we are telling him, don’t protect against the sparks. Protect yourself—just put an empty vessel there, not a vessel with water. And the assumption is that the empty vessel too will prevent the fire; it won’t let the sparks reach the table or the curtains or whatever. Okay? So it will prevent the fire, only it will prevent the fire without extinguishing. Why is that without extinguishing? After all, the sparks will go out. They will go out because their fuel will simply run out. It is not that the water extinguishes the sparks. The vessel catches the sparks, and once the spark lies on the vessel it simply goes out on its own. So that is not even indirect extinguishing. Here there is no extinguishing at all. So since I have a way to prevent the fire in a way that does not involve indirect extinguishing, and I can put the vessel there without water, the Mishnah forbids placing a vessel with water. Why? Because indirect extinguishing is forbidden. We asked: yes, but precisely here the rationale why indirect extinguishing is forbidden does not exist. What? That’s not so terrible. Why is it not so terrible? A general rule. Once I say indirect extinguishing is forbidden, then I say indirect extinguishing is forbidden everywhere. You can ask me: wait, but here you create the opposite problem. If you forbid placing the water, precisely then there may be a fire here and I will panic and then desecrate the Sabbath. The Mishnah says: no, place an empty vessel, without water. An empty vessel without water also prevents the fire. So true, there is no reason to forbid placing the water—that’s true. But there is also no opposite reason that obligates putting water there, that instructs you to put water there. That, no. Because you can stop the fire also with an empty vessel. So why nevertheless do they forbid putting water there? A general rule. The reason for the decree does not exist here, but it is still a general rule. Since they forbade indirect extinguishing, they forbid indirect extinguishing here too. By the way, it seems to me that Tosafot—I didn’t bring it here, but I’m almost sure that Tosafot asks this very question. Ah yes, here. Tosafot there on that Talmudic passage asks exactly this: “Shall we say that our Mishnah is not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, who says causing extinguishing is forbidden? But one could have said: and according to your reasoning, Rabbi Yosei himself said it only in the case of a fire, because a person is anxious about his property, and if we permit him this he will come to extinguish; and thus it is explained in ‘All Writings,’” in the Talmud in the sugya we saw earlier, “but here there is no need for a decree, because there is a vessel under the lamp and he is not anxious.”

[Speaker E] And I would say more than that, not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not because there is a vessel under the lamp. He is not anxious because there is no fire. If you place the water, the fire won’t ignite, won’t spread at all. That is even independent of the vessel. “And in many places in the Talmud it could say ‘and according to your reasoning,’ and it does not say it.” Meaning: right, one could have rejected this question that way too, but it rejected it in another way. It could also have rejected it that way. By the way, the point is: why does Tosafot nevertheless bring in here the idea that you can put a bucket there without water and therefore the fire won’t break out? Maybe because of the consideration I mentioned earlier. Because in Tosafot’s place I would not have needed that. I would have said simply: here, as long as there are no sparks and no fire has broken out, then there is no human panic, so why forbid him to extinguish the sparks? I’m putting the water there in advance. Okay? There is no need to get to the fact that I also have the option of placing an empty vessel. Even without that—suppose I have no such option, only a vessel with water—still one should permit me to place a vessel… still I should be able to place a vessel with water there so that the fire does not break out. What’s the problem? Why do we need to resort to the fact that there is also an option of a vessel without water? The answer is what I said before. The fact that there is another option, with an empty vessel, means that in principle I can ensure that no fire breaks out even without placing water. So then there is no question that the Torah should instruct him to place water—not merely not forbid him, but instruct him to place water so that the fire should not break out and the panic should not arise. That, no—because you have an empty vessel. The question still remains: fine, but even if he has the option of the empty vessel, if he puts water there anyway, the reason for forbidding indirect extinguishing does not exist here, because there is no panic here. To that, the answer is: a general rule. That is because of the general rule. Tosafot apparently does not accept that, because he says “and according to your reasoning.” I continue in the Talmud. “But raise a contradiction from a baraita: granted that Rabbi Yosei said this on the Sabbath, but did he say it on the eve of the Sabbath?” You tell me not to put water into it because he thereby extinguishes. All this is on the Sabbath, but what about on the eve of the Sabbath? Surely it is permitted to place the water—perhaps the case here is water placed before the Sabbath. Why not place it before the Sabbath? The assumption is—notice—that if I place the water on the eve of the Sabbath, even though the extinguishing will happen on the Sabbath itself, this will not be considered indirect extinguishing. Interesting point. There is also room to say that even if I placed the water on the eve of the Sabbath, if in the end the extinguishing itself is performed on the Sabbath, the sparks fall into the water on the Sabbath, then one could say that I performed indirect extinguishing, because my act is considered an act done on the eve of the Sabbath. So I performed indirect extinguishing, but I performed indirect extinguishing on the eve of the Sabbath, not on the Sabbath. In other words, the act is not considered at the moment of the extinguishing itself, but at the moment when I did my part—in other words, when I put in the water. Okay? That is what the Talmud is assuming here. The Talmud says no, that won’t work. “And if you would say that here too it is on the Sabbath”—what is going on here? “And if you would say” that on the Sabbath too it is like this—that what is written in the Mishnah is not only putting it there on the eve of the Sabbath but also putting it there on the Sabbath? And if it says not to put it—wait, no, sorry, what the Mishnah says is on the Sabbath because he thereby extinguishes, but on the eve of the Sabbath it is permitted. So the Talmud says: but wasn’t it taught in a baraita: “One may place a vessel under the lamp to catch sparks on the Sabbath, and needless to say on the eve of the Sabbath”; yes, to place the vessel on the eve of the Sabbath. “But one may not put water into it because he thereby extinguishes, on the eve of the Sabbath, and needless to say on the Sabbath.” In short, the baraita says that it is forbidden to put the water there, not on the eve of the Sabbath and not on the Sabbath.

[Speaker E] Also on the eve of the Sabbath, yes. Both on the eve of the Sabbath and on the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So from the standpoint of the Sabbath, why is it forbidden to place the water? Because it is indirect extinguishing, like Rabbi Yosei. And on the eve of the Sabbath, why? Perhaps a decree lest he come to place it there on the Sabbath. It does not seem that they also retracted the initial reasoning that if I place the water on the eve of the Sabbath, then the indirect extinguishing is performed on the Sabbath.

[Speaker E] That’s already a decree upon a decree, that’s already two decrees.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker E] Here this is a decree, and the decree lest he come because of his property was also a decree.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning: the decree against placing it on the eve of the Sabbath is a decree lest one place it on the Sabbath, and placing it on the Sabbath itself is also because a person is anxious about his property. More than that: even when I place it on the Sabbath, that isn’t really correct—there is no situation here at all of a person being anxious about his property with a lamp. So this is a decree upon a decree upon a decree. So that’s three decrees. Right, because I’m saying it is forbidden to place it on the eve of the Sabbath lest you place it on the Sabbath, and even if you place it on the Sabbath there is no problem of a person being anxious about his property. So this is a decree because of another situation where there would be an actual fire, where a person really is anxious about his property. So this is a decree upon a decree upon a decree.

[Speaker E] For the record, two is enough.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in any case, the Talmud says, even regarding the Sabbath itself: “You may even say it follows the rabbis; it is different here because he brings its extinguishing closer.” Meaning, this does not go specifically with Rabbi Yosei, not necessarily with Rabbi Yosei. The reason it is forbidden to place the water on the Sabbath is not because indirect extinguishing is forbidden. Indirect extinguishing is in fact permitted; Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas says indirect extinguishing is permitted, and even he will agree with what the Mishnah says, not to put water into it on the Sabbath. Why? Because he brings its extinguishing closer. That is, bringing the extinguishing closer is something more severe than indirect extinguishing, and that is forbidden even according to Rabbi Shimon ben Nanas. Here we encounter for the first time these distinctions I mentioned at the beginning of the lecture, where the Talmud and the medieval authorities (Rishonim) distinguish between different situations in the question of which situations are even defined as indirect causation. The claim is that placing water under a lamp is not defined as a case of indirect causation. It is defined as actual extinguishing, a Torah-level extinguishing. It is not indirect causation, because this is called bringing its extinguishing closer. So Rashi explains it like this. “Rather,” says Rav Ashi, “our Mishnah may even follow the rabbis. For it is not comparable to indirect extinguishing, because there, when the fire reaches the vessels, it is the fire that causes them to burst, and it is only indirect causation.” What happens? Where do we see indirect extinguishing? When the fire reaches the new vessels, the new vessels burst, the water spills out of them and extinguishes the fire, right? So basically, my placement of the water did not perform the extinguishing at all. The fire caused itself to be extinguished, because it burst the vessel and caused the water to spill onto it and extinguish it. I did not extinguish it with the water. That is a case of indirect causation. “But this one,” who put the water directly under the lamp—I continue reading Rashi—“this one who put the water directly under the lamp, he is actually extinguishing.” This is called actual extinguishing. But I only put the water there, and afterward the sparks will come, enter the water, and go out. At the stage when I placed the water there, there are no sparks and nothing at all. Still, says Rashi, this is called extinguishing directly by hand. “Actual extinguishing”—that is Torah-level extinguishing. “And it is decreed from before dark because of after dark.” So why is placing it there on Friday forbidden? A decree because of placing it on the Sabbath. And placing it on the Sabbath is a Torah prohibition of extinguishing; it is not indirect extinguishing. So your question about a decree upon a decree falls away, right, David? It is no longer a decree upon a decree. It is a decree because of a Torah prohibition. Bringing its extinguishing closer is a Torah prohibition, and placing it on Friday is a decree because of that Torah prohibition. And I think that is what leads Rashi to assume that the extinguishing here really has to be Torah-level extinguishing, because otherwise it would be a decree—

[Speaker E] Upon a decree.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s what he says in the next comment: he says that by bringing about its extinguishing, he explicitly prepared an extinguishing. That’s what he explained in the previous comment. “And it would be like actually extinguishing if he were to place it there on the Sabbath.” If he did this on the Sabbath, that would be actual extinguishing. So putting it there on the eve of the Sabbath is only one decree, a decree lest one come to a Torah prohibition.

[Speaker B] I don’t understand the case, Rabbi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker B] What is he putting under what exactly, that it extinguishes it? I didn’t understand. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If—

[Speaker B] I have a candle, and under the candle he puts a vessel with water. The water doesn’t reach the candle—I don’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the sparks come out of the candle and are extinguished in the water. About the sparks?

[Speaker C] Yes.

[Speaker B] But we already moved away from the sparks; we moved to a case where he brings the extinguishing closer. How is he bringing the extinguishing closer?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s what’s called bringing the extinguishing closer. Putting a vessel with water under a candle that throws off sparks—that’s called bringing about extinguishing.

[Speaker C] That’s not extinguishing the candle.

[Speaker E] When the spark reaches the water—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It goes out.

[Speaker C] Yes. No, that’s extinguishing the sparks, not extinguishing the candle.

[Speaker B] It’s extinguishing the sparks—I don’t understand. And if he put a vessel there without water, it would be the same thing. No, because he doesn’t extinguish; only the water extinguishes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The water is the extinguishing. When the spark falls onto the vessel, the vessel only stops it from continuing; after that the spark goes out on its own.

[Speaker B] So “bringing extinguishing closer” means with regard to the sparks? What? “Bringing extinguishing closer” means with regard to the sparks?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. The water brings the extinguishing of the sparks closer. What does “brings it closer” mean? Say he put a vessel there without water—then the spark would fall on the vessel, sit there for a moment, and then burn out, right? Once there’s water, the extinguishing happens earlier. He brings its extinguishing closer. So there’s an act of extinguishing here. If there were a vessel here without water, it’s not that there would be an act of extinguishing only farther away. There would be no act of extinguishing at all. The vessel only stops the spark, and the spark expires on its own. There is no act of extinguishing. Like the distinctions we made in the Mishnah in the previous topic / passage: if I put water here and the fire is there, I haven’t extinguished the fire at all—I’m just not letting it advance. Afterward it dies out.

[Speaker E] I don’t understand how, according to Rashi’s reasoning, this is Torah-level. How is it Torah-level at all? How does it get to being Torah-level? There aren’t even any sparks yet. Sparks may come later, maybe. So where is the Torah prohibition here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You put the water there in advance; when the sparks come, the water extinguishes them.

[Speaker E] They’ll come—but when they come. But right now I didn’t do anything.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? Not right now—when they come, yes. So—

[Speaker E] When they come, then…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You want to say this is indirect causation, but no, it’s not indirect causation. Indirect causation is only where the relationship is not direct. That’s what Rashi explained above. If you place new vessels full of water and the fire bursts the vessels, and the water spills out and extinguishes the fire—that is an indirect action. Not because it happens later. The fact that it happens later is not the reason. Rather, because when it happens, it happens indirectly: the fire is really what brings it about, not me. The act of extinguishing too is brought about by the fire, not by me. And that’s what defines it as indirect causation. The fact that there’s a time gap doesn’t interest me. If I prepared the water in advance and the fire reaches it later and the water extinguishes it, that is still extinguishing. Therefore there’s room to discuss, for example in our topic / passage too—as I read at the beginning from the Mishnah—when I… the garment is burning and I put water on the part of the garment that isn’t burning yet.

[Speaker E] I don’t understand—if I first put vessels there—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, wait, just a second. So I said that in such a case this isn’t called an act of extinguishing at all; I’m only stopping the fire, and it goes out by itself. According to Rashi here, that’s no longer so simple, because the question is whether when the fire reaches the water, the water only stops it, or whether the water that reaches the fire also extinguishes it. And then it would be actual Torah-level extinguishing—not merely causing extinguishing; there it would be actual extinguishing, really. According to Rashi, not only would it be causing extinguishing, it would be actual extinguishing itself—he brings its extinguishing closer.

[Speaker B] And with water placed there from before the Sabbath, is it the same prohibition to the same extent?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the eve of the Sabbath it’s a decree. If you do it on the Sabbath, that’s bringing its extinguishing closer, which is a Torah-level extinguishing. And if you put it there on the eve of the Sabbath, it’s a decree lest one put it there on the Sabbath. But then it’s no longer a decree upon a decree, because it’s a decree lest one come to a Torah prohibition.

[Speaker E] According to the one who says it’s Torah-level, I still don’t really understand how it’s Torah-level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it’s extinguishing. The time gap doesn’t play a role according to Rashi.

[Speaker B] We learned, regarding filling earthenware vessels, that there’s an opinion that says it’s only prohibited if he needs the charcoal and so on and so on. How does that fit here with these views?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] They say extinguishing is prohibited by Torah law only if he needs the charcoal and so on, in the case of filling vessels. So what are we saying—

[Speaker C] Here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the question: a labor not needed for its own purpose. That’s a very good question. This is, seemingly, a labor not needed for its own purpose, and therefore even according to Rashi it seems hard to say that there is actual Torah-level extinguishing here. What he may mean to say is that if you put the water there, that brings its extinguishing closer—again, the extinguishing here is a labor not needed for its own purpose. You’re doing it not for the sake of the coals, but so that there won’t be a fire. But a decree lest one perform a labor not needed for its own purpose is still not a decree upon a decree. Why? Because a labor not needed for its own purpose—and we discussed this when we talked

[Speaker C] about a labor—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not needed for its own purpose—it’s really not an ordinary rabbinic prohibition. Rather, it is either a severe rabbinic prohibition or even actually a Torah prohibition, only one is not punished for it; I cited such a Pnei Yehoshua. And by the way, this discussion takes place in the previous chapter, “All the Sacred Writings.” I said there that when a house is burning on the Sabbath, we’re forbidden to extinguish the fire, right, lest a person panic over his money and come to extinguish it or violate a prohibition. We’re also forbidden to save items from the house, lest if they permit you to save things, you’ll also come to extinguish. The Sefer Kovetz asks on Maimonides: even if he does extinguish, that’s only a rabbinic prohibition—a labor not needed for its own purpose. You’re not extinguishing because you need the charcoal; you’re extinguishing because you don’t want the house to burn down. So why make a decree lest one perform a labor not needed for its own purpose? You decree that one may not save things from the house lest he come to extinguish the house—but even if he extinguishes the house, that’s only a rabbinic prohibition, a labor not needed for its own purpose. So Sefer Kovetz says there—and there he brings this Pnei Yehoshua that I’ve never managed to find—that a labor not needed for its own purpose is a Torah prohibition. It’s a Torah prohibition, except that it was newly established that there is no punishment for it according to Rabbi Shimon; it is not a rabbinic prohibition. And therefore there can be a decree lest one perform a labor not needed for its own purpose; that would not count as a decree upon a decree. I’ll suggest a different explanation, not according to Pnei Yehoshua, because Pnei Yehoshua is strained. Simply speaking, a labor not needed for its own purpose is a rabbinic prohibition, and still, a decree lest one perform a labor not needed for its own purpose is not a decree upon a decree. Why? I’ll introduce something here that will also come up later for us. Regarding rabbinic Sabbath restrictions, the later authorities (Acharonim) divide them into two types—someone already mentioned this, I don’t remember who. One type is a decree lest one come to… For example, you ride a horse on the Sabbath—they prohibited that lest you break off a branch. That’s a decree lest one come to reaping, right? Lest you come to reap. There’s also selecting food from waste: that was prohibited rabbinically as a decree lest one select waste from food. Selecting waste from food is a Torah prohibition. Some later authorities (Acharonim) want to claim that the second case is not a decree; it is an independent prohibition, an essential prohibition. Selecting food from waste was not prohibited because if they permit it you’ll come to select waste from food, but because selecting food from waste is also selecting. It’s selecting at a lower level, not enough to be prohibited by Torah law, but the sages prohibited it in itself, not out of concern that you’ll come to do another act that is Torah-prohibited. Rather, the sages prohibited it because it itself is problematic on the Sabbath. It isn’t problematic enough for the Torah to prohibit it, but the sages lowered the threshold and prohibited this too. So in effect that means it is selecting on a rabbinic level. Selecting food from waste is rabbinic selecting—that’s as blunt as can be. Can anyone say that riding a horse on the Sabbath is reaping on a rabbinic level? What does it have to do with reaping? He’s riding a horse. Right, right.

[Speaker E] Here it’s a decree lest one come to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to do Torah-level reaping. There it is certainly a decree lest one do another labor that is Torah-level; it is not a rabbinic extension of the Torah-level labor. Is the distinction clear? Now, among the later authorities (Acharonim) there are two sides regarding the hierarchy between these two types. There are later authorities (Acharonim) who want to argue that the second type is more severe than the first, the type of riding a horse. Why? Because in the second type you can come to a Torah prohibition. True, it isn’t problematic in itself, but if we permit it you may come to a Torah prohibition. That’s very severe; you have to be careful with that. By contrast, selecting food from waste—the prohibition is not because you may come to a Torah prohibition, but because it is itself prohibited. Fine, but the problematic aspect here is only rabbinic, so it’s lighter. Others argue the opposite—one hundred and eighty degrees the opposite.

[Speaker E] It’s obvious that it’s the opposite.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Riding a horse on the Sabbath—there is nothing problematic in that at all, only the concern that you may come to do something else that is problematic. As long as you haven’t gotten there, then what happened? You just rode a horse. There’s no—

[Speaker E] problem—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in riding a horse. By contrast, if you selected food from waste, then even if you didn’t come to select waste from food, this itself is a problematic thing—not because afterward you went on to do something else. Therefore it is more severe. In short, there are really opposite directions here about which type…

[Speaker E] The first side isn’t clear at all—how did they even get to that? The first side is not clear at all; the second side is very clear and very logical. Why isn’t it clear?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something that can lead to a Torah prohibition is more severe. What’s the problem?

[Speaker E] But here I’m already arriving—I’m already inside a prohibition…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you’re not arriving there; it’s a rabbinic prohibition. And a rabbinic prohibition that cannot lead to a Torah prohibition—here it’s a rabbinic prohibition that can lead to a Torah prohibition, so it is more severe. Now I want to argue—not because of the question of severity—I want to distinguish between these two rabbinic restrictions with regard to a decree upon a decree. And I want to argue that when you have a rabbinic restriction that is entirely a decree, like riding a horse on the Sabbath, then there might be room to decree: don’t ride a bicycle on the Sabbath lest you come to ride a horse on the Sabbath, right?

[Speaker B] And about—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that we do not decree, because that’s a decree upon a decree. The first decree is a concern lest you come to break off a branch, and the first decree here is lest you come to the second decree. That’s a decree upon a decree. But if the rabbinic prohibition in question is an intrinsic prohibition, not a decree lest one do something else—it’s a rabbinic prohibition, not a decree, not something secondary—then it’s not a decree upon a decree; it’s a decree for the sake of a prohibition. And who said we don’t make a decree for the sake of a prohibition? A decree for the sake of a rabbinic prohibition. Understand: “a decree upon a decree” only means that my distance from the Torah prohibition is doubled. And they’re not concerned to that extent; a double distance they do not prohibit. But if the first prohibition is an essential prohibition, not because of concern that you’ll get to a Torah prohibition, then I’m not measuring distances from a Torah prohibition here. I have an essential rabbinic prohibition, and then a decree lest one violate that essential rabbinic prohibition—why shouldn’t they make such a decree?

[Speaker C] Okay, so a labor not needed for its own purpose is basically a rabbinic prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—that’s what I want to claim: that a labor not needed for its own purpose was not prohibited out of concern that you would perform it for its own purpose. It was prohibited because it itself is problematic—not problematic enough to be prohibited by Torah law, but it itself was prohibited rabbinically. If that is so, then there is no problem with having a decree lest one violate the prohibition of a labor not needed for its own purpose; that is not a decree upon a decree. And it may be that Rashi too, when he speaks about bringing its extinguishing closer, means this. He means to say that extinguishing in itself is a Torah-level labor. True, here it is done not for its own purpose, so it’s only rabbinic; but it is not a decree lest one do something else. It is a labor that is in itself prohibited; there is real extinguishing here. So a decree lest one do actual extinguishing is not a decree upon a decree. Maybe that’s what he means. Okay, I’ll stop here. Next time we’ll continue. Yes, this will probably take me another two sessions or so.

[Speaker C] More power to you, more power to you.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] May we hear good news. Again, if there’s anything, you’re welcome to reach out—any problem that comes up. Goodbye.