The Laws of the Melachot – Lesson 25

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[Speaker D] If this counts as a thoughtful labor only formally, just because of the Tabernacle, then he’d be exempt. That would be the problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because you can’t know that they did it that way in the Tabernacle, right? Because maybe they didn’t do it that way. True, it’s a normal way to do it, but they didn’t do it that way in the Tabernacle. But if I understand that it’s enough that this is a normal way, then just like in winnowing, here too he would be liable, right? So that will be a practical difference in labors that are not winnowing, where there is a normal way to do them indirectly, though you can also do them not indirectly. And later we’ll see an example of this: grinding with millstones, a water mill. Okay? Fine, but before I get there, let’s summarize for a moment. So we have a dispute between Rashi and the Rosh. Rashi says that we learn in tractate Bava Kamma that the Torah prohibited thoughtful labor, and therefore even indirect causation is liable under the laws of the Sabbath. That is Rashi’s view. The Rosh’s view is that no: only in labors where this is the normal way, or the only way—two possibilities for understanding the Rosh—only there does the rule of thoughtful labor teach me that I’m liable. In all other labors I’m not liable. So what comes out? According to Rashi, there is basically a general liability for indirect causation in the laws of the Sabbath, because his intention was fulfilled—“the Torah prohibited thoughtful labor.” That seemingly contradicts the conclusion that emerged from the passages in tractate Shabbat. Because there we saw that in the end, causing extinguishing is permitted. Maybe in a case of loss it’s only a rabbinic prohibition. In any case it’s only a rabbinic prohibition. Here in Rashi it says this is a Torah prohibition—his intention was fulfilled, thoughtful labor. So that contradicts what we saw in the passages in tractate Shabbat. Unless—unless—we adopt what I suggested when we read the Talmudic text in Shabbat: that Rabbi Yosi’s view is that indirect causation is prohibited by Torah law in the case of causing extinguishing. Okay? And according to the Rabbis, either it’s permitted or it’s rabbinically prohibited and they allowed it in a case of loss. And Rashi in Bava Kamma is speaking according to Rabbi Yosi’s view. I don’t know why he decided that it was said according to Rabbi Yosi’s view, but that’s what comes out. And then it really comes out that Rav Ashi’s words were not said as practical Jewish law, because in practice, in the dispute between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis, we rule like the Rabbis. So that makes it even harder: why does Rashi set up the passage in Bava Kamma specifically according to a view not accepted in practical Jewish law? What forced him to do that? Why not explain it according to the Rabbis? Fine, he apparently understood that what it says there is that indirect causation is prohibited. You can’t explain it according to the Rabbis because it says there that indirect causation is prohibited, prohibited by Torah law. In any case, according to Rashi there is a contradiction between the passages. According to the Rosh there is no problem, because the Rosh basically says that indirect causation on the Sabbath is also permitted; specifically regarding winnowing—or maybe labors similar to winnowing—there indirect causation will be prohibited. Fine, but in extinguishing and kindling and all kinds of things we saw in tractate Shabbat, there indeed indirect causation will be permitted. There is no contradiction between the passages. Rashi basically sees a contradiction between the passage in Bava Kamma and the passages in Shabbat. The Rosh says it’s the same everywhere: causing extinguishing is permitted. According to Rashi, no—causing extinguishing is prohibited in the passage in Bava Kamma; in the passage in Shabbat it seems that causing extinguishing is at most rabbinically prohibited or permitted. But I said that Rashi probably reads the Talmudic text in… okay? Now, let’s return to the distinction I mentioned in the Rosh’s view. We saw in the Rosh that there is an exception for labors whose way is to be done by means of wind, where in fact one is liable under the laws of the Sabbath. It’s not that there is some general rule that every indirect causation on the Sabbath is liable. Now look: there is a dispute among later authorities about—a very well-known dispute, a huge amount has been written about it—a dispute between Even HaOzer and Magen Avraham.

[Speaker D] Is it permitted—and who is Even HaOzer?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One of the later authorities, the earlier later authorities, meaning, even before Magen Avraham. He’s a commentary on the Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim. Even HaOzer basically says that it is forbidden to put wheat into a water mill so that the mill will grind the wheat. Now notice: what operates the mill, what turns it, is the water. They set up some waterfall that turns the mill, and the mill grinds the wheat. The question is whether I am allowed to put the wheat into the mill so that the water will turn the mill and grind the wheat.

[Speaker D] When Even HaOzer says that, does he mean they put it in on Friday before the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—on the Sabbath itself.

[Speaker D] On the Sabbath itself?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. So he says it’s forbidden, even though it’s indirect causation. Because the water is grinding, not me. The water grinds, not me. But even indirect causation is prohibited. That is Even HaOzer’s claim. So he is like Rashi’s view, right? That indirect causation is prohibited. And not only is he like Rashi’s view; he also rules that indirect causation is prohibited by Torah law. Right? Meaning, it’s not only that—he also rules this as practical Jewish law. Now, even in Rashi’s view I said that this goes with Rabbi Yosi, which is not accepted as practical Jewish law. Even HaOzer takes Rashi and sees him as making a practical ruling, and that already really doesn’t fit in any way. Magen Avraham in section 252 disagrees with him and claims that it is permitted. Why? Because this is indirect causation, and indirect causation on the Sabbath is permitted. Even on the Sabbath it’s permitted. Completely permitted, as it were?

[Speaker E] There’s no rabbinic prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes—permitted. Even not in a case of loss. We saw this in the Shulchan Arukh, right? What did we see in the Shulchan Arukh? That even extinguishing is permitted, and likewise in Maimonides. The Rema added: in a case of loss. But simply speaking, the Rif, Maimonides, and the Shulchan Arukh say no, indirect causation is permitted on the Sabbath. Right, so Magen Avraham basically says that this is indirect causation, whereas Even HaOzer forbids it because that is the way grinding is done with a water mill. Okay? Notice—the reasoning of Even HaOzer I’m adding now. Why? Because that is the way grinding is done with a water mill. Okay?

[Speaker C] Like one explanation you gave in the Rosh. What? One interpretation out of the two interpretations of the Rosh.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, Even HaOzer really is not going like Rashi. Even though he prohibits indirect causation, I would have said, fine, so he probably follows Rashi’s view. No. Even HaOzer goes in the Rosh’s view. Because even Rashi, who says that indirect causation is prohibited according to Rabbi Yosi, all of that is only in Rabbi Yosi’s view, which is not accepted in practice. Even HaOzer is ruling practically. According to both Rashi and the Rosh, indirect causation is permitted. So why is it prohibited here? Because of the Rosh’s reasoning. Because a water mill is normally done through indirect causation. And that is like winnowing, where the wind assists him. Something normally done through indirect causation does not get the exemption of indirect causation. By the way, notice this is actually a stringency of the Rosh over Rashi. Usually Rashi is stricter than the Rosh, because Rashi says that indirect causation on the Sabbath is prohibited and the Rosh says only in the special labors. But actually Rashi is more lenient than the Rosh, since Rashi says that only in Rabbi Yosi’s view. But according to the Rabbis, where indirect causation on the Sabbath is permitted, it comes out that the Rabbis also disagree even about winnowing with the assisting wind; everything is permitted. Even something whose normal way is to be done by means of wind would be permitted. Because Rashi does not distinguish. Now Even HaOzer, who says this is forbidden, is going specifically in the Rosh’s view, not in Rashi’s. How do I know? Because his reasoning is that this is the way that labor is normally done with a water mill. Now what does “the way that the labor is done” mean? That this is its primary mode of performance, or only that it is a normal way? Remember the two possibilities I mentioned in the Rosh. It is quite clear that he means this is a normal way. Not every mill runs on water. There are mills that run with a donkey; there are mills that I operate by hand. But true, a normal way is also with water. It is a normal way, but not the only way. So now I can sharpen it even more. First of all I said Even HaOzer looks like Rashi—not true. From his reasoning you can see that he is like the Rosh. Now I ask: like which of the two possibilities we saw in the Rosh? I say: like the first possibility. The possibility that says if this is a normal way, that is enough to impose liability; it doesn’t have to be the only way. Okay, that’s Even HaOzer. Magen Avraham’s view is that it is permitted because indirect causation is permitted. What does that mean, indirect causation is permitted? But the passage in Bava Kamma says that indirect causation is prohibited. What will you say—that the passage in Bava Kamma says indirect causation is prohibited only according to Rabbi Yosi? But in practice we rule like the Rabbis, that indirect causation is permitted, and therefore specifically Magen Avraham, who permits it, can go with strict Rashi. Because Rashi is strict, true, but he is strict only in Rabbi Yosi’s view. In practical Jewish law, where we rule like the Rabbis, indirect causation is permitted, and indirect causation is permitted even in cases where things are normally done that way. So that is one way to explain Magen Avraham. Another possibility: maybe he goes like the second view in the Rosh? What does that say? It says as follows: I go like the Rosh, and therefore indirect causation on the Sabbath is permitted. True, in labors whose primary mode of performance is through indirect causation there one would be liable, but that is only where you do it only through indirect causation. The fact that this is the normal way to do it through indirect causation is not enough to impose liability. And here, with a water mill, we saw that this is indeed a normal way, but not the only way. Therefore it could be that Magen Avraham and Even HaOzer disagree over the two possibilities of how to understand the Rosh. Are the exceptional labors, for which we impose liability even in indirect causation, cases where indirect causation is a normal way to do it, or only where indirect causation is the only way to do it? The practical difference is, yes, whether “the Torah prohibited thoughtful labor” is a law of thoughtful labor, or whether it only means that what was done in the Tabernacle is what was prohibited. Everything I talked about at the beginning of the class. Okay, so in Magen Avraham there are basically two possible ways to understand it: either he goes in Rashi’s view, in which case he makes no distinctions—every indirect causation is permitted. Or he goes in the Rosh’s view, but says that what they prohibited in indirect causation is only labors that are done only through indirect causation, and labors for which the normal way is to do them through indirect causation—that still doesn’t mean it is prohibited; it is permitted because it was not in the Tabernacle. Okay, now let’s look at the Achiezer. And here is a passage from the Achiezer: “Now regarding the main law of indirect causation on the Sabbath, the view of Even HaOzer, Orach Chayim, end of section 328, is that one who puts wheat into a water mill is liable.” Liable—notice, by Torah law. “And not as Magen Avraham wrote in 252, and all the later authorities objected”—not important, that’s not interesting. “And the view of Even HaOzer is that he is liable, as they said in Bava Kamma 60a, ‘one who winnows and the wind assists him’: even though with respect to damages it is indirect causation and exempt, with respect to the Sabbath, the Torah prohibited thoughtful labor.” Fine, so it sounds like he brings his proof from Bava Kamma. But in Bava Kamma—which reading? Rashi’s reading of Bava Kamma, or the Rosh’s reading of Bava Kamma? So the Achiezer says: “At first glance the words of Even HaOzer are puzzling. What proof is there from winnowing, for that is its labor—like sowing and baking and trapping.” And what do all those have in common—winnowing, baking, and trapping? They are all labors done by indirect causation. When I sow, I bury the seed in the ground, right? What causes it to grow? The ground, not me. I only caused it indirectly. Baking: I put it on the fire; the fire bakes. Trapping: I set the trap; the trap catches the animal. So all those labors are labors whose way is to be done by indirect causation. He says winnowing is like that too. Therefore I don’t understand, he says about Even HaOzer, what proof are you bringing me from the passage in Bava Kamma? The passage in Bava Kamma speaks only about labors of that type, whose way is to be done by indirect causation. Now what’s the problem? I don’t understand—what is the Achiezer asking? A water mill too is a way that grinding is done by indirect causation. So what do you want? What is the problem? So he says: “And it appears, in their view, that when they said regarding ‘one who winnows and the wind assists him’ that ‘the Torah prohibited thoughtful labor,’ they did not say that this is the very essence of the labor. Rather, whenever it is thoughtful labor and the labor is performed in this manner, it is considered thoughtful labor. Therefore also in one who puts wheat into a water mill, since this is the way of grinding, even though it is possible to do it by hand-grinding, nevertheless this is thoughtful labor that the Torah prohibited. And this is not similar to what is said in Shabbat 120 regarding causing extinguishing, where it comes about incidentally; in such a case we say, ‘You shall do no labor’—indirect causation is permitted, and in such a case this is not considered labor. But where the labor is typically done by indirect causation, that is considered thoughtful labor.” So what is he saying? He says that in winnowing with the assisting wind, the normal way of doing winnowing is by means of wind, but it can also be done without it. But it is enough that this is the normal way in order to impose liability. It’s not that this is the very essence of the labor; it’s not always done by means of wind, but it is indeed a normal way to do it by means of wind. You can see from tractate Bava Kamma that they impose liability in such a case. If so, then with grinding in a water mill too, true, this is not the only way to do grinding, because it can also be done by hand, but it is a normal way. Therefore Even HaOzer says: just as in winnowing with the assisting wind in Bava Kamma one is liable, so too in grinding with a water mill one is liable. Notice, the Achiezer feels—we see it implicitly between the lines—he feels the distinction I made earlier: is this a labor that is done only this way, or is this just a normal way to do it? And therefore he insists and says: notice, both in winnowing and in a water mill, this is a normal way to do it, but not the only way to do it. And the fact is that in winnowing one is liable, so you see that it is enough that this is a normal way in order to impose liability. Therefore Even HaOzer says that in a water mill too, this is a normal way, and therefore one is liable. That is—

[Speaker B] Like the first view?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can’t hear.

[Speaker B] Is that like the first view you mentioned?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The first view in the Rosh. Meaning, he goes like the Rosh in the first view, that if something is normally done this way, that is enough to impose liability. According to the second approach, where only this way is how it is done, then in winnowing you’d be liable because only that way is it done, with the help of wind. But with a water mill there is also a way to do it with a hand mill. So true, this is a normal way, but it is not the only way. So if I understood according to the second view in the Rosh, then with a water mill I would exempt. And that indeed could be Magen Avraham’s view. All right? In other words, the Achiezer explains that both Magen Avraham and Even HaOzer learned the Talmudic text in Bava Kamma like the Rosh. And that makes a lot of sense, because according to Rashi it comes out that… in other words, the Achiezer explains that both Magen Avraham and Even HaOzer learned the Talmudic text in Bava Kamma like the Rosh. And that makes a lot of sense, because according to Rashi it comes out that the Talmudic text in Bava Kamma is not practical Jewish law. It goes according to Rabbi Yosi’s view. So everyone follows the Rosh. So what is the dispute? The dispute is whether what the Rosh imposes liability for in winnowing is because winnowing is done only by means of the wind—that is how Magen Avraham learned it. And if so, then with a water mill, since it can also be done by means of a hand mill, with a water mill it would be permitted even according to the Rosh. That is Magen Avraham’s view. Even HaOzer says no. In winnowing, it can be done with wind and it can also be done without wind. From the fact that the Rosh imposes liability in winnowing, you see that it is enough that this is the normal way to do it by means of wind, by indirect causation. So if that is so, then with a water mill too, which is admittedly not the only way but is a normal way, that is enough to impose liability. So the dispute between Magen Avraham and Even HaOzer is over those same two ways of reading the Rosh’s view. And in Yeshuot Yaakov, section 334, in the responsa of his grandson, he wrote in the view of Shiltei HaGibborim that causing extinguishing is exempt only when one does not intend it. But when he intends it, he is liable because of extinguishing, because it is thoughtful labor, for which one is liable even in indirect causation, as explained in Bava Kamma 60a. And only where it is unintentional—since this is not labor and not thoughtful labor—in such a case there is no liability in indirect causation.

[Speaker D] That goes back—we’ve gone back to Rashi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And until now we haven’t seen such a view. He basically wants to say—wait. Yes, he wants to say that Rashi’s view is that causing extinguishing is liable because of the rule of thoughtful labor. And he wants to say one more thing: this view is also the practical law. How does that work? We saw that in the dispute between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis—there is a dispute between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis about causing extinguishing, maybe even only at the rabbinic level—but even if it is Torah-level, that is only according to Rabbi Yosi; according to the Rabbis it is completely permitted. So how can you say that in practice indirect causation is forbidden by Torah law? So he says there is a difference between the passages. He explains Rashi: Rashi is not going according to Rabbi Yosi’s view. Even the Rabbis agree with Rashi’s words in Bava Kamma 60a. Even according to the Rabbis, winnowing with the assisting wind is liable. How is that different from causing extinguishing, which according to them is permitted? So one possibility would be to say maybe there, in the case of loss, it was permitted, while here it is not a case of loss. But that is not enough, because if it is not a case of loss then it would only be a rabbinic prohibition, and a Torah prohibition is not permitted in a case of loss. And in the Talmudic text in Bava Kamma you can see that this is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic one. “The Torah prohibited thoughtful labor”—that is a Torah prohibition. Therefore one must say—one has to distinguish between the cases. In winnowing with the assisting wind, the person clearly intends from the outset to perform this action, right? That is what Rashi says: his intention was fulfilled. Right? But in causing extinguishing, where it is permitted, that is only when he does not really intend to extinguish. He extinguished indirectly; there it will be permitted. Why? Because you cannot say that his intention was fulfilled. After all, why does Rashi say that indirect causation on the Sabbath is liable? Because his intention was fulfilled. That is what he planned, and that is what in fact happened. But if he did not plan it, it happened unintentionally. Then you do not have the reasoning of “his intention was fulfilled.” Therefore if he did not intend it, even though he extinguished indirectly, then he will be exempt or permitted—exempt or permitted—but it will not be a Torah prohibition. In other words, he distinguishes between the passages. In other words, Rashi said that indirect causation is liable by Torah law, and that is also the practical law—not Rabbi Yosi’s view. This is also the practical ruling. But what he said here is difficult. Why is it difficult? Because remember the case we saw of causing extinguishing on the Sabbath—what was the case? To place new vessels filled with water in front of the fire, right?

[Speaker D] So he intended it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He intended it, obviously; he did it in order to stop the fire. So how can you say that everything the Rabbis say is permitted is only where he did not intend it, and where he intended it they agree it is forbidden? There we are dealing with a case where he intended it, and they still say it is permitted.

[Speaker C] He intended to stop it, not to extinguish it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—so it could be that what he means is: I put the vessels with the water there in order to stop the fire. True, those vessels may also burst and then the water will spill and extinguish the fire—that I did not intend. As far as I was concerned it was enough to stop the fire; I did not intend to extinguish it. Then maybe one can understand the Yeshuot Yaakov. Okay? “However, the Rosh in Bava Kamma 60a wrote that the phrase ‘the Torah prohibited thoughtful labor’ comes to teach that even though this is only indirect causation, the Torah nevertheless imposed liability here, since this labor is primarily done by means of wind.” It is explained there that specifically in winnowing, where its primary mode of performance is this way—but not in other labors. I think this is the continuation of Yeshuot Yaakov’s words. Until here he spoke about Rashi’s view. And the Rosh claims otherwise. “The Torah prohibited thoughtful labor” is not a general principle that indirect causation is prohibited when intended. Even if he intends it, it will not be prohibited except in labors whose primary mode of performance is by means of wind. Now I have to discuss Rashi’s view. Rashi basically says that on the Sabbath indirect causation is liable. Now if Rashi is going according to Rabbi Yosi—without the Yeshuot Yaakov, who says that this is also the practical law, but the common understanding is that Rashi follows Rabbi Yosi’s view, because indirect causation is liable—then what comes out in the end?

[Speaker D] According to the Rabbis, that it’s permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Permitted, right. According to the Rabbis—the law follows the Rabbis against Rabbi Yosi—that it is permitted. Okay. So what will the law be in winnowing with the assisting wind according to that, practically?

[Speaker D] It will be permitted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It will be permitted, yes? But in the list of labors in the Mishnah, winnowing appears. So what will the Rabbis do with that? What, do they not have the labor of winnowing? Seemingly, Yeshuot Yaakov is necessary. You have to say that the case of winnowing with the assisting wind is exceptional according to Rashi, because there he intended it, or for some reason of that kind. Because otherwise it comes out that the Rabbis disagree even about that, and then it comes out that there is no labor of winnowing at all according to the Rabbis. But in the list of labors, winnowing appears.

[Speaker E] You can winnow without wind too, no? Or…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So one has to say—there is no choice but to say—that according to Rashi, the view—

[Speaker D] the second view of the Rosh—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] they will establish the labor of winnowing according to—

[Speaker D] the second view—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] of the Rosh, in winnowing not by means of wind. Right? Winnowing not by means of wind. Because winnowing by means of wind is exempt according to the Rabbis. Then it comes out that winnowing is the sort of labor that, true, is normally done by means of wind, but not only by means of wind. It can also be done without wind. Right? Meaning that Rashi, in understanding the labor of winnowing, will go with the first direction in the Rosh: that the labor of winnowing is not done only by means of wind, and that this is the normal way to do it. How do I know that Rashi agrees with that? Because otherwise the Rabbis are stuck according to Rashi in practical Jewish law. Otherwise it comes out that there is no labor of winnowing at all according to the Rabbis. Okay. We have no choice but to say that it is talking about winnowing not by means of wind. That is what they did in the Tabernacle and that is what was prohibited. So you see that there is labor—there is a normal way to do winnowing not necessarily by means of wind. Now the Maggid Mishneh and the Kesef Mishneh, in the laws of financial damages, write that Maimonides does not bring the rule that winnowing with the assisting wind is liable. He does not bring that ruling. So the Maggid Mishneh and the Kesef Mishneh in chapter 14 of the laws of financial damages explain that Maimonides simply did not rule like Rav Ashi.

[Speaker D] So there really he is exempt? What? Did he say he’s exempt?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides rules that indirect causation is permitted, right? As we said, indirect causation on a Jewish holiday is permitted. So apparently there is a general rule according to Maimonides that indirect causation on the Sabbath too is permitted. So if you do not write that winnowing with the assisting wind is liable, you apparently understand that like all indirect causation it is permitted. The Kesef Mishneh and the Maggid Mishneh explain why. After all, it says in the Talmudic text in Bava Kamma that winnowing with the assisting wind is liable. No—that is according to Rabbi Yosi’s view. According to the Rabbis it is indeed permitted. According to this, it comes out that Maimonides learned like Rashi, not like the Rosh. And also not like Yeshuot Yaakov, because Yeshuot Yaakov says that Rashi—Rashi explains this not like Rabbi Yosi but also like the Rabbis, meaning that it is accepted as practical Jewish law. But Maimonides learned like Rashi that this is subject to the dispute between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis, but he really says that if so, then it is not accepted as practical Jewish law. Not like Yeshuot Yaakov. Okay? Notice how the whole passage unfolds according to these possibilities. Of course, according to this there arises the question we asked also according to Rashi: so what is the labor of winnowing? Apparently winnowing by hand, not with the help of wind—some other form of winnowing, right? Because Maimonides too agrees that winnowing is one of the thirty-nine labors. Okay, what I asked about Rashi. Fine? Now several later authorities nevertheless reconciled Rashi differently. We already saw Yeshuot Yaakov. So let’s go back for a moment. We said that according to Rashi there is a contradiction between the passages. The passage about causing extinguishing says that indirect causation is permitted in practice, like the Rabbis, and the passage in Bava Kamma 60a about winnowing with the assisting wind says that indirect causation is liable. I said one possibility is to explain that the passage in Bava Kamma goes according to Rabbi Yosi’s view, according to which indirect causation is liable, but then it comes out that this is not the practical law, and it should follow that winnowing with the assisting wind in practice is exempt—and maybe that really is Maimonides’ view. But if I want to say that the Talmudic text in Bava Kamma goes according to practical Jewish law—

[Speaker D] What about the Rosh? What? If it’s practical law then according to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—according to Rashi. It is practical law, and then it comes out that indirect causation on the Sabbath is generally liable, not only in winnowing. Indirect causation on the Sabbath is liable. Okay? That is Rashi’s general view. So what do we do with the passage about causing extinguishing, where indirect causation is exempt? Once we have a contradiction between two such passages, there are always two basic ways to reconcile them. Either say that winnowing is the exception, and in general indirect causation is exempt except in winnowing—that is the direction the Rosh took—or say that causing extinguishing is the exception, and in fact in general indirect causation is liable; causing extinguishing is something exceptional and therefore exempt. Okay?

[Speaker D] Which is what—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yeshuot Yaakov, for example, says that in fact indirect causation is liable when he intended it, but in causing extinguishing he did not intend it and therefore he is exempt. So in principle causing extinguishing is the exception. But why specifically extinguishing? Rather, this applies to anyone who performs labor by indirect causation without intending it. That is what it means that he is exempt. One has to comment a bit on this, because if he did not intend it, then you already have an exemption of unintentional action; why do you need the exemption of indirect causation? Fine, that is a discussion—maybe you’ll see later in the summary, I get into it a bit there. An inevitable consequence or not, because here we are dealing with a case where it was indeed inevitable. Do you understand? In other words, if I say that I did not intend the water in the new vessels, then Yeshuot Yaakov says: he did not intend it, right? And therefore the indirect causation is permitted. But then why do you need to get to the point that indirect causation is permitted? Let that follow from the fact that it was unintentional—he did not intend it.

[Speaker D] But he knows for certain that those vessels will burst?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So is this an inevitable consequence? Do you have an exemption of unintentional action?

[Speaker D] Yes, there is certainty there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] New vessels—

[Speaker C] burst for sure. What? He didn’t intend that, but he had a different intention.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, yes, he had a different intention—to stop the fire. You yourself said that before. He didn’t intend to extinguish; he intended to stop it.

[Speaker C] So you can say he didn’t intend it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? He did not intend extinguishing; he intended to stop it. Stopping it is permitted. Every case of unintentional action is like that. I’m saying there will not be an exemption here of unintentional action, because this is an inevitable consequence, right? Well, but if it is an inevitable consequence, then what does it help me that he didn’t intend it? So why is he really exempt here? Because of indirect causation. Notice: when I add lack of intention as a condition, it is not because the exemption is the exemption of unintentional action. The exemption is the exemption of indirect causation. Only when does the exemption of indirect causation exist? Only when I did not intend it, because otherwise my intention was fulfilled. But the fact that I did not intend it is a condition in the laws of indirect causation; it does not make this an exemption of unintentional action. Because from the standpoint of unintentional action, this is an inevitable consequence, so there is no exemption of unintentional action here. But as we saw regarding an inevitable consequence, an inevitable consequence does not turn me into someone who intended it, right? It causes me to be liable even though I did not intend it. In indirect causation, then, since I did not intend it—it doesn’t matter that it is an inevitable consequence—if I did not intend it, you cannot say that my intention was fulfilled. And by the way, this is proof that an inevitable consequence does not turn me into someone who intended it. We saw there is a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities about this. This line of reasoning is proof that an inevitable consequence does not make me someone who intended it, but leaves me in the category of unintentional action; I’m just liable anyway. But here, the unintentional aspect is required as a condition for the exemption of indirect causation, and therefore I don’t care that it is an inevitable consequence, because even if it is an inevitable consequence, he still did not intend it, and therefore he will be exempt—but the exemption is from the laws of indirect causation, not from the laws of unintentional action. That is Yeshuot Yaakov. But there are other later authorities who go in different directions. Some, for example, distinguish between different levels of indirect causation, and I said that there are—after all, we discussed bringing extinguishing closer, the whole passage in the chapter Kira, where you can see that there are different levels of indirect causation or different kinds of indirect causation, one more severe than the other. Here they say: in Bava Kamma, in winnowing with the assisting wind, he tossed the kernels and the wind separated them. That means that there was in fact a human action here that was part of what took place. Throwing the grains upward is a direct physical action. It’s just that my direct action did not do all the work; the wind completed the work. Like fanning a flame and then the wind intensified it. I fanned it, and the wind completed the work. Such indirect causation, says Rashi, is liable in the labor laws of the Sabbath. But when I place the vessels with water and the fire bursts the vessels and the water spills and extinguishes it, there is no action of mine in that matter at all. I put the vessels there and went home. So the extinguishing action is done entirely by the fire upon itself. Right? There is no involvement of the person. Such indirect causation would be exempt. That is what several later authorities claim. Then once again it comes out that Rashi’s statement—that indirect causation on the Sabbath is liable—was said as practical Jewish law. But it was said as practical Jewish law in certain situations, not like in causing extinguishing. Yeshuot Yaakov says: in situations where he intends it. These later authorities say: in situations where his own action has some role in the performance of the labor. But indirect causation that is entirely indirect causation, where the person himself takes no part at all in carrying out the action—there, indirect causation will be exempt. Here one has to hesitate a bit. According to Yeshuot Yaakov, it is very clear why the Talmudic text said, “The Torah prohibited thoughtful labor.” Rashi says: because his intention was fulfilled. If you did not intend it, you cannot say that his intention was fulfilled. So that follows very naturally from the Talmudic text’s reasoning. But according to the distinction of those later authorities I just cited, what are they saying? They are saying that where there was human involvement in doing the action, like winnowing with the assisting wind, there indirect causation is liable. Where there was no involvement, indirect causation is exempt. Why? In both cases his intention was fulfilled. We are talking about a case where he intended it; it’s just that here he acted and there he didn’t. So the Talmudic text should have said: because he acted, not because his intention was fulfilled. Why does the Talmudic text justify it through the law of thoughtful labor? Well, according to those later authorities this is not clear. It could be that there is an additional condition here. Thoughtful labor means that his intention was fulfilled, and that by itself is not enough. It is a necessary condition for liability, but not enough. In order to impose liability there must also be some action on his part. If his intention was merely fulfilled and he did nothing, he sat here and really wanted something to happen, and then suddenly that thing happened—no one would think to say he is liable, right? That he did labor here. The fulfillment of his intention is not enough to turn this action into Sabbath labor. It is a necessary condition, but not sufficient. You also need him to do some action. Therefore that objection is not so bad. They say “thoughtful labor” in order to say that his intention was fulfilled. True, that is not enough; you also need an action that he himself does. In the passage in tractate Beitzah, which I also mentioned in the past, 22a: Rav Yehudah challenged Ulla: “One who puts oil into a lamp is liable because of kindling, and one who takes from it is liable because of extinguishing.” Right? There is a bowl of oil and a wick that is burning; that is what they call a lamp. Okay? Now if I add oil to the bowl, I am liable because of kindling. If I take oil from the bowl, then I am liable because of extinguishing. What is the explanation? Tosafot says as follows there in Beitzah: “And one who takes from it is liable because of extinguishing”—it does not mean because he hastens the extinguishing. “For that would only be causing extinguishing, and causing extinguishing on a Jewish holiday is permitted, even though he hastens its extinguishing, and on the Sabbath as well he is not liable.” Because causing extinguishing, we saw, is permitted; in practice we rule like the Rabbis, right? So the fact that you extinguish indirectly, by taking the oil from the lamp, means you are extinguishing by indirect causation; the fire will eventually go out. Fine? But extinguishing by indirect causation is permitted. So why does it say here “liable”—“one who takes from it is liable because of extinguishing”? Rather, says Tosafot, “the reason is that at the very moment he takes from it, he somewhat extinguishes it and dims its light, for it cannot illuminate as much when there is little oil in the lamp, and therefore it appears like extinguishing.” The point is that when you take the oil, the flame is slightly lowered, that is, becomes smaller. Taking the oil lowers the flame, and so he basically says this is direct extinguishing. It is not causing extinguishing, and therefore it is permitted—

[Speaker B] I can’t hear. Why, according to Tosafot—why if he removes a little oil does it immediately extinguish? It should take time. Unless he is arguing—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that immediately the flame—immediately the flame goes down when you remove the oil. That is his factual assumption. Of course one can argue with it, but that is his factual assumption.

[Speaker B] Maybe it’s at the very end, and then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, even if it takes time, that doesn’t matter, so long as the effect is a direct effect. It’s not like the water—we talked about that—that the difference between indirect causation and not indirect causation is not only the time gap, but think about the jugs with the water. The jugs with the water are not only a case where there is a time gap between the stage when I placed the jug and the extinguishing; the extinguishing action itself was not done by me at all, it happened on its own through the fire. Here, the claim is: if the claim is that I myself performed the action, only there is a time difference, that doesn’t bother me, because I myself performed the action, so this is called extinguishing directly. The Rosh writes there: “Tosafot wrote that the reason this is considered extinguishing is that when he reduces the oil and distances it from the lamp that is burning, immediately the light of the lamp dims and it no longer burns as well as at first, and this is considered extinguishing.” That is—

[Speaker B] More reasonable. And that’s Tosafot, that’s what he says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine? And then he says: “And it should not be explained as because he hastens the extinguishing of the lamp, because the oil will be used up. For that is causing extinguishing, about which Rabbi Yosi and the Sages disagreed,” as we saw. Fine? “Therefore it seems to me that the reason one who takes from the lamp is liable is because he hastens its extinguishing. And even the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Yosi, agree regarding this kind of causing extinguishing that one is liable.” So he returns to the explanation Tosafot rejected. It is forbidden to take the oil because the future extinguishing will happen more quickly. Ah, but we said this is the dispute between Rabbi Yosi and the Rabbis, and in practical Jewish law we rule like the Rabbis, that causing extinguishing is permitted? So he says no: “They only disagreed there because he does not touch the burning object, but rather does something external to it that causes the extinguishing when the fire reaches there. But the oil and the wick both cause the burning, and one who reduces one of them and thereby hastens the extinguishing is liable.” Fine? So what is he basically saying? A distinction very similar to the distinction of the later authorities we saw. Namely: everything they said—that causing extinguishing is permitted regarding those new jars—that is only where you do not touch the burning object at all, or what causes the burning. You do something, and indirectly something else happens that extinguishes the fire, as with the jars. Over that Rabbi Yosi and the Sages disagreed, and that is called causing extinguishing. In practical Jewish law we rule like the Sages, that such a thing is permitted. In our case, where one takes from the oil in the lamp, what causes the burning? The oil. The oil and the wick are what burn. And if you take the oil, then true, the whole problem is that the future extinguishing comes sooner, but that happened because you yourself performed the extinguishing action on the burning thing itself. That is a kind of indirect causation that we do prohibit. And this is very reminiscent of the distinction of those later authorities between winnowing with the assisting wind, where I myself touched the kernels and the chaff. True, the wind finished the job, but I myself caused it in a way that I was involved in the action. In such indirect causation, there is liability. Only in the indirect causation of the jars are you exempt, where I did not touch anything at all—I was not part of the extinguishing act at all. So if so, it comes out that this distinction of those later authorities already has a source in the Rosh. The Rosh basically says this idea.

[Speaker B] Tosafot doesn’t accept that, because Tosafot are talking about wax. He says that if you cut the wax, you are touching that very thing. As far as Tosafot are concerned, wax and oil are the same thing. And Tosafot says that if you cut the wax above, that doesn’t matter, because it’s not at that moment, so it’s not exactly—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the same view.

[Speaker C] Tosafot emphasize that you are not affecting it at that same moment.

[Speaker D] Right, exactly. The time gap does matter. The gap—yes, according to Tosafot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the Rosh disagrees with Tosafot.

[Speaker D] The Rosh doesn’t go that way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the Rosh explains with the very interpretation Tosafot rejected. He says that the fact that later on it will go out—even if there is a time gap—that still does not mean there is an exemption of indirect causation, because in the end his intention was fulfilled, so there is no exemption of indirect causation. Okay? Now this is an interesting point, because let’s remember what the Rosh wrote in tractate Bava Kamma. The Rosh—so this looks very much like Rashi, right? After all, this distinction of the later authorities, this distinction of the later authorities was said in Rashi’s view. How does Rashi say that winnowing with the assisting wind is indirect causation and yet liable? After all, in causing extinguishing we rule that one is exempt, and the assumption is that Rashi said his words as practical law too, not only according to Rabbi Yosi. So they distinguish: here he touched the things and there he did not touch the things. But the Rosh learns Bava Kamma differently. He says it is because winnowing is a special labor done by indirect causation. So what place is there for the distinction the Rosh makes here in tractate Beitzah? Such a distinction was said in Rashi’s view, not in the Rosh’s. If the Rosh says this distinction, then he could have explained tractate Bava Kamma like Rashi too, and not singled out the labor of winnowing as different from other labors. Rather, he could simply have said: in winnowing with the assisting wind the person was involved, therefore he is liable—even according to the Rabbis he is liable. Why do you need to get to the point that winnowing is a special labor done with the help of the wind? Fine? The Rosh is a little difficult against himself, the Rosh according to his own approach. Look, I mentioned the Avnei Nezer; he raises a very interesting possibility. I didn’t bring a quotation from him, so I’ll tell you orally. Avnei Nezer claims that the Rosh does not mean what we said earlier, the distinction of the later authorities in Rashi. Rather, the Rosh means to say that when you take the oil, you extinguished. Why did you extinguish? Because before you took the oil, all the oil was considered oil that is now burning. True, the fire is only grasping the wick, but that doesn’t matter; all the oil in the lamp is considered to be burning. And once you take the oil out of the lamp, the oil you took is no longer burning; it is no longer connected to the whole system of the burning lamp. So you extinguished that oil that you took. That is the extinguishing. And that is direct extinguishing, not indirect causation. The Rosh does not distinguish between two levels of indirect causation—indirect causation where you are involved in the act, and indirect causation where it happens only indirectly. No. The Rosh claims that in extinguishing, when you take the oil from the lamp, this is simply not indirect causation at all; it is direct extinguishing. Because extinguishing does not mean removing the fire—that is not the definition of the labor of extinguishing. The definition of the labor of extinguishing is to stop the burning of the oil. The oil was burning, and now it stops burning. Or in other words, it is not removal of the fire, but saving the fuel. The labor of extinguishing is not the elimination of fire; the labor of extinguishing is the saving of combustible material. That is the definition of the labor of extinguishing.

[Speaker D] And here I took the oil, I saved fuel. So is that a labor not needed for its own sake?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? No, this is the labor of extinguishing. That is the labor of extinguishing; there is no other need in extinguishing. This is the labor of extinguishing.

[Speaker D] Ah, this is the labor of extinguishing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Now of course this is not precise, because the Talmudic text says that in extinguishing it is only when he wants the coals—that is the “needed for its own sake.” We need to understand how he deals with that point; in that respect it is not clear. What?

[Speaker D] It doesn’t work.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, unless he says, what do you mean, you need the coals? It’s like—like saving the fuel itself. After all, you’re extinguishing the coals, and the coals were the burning material. You want the burning material, and that’s why you extinguish it. So how is that different from extinguishing because you want the oil? It’s the same thing. Saving the burning material. Never mind, I think that can be understood. In any case, I think that in the Rosh’s formulation, it doesn’t seem to me that this fits in. I want to finish with a comment about the exemption of indirect causation. There could be, after all, a contradiction between the passages: regarding the labor of extinguishing we say that causing extinguishing is permitted, while regarding winnowing we say that indirect causation is prohibited. I said it could be that winnowing is the exception and indirect causation is permitted, but winnowing is unique and therefore one is liable—that’s the Rosh. It could be that extinguishing is the exception. Meaning, in general indirect causation is prohibited—that’s Rashi—but extinguishing is exceptional. Why is extinguishing exceptional? We saw several possibilities. I’ll suggest another one. When I extinguish a fire, in general, extinguishing is always just bringing the time of the extinguishing earlier. If I hadn’t touched it, it would also have gone out. Once the fuel was used up, it would have gone out, right? So what did I do by extinguishing it now? All I did was bring the time of the extinguishing earlier, right?

[Speaker C] Unless it would go out only after the Sabbath.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter—what difference does that make? I still only brought the time

[Speaker C] of the extinguishing forward to Sunday.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, still, all I did in terms of the benefit, in terms of the result, was to bring forward the time of the extinguishing—the extinguishing itself, sorry, not causing the extinguishing. That is the definition of the labor of extinguishing. Think, for example, about cooking. What is the labor of cooking? To cook. But I don’t cook; I just put it on the fire. Right? It cooks on its own. Clearly, the definition of the labor of cooking is putting it on the fire. There’s a condition that it actually get cooked, but when you ask what the definition of the labor is—it’s putting it on the fire. After that the fire cooks it, and so it gets cooked. I’m arguing that the labor of kindling—or the labor of extinguishing, sorry—is the same kind of thing. The labor of extinguishing is not to achieve the result of extinguishing, because that result would come anyway; it’s only to bring about that result earlier, right? So if that’s so, it may be that bringing the extinguishing closer, or causing extinguishing, is prohibited because specifically in the labor of extinguishing, that’s what is prohibited.

[Speaker B] Is that the definition of the labor? Do you hear? Is that the definition of the labor of extinguishing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the definition of the labor of extinguishing is bringing the act of extinguishing earlier. Okay, so now how do I define the labor of extinguishing? Is it a prohibition on an act or a prohibition on a result? Clearly on an act, right? A result-prohibition would mean that now there’s no fire—I removed the fire. But no, that result would have happened anyway. What’s prohibited for me is to perform an act that brings about an earlier appearance of that result. So extinguishing is an act-prohibition, not a result-prohibition. But with act-prohibitions, it really makes more sense that there would be an exemption for indirect causation. Why? Because if I did it indirectly, then that’s not my act. What is indirect causation? When I do it indirectly, that means the act is the wind’s, not mine. And if the whole prohibition is a prohibition on an act, then there will be an exemption for indirect causation. But in winnowing, where the wind assists him, there it’s like the labor of selecting: the prohibition is a prohibition on the result, that in the end the chaff is separated from the grain. So there, why should I care that it happened indirectly? After all, his intention was fulfilled, as Rashi says. Bottom line, the result he aimed at was achieved. So why should I care that he did it indirectly? Therefore there indirect causation would incur liability. And then what comes out of this—and a number of later authorities (Acharonim) wrote this—is that exemptions of indirect causation were stated only with regard to act-prohibitions. Because with act-prohibitions my act is required, and if I did it by means of indirect causation, then there is no act of mine here, and therefore I am exempt. But prohibitions that are result-prohibitions—even if I achieved the result by indirect causation, in the end the result was achieved through me, and so even with indirect causation I would be liable; there would be no exemption for indirect causation. So then this is not some general statement about the laws of the Sabbath; rather, it depends on the nature of the prohibited labor. Extinguishing is an act-labor, and winnowing is a result-labor. This is not a distinction between Sabbath and the rest of the Torah; it’s a distinction within Sabbath itself as well. The question is whether it is an act-prohibition or a result-prohibition. And in the rest of the Torah too, by the way, if there are act-prohibitions, then indirect causation would be exempt. For example, in damages, I want to say according to this that for damage you pay for the damaging act that you performed. The result is only the practical circumstance needed to say: something happened, compensate for it. But what do you pay for? For the damaging act that you performed. If you did it indirectly, then you did not perform an act of damage, and therefore you are exempt. If one fanned a fire and the wind fanned it further, he is exempt in damages. On the Sabbath, why is he liable? Because on the Sabbath we’re talking about the act of winnowing. The act of winnowing is a result-prohibition. And a result-prohibition does not have an exemption for indirect causation, because in the end the result was achieved. Now, this is a very common approach among later authorities (Acharonim): the exemption of indirect causation is only an exemption for act-prohibitions, not an exemption for result-prohibitions. In result-prohibitions, even if done indirectly, one would still be liable. What is a result-

[Speaker B] prohibition, for example? How would that explain the dispute between Tosafot and the Rosh? I can’t hear. How would that explain the dispute between Tosafot and the Rosh?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, I wasn’t talking about the dispute between Tosafot and the Rosh. I was talking about the contradiction between Bava Kamma and Sabbath. Why in winnowing, when the wind assists him, is he liable, while causing extinguishing is permitted? Because extinguishing is an act—it’s an act-prohibition—so with indirect causation you didn’t do anything. But in winnowing it’s a result-prohibition, so even if you did it indirectly, you reached the result. Now, it’s possible to say—there are medieval authorities (Rishonim) from whom one can see that the exact opposite comes out. Wait a second. There are medieval authorities (Rishonim) from whom it comes out that the exemption of indirect causation actually stems from the fact that the result is not attributed to me. In the case of winnowing where the wind assists him, why am I exempt? Because although the result happened, I didn’t do it. So why should I be liable? The one that did it was the wind. Notice, here I’m saying that the prohibition is a result-prohibition. But clearly, the fact that the result happened is not in itself enough to make me liable. It also has to be attributed to me. Right? If I did it indirectly, then the wind did it; it’s not attributed to me, and therefore I am exempt. And then the exact opposite comes out from what I said earlier—one hundred and eighty degrees the opposite. Specifically in result-prohibitions there would be an exemption for indirect causation. Because in result-prohibitions the act has to be attributed to me. If it happened indirectly, the act is not attributed to me, but to the wind. But if the prohibition is a prohibition on an act, then so what if I did the act indirectly? There was still an act here, only indirectly. So there is at least room—it’s not necessary, but there is at least room—to say that I am still liable even though it was done indirectly. And if before I said that indirect causation exempts in act-prohibitions but not in result-prohibitions, now it comes out that it specifically exempts in result-prohibitions, while in act-prohibitions it remains open—maybe yes and maybe no. Because it depends on how I understand the exemption of indirect causation. Does the exemption of indirect causation stem from the fact that there was no act here, or from the fact that there was an act but the result is not attributed to me? The second formulation actually speaks about result-prohibitions. The first formulation speaks about act-prohibitions. And therefore the conclusions are opposite conclusions. Is it specifically in act-prohibitions that there is an exemption of indirect causation and not in result-prohibitions, or specifically in result-prohibitions that there is an exemption of indirect causation and not in act-prohibitions? Usually, among later authorities (Acharonim), they accept the first formulation: that indirect causation exempts in act-prohibitions and not in result-prohibitions.

[Speaker C] Rabbi, what about someone who places bread in the oven and the Talmud asks whether the second person may remove it in order to spare him from committing a transgression? So we see that the main thing is the result and not the act.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I said that the prohibition is an act-prohibition, but if the result didn’t occur, then the condition needed in order to make me liable was not fulfilled. If the act did not bring about the relevant result, then one is not liable for it. But still, what I did was only an act. The result happened. Therefore they discuss there what happens if I placed it on the Sabbath and it got cooked after the Sabbath, or something like that. So if it’s only a condition, then if it got cooked after the Sabbath, the condition was fulfilled, and I placed it there on the Sabbath, so I’m liable. I don’t care that it got cooked after the Sabbath. Do I understand the prohibition as a prohibition on the result, such that the result is attributed to me—the result happened after the Sabbath? That is a dispute among later authorities (Acharonim), and they tie it exactly to this point. Just one last point I want to make. We saw in the passage in tractate Sabbath about causing extinguishing, that “doing” is what is prohibited, but indirect causation is permitted. Right? That connects very well to the first formulation of the later authorities (Acharonim): when there are act-prohibitions, if you did it indirectly, there was no act, and therefore it is permitted. But with result-prohibitions there is no exemption for indirect causation. In the Talmud’s formulation this is excellent. It says, “You shall not do any labor”—doing is what is prohibited, but indirect causation is permitted. Since on the Sabbath the prohibitions are act-prohibitions, and you did it indirectly, then there is no act of yours here, and therefore you are exempt.

[Speaker D] So then that’s an exception?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s an exception, or at least a kind of exception; it could be there are others like it. Okay? I assume that selecting is like this too. Winnowing, selecting, and sifting are the same type of labor. The approaches that say that specifically in a result-prohibition there is an exemption don’t fit so well with this derivation in tractate Sabbath: doing is what is prohibited, but indirect causation is permitted. But we already saw that in the final conclusion, that derivation does not remain. So it could be that indeed that was the initial assumption, but in the final conclusion it doesn’t remain. Fine. Okay, we’ll stop here. For us, this is basically the end of the semester.

[Speaker B] No, no, no, Rabbi, I want to update you—there are classes next week. What? There are classes next week, that’s what Eran said. He just wrote to me now; he also wrote to you. Right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because earlier he wrote—he wrote to us yesterday—that it was only through Wednesday, so I didn’t understand.

[Speaker B] But I was just messaging with him now and he said that he would write to you right now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I thought. Okay, so if that’s the case, then on Thursday we’ll do something else. Great, okay, bye, thank you very much, more power to you.

[Speaker D] Thanks.

[Speaker C] It says until the third of July, so apparently inclusive.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I also understood that it was through Thursday. I just got a message from him yesterday saying it was through Wednesday, so I didn’t understand.

[Speaker C] No, it’s inclusive. We knew it was Thursday; we knew the whole time that it was until—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very good. Goodbye.