The Laws of the Forbidden Labors – Lesson 26

Table of Contents

• Opening the topic: a partial measure versus intent in Sabbath labors
• The meaning of prescribed measures in Jewish law and their status as tradition
• Examples of halakhic measures
• The dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish in Yoma 74
• Measures as determining punishment according to Rabbi Yohanan and in practical Jewish law
• The relationship between verse and reasoning: “all fat” versus “fit to combine”
• Maimonides’ ruling and the innovation of “disciplinary lashes” even for a Torah prohibition without formal punishment
• An oath regarding a partial measure in Maimonides’ words
• Practical questions about the boundary of “any amount at all” and a partial measure
• The nature of the prohibition of a partial measure: the same prohibition or a new prohibition
• The counting of the commandments and broad legal principles
• Additional practical differences: different stringencies regarding a partial measure
• The meaning of “fit to combine” and its implications
• Is a partial measure specifically half, partial measure in commandments, and partial measure in rabbinic prohibitions
• A partial measure in Sabbath labors: three possible situations
• Lifting up and setting down, and partial labor in the words of Sefat Emet and Rashi
• Maimonides’ approach in the laws of Sabbath and the definition of “exempt”
• Sources in Rashi for partial measure on the Sabbath
• Kiryat Sefer by Mabit, “when one does it,” and understanding the deficiency as an incomplete act
• The Shulchan Arukh: pulling one hair and two hairs, and the dispute over how to interpret it
• A possible source for a rabbinic prohibition when there is no Torah-level partial measure on the Sabbath
• The definition of labor on the Sabbath versus a quantitative measure
• Conclusion of the session

Summary

General overview

This is the last session of the year, and it is devoted to the law of a partial measure, mainly in the laws of Sabbath, with a general introduction to the meaning of “measures” in Jewish law and the status of a partial measure within Torah prohibitions. The measures are defined as a tradition given as law to Moses at Sinai, and the discussion in Yoma 74 presents a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan, who forbids a partial measure by Torah law because it is “fit to combine,” and Reish Lakish, who permits it by Torah law but forbids it rabbinically, and treats the exposition of “all fat” as merely a scriptural support. In practice, the law follows Rabbi Yohanan, and Maimonides formulates that the measure relates to punishment and not to the essence of the prohibition itself. But in the laws of Sabbath, a dispute arises among medieval and later authorities as to whether the law of a partial measure applies to Sabbath labors as well, especially in cases of “partial labor,” such as lifting up without setting down.

Opening the topic: a partial measure versus intent in Sabbath labors

A partial measure is presented as a different topic from discussions like an unintentional act, labor not needed for its own sake, mere involvement without awareness, and inadvertent violation, because here the gap lies in the act itself and not in awareness or intent. The action is done on only part of the required measure and not on the full measure, so the focus is on the content of the act and not on the intentions accompanying it. The principle is presented as a broad Torah rule according to which less than the required measure may carry no obligation, or no prohibition on the same level, and therefore it belongs both to the rules of labor and to the rules of prohibitions generally.

The meaning of prescribed measures in Jewish law and their status as tradition

The measures are described as having been transmitted from Sinai, based on Rav’s statement: “Measures, interpositions, and partitions are law given to Moses at Sinai,” even though the Talmud examines the possibility of connecting them to the verse “a land of wheat and barley…” and to Rav Hanin’s exposition that the whole verse was stated for legal measures. The conclusion presented is that the measures are law given to Moses at Sinai. As an aside, it is noted that at least for some measures there is room to understand that the numbers themselves were set as the sages’ assessment of what counts as a “significant thing” within the Torah’s intent, similar to the idea that “Scripture left it to the sages” in the labors permitted on intermediate festival days.

Examples of halakhic measures

Familiar measures are brought from different areas, such as an olive’s bulk and a large date’s bulk in eating law, and on Yom Kippur specifically a large date’s bulk, the size of a garment capable of receiving ritual impurity, three by three handbreadths, and measures regarding domains and movement in the public domain, such as four cubits. The principle presented is that in most prohibitions there is a minimum measure, and below it the prohibition is considered not to have been committed, or the commandment not to have been fulfilled, and the basic status of this is established as a tradition from Sinai.

The dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish in Yoma 74

The Talmud in Yoma brings a dispute: Rabbi Yohanan says that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law because “since it is fit to combine, he is eating a prohibition,” while Reish Lakish says that it is permitted by Torah law because “the Merciful One said ‘eating,’ and that is not present here,” though he still forbids it rabbinically. Rabbi Yohanan’s challenge is brought from a baraita that includes “and a partial measure” from the verse “all fat,” and Reish Lakish answers that the prohibition is rabbinic and the verse is merely a scriptural support. It is emphasized that “partial measure” means any part of the required measure, not necessarily an exact half.

Measures as determining punishment according to Rabbi Yohanan and in practical Jewish law

The question is raised: what is the role of the measures if even less than the measure is already prohibited by Torah law? The answer brought from the medieval authorities (Rishonim) is that the measures were stated with regard to punishment. According to this, the prohibition exists even below the measure, but punishment applies only when the full required measure has been eaten. As for positive commandments, a reservation is presented that the straightforward sugya of a partial measure deals with prohibitions, and a partial measure in positive commandments is described as a non-simple question that the commentators discuss.

The relationship between verse and reasoning: “all fat” versus “fit to combine”

It is explained that there is no contradiction between a source from a verse and a conceptual argument, and that the verse and the reasoning work together, with the verse establishing the law and the reasoning explaining its rationale. A broader example is brought from the discussion of “we do not derive punishments by pure logic,” where it is argued that the tendency to see “verse” as an alternative to “reasoning” is mistaken, because one can learn a law from a verse and explain its logic as well. In the sugya of a partial measure, it is emphasized that the Talmud presents this naturally: Rabbi Yohanan first gives a reason and then is challenged from a verse, and both are presented as supporting the same conclusion.

Maimonides’ ruling and the innovation of “disciplinary lashes” even for a Torah prohibition without formal punishment

It is said that in practice we rule like Rabbi Yohanan, and Maimonides brings this in several places. In the laws of the Yom Kippur rest, Maimonides rules that one who eats or drinks a partial measure receives disciplinary lashes, because although this is forbidden by Torah law, there is no liability to karet for less than the required measure. What is emphasized here is Maimonides’ innovation that disciplinary lashes are administered even for a Torah transgression when the person is exempt from the Torah punishment for some reason, such as the lack of the required measure.

An oath regarding a partial measure in Maimonides’ words

In the laws of oaths, Maimonides rules that an oath saying, “I will not eat any amount at all of carcasses or torn animals,” takes effect even if one ate less than an olive’s bulk, because “he was not sworn at Sinai concerning a partial measure.” It is explained that Maimonides understands that an oath does not take effect on an existing prohibition not because “one prohibition cannot take effect on top of another prohibition,” but because of a special rule that “an oath cannot take effect on top of an oath.” Therefore, it matters whether a person was “sworn” on a specific detail from Sinai. An explanatory framework is offered according to which what is learned from an exposition is an extension of Scripture not included in the Sinai oath concerning the written prohibitions themselves. So even though a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law, the oath can still take effect on it.

Practical questions about the boundary of “any amount at all” and a partial measure

A question is raised about whether a partial measure would end up forbidding every tiny movement whatsoever, and it is said that there may be room for some minimum threshold even for “any amount at all” itself, which also requires meaning and common sense. In the name of Rabbi Ben Zion Abba Shaul, it is brought that leaven on Passover is forbidden in any amount at all, but “even any amount has its own measure,” in the context of filtering water out of concern for crumbs of leaven. The precise line is not defined, and it is said that one uses common sense and the laws of doubt where uncertainty remains.

The nature of the prohibition of a partial measure: the same prohibition or a new prohibition

A dispute among later authorities is presented: does someone who eats less than the full measure violate the original prohibition itself, for example the prohibition of pork, only without punishment, or does he violate an independent prohibition called “the prohibition of a partial measure,” perhaps even a general prohibition applying to all prohibitions? A practical difference is given in the Sabbath context: if someone carried out a partial measure on the Sabbath, the question is whether he violated the prohibition of labor on the Sabbath and therefore has the status of one who publicly rejects Sabbath observance, which in turn is treated like rejecting the whole Torah, or whether he violated only an independent prohibition that does not define him as one who rejects the Sabbath.

The counting of the commandments and broad legal principles

The question is raised why the prohibition of a partial measure is not counted among the 613 commandments if it is an independent prohibition. It is suggested that according to Maimonides, things learned from exegesis are not counted in the enumeration of the commandments, based on the second root principle. More generally, broad and meta-halakhic rules are not counted, such as beautifying a commandment from the verse “This is my God and I will glorify Him,” or general principles like an unintentional act. A partial measure is presented as a broad rule touching the whole range of prohibitions, and therefore it is not counted.

Additional practical differences: different stringencies regarding a partial measure

A medical practical difference is brought: a patient can be fed either a partial measure of forbidden fat or a partial measure of pork. If a partial measure is just a miniature form of the original prohibition, then forbidden fat is more severe than pork. But if it is a single independent prohibition, then there is no preference. It is hinted that even if it is one prohibition, one could theoretically still discuss differences in severity, but the claim is that on the plain level there is no room for that without an explicit source.

The meaning of “fit to combine” and its implications

In the name of Rabbi Shimon Shkop, it is brought that the reasoning is qualitative: if combining the parts creates a full prohibition, that proves that the quality of the prohibition already exists in the first part, and only the quantity is lacking for purposes of punishment. Another approach is brought from later authorities who view “fit to combine” as a Torah-level fence, and therefore discuss, for example, eating a partial measure right before the end of Yom Kippur. They argue that if there is no practical possibility of combining it with another partial measure within the time of the prohibition, then there is no Torah prohibition. This view is connected to the broader discussion whether there are “fences within Torah law,” with examples such as the prohibition of possessing visible leaven and the understanding of seclusion laws.

Is a partial measure specifically half, partial measure in commandments, and partial measure in rabbinic prohibitions

An anecdote is brought about Maharam Halava and Avnei Nezer, who understand Maimonides in chapter 1 of the laws of leaven and matzah as holding that a partial measure is specifically “half,” in order to explain the need for a special source concerning leaven on Passover. The view of Hakham Tzvi in responsum 86 is also brought, according to which a partial measure applies only to eating prohibitions, as opposed to others who say it applies to other prohibitions as well. Regarding positive commandments, the question is raised whether someone who has only a partial measure of matzah is Torah-obligated to eat it, or is considered coerced and therefore exempt. Regarding rabbinic prohibitions, differing views are brought: Rivash forbids based on “whatever the rabbis enacted, they enacted in a form parallel to Torah law,” while Tosafot Shabbat permits. A dependent explanatory framework is suggested based on Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s reasoning and on the distinction between Torah-level object-prohibitions and rabbinic person-obligations, with the example of poultry cooked with milk as a prohibition stemming from the obligation to obey the rabbis and not from anything intrinsically problematic in the object itself.

A partial measure in Sabbath labors: three possible situations

It is said that on the Sabbath there are three forms in which the idea of a partial measure can arise: a partial object in carrying out, when someone carries less than the required amount; a partial act, like moving something less than four cubits in the public domain; and partial labor, like lifting up without setting down, or setting down without lifting up. A principled possibility is suggested for denying the law of a partial measure on the Sabbath, because Sabbath labors are described as person-centered prohibitions and as a duty of rest. But alongside that, it is argued that even there one could explain a partial prohibition as a lesser degree of “lack of rest.”

Lifting up and setting down, and partial labor in the words of Sefat Emet and Rashi

Sefat Emet at the beginning of tractate Shabbat asks why lifting up without setting down is not forbidden by Torah law like any other partial measure, and suggests that one might have expected at least the person who lifted it to be forbidden, because “it is fit to combine with setting down as well.” Sefat Emet notes that from Rashi and the Rosh it seems that the prohibition here is only rabbinic, and he concludes that what is done here is not a “partial measure” but “partial labor,” meaning that what is lacking is the quality of the complete labor and not merely its quantity. Meiri on Shabbat 3 is brought as formulating a similar principle: a partial measure applies when the prohibition exists and only the required measure is lacking, but not when what is lacking is in the body of the labor itself.

Maimonides’ approach in the laws of Sabbath and the definition of “exempt”

Maimonides in the laws of Sabbath, chapter 18, writes: “One who carries out a partial measure is exempt, and likewise anyone who does a labor from among the labors in a partial measure is exempt,” and he arranges the laws of combining partial measures in carrying. One possibility presented is to interpret “exempt” as exempt from punishment but still under a Torah prohibition, but this is rejected because Maimonides himself defines in chapter 1, law 3, that “exempt” in the laws of Sabbath means prohibited by rabbinic law. From here a reading is built according to which Maimonides teaches that on the Sabbath there is no Torah prohibition of a partial measure; rather, the prohibition is rabbinic, as a safeguard against full labor.

Sources in Rashi for partial measure on the Sabbath

In Rashi on Shabbat 74, on the sugya of selecting, it is stated explicitly that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law even on the Sabbath: “True, there is no liability for a sin-offering, but there is nevertheless a prohibition, for we hold that a partial measure is forbidden by Torah law.” From this it emerges that for Rashi, “exempt” can mean exempt only from punishment while there is still a Torah prohibition. The picture presented is that there are medieval authorities on both sides, and at times the language of “exempt” requires clarification as to whether the meaning is a rabbinic prohibition or a Torah prohibition without punishment.

Kiryat Sefer by Mabit, “when one does it,” and understanding the deficiency as an incomplete act

In Kiryat Sefer by Mabit on Maimonides’ laws of Sabbath, a reason is suggested according to which there is no partial measure on the Sabbath because it is excluded from the phrase “when one does it,” meaning that the requirement is for there to be a complete “doing,” and a partial measure is defined as a deficiency in the act itself. Even if this exposition is not presented as an explicit Talmudic source, it fits well with the assumption that since the prohibition of Sabbath is a prohibition on the person’s action, the measures are perceived as measures in the action itself and not only in the object. Therefore, a deficiency in measure is a deficiency in the act and not a “full act performed on a small object.”

The Shulchan Arukh: pulling one hair and two hairs, and the dispute over how to interpret it

The Shulchan Arukh rules: “It is forbidden to pull out one’s hair or one’s nails… and one is liable for two hairs,” and the simple reading could imply a Torah prohibition even for one hair, under the law of a partial measure. Magen Avraham and Mishnah Berurah interpret this to mean that there is a Torah prohibition for one hair, like a partial measure in all prohibitions, and Mishnah Berurah broadens this, saying that so too is the law for all Sabbath labors where the measure relates to liability for a sin-offering. In contrast, Ateret Zekenim / Ir Shoshan interprets the “forbidden” in the case of one hair as a rabbinic prohibition, and the Shulchan Arukh does not prove that this is the very same prohibition, because it is a practical code and does not insist on formulating analytic distinctions.

A possible source for a rabbinic prohibition when there is no Torah-level partial measure on the Sabbath

A possibility is suggested for explaining that even if there is no Torah-level partial measure on the Sabbath, there could still be a rabbinic prohibition in the model of Reish Lakish, according to whom a partial measure is forbidden rabbinically. A broader phenomenon is also suggested among halakhic decisors: a tendency to forbid rabbinically where “it is not reasonable” to permit, along with criticism that imposing a rabbinic prohibition requires an authorized religious court. Reference is made to the Hazon Ish, who suggests a legal fiction according to which the early sages empowered the sages of later generations to establish such prohibitions. This is connected to criticism of reasons like “lest one come to repair” regarding bicycles, and to the circular discussion of the prohibition of weekday-type activity.

The definition of labor on the Sabbath versus a quantitative measure

A claim is presented that in several Sabbath labors the measure is not merely a quantitative condition for liability but part of the definition of the act itself, such as writing, whose measure is two letters, so that writing one letter is not “half-writing” but not writing at all. According to this, there is no room for the law of a partial measure, because the act lacks the essential definition of the labor. It is concluded that this offers a way to understand why many places in Sabbath law do not fit comfortably with applying the dispute of Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish about a partial measure.

Conclusion of the session

The lecture stopped after presenting the main elements of the sugya and its implications in the laws of Sabbath and in halakhic ruling, and it was said that this marks the end of the series for the year. Blessings were offered for success on exams, and it concluded with wishes of Shabbat shalom and thanks.

Okay, so this is actually the last meeting of the year, and I wanted to touch on a topic we could finish in one session, so I’m going to talk about the law of a partial measure. A partial measure in the laws of the Sabbath in particular, but of course we first need to introduce the whole issue of a partial measure in general. This topic of a partial measure is a bit different from the previous list of topics we dealt with, because with an unintended act, a labor not needed for its own purpose, one who is occupied with something else, an unwitting sinner, and so on, we’re talking about situations where a person’s intention or knowledge—yes, his awareness of the act—is not complete; it’s different from the regular case of Sabbath prohibitions, prohibited labor on the Sabbath. In the case of a partial measure, the difference is in the act itself, not in the intentions connected to the act, but simply that you do only part of the act, you do the act on only part of the required measure. So this doesn’t relate to intentions, or to other purposes, or to someone occupied with something else who isn’t aware that he’s doing something now, but to the content of the action itself. And still, there’s really a broad principle here that says that with different kinds of labor, or Torah prohibitions in general, when you do it in an incomplete measure, it may be that you are exempt, or it is permitted, or whatever the case may be. So this too is really a topic connected to the general rules of the labors, which is the subject of this series. So I want to begin, as I said, with an introduction to a partial measure in general. So when we talk about a partial measure, first of all we need to understand what a measure is, what the significance of measures in Jewish law is. The Talmud in several places says—it’s in Sukkah, and elsewhere too—“Rabbi Chiya bar Ashi said in the name of Rav: measures, interpositions, and partitions are a law given to Moses at Sinai.” Right? The laws of partitions in a sukkah and so on are a law given to Moses at Sinai, and the laws of measures too are a law given to Moses at Sinai. The Talmud asks: “Are measures really of Torah origin?” Aren’t the measures written in the Torah, and not a law given to Moses at Sinai? As it is written: “A land of wheat and barley, vines, figs, and pomegranates, a land of olive oil and honey.” And Rav Chanin said: this entire verse was said for measures. Wheat—for a house afflicted with leprosy—and then they start detailing what measure each one teaches, and in the end the Talmud backs away from that, and the conclusion is that the measures are a law given to Moses at Sinai. That’s the basic datum. Now what does “measures” mean? We know all kinds of measures. In prohibitions of eating or commandments involving eating there is the measure of an olive-bulk; sometimes there is the measure of a large date, for example on Yom Kippur the measure for breaking the fast, for violating the fast, is a large date. There are measures like the size of a garment that can receive impurity—three by three handbreadths. There is the measure of a domain, right, four by four cubits, or walking in the public domain four cubits, and so on. There are all kinds of measures we know in Jewish law. The discussion there in the Talmud is whether this is a law given to Moses at Sinai or derived from the verse, but still there are such measures. By the way, I’ll just add in passing: it is very likely, at least regarding some of the measures, that these measures are really some kind of determination by the Sages. Let’s say the Sages want to know what the measure is for a significant garment that can receive impurity, because something less significant isn’t called a garment and so won’t receive impurity. So they say: in our estimation, three by three handbreadths—that seems reasonable to us. Still, it may be that this is a law given to Moses at Sinai, or a Torah law, because the Sages are simply evaluating what the Torah intended. In other words, when we say this is a law given to Moses at Sinai or a Torah law, that doesn’t necessarily mean we have some concrete source that gives us the number. It only means we have some tradition that there must be a minimal measure—the garment has to be important in order to receive impurity. How important—that may be the Sages’ evaluation. Something like what we find with labor on intermediate festival days. There are some medieval authorities (Rishonim) who write that “Scripture handed it over to the Sages.” Scripture itself appoints the Sages to determine which labors will be prohibited on intermediate festival days and which will not, and once the Sages determine it, it becomes a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic one. It’s just that who the Torah prohibition applies to was handed over to the Sages to determine. So similarly, something like that may exist with measures too, or at least with some of the measures. In any event, the rule is that in order to violate a prohibition there is some minimum measure. In most prohibitions there is a minimum measure; there is a measure for setting aside terumah, there are all kinds of measures in all kinds of contexts, such that below them, you really haven’t done the prohibition or haven’t done the commandment. And in the conclusion, this is a law given to Moses at Sinai. Now we move to the law of a partial measure. In Yoma 74, the Talmud brings a dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish on this issue. The Talmud says this: “Returning to the matter itself: a partial measure—Rabbi Yochanan said it is prohibited by Torah law, Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law.” Permitted by Torah law, but apparently prohibited rabbinically. Rabbi Yochanan said it is prohibited by Torah law: since it is fit to combine, he is eating a prohibition. Since it can combine with another measure and another half-measure to form a full measure, then he is eating a prohibition. Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law: the Merciful One said ‘eating,’ and that is not present. Eating less than the required measure is not called eating. Rabbi Yochanan objected to Reish Lakish. So Rabbi Yochanan asks Reish Lakish a difficulty: “I only know that anyone subject to punishment is subject to warning. And with a partial measure, since he is not subject to punishment, perhaps he is not subject to warning? Therefore Scripture says: ‘all fat.’” Right, “all fat”—any amount of fat. Meaning, even the slightest amount. So there is a verse that teaches us that even less than the required measure is also prohibited by Torah law. So this is difficult for Reish Lakish, who says it is permitted by Torah law. Reish Lakish says: that is only rabbinic, and the verse is merely a scriptural support. So really it’s just a support-text; the prohibition is rabbinic. We learn from here that according to Reish Lakish too there is a prohibition, it’s just a rabbinic prohibition. According to Rabbi Yochanan there is a Torah prohibition. Now of course one can ask: if even according to Rabbi Yochanan there is a Torah prohibition even for a partial measure—by the way, “partial measure” means part of a required measure, not necessarily half, also a third or a quarter or whatever; in other words, even less than the required measure, it doesn’t have to be exactly half—so even if less than the required measure is a Torah prohibition, then for what purpose was the law given to Moses at Sinai about measures stated? So the medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain that this was said with regard to punishment. Meaning, according to Rabbi Yochanan the prohibition exists even below the required measure, but punishment you receive only if you ate the full required measure. Regarding commandments, it gets more complicated. What happens if you performed a commandment in a partial measure? So here, what are you going to say—that you have a commandment but have not fulfilled your obligation, or how exactly do you relate to such a thing? Well, a partial measure in commandments is generally a question that is not simple at all; commentators discuss it. Simply speaking, a partial measure is usually said about prohibitions, not commandments. So in any case, for our purposes, the claim is that Rabbi Yochanan says this is a Torah prohibition. And there appears here a double source according to Rabbi Yochanan. On the one hand he says: “all fat”—any amount of fat. Meaning, we learn that even the slightest amount, not only a full measure. So there is a verse teaching that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. Besides that, he also brought a logical argument. The logic is that it is fit to combine. Since if you were to eat another partial measure then you certainly would have violated a prohibition because you reached the full measure, that means that there is also a prohibition in the partial measure itself. That is the logical claim. The question that arises here, of course, is what the relationship is between these two sources according to Rabbi Yochanan—the source from the verse and the logic. About that, I think I spoke in the past, that many times we treat logic and a verse as two alternatives that exclude each other. Right? The example that always comes to mind for me in this context is the rule that “we do not punish based on inference.” We do not punish based on inference, right, you don’t punish for something learned through a kal vachomer. How do we know that? In the Talmudic Encyclopedia—but the source is Rabbi Yosef Engel in several places—he says there are three approaches. One approach is that you learn the law from a kal vachomer, but maybe there is a refutation. Right, you can’t punish; it’s not solid enough to punish on that basis. The second approach is that if you learned it through a kal vachomer, that means the thing learned is more severe than the source, right? That’s why we learn through a kal vachomer. So who says that the punishment given to the source is sufficient also for the thing learned? Maybe the thing learned needs a greater punishment, and therefore we do not punish. And a third possibility is that it is learned from the verse “or her sister, the daughter of his father or the daughter of his mother.” Because if it had said only “daughter of his father,” then obviously his father-and-mother’s daughter would be included in that, to teach you that we do not punish based on inference. But people say: “it is enough for what comes through inference to be like the case from which it is derived.” I didn’t understand. “It is enough for what comes through inference to be like the case from which it is derived”—so what is the second answer? Because with “it is enough…” regarding punishment, it’s not certain that helps. Because if you give him the lighter punishment, a lighter punishment is not half of the more severe punishment; it is different. So if to someone liable for death you give lashes, it’s not that you only did part of the job and at most there is something more—no. It may be that you did something totally irrelevant, because the punishment of lashes and the punishment of death are two different kinds. It’s not that lashes are half of death. And then it doesn’t make sense to say “it is enough…” In any case, for our purposes here, I don’t want to go into that whole issue. In my opinion none of these explanations is correct. There are other explanations. I just want to bring from here an example of why this is called three approaches at all. In my view it’s two approaches. The first two approaches explain it through logic—either there may be a refutation, or the lighter punishment is not sufficient for the more severe transgression—and then there is a source. The source says that this is the law, that we do not punish based on inference. But there are two explanations for what that source means—meaning, what logic underlies what the source says. Why do people think that “a source” is a third approach? There are two logical explanations and a source. The source is not another logic. People have some assumption that if something comes from a verse, then it can’t have an explanation. If we have explanations, then it probably doesn’t come from the verse. A verse can’t be something that is explained. But that is of course nonsense. Certainly we can learn something from a verse and afterwards think about the logic behind what we learned. Therefore, in my opinion, of the three approaches I just listed regarding “we do not punish based on inference,” there are really only two approaches, not three. The verse says that we do not punish based on inference, and there are two approaches explaining what the verse says—either because of concern for a refutation, or because of concern that the lighter punishment won’t suffice for the more severe transgression. Here in our passage you see this very clearly, because here Rabbi Yochanan says “fit to combine.” Therefore a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law; he has a logical argument. And then when he objects to Reish Lakish, he says: wait a second, but we have an exposition from “all fat,” any amount of fat—what do you do with that? Now did Rabbi Yochanan derive it from logic or from the verse? The Talmud doesn’t ask: if there is a verse, why are you bringing me logic? On the contrary. The same Rabbi Yochanan who brought logic immediately afterwards objects to Reish Lakish from a verse. And this is said naturally; it is obvious that this supports Rabbi Yochanan and contradicts Reish Lakish. Now why does it support Rabbi Yochanan? Rabbi Yochanan brought his source from logic, and here you learn it from a verse. The answer is: there is no contradiction at all. We learn from the verse that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, and the logic in it is because it is fit to combine. So verse and logic are not two things that contradict one another; they are not two alternatives we need to choose between. Okay? So here in the Talmud this is presented in a completely natural way. By the way, also here in the Talmud various later authorities (Acharonim) discuss this: there is a source from a verse and a source from logic, and there are practical differences between them. It may be that the source from the verse says “any amount,” while the source from logic wants only half and not less than half, because only a half has another like it that is fit to combine; one more half will bring you to a full prohibition, but a third—we don’t say about that the logic of “fit to combine.” I’ve seen that in some later authorities. It doesn’t matter at the moment whether it’s right or not; one can argue. But the very fact that the later authorities see these two sources as alternative sources, and therefore search for why both are needed, really shows that they are falling into the same mistake I spoke about earlier. There is no need to demand an explanation of this duplication. It is not duplication. We have a source—“all fat,” any amount of fat—and the logic teaches what the source has taught us. The source taught us that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law; the logic explains why it is indeed prohibited—because it is fit to combine. The logic explains the law that emerges from the source; it is not an alternative. Therefore there is no problem at all here in the Talmud when, after Rabbi Yochanan gives the logical argument, he objects to Reish Lakish from the verse. There is no contradiction between those two things. In any case, in practical Jewish law we rule like Rabbi Yochanan. Maimonides writes this in several places. Look here in the laws of resting on the tenth, on Yom Kippur: “One who eats or drinks a partial measure is given disciplinary lashes.” What does Maimonides say? Less than the required measure is prohibited by Torah law, but he is not liable to karet. This is exactly Rabbi Yochanan, right? Rabbi Yochanan basically says that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, so why was the measure stated? The measure was stated regarding punishment. And that is what Maimonides rules: for punishment you need the measure. Someone who ate less than the required measure—but it is still prohibited by Torah law—just will not receive the punishment. What do we do with him? Disciplinary lashes. Another novel point: disciplinary lashes are administered also for Torah violations, not only for rabbinic ones. Any violation from which you are exempted from the Torah punishment, you receive disciplinary lashes, whether it is a rabbinic prohibition or a Torah prohibition where for some reason you are exempt from punishment—for example here, because the measure is lacking. But that is what Maimonides claims. He repeats it in the laws of forbidden foods in several places, and in the laws of impurity, unwitting sins, and so on. Also in the laws of oaths Maimonides says: “If one swore not to eat any amount of carcasses or non-kosher animals and he ate less than an olive-bulk, he is liable regarding the oath, for he was not sworn from Sinai regarding a partial measure.” What does that mean? If a person swears that he will not violate a prohibition, okay? Then the oath does not take effect. Why? The Talmud says: because he is already sworn and standing from Sinai. I am sworn not to eat this prohibition, and my oath now not to eat pork does not take effect, because I am already sworn about it. The later and medieval authorities understand this itself in several ways. One way is to say: no prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition. Since it is already prohibited, the second prohibition does not take effect. A second way is to say: no, there is a special rule specifically about oaths. The rule regarding oaths is that an oath does not take effect upon an oath that already exists. If you swore once, you cannot swear again, beyond the rule that no prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition. I’ll explain in a moment where the practical difference is. Maimonides says here: he is not sworn about a partial measure, even though a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. Right, a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, but he is not sworn and standing from Sinai regarding it. Therefore, if he now swears that he will not eat a partial measure of pork, the oath takes effect. Since about this thing you were not sworn previously, therefore the new oath is not taking effect upon a previous oath, upon an existing oath, and therefore the second oath is valid. Okay? What does it mean that he was not sworn from Sinai? If it is a Torah prohibition, the rule is that no prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition. Why do I care whether he was sworn and standing from Sinai or not sworn and standing from Sinai? What does that even mean, sworn and standing from Sinai? After all, a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law—we rule like Rabbi Yochanan. Maimonides himself rules like Rabbi Yochanan. So if you swear not to eat it, no prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition. How can the second oath possibly take effect if this thing was already prohibited by Torah law beforehand? Maimonides claims here—I think—that the fact that an oath does not take effect on a prohibition is not because of the rule that no prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition, but because of the rule that one oath does not take effect upon another oath. But if so, then even if a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, that still does not mean the oath won’t take effect on it. If it were because no prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition, then the oath would not take effect. But if it is because one oath does not take effect upon another oath, then even though a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, we still need to check whether we were really sworn about it. Assuming there can be Torah prohibitions about which we are not sworn, then an oath not to eat them will take effect, because we are not already sworn about that prohibition, and so the second oath can take effect. Why indeed does the oath not apply from Sinai to a partial measure, although according to Rabbi Yochanan it is prohibited by Torah law? So either you will say that this is an exposition—“all fat,” any amount of fat. In Maimonides’ method, an exposition is an extension of what is written in the Torah—I’m not going to get into proofs for this here, but it is clear in Maimonides’ method in several places. An exposition is basically an extension of what is written in the verse, but it is not written in the verse itself. And what we were sworn to at Sinai was the Torah that we received at Sinai, what is written in the verses. All the things that are extensions beyond what is written in the verses are not included in the oath of Sinai. That doesn’t mean we are not obligated to obey them—we are obligated to obey them—but we are not sworn about them. Since we are not sworn about them, therefore even though this is prohibited by Torah law, a new oath, if I now swear not to eat a partial measure, will take effect on that, because I am not sworn and standing regarding this matter. Concerning anything that does not appear explicitly in the Torah, we are not sworn about it—certainly rabbinic laws all the more so. The later authorities discussed this; there is Avnei Miluim, responsum 17—yes, at the end of Avnei Miluim there is a collection of responsa—so in responsum 17 he goes on at length about this issue of whether an oath takes effect on a partial measure or not. Well, in any event. Can I ask a question? Yes. The question is this: a partial measure has two sides. On one side, beyond it he becomes liable, and on the other side he hasn’t even begun at all. Meaning, if I say for example that I transfer a grain of dust from one domain to another, how can I say he performed a transfer? He didn’t transfer anything. So there is some minimum below which the prohibition doesn’t begin at all, and at the end there is the maximum where he violates and becomes liable. Well, that’s not a question that matters for our purposes. You can say that even if we say a partial measure is prohibited, there is some level that would not be considered a partial measure. That may be. So let’s talk about something meaningful, not a grain of dust. There you have a partial measure. What about carrying four cubits in the public domain? If I say a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, that means it is prohibited to carry at all, because even any quarter of a millimeter… Meaning, I’m sitting in the public domain and I’m not allowed to move something next to me from one corner to another. You’re repeating the same question and I’ll repeat the same answer—what is the question? Right. A partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. The question is whether there is some minimal measure—if I move a millimeter, whether that too will count. It may be that it won’t. No, there it’s a technical question. But if you move three cubits or two cubits, then yes. No, with four cubits in the public domain, for example, they are considered a person’s own domain, and therefore it may be that the prohibition doesn’t begin there at all, not because he… So now, after asking the objection, you also answered it. Fine, we’ll get to all of that later, but all that doesn’t affect our discussion right now. We’ll get to those things, I hope. I’ll just say—this reminded me—I once heard in the name of Rabbi Ben Zion Abba Shaul that on Passover leaven is prohibited in any amount. Okay? And it is not nullified, and so on. So there really are people who are careful not to drink water from the Kinneret. So they put cloth over the water tap to filter it, because if there is some grain of bread from the Kinneret or something—fishermen throw pieces of bread to the fish or something—and since leaven on Passover is prohibited in any amount, you have to be careful that there isn’t even a crumb. And why would the cloth get rid of the bread? I can’t hear. Why does putting cloth there mean you’re not eating the bread? The assumption is that the cloth filters out the bread and only lets the water through. But if it’s prohibited in any amount, it could be very tiny too. Crumbs—there are no bread particles that tiny. Meaning, the most basic grain of bread won’t pass through the holes in the cloth. Through the holes in the cloth maybe air passes, but no bread particles. That’s the assumption; it’s not important. So Rabbi Ben Zion Abba Shaul said: even “any amount” has a measure. You can drink water from the tap. It’s not… There is some common sense that says there are certain things that have no significance whatsoever, and it’s a waste of time. Where exactly the line is—I have no idea, and nobody else has any idea. You need to use common sense, and there are also laws of doubt where you are uncertain. Okay? So that’s for our purposes. Fine, let’s continue. So what comes out is this: we rule in practical Jewish law like Rabbi Yochanan that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law, and the measures were stated only regarding punishment. According to Reish Lakish, a partial measure is prohibited rabbinically. The measures were stated regarding the very existence of the Torah prohibition, and therefore also punishment. Less than the measure is a rabbinic prohibition but not a Torah prohibition. Now the later authorities disagree about the character of the prohibition of a partial measure. Is a partial measure—say I ate, I don’t know, a third of an olive-bulk of pork—what did I violate? It is a Torah prohibition. Did I violate the prohibition of pork, or did I violate the prohibition of a partial measure? Is there a new prohibition called “partial measure”? And if you like, it may even be a general prohibition. Meaning, the prohibition of a partial measure of pork and the prohibition of a partial measure of forbidden fat are the same prohibition; both are the prohibition of a partial measure. Okay? So this is a discussion among the later authorities. For example, in the case of someone who ate a partial measure of forbidden fat and a partial measure of… then they combine. Right. Correct. That could be a practical difference. Right. Although eating and drinking, even though both are the same prohibition on Yom Kippur, their measures do not combine. Meaning, even if it is the same prohibition, if there is an essential difference between the things I am consuming, maybe they still will not combine. How does this combine… One second, one second, I’ll get to that. Actually, I’ll tell you right now. The claim is basically this—let me formulate it this way. Let’s say I eat half an olive-bulk of pork. Now they tell me: look, if you were to eat another half olive-bulk, then you would violate the prohibition of pork, so it makes sense that even in half an olive-bulk there is a prohibition. But there would still be room to say that the issue exists, but not the prohibition itself. Meaning: why did the Torah really prohibit pork? Because apparently eating pork creates some kind of spiritual problem, some spiritual damage—I don’t know what to call it—something like that. Now, if an olive-bulk of pork creates spiritual damage, it is very likely that half an olive-bulk also creates some level of spiritual damage. There is no reason to assume there is some phase transition here, that from an olive-bulk upward suddenly damage appears, and before that nothing happened. It is probably continuous. So half an olive-bulk also creates spiritual damage. But that doesn’t mean that that half olive-bulk is the prohibition of pork. It may be that because there is spiritual damage, the Torah now creates a new prohibition called the prohibition of a partial measure—a prohibition on mild spiritual damage—but it is still an independent prohibition in terms of its halakhic definition. The problematic aspect here is the problem of eating pork, but the halakhic definition of the prohibition may be the definition of a newly created prohibition, the prohibition of a partial measure. If we understand that the prohibition of a partial measure is really the prohibition of pork—it is not a new prohibition, it is the prohibition of pork itself—then of course the measure, how do we understand the measure? The measure establishes a benchmark for significance. Really, the prohibition of pork exists in any amount. Whatever amount of pork you ate, you violated a prohibition. You need a certain minimum measure for it to be considered significant eating in order to be punished, but the prohibition itself exists below the measure. There the concept of measure is understood very clearly: the measure comes to define a minimum level of significance in order to be punished for it, but it does not define the prohibition itself. The prohibition itself exists even below that. It is only a quantitative matter: if you did a large enough amount, that is significant enough to be punished for. But in terms of problematicity, the problematicity exists all along. If I understand it as an independent prohibition, the prohibition of a partial measure, then the measure of an olive-bulk for pork has consequences also for the prohibition, not only for punishment. Because below an olive-bulk you are not violating the prohibition of pork; you are violating the prohibition of a partial measure, but not the prohibition of pork. Then it turns out that the olive-bulk measure is not a measure only regarding punishment, but also regarding the prohibition. Let me give you a practical difference. What happens if someone did a partial measure—not ate—carried out a partial measure on the Sabbath? All right? Let’s assume for the discussion that there is a prohibition of a partial measure on the Sabbath too; we’ll see that later on. Is the prohibition he violated a prohibited labor on the Sabbath, because he performed carrying out, just he isn’t punished for it because it’s not the required measure, but he violated the prohibition of labor on the Sabbath? Or is it an independent prohibition, the prohibition of a partial measure, unrelated to the Sabbath prohibitions? Where is the practical difference? Because we know that someone who violates Sabbath prohibitions has the status of an apostate—one who is an apostate regarding the Sabbath is like an apostate regarding the entire Torah. Now the question is whether he violated one of the Sabbath prohibitions and therefore is like an apostate regarding the entire Torah, or whether he violated an independent prohibition, the prohibition of a partial measure, like any other prohibition. Then he is not like an apostate regarding the entire Torah; he is only an apostate regarding that particular thing he violated. So that is one practical difference, for example. So the question is whether this is the same prohibition or an independent one. If we understand that the prohibition of a partial measure is really the prohibition of pork—it is not a new prohibition, it is the prohibition of pork itself—then of course the measure, how do we understand the measure? The measure establishes a benchmark for significance. Really, the prohibition of pork exists in any amount. Whatever amount of pork you ate, you violated a prohibition. You need a certain minimum measure for it to be considered significant eating in order to be punished. But the prohibition itself exists below the measure. There the concept of measure is understood very clearly. The measure comes to define a minimum level of significance in order to be punished for it, but it does not define the prohibition itself. The prohibition itself exists even below that. It is only a quantitative matter. If you did a large enough amount, then it is significant enough to be punished for. But in terms of problematicity, the problematicity exists all along. If I understand it as an independent prohibition, the prohibition of a partial measure, then the olive-bulk measure for pork has consequences also for the prohibition, not only for punishment, because below an olive-bulk you do not violate the prohibition of pork; you violate the prohibition of a partial measure, but not the prohibition of pork. Then it turns out that the olive-bulk measure is not a measure only regarding punishment; it is also a measure regarding the prohibition. Let me give you a practical difference. What happens if someone did a partial measure—not ate—carried out a partial measure on the Sabbath? All right? Let’s assume for the discussion that there is a prohibition of a partial measure on the Sabbath too; we’ll see that later. Is the prohibition he violated a prohibited labor on the Sabbath, because he performed carrying out, just not punishable because it isn’t the full measure, but he did violate a prohibited labor on the Sabbath? Or is this an independent prohibition of a partial measure, unrelated to the Sabbath prohibitions? Where is the practical difference? Because we know that someone who violates Sabbath prohibitions has the status of an apostate—one who is an apostate regarding the Sabbath is like an apostate regarding the entire Torah. Now the question is whether he violated one of the Sabbath prohibitions and therefore is like an apostate regarding the entire Torah, or whether he violated an independent prohibition, the prohibition of a partial measure, like any other prohibition. Then he is not like an apostate regarding the entire Torah; he is only an apostate regarding that particular thing he violated. So that is one practical difference. So the question is whether this is the same prohibition or an independent one. Why isn’t it counted among the commandments if it is an independent prohibition? If it is part of the original prohibition, then of course there is nothing to count in the enumeration of the commandments, because the prohibition of half an olive-bulk of pork is one detail within the negative commandment of eating pork. There is no point making that into a separate prohibition. There are many details in the prohibition of eating pork; one of the details is that a partial measure is also prohibited to eat. Fine. Clearly there is no need to count an additional prohibition here among the 613 commandments. But if it is an independent prohibition, then I would expect it to be counted among the 613 commandments. Why isn’t it counted? Here the answer will apparently be: according to Maimonides there is no problem, because Maimonides in the second root says that things learned through exposition are not included in the count of the commandments. And my claim is that they are not included in the count of the commandments because something that emerges through exposition is not written in the Torah. The expositions extend what is written in the Torah; they do not uncover what is written in the Torah. Okay? So according to Maimonides that is simple: even if it is an independent prohibition, it won’t be counted. But in general you should know there are all kinds of Torah laws that are not counted among the commandments for various reasons. I think that, in general, Torah laws that are broad rules applying to all commandments are not counted among the commandments. For example, beautifying a commandment. “This is my God and I will glorify Him”—from the verse we learn that there is an obligation to beautify a commandment. Why don’t they count that among the commandments? Some want to say it is only a support-text and really rabbinic. I don’t think so. It is learned from the verse; it is a Torah law. But it is a Torah law that is a broad rule, a meta-halakhic rule. It is a rule that concerns all the commandments or adds another aspect within all the commandments. Therefore that is not counted among the commandments. Right, like—I don’t know—why is “an unintended act is permitted” not counted among the commandments? Why isn’t it counted among the commandments not to judge by the rule of an unintended act? Because an unintended act is a broad rule that concerns all prohibitions: if you do them unintentionally, it is permitted, so it is permitted. Okay? Such broad rules, which speak about how one relates to Jewish law in general, are not included in the count of the commandments. So just as such rules are not included, or beautifying a commandment is not included, so too a partial measure is a broad rule that concerns all commandments or all prohibitions, and therefore it is not counted among the commandments. Fine, there can be such explanations or others, but clearly it is not counted; nobody counts it among the commandments, even according to Rabbi Yochanan who says it is prohibited by Torah law. Another practical difference to the question we discussed earlier—whether it is the same prohibition or a new prohibition—is, for example, the question: if I ate a partial measure of forbidden fat and a partial measure of pork, which is more severe? There is a sick person; you can give him a partial measure of forbidden fat, or you can give him a partial measure of pork. Pork is the lighter prohibition compared to forbidden fat. Forbidden fat carries death at the hand of Heaven. So should you give him a partial measure of pork or a partial measure of forbidden fat? If this is the reflection of the original prohibition, then it is preferable to give him pork. But if the prohibition of a partial measure is an independent prohibition, then it makes no difference; give him whatever you want. A partial measure of forbidden fat and a partial measure of pork are the same prohibition, so there is no scale of severity between them, right? One is not more severe than the other. Maybe one is more severe than the other even though it is one prohibition; perhaps within that independent prohibition there are internal differences in severity. Why should there be? If you violate the prohibition, then you violate the prohibition. Why assume there are differences of severity between them? After all, if you carried out on the Sabbath—if you moved something four cubits in the public domain or six cubits in the public domain—you violated the prohibition. There isn’t more severe and less severe here. Again, there could be such a situation if I had a clear source saying so, but just to derive it from logic, simply speaking, it’s not like that. Maimonides says that an oath takes effect on a partial measure because he is not sworn and standing from Sinai on this matter. Can we learn something from this about how Maimonides understands the prohibition of a partial measure? I don’t think so. As I said earlier, the same reasons why we do not count a partial measure among the commandments are also the reasons why we are not sworn and standing about it. Because it is not included in the Torah, we are not sworn and standing about it, and therefore an oath will also take effect on these things. Therefore I don’t think that from that Maimonides one can infer anything about how he understood the prohibition of a partial measure. Now regarding the logic—the logic of “fit to combine.” What does this logic mean? I explained it a bit earlier and I’ll explain it again. Rabbi Shimon Shkop basically explains it this way: if I eat half an olive-bulk of pork or a third of an olive-bulk of pork, it is obvious that three such thirds bring me to a full prohibition. So therefore it is clear that the quality of the prohibition is present even in one third. What is lacking is quantity. So the measure determines what the minimum quantity is for which I am punished. But the quality of the prohibition already exists even in a third. Therefore we learn from the logic of “fit to combine” that there is also a prohibition in a partial measure. In its simple sense, this logic really says—as was noted here earlier—that the prohibition of a partial measure is the same prohibition as the original prohibition, meaning the prohibition of pork; it is not another prohibition. Although, as I already said earlier in response, one could reject that. One could say that the problematicity is the same problematicity as the prohibition of pork, but the halakhic definition is the definition of a prohibition in its own right. Okay, but if there is no reason to do that, then why make that split? So you need some logic in order to make that split; without it, I wouldn’t do it. There are later authorities who discussed the question: if someone ate a partial measure 10 seconds before the end of the Yom Kippur fast, does he violate the Torah prohibition of a partial measure? There are later authorities who wanted to claim that he does not, because it is not fit to combine. Why? Because you cannot eat another partial measure and reach a full prohibition, because the next partial measure you eat will already be after the fast, when it is no longer prohibited. So the logic of “fit to combine” is absent here—that is what they argued. It is clear that those later authorities did not understand the logic of “fit to combine” as Rabbi Shimon Shkop did, right? Because according to Rabbi Shimon Shkop, that consideration is completely irrelevant. According to Rabbi Shimon Shkop, the issue is not that afterwards I will eat another partial measure, but that from the very fact that if I were to eat another partial measure then I would violate a prohibition, that proves there is also a prohibition in the first half. Therefore even if I did it in the very last second of Yom Kippur it would still be prohibited. You do not need a practical possibility of eating another partial measure. According to those later authorities, they apparently understood the logic of “fit to combine” as basically some kind of Torah-level safeguard. It is a safeguard: the Torah prohibited you from eating a partial measure lest you add another partial measure and then violate a Torah prohibition. Of course, according to Rabbi Yochanan it is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic one, but it is still a Torah-level safeguard. One second. So they apparently saw it as a Torah-level safeguard. In Atvan De’oraita—there is a chapter on this, or in Lekach Tov, I don’t remember, in one of the books of Rabbi Yosef Engel—there is a chapter on the question whether we find safeguards in Torah law. Meaning, whether there are Torah prohibitions that exist as safeguards. So he brings there the Ran on “it shall not be seen,” that “it shall not be seen” is a safeguard lest you come to eat, and yet it is still a Torah prohibition, a Torah negative commandment. Or seclusion, which is also prohibited by Torah law because of concern that you will come to commit an act of transgression. But the simple conception is that in Torah law there are no safeguards. Safeguards are the role of the Sages to add safeguards—“make a safeguard for My safeguard.” Therefore if this thing is a safeguard, and if it is Torah law, then simply speaking it is not a safeguard. But the fact that there really are later authorities who understood it that way—that it really is a safeguard—means this is another way of understanding the logic of “fit to combine.” There may be a few more remarks about a partial measure before we move on to the laws of the Sabbath. There are some commentators who understood in Maimonides, chapter 1 of the laws of leaven and matzah, that a partial measure means specifically half. The Maharam Chalava in Pesachim and the Avnei Nezer say that a partial measure is specifically half. Why? Because Maimonides there brings a source to prohibit a partial measure of leaven. And everyone asks: why do you need a source? A partial measure is prohibited by Torah law in all prohibitions. So they want to claim that a partial measure on Passover—meaning, the general law of a partial measure—is specifically half, because it is fit to combine, and on Passover there is a prohibition on any amount of leaven because there is a special verse teaching the prohibition of a partial measure regarding leaven. Okay, but then the conception is that a partial measure in the Torah generally means specifically half and not any part of the measure. But that is just an aside; I don’t think it is correct even in Maimonides, and it certainly is not accepted for practical Jewish law as a whole. Another important point is the question whether the prohibition of a partial measure applies only to eating prohibitions. The Chacham Tzvi in responsum 86 says yes, but other later authorities say no; there is a partial measure also—and already medieval authorities, not only later ones, we will see this—not only in eating prohibitions but also in other prohibitions. There is another discussion among the later authorities: what happens with a partial measure in positive commandments. If someone has a partial measure of matzah, is he obligated by Torah law to eat it? Or not—he cannot fulfill the commandment, he is under compulsion. Okay? So there are later authorities who want to claim that by the law of a partial measure he is obligated to eat it. Clearly, if this is a safeguard to a Torah prohibition, then there is nothing to discuss regarding positive commandments. A positive commandment is not a safeguard that you should eat the partial measure lest you eat another partial measure—there is no point talking about safeguards in the context of commandments; that belongs in the context of prohibitions. So this will depend on the explanations we discussed earlier. Regarding rabbinic prohibitions, the decisors are divided on this issue: is there a law of a partial measure in rabbinic prohibitions? The Rivash claims it is prohibited—whatever the Rabbis enacted, they enacted in a way similar to Torah law—but Tosefet Shabbat, for example, claims no, that it is permitted; in rabbinic prohibitions the law of a partial measure does not apply. What might this depend on? According to Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s reasoning, it is quite natural to understand it as follows: Torah prohibitions, simply speaking, are commonly conceived as object-based prohibitions—prohibitions whose basis is in reality itself. Then Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s reasoning says that if in an olive-bulk of pork there is some real problem in the pork itself, then that problem exists also in a third of an olive-bulk of pork; it cannot be that it comes into being exactly when we reached the quantity of an olive-bulk. Therefore a partial measure is prohibited in Torah law. But regarding rabbinic prohibitions, the common conception is that rabbinic prohibitions are person-based prohibitions, not object-based. Poultry cooked in milk—the prohibition of eating it is not because poultry cooked in milk is inherently problematic, but because I need to obey the command of the Sages. It is a law on the person, not a law in the object. Poultry with milk is not a problematic thing; if it were problematic, the Torah itself would have prohibited it. The Torah does not prohibit it; the Sages prohibited it lest you come to eat meat with milk. So if that’s the case, poultry with milk in itself has no prohibition; in the object itself it is not a problematic object. It is only an obligation upon the person to obey the instruction of the Sages. So the logic of “fit to combine” does not apply, because if the command of the Sages was from an olive-bulk, then when I ate less than an olive-bulk there was no failure to obey; everything is fine. And here the quality of prohibition in poultry with milk itself does not exist even when there is an olive-bulk, even when the measure is present; there is no true quality of prohibition in the object itself. The prohibition is person-based, not object-based. Therefore the whole logic of Rabbi Shimon Shkop does not apply to rabbinic prohibitions. So the later authorities who say that in rabbinic prohibitions there is no law of a partial measure can definitely be explained according to Rabbi Shimon Shkop, assuming that rabbinic prohibitions are person-based prohibitions. Two assumptions that are not agreed upon: one can disagree with Rabbi Shimon Shkop, and one can disagree that rabbinic prohibitions are person-based prohibitions—that too is a dispute among the later authorities. But I’m doing this very briefly, just to create some general familiarity with the issue of a partial measure. Fine. What about prohibited labors on the Sabbath? Up to now, that was a general introduction to a partial measure. What happens with the labors of the Sabbath? With Sabbath labors there are really three possibilities, or three situations, in which the prohibition of a partial measure could arise. For example, there are measures for carrying out—how much you need to carry out in order to violate the prohibition of carrying out. What happens if you carried out a smaller amount? A third of the measure, three-quarters of the measure—is that too a Torah prohibition of carrying out? Stoning you certainly would not be liable for, as with a partial measure, but the question is whether you are liable—does the law of a partial measure also apply on the Sabbath? On the face of it you could ask: why not? It applies in all Torah prohibitions; why shouldn’t it apply in Sabbath prohibitions? Here one could say that it does not apply in Sabbath prohibitions because in Sabbath prohibitions too there is no problem in the object. It is not an object-prohibition, but rather the person is prohibited from carrying out such an object. Therefore there is no room here to talk about accumulation of amounts of prohibition in the object. These are all laws about the person, not the object, like I said about rabbinic law. Therefore there, it could be that a partial measure is not prohibited. Yes, I—there is room for hesitation here, because there are Beit Meir and Chatam Sofer who bring a Rashi at the beginning of “Mi Shehechshikh” saying that telling a non-Jew to do something is prohibited because it is agency. You appoint the non-Jew to be your agent, and if he does the prohibition it is as if you did the prohibition—“a person’s agent is like himself.” Of course a non-Jew is not subject to agency, because “you” includes your agents—just as you are members of the covenant, so too your agents must be members of the covenant—but rabbinically there is agency for a non-Jew in the stringent direction. There is a Rashi in the chapter “Eizehu Neshekh,” never mind. Rabbinically there is agency for a non-Jew in the stringent direction, and therefore Rashi says at the beginning of “Mi Shehechshikh” that the prohibition of telling a non-Jew is based on the fact that rabbinically there is agency for a non-Jew in the stringent direction. So the Chatam Sofer and Beit Meir ask: what does that have to do with anything? In Sabbath prohibitions—sorry, what are Sabbath prohibitions? Sabbath prohibitions are basically an obligation on the person to rest. Right? The problem is not in the object; the problem is in the person. He did some kind of work there. Fine, “a person’s agent is like himself”—so what? Does that mean I didn’t rest? If my obligation to rest is the prohibition on the Sabbath, then “a person’s agent is like himself” is irrelevant. That is what they argue there. If so, this basically means that Sabbath prohibitions are prohibitions on the person. He has an obligation, and these are not object-prohibitions but person-prohibitions. Now from here one could perhaps infer that the law of a partial measure would not apply to prohibited labor on the Sabbath, because these are person-based prohibitions and not object-based prohibitions. But that is not precise, because Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s reasoning, for example, applies here too. Let’s say I carried out only half an olive-bulk and not a full olive-bulk from a private domain to a public domain. It is obvious that there is some lack of rest in the person here—he did not rest on the Sabbath, just at a lower level. But if carrying out an olive-bulk is called not resting at all, then carrying out a third of an olive-bulk is also called resting only partially. And therefore there would be room to say that Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s reasoning exists also in prohibitions of labor on the Sabbath. But all that is when we are talking about an object-half, yes, half in the object itself. When I am talking about a partial measure where there is a measure for how large the object must be or how much quantity of the object there must be, and the partial measure is that we are talking about part of the quantity of the object. But in Sabbath prohibitions there are two more possibilities, two situations in which the prohibition of a partial measure could arise. For example: transferring two cubits in the public domain instead of four cubits, or one cubit instead of four cubits. Right, transferring four cubits in the public domain—yes, that is moving, it is a subcategory of carrying out—and transferring one or two cubits, ostensibly one could discuss whether by the law of a partial measure it should be prohibited by Torah law. Again, there would be no stoning for this, but it would be prohibited by Torah law. Now here, why is this different from the previous case? Because here there is no object where I took part of the measure of the object, where the quantity of the object is lacking. This is part of an action, not part of an object. Okay, so this is another situation in which the law of a partial measure could arise in Sabbath prohibitions. But as I said earlier, Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s reasoning can also be said here. Because if you walked four cubits in the public domain, then you did not rest on the Sabbath. So if you walked one cubit, again you did not rest. It is perhaps a lower level of lack of rest, but there is still some lack of rest here. So Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s reasoning can definitely be applied also to this type of partial measure. But there is a third kind of partial measure in the laws of the Sabbath where it is very difficult to apply Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s reasoning. For example, at the beginning of tractate Shabbat the Mishnah talks about the homeowner and the poor man—you know, regarding the definition of the labor of carrying out. So what happens if the homeowner performs an uprooting and the poor man performs the placing down? Or the homeowner performs the uprooting and no placing down is done? Or the poor man performs the placing down but nobody does the uprooting? In all those cases there is no Torah prohibition. There is a rabbinic prohibition but no Torah prohibition. The commentators ask—for example the Sefat Emet there in that place—why shouldn’t there be the law of a partial measure? You did only the uprooting and not the placing down, or only the placing down and not the uprooting—this should be prohibited by Torah law because of the law of a partial measure. Carrying out requires uprooting and placing down; you did only uprooting or only placing down, so you did half a measure of the prohibition of the labor of carrying out. About that the Sefat Emet says—he asks this question. There in the Mishnah both are exempt, right? This one uproots and that one places down, both are exempt. Ostensibly it would seem that in any event it is prohibited by Torah law like any partial measure. Like any partial measure—especially the one who uproots, because it is fit to combine with a placing down as well. What did he add here? This addition is what we discussed regarding Yom Kippur, remember? If you tell me that one who places down is not a partial measure—why? Because it is not fit to combine. Once he has placed it down, then the uprooting is already irrelevant; he already placed it down. But if someone uproots, afterwards he can combine a placing down with it—later he can put it down and then it will really be a complete prohibition. You see here where he understood “fit to combine”: not like Rabbi Shimon Shkop, but as some sort of Torah-level safeguard. Then he says: if we allow you to uproot, afterwards you may also come to place down. But if we allow you to place down, there is no concern that you will first uproot; the stage of uprooting is already past—we are only saying that you placed it down. Therefore there is no point at all talking about a partial measure there. But regarding uprooting, why don’t we prohibit it by the law of a partial measure? That is his question. The Sefat Emet asks. “And so one could explain what the Talmud says: exempt cases that can lead to liability for a sin-offering are considered significant because they are prohibited by Torah law. And those that cannot lead to liability for a sin-offering, such as placing down, according to Rashi’s explanation that by Torah law it is permitted, are not considered significant.” Right? Because in placing down it is impossible to reach a Torah prohibition, because the placing down has already happened; the uprooting has already not happened. “However, from Rashi it appears—and so the Rosh also writes explicitly—that it is only rabbinically prohibited.” It is not a Torah prohibition without stoning whether one uproots and does not place down, but rather a rabbinic prohibition. And that of course raises the question why this should not be a Torah prohibition under the law of a partial measure. The Sefat Emet also says: in all the measured prohibitions of the Sabbath, I did not find explicitly in the Talmud that there is a Torah prohibition for less than the measure because it is fit to combine. So why, with Sabbath labors, did we not find the prohibition of a partial measure? “One can say that specifically in prohibitions of eating a partial measure is prohibited from the verse ‘all fat,’” as the Chacham Tzvi wrote—I mentioned him. “However, in Rashi later on 74, which we’ll see next, it is explained that also in Sabbath prohibitions a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. And in the Lechem Mishneh, that in a partial measure there is a positive commandment of ‘and on the seventh day you shall rest,’ and see the Mishneh LaMelekh and the Pri Megadim in the introduction about what they wrote from the words of the Tur. But it seems to me,” says the Sefat Emet, “that here this is not called a partial measure but half a labor, and this is not prohibited at all. This is unlike half an olive-bulk of forbidden fat, where the prohibition is present and only the measure is lacking.” True, from the language of Maimonides and the SeMaG and the Tur he makes a slight inference that perhaps there is a partial measure here, but in the simple understanding he says that in Rashi and the Rosh it is clear that this is only a rabbinic prohibition. Why is there no prohibition of a partial measure here? Because this is half a labor and not a partial measure. What does he mean by “half a labor and not a partial measure”? We discussed this earlier: there is a partial measure that is half an object, right? Where we are talking about carrying out a third of an olive-bulk instead of a full olive-bulk. There is a partial measure that is walking one cubit in the public domain and not four cubits in the public domain, which is no longer half an object but still half of a labor. Still, the logic of “fit to combine” exists there too. There too, Rabbi Shimon’s logic—or not Rabbi Shimon, actually even according to the later authorities who saw it as a safeguard: they prohibited one cubit because afterwards you can continue another three cubits and violate a Torah prohibition. That safeguard logic also applies there. In that sense this is not different from prohibitions concerning the object and a partial measure of the object. But here, when you did an uprooting and did not do a placing down, the Sefat Emet says this is half a labor, not a partial measure. What does he mean? He means that a partial measure means that all that is lacking is quantity. The quality of the prohibition exists even in a third, and what is lacking from a full olive-bulk is only quantity, because you need a minimum quantity in order to punish. So the logic of “fit to combine” applies. But here, when you did an uprooting, what is missing is not more uprooting; what is missing is placing down, which is a different kind of act. So it may be that the act of carrying out is significant only if it consists of uprooting plus placing down. But if there is uprooting alone, you cannot say this is half of carrying out. This is a qualitative half, not a quantitative half. It is not that only quantity is lacking, with all the qualities of the complete prohibition already present. That is not true here. What is lacking is the quality of the complete labor. A labor is uprooting and placing down; if you did only uprooting, you did nothing. Then there is no Torah prohibition at all of a partial measure in such a case. Here there is no Rabbi Shimon reasoning regarding “fit to combine”—sorry, there is no Rabbi Shimon reasoning that it is fit to combine—but the later authorities’ reasoning of a Torah-level safeguard could still apply here, right? Those later authorities can say: if you did an uprooting, afterwards you can still come and do a placing down as well, and then you’ll reach a Torah prohibition. So a safeguard. Someone who sees a partial measure as a Torah-level safeguard can definitely say that there is also a law of a partial measure in uprooting without placing down. But Rabbi Shimon’s reasoning that it is fit to combine does not apply to half a labor; it applies to a partial measure, not to half a labor. And that is what the Sefat Emet says here. Therefore, according to Rashi and the Rosh, a partial measure does not apply to half a labor. What he infers from Maimonides and the Tur and the SeMaG—that uprooting alone is a partial measure prohibited by Torah law though there is no stoning for it—will perhaps fit with the conception that a partial measure is a Torah-level safeguard or something like that. Then indeed, if you uprooted, it may be that you will also come to place down. Of course, according to that, what is written in the Mishnah—that if one uprooted and another placed down, or that one simply uprooted and nobody placed down, he is exempt—“exempt” would mean exempt from punishment, but the prohibition that exists would be a Torah prohibition of a partial measure, as the Sefat Emet inferred from Maimonides and the Tur and the SeMaG. So the prohibition of a partial measure is a Torah prohibition, and what is written “exempt” means exempt from punishment, not that it is only rabbinically prohibited. The simple approach—that it is rabbinic—is Rashi and the Rosh, and then I say that because Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s logic of “fit to combine” does not apply to half a labor—it applies to half an object or half an action, but not to half a labor, a qualitative half of a labor. One second. Yes, Maimonides in chapter 18, law 23–24 writes as follows: “One who carries out a partial measure is exempt, and likewise anyone who performs one of the labors in a partial measure is exempt. If he carried out a partial measure and placed it down, and then carried out the other half, he is liable. But if he first picked up the first half before placing down the second half, it is considered as though it was burned, and he is exempt.” Right? “If he carried out a partial measure and then carried out another partial measure in one lapse of awareness to one domain, he is liable; to two domains, then he is exempt,” and so on. The really important part is the first sentence in the first law: “And likewise anyone who performs one of the labors in a partial measure is exempt.” What do we see here? According to Maimonides there is no law of a partial measure on the Sabbath. That is what it seems, ostensibly, right? In general. Moreover, when he speaks about a partial measure, simply speaking he means half an object—someone who carried out less than the required measure. If in that case there is no law of a partial measure, then in half a labor of the other two types—either two cubits out of four, or uprooting without placing down—certainly there will be no law of a partial measure. Because half an object is much more readily understood as a case where there should be a law of a partial measure than half a labor. So if even regarding half an object Maimonides says that in the laws of the Sabbath there is no law of a partial measure, then in the next two types all the more so he would say there is no law of a partial measure. However, it is not entirely certain that one can infer that from Maimonides here. Why? Because when Maimonides says one who carries out a partial measure is exempt, what does “exempt” mean? Maybe exempt from punishment, but still prohibited by Torah law? There will be no lashes here, but it may be that the prohibition is a Torah prohibition. When we read “exempt,” we understand exempt, but prohibited rabbinically. Yet simply speaking it could mean exempt but prohibited by Torah law—exempt from punishment but prohibited by Torah law. Then there would in fact be a law of a partial measure here. I think this is a possible interpretation in Maimonides, and some wanted to understand him that way. According to the inference of the Sefat Emet we saw above, that is probably what comes out, because he understands that according to Maimonides there is a law of a partial measure in the laws of the Sabbath, and therefore what is written here, “exempt,” means exempt from punishment but prohibited by Torah law. But that is not likely. It is not likely, because then all Maimonides is saying is that the regular law of a partial measure exists—you don’t need to spell that out here, since the law of a partial measure is true throughout the Torah. When we read Maimonides here simply, it looks like he is coming to say that in the laws of the Sabbath there is no law of a partial measure, not merely that one is exempt from punishment. “One who carries out a partial measure is exempt”—that means it is not a Torah prohibition like everywhere else in the Torah, but a rabbinic prohibition. It seems to me that Maimonides actually defines the terms exempt, permitted, and liable in the laws of the Sabbath, and it seems to me that he explicitly writes that “exempt” means rabbinic prohibition, a rabbinic prohibition. One second. Yes, look here, chapter 1 law 3 of the laws of the Sabbath. See? “Anywhere in the laws of the Sabbath where it says that one who does this is liable, that means he is liable to karet. And if there were witnesses and warning, he is liable to stoning, and if he was unwitting, he is liable to a sin-offering. And anywhere it says that one who does this is exempt, that means he is exempt from karet, stoning, and offering, but it is prohibited to do that thing on the Sabbath, and its prohibition is by the words of the Scribes, as a distancing from labor. And anywhere it says permitted, it is permitted from the outset.” So it comes out from here that when it says “exempt,” it means a rabbinic prohibition, right? “By the words of the Scribes.” So it is not likely that this means a Torah prohibition on which one simply is not punished—the prohibition of a partial measure. It is true that in Maimonides in several places there are expressions suggesting that there are cases where one violates a Torah prohibition on the Sabbath even though one is not stoned, but it is still a Torah prohibition. For example, “resting” restrictions on the Sabbath—in several places Maimonides seems to imply that this is a Torah prohibition, like Nachmanides in the portion of Emor and elsewhere. Even though that does not fit into any of the categories from what we just read, because “liable” means including stoning, “exempt” means rabbinic prohibition, and “permitted” means completely permitted. So how do you write something that is prohibited by Torah law? Either you write “prohibited by Torah law,” or you write “not liable”; you don’t write “exempt,” but rather “not liable.” “Not liable” means you came to negate punishment, but it doesn’t say anything about the prohibition. So perhaps, with some difficulty, one could say like the Sefat Emet that when Maimonides says “exempt” regarding a partial measure on the Sabbath, he means the regular law of a partial measure—that there is a prohibition and exemption from punishment. But the straightforward reading of Maimonides does not look like that, because both his language suggests that he is saying there is no law of a partial measure here at all, and also because the dictionary he established at the beginning of chapter 1 says that when I write “exempt,” I mean a rabbinic prohibition. Therefore it is more likely that there is indeed no prohibition of a partial measure at all in the laws of the Sabbath. How should we understand that? The Mishnah Berurah, for example, claims that Maimonides really says that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law also on the Sabbath, siman 340-something. But that is not likely. And why indeed not? Why indeed throughout the laws of the Sabbath should there be no law of a partial measure? So if I understand that the laws of the Sabbath are all prohibitions on the person, or really an obligation of rest imposed on the person, then there is room to say what I said regarding rabbinic prohibitions, and what I said earlier also regarding the Sabbath with Beit Meir and the Chatam Sofer: that in person-based prohibitions the law of a partial measure does not apply. A partial measure was said about objects, not about the person. And therefore, in Sabbath prohibitions—even if objects are involved there, when I carry an object from a private domain to a public domain—ultimately the prohibition is not a prohibition on the object but a prohibition on the person. Since that is so, if I carried out a partial measure then there is no Torah prohibition on me; there is no law of a partial measure in the laws of the Sabbath. All the more so when I am talking about a qualitative half, like someone who only uprooted or only placed down. One can formulate it differently. I say as follows: when I carry a third of an olive-bulk from a private domain to a public domain, it is not that I performed a full carrying-out on a partial object, a third of an olive-bulk. Rather, I performed a partial action. This too is part of a labor and not part of the object, because the prohibition is a prohibition on the action of carrying out the object, not a prohibition on the object, and the action of carrying out here was done partially. So this too is only part of a labor and not part of the object, even though here it is an object-half. Because of the definition of Sabbath prohibitions as prohibitions of labor on the person, when I carry out a partial object, that is really a partial action and not a partial object. In Shabbat 74—that is what the Sefat Emet mentioned—the Talmud says this: “Rather, Rav Chisda said: one may select and eat less than the required measure, one may select and put aside less than the required measure, but one should not select the full measure, and if he selected he is liable to a sin-offering.” Rav Yosef challenged him: “And is it permitted to bake less than the required measure?” What do you mean—how can you say “one may select and put aside,” “one may select and eat” as though from the outset? Is it permitted to bake less than the required measure? Rashi says: “And is it permitted to bake less than the required measure? Granted, there is no liability for a sin-offering, but there is nevertheless a prohibition, for we hold that a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law in the last chapter of Yoma. So how can it teach ‘one may select’ from the outset?” So in Rashi here it says that there is a law of a partial measure also in the laws of the Sabbath, explicitly. And what is written here, “exempt,” means exempt from punishment but prohibited by Torah law. Okay? Like what the Mishnah Berurah learns in Maimonides—which is not the simple meaning of Maimonides—but in Rashi that is indeed what it says. One can bring other various sources among the medieval authorities one way and the other, on whether there is a law of a partial measure or not in Sabbath prohibitions. But again, in most places the sources they bring say “exempt.” Now if it says “exempt,” the dilemma always arises: what does “exempt” mean? Does “exempt” mean this is a rabbinic prohibition and there is no law of a partial measure in the laws of the Sabbath, or does “exempt” mean exempt from punishment but there is still a Torah prohibition of a partial measure also in the laws of the Sabbath? What? The Sefat Emet’s point is also found in the Meiri in Shabbat 3. He asks why uprooting without placing down is not prohibited by Torah law, since there is a partial measure. Then he says that a partial measure is when the prohibition is before us and only the measure is lacking, whereas when what is lacking is the labor itself, no—that is not the kind of thing one can prohibit. The Magen Avraham writes this too, and others. So you see this principle too, and the Pri Megadim as well—they all say that really this is half a labor; it is not a complete labor with a partial measure. And half a labor is not the prohibition of a partial measure. What about someone who cooks to a degree less than ben Derusai’s food? Meaning, it reaches the point of “the hand recoils,” of course, because if it doesn’t reach that point then he did nothing at all. But it reaches that point, and yet the dish itself has still not been cooked; it does not have that one-third cooking called ben Derusai’s food. What is the law in such a case? The Chazon Ish in siman 50 claims in Maimonides’ opinion that there is a prohibition there, and perhaps even a Torah prohibition under the law of a partial measure. How does that fit with the Maimonides we saw above, who says there is no law of a partial measure in the Torah in the laws of the Sabbath—sorry? The Chazon Ish apparently read Maimonides like the Mishnah Berurah did: that when Maimonides says “exempt,” he means exempt from punishment, but it is prohibited under the law of a partial measure. In the Kiryat Sefer of the Mabit, on Maimonides chapter 18 of the laws of the Sabbath, he writes that Maimonides’ reason—he understands Maimonides as holding that there is no partial measure in the laws of the Sabbath—and he claims that this is excluded from “in performing it,” because this is not called performing. Remember I spoke about indirect causation, and I said there that “performing, said the Merciful One, and here it is lacking,” “in performing it”—“performing, said the Merciful One, and here it is lacking,” the Talmud says in the chapter “All Sacred Writings.” So there is a requirement in the laws of the Sabbath that this be an act of performing. Therefore indirect causation will be exempt according to the approaches that say indirect causation is really not prohibited on the Sabbath. The same applies here: when you do a partial measure, there is no “performing” here. Of course, if you learn it from “in performing it,” he is inventing an exposition, yes—there is no actual source for this in the Sages. But even if I accept that exposition, that exposition still assumes some kind of premise; you have to notice this: that doing a partial measure on the Sabbath is lacking in the act of performing. Because one could say: no, this is a complete act of performing, and what is lacking is only the measure of the object on which you performed the act. Right? When I carried from a private domain to a public domain an object that was a third of an olive-bulk of food, yes, a third of an olive-bulk—that is a complete act of carrying from a private domain to a public domain; what is lacking is the measure of the object. He understands that this is not so. What is lacking is the measure of the act. Why? Because the act of carrying out on the Sabbath—the prohibition of the action—is a prohibition of the action of the person, and therefore the measure given there is a measure in the action of the person; it is not a measure in the object. And if the measure is lacking, that means you did not perform a complete carrying-out, not that you performed a complete carrying-out on an object that was smaller. Okay. As for practical Jewish law: the Pri Megadim rules that there is no law of a partial measure on the Sabbath, no prohibition of a partial measure on the Sabbath, and so does the Mabit in Kiryat Sefer. But in the Shulchan Arukh there is also wording that always confuses people, because in the Shulchan Arukh there are commentaries that understood him to hold that there is a prohibition. Look at the Shulchan Arukh here, 340: “It is prohibited to remove one’s hair or nails, whether by hand or with a tool, whether from oneself or from others, and one is liable for two hairs.” How do you understand that? “Liable”—that sounds like an actual Torah prohibition. Liable. It sounds like there is a law of a partial measure on the Sabbath, right? As Torah law, yes. He is essentially putting everything into the same prohibition, even for one hair. Liability exists only for two hairs. Liability—but the prohibition exists for one hair. So on the face of it, the simple reading is that this is the regular law of a partial measure. And that is also what the Magen Avraham writes: “Two hairs, but with one there is a prohibition, like any partial measure. That seems obvious to me, unlike the Ir Shushan.” The Ir Shushan, he says, wrote two separate laws and did not see in this siman, see siman 338 and more. And the Mishnah Berurah also writes: “And one is liable for two hairs, but one hair has a Torah prohibition like any partial measure in all prohibitions. And so is the law in all Sabbath labors: a measure is not required for prohibition, only for liability to a sin-offering.” But what does the Ir Shushan hold? The Ir Shushan says no—there is no prohibition of a partial measure. So how did he read the Shulchan Arukh? “It is prohibited to remove one’s hair”—that means rabbinically prohibited, not a Torah prohibition of a partial measure. With two hairs there is a Torah prohibition and one is also liable. Especially in the Shulchan Arukh we have to remember that it is basically a practical legal code; it is not an analytical work. So it is not careful about the essential classification of prohibitions. It writes practical instructions. So practically, that is true: it is prohibited to remove one hair, and from two hairs onward you are liable. The fact that he wrote it in one law does not mean that the prohibition is the same prohibition in both cases and the only difference is punishment, but rather that this is prohibited and that is liable. Why is this prohibited? Maybe because of a partial measure, maybe because of some other rabbinic rule unrelated to a partial measure. Because in Maimonides there is such a principle that the placement of the law and the wording of the law are precise, and conclusions can be drawn from this. In the Shulchan Arukh that is absolutely not the case. The Shulchan Arukh also sometimes mixes Torah laws, customs, and rabbinic laws, and is not careful with its wording. It is a sort of practical code that comes to tell you what is permitted and forbidden to do. It does not enter into conceptual understandings and ideas; it simply summarizes for you what is permitted and forbidden. Therefore it is very difficult to infer from the Shulchan Arukh what exactly he means. And that is what the Ir Shushan is basically claiming: when it says here that it is prohibited to remove one hair, he means a rabbinic prohibition. Where does that rabbinic prohibition come from? If it is the law of a partial measure, then I understand—it is the prohibition of a partial measure as in the rest of the Torah, also in the laws of the Sabbath. But if there is no law of a partial measure, as the Ir Shushan says, and there is only some rabbinic prohibition, where did that rabbinic prohibition come from? Are we just inventing rabbinic prohibitions? Where does it come from? I assume one can say this in two ways. One way: we know that even Reish Lakish, who says there is no Torah prohibition of a partial measure, still says there is a rabbinic rule. There is a rabbinic prohibition of a partial measure. Now we rule like Rabbi Yochanan. But in the laws of the Sabbath, where even according to Rabbi Yochanan there is no Torah prohibition of a partial measure, that is certainly no better than Reish Lakish—at least there would still be a rabbinic prohibition. Understand that according to Reish Lakish, when you say there is a rabbinic prohibition of a partial measure, this is not a Torah prohibition of a partial measure; it is a rabbinic decree. That rabbinic decree, simply speaking, also exists on the Sabbath. So Rabbi Yochanan says to him: forget it, there is no need for a rabbinic decree, because throughout the Torah a partial measure is prohibited by Torah law. But on the Sabbath, where there is no Torah prohibition on a partial measure, it is entirely possible that the rabbinic decree of Reish Lakish remains. That is one possibility. A second possibility—and in my eyes this is problematic, but one cannot deny that it appears in many decisors—is that many decisors have a kind of instinctive sense that says: it cannot be that I permit a partial measure. If it is not prohibited by Torah law, then it is prohibited rabbinically. It cannot possibly be permitted; that makes no sense. What do you mean “makes no sense”? “Makes no sense” means it would have been appropriate to prohibit it. Very nice. But as long as no court sat and prohibited it, then it is not prohibited. The fact that it would be appropriate to prohibit it—so what? And it turns out that very many decisors, already among the medieval authorities, not a new invention, reach the conclusion that in some situation there is no Torah prohibition, but their heart will not let them fully permit it because it is obvious that such a thing should be… so they say it is rabbinically prohibited. And for many years this has bothered me. What do you mean—how can you decide on your own reasoning that something is rabbinically prohibited? In order for a rabbinic prohibition to be valid, there must be an authorized court, which has authority by virtue of “do not deviate,” that establishes a decree or enactment or whatever, and then there is a rabbinic prohibition. You as a decisor, as important as you may be, are not the Sanhedrin. You can say: if I were the Sanhedrin, it would be appropriate to prohibit such a thing rabbinically. Fine, if you were—but you aren’t. So you can say it would be appropriate to prohibit. You cannot say it is prohibited. As long as no court established a prohibition on this thing, you cannot say it is prohibited. A few years ago I saw in the Chazon Ish that he senses this difficulty: how do decisors allow themselves at every turn to declare things rabbinically prohibited? If you have no source that prohibited it, then it cannot be rabbinically prohibited. So he says that apparently the early Sages, those who sat on the Sanhedrin, empowered the sages of all generations to determine in every place where it is appropriate to prohibit, to establish a prohibition. Meaning, we prohibit and leave it to the sages of later generations to determine where this prohibition applies and where it does not. This is probably a legal fiction—that is, there was never really a session of the Sanhedrin that did this—but it is some kind of halakhic or legal fiction which basically says: the authority of the early generations that sat on the Sanhedrin is what prohibited everything that the decisors today say should be prohibited rabbinically. Fine, a very strange invention, and I don’t think one can rely on it in practice. Therefore, in my opinion, whenever decisors say—for example, why is it prohibited to ride a bicycle? Out of concern that one may come to repair it. There are many decisors who say it is prohibited; it is a weekday-like activity. Others say it is prohibited because of concern that one may come to repair it—a decree. Concern that one may come to repair requires an authorized court to decree not to ride bicycles out of concern that one may come to repair. As long as no court decreed this, the fact that you think it would be appropriate to decree it—very nice, establish a Sanhedrin and decree it. But the fact that it would be appropriate to decree it does not yet mean that it was decreed. And as long as it was not decreed, it is permitted. You can tell me: look, it is appropriate to refrain because there is concern that you will come to repair. Fine, I’ll consider it; maybe I’ll listen to you because it really is appropriate to refrain. But if I did not listen and I got on the bicycle, you cannot say that I committed a prohibition. Nobody prohibited it; no authorized body prohibited it. By the way, what is strange to me is that as against those who say that riding a bicycle is a weekday-like activity, I saw quite a few decisors who claim that we cannot invent on our own new prohibitions of weekday-like activity. Which is strange to me, because weekday-like activity is a prohibition that by definition is a catch-all prohibition, and anything that seems to you weekday-like is an interpretation of the old concept of weekday-like activity. What is the problem? Precisely with the explanation that says it is out of concern that you might come to repair, there I would say: where do we have the right to invent new decrees on our own? Not with weekday-like activity. With weekday-like activity, it is merely a matter of interpretation. If you think this is indeed considered weekday-like activity, then it is included in that old prohibition that prohibited weekday-like activity. What is the problem? That is really strange to me. Weekday-like activity also changes with reality. Today bicycles, say—I’m not expert in them—that is not a weekday-like activity. People do it. Weekday-like activity is a very difficult issue because it is circular. Once people don’t ride bicycles on the Sabbath, then it becomes weekday-like activity. Once it becomes weekday-like activity, it is prohibited to ride bicycles on the Sabbath, and then you can’t get out of that. But if from the outset you had decided that one may ride bicycles on the Sabbath, then it also would not have been weekday-like activity, so there would be no reason to prohibit it, and so one could have continued riding. Which means that this whole story begins from a mistake. At first they prohibited it—at first they prohibited it halakhically, say because of concern that one may come to repair. Once everyone doesn’t ride, it becomes weekday-like activity. The decree because one may come to repair is not valid because we cannot innovate it on our own. So they say: yes, but it is weekday-like activity. No—it is weekday-like activity only because people thought there was a decree forbidding it, and therefore did not ride. But if they had ridden, then it would not have been weekday-like activity, and so they would have done it on the Sabbath too. Weekday-like activity is a very difficult question that seems somewhat arbitrary. The decisors see the concept of weekday-like activity as a concept with some essential content. There are things that are not appropriate to do on the Sabbath. They do not check empirically what people do or do not do on the Sabbath, but rather what is appropriate to do—some kind of, I don’t know exactly how they determine that. Simply speaking, weekday-like activity means what people don’t do on the Sabbath. Then it looks entirely circular. If you decide that people don’t do it, then indeed they don’t, so it becomes weekday-like activity. If you decide that people do do it, then they will, and it won’t be weekday-like activity. Meaning, yes—the first person who starts riding a bicycle on the Sabbath will be a sinner. Those who come after him will continue riding bicycles on the Sabbath because it will no longer be weekday-like activity, so there will be no problem. And it will no longer be a violation. This whole story of weekday-like activity is really a very difficult one. And the Talmud says, for example, elsewhere too—well, it’s all the same thing—that one who writes one letter is exempt, because writing means two letters, right? Or one who transfers two cubits in the public domain is exempt. In all these places there are commentators who claim that “exempt” means exempt from punishment but prohibited because of the prohibition of a partial measure. In the simple reading, it doesn’t look like that. The Talmud does not connect this, for example, to the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. Why doesn’t the Talmud say: from here there is a difficulty on Reish Lakish, who says a partial measure is permitted? Why doesn’t the Talmud object? Therefore it does not seem related to the law of a partial measure, and “exempt” means a rabbinic prohibition. So you see that in the laws of the Sabbath there is no law of a partial measure, no Torah prohibition of a partial measure. But it may be—and this is what was said here earlier, what Shmuel said earlier—it may be that really the four cubits in the public domain or the two letters in the prohibition of writing are not quantitative matters. If you write one letter, it is not that you wrote half. It is not that you wrote half, but rather that you did not write at all. That is not called writing. If I wrote only a little stroke of the letter, then is that also partial writing, or is it not called writing at all? The question is whether this falls within the definition of the labor. The question is whether in Sabbath prohibitions we are also dealing with what is called the definition of the labor. If it does not fit the definition of the labor, then it is not labor. So I say: the question is whether all these things are simply not within the category, not defined as labor at all. When you talk about the definition, you can say that in two ways: definition in the quantitative sense— the labor of writing is defined as two letters, why? Because you need a quantity of two letters to violate it. But that does not mean the act of writing itself requires two letters. What I want to claim is not merely that the prohibition of the labor of writing is defined around two letters, but that the act of writing is not an act of writing if it is not two letters. This is not a quantitative deficiency in the measure; it is simply not an act of writing at all. Writing one letter is not called writing. It is like uttering one syllable from a word. It is not called that you spoke, only partially; it is not called speaking at all. It is called making a sound. Then really a partial measure does not apply here—but not because the laws of the Sabbath do not recognize a partial measure, but because the measure in these specific labors is a measure that defines the action itself, and not merely a quantity required in order to violate and incur punishment. Therefore there will be no law of a partial measure there. Fine. There are those who wanted to claim that a partial measure on the Sabbath is prohibited because of “you shall rest,” even without the general law of a partial measure; there is Lechem Mishneh. There are still a few more details to discuss here, but these are the main points. Okay, we’ll stop here. That’s it—we’ve finished this series for this year. Good luck on exams to whoever has them, in the summer. That’s it, goodbye. Yasher koach. Thank you very much. Sabbath peace.