Dogmatics – Lesson 3
This transcript was generated automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- The Raavad’s claim about principles and dispute
- Formal authority and substantive authority
- Principles as factual claims and the conceptual problem of obligatory belief
- Maimonides in the Commentary on the Mishnah: no halakhic ruling in matters without practical action
- The Mishneh Torah versus the Commentary on the Mishnah, and the remarks of David Henshke
- Sanctions, the heretic, and the difficulty of separating thought from practical decision
- Social enactment versus conceptual determination, and continuation of the discussion
Summary
General Overview
The text presents an ongoing inquiry into the Raavad’s objection to Maimonides regarding the Thirteen Principles, and into the question of what makes a principle a binding “principle” in the strong sense. It suggests understanding the Raavad not as denying that Maimonides is correct in rejecting corporeality, but as disputing the authority to establish a binding framework when there is serious disagreement among “great and worthy” scholars. It then presents a philosophical-conceptual claim that formal authority cannot operate over beliefs that are factual claims, unlike practical norms where obedience is possible even without conviction. Against that background, the discussion also examines Maimonides’ position in the Commentary on the Mishnah about not issuing halakhic rulings in disputes that have no practical action, the relation between the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah, and the difficulty of understanding binding rulings in matters of thought when there are sanctions and consequences toward heretics and unbelievers.
The Raavad’s claim about principles and dispute
The Raavad is understood as arguing that a principle of faith, in the sense of a binding framework, cannot be something over which there is serious disagreement among wise and serious people, and therefore he mentions “great and worthy” figures who disagreed or erred. The discussion presents the claim that the Raavad agrees that Maimonides is substantively correct in rejecting corporeality, but denies Maimonides’ ability to determine that this is a binding principle whose denial places a person outside the framework. The Raavad is understood as saying that the framework of the religion of Israel is supposed to be agreed upon, and if it is not agreed upon then it is at most the personal opinion of whoever formulates it and not a binding framework. This understanding is presented as a “who appointed you?” claim—not in the sense of denying correctness, but in the sense of denying authority to set the binding boundaries of the discussion.
Formal authority and substantive authority
The text distinguishes between the substantive authority of an expert who decides on the basis of persuasion, and formal-institutional authority that obligates obedience by virtue of status, institution, or law, such as the commandment not to deviate. It is argued that formal authority requires me to accept something even when I do not agree, and therefore it belongs to practical norms where one can obey even without being convinced. It is argued that formal authority cannot apply to factual claims, because one cannot demand that a person believe something he does not believe, and the demand itself is conceptually impossible to fulfill. It is further argued that even if the source is the Torah or even revelation, acceptance will always be because one is persuaded that the source knows the truth, and therefore this is substantive authority, not formal authority.
Principles as factual claims and the conceptual problem of obligatory belief
The Thirteen Principles are presented as factual claims in the sense that they assert that something is or will be the case in the world, even if there is no observational way to verify it, such as the coming of the Messiah. It is argued that since principles are usually understood as an objectively binding framework such that one who does not accept it is a heretic, a conceptual failure arises, because belief cannot be imposed in the way an action can be imposed. An alternative possibility is presented, according to which principles can be formulated as a subjective map of Maimonides’ own position alone, without any claim to bind others, but it is argued that this is not the usual way “principles of faith” are understood. Within the discussion there is an attempt to translate principles into norms, including the suggestion that belief in the coming of the Messiah means “living in expectation of redemption” in an endless sense, and the response is that this very translation itself provokes a sharp dispute about its meaning.
Maimonides in the Commentary on the Mishnah: no halakhic ruling in matters without practical action
A passage is cited from Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishnah to tractate Shevuot (chapter 1, mishnah 4), where he writes that in the dispute over what the sacrificial goats atone for, one should not say that Jewish law follows a given sage because this is “a matter entrusted to God,” and he adds a broader rule according to which “any opinion among the opinions in which there is no practical action, and over which the sages disagreed, we do not say in it that Jewish law follows so-and-so.” It is argued that Maimonides there is not saying that one cannot form a position, since the Tannaim themselves formed positions on the basis of evidence and scriptural interpretation, but rather that there is no authority to issue a halakhic ruling in a dispute that has no practical relevance. From this there apparently arises a difficulty with Maimonides himself when he establishes binding principles in matters of thought.
The Mishneh Torah versus the Commentary on the Mishnah, and the remarks of David Henshke
The text presents a possible resolution of Maimonides: when there is a practical implication, he does issue a ruling, even if the matter concerns issues of thought; whereas when there is no practical implication, he does not issue a ruling. It is brought that David Henshke wrote an article in De’ot and showed that in two out of the three cases where Maimonides in the Commentary on the Mishnah says that one does not issue a halakhic ruling, in the Mishneh Torah he in fact does issue a ruling, apparently because a practical implication was found. It is also suggested that this may not reflect a substantive retraction, but a move from the perspective of intellectual dispute in the Commentary on the Mishnah to a halakhic-practical perspective in the Mishneh Torah. At the same time, it is argued that Maimonides in the Thirteen Principles is not writing esoterically, but explicitly asks the reader not to read quickly, rather to contemplate and understand, and therefore it is difficult to attribute the principles to a method of “holy lies.”
Sanctions, the heretic, and the difficulty of separating thought from practical decision
It is argued that in the Commentary on the Mishnah Maimonides also presents sanctions toward one who does not believe in the Thirteen Principles, such as an attitude of hatred, and the discussion addresses the question whether this is an intellectual ruling or merely a social-halakhic consequence. One possibility presented is that the halakhic decision may operate only on the plane of behavior toward a person and not on the plane of the truth of the intellectual position itself, but it is argued that this is difficult to accept where the very definition of someone as a heretic leads to severe laws such as “we lower him and do not raise him.” It is argued that examples such as a “decree of Scripture” in the case of conspiring witnesses show that there are situations in which one cannot separate the factual determination from the halakhic consequence, because the punishment presupposes a decision on the intellectual question. On that basis it is argued that Maimonides apparently does assume that one can decide even in intellectual disputes, and that this cannot be explained only by a technical need for social order without substantive determination.
Social enactment versus conceptual determination, and continuation of the discussion
A proposal is raised to view the laws of heretics as an enactment intended to preserve the social fabric rather than a conceptual determination of truth, but it is rejected as insufficient or as failing to explain differences between generations. The text returns and sharpens the point that the central claim is not what the Torah permitted or forbade one to rule on, but rather that according to the position being presented it is conceptually impossible to obligate belief or to decide a dispute that is a factual claim, even if it has practical implications. In conclusion it is said that the inquiry will continue, including the Talmud’s and Maimonides’ relation to the law of the heretic and to the meaning of the sanctions.
Full Transcript
[Speaker A] No, no, not exactly. The Raavad explains why this is not a principle. What is the Raavad really claiming? Because honestly, on a very simple reading it’s hard to understand what he’s saying. Like, look, most of the great and worthy people believed this—so what? Now I understood it simply to mean, I mean, obviously it’s nonsense, like the Rabbi also said, that the Holy One, blessed be He, has bodily form and all that. But that doesn’t mean it pulls the rug out from under them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not?
[Speaker A] It doesn’t pull the rug out from under them because there’s no reasoning, there’s no reasoning at all to say yes. I don’t understand the reasoning for saying yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let him say that. He doesn’t say that.
[Speaker A] Right, so it seems to me the main point—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something is missing from the text. He—
[Speaker A] He comes to suggest, like, he comes to show that here are people—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So before he shows that, let him say what the claim is that he’s coming to demonstrate. He doesn’t write it. Yes, but he doesn’t say: listen, if someone believes that the Holy One, blessed be He, has bodily form, why does that pull the ground out from under the whole system? He’s mistaken, but why does that pull the ground out from under the whole system? Let him say that, and afterward he can add that there were also great and worthy people who made that mistake, as some kind of support. But he only brings the support.
[Speaker A] Yes, but then I didn’t really understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also beyond that, by the way, I think—I don’t see why, for example, the coming of the Messiah is something more fundamental than the claim that He has no bodily form. Why? You can argue about other principles of Maimonides in exactly the same way.
[Speaker A] Yes, I mean, that’s basically what Rabbi Yosef Albo did.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, but—
[Speaker A] I didn’t understand, so I never really grasped what the Raavad is proposing, what it means in the end.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Raavad basically wants to say that once there is an argument over this principle, it cannot be a principle. That’s his claim, right? Yes. But by argument I mean with wise people, okay? Not some idiot who says something else. That’s why he said “great and worthy.” But once there is an argument over it, it can’t be a principle.
[Speaker A] So that’s not really an argument, it’s like he just doesn’t agree with Maimonides’ basic assumption.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, that’s the argument. I don’t understand—what do you mean it’s not really an argument?
[Speaker A] No, I mean, he’s just saying that if people argue—if there’s argument about principles—that shows there are no principles.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not that there are no principles. That this cannot be a principle.
[Speaker A] Yes, about something people argue over.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.
[Speaker C] Why can’t it be a principle? Because of what you explained?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I explained: because the claim is that if you understand the concept of a principle as something over which argument cannot take place, such that all arguments have to take place within that framework, then the very existence of an argument shows you that this “principle” is not part of the framework.
[Speaker C] What do you mean a principle can’t be argued about? Anything can be argued about, of course there can be an argument.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it’s not a principle. That’s not a fact.
[Speaker C] How can you—who said that’s exactly the idea, to invent a concept of a principle as something that can’t be argued about? What is a principle? Some fool comes and argues.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re not talking about a fool. There’s no point in that.
[Speaker C] No, but someone comes and argues about something, and you say okay, that already damages the essence of the thing as a principle? Why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. That’s what the Raavad claims. Why not?
[Speaker C] Since when? So any little kid in Israel, some child comes and argues about some principle, and the Raavad will say that now—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shmuel, I’ve answered that ten times already. We can’t keep repeating it all the time. We’re not talking about some little kid in Israel. The Raavad says “great and worthy.” I didn’t say every little kid in Israel can argue. I’ve repeated this over and over. Once there is a serious dispute with serious people, then, says the Raavad, it can’t be a principle. And the question is why. And I explained at length last time why, or the time before last, yes. Since the term “principle,” apparently—this is how I understand it—means something that sets the framework for discussions. But nobody appointed you to set the framework for discussions; you can’t set the framework. You can say what your opinion is, what is right and what is not right. You can’t set the framework. A framework is something that is supposed to be agreed upon. It isn’t agreed upon, so how can you determine that this is the framework? You’re asking the question that I asked and answered.
[Speaker C] No, what interests me is that the Raavad is revolutionary here, because when he says, if you want to see what Judaism is, look at the people of Israel or at the great scholars of Israel—that’s a different way of looking at religion. It’s not a religion that supposedly—it’s really a religion with a deep element of Jewish culture in it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. You jumped very, very far. First, he doesn’t say what the religion of Israel is. He says: if you want to establish a framework for the religion of Israel, the framework is supposed to be agreed upon. Otherwise it’s not a framework, it’s your personal opinion. And second, he’s not saying this is a matter of culture. He’s not talking about culture. He says: once wise and worthy people understand things differently from you, you can’t say that—
[Speaker C] Now he passed it on, and Maimonides received it. Then some other sage comes along, as great as he may be, and says: I want to argue about this. Maimonides says: no, but I received from Sinai that this is one of the Thirteen Principles. So can he argue about it? What would the Raavad say to that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all—even if it were true that Maimonides claimed he received it from Sinai—he himself claims that something received from Sinai was never disputed. So once there is a dispute over it, that itself is proof that it was not received from Sinai, according to Maimonides’ own view. And second, Maimonides does not say that it was received from Sinai. Obviously. So what? He invented it—he decided these are the important principles, this is the intellectual framework. So what? That’s exactly what the Raavad is claiming: who appointed you? As people argued against him about his whole book, by the way. Who appointed you to determine halakhic rulings without reasons and decide that this is what obligates everyone? The codification controversy, as it’s called.
[Speaker A] No, but does the Rabbi really think that the Raavad is saying to Maimonides, “Who appointed you?” It doesn’t sound like that from the Raavad, that he’s coming to tell him—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course he is. That’s exactly what he’s claiming. What do you mean? He says many who are greater and better than you say otherwise—so who appointed you? That’s exactly what he’s claiming. “Who appointed you” not in the sense that you’re not right; even the Raavad agrees with him that he’s right… yes, yes. Only in the sense of: who appointed you to establish principles? What are you, the Holy One, blessed be He? You determine the framework of the discussion? You think this way, others think differently.
[Speaker C] Say the Raavad were alive today, when really I don’t think there’s even one major scholar who would say that—nobody says God has a hand and a foot. So would the Raavad say, Maimonides, you’re right? Because today nobody disagrees with it, nobody—from the smallest to the greatest.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no idea. I don’t know. Besides, even if today nobody disagrees with it, so what does that mean? In the past there were those who did disagree, so what?
[Speaker D] I have a question about codification. I can understand it there, because Maimonides really relies on the Talmud, on all sorts of things. But with the Thirteen Principles—what was Maimonides even thinking? Why did he think he could do such a thing? There has to be some logic to it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides—the logic is that Maimonides was a dogmatist, and we’ll talk about that later. But yes, he understood that if, from his perspective, without this there is no Jewish faith, then he can establish the framework. Yes. Anyone who doesn’t understand that is simply mistaken; he’s simply a heretic or whatever, yes.
[Speaker D] But that doesn’t fit his general approach so well. He always relied on things, he always had textual supports from the sources. Here he has no support at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] נכון, right. In some of the items he does bring supports, but clearly the distillation and determination of principles and so on is all his, right. By the way, also regarding—I spoke about the analogy to Maimonides’ enumeration of the commandments—there too, in the end, the distillation of all Jewish law into 613 primary principles, what are called commandments, is Maimonides’ own work. He doesn’t really have proofs for his count. He has arguments this way and that way. And if only because the sages—the point Nachmanides makes against him several times—the sages didn’t deal at all with this concept or this world of counting commandments, so you can’t bring proofs from the sages for what should be included in the count of commandments and what should not. On the contrary, there are places where the sages, for example, write “he violates two prohibitions,” at the beginning of Eizehu Neshekh, regarding interest and increase, “he violates two prohibitions,” and Maimonides counts it once, even though the Talmud says there are two prohibitions here.
[Speaker E] But he’s claiming the authority to remove people from the congregation of Israel. He’s claiming here to say: you will not be a kosher Jew. There’s a kind of responsibility here that doesn’t really fit with just disagreeing about something.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right. We’ll still talk about that later. I don’t think Maimonides wants to say—at least not necessarily—that those people are to be lowered into the pit and not raised out, that sanctions should be taken against them. He’s making a claim on the intellectual plane. Meaning, someone who thinks this way is not a Jew—in other words, he is not within Jewish faith. That’s a position. He’s not saying that someone who thinks this way and is mistaken is wicked and a heretic and all the laws of a heretic apply to him—that’s regarding sanctions and so on. But we’ll get to that.
[Speaker A] Why, Rabbi? Doesn’t it have implications for a heretic according to Maimonides? It also has implications in Jewish law regarding a heretic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he’s mistaken, then no—or at least not necessarily. We’ll discuss it. But okay, just a second—
[Speaker A] To go back. That was about sanctions and so on. But we’ll still discuss that. The Rabbi said: it has no implications for a heretic according to Maimonides? It also has implications in Jewish law regarding a heretic? If he’s mistaken then no. Or at least not necessarily, we’ll discuss it. But okay, just a second—to go back to what the Rabbi said, I want to understand exactly what the Rabbi is saying about the Raavad. So is it because—it’s not exactly what I understood—it’s not really that because there are people who claim otherwise, therefore it’s not true. Rather it’s simply because you have no authority over it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there are people who claim otherwise, therefore it is not a principle—not therefore it is not true.
[Speaker A] Yes, so therefore you don’t have—but why is it connected to whether people argue about it or not, in terms of authority?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said: because establishing principles is not like determining whether something is true. When I determine whether something is true, I may have my reasoning and you may have your reasoning and we can disagree. But to determine that something is a principle—what are you doing that as? In what capacity are you determining it?
[Speaker A] Yes, but that doesn’t touch on whether people argue about it or not.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, it does. If it happened to be something that everyone agrees on—for example, I assume the Raavad would also agree that someone who says the Torah is not from Heaven is denying a principle. I assume the Raavad would also agree with that. Nobody disputes it.
[Speaker A] Is it because nobody disputes it? Is that the claim?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s an indication, yes. Meaning, it’s a condition. It’s not enough. No—say there were some halakhic detail that nobody disputed; that would not make that halakhic detail a principle of faith. It’s not that everything undisputed is a principle of faith. But something that is disputed cannot be a principle of faith. Obviously your reasoning about why it is fundamental, why it is basic, principled, also comes in here. But the condition has to hold that it not be disputed. Again, disputed by worthy and wise people, yes? Not just random people on the street. Okay? Good. So last time I spoke a bit about the—about the… what?
[Speaker G] No, are you recording the lecture? Yes. Okay, for me it doesn’t show that. Fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, yes, yes, I turned on the recording. It’s not working? Yes, it is. I didn’t turn it on right at the beginning because that was just preliminary discussion, but at some point I did turn it on, yes. Fine. So—I spoke a bit about… one second. I spoke a bit about concepts of authority, right?
[Speaker A] Yes, the Rabbi mentioned that. The Rabbi mentioned those concepts, but we discussed them in the lecture—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah yes, yes, I spoke about it, yes. The concept of authority—so here I’ll just summarize what I said. The claim was that when we talk about the concept of authority, we mean formal authority, not substantive authority. That is, not the authority of an expert, but institutional authority. That I have to accept what you say because of who you are—an individual or an institution or, yes, the Sanhedrin, for example, by force of the commandment not to deviate. And the claim is that institutional authority cannot exist with respect to facts. Substantive authority, the authority of an expert—yes. But institutional authority, formal authority, cannot exist regarding facts. Why? Because authority requires me to accept something you say even if I don’t agree. If I was persuaded and I agree, that’s not authority—I was simply persuaded. Even if I was persuaded not on the merits of the matter but because I trust that you are a great sage, still, at the end of the day, I really think you are right. That’s called being persuaded. I don’t care if at the moment I don’t understand why you’re right, but if I reached the conclusion that you’re right, that means I was persuaded. When I speak about authority, I’m speaking about institutional obedience. Meaning, I obey you not because I agree, but because you have authority and I have to listen to you. That’s called formal authority. Such authority cannot be defined with regard to facts, because with regard to facts, on the conceptual and logical level, you simply cannot demand of a person that he adopt a fact that he himself does not believe. In what sense will he adopt it? Meaning, suppose there is such a demand. How do I fulfill that demand? How do I respond to it? Let’s say I decided that the Messiah is not true—well, that the Messiah is not supposed to come. Now they tell me: yes, but this is one of the Thirteen Principles, you have to believe that the Messiah will come. What does it mean that I have to believe? If you persuade me that he will come, then I believe. If you don’t persuade me, then what does it mean that I have to believe? Do you want me to mouth the words and say, “I believe with complete faith in the coming of the Messiah”? In truth, I don’t believe. So the claim is that with respect to facts, formal authority is irrelevant. Now note that the coming of the Messiah is not a simple fact, meaning an observational fact, like there’s a table here. I see there’s a table here, okay? Or even a fact that I could infer through some scientific reasoning. No, it’s some kind of fact—you could call it, first of all, a fact about the future. A fact for which there is no scientific or other evidence; you can’t test this fact by observational means to see whether it is true or not. I have to reach some kind of conclusion. But the claim that a Messiah will come at some stage is a factual claim. That is, the claim is that something will happen in the world. So this is a claim which, in its essence, in its category, is a factual claim. The fact that you can’t verify it through observation is irrelevant, but it is still a factual claim. And the claim I made earlier—that formal, institutional authority cannot relate to factual claims—is true of every factual claim as such. It doesn’t matter whether it’s a scientific fact, a visible fact, an invisible fact. A factual claim as such—you cannot apply formal authority to it. You cannot require me to believe something I do not believe. You can persuade me; you cannot require me. One second, let me just clarify that against a case where formal authority can be required—namely with norms. For example, in Jewish law, or in civil law, in jurisprudence, they tell me: true, you think selecting is not one of the thirty-nine categories of prohibited labor and in principle it should be permitted on the Sabbath. But the Sanhedrin determined that selecting is one of the thirty-nine categories. So you have to obey them. What does it mean you have to obey them? You have to refrain from selecting on the Sabbath, practically. You do not have to think that selecting is one of the thirty-nine categories, because I don’t think so. If you don’t persuade me, I won’t think so. But you can demand obedience from me. When the command is a practical command, then formal authority can apply to it, and you can demand obedience from me even though I don’t agree. But once we are dealing with a factual claim—yes, all kinds of intellectual principles, like Maimonides’ principles—they are essentially factual claims. Now with regard to a factual claim, you cannot demand that I adopt that factual claim despite not believing it. Because the demand contradicts the fact that I don’t believe it. The demand to carry out something practical does not contradict the fact that I think it is wrong. Okay, I think it is wrong, but I am still required to do it or not do it. Okay? But regarding beliefs—yes, facts—what is being required of me there is to believe, but in the end I don’t believe. So what do you want me to do with that demand? Only if you tell me: look, yes, but the Holy One, blessed be He, said so, and Moses and all the sages and the great geonim, and they surely understand better than you—if that persuades me, then no problem. But that is not formal authority; that is substantive authority. I was simply persuaded that they are right, and therefore I accept it. I am talking about formal authority. Formal authority cannot be applied to facts. And to my mind, that is the most fundamental problem in this whole matter of principles. The principles basically cannot be binding—not because they are not agreed upon, as the Raavad says, or because who says Maimonides is right. Independently of all that—even if Maimonides is right, it’s irrelevant—conceptually, there cannot be principles of faith. That is what I’m claiming now. Notice, this is a strong claim. On the conceptual level, there cannot be principles of faith—at least if I understand the concept of a principle as something binding. If you are drawing some subjective map of your own—Maimonides: as far as my faith is concerned, these are the thirteen principles that are foundational. Of course I cannot demand that anyone accept this, because one cannot apply formal authority to intellectual principles. But this is the map of faith according to my view. Fine, of course one can do that. But usually when we understand the concept of a principle or principles, we do not understand it like that. We understand it as something objective, binding, something everyone has to align with—and that cannot be about factual claims.
[Speaker A] Rabbi, but there can be factual claims about something that I think is not supposed to happen, but if God tells me so, then here it’s not because probably He’s right, but because clearly He’s right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t matter. It’s still because I was persuaded. That’s substantive authority, not formal authority. Right, I was persuaded that He is certainly right. Fine. Still, if you ask me what I really think, I really think that. It’s not that I think otherwise but do it anyway—I really think it.
[Speaker A] Yes, the Rabbi tried to say that there can’t be something I don’t think is true and yet I still fulfill the commandment, so to speak.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that I can do. That is possible.
[Speaker A] No, I don’t think it and yet I fulfill the commandment—I mean on the factual level, not on the normative level.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. But it cannot be that I do not think this thing is true, and yet I am required to think it. That’s an oxymoron. There can’t be such a thing.
[Speaker A] Ah, of course, yes. There’s simply no such thing. You can’t believe something you don’t believe—it’s obvious, it’s a contradiction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Very simple. But this simple point has many implications. For example, it raises a major doubt as to whether it even makes sense to speak of intellectual principles at all.
[Speaker A] You can, in the direction we said—that without it the Torah collapses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think the Torah does not collapse. What do you mean, without it the Torah collapses? That’s what you think. Okay.
[Speaker A] But maybe we can define it this way—what counts as a principle? Something without which—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying again: if you do not regard it as something binding, fine. Then maybe define principles differently, no problem. Usually when people understand the concept of principles of faith, they mean to say: yes, this is the framework, it is binding, everyone has to accept it. Whoever does not accept it is a heretic. Well, and what does that mean? That’s fine, in some sense.
[Speaker A] Yes, but even a heretic—I can’t turn a heretic into… if he’s a heretic, he’s a heretic. What can you do?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, the “poor heretic” of Rabbi Chaim—that’s where we’re headed in a moment. Meaning, of course you can determine factually that he is a heretic; maybe he is mistaken, maybe… But factually he is outside the framework of faith—that’s what Maimonides claimed, fine. That can be said. But the Raavad, apparently, understood the concept of a principle differently. That is, he understood the concept of a principle the way I think people usually understand it: a principle means a binding framework that is demanded of everyone. Not some outline Maimonides decides to present as his own view.
[Speaker I] Rabbi, what does “demanded of everyone” mean?
[Speaker A] Yes, but what does “demanded of everyone” mean? Demanded in what sense? Demanded to believe, or demanded because that’s the truth and there’s nothing to be done?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If someone does not—the truth is irrelevant; that’s the dispute, what the truth is. When you determine that something is a principle, then basically—usually that’s how it’s understood—“principle” means that it binds; whoever does not accept it is denying a principle. If you are only determining that this is the truth, fine—that’s what I said before. Then if you say that this is the truth, that’s your opinion. You can distill your intellectual doctrine and extract from it the thirteen most fundamental principles in your view. Good for you, fine. Rabbi, the sages—
[Speaker F] Did the sages really believe in all the facts that were more or less commonly accepted by everyone? No, I didn’t understand. Did the sages themselves really believe in all those facts over which there was supposedly consensus? Did all… did all the sages really believe what they said—that the Messiah will come, resurrection of the dead, the world to come, and all these stories? If they say it, why assume they didn’t believe it? I don’t—no, because they know they have no formal authority over it, and since we’re dealing with facts, then what… what are we talking about?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. They did not determine this as people with authority. They said what they thought. What… I don’t understand the claim. The concept of principles is something Maimonides invented; it doesn’t exist among the sages.
[Speaker F] No, but what Maimonides invented and—the codification—when he speaks about the Messiah, less about resurrection of the dead, but concepts that are accepted among the sages as simple matters, like regarding Rabbi Hillel where “may the Master forgive him” was said—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —meaning—
[Speaker F] But I ask myself whether all the sages really believed this, agreed to these things?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again I say: if the sages said it, then they probably thought so, no? Why assume they were lying? I don’t—
[Speaker A] No, so it’s a bit—
[Speaker F] It’s a bit problematic that all the sages, who were wise,
[Speaker A] believed in things where there’s no—
[Speaker F] no way to persuade, when they apparently have no tradition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, I didn’t say such a thing. Maybe they did have a tradition—who says they didn’t? I don’t know. There’s room to discuss that. But the fact is that the sages—again, there are exceptions, you mentioned Rabbi Hillel, we’ll get to him—there are exceptions, but yes, there were things that apparently were agreed upon. Fine. Not many, by the way, not so many.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, in light of the Rabbi’s strong difficulty, isn’t there seemingly no choice but to say that Maimonides really means the Thirteen Principles not as facts but as norms? As the Rabbi said, that all these principles have to be translated into norms, and that’s the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How would you translate the coming of the Messiah into a norm?
[Speaker C] The Rabbi knows Yeshayahu Leibowitz no less well than I do. What? He said that a true messiah is a messiah who will come; any messiah who has come is a false messiah. So what does belief in the coming of the Messiah mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what does belief in the coming of the Messiah mean?
[Speaker C] Leibowitz said countless times that the messiah is always the messiah who will come; a messiah who has come is a false messiah. Fine, I know, I know. Now, I’m not his interpreter, but he was thinking something, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. I don’t know if he was thinking—
[Speaker C] something. I’m asking what you think.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why do I care about this ad hominem? Tell me what you think, not what Leibowitz said.
[Speaker C] I completely agree that it’s normative. Clearly it’s normative. That’s all. So what—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what’s the question?
[Speaker C] No, maybe the Rabbi wasn’t satisfied with what I’m saying; maybe Leibowitz carries more weight. I’m saying it’s possible to translate all Thirteen Principles very easily—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t see you translating. Translate for me.
[Speaker C] Very easily. Go ahead. What is the coming of the Messiah? It’s living in expectation of redemption, of some future—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In expectation of redemption that you know will never come.
[Speaker C] Absolutely, because it’s infinite. Certainly. It’s very easy—what does that mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s infinite? It won’t come—what does infinite mean?
[Speaker C] What do you mean it won’t come? Does the Rabbi really think there will be some messiah who comes and then that’s it, it’s over?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know what I think. I’m—
[Speaker C] asking you what you think. Like the comedy troupe says: that’s it, that’s what there is.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m asking you, Shmuel, excuse me—do you mean that I have to believe in a messiah whom I know will not come? Answer me yes-or-no question.
[Speaker C] Yes, unequivocally. Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Then apparently we do have a dispute. This translation is a translation—well, even calling it a translation would itself need translation. Okay. Rabbi, yes.
[Speaker K] I think maybe a distinction is needed here between sources, because actually I read this whole thing about formal and substantive authority also in the trilogy, and I really think it makes sense when we’re talking about later authorities, medieval authorities (Rishonim), and maybe even Tannaim and Amoraim. Because when the Talmud says the world is square, that fact I obviously don’t have to accept, okay? But actually I heard this for the first time from the Rabbi in some podcast that went up on YouTube, on Relevant or something like that—it came up this week when the Rabbi was interviewed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker K] The Rabbi was asked there about facts in the Torah. Okay. Facts in the Pentateuch. So the question is whether there isn’t a distinction to be made here—facts that appear in the Pentateuch, say in Genesis, all the—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s unrelated. The facts—if you read it—that’s a completely different level of discussion. If you read the beginning of Genesis literally, then I would accept what is written in Genesis, but through substantive authority, not formal authority. If the Holy One, blessed be He, wrote it, then He knows.
[Speaker K] No, Rabbi, that’s what I’m trying to claim—that maybe because it’s Torah and it comes from the Holy One, blessed be He, then even if it’s hard for me to believe, hard for me to believe that a snake spoke to Eve and told her to eat an apple or some fruit—hard for me to believe—but because it comes from the Torah and from the Holy One, blessed be He, maybe there specifically there is substantive authority, and even if it’s hard for me—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You said substantive authority, not formal authority.
[Speaker K] No, sorry—formal authority.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe there there is formal authority? What? But at the end of the day, what do I really think? These are just words. I’m asking what I really think. Do I think the world was created in six days—yes or no? Yes-or-no question.
[Speaker K] No. Fine, Rabbi, I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s all. So what is this word game?
[Speaker K] But maybe because it’s written in the Torah… it’s written in the Torah, it says it was created in six days.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but it’s hard for me—
[Speaker K] to believe, and it doesn’t even seem plausible to me, but still, because it comes from the Torah, I have to believe.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t have to believe. Rather, you know that it is true because it is written in the Torah and the Torah does not err. That is substantive authority, not formal.
[Speaker K] But when I say that I have to, what practical difference does it make? Meaning, if I don’t believe, then maybe that itself is a transgression or—what transgression?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I don’t believe—I really don’t believe. What is being demanded of me? I reached the conclusion that the world was not created in six days. So now what am I supposed to do? Explain to me what this commandment imposes on me.
[Speaker K] To believe that every letter written in the Torah is absolute truth.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But no, that’s not true. I reached the conclusion that the world was not created in six days. So what then? If you tell me, look, but the Torah was given by the Holy One, blessed be He, so apparently you’re mistaken—fine, no problem. But that is substantive authority, not formal authority, because you’re basically making a claim that is meant to persuade me that the world really was created in six days. No problem—if I become convinced, then fine. But that’s only because I was convinced. That’s substantive authority. You can’t talk about formal authority with regard to facts—not even from the Holy One, blessed be He Himself.
[Speaker K] So again, let me return to the practical difference. That means that if I’m not convinced that it’s true, then there’s essentially no problem with that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not that there’s no problem at all; rather, you can’t demand that you think otherwise.
[Speaker K] No, fine, but can one demand it from a halakhic standpoint, even?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From no standpoint whatsoever can one demand it of you.
[Speaker K] But I don’t care about any other standpoint. From a halakhic standpoint, after a hundred and twenty years…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From no standpoint—and especially not from a halakhic standpoint.
[Speaker K] What? Sorry?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From no standpoint, and especially from a halakhic standpoint. If I say from no standpoint, that includes the halakhic one too.
[Speaker K] Yes, yes, of course, that’s included.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t demand beliefs. That seems obvious to me.
[Speaker K] I don’t know, it felt very obvious to me too until we touched the Five Books of Moses directly, because there…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. Even if the Holy One, blessed be He, appeared here from heaven and told me that the world was created in six days, then one of two things would happen: if I’m convinced—because He knows everything and apparently I was mistaken—no problem, I’ll accept it. But if I’m not convinced, then I won’t accept it even if lights come down from heaven here. Because I can’t accept it. I very much want to accept it, but I can’t.
[Speaker K] No, Rabbi, again, I’m trying to separate between being convinced and whether I have an obligation to believe. Meaning, those don’t necessarily come together…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There cannot be an obligation that cannot be fulfilled. It can’t be fulfilled.
[Speaker K] What do you mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I mean, there cannot be an obligation that I’m unable to fulfill. So what is being demanded of me? Every such obligation demands something from me. What exactly is it demanding of me?
[Speaker K] Nothing. Can I fulfill every Jewish law? Is there no law that I can’t fulfill?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course—otherwise it wouldn’t be Jewish law. What do you mean? If you specifically can’t fulfill it, then you’re under duress, fine, that’s a different issue.
[Speaker K] But there can’t be a commandment that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …that in principle cannot be fulfilled—then it simply cannot be fulfilled. In general, intrinsically it can’t be fulfilled—not that some particular person can’t fulfill it. A commandment that cannot be fulfilled cannot really be demanded. Obviously. I’ll say it again: if there’s a particular person who is a kleptomaniac, then he is still subject to the prohibition of theft, even though he can’t help stealing. Because human beings generally can refrain from stealing. He has a specific problem. So maybe you can say he’s under duress, but the obligation exists. But there cannot be an obligation that no one, under any circumstances, can fulfill.
[Speaker I] I think in his question he wants to know whether a person who does not fulfill an obligation that he doesn’t think he needs to fulfill—is he liable to punishment?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, obviously not. If there’s no such commandment and no such obligation.
[Speaker I] So I think in his question there’s a concern that maybe he would receive punishment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, I don’t know. I’m not responsible for the issue of punishments. For that you’d have to turn to the Holy One, blessed be He; after all, there are authorities above me. I can only say what I think.
[Speaker J] Punishments depend, Rabbi,
[Speaker C] It’s not only because the commandment can’t be fulfilled. For example, the stubborn and rebellious son—maybe according to the one who says it never happened because it couldn’t happen—then maybe it’s because conceptually you really can’t say such a thing; you can’t demand belief in something mistaken. That’s what I’m talking about.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why can’t you demand it? The fact that it’s not fulfillable is an indication that it can’t be demanded.
[Speaker G] In that context I took a quick look at Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah, and I see that there he does bring sanctions against someone who does not believe in these thirteen principles. He says that someone who doesn’t believe in them should be hated, and so on and so on.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll talk about that in a moment.
[Speaker G] That’s an obligation with a sanction.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll get to that in a little…
[Speaker G] …bit.
[Speaker J] Regarding punishments, it depends on whether it’s substantive or not. If it’s like the Rabbi brings in the trilogy, in the third volume—whether there is punishment, whether a person who commits a transgression does something substantive, creates some substantive defect, and then it becomes something spiritual, as it were, in the upper worlds, and then there is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but obviously if you’re not culpable, then you aren’t punished.
[Speaker J] Yes, but it’s still a fact. The moment he did it…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A fact is a fact, but if you’re not culpable, then no—you don’t get punished.
[Speaker J] Who said punishment is because a person is culpable? Maybe the very fact that a person did something—it’s not a matter of punishment. Maybe just the reality is that he did something, and he can only repair it. I mean, it depends if…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he can’t repair it, though.
[Speaker J] No—by returning in a reincarnation, I don’t know, all sorts of things.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Returning in a reincarnation—fine. But punishment he won’t get. I’ll say it again: maybe they’ll send him back in a reincarnation so he can try believing again, and this time maybe he’ll succeed—fine. But punishment is not given for something you could not avoid.
[Speaker J] Not necessarily. The question is what the punishment is for. Because there may be different kinds of punishments. Maybe one punishment is for having committed a transgression, and another is that a person needs, as it were, to repair it, and that’s good for him—that he should repair it rather than… I don’t know whether that’s punishment, exactly how to define it, but something like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. Corrections that are not punishment may exist—that’s unrelated. But punishment in the sense of a sanction because you were not okay—that cannot be.
[Speaker F] The Rabbi mentioned Rabbi Shimon Shkop about when there is permission, when in a rabbinic-level doubt we rule leniently. But if it turns out that the thing was actually forbidden, then it’s like—I don’t remember—like poison or something, that one is not spared punishment if really…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a rabbinic-level doubt, yes. In a Torah-level doubt, no. In a Torah-level doubt—sorry. In a Torah-level doubt you have an obligation to be stringent.
[Speaker F] Also…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …in the state of doubt itself you have an obligation to be stringent. And therefore if you stumbled, then you will be punished, because you should have been stringent. But in a rabbinic-level doubt, where in the end it turns out that you failed, you were allowed to be lenient—so what punishment would you get? You wouldn’t get any punishment.
[Speaker F] Right, because that’s the action.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. So the claim, ultimately, is that there is a fundamental problem in this whole issue of principles of faith. If I understand the concept of a principle as something that forms a framework one must accept, some kind of demand on people to adopt it, to accept it—then that cannot apply to intellectual principles. Intellectual principles are really factual claims. Yes, that’s basically the claim. Now I want to continue for a moment. Maimonides, in several places in his Commentary on the Mishnah, writes that in three places, basically, Jewish law is not decided regarding something that does not pertain to practice—matters of aggadah, thought, things that do not pertain to practice—in those things one does not issue a halakhic ruling. Let me give one example; it appears in three places in the Commentary on the Mishnah. One example is from tractate Shevuot, Commentary on the Mishnah in tractate Shevuot, chapter 1, mishnah 4. “What Rabbi Meir said, ‘all the goats’”—meaning, there are offerings and the question is what they atone for, that’s the discussion. “All the goats” means the goats of the festivals, the goats of the New Moons, and the goat offered outside on Yom Kippur. “And in this dispute one cannot say that the Jewish law follows so-and-so, because it is a matter entrusted to God, may He be exalted and glorified.” Yes—what does each goat atone for? The Holy One, blessed be He, is supposed to grant the atonement, so He has to handle the matter. Therefore, if there is a dispute among Tannaim over what atones for what, that is not something we are supposed to issue a halakhic ruling about. “And they disagreed by means of proofs and textual inferences from the verses, and this is not the place suited to mention the ways by which they derived them.” So how do the Tannaim formulate a position on such a matter? They understand it from the verses. One understands it this way, one that way. But ultimately, since this is meant to say something that the Holy One, blessed be He, is supposed to do, we are not supposed to issue a halakhic ruling in that dispute. Again, notice: he does not say that we have no way to form a position on the matter. Clearly they did form positions. Why? Because they can do so through interpretation of the verses and reach their conclusions. His claim is not that one cannot form a position, but that if there is a dispute, we are not supposed to issue a halakhic ruling in it. That’s the claim. Put differently: if I don’t have a position like Rabbi Shimon or Rabbi Meir or whoever the two disputants there are, then no one can tell me, “Look, Rabbi Meir says such-and-such, therefore you have to think such-and-such.” Because this is not something that affects me in practice; these are things that the Holy One, blessed be He, does. In that area one is not supposed to issue a halakhic ruling to me. Let everyone form his own position—or remain in doubt.
[Speaker C] So then that’s the proof that the principles too must also be for something practical and not just something normative?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m getting there, I’m getting there. I’m not bringing this for nothing. “And we have already explained that any proposition among the propositions in which there is no practical action, over which the sages disagreed, one does not say in it that the Jewish law follows so-and-so.” Here he expands more. Earlier he said these are matters entrusted to the Holy One, blessed be He. The question of what each goat atones for is a narrower statement: matters that pertain to the Holy One, blessed be He, we are not supposed to issue halakhic rulings about—let Him decide the law; He has to know what to do, not us. But here afterward he expands it and says more than that: any matter that is merely an opinion with no practical action involved, we do not say that the Jewish law follows so-and-so. That is broader. Even matters of thought that are not connected to the Holy One, blessed be He, but connected to us—if they are intellectual and not connected to practical law—then we do not issue halakhic rulings there. That is broader. And he says this in two other places as well, in Sanhedrin and somewhere else. So ostensibly Maimonides is establishing here a principle: things that do not pertain to practice, we do not issue halakhic rulings about. Now that doesn’t fit so well with his determinations regarding the principles. Regarding the principles, he did issue a halakhic ruling on intellectual matters—what I am supposed to think. Now it’s true that being a heretic with respect to a principle can have practical implications—I spoke about this last time too: “they are lowered and not raised,” and all sorts of ways we relate to such people. So because of that, it may be that with the Thirteen Principles Maimonides does see fit to rule or decide what is true and what is not true, even though in the Commentary on the Mishnah he writes that on matters that do not pertain to practice we do not decide—because here it does pertain to practice, there is an implication. If someone says that that goat atones for something else and he was mistaken, nothing happened; he’s not a heretic regarding a principle, and there is no need to treat him in any special way. So it doesn’t pertain to practice, and therefore we do not issue a halakhic ruling. But with the Thirteen Principles, since there are halakhic implications, practical implications…
[Speaker C] But not for the person himself. Where is the practical act of the person himself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not for the person himself—so what difference does that make?
[Speaker C] It’s the act of another Jew. Again, about the stories you don’t say that, because it’s not something you need to rule on. He can think—if he thinks like one Amora or another Amora, then suddenly it doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter what he thinks, because it’s not practical. Suddenly here it is? So why is the thought suddenly different here? Here it’s practical. There’s nothing practical—not for you, it’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not practical for you, only for someone else it’s practical—so one needs…
[Speaker C] …to issue a halakhic ruling? What does that have to do with it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are practical implications here. What difference does it make whether the implication is for you or for someone else?
[Speaker C] But the implications come after you determine it. Only after you issue the halakhic ruling do you come and say, okay, what should we do?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but if that’s the truth—if that’s the truth—then it has implications. So we need to determine what the truth is, because we need to know what to do in practice.
[Speaker C] But that’s after issuing the halakhic ruling.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everything is like that. Also in the laws of selecting on the Sabbath, only after we determine the law are there practical implications.
[Speaker C] But the act itself is whether to select or not to select.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so what? How to relate to someone who thinks this way or that way—so what? That too is a practical implication. So within Maimonides himself, to say there is a contradiction is not really necessary. It could very well be that he really is speaking—and in fact the examples he brings there are examples concerning what the Holy One, blessed be He, is supposed to do. And that truly doesn’t pertain to practice in any way. By contrast, the Thirteen Principles may be, in his view, things that do pertain to practice. By the way, in various places where we discuss, for example, what incurs death at the hands of Heaven, what incurs karet, or things of that sort—that too is basically issuing a halakhic ruling about what the Holy One, blessed be He, is supposed to do, because death at the hands of Heaven and karet are things that the Holy One, blessed be He, does, not the religious court. So why do we issue halakhic rulings about that? And Maimonides does issue halakhic rulings on those matters. Well, there one could say there are implications, because it indicates the severity of the transgression.
[Speaker H] Not only that, but…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The obligation of punishment is itself—no, those liable to karet who receive lashes are exempt from their karet. Meaning, there is some practical implication—whether it is death at the hands of Heaven, the matter of “kim lei be-derabah minei,” the matter of lashes, all sorts of other things—so maybe there too there is some practical implication. Therefore it may be that Maimonides’ claim is not a fundamental one; it is a more limited claim. A matter that does not concern us—there is no point in issuing a halakhic ruling. But if it does concern us, then even if it is about intellectual matters, if it has a halakhic implication, a practical implication, then there we are indeed supposed to issue a halakhic ruling. If so, then maybe that resolves Maimonides’ words. By the way, Hanokh Albeck—no, David Henshke, the Talmud professor—he wrote an article in Da’at about these passages in Maimonides, and he showed that in two out of the three cases, in two of the three cases, Maimonides in the Mishneh Torah did rule. In those same cases where in the Commentary on the Mishnah he says we do not issue halakhic rulings because it does not pertain to practice, in the Mishneh Torah he did rule. There was some practical implication there.
[Speaker J] Since the Rabbi mentioned David Henshke—possibly, I once heard in a class from a student of Rabbi Shagar on the matter of the Sabbatical year, and there he mentions that Maimonides, because he answers some serious question in the laws of the Sabbatical year in Maimonides this way, he brings an article of Henshke, who explains that Maimonides at different ages wrote different things, and he proves that he changed his mind in various places. So maybe there’s no question on these matters at all, because really the reasoning, say, changed accordingly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here too he writes that Maimonides changed his mind, and he discusses there exactly what he changed his mind about. Yes, it’s known. We have manuscripts of Maimonides where there are erasures there—that is, you can see that he changed his mind in real time. You can literally see it before your eyes.
[Speaker J] But you don’t have to say that he changed his mind in the sense that he doesn’t agree with what the Rabbi is saying. It could be, say, that there was a situation where he had to say now that someone who does such-and-such—for example, in reality, someone who would do such-and-such, say, claim there is no providence—in that period he would also be wicked in addition to that, so he claimed that someone who says there is providence is wicked. That doesn’t mean that now this is some eternal truth for every period.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. Did he rule it as Jewish law? He ruled practical law for all time, forever.
[Speaker J] Yes, but I mean by way of example—say, Conservatives, for example, people would say they’re wicked. Now in reality the Rabbi proves a thousand times that that’s not true on the level of ideas, but how shall we say, de facto, when you look at the public, that public—there is no public there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not what this is about. Maimonides is issuing halakhic rulings in very specific cases where in the Commentary on the Mishnah he writes that one does not issue halakhic rulings—not something general, and not that he is considered wicked. It’s practical Jewish law. Laws that are not related to wickedness and not…
[Speaker J] …wickedness.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s about fundamental intellectual matters there.
[Speaker J] No, I’m saying that historically too you see this a lot. I know the Rabbi doesn’t like bringing history into Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But again, it doesn’t pertain here. I’m not arguing with you; it just doesn’t pertain here. These cases are not cases…
[Speaker J] How does the Rabbi know these aren’t cases…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] …of that type?
[Speaker J] I know because I saw the laws he rules.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He rules specific laws. It’s not that he rules that you are wicked because you think wrongly.
[Speaker J] Still, it has a practical implication.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He rules it. Maybe because in that period someone who would say such a thing was generally also wicked. No, no, it’s unrelated. He issues a halakhic ruling about what is correct—not about wicked or not wicked. He issues a halakhic ruling about what is correct, and there is a halakhic implication. I’ll send a link to the article; you can read it there.
[Speaker J] It’s like the Hatam Sofer who writes that if someone does not remember one of the principles—he says that in principle it was not a principle, like the Messiah for example, it was not a principle, but from now on it is a principle. Whoever says it isn’t is a sinner. Why? Because he saw that the Reformers around him who said that were wicked, so he said that from now on they are wicked.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not arguing with the fact that there are people who speak esoterically—what are called noble lies. I’m only saying that in Maimonides I don’t think that’s the explanation here. I’m also against this whole notion of noble lies in general, but I don’t think that here in Maimonides that is the explanation, regardless of whether Maimonides was in favor of noble lies or against them. He specifically spoke about esoteric writing in the introduction to the Guide for the Perplexed; he is in favor of esoteric writing.
[Speaker G] Specifically in this case, Maimonides writes explicitly that he asks people not to read it—the Thirteen Principles—not to read it quickly and say “I believe this.” He asks them to study it deeply and understand it, and thus arrive at it. So clearly it’s not esoteric here.
[Speaker J] No,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course not. He means to say that it is a binding principle, obviously. But I’m not even talking about the principles; I’m talking about the examples from the Commentary on the Mishnah that Maimonides ruled on. There it has nothing to do with thought, or wicked people, or principles. It simply has a practical implication, and he ruled on it.
[Speaker H] So the uniqueness of Da’at—but I have to comment that maybe in Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah he also has to explain why you can’t do this in every case, whereas in the Mishneh Torah, in legal rulings, he doesn’t write the reason. Therefore in the Commentary on the Mishnah he says it’s better not to deal with it—we don’t decide. Because if he would have to decide, he’d also have to explain and justify it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, here he writes something else. He writes here that one does not decide on matters that do not pertain to practice.
[Speaker H] Just joking—not at the opening, in the middle. Sorry.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. In any case, for our purposes, this apparent contradiction is not necessarily a contradiction. By the way, the relation between the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah really can also be explained this way. It may be that Maimonides did not truly change his mind on the substantive level—and here I’m going one step beyond Henshke. He did not really change his mind substantively. Henshke ultimately argues that Maimonides changed his mind, but not that he does not issue halakhic rulings in intellectual matters—for obviously in the Thirteen Principles he did issue a ruling. Rather, that he does not issue halakhic rulings on things connected to what the Holy One, blessed be He, is supposed to do. That he leaves to Him and not to us. A very limited principle—which at the beginning of the Commentary on the Mishnah was indeed the formulation. Only later, as we saw, did he broaden it more. So in the Mishneh Torah it remained with that initial formulation. I think one can say more than that. In the Mishneh Torah, when he reached the conclusion that there really is some practical implication, he came back and ruled on it. In the Commentary on the Mishnah he was dealing with the dispute itself. The dispute itself is an intellectual dispute, and in an intellectual dispute we do not decide. But in the Mishneh Torah he suddenly saw that he needed to decide it because there was some practical implication. Well, if there is a practical implication, then he decides. So there is still some difference between the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah, at least in the sense that in the Commentary on the Mishnah he did not notice—or was not dealing with—the halakhic implication of that dispute, and saw it simply as an intellectual dispute. In the Mishneh Torah, because it is a legal book, there he suddenly saw that he needed to decide it because it does pertain to practice. So a very minor retraction, if any; it’s not really a true retraction. In any case…
[Speaker H] But now I’m thinking again for a second that actually, once he doesn’t have to justify it—after all, in the Guide for the Perplexed, when Maimonides speaks about the number of offerings, he writes that someone who thinks there is an explanation for why specifically on this day they offer such-and-such on Hol HaMoed and on that day… or something like that, I don’t remember exactly. Maybe the fact that in the Mishneh Torah he doesn’t have to justify it makes it easier, so that also fits with Maimonides’ view that he can decide.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Mishneh Torah Maimonides writes that it is a scriptural decree, and in the Guide for the Perplexed he offers explanations regarding sacrifices. So what is it in the end? In the laws of misuse of consecrated property—this is a well-known contradiction in Maimonides. In any event, I think that for our purposes, this really seems to be the natural explanation: once there are intellectual principles, in and of themselves there is no need to issue a ruling. But once they pertain to practice, then I issue a ruling regarding the practical implication. Now even in that ruling there is room to discuss: once I have ruled on it, have I also settled the intellectual question? Or not? Maybe I leave the intellectual question open and only decide what one must do on the practical plane. But if someone thinks otherwise on the intellectual plane, yet acts practically this way, then everything is fine. Because I did not issue a ruling on the intellectual question. True, the practical implication is a result of the thought, of the intellectual conception. Fine—but if I was not convinced on the intellectual level, then I was not convinced. As long as I do what Jewish law says, then fine. So maybe the gap between the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah is even narrower—that really even in the Mishneh Torah he does not truly issue a ruling on the intellectual dispute itself. He only says what one should do. That’s a bit difficult, but perhaps; I don’t know.
[Speaker J] Rabbi, that’s a bit difficult, because Maimonides himself, say regarding the laws of prayer, where the Rabbi brings up the issue of providence—the Rabbi wants to draw different conclusions from it—but Maimonides doesn’t present the Rabbi’s conclusions from it, even though he too held that providence is much more limited. So you see here that he didn’t have that conception, that they looked…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think you’re right. Once providence—even if providence is limited—the whole institution of prayer can remain exactly as it is.
[Speaker J] How can it remain exactly as it is? “Forgive us,” or all those things, “heal us,” all those things—how do they fit in? Where do they fit?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? “Forgive us” is excellent; according to my view too it’s fine. What’s the problem?
[Speaker J] No, no, sorry—requests for active things in our lives, like “heal us.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. It could be that there is also involvement in our lives. The question of how limited or broad it is—that’s a different question. What does that have to do with it?
[Speaker J] I’m going according to Maimonides, according to the common approach to Maimonides that says it’s only for the righteous, or as Rabbi Soloveitchik says, only for people of truly great spiritual stature.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where is the… Well, that’s Rabbi Soloveitchik, not Maimonides. In Maimonides there are different and contradictory sources, and sometimes he also speaks esoterically. It’s very hard to know what Maimonides thought on the issue of providence. There are places where it seems that there is none at all.
[Speaker J] Right, I know. There are places, for example, where he says that crying out to ask for something—he says that’s just crying out to ask because something happened, all sorts of strange things. I’m saying according to the view that does understand it that way, which the Rabbi also brings in his book—the view that understands providence to be limited—exactly how does that fit? Why are there no implications for reality, for change in Jewish law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore I say: who says there really is such a view in Maimonides?
[Speaker J] It seems that way. In many places in Maimonides it looks that way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. You see many things in Maimonides. There are many contradictions on these matters in Maimonides. I wouldn’t draw systematic conclusions from it.
[Speaker J] Is the Rabbi saying he’s become like the Five Books of Moses? What—that Maimonides became like the Five Books of Moses, where you can’t know…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On this matter, I think yes. Anyway, look: once Maimonides writes at the beginning of the Guide for the Perplexed that sometimes he writes esoterically, that ends the story. You can burn all of Maimonides’ writings—you can’t learn anything from them. Because whatever he says, you can always say, well, that’s esoteric, he didn’t really believe that. That’s what many people today claim and write; many people make a living from these things. Fine. Once you permit that—that is the price of esoteric writing, of noble lies. People think that a lie is useful in some particular place, so it’s worthwhile, or there is justification for lying. But the broader consequence is that in the end you lose all meaning in anything you say anywhere. Because someone who permits himself to lie in general, say as an approach—then you can’t believe anything he says. And that is why I think this whole idea is so severe—this notion of noble lies, of esotericism, of all these… yes, things that once were very common. It is certainly true that such things existed; I’m not arguing with the facts. Clearly they did exist. I’m simply very, very opposed to these approaches, because they are genuinely destructive approaches.
[Speaker J] That much?
[Speaker H] But if it’s transparent—if he writes and does it in a transparent way, signaling to you that he is going to be somewhat esoteric—then it’s less harsh.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] נכון, but you know, our own eyes see how many disputes there are over things Maimonides wrote, between people who say it was esoteric and people who say he wrote it literally. So you see that he did not succeed in clarifying well enough what is esoteric and what isn’t.
[Speaker H] It’s a slippery slope.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a slippery slope; it’s already problematic from the outset. You don’t need to get to the slope at all. True, that is a possible conclusion in light of esotericism. You know, esotericism has no limit—the question is where you stop. Once you allow yourself esotericism, you can do whatever you want with what you write. Now, some people want to argue that Maimonides planted—he himself basically writes this—that he planted hints. Meaning, the contradictions are not just random contradictions, but someone who studies carefully and has a sound head will manage to understand what I really think. Fine, very nice statement. It doesn’t seem to have real backing in the world, unless some of the people who seem to me intelligent are actually stupid. But it seems to me that intelligent people too are perplexed by Maimonides’ esotericism. There is an approach…
[Speaker F] …that Micah Goodman has about this.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, I’m saying…
[Speaker F] …an extreme approach among researchers who say that you can no longer attain or understand anything, since he already warned us in the seven points in the introduction. Such an extreme approach would imply he wouldn’t have written a book at all, because you’d have to burn everything, there’s nothing there, and that’s unreasonable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s not an approach, that’s a fact. That’s not an approach. I have a question on him: why did he write the book? Factually, everything he wrote cannot be taken seriously. Factually. Now, maybe he thought it would be possible to extract the truth, but factually he didn’t succeed. So practically speaking, you can throw that book in the garbage. It’s a factual question. Don’t answer me with objections like, so why did Maimonides write it? I don’t know why Maimonides wrote it. Factually, I can’t derive anything meaningful from it, so what good does it do me? He apparently thought it would be possible.
[Speaker F] But there are various things—in the Guide he, in the Guide he focuses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like the objection to what I said about the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh): that you can derive whatever you want from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), and therefore you can’t learn anything from it. People say, fine, so why was the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) written? Great question, but practically speaking, you can’t derive anything from it—what can I do? That’s the fact. But…
[Speaker F] It’s not the same thing. The Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) doesn’t focus on principles. No, I’m asking you—the question is a good one.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why was the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) written? If you can’t learn anything from it, then why was it written? That’s an excellent objection to my view. Fine. But the objection doesn’t topple my view. Wonderful objection. Okay, and therefore what? Practically, I’m showing you that you can’t derive anything from it.
[Speaker F] No, but you also admit that it was written, at least historically, because some tradition had to be transmitted, some story.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Historically, Maimonides also had to transmit… I don’t know, I can say the same sort of vague words about Maimonides too.
[Speaker F] No, but that’s history. Maimonides wasn’t focused on history. There are contradictions scattered throughout the Guide here and there, but when he really enters into the thick of a topic—for example providence—you can’t say that he really didn’t drastically limit providence. He develops it; he has chapters on it, he develops it and defends it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has chapters, and there are other places where he writes otherwise. There are contradictions on this matter. Fine, he develops it—so what can I do? Look at the differing opinions among his commentators and you’ll see that there is a broad range.
[Speaker F] Yes, that’s why I said according to researchers, because there are the conservatives who even say that the Guide…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay. The fact that esotericism allows this whole range to appear—that is problematic.
[Speaker J] In the end there is also an answer according to the Rabbi’s view for why there is a Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), because after all the Rabbi argues that there is an intuition by which one can ultimately understand something from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh).
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t think one can.
[Speaker J] Then how about laws?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Historically, factually—and historically, fine.
[Speaker J] No, no, laws, laws.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not laws. I’m talking about thoughts, values.
[Speaker J] Ah, so not that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This reminds me that once I was at a shivah visit at someone’s house, and there was some Talmud professor from Bar-Ilan there; the mourner was also a professor at Bar-Ilan. So I was there, and he said how wonderful Rashi is, that everyone can understand in him whatever he wants. It was in a conversation there between Minhah and Ma’ariv. At that exact time I was learning Hezkat HaBatim intensely. In Hezkat HaBatim there is Rashi at the beginning, and then at some stage it becomes Rashbam—Pesahim and Hezkat HaBatim. And I told him: listen, do you know what’s so beautiful about Rashi? That you can’t understand whatever you want in him. You understand what he is saying. In contrast to Rashbam, who writes you mile after mile and you don’t understand what he wants from you. Everyone can understand him differently, and there are contradictions. You suddenly see Rashi’s artistry when you suddenly see Rashbam’s commentaries. You see Rashi’s artistry, how wrong it is to say that everyone can understand in him whatever he wants. Rather, he truly knows how to clarify briefly exactly what he wants to clarify. And that is exactly the point.
[Speaker H] I miss Nedarim.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I miss Nedarim, the Ran. Fine. In any case, there it’s shorter; it’s not as long as Rashbam. Rivan tries to imitate Rashi more. In any event, one way or another, what emerges basically is that Maimonides probably does issue halakhic rulings on intellectual matters if they pertain to practice, and he does decide them. Okay? Now here I return to the introduction I gave earlier as well.
[Speaker A] But wait, regarding Yom Kippur—does the essence of the day itself atone or not? There’s a dispute there in Yoma, Rabbi Yehuda—is there no halakhic ruling there at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course there is.
[Speaker A] Okay, so there it pertains to practice?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Certainly—the question is whether you need to repent, or whether the very essence of the day atones. Okay. In any case, notice that this whole discussion is being conducted under the assumption that, on the fundamental level, it is possible to issue a halakhic ruling even in matters of belief and thought. The only question is whether such authority really exists. Meaning: does Jewish law or the Torah maintain that even in questions of belief we issue a halakhic ruling? Then there is room to discuss—maybe yes, maybe no; in places that affect practice, yes; in places that do not affect practice, no; in places that relate to the Holy One, blessed be He, also no; and so on. But if I am right in what I said earlier, then the problem is much more basic. You cannot issue a halakhic ruling in the realm of belief, not because the Torah does not grant a mandate to decide such disputes, but because conceptually it has no meaning. You simply cannot issue such a ruling. Understand that if I am right, then even if that theological dispute affects practice, even then you cannot issue a halakhic ruling. Everything I said earlier about Maimonides is irrelevant. Because what I said earlier about Maimonides was that if the theological dispute affects practice, there he does issue a halakhic ruling. That is something you can say only on the assumption that the decision whether to issue a halakhic ruling or not is given over to us—to us, to the Torah, whatever—but the question is what the Torah wants: that we rule, or that we not rule. But I am claiming that this has nothing to do with the Torah. Conceptually, you cannot issue a halakhic ruling on questions of belief. Conceptually. So even if it affects practice, you still cannot issue a halakhic ruling on it. What difference does it make? At most—and this is the last formulation I gave earlier—maybe you can say that the theological question remains open, but with regard to practical decision-making we want a bottom-line ruling that will bind everyone, on a completely technical level. Then I will think like Rabbi Meir but act like Rabbi Yosei. Okay? Even though the practical conduct is a result of the theological principle, and the dispute is over a theological principle, I am nevertheless required in some sense to decide the practical question so that the Torah not become like two Torahs, or for all sorts of similar considerations. Then you could say that in principle it is really impossible to issue a halakhic ruling in matters of belief; in fact, even where it affects practice they did not issue a halakhic ruling in matters of belief—what they told you was only what to do. Meaning, they also did not decide the dispute because there are halakhic ramifications; rather, they ruled on the halakhic ramifications, not on the dispute. That perhaps one could say even if one accepts what I said earlier—that in disputes that concern facts, or theological disputes, conceptually you cannot issue a halakhic ruling. The discussion in Maimonides and in others does not look like that. In Maimonides it looks like in principle you can issue a halakhic ruling. Even from what he writes—he says that in things that do not affect practice, we were not told to issue a halakhic ruling. He does not say that it is conceptually impossible. Rather, there we were not told to rule. Meaning, it seems that this is a matter of instruction: whether the Torah instructs us to decide also questions of belief or fact, or only halakhic questions. And that is an inquiry into what the Torah said. According to how I am presenting it, this has nothing at all to do with the question of what the Torah said. You cannot issue a halakhic ruling on questions that are theological, questions that concern fact. So this claim, in the simple sense, does not fit with Maimonides—unless, again, I say the strained explanation I gave at the end: that they really did not decide the theological dispute, but only told you what to do in the bottom line. Okay? But that is not the plain meaning of Maimonides. The plain meaning of Maimonides seems to be that he really does issue a halakhic ruling in these areas. Such a thing is inconceivable. Fine—acting one way or another, okay; in a practical question you can separate it from the theological infrastructure underlying it. But you cannot say that a person holds a legitimate position that cannot be determined to be wrong, and then you will lower him into a pit and not raise him out. That sounds unreasonable. Because from that, if you say it, then apparently you really did decide the theological dispute; you did not merely decide what to do in practice, the halakhic ruling. Like I once discussed regarding a scriptural decree. I said that in the Talmud there appears a dispute between Abaye and Rava whether conspiring witnesses are a scriptural decree, and you have there only what is explicitly novel in it, or whether it is not a scriptural decree. Yes—the practical difference is whether a conspiring witness is disqualified only from that point onward, or retroactively. Now, usually people understand a scriptural decree to mean a law without a reason. What does that mean? Basically this is two against two: there are two witnesses against two witnesses. But there is a scriptural decree to accept the position of the disproving witnesses, the second pair, and to disqualify the first witnesses. And I wrote there, and said there, that such a thing cannot be. It cannot be. It cannot be that two witnesses come, who in principle are telling the truth, and I will kill them because it says, "Then you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother." What do you mean? He spoke the truth—this is two against two. If you ask me whether he told the truth—the answer is yes, but I kill him as a liar. Such a thing cannot be. Meaning, you cannot explain the concept of a scriptural decree in its ordinary sense. There have to be explanations there. So I explained why it is in fact called a scriptural decree, and why nevertheless there is logic in it. Meaning, it is not… how should I put it? There are certain things in which there is an essential connection. If you kill him because he is a liar, right? He bore false witness against his brother, and then you shall do to him as he conspired to do to his brother. Meaning, this is a punishment for the lie. If you tell me, no—the truth is that he did not lie, but there is a scriptural decree to punish him as a liar—you cannot say there is a scriptural decree that now day is night. Meaning, there are situations in which the connection between the factual or theological determination and the halakhic consequence is a direct connection, a direct bond. And there you cannot split them and say: the theological question I leave open, and the halakhic consequence I decide. And I think the same is true here. With regard to heretics, you cannot detach it and say: no, he is perfectly fine, he did not violate anything, there is no decision on the theological question—but we will lower him into a pit and not raise him out.
[Speaker G] But if so, then the question is not about Maimonides. The question is already about the Talmud, which determines the law regarding a heretic. After all, already in the Talmud, if the Talmud says that regarding a heretic, "they lower him down and do not raise him up." Or alternatively… I said, Maimonides, I said—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said this in the previous class: Maimonides brings his thirteen principles in the chapter Chelek. He brings them in the chapter Chelek apparently because he understands that this is the explanation of the concept of a heretic, about whom the Talmud says what it says.
[Speaker G] But if so, then really the difficulty is not specifically on Maimonides; it is already—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] on—
[Speaker J] the Talmud.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Alternatively, yes. That is why I say that from Maimonides' standpoint, apparently you cannot say that he did not rule on the theological question, but only on the practical one. He apparently understands that one must rule on the theological question too. Or in other words, he is not bothered by what I said earlier—that conceptually you cannot issue a halakhic ruling in a theological dispute. From his perspective it is only a question of what the Torah expects from us. Does it expect us to decide such a dispute or not?
[Speaker J] And then he says—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in a place that affects practice, it expects us to decide, and when it does not affect practice, it does not expect us to decide—that is all. But he has no principled problem with deciding a theological question. And we see that the Talmud also had no principled problem with it. Wait—alternatively. Wait, but in the end Maimonides came to the point where he had to decide, do you hear?
[Speaker H] I am saying that Maimonides had to decide between his moral choice, his theological outlook, and what the Torah itself obligates and says. So it was clear to him that he had to rule, even if it contradicted what he thought a person… because, as we saw earlier, that is what is written. There is no other option in the Talmud.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is written? I did not understand.
[Speaker H] That regarding a heretic, "they lower him down and do not raise him up," as if…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I said—the question is already on the Talmud, not only on Maimonides. Alternatively, yes. I will get to that question when we get to it.
[Speaker H] No, Rabbi, you are trying to say that Maimonides held such-and-such, and I am saying that Maimonides held like you, only he was simply bound… this is just wording. He was bound… and "they lower him down," as it were. Fine, okay, so I said—the question is already on the Talmud, not only on Maimonides. Indeed, yes, I will get to that question, I will get there. Rabbi, when I say it is not difficult—no, you, Rabbi, are trying to say that Maimonides held such-and-such. I am saying that Maimonides held like you, only he was simply bound by what is written in the Talmud, and that is what he wrote. It is just wording.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is just wording. In the final analysis, if Maimonides rules that way, then it means he adopted the Talmud's position. It may be that he did not want to, but practically speaking, if he rules that way, the meaning is that he thinks one can and should decide theological disputes. If I were to see the Talmud that way, and I were convinced that theological disputes cannot be decided, I would remain with it as requiring further study—but I would not be able to rule like the Talmud, because it is simply impossible.
[Speaker J] The Talmud itself, when it rules that a heretic is killed—what is the Talmud's reason? Is this something the Talmud does as an enactment? This is not something of Torah-level origin, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It is not clear; it is not clear to me.
[Speaker J] No, because if it is an enactment, then it is easier to understand that it is not connected to the conceptual issue.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You could say it is a public welfare enactment.
[Speaker J] You tell him: listen, you are going to destroy society, so we take you down, as it were. Do not cause trouble. There is logic to that; they do it today too in different ways.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I will get there. I think I have a better explanation, so we will get to it later. In any event, this is the point I wanted to sharpen here: according to what I wanted to argue, even in a place where the theological dispute affects practice—where it has halakhic implications—even there you cannot rule, because conceptually you cannot rule in a theological dispute. By contrast, if you say that when there is a practical implication you can rule, and only when there is no practical implication we do not rule, then that means that on the principled level you are saying that yes, one can decide a theological dispute. The whole question is only where we were told to rule and where not—but you do not accept that conceptually such a thing is impossible. Right—that is basically the claim. Okay, so I will stop with this distinction; we will continue with it next time.
[Speaker J] But just to note, this can also work if I say, as I said, that this is a social issue—as in preserving the public. Then it would also explain why over all the generations, I do not know, hundreds of generations, they did not touch anyone who insulted Torah scholars. I believe that contempt for Torah scholars is something that has already been entrenched among the Jewish people for years on this issue—people mocking and things like that—and nobody thought of grabbing someone and throwing him off a roof, right? Because it did not really tear the social fabric, so nobody touched it. They acted only on things that damaged the social fabric.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I do not think that in the 12th, 15th, or 17th century it undermined things any less than in the time of the Talmud. That is not my impression.
[Speaker J] In the Talmud maybe it was more so, because the Torah scholars—their status there sounds like it was greater.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Their status was greater, so the opposite—if so, then even more—
[Speaker J] then it was less destabilized by someone not preserving their honor. Why? Of course, when everyone thinks Torah scholars—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] are such great figures, and then suddenly someone comes and mocks them in front of everyone—that is enormous brazenness. People understand that he is an idiot, because they are so great. Today, when you see everyone as human beings, it could be more destructive.
[Speaker J] I do not think so, that is not my impression—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that that is the difference between the generations.
[Speaker J] No, in that period they thought they were ministering angels, and suddenly some person came along who was somewhat clever, say—not necessarily some complete fool—and said something insolent. They pounced on him immediately with forks—what is the question?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if you are giving psychological explanations, I am not arguing.
[Speaker J] Not psychological—social. Why did they enact it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you are explaining to me substantive differences, then in my view—
[Speaker J] the expected damage—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] in such a situation is less. When they are heavenly beings, then what is the problem? Nothing can undermine their status.
[Speaker J] The Talmud tells us about the beginning of the situation, when people started to get a bit of sense and dared to speak up.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now this is just the continuation of that situation, so we should have had to deal even more harshly with such heretics.
[Speaker J] Everything has already unraveled, that is it, there is nothing to do.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, I will get to that later. I think that this—
[Speaker J] I have a different explanation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay. Any other comments or questions? Okay then, goodbye, Sabbath peace, and good tidings.
[Speaker F] Thank you very much.