Dogmatics – Lecture 4

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—an act. That’s why I said this distinction exists on the conceptual level. But logically it makes no sense at all. Conceptually it’s not the same thing: a prohibition against holding a different opinion, versus a prohibition against examining a different opinion. Right, that’s why I made that distinction in Maimonides. Only afterward I noted that maybe conceptually you can make such a distinction, but logically it makes no sense; it doesn’t hold water. Because just as you can’t demand that I think something, you also can’t forbid me from examining other thoughts. It’s the same thing. Fine.

[Speaker E] Rabbi, two questions. Let’s say Maimonides was talking about the time of the giving of the Torah, roughly that generation when they say there was revelation and the Holy One, blessed be He, was still revealed—then you supposedly already see that the Torah is true, you see it with your own eyes, you don’t need all kinds of proofs and beliefs and so on. So maybe here there is room for Maimonides’ argument? Meaning, in any case you know it’s true, so don’t…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—why not? What do you mean? Either way. If I think it’s true because the facts and everything are true, then there’s no need to command me anything; I already think it’s true. But if I don’t think it’s true, then either convince me or be quiet. You can’t command me not to think what I think.

[Speaker E] No, I’m commanding you not to arrive at the conclusion you reached, because after all you know the conclusion is apparently not correct. You saw with your own eyes that the conclusion is not correct.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I saw with my own eyes, then I already know it’s not correct; you don’t need to command me.

[Speaker E] No, and then you reach an apparent contradiction between, say, your observation and your rational conclusion. Then you think your rational conclusion is correct, and then you go and reject the observation. You say, well, apparently I hallucinated maybe, things like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, fine, excellent. So I reached the conclusion that I hallucinated, and now that’s what I hold. Now explain to me how you can forbid me from that.

[Speaker E] Okay, I understand. Another question: does the Rabbi think there’s room, say, to forbid rabbis—meaning, for rabbis to forbid their students from coming and studying? Meaning, the rabbi knows it’s true; he thinks his student isn’t that smart or, Heaven forbid, might go astray.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like the Hasidim, yes. The Hasidim say that the rebbe is allowed all kinds of things because he has lofty attainments, but ordinary people are forbidden. Like Rabbi Nachman.

[Speaker E] That’s seemingly also what Maimonides implies here—that he says: you shouldn’t study, because you’ll come to the wrong conclusion, but I do know and I do study.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Look, everyone can adopt whatever policy he wants. I, as an ordinary person, wouldn’t accept such an instruction. It seems to me I even suggested this explanation on the website: that maybe Maimonides is speaking to such foolish people who really think they need to accept such an instruction. So for such people, maybe it really is worthwhile to give them that instruction. But an intelligent person understands that it’s nonsense. So as far as he’s concerned, it isn’t directed at him at all.

[Speaker I] I think you can also add one more small thing here regarding the prohibition against studying other things—that it’s similar to a commandment, to the positive commandment to believe in God.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning—wait, I’ll get to that commandment in a moment.

[Speaker I] No, no, I’m not talking about the commandment. This principle is similar, because if you forbid me from studying something else, by what authority are you commanding me? After all, I need to examine whether you have the authority to command me in this matter. That’s my claim, right? No, the claim—I understood it a bit differently from what you claimed. I understood that—wow, I don’t remember exactly how I understood it before, but it sounded a bit different to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. What you said seems to me to be what I said.

[Speaker I] Okay, if…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I understood correctly, I don’t know.

[Speaker B] So how does the Rabbi reconcile Maimonides?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First, I don’t know how to reconcile Maimonides as such. The only thing I can say in his defense is that he was speaking to fools. Very plausible. And if someone is foolish enough to accept such a command as a valid command, then maybe he really should be commanded with that command.

[Speaker F] Rabbi, you can see in Maimonides’ own introduction—you can see that he writes that he wrote the book for those kinds of people, because at the beginning of the introduction he writes that people don’t even know how to read baraitot and Tosefta texts and Talmud. In such a situation, there’s nothing to talk about.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, maybe. In any case, you know, I don’t like these interpretations of Jewish laws or of texts generally, because the moment you start saying, no, he didn’t mean it seriously, he really meant something else—we talked about esotericism, right? The moment Maimonides says he allows himself to write things esoterically, you can no longer know anything about him. Anything he says that doesn’t fit for me, I’ll say, well, he didn’t mean that, it’s just esoteric writing. So in practice, once you allow such a thing, you basically empty everything you say of content.

[Speaker B] And that’s why Maimonides raises this question—because it’s also a strong question. What? If Maimonides says he follows an esoteric approach, then that’s it, there’s no point to the whole project.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I don’t know. In his introduction there in Guide for the Perplexed, he claims that he writes esoterically, but intelligent people can know what he thinks. He constructs it in such a way, with these hints and those hints, that if a person is wise, he understands what Maimonides thinks. But that’s very strange, because the book was written for the perplexed. So maybe these are extremely smart perplexed people, I don’t know. But the fact is that Maimonides’ interpreters are perplexed by what he himself wrote. There are many perplexities in the interpretation of the Guide for the Perplexed.

[Speaker J] No, but Maimonides’ “perplexed”—he writes himself that the definition of the perplexed he means is those who have reached the level of the perplexed. It’s not someone who never asked himself at all. “Perplexed” is a level in Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so those are words. In practice, what human beings is this aimed at? Because these people too are very intelligent, and still the fact is they can argue opposite claims in interpreting Maimonides’ words. And everyone hangs it on esotericism. There are those who say Maimonides didn’t believe in God. There are such interpretations too. That he didn’t think the commandments needed to be observed at all. I’ve seen everything already among the interpreters of Maimonides. Really, this esoteric writing is downright destructive, in my view. But yes, Maimonides did it, I’m not…

[Speaker B] Maybe Maimonides anticipated postmodern deconstruction. Quite a strong statement already from Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, then it would have been pointless for him to write. He could have just spilled ink on paper and published that. Rorschach blots. Everyone would understand whatever he wants in them, and everything would be excellent.

[Speaker F] That’s exactly Rabbi Shagar’s claim—that everything should be understood however one wants.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, so it’s just a shame to invest effort in it. You could just spill the ink, and in a second I would have written the Mishneh Torah and the Guide for the Perplexed, and everything would have been fine. In short: absurd things on the one hand, but on the other hand Maimonides himself cooked this stew. Meaning, once you allow yourself esotericism, that’s problematic. In the Mishneh Torah it’s not generally thought that there is esotericism; in the Guide for the Perplexed, yes. In the Mishneh Torah it’s less likely, or at least it doesn’t seem that way and it isn’t accepted that Maimonides writes esoterically in the Mishneh Torah. But this Jewish law I simply cannot understand. Either it’s something plainly unacceptable, and if I can somehow speak in Maimonides’ favor, it would be to say that he was speaking to fools. I don’t know. In any case, perhaps one more source that people brought up to me on the website בעקבות the previous lesson. Here in chapter two of Eight Chapters: “Know that rebellion and obedience to the Torah are found only in two parts of the soul: the perceptive part and the arousing part alone. And in these two parts are all the transgressions and commandments. But the nutritive part and the imaginative part have neither obedience nor rebellion, since neither of them has knowledge or choice in any action at all, and a person cannot cancel their activity or limit them by any act. Do you not see that these two parts—the nutritive and the imaginative—operate during sleep, unlike the rest of the powers of the soul? However, the rational part presents a difficulty, but I say that it too may involve obedience and rebellion, in accordance with belief in a false opinion or belief in a true opinion. But there is no act in it to which one can simply apply the term act of commandment or transgression.” So this is a very interesting passage. First, the nutritive and imaginative parts are not things of thought; they’re instincts. And Maimonides says: with instincts, commandments and transgressions don’t apply. By the way, in my view that’s the reason commandments and transgressions don’t apply to emotions. They belong to the imaginative and nutritive part. Now beyond that there is the perceptive part…

[Speaker B] And the arousing part, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, this is…

[Speaker B] Maimonides here explicitly says that the perceptive part is not in the category of the nutritive and imaginative.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the sentence I had just begun to say. Meaning, I claim on this basis that it also makes no sense to command emotions, but Maimonides here—the perceptive part and the arousing part—seem, apparently, yes. Beyond that, Maimonides—but there is an additional category, namely the rational part, and there Maimonides says there is perplexity. That’s very interesting, because this is exactly our issue: are there commandments and transgressions in the rational part or not? So he says here: belief in a false opinion or belief in a true opinion. There can be—because there is truth or falsehood here—one can decide. With instincts there is no truth or falsehood; an instinct is an instinct; what arises is what arises. But in the intellect, of course there is truth and falsehood. But Maimonides says: “it too may involve obedience and rebellion, in accordance with belief in a false opinion or belief in a true opinion.” Meaning, up to this point it could be that an obligation is also imposed on me, because there is obedience and rebellion here—to obey it or rebel against it—because there is truth or falsehood. But then he adds something else here that is very interesting: “But there is no act in it to which one can simply apply the term act of commandment or transgression.” What does he mean here? Does he mean that I’m only thinking, that the transgression is the thought and not some act? Fine, obviously—he’s talking about thought. What is the point of that addition? It could be that what he means to say here—I’m not sure, because the wording isn’t clear—is that there is a determination of truth and falsehood here, but you can’t turn that into a commandment. Meaning, to think this thing is not an act of commandment. It’s a correct act. Meaning, this thought is a correct thought, and that thought is an incorrect thought. But you can’t say that the correct thought is an act of commandment, or the incorrect thought is an act of rebellion—that it’s a transgression. And that actually brings me to the suggestion I proposed in the conclusion of that column, and here I’m completing the previous lesson. It could be that what Maimonides—I’m returning again to his words in his commentary on the Mishnah. In the commentary on the Mishnah he said: what merit delays for the suspected adulteress, or for what do the goats of the New Moons or the festival goats atone? And then he says that we do not issue a halakhic ruling about that, whereas in the Mishneh Torah he did rule. But notice: he didn’t rule something practical; he ruled what is correct. Which merit delays and which merit does not delay, or for what the goats atone—whether it involved thought and not thought at the beginning and end—for what the goats atone. So his ruling is not a ruling of what to do, but a ruling of what to think. And here it could be that this is indeed what he means also in this passage from chapter two of Eight Chapters. I suggested in that column that Maimonides is not really issuing Jewish law here, but deciding what the truth is. That’s not the same thing. Maimonides can say: look, the truth is that the goats of the New Moons and festivals atone for this and this, or that for this one incurs death at the hand of Heaven and for that one incurs karet. All these things are not halakhic rulings in the sense that they obligate, because you can’t obligate thoughts, as I said earlier. It is a determination of what is true. Maimonides says this is what is true. Because here—this is an important point—when I say that one cannot decide here, one cannot force a person to believe this, and one cannot command it, that doesn’t mean there is no truth in it. On the contrary: factual claims are the claims in which it is clearest that there is truth and falsehood. Right? The claim is not that in factual matters there is no truth and falsehood, some kind of pluralism where everyone is right. Certainly not. On the contrary, factual claims are the least suited to pluralism. It’s clear that one is right and the other is wrong if there is a dispute. I’m only claiming that you cannot invoke authority with respect to factual claims. Even if you are mistaken, one cannot demand that you think otherwise. That’s not a coherent demand. Not because you’re not mistaken—you are mistaken—but truth and falsehood do exist in these claims, yes? That’s clear. It’s just that demanding that you hold the truth or abandon the falsehood—that you cannot do. You can persuade, but not demand. Okay? Now if that’s really the case—and that may be what he writes in chapter two, in what we just read—there is true belief and false belief. But “an act of commandment” cannot be said of it. There cannot be a demand to hold the true belief or not hold the false belief. You can’t turn it into a commandment. So yes, it appears in the Mishneh Torah, and in that sense Maimonides ruled regarding the question of what is correct, but it is not Jewish law or a commandment in the sense that you are required to accept it. There is no such thing as being required to accept facts. You may be persuaded that Maimonides is right—then no problem. But if you weren’t persuaded, you cannot be required to think that way. And maybe Maimonides doesn’t mean that either. All he means is only to decide what the truth is, that’s all. And if that is the meaning, then indeed the claim is that what he writes in chapter two of Eight Chapters is exactly that. He says: there is truth and falsehood in these claims, in the intellectual commandments. “There is perplexity in this,” he says. Why is there perplexity here? Because after all, there is truth and falsehood here; it’s not instinct, it’s judgment. There is a correct conclusion and an incorrect conclusion. It’s just that you cannot call it an act of commandment. Or in other words, you cannot command it. When I hold the correct position, you can’t say I fulfilled a commandment, and someone who does not hold that position did not commit a transgression. You cannot demand such things of a person. You can express an opinion about what is correct. Maimonides decides what, in his opinion, is correct, but he does not demand that people adopt it. Now if that is really how one understands it, then it may be that Maimonides did not retract at all between the commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah. Because Ibn Tibbon tries various possibilities for minimizing how much Maimonides retracted from the commentary on the Mishnah to the Mishneh Torah. According to what I’m suggesting now, he didn’t retract at all. It really is impossible to issue a binding ruling. All he said in the Mishneh Torah is what, in his opinion, is true. Now look, I’ll show you the wording of Maimonides in the three places in the commentary on the Mishnah, and you’ll see that he is very precise in his wording there. Let me return for a moment to what he wrote in the commentary on the Mishnah. In Sotah—here, let’s start first with Shevuot. Look at the sentence Maimonides writes: “We have already mentioned to you several times that any dispute that occurs between the sages, which is not dependent on action but only on establishing an opinion, there is no place to rule Jewish law in accordance with one of them.” Not: there is no place to decide who is right, but rather: one cannot issue a halakhic ruling. Meaning, you cannot obligate someone to accept one of the sides. But you certainly can express an opinion about who is right. Look at the next source in Sotah: “I have already told you more than once, that if the sages disputed some outlook or opinion whose purpose is not an action of actions, then one does not say there ‘the Jewish law follows so-and-so.’” He does not write that one cannot decide the matter. He writes that one cannot establish it as Jewish law, because Jewish law is a demand made of people. To establish what the truth is—that’s a conclusion, that’s the truth. To establish Jewish law means that this truth also obligates you. There is a claim against you if you do not hold it. The same thing in the commentary on the Mishnah in Shevuot: “We have already explained that any opinion among the opinions in which the sages disputed, and which does not involve any action, one does not say concerning it ‘the Jewish law follows so-and-so.’” You see, he is very precise in his wording in all three places, really. And now let’s return for a moment to chapter two. You see: “However, the rational part presents a difficulty.” I’ll read it now through these lenses. “However, the rational part presents a difficulty. But I say that it too may involve obedience and rebellion”—there is perplexity in it, so he is not sure. But he says it may involve obedience and rebellion, in accordance with belief in a false opinion or belief in a true opinion. “But there is no act in it to which one can simply apply the term act of commandment or transgression.” At first glance you say, fine, because this is thought, not an act of commandment—it’s a commandment in thought. But that doesn’t need to be said. You’re talking about thought. It’s obvious that when we’re talking about thought, there are no actions here; these are thoughts. It could be that what he means is what I said earlier: that this thing is a false opinion or a true belief, but it is not an act of commandment to hold that opinion or not to hold that opinion, and it is not a transgression not to hold that opinion. That’s what he means—not that thought is not an act; I know that too. Rather, that commandment doesn’t apply to such a thing. That’s why he says there is perplexity in it. Otherwise why does he say there is perplexity in it? He should say the opposite: so in the intellect there is a commandment and there is a transgression. True, it is not an act of commandment; it is a commandment concerning thought. So where is the perplexity? What exactly is unclear to him in the whole story? Therefore he says, “And therefore I said above that in those two parts are found the transgressions and the commandments.” Meaning, with respect to the rational part, which is a third part, it remains in perplexity. He does not add it to the realm of commandments and transgressions. Why? After all, he just said there is. “It too may involve obedience and rebellion, in accordance with belief in a false opinion or belief in a true opinion.” Well then, there are commandments and transgressions in it—obedience and rebellion. So why is that only in the perceptive and arousing parts and not in the rational part? Because it may be that what he really means—we would perhaps need to look at other translations; all this is translated from Arabic—it may be that when he says “there is no act in it,” he means it cannot be defined as a commandment. That is his perplexity. There is truth and falsehood here, but Maimonides says that maybe such a thing cannot be defined as a commandment or a transgression, because one cannot demand of a person that he think something, even if it is true.

[Speaker F] So why “raise them up and do not lower them,” and things like that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] So why “raise them up and do not lower them,” and all that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll get there, I’ll get there.

[Speaker I] So if we use the terminology of the previous lesson, can we say that Maimonides here is acting not as a formal authority but as a substantive authority?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Exactly like that.

[Speaker I] And if so, then this has no connection to the thirteen principles of faith / belief that we’re talking about here? Because there he speaks as a formal authority.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a moment. Not sure—maybe there too it’s like this. Okay. We’ll see in a moment. That’s what they asked here now regarding “lower them and do not raise them,” because that seemingly really does look like formal authority. But the determination itself—you could say that the determination of the thirteen principles too is only a determination that this is the truth, but not a demand of human beings to accept them.

[Speaker I] It doesn’t look that way…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There as commandment and transgression.

[Speaker I] From that place it doesn’t look that way from this place.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Until now I hadn’t made this distinction at all, but after making this distinction, I don’t know—maybe there too one can read it that way.

[Speaker I] From the previous time I looked at it, it didn’t seem that way to me, but I’ll hear the continuation of this lesson.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll still get to the thirteen principles; we haven’t read them yet.

[Speaker K] Rabbi, later on, later on there Maimonides argues that his view inclines to yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker K] Later there Maimonides argues that his view inclines to yes—that there would be commandments and transgressions about this. That there would be commandments and transgressions regarding the rational part.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About which passage I just read are you talking?

[Speaker K] No, no, no—later there, later in Eight Chapters, in that same chapter later on, he says that his view inclines to yes. And I saw in Rabbi Leibowitz’s commentary that he wrote—he said that Maimonides means, as it were, that you can demand of a person to remove as much as possible the imaginings from his rational analysis. On that, as it were, there may perhaps be a command according to Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but that’s not a command telling a person who doesn’t believe to believe. It’s a command to do the best one can in order to arrive at the truth. But at the end of the day, if I didn’t arrive at the truth, there shouldn’t be a claim against me. I think differently.

[Speaker K] So the Rabbi doesn’t agree with that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, maybe that is what he says; I don’t know. We’d need to see what he says. But in any case, in the passage I read here, when he speaks about perplexity, it’s not clear what exactly the perplexity is. So that’s regarding—I’ll still get to “lower them and do not raise them” and heretics and apostates. I just want to deal with two more topics. Yes, so the question that already came up here earlier is indeed the question of faith / belief. Maimonides, positive commandment 1—wait. Yes. Maimonides, positive commandment 1: “The first commandment is the command with which we were commanded to believe in divinity, namely that we should believe that there is a cause and source that brings all existing things into being, and this is His saying, exalted be He, ‘I am the Lord your God.’” And at the end, the Talmud in Makkot says: “613 commandments were said to Moses at Sinai. What verse is this based on? ‘Torah Moses commanded us’—that is, the numerical value of ‘Torah,’ which is 611.” And they challenged this and said: “Does ‘Torah’ in numerical value come to that? It comes to 611.” And the answer was: “‘I am’ and ‘You shall have no other gods’ we heard directly from the Almighty.” So it has already become clear to you that “I am the Lord” is included among the 613 commandments, and it is a command concerning belief, as we have explained. Now here it seems quite clear that Maimonides is commanding belief. Meaning, according to Maimonides, the Torah commands belief. Now many have objected to this commandment of Maimonides, and the main objection is—meaning, beyond interpretations, there are interpretations, and Maimonides himself hints at them—there are interpretations of the passage in Makkot. The question is whether, interpretively, “I am” really intends to command us something—“I am the Lord your God”—or not. On that point Maimonides deals with it. Maimonides says that “‘I am’ and ‘You shall have no other gods’ we heard directly from the Almighty,” and that completes the 613 commandments, so we see that “I am” is understood as a commandment. That’s a proof from the Talmud. But beyond that, they asked Maimonides conceptual questions, not questions of Talmudic interpretation. The best-known question is: how can you command belief if all commandments presuppose belief? Meaning, if I don’t believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, then He cannot command me. When I am commanded, that rests on my belief in the commander and in the commander’s authority. But to command me to believe that there is a commander—do you see? It’s absurd. Who is the commander? If I reached the conclusion that He exists, then there is no point to the command. If I don’t think He exists, then I won’t observe this command either, because why should I obey the command of someone who has no authority or doesn’t exist? So the basic question—which several of Maimonides’ commentators ask—is: how can such a thing be considered a positive commandment? Okay, so here too there are—I once thought that Maimonides brings this commandment, but he doesn’t really mean that this thing is a commandment. Rather it is the heading or introduction to the Sefer HaMitzvot. What Hans Kelsen, a philosopher of law, calls the basic norm of Jewish law. The basic norm of Jewish law is the foundational principle on which all Jewish law rests. And Kelsen says that in every legal system there is a basic primary norm from which the whole legal system is derived. In Jewish law, the basic norm is belief and commitment to the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. And if so, it could be that positive commandment 1 is not a commandment in the sense that it comes to command us, but rather it is the opening heading at the top of the book, after which all the commandments appear. Now you’ll ask: so why does Maimonides call it a commandment? Let him write it as an introduction. So first of all, he brings proof from the Talmud that this thing is a commandment. But beyond that, in Maimonides, as is well known, there are commandments that command nothing. Positive commandment 95 and positive commandment 96 are the two examples, though there are others. Commandments of impurity—that someone who touches a corpse becomes impure, or someone who touches a creeping thing becomes impure. Maimonides says, when you read that, when he writes it there, don’t think that there is some commandment to become impure or some prohibition against becoming impure. Neither a commandment nor a prohibition—for an Israelite or for a priest. There is neither commandment nor prohibition. So what is it? If you are impure, that has implications regarding terumah, entering the Temple, performing the service, and the like. But the becoming impure itself is neither a commandment nor a prohibition. So why is the statement that someone who touches a corpse or a creeping thing is impure considered a positive commandment? Maimonides says: because there are commandments that command nothing, but one needs the—meaning, this is a halakhic directive that one who touches a corpse becomes impure, and that has halakhic implications, but the definition itself—that one who touches a corpse or a creeping thing is impure—does not itself command us anything.

[Speaker K] On the other hand, Rabbi—on the other hand, here…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Implications—no, no, wait, wait, we’ll get there in just a second. Just let me complete the picture. So the claim is that in positive commandment 75 this is annulment of vows. So he says that also in annulment of vows, the Torah says that if the husband annuls his wife’s vows on the day he hears them—vows involving self-denial and the like, all the relevant conditions being met—then the vow is void. But there is no commandment to annul and no prohibition to annul and no prohibition not to annul. There is nothing there at all. It doesn’t belong at all to the world of commandments and transgressions in the ordinary sense. It is a halakhic definition that if the husband annuls according to these rules, the vow is void. That’s all. And nevertheless Maimonides says: there are such positive commandments. Why they are specifically positive, I don’t know, but they are positive commandments. What is the idea behind this? It seems to me the idea is this: for Maimonides, the Sefer HaMitzvot is what in today’s language we would call the halakhic lawbook. A commandment is a law. This is an important point. It sounds like a semantic game, but it’s an important point. Why? Because in a lawbook no one would ask why this law appears—that one who touches a corpse becomes impure, or that if a husband annuls his wife’s vow on the day he hears it, then the vow is void. Obviously—it’s a law like any other. True, this law as such commands me nothing and forbids me nothing, but it is a law. Clearly its place is in the lawbook. Now if I translate the term Sefer HaMitzvot and understand that it really means the halakhic lawbook, then there is no question why Maimonides also includes this commandment of annulment of vows, or the commandment of corpse impurity or creeping-thing impurity. Obviously that should appear in the lawbook even though it commands me nothing, because one must define when a vow exists and when it does not exist—that has many implications; when a person is impure and when he is not impure—that has many implications. But that itself commands me nothing. But there are definitional clauses—for example, a law may say: for the purposes of this law, a minor is anyone under sixteen. Is that a law? Yes, that’s a law. But what does that law say? It commands me nothing. It only defines the term “minor.” After that there will be other laws that say what the legal status of a minor is. This law merely defines the term “minor,” but obviously its place is in the lawbook. It is a law. There are laws that are definitional laws. Therefore Maimonides says: also in the Sefer HaMitzvot there are commandments that merely define situations; they command you nothing. What confuses us is the term “commandment,” because a commandment is something that commands me. But if we adopt the interpretation I am suggesting—that “commandment” is simply the halakhic term parallel to “law,” that’s all, it is the lawbook, 613 laws—then the question would never have arisen why those two commandments appear. Now I return to positive commandment 1, and regarding positive commandment 1 I would say: it is obvious that at the head of the lawbook the basic norm should appear. Therefore Maimonides places positive commandment 1 there—to know, yes, to believe in divinity and to be committed to its command.

[Speaker K] But that’s not a law, Rabbi. It’s the foundation, not a law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, exactly.

[Speaker K] Maimonides’ wording—wait, wait—the difficulty there from Hasdai Crescas, wait—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I asked you a question before you ask. If I were writing the halakhic lawbook—I wouldn’t call it the Sefer HaMitzvot, I’d call it the lawbook—do you understand that the first law would be this one?

[Speaker K] I understand that it would be the opening, not the law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, it’s the first law. Clause 1 in the lawbook is the clause that opens the book. Now every clause in the lawbook is a law. That’s the definition.

[Speaker K] Yes, but the problem is different, Rabbi—let me formulate the question. For Hasdai Crescas the question is very simple: either way, if you believe, you don’t need to tell me; and if you don’t believe, what will it help that you tell me? Meaning, you come and say, “I am your God,” you come and say, “Believe in Me.” So either way, if I believe in You, You don’t need to tell me that—just bring the laws.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that’s what I answered. I didn’t understand.

[Speaker K] But how does that answer it? It doesn’t answer it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That was the question—of course it answers it. Why? Because this law commands nothing. That’s exactly what I’m answering. It is the opening clause of the lawbook, that’s all.

[Speaker K] So you’re saying that the fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, said “I am the Lord your God” is basically just the opening line. A kind of introduction, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, for example, I brought here…

[Speaker K] But it’s unnecessary, it’s unnecessary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, unnecessary? It’s the opening to the lawbook.

[Speaker K] Yes, fine, but it’s unnecessary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not unnecessary at all. Of course it’s not unnecessary to open the lawbook. It’s unnecessary as a rationale, because clearly—

[Speaker K] Because I’m meeting You, You don’t need to tell me, here I am, I’m here, I don’t know, here…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again: the lawbook opens with the basic norm. Nothing here is unnecessary. It’s perfectly fine. It is unnecessary as a command, but the lawbook is incomplete without it. It is not a command—that is exactly the point I want to make here.

[Speaker G] Even though Maimonides repeats the root “command” and “He commanded us,” and “commandment” several times, he seems to emphasize that this is a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but for Maimonides the term “commandment” is our term “law.”

[Speaker G] The term “law,” yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s my suggestion, I’m saying.

[Speaker B] But why at the end does he say, “And this matter is a positive commandment: knowledge of God is a positive commandment”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That sentence is superfluous. “This matter is a positive commandment”—even though this matter commands you nothing, this matter is a positive commandment, like positive commandments 95 and 96. And the proof from the Talmud is that the Talmud says that “‘I am’ and ‘You shall have no other gods’ we heard directly from the Almighty,” and that completes the 613 commandments. From here there is proof that even a clause that commands you nothing is included in the 613 commandments. It is one of the commandments.

[Speaker G] The difference, Rabbi, between this and the other two commandments is that in the other commandments there are implications. Meaning, really, it’s not that I’m forbidden to be impure, but there are implications to being impure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This too has implications. If you don’t uphold this commandment, all the other commandments are emptied of content. You won’t observe them.

[Speaker G] No, fine, but I’m saying, in both cases these are facts and they place me in a status of either believer or non-believer, or impure or pure. Meaning yes, it really places me in a status. Right. But the status of not believing has no direct implication in… I mean, in some specific thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean by direct implication? If I do not uphold this commandment, then I will not perform any other commandment.

[Speaker G] Fine, if I don’t find myself in the status of a believer…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s hair-splitting. I don’t care. In the lawbook this clause should appear at the beginning, so that’s why it appears here. That’s all. Why should I care whether it is different from those two commandments or not? I didn’t bring those two commandments to say that this is exactly the same as here; I brought them to show that the Sefer HaMitzvot is the lawbook.

[Speaker G] In terms of the language, the language of the Sefer HaMitzvot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once you understand that, I think positive commandment 1 too—whether it has differences or not—then positive commandment 1 is no longer difficult as to why it appears. Obviously the lawbook opens with it.

[Speaker G] By the way, why did Maimonides say that this is the first commandment? Because of the Ten Commandments?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, his ordering of the commandments is his own ordering; it has nothing to do with the Ten Commandments.

[Speaker G] Why does he say this is first?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That it is first? He put it first—what do you mean?

[Speaker G] No, but why did he choose it to be first?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? What do you think? This is the clause that opens the lawbook. That’s exactly the point.

[Speaker G] Because it’s not the first commandment that appears in the Torah, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course not, but Maimonides’ order is not according to the order in which things appear in the Torah.

[Speaker G] No, I’m saying maybe that strengthens what the Rabbi is saying—maybe he really takes it as the basis.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, of course, and therefore—

[Speaker G] He says this is the first.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s obvious. What do you mean? I don’t understand. Of course this is the first commandment.

[Speaker G] I just wanted to understand the meaning of the word “first”—why he says this is the first one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you had to open the lawbook, obviously you would open it with this. There’s no question here at all. About the other commandments one can engage in pilpul over Maimonides—why he arranged them this way, why that way. About this commandment there is nothing to debate; it’s obvious.

[Speaker G] No, because specifically he didn’t choose the first commandment that appears in the Torah; he didn’t go according to the order of the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course not, he does not—

[Speaker G] Go according to the order of the Torah. As it were, he changed the order. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the whole book he doesn’t go by the order; it’s not only with this commandment. The order in the Torah doesn’t interest him in the Sefer HaMitzvot. I saw here—brought it—one of the commentaries, Lev Sameach, yes, one of the commentaries. “In any case, we need to know…”

[Speaker B] Rabbi, I still don’t understand it, still. Even in a lawbook, when it says that a minor is under sixteen, what is the command there? But clearly it is a determination. The Knesset determines as a formal norm that we will treat a person from age sixteen as an adult for this or that matter. Right. So there is an absolute normative determination here—you are basically commanded to heed… you are commanded to treat someone under sixteen as an adult.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you are not commanded to treat him that way. The commands about what to do with the practical implications appear in the Sefer HaMitzvot separately. After I am impure—for example, that I am forbidden to enter the Temple and forbidden to eat terumah—all of those are commandments listed separately; they are already listed. Only commandment 96 is that one who touches a creeping thing becomes impure. All the implications have their own commandments; they are counted separately as implications. The definition itself is the commandment—in 95 and 96.

[Speaker B] So someone will say: I don’t accept this determination that he is an adult and a minor until age six, and therefore I can’t accept the rest of the laws either.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. Of course—if he doesn’t accept that, he won’t accept the rest of the areas, but this is a commandment. What do you mean?

[Speaker B] So basically there is a normative component in this factual determination?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this is not a factual determination at all; it’s not a factual determination, it’s a normative determination. It’s a normative determination, but it commands me nothing. It’s not a fact that he is impure; it’s the Torah’s decision that he is impure. One can discuss whether that reflects reality or not, and that’s another discussion, but no—as far as I’m concerned this is a norm, but it’s a norm that commands me nothing and forbids me nothing. That’s what Maimonides says; even so it counts as a commandment. Why? Because this is the lawbook, not a book of commands. If so, then positive commandment 1 too I can understand in the same way.

[Speaker B] But how is it included in the norm? It isn’t a norm after all; there is no such norm.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It belongs in the lawbook; it has to appear there. Again, I’m not talking…

[Speaker B] Just as someone who thinks for some reason that God exists, so now I write him a book of commandments. There is no normative component here at all. He does not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Determine that He is here, and he does not determine that God exists.

[Speaker B] Fine, there is no…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that is not Maimonides’ wording.

[Speaker B] “This matter is a positive commandment.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “This matter is a positive commandment” means it is one of the 613 commandments, but it commands me nothing. After all, the proof he brings from Makkot is also to tell you that this is one of the 613 commandments. Don’t go looking for another one—you only have 612. No—this is the 613th, even though it commands nothing. Which one? Maimonides’ positive commandment 1.

[Speaker H] It is the basis of all the commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. In any case, look at the Lev Sameach. "In any case, we must know that if the commandment of 'I am' were fit to come in the form of a command, it should have said: Know or hear that I am the Lord, or something in language that indicates a commandment, like all positive commandments: Remember the Sabbath day, Honor your father," and many others in the Torah. "But this wording, 'I am,' etc., is not the language of command but the language of information and narration. And this was the claim of some of the dissenters, who said that this verse is an introduction to the Ten Commandments." This is no longer in Maimonides; this is in the Ten Commandments themselves, in the Torah. That this is not a commandment but an introduction to the commandments, meaning: I am the Lord your God who did good to you and brought you out, etc., and therefore it is fitting for you to listen to My words and accept My commandments, which are: You shall have no other gods, and all that follows from that. "You shall have no other gods" is the second commandment, from the second utterance onward. So he really is suggesting that already in the Torah itself, "I am" is not a commandment but an opening statement. What I just want to argue is that this is not an objection to Maimonides. Maimonides too could understand it that way, and still place it as positive commandment no. 1, because this is the law book and this opening statement is the first law.

[Speaker G] By contrast, "You shall have no other gods"… what? How is that a commandment then?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker G] "You shall have no other gods" is obvious; it's just the opposite of "I am the Lord your God."

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not at all. "I am the Lord your God" I can fulfill, and besides that I can also have other gods. Like, who was it who said this, Bernard Shaw, I don't remember, that I have many principles, but if you don't like them, I also have others.

[Speaker G] I didn't understand, Rabbi. Again we're going back to that same… it's the same thing as at the beginning. "You shall have no other gods" is again, you're determining for me not to believe in other things, right? So if you can't determine that I should believe in You, then you also can't determine that I shouldn't believe in other things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, here they are not determining that you shouldn't believe in other gods, but that you shouldn't be committed to them. A god is that to which you're committed. We're talking about worship; this is the prohibition of idolatry. I can—and history is full of people who believed in the Holy One, blessed be He, and worshiped idols. There's no problem with the command of "You shall have no other gods."

[Speaker G] "You shall have no other gods" refers only to worshiping other gods, supposedly? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the Megillat Esther here says: "As for what he also said, that the view of the Bahag was that he did not count it, that was because 'I am' is the foundation of the commandment"—that's the previous claim—"it seems to me that even though it is a foundation, that does not detract from its also being a commandment, for there is a commandment to believe in this foundation." Yes, the Megillat Esther argues that this is an actual commandment as well. And in fact, someone once pointed this out to me—Dror Pixler once pointed this out to me.

[Speaker K] Rabbi, is it to believe or to know? There does he mean to know, or to believe?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To believe and to know are the same thing.

[Speaker K] Oh, because there are many who make that distinction because of this difficulty.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, living that way is a consequence; if He is God, then you are obligated in His commandments.

[Speaker K] Yes, in consciousness, to be in that awareness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, you have to believe in Him as God.

[Speaker K] Yes, but you can believe and not always have that awareness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] When you're not aware, you're not aware. But if you believe in Him and He is God, then you are obligated in His commandments. What is the difference between knowing and believing?

[Speaker K] Through philosophy there's a difference, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No difference at all. A widespread myth. There's no difference whatsoever. To believe and to know are synonymous. You say amen. What is amen? Amen means truth, yes, I know that this is so.

[Speaker K] People believe because they were born into it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then you haven't examined the matter. Someone who believes because he was born into it doesn't believe; he's an atheist.

[Speaker K] Even if he didn't examine the matter?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn't believe. What do you mean? The fact that he lives in that atmosphere because that's how he was born—so what if he was born that way? The pagan was also born among pagans, so what? Why do I care where you were born? Why is that relevant at all? People keep saying these nonsense claims: well, that's how we were educated. Why do I care that that's how you were educated? You decided to do it; you're responsible for what you decided. For better or worse. The fact that that's how you were educated is of no interest to me. Everyone was educated in all sorts of ways, so what does that prove? If I was educated this way, does that make it true? The pagan was educated too.

[Speaker K] So does the Rabbi think that everyone needs to do the philosophical inquiry in order to arrive at faith?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not philosophical—to decide for himself what he believes. Not everyone has to be a philosopher. If a person makes decisions not with philosophical tools, there's no problem with that; that's his right. Let everyone make decisions as he understands. He has to reach his own conclusion that there is God and that he is obligated to Him. That's all, each person in his own way.

[Speaker B] The Rabbi rejects the cultural-social influence as the overwhelmingly decisive factor in a person's consciousness.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don't reject it; I claim that it should not be the factor that affects belief. On the contrary, you have to neutralize it when coming to decide.

[Speaker B] But the fact is that if all 70 participants currently in the class had been born X years ago in Gaza, they would have had a completely different set of beliefs. We would be conducting a different class with a different rabbi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe yes and maybe no, but statistically. Statistically, that's exactly the point. Statistically means it's not deterministic. It may be that most of us really don't make the calculation and don't reach conclusions. But you should make the calculation and reach conclusions. The fact that most people don't do that—fine, they don't do it.

[Speaker B] I understand what the Rabbi is saying, but on the other hand it's hard not to ask: if the Rabbi had been born X years ago in Gaza,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then he would have believed—

[Speaker B] and given lecture series on something else.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe yes and maybe no, I don't know. Could be. You still need to make your own inquiry and reach your own conclusions. We all also speak gossip, so does that make it permissible to speak gossip? What everyone does is no proof of anything.

[Speaker G] There, now—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I spoke gossip because I said that everyone speaks gossip.

[Speaker G] Rabbi, this reminds me of something you said in the series on repentance, that really when we all want children who will grow up in the way of Torah, and from our point of view that's the optimal path,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But—

[Speaker G] a child who really checks things out and in the end decides not to follow the way of Torah—we see that as a disaster, but it's not really a disaster because at least he checked. At least he checked and he's autonomous.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that's a success of another kind; from another perspective it's a failure. Fine, it's more complex. For our purposes: so Pixler pointed out to me that Maimonides counts the commandment of faith as one of the constant commandments. He divides them up; he gives a list of the constant commandments. Now if that's so, then you can't explain it the way I suggested here. Because constant commandments means that it really does impose something on me—I am supposed to do this. It's not just some heading at the beginning of the Book of Commandments, some opening statement, but it really commands me something. Right.

[Speaker F] What other constant commandments are there? Faith, the unity of God, what else? Love of God. The Biur Halakha brings it at the beginning of the Mishnah Berurah—

[Speaker G] He brings all the constant commandments.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I just remembered. Love of God, fear of God, it's the source—

[Speaker K] From the Sefer HaChinukh, basically.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, for our purposes: if so, then in Maimonides this is not a possible explanation. And I'll say more than that. Beyond the problems everyone raises regarding Maimonides' first positive commandment, there's the problem that in my view is the most— the most basic. And this is the problem we talked about earlier. And it's not the same problem I described earlier. Faith in the Holy One, blessed be He, is a factual claim—that the Holy One, blessed be He, exists. You can't command me concerning a factual claim. The previous argument, which says you can't command faith because faith is the basis for commands—without faith, commands have no meaning—that is a specific argument about the commandment of faith, that it cannot be a commandment. I argue that the commandment of faith cannot be a commandment just like many other commandments cannot. Anything that is a factual claim, belief, thought, and the like, cannot categorically be considered a positive commandment. Not specifically faith because you need faith in order to obey commandments. That's a correct argument, but it's a specific argument about the commandment of faith. Here there is a more basic argument: the whole category here is that we're dealing with factual claims, mental claims. You can't command a person regarding a factual claim, mental claims. And if Maimonides defines this as positive commandment no. 1, and if indeed the proof I brought earlier from Pixler is right, that he really means this as a commandment—meaning it commands me this thing—then that will already be hard to present in a non-dogmatic way. Here Maimonides appears to be a dogmatist. Unless, again, as I said before, maybe Maimonides means some kind of statement: this is the truth, that there is a God. True, I can't command you to adopt that truth, but I determine that this is the truth. Meaning, someone who doesn't think so is mistaken—not that someone who thinks otherwise is a criminal. Okay? I don't know.

[Speaker F] Maybe this commandment is that someone—if you believe, then you basically need to fulfill this commandment, but He doesn't determine that you must fulfill this commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. Some particular kind of definition may be possible, I don't know.

[Speaker F] Why does the Rabbi say it doubtfully? It sounds reasonable, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because that's not the meaning of a commandment in its usual sense. I would not define such a thing as a commandment.

[Speaker F] Why not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you believe, then you have the commandment, and if you don't—it's an existential commandment.

[Speaker F] There are commandments; they exist in the world. Now if you believe—fine, they exist, no? What can you do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but the commandment itself—that's what I'm asking.

[Speaker F] Yes, that's also a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It's a commandment. When do I fulfill it? If I believe, then I fulfill it?

[Speaker F] And if I don't believe—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] then I'm not violating it? Yes, what's the problem? So it's an existential commandment. That's what I said before. It's basically an existential positive commandment.

[Speaker I] If you fulfill it, then you have a commandment, and if you don't fulfill it then nothing happened. What do you mean, nothing happened? Something happened. Nothing. In terms of criminality, nothing happened. No, he wasn't a transgressor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, like giving charity, supposedly. Fine, but then it really gets a bit emptied of content. I think that according to your approach all commandments are like that, no?

[Speaker F] After all, according to your approach, if I'm not mistaken, someone who puts on tefillin without—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] believing that there is a God—he did not fulfill a commandment. Right? So all commandments, in your view, are like that: if I believe in God then I fulfilled them, and if I don't believe then I didn't fulfill them. No, that's obvious, but everything starts with belief in God. Yes, but I say that putting on tefillin is a commandment addressed to someone who believes. But to say that faith is a commandment addressed to someone who believes—that's strange. Why is it strange? I don't understand. If I believe anyway, then what is the significance of the commandment? Because it's a commandment. A commandment means that you deserve some reward. You were good, you did something for which you deserve credit. If I reached the conclusion that there is a God, then I reached that conclusion. And someone who reached a different conclusion reached a different conclusion. In what sense do I deserve a reward more than he does?

[Speaker F] Like he said here earlier—I think he meant this too—according to the Rabbi, and the Rabbi also explains this in theology, the commandments are something not connected to the world, something that exists out there somewhere, and we do it. Now once there are such commandments, it's not a matter of whether you did it or didn't do it; it doesn't matter how you perceive it, in that sense, whether you can believe or can't believe. In reality there are these commandments. Now if you want to, if you believe in them, then you fulfill them. If you don't believe, you don't fulfill them.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, but I'm saying: when I believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, that means I reached the conclusion that I believe, right? I didn't do this by force of the commandment. So if I didn't do it by force of the commandment, why should that thing be a commandment and why should I get credit for it? After all, the whole idea of a commandment is when you do it because you're obligated by commands, when you are fulfilling the will of God. But you are not fulfilling the will of God by believing in Him.

[Speaker F] It's like what the Rabbi said, there are various commandments that repeat things. After all, apparently there are various commandments like, I don't know, do not murder, honor your father and your mother. It's obvious from reason alone—why did God command this? Because He wanted to increase some additional spiritual element, as the Rabbi explains, some surplus spirituality. This too is a commandment, right? Good, so here too. No, wrong!

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once you've reached the conclusion, then you've already reached it. You didn't reach it because of a commandment. Fulfilling a commandment is when you do something because of the command. As for "do not murder," if you don't murder because of the command, then indeed you fulfilled that prohibition. But if your conclusion was that there is no God, then you reached that conclusion not because there is a commandment. So if that's so, why do you have a commandment in that? You only have a commandment in something if you do it because it is a commandment.

[Speaker F] Okay, maybe once you perform a commandment, once you do this even though you already believe it and it's not really by force of the commandment, part of the commandment of "I am the Lord your God" is actually "I am the Lord your God who gave you, who brought down the Torah to you." There's an addition here, as it were; it's not just "I am the Lord your God."

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, you're offering another suggestion. There are those who indeed want to argue: no, believing that there is a God is obvious, but being obligated to His commandments—that is positive commandment no. 1.

[Speaker F] It's together, "I am the Lord your God who gave the Torah," meaning it's the Tetragrammaton.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Such suggestions have been made. Or the commandment is to investigate in order to reach the conclusion that there is a God, and whatever conclusion you reach, you reach. But according to that, it would come out that if I investigated and became an atheist, I also fulfilled this commandment. I investigated, and that's my conclusion. In short, there are all kinds of suggestions of this type. It doesn't seem from Maimonides' language that this is what he means.

[Speaker F] Not necessarily that this is what Maimonides means; it just sounds more logical now in the verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I'm talking about Maimonides. With the verse I have no problem. The verse is open-ended; I have no problem with it. But the question is how Maimonides turns this into a positive commandment.

[Speaker B] Rabbi, I don't understand any norm at all. Any obligation that exists has to come from me, if we really understand the full meaning of the word obligation. Because what fact in the world can obligate me if I think not? I don't believe in it. So what meaning does the word obligation or norm have at all if it doesn't come from me? It's really true: a genuine obligation has to come from me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don't understand the question.

[Speaker B] The Rabbi asks: if faith in God is an obligation, a norm, a commandment, then if I already came with it from home, why command me? And if I didn't come with it, then there's no point in commanding it. But I'm saying every norm—every norm in the world, if I don't come to it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shmuel, that's not what I'm asking. Stop right there. I didn't ask that. Others asked that. I asked a more fundamental question: how can you command a fact? You can't.

[Speaker B] Exactly. Obviously you can't. We're only determining—it is itself a factual determination that you are commanded, you know that you are commanded.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So, a fact?

[Speaker B] But that doesn't renew anything, it doesn't sustain the commandment; it's a strange commandment. All obligations are like that. When the Knesset comes and tells a person—when society comes to a person and says you shall not murder—it says: first, you formally violated the law of the Knesset, and also you violated the moral, human, ethical issue of murder. And not because we commanded you and not because it's written, but because it's already within you. So—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but that's not the law. The law is the normative part that is added.

[Speaker B] I'm saying, therefore the law is secondary; it's just formalism of society. No, it's not secondary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We're talking only about that.

[Speaker B] But it's not because of that that I'm obligated not to murder people, not because the Knesset decided it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course it is because of that.

[Speaker B] How can you justify a norm with some rationale? The Knesset said: we decided by majority vote that murder is forbidden. I don't care what you decided.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you don't care, then you don't care; go to prison. Fine.

[Speaker B] But what you're obligated not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] not to murder because of is not morality; it's because the law legislated it.

[Speaker B] No, so all the law said is: you're not obligated not to murder, we're just informing you that if you murder you'll go to prison. That's merely a regulatory, pragmatic matter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What are these pilpulim of yours, Haim Cohen? I've heard them more than once already. No. The law forbids you to murder, and from the standpoint of the law, the reason you're forbidden to murder is because there is such a law. That's it. You refrain from murder both because of the law and because of morality. Very good. But the norm—what determines it—is only the law, not morality.

[Speaker B] And I'm asking about the law: why should I accept it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no idea; maybe you shouldn't, but that's what the law says.

[Speaker B] Fine, so they'll force me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I'm not obligated to the law, then don't comply. But that's what the law says. The law's demand is not by force of morality; it is by force of legislation.

[Speaker B] Fine, I agree, obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And it's the same thing in Jewish law.

[Speaker B] But how can one speak of any norm when it can't be justified in any way and I'm entitled not to accept it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn't understand the question.

[Speaker B] How can one—what does it mean to say that a commandment or an obligation is incumbent on a person? What do those words mean? If those words only mean, look, if you violate the law you'll be punished, fine, then it's just some kind of silly game. No, no, no. You'll be punished because there is an obligation, not that there is an obligation because you'll be punished. I come to the Knesset and say: I don't feel the obligation not to murder.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you don't feel an obligation, then they'll punish you without your having felt that obligation. That's the law. Ignorance of the law does not exempt from punishment. But in Jewish law it's not—maybe they would come with the claim, maybe they would come with the claim: you are commanded and not fulfilling it. The legal sphere and the moral sphere are two different spheres.

[Speaker B] Fine, that's clear to me. I'm not talking about that; I'm talking about all spheres of obligation. If the word obligation exists in the world, then the word obligation has to come from the person. You can't impose it from outside, you really can't. Obviously you can't. How can you force a feeling on a person?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The concept of obligation not only can come from outside—it must come from outside. If it comes from the person, that's not an obligation. From me? So what is from me? I have within me something, some obligation? Obligation is something imposed on me, which I have to do even if I don't identify with it—that's what obligation means. Obligation is not something I feel like doing, and therefore I do it. If it comes from within me, that's not an obligation.

[Speaker B] Suppose we manage to communicate with some ape or some other advanced animal and we say to him: listen, murder is forbidden. And he'll say: I understood what you're saying, I really understood the words, but do you realize that when we say this to him we're speaking to a wall, to a rock?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because he doesn't understand the words.

[Speaker B] No, suppose he does understand, but he doesn't have a conscience—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] he doesn't have a conscience—

[Speaker B] he doesn't have the human element.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says to me: you're telling me—

[Speaker B] not to murder, not to murder, not to prey.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Don't assume he does understand; he doesn't understand. Why? They told him, and he says: not to murder, not to murder, not to prey. Someone who says to me—and I've spoken about this more than once in the past—someone who says to me, "I understand that morally murder is forbidden, but why not murder?"—then he does not understand that morally murder is forbidden.

[Speaker B] Right, so that part has to come from me. It's not what they told me. You can't come heteronomously and tell me: at Mount Sinai they told you do not murder. If I didn't have within me that part—I've forgotten the word—the normative obligatory part of the matter, then you can't tell it to me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They can tell it to me. It's obvious that you understand the concept of norm, but the entire force of the norm is not you; it's always an external factor. Always.

[Speaker B] Never an external factor. It can't be an external factor. What happened? No, I'm asking, how can it be? What was at Mount Sinai? Was it pyrotechnics?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] God appeared, said something? I don't know how to answer more than that. It's completely absurd. If it comes from me, it's not an obligation. But okay, look at what I wrote—that's exactly the argument I had with David Enoch in our debate; I think it's column 456. Column 456, where I sharpen my position more. Accept it or don't accept it, look there.

[Speaker K] As for morality with God—do we need God?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. My claim is that there cannot be an obligation that comes from me. There is no such thing as an obligation that comes from me. It's simple.

[Speaker K] You always argue about the same issue. Okay. It always gets there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there's also Rabbi Fohrman's suggestion. I once heard in Rabbi Fohrman's name that he said there are two types of people: there are people who have one idea their whole life, and there are people who have no idea at all. And there's a lot of truth in that. A lot of truth in that. Meaning, people who represent some sort of conception—you can always see that at root it's one issue. All the implications and different aspects, at root you can see one issue there. It's an interesting observation that he made.

[Speaker K] But Rabbi, regarding how you concluded with the difficulty on Maimonides, there's also Rabbi Soloveitchik's suggestion—that really faith, it's not clear that he believes; he just doesn't always believe.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Either I believe or I don't believe. You can say it's not always in my awareness.

[Speaker K] Yes, so it's a different definition of faith. He doesn't define faith as—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I don't always know mathematics because sometimes I'm not thinking that two plus three equals five? Fine, I know that two plus three equals five.

[Speaker K] No, it's something else he defines—he defines it as something existential, to always live in relation to it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That sounds like words to me. Faith is knowing that there is a God, that's all.

[Speaker K] No, why? Let's say I believe that my brother exists, right? I know that my brother exists, I believe he exists. That doesn't mean that I'm always now living in his presence.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You're not always thinking about your brother and that he exists.

[Speaker K] Right, so he says the commandment is always to live in God's presence.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What is he claiming? What, is that an interpretation of Maimonides?

[Speaker K] That's how he interprets it; it's a different definition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That's not written in Maimonides.

[Speaker K] That's how he defines faith.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To experience explicitly the knowledge that I already have anyway. Maybe that's related to "In all your ways know Him," but it's not "I am the Lord your God." He interprets it as something—

[Speaker K] else, like "And Adam knew Eve his wife," in that sense.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand. I'm just saying that that's "In all your ways know Him," not "I am the Lord your God." "In all your ways know Him" is not a commandment.

[Speaker K] Thank you very much, Rabbi.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay.

[Speaker F] The Rabbi didn't answer the question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which question?

[Speaker F] So what ended up happening with that matter of killing those who deny?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn't understand.

[Speaker F] What about those who "may be brought up but not brought down" and all that? I didn't understand. Which—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] question? I don't know what you're talking about.

[Speaker F] "May be brought up but not brought down," that the Rabbi said—how does that fit with Maimonides?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, we'll get to that later. I haven't gotten there yet. We'll talk more.

[Speaker I] Is it possible to ask a question regarding the column, or is the time up?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Briefly, because I really have to—I have a meeting now. What's the number of the column?

[Speaker I] The last one. So I'll try to be brief; maybe you can direct me. When I started reading the last column, and when you bring Maimonides' difficulty against the Bahag, you write this in trying to answer for the Bahag: "Indeed, his argument here can also arise if one adopts that there is halakhic ruling in questions that pertain to the Holy One, blessed be He." And then you continue that in the Book of Commandments it's not relevant, it can't be included as a commandment, but you bring up some concept of halakhic ruling regarding the Holy One, blessed be He. It reminded me of the conception common in Hasidism and Kabbalah, that when a rabbi issues a halakhic ruling, it can also touch, as it were, on how the Holy One, blessed be He, will behave. My question is what you meant.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I meant—all of that is a hava amina.

[Speaker I] What do the words mean, that there is halakhic ruling regarding the Holy One, blessed be He?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said, all of that is a hava amina that I do not accept. It's a discussion. In the end, after all, I explained that the conceptual problem is the hard problem here, which I only reached at the end. But this whole discussion was conducted before the conceptual problem, and then I say: okay, so now the question is, about what was halakhic ruling said, and about what was halakhic ruling not said; what is it even possible to issue a halakhic ruling about with respect to the Holy One, blessed be He? So there was a suggestion there, yes, maybe one can rule.

[Speaker I] Is that accepted? I know that in the kabbalistic approach it's some idea they talk about, that a rabbi has a special power to rule, that a legal ruling has some mechanical aspect.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They always bring—it already appears in Talmudic texts, it's—

[Speaker I] Our Sages bring the Holy One, blessed be He, as—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, "My children have triumphed over Me, My children have triumphed over Me," and… whatever… yes, all kinds of things like that. In short, there is—or that "My children have triumphed over Me."

[Speaker I] Meaning, what I thought—the question is whether this could have implications for the Thirteen Principles of Faith. Meaning, maybe Maimonides determines the Thirteen Principles of Faith as a halakhic ruling, and from that point on it also obligates the Holy One, blessed be He. It's just a little homiletic idea, but it occurred to me when I read that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It's a nice idea, but I don't accept it. Fine, I understand.

[Speaker I] Very good. Great. Thank you very much.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Goodbye,

[Speaker G] Sabbath peace.