Dogmatics – Lecture 2
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Principles as a binding framework and the problem posed by disputes over the principles
- Examples in which the very existence of a dissenting opinion undermines a claim
- The Raavad and Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance: body and form, heresy, and what lies behind the question
- Principles as factual determinations and the distinction between facts and norms
- Formal authority and substantive authority: examples and definitions
- A deity, idolatry, and judges as “gods”
- Ordination, authorization to judge, and the governmental authority of a judge
- Authority with respect to norms versus facts: “do not deviate” and the impossibility of formal authority over facts
- Implications for the Talmud, divine inspiration, and the issue of obedience
- A binding framework, an open text, and autonomy in halakhic decision-making
- Questions about commandments of belief, the messiah, resurrection of the dead, and the observance of “mental commandments”
Summary
General Overview
The text presents a critique of the concept of “principles” as a binding framework that defines who is inside Jewish discourse and who is outside it, and argues that the very existence of disputes over principles undermines their ability to function as such a framework. It brings logical and halakhic examples in which the very existence of a dissenting opinion undermines a claim, and applies this to the Raavad’s question on Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance regarding anthropomorphism. It then develops a distinction between facts and norms, and between formal authority and substantive authority, and argues that formal authority can bind in matters of norms but cannot bind in matters of fact. From this follow implications regarding the validity of factual determinations even when they are attributed to the Talmud or to religious authorities.
Principles as a binding framework and the problem posed by disputes over the principles
The principles are set up as a binding intellectual framework within which debates are supposed to take place, and anyone who leaves it is no longer engaged in a legitimate debate but is outside the boundary. The very fact that there are disputes about the principles themselves undermines the idea that the principles are threshold conditions for any discussion, because that creates a situation in which the argument is about the framework itself. The claim is that the existence of such disputes empties the discussion of principles, in their dogmatic sense, of its content.
Examples in which the very existence of a dissenting opinion undermines a claim
In the dispute over renewing ordination in the 16th century, Mahari Beirav sought to renew ordination in Safed, and Maharalbach, one of the sages of Jerusalem, disagreed with this, including with the possibility of implementing Maimonides’ position that makes it dependent on the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel. In his pamphlet on ordination, Maharalbach argues that his very opposition means there is no agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel, and therefore even according to the other side’s own view, ordination cannot be renewed, regardless of his substantive arguments. The text notes that Rabbi Yosef Karo was ordained by Mahari Beirav and nevertheless wrote in Beit Yosef that nowadays there are no ordained sages.
Rabbi Shimon Shkop is mentioned in the context of a tannaitic dispute about palm-branch brooms on the Sabbath, where they disagreed over whether this was an unavoidable result of leaves being detached. The text presents the dispute between the Taz and Rabbi Akiva Eiger regarding an uncertain unavoidable result in a case of epistemic uncertainty, such as closing a box that may contain a fly, where the Taz permits it and Rabbi Akiva Eiger forbids it because of an “uncertain unavoidable result.” Rabbi Shimon Shkop argues that when one tanna says it is an unavoidable result even though another tanna disagrees and says it is not, the very existence of the dissenting opinion proves that uncertainty in a person’s knowledge does not remove something from the category of an unavoidable result, and in this way he brings support for Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s side.
The Raavad and Maimonides in the Laws of Repentance: body and form, heresy, and what lies behind the question
Maimonides, in Laws of Repentance chapter 3, counts among the heretics “one who says there is one Master, but that He has a body and a form.” The Raavad objects: “Why did he call such a person a heretic? Many greater and better than he went with this view, according to what they saw in the verses, and even more from what they saw in the aggadic passages that confuse people’s beliefs.” The text interprets this to mean that the Raavad agrees that the anthropomorphic view is mistaken, but opposes defining those who hold it as heretics, because the existence of “great and good” figures who held it prevents it from becoming a principle outside of which there is no legitimacy.
The text suggests that the Raavad’s question makes sense if a “heretic” is defined as someone who denies a principle that marks the boundaries of the discourse. In that case, when there is a real dispute over the framework itself, you cannot label the dissenter a heretic in that sense. It compares this to the concept known in the name of Rabbi Chaim of a “poor unfortunate apikores,” where a person is factually mistaken but the question of blame is separate from the question of factual classification. The text presents the possibility that Maimonides would answer that the principles are whatever is true, even if sages err about them, and emphasizes that the dispute may be over the very definition of a “principle”: is it a boundary of discourse that is not itself open to debate, or a fundamental truth that one must arrive at even if in practice people argue about it?
Principles as factual determinations and the distinction between facts and norms
The text presents the principles as determinations dealing with facts, such as the coming of the messiah, providence, and whether the Holy One, blessed be He, has a body or not, and argues that in matters of fact, “these and those are both the words of the living God” does not apply, because only one of the claims can be true. It says this is important because facts are not subject to formal obedience but to persuasion, and therefore a binding demand with respect to factual beliefs raises a conceptual problem.
Formal authority and substantive authority: examples and definitions
The text distinguishes between formal authority, which binds by virtue of role or status itself, and substantive authority, which stems from expertise and the likelihood of being right. The Knesset is brought as an example of formal authority that obligates obedience to its laws not because they are just but because it is the Knesset, while a doctor is brought as an example of substantive authority, where obedience depends on the assumption that he is right, and if it turns out he is wrong there is no reason to obey. The text argues that in this sense formal authority can be stronger than substantive authority, because it does not depend on the correctness of the ruling.
A deity, idolatry, and judges as “gods”
Maimonides, in the Laws of Idolatry chapter 3 law 6, is cited regarding one who worships an idol out of love or fear, who is exempt unless he “accepted it as a deity,” and the text explains that a “deity” is someone obeyed by virtue of unconditional obligation and not because of justice or benefit. From this it is argued that accepting a formal authority other than the Holy One, blessed be He, carries an element of idolatry. The text connects this to a critique of Leibowitz, who argued that morality is an atheistic category, and claims that formal obedience to moral principles not coming from the Holy One, blessed be He, may be considered a kind of idolatry.
The text explains that judges are called “gods” in the Torah because they have formal authority that obligates obedience to them not because they are right but because they are judges. It distinguishes between a judge and a Torah scholar: a Torah scholar has substantive authority by virtue of his expertise, while a judge has formal authority even if it turns out he was mistaken.
Ordination, authorization to judge, and the governmental authority of a judge
The text explains that ordination grants professional expertise, but authorization to judge is governmental authority that turns the power of decision into something formal. It cites the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin 5a about the tension between the sages of Babylonia and those of the Land of Israel over who grants governmental authority to judges: the Nasi in the Land of Israel as the one who grants professional ordination, versus the Exilarch in Babylonia as the source of governmental authority. It compares this to appointing a judge through a governmental committee, and to appointing a district psychiatrist who receives coercive powers that do not stem from his expertise but from his office.
Authority with respect to norms versus facts: “do not deviate” and the impossibility of formal authority over facts
The text argues that with respect to norms there can be formal authority, such as the authority of the Sanhedrin by virtue of “do not deviate,” which obligates one to act according to their ruling even if a person disagrees with the correctness of the decision. It states that with respect to facts, formal authority has no meaning, because you cannot demand that a person believe a fact contrary to what he is convinced of, and the distinction between “thinking” and “acting” exists in norms but not in facts. It formulates this as a conceptual claim not dependent on sources, and adds that even if the Holy One, blessed be He, were to demand belief by virtue of formal authority without persuasion, the demand itself would not be defined as something that can be fulfilled.
Implications for the Talmud, divine inspiration, and the issue of obedience
The text concludes that factual determinations from any source, including the Talmud, are not binding by virtue of formal authority, and only substantive authority can lead to accepting them through persuasion that they are true. It argues that the aggadic stories about divine inspiration and the ability to revive the dead are attributed in order to justify obedience by turning authority into substantive authority, whereas in his view the authority of the Talmud in matters of norms is formal and does not need such justifications. It presents the distinction between accepting something because “they are right” and accepting it because “they are the binding institution,” and emphasizes that a failure to understand formal authority leads to attempts to ground obedience in myths of absolute knowledge.
A binding framework, an open text, and autonomy in halakhic decision-making
The text argues that formal authority in the sense of the Sanhedrin disappeared with the absence of ordination, and that after the sealing of the Talmud, halakhic decisors have at most substantive authority, except for formal authority created from below through acceptance by the public or by a community. It presents the Talmud as an open text, not a Shulchan Arukh, and argues that this openness allows for a binding framework of discussion without fixing final conclusions, so that disagreements can remain within a shared language. It adds that the historical establishment of the framework of the Talmud is what enabled the survival of halakhic discourse and Jewish culture, without claiming that this was done for the sake of the value of survival.
Questions about commandments of belief, the messiah, resurrection of the dead, and the observance of “mental commandments”
At the end, questions arise as to how one can demand belief in future facts such as the messiah, the world to come, and resurrection of the dead, if there is no formal authority over facts and if there is no ordinary way to persuade people about them. The text presents this as “the game” that will come later, after laying out the tools, and identifies the question as connected to the discussion of Duties of the Heart and commandments concerning thought. It states that the obligation to observe commandments does not stem from their corresponding to moral or rational conceptions, but from the fact that they are commandments, and indicates that the continuation of the discussion will focus on the possible meaning of commandments of belief according to Maimonides.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re in dogmatic understanding. We talked a bit about the meaning of the principles, right? Setting some kind of binding intellectual framework within which the whole story is supposed to take place, or needs to take place. Someone who goes outside it—then it’s not some legitimate disagreement of one sort or another, like we find a lot in the Torah, in Jewish law, and so on. It’s outside the boundary. And that immediately, of course, raises the problem: the moment there’s a dispute about the principles themselves, then how can you say that the principles are the framework inside which—and only inside which—you can argue? There’s a dispute about the principles themselves. So the very existence of the dispute over the principles kind of empties the discussion of principles of its content, because once you define them as principles in the sense that every discussion must take place within them, and whoever denies them or disagrees with them is not in the game—then how can there be a dispute about the principles? Meaning, then these are basically other religions. So I really do think that the very existence of disputes here seriously undermines the meaning of the discussion about principles.
By the way, there are also all kinds of examples like this in Jewish law. At one point I collected a few examples like these—I think in one of the books; it’s in Talmudic Logic—various examples in which the very existence of a dissenting opinion refutes my position. Its mere existence—not the arguments it raises against me. For example, yes, for example, the renewal of ordination. The renewal of ordination—so there was a dispute, right, in the 16th century. Mahari Beirav wanted to ordain; they ordained him, and he wanted to ordain five other students. A controversy arose opposite Maharalbach, one of the sages of Jerusalem, who disagreed with the sages of Safed, and they argued that it was not correct, or unnecessary, or forbidden, or impossible to renew ordination—whether because they disagreed with Maimonides, or even according to Maimonides’ own view, which says that ordination can be renewed with the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel.
And one of Maharalbach’s arguments—there’s a whole pamphlet on ordination at the end of his responsa, the last responsum in his collection is an entire pamphlet called The Pamphlet on Ordination—and it’s basically the main documentation of all sides in the dispute. Meaning, he brings there both the arguments of the sages of Safed and his own arguments against them, and basically what we know about that dispute comes mainly from Maharalbach’s Pamphlet on Ordination. One interesting thing is that Rabbi Yosef Karo had ordination. He was one of those ordained by Mahari Beirav. And he himself writes in Beit Yosef that nowadays there are no ordained sages—that in our time there are no ordained sages. So that’s just an interesting remark, but that’s almost the only trace in Rabbi Yosef Karo—not even really a trace, just indirectly—of the question of ordination. Meaning, even the views of the sages of Safed we learn from Maharalbach’s Pamphlet on Ordination.
In any case, for our purposes, Maharalbach makes a fascinating argument on the logical level. He says: since I disagree with you—or I and the sages of Jerusalem disagree with you—then there is no agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel. And if there is no agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel, then even according to your own position, ordination is impossible. Because after all, your position is based on Maimonides, who requires the agreement of all the sages of the Land of Israel. So now, regardless of whether I’m right or not—don’t argue with my arguments. The mere fact that I think differently lets the air out of your balloon, or your whole construction.
Okay, there’s another example. Rabbi Shimon Shkop brings this regarding an unavoidable result. He brings it there about palm-branch brooms. There’s a tannaitic dispute about palm-branch brooms: if we sweep the house with palm-branch brooms on the Sabbath, is that permitted or forbidden? What’s the argument? The argument is whether this is an unavoidable result that leaves will be detached. Palm-branch brooms are palm fronds, right? So if I sweep the house with palm fronds—that used to be the broom—then while sweeping, leaves can fall off that palm branch. And that’s detaching on the Sabbath, which is forbidden, right? And therefore it’s forbidden to do it because it’s an unavoidable result. And the tanna who says it’s permitted says: it’s not an unavoidable result, because it’s not certain that leaves will be detached. It’s an unintended act, and not an unavoidable result, and therefore permitted.
Now there’s a dispute among the later authorities—the Taz and Rabbi Akiva Eiger—about what happens with an unavoidable result in a case that’s uncertain, what’s called uncertainty about the past rather than uncertainty about the future. Right? In unavoidable result or not unavoidable result, the discussion is always uncertainty about the future. I drag a bench over the ground, and there’s uncertainty whether this dragging will create a furrow in the future. That’s the issue. So if it’s certain that a furrow will be made, that’s an unavoidable result. If it’s not certain, then it’s not an unavoidable result, so it’s just a regular unintended act.
What happens if I close a box that maybe has a fly inside it? If there’s a fly inside, I closed the box and trapped it. If there’s no fly inside, I closed the box and nothing happened. Since there’s uncertainty here, says the Taz, then it’s not an unavoidable result. There’s uncertainty; you’re not sure you’re doing a prohibition, because maybe there’s no fly. Rabbi Akiva Eiger says no, that’s forbidden, because it’s an uncertain unavoidable result. What does that mean? Here either there is a fly or there isn’t. On the side where there is a fly, then it’s certain that if I close the box I violated trapping. I just don’t know whether there is or isn’t a fly, but in reality there either is a fly there or there isn’t. And therefore this is called an uncertain unavoidable result. It sounds like a contradictory concept—if it’s uncertain, it’s not an unavoidable result—but no, it’s an uncertain unavoidable result, and therefore forbidden. There’s a Biur Halakha and other discussions like that.
[Speaker B] Rabbi, can I ask something? Yes. I don’t really understand this concept, because from a deterministic standpoint we really don’t know—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no, don’t bring that in here. Good question—I wrote a column about it; you can look there. I answered it. No, I don’t want to—it’s only an example, I don’t want to get into it. I called it pseudo—anyway, look in the column.
In any case, for our purposes, what Rabbi Shimon Shkop argues—and I’m going back to the tannaitic dispute about palm-branch brooms—he says: according to the Taz, if there is uncertainty in a person’s knowledge, then that too is considered uncertainty, and therefore it’s not an unavoidable result. According to Rabbi Akiva Eiger, if the uncertainty is in the person’s knowledge—whether there is a fly or there isn’t a fly—then it’s an uncertain unavoidable result, and it’s forbidden. That does not remove it from the category of unavoidable result. Only uncertainty in reality itself would do that. But uncertainty in a person’s knowledge does not remove it from the category of unavoidable result.
So he says: then what happens in the tannaitic dispute? In the tannaitic dispute, the tanna who says this is indeed an unavoidable result knows that opposite him there is a tanna who holds that it is not an unavoidable result, right? Meaning, it’s not true that every reasonable person understands that in such a situation leaves will definitely be detached. So then it’s not an unavoidable result. So how can that tanna say that it is an unavoidable result? The very existence of a dissenting opinion collapses my position. Its mere existence—not its arguments, even if it’s mistaken. Because if indeed the mere fact that people cannot be certain that a branch will be detached means that this is not an unavoidable result, then here you have a person, a Torah scholar, a tanna, who is not certain that a branch will be detached. So you can’t say that it is certain to every rational person that if you sweep, a branch will be detached—here in front of you is a rational person for whom it isn’t certain.
So that’s another example. I think I also talked about this in that column I wrote—it was some series, if I remember correctly, on ontic and epistemic doubts, and so on. In any case, this is another example of a situation in which the very existence of a dissenting opinion undermines my position—not the arguments of the dissenting opinion, but its mere existence. I have several more examples like this.
In any event, for our purposes, the same is true here: the very fact that there are opinions that dispute the principles—even if Maimonides thinks they are mistaken—the very existence of other views basically means that Maimonides himself cannot say that the principles are the binding thing and that all debates must take place within them. The fact is that debates take place about them too. And it may be that this is the root of the Raavad’s famous comment—we saw it briefly last time. The Raavad, in the Laws of Repentance, chapter 3—one moment, I’ll share the screen here.
Right. Maimonides says: “Five are called heretics: one who says there is no deity and the world has no leader; one who says there is a leader, but there are two or more; and one who says there is one Master but that He has a body and a form,” and so on. Okay? “That He has a body and a form.”
The Raavad’s gloss: “And one who says there is one Master but that He has a body and a form”—this is quoting Maimonides. “Abraham said: Why did he call such a person a heretic? Many greater and better than he went with this view, according to what they saw in the verses, and even more from what they saw in the aggadic passages that confuse the mind.”
So I already noted last time too that it’s quite clear that the Raavad accepts what Maimonides says. Meaning, the Raavad also agrees that the Holy One, blessed be He, has no body and no form, and someone who says He has a body and a form is mistaken—the Raavad agrees with that too. He only argues that you can’t call him a heretic. But why not? Say he’s a heretic by mistake, a coerced heretic, intellectually coerced. Why—why does the fact that someone disagrees mean that you can’t say such a view is heresy? What, can’t there be a Torah scholar who is a heretic by mistake? He erred in his analysis and reached that conclusion, and he’s a heretic. No—not regarding punishment; he’s coerced. I’m not saying he should be punished. But why can’t you call him a heretic? What’s the problem?
Even those who say there is no deity—even if there are Torah scholars who say this, or intelligent people who say it and say it innocently—I don’t think you can say that everyone who says there is no deity will necessarily be punished. The claim is that he is a denier as a factual determination. Right? What’s known in the name of Rabbi Chaim is the “poor unfortunate apikores.” Meaning, an apikores by mistake is a poor unfortunate apikores. He is still an apikores because he does not believe the correct thing. Obviously. But as for blame—if he’s unfortunate, then he bears no blame. Factually he is an apikores because he does not believe the right thing, but he bears no blame.
The same here. The fact that there are people who think—Jewish Torah scholars, and I’m saying “greater and better than he,” than Maimonides, as the Raavad describes them—who thought that the Holy One, blessed be He, has a body and a form. And they saw it in the verses, because of expressions like “the hand of God” and other well-known things, and “the aggadic passages that confuse the mind,” and so on, so they reached the conclusion that the Holy One, blessed be He, has a body and a form. So how can it be that Maimonides labels such a position as heresy? That is the Raavad’s question. What’s the question? Fine, it’s heresy by mistake.
The answer I want to suggest is what I said before. What is a heretic? A heretic is someone who denies a principle. Meaning, at the foundation of the concept of a heretic, an apikores, and the like, lie the concepts of principles. There are such binding principles that whoever does not accept them is outside the game, right? He is not legitimate. A heretic, an apikores, or a denier of Torah and the like—Maimonides divided this into three types in the previous law. So there are such principles that determine the framework of discussion. And only because there are such principles can we speak of heretics and apikorsim and deniers and the like, because these are the people who do not accept the principles.
The Raavad says: but the concept of principles—he is not disputing the classification of this opinion, or of the people who hold it, as heretics, in my opinion. He is disputing the concept of principles. And if so, then there is no concept of heretics either. Because a heretic is someone who does not accept the principles. But if there is no such thing as principles, then why—or at least, the Raavad is not disputing the concept of principles as such, but at least in this matter, of God’s not having a body and not having a form—he says this cannot be a principle. Why can’t it be a principle? Because factually people disagree. So what if they disagree—maybe they’re mistaken? Yes, but if you say they are heretics, that means this thing is a principle under which all debates must be conducted. There cannot be a debate about it itself. Once there is a debate about it itself, you cannot define it as a principle. And once you cannot define it as a principle, then whoever disputes it—even if he is mistaken, and the Raavad agrees that he is mistaken—you still cannot call him a heretic, because he is not denying a principle.
So it seems to me that what lies behind this question of the Raavad on Maimonides is exactly the claim I made earlier: that the mere existence of dissenting opinions undermines not this specific principle alone, but the concept of principles in general. The Raavad here speaks about a particular principle, but you could broaden it and say that maybe this means the whole concept of principles has no real meaning.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, rabbi, rabbi, all this is true if we relate to Maimonides as though he set up the principles like some scientist coming to define species and categories of creatures and people for us. But if Maimonides presents this as a normative determination that one ought to strive to fulfill—after all, these beliefs aren’t in a person’s hands, either he believes or he doesn’t believe—then just sitting on the side and saying, look, I’m bored so now I’m going to classify you, that seems unnecessary for Maimonides. But if, on the other hand, he is making a normative claim here—that this is how it ought to be, and one has to strive toward it and seek some way to attain the ideal in them—then that’s something else. So what does it matter that there are people who disagree? On the contrary, that only sharpens the need to do it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But those who disagree searched and still didn’t arrive at that conclusion.
[Speaker C] So let them search a little more.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They searched a little more and still didn’t arrive at that conclusion.
[Speaker C] At least they aspired.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Maimonides thinks that’s the conclusion everyone should reach. I’m saying, you can defend Maimonides with that claim. I based what I said earlier on the words of the Raavad. My claim is that the Raavad’s question against Maimonides is not understandable unless you explain it the way I suggested. What would Maimonides answer him? Maybe what you’re saying. Maimonides would answer him: What do you mean? These are the true things, and if they are mistaken, then they are mistaken—so they are heretics by mistake.
[Speaker D] But if you look at the Raavad himself that the rabbi put up here, he writes: “and greater people than he said the opposite.” I think that’s a classic Haredi argument, and in the study hall too it’s very strong: ah, but so-and-so said such-and-such, and if he said such-and-such then we can’t say the opposite.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite—it’s clear that that’s not correct in the Raavad. Why? Because the Raavad himself said that they rely on verses and on aggadic passages that confuse the mind.
[Speaker D] Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Raavad himself said they are mistaken.
[Speaker D] He says they are mistaken, but on the other hand he creates a paradox here. On the one hand he says: look what great people said this, so you have no way of saying anything, that’s it. You can’t say about them that they are deniers, because they are great—there’s this sort of axiom. Afterward he says: but it’s not correct.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why explain the Raavad in an illogical way when you have a logical explanation?
[Speaker D] Because that’s how the study hall works. Now why am I saying that—not only because—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Which study hall works that way? Depends which study hall. I brought a very logical explanation—
[Speaker D] —for the Raavad, and there’s no reason to hang illogical explanations on him. I’ll tell you why, because if indeed—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If what the rabbi is saying is true, then why didn’t the Raavad himself write: gentlemen, there are no principles? What would be simpler than writing that?
No, he didn’t say that, and that’s why I said: the Raavad is not claiming that there are no principles. The Raavad is claiming that this—that God is not corporeal and has no form—cannot be a principle. I am only claiming that if you take this logic of the Raavad, it may pull the rug out from under the whole concept of principles. The Raavad did not dispute the concept of principles in general. The Raavad does not dispute the very definition that there are heretics and apikorsim. He only argues: body and form—that cannot be a principle. Why not? Because someone disagrees with it. So what? So what if someone disagrees?
[Speaker D] Then let him write that it’s not a principle. What could be simpler than that? That’s what he says. He doesn’t say it’s not a principle, he—what the rabbi is explaining is that this is what he means. He doesn’t write, “it’s not a principle”; he says, “greater and better.” Why does he mention the words “greater and better”? He doesn’t need to mention that at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If they’re fools who think this way, then they really are deniers—what do you mean? Then they’re mistaken and confused.
[Speaker D] For the argument itself you don’t need to get to “greater and better.” You should simply say: they thought this way because they were mistaken, and that’s the end of it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. If they aren’t greater and better, then their mistake has no significance, then they’re just idiots. A mere idiot is not a position. When there is an opposing position, you can’t say that this is the binding position. There is an opposing position, so we have an argument about it. That’s fine—I say you’re mistaken—but you can’t say you must conduct yourself within the framework that I determine. We have an argument about the framework. But if I’m arguing with the village fool, then it’s not a debate about the framework; he’s just an idiot.
[Speaker D] It’s not because he’s the village fool. The dispute here, in my opinion, is not about the principles at all. The dispute here is about whether people—someone who says now, even not a great wise person, just a simple person—says he thinks this because he read the verses in a distorted way, is he a denier or not? The Raavad says: about this matter of form and body, it doesn’t make sense to say he is a denier. But that has nothing to do with principles, with whether he holds such views. It simply isn’t connected.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it is connected. This very notion of body and form cannot be a principle. That’s what the Raavad is claiming. No, I also said earlier: he is not challenging the concept of principles in general. He is saying: body and form—which Maimonides turns into a principle—that cannot be a principle. Why not? There are great and good people who think otherwise, and they too rely on verses and on aggadic passages that confuse the mind, and so on. They are mistaken. But even though they are mistaken, it still cannot be that they are heretics.
[Speaker D] The rabbi wants to derive from that that in general the principles—this takes the whole idea of principles out of context entirely.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m claiming that this logic that the Raavad applies to this principle of body and form may undermine the concept of principles in general. The Raavad didn’t say that; I’m saying it. Okay, so that’s one more—maybe I’ll still go a little—
[Speaker E] Yes, I want to take an example. Suppose the concept of democracy, unrelated to the arguments happening now. If I claim that the concept of democracy is something particular, and someone else says it’s something else, that the definition is different—and now you come and tell me that this other person is mistaken, but you can’t define what you’re defining as a principle because he disagrees with you. What difference does it make that he disagrees with me? But you yourself admit that he is mistaken. So why can’t I define a principle in democracy as something particular? He disagrees with me, but you admit he is mistaken.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll divide the answer in two. Regarding the question of anthropomorphism, of body and form, the claim is that when you talk about principles—or in general about principles, not specifically body and form—you are basically determining, as I said at the beginning, a framework. An intellectual framework within which all the study-hall discussions and debates are supposed to take place. It defines Judaism. Now, within Judaism there are streams and outlooks and opinions, everything is fine—but in what sense are these Jewish outlooks? They are Jewish outlooks because they are outlooks within this agreed-upon and binding framework.
The Raavad says: if that is the definition of the concept of principles, then body and form cannot be a principle. You cannot say that these many greater and better than Maimonides—that this is not Judaism. You can say they are mistaken, but you cannot say this is not Judaism. And that is the Raavad’s claim.
[Speaker E] That’s on the assumption that a principle is something no one ever argued about. Right. But if—I’m thinking that Maimonides claims he investigated Judaism and reached the conclusion that without this the whole thing collapses—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like Shmuel said earlier, I agree. That could be Maimonides’ answer to the Raavad’s claim. I’m explaining the Raavad’s claim, and I’m saying that the Raavad’s claim is apparently based on the understanding that principles must be something within which all debates can take place, and only within it. And then he says: this issue of body and form cannot be a principle, because the fact is that debates take place about it itself. That is the explanation I’m suggesting for the Raavad’s claim. Maimonides, of course, does establish principles, and Maimonides thinks this is indeed a principle despite the fact that there were disputes.
[Speaker E] Because he defines—you can’t hear—he defines the concept—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —of principle in a different—
[Speaker E] —way, basically.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A principle, in his opinion, is—
[Speaker E] —not something no one ever argued about.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Meaning, the explanation I suggested hangs on the Raavad’s question against Maimonides. What would Maimonides answer him? Maimonides probably understands that dogmas or principles are whatever is true. And if someone is mistaken, so what if he is mistaken? Then he is mistaken. That doesn’t mean these aren’t extremely fundamental principles. True, there are intelligent people who are mistaken about fundamental principles. That can happen. Fine, yes, it could definitely be that there is a dispute here about what a principle is, or what a principle is meant to achieve. Is it something one cannot argue about, or is it something one must believe, even though one can argue, and either I’m right or I’m not right? Yes, it could very well be that this is the dispute between Maimonides and the Raavad. Okay, thank you. So that’s regarding the—what? I can’t hear.
[Speaker G] I just wanted to ask: how can it be that in a tannaitic dispute there is a tanna who says it’s an unavoidable result if opposite him there’s a tanna who says it isn’t—no—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what Rabbi Shimon Shkop asked. I didn’t understand. Those were the examples I brought earlier. I didn’t understand exactly.
[Speaker G] You’re saying that if there’s a tanna who says it’s an unavoidable result, then he wasn’t working with Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s logic?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the other way around. Rabbi Shimon Shkop talks about this dispute among the Tannaim and brings from it proof that a doubt in a person’s intention also does not remove something from the category of an inevitable result. Proof for Rabbi Akiva Eiger. Because if it did remove it from the category of an inevitable result, then it couldn’t be that one Tanna treats it as an inevitable result if another Tanna says it isn’t. That’s proof for Rabbi Akiva Eiger. Okay? Fine, so that’s an example; there’s no point getting into those things right now. In any case, that’s basically the point.
Now here something comes in — I’ll already bring it in here because it’s always in the background — the conceptual principles, the fundamentals we’re talking about, these are the foundations of Jewish thought. Now usually conceptual principles, and especially the principles that are the foundations of the matter, are determinations that deal with facts. Meaning, for example, that the messiah will come, that the Holy One, blessed be He, exercises providence, that He has a body or that He does not have a body. All these are facts. These are not facts that I can necessarily see with my senses or through scientific instruments, but they are facts. Meaning, either it’s true or it’s not true. Here you can’t say, “These and those are both the words of the living God.” “These and those are both the words of the living God” you can maybe say about norms. Maybe, if at all. You can’t say it about facts. With facts, if one is right then the other is wrong; only one is right. Okay?
Now all the questions whether the messiah will come or not come, whether the Holy One, blessed be He, exercises providence or does not exercise providence — all those are factual questions. Either it’s true or it’s not true. They are not normative questions. Why is this claim important? Because, as I’ve said more than once already — if you stop hearing me, I’m here with this microphone, tell me — if we’re dealing here with facts, then we have to pay attention to a very important point.
I’ve distinguished in the past several times between two concepts of authority. There is formal authority and substantive authority. Formal authority is authority that a person or institution has by virtue of being who they are. And substantive authority is authority that a person has by virtue of being an expert in a certain field. What he says is probably true.
Formal authority is not connected to the question of whether the authority figure is right; rather, it is connected to the question of whether he is the authority figure. That’s called formal authority. I’ll give some examples — I’ve said this more than once, but I’ll still give a few examples. The authority of the Knesset. The authority of the Knesset is formal authority. One must obey the laws of the Knesset not because the Knesset is right. Even if it isn’t right, but because it is the Knesset. In our system of government, the Knesset is the binding institution. And if they determined something, it’s not because they’re right but because they are the Knesset. Even if they are mistaken and I’m convinced they are mistaken, there is still an obligation to obey. I’m not talking now about extreme cases and a black flag and so on, but about ordinary cases, without going to extremes. So there is an obligation to obey them because they are the Knesset, not because they are right. Even though it could definitely be that they are wrong — and let’s say the simple assumption is that if the Knesset said something, it’s probably a mistake until proven otherwise — and still, it’s the Knesset. Okay, so that’s an example of formal authority.
Substantive authority is the authority of a doctor. A doctor tells me to take a certain medicine. I’m sick, I go to the doctor, he prescribes a certain medicine. The doctor’s authority is by virtue of the fact that he understands this field. And if he prescribed it for me and I don’t understand it, then presumably he understands, and if he prescribed it then presumably that’s the right thing to do. I trust what the doctor said; he is probably right, and therefore I’ll listen to him.
Where is the difference? The difference is that with the doctor, my trust stems from the assumption that he is right. If it somehow becomes clear to me — I don’t know how, Elijah comes, I ask another doctor, just intuition, I checked Google, I don’t know exactly what — I reach the conclusion that the doctor is mistaken, then I will not listen to him, because that’s obvious. And nobody should have any complaint against me for not listening to him. Because a doctor doesn’t really have authority. The concept of substantive authority is just a name; it isn’t really authority, but expertise. Expertise is based on the fact that he is probably right. But if it becomes clear to me that he isn’t right, then of course I won’t listen to him, and I also shouldn’t listen to him. On the contrary, it’s not advisable to listen to him.
By contrast, with the Knesset, even if it becomes clear that they are mistaken in some way, however one could determine that, still what they determine is the binding law. That is formal authority; it has nothing to do with whether they are right.
So ironically, fools actually have higher authority than wise people. If there is a fool who has authority, then it is apparently not by virtue of his wisdom but by virtue of his position. And if so, then it doesn’t depend on whether he is wise or not, and whether he is right or not. By contrast, the authority of the wise person is tied to his wisdom. Meaning, if he is wise then he is probably right. If he is right then it is worth listening to him. But if it becomes clear to me that he isn’t right, even though he is a great sage and understands far more than I do, but somehow I became convinced that he is not right, then I won’t listen to him. Okay, that is the difference between formal authority and substantive authority.
Let’s say the basic source for formal authority is the authority of the Holy One, blessed be He. And this is what Maimonides calls accepting something as a god. In Laws of Idolatry, chapter 3, law 6. Maimonides says that one who worships idolatry out of love or fear is exempt. There is a dispute between Abaye and Rava in tractate Sanhedrin; Maimonides rules like Rava, that one who worships idolatry out of love or fear is exempt, unless he accepted it as a god. Meaning, when are you worshipping idolatry in the full sense? When you accept the idol upon yourself as a god. What does it mean to accept it as a god? Briefly — yes, I’ve also spoken about this in the past — the claim is that a god is someone whose words I fulfill by virtue of his being a god. Not because he is right, not because he is wise, not because I identify with it, but because of unconditional obligation or formal authority that he has. By virtue of his being a god, I have to obey him. Okay?
And therefore the obligation to obey the Holy One, blessed be He, does not stem from the fact that if we obey Him it will help us and benefit us and make the world better. Even if all that is true — and I’m not sure — but even if all that is true, it’s irrelevant. That’s not why there is an obligation to obey the Holy One, blessed be He. The obligation to obey the Holy One, blessed be He, is because He is God. That’s all.
And therefore blind, or formal, obedience to another authority is problematic from the standpoint of idolatry; it has a certain dimension of idolatry. If I accept upon myself another formal authority that is not the Holy One, blessed be He, there is something here akin to idolatry. Therefore I argued, for example, that Leibowitz, who says that morality is an atheistic category — meaning, he says basically: to morality I am obligated as an ordinary person, secular or religious, it doesn’t matter, as a person; and to Jewish law I am obligated as a religious person. But morality has no connection to the Holy One, blessed be He; it is an atheistic category. And my claim is: I accept the separation he made between morality and Jewish law — that’s what we discussed earlier with Shmuel — but I don’t accept that it can be detached from the Holy One, blessed be He. Because formal obedience to moral principles, if it does not come from the Holy One, blessed be He, has an element of idolatry. There cannot be formal authority for anyone other than the Holy One, blessed be He, or for anything other than the Holy One, blessed be He.
Okay, and for our purposes, the claim is that therefore judges are also called gods in the Torah, right? The Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin at the beginning learns that a religious court for monetary cases must have three judges, and they derive it from the word “gods” appearing three times in the passage. Because “gods” means judges: “the owner of the house shall approach the judges,” “the owner of the house shall be brought near to the judges.” Who are the “gods”? Judges. Why are judges called gods? Judges are called gods because they have formal authority. What the judge says I have to do not because he is right, but because he is the judge. And therefore Scripture calls the judge “god.” “God” is someone who has formal authority. Okay? That is basically the meaning of the matter.
Therefore, for example, this is the great difference between a judge and a Torah scholar. What’s the difference? Both know the same Torah. The Torah scholar has substantive authority, not formal authority. What does that mean? If he says something, he is probably right because he is a Torah scholar. So it is worthwhile to listen to him if I want to observe Jewish law, because he is probably right. A judge has formal authority. I have to listen to him not because he is right; even if it turns out that he is mistaken, all the sages in the world could come out against him — still, if he is the judge, I am obligated to listen to him. Why? Because he is the judge, not because he is right. He has formal authority.
So for example, the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin 5a — the Talmud discusses there, yes, there was a polemic between the people of Babylonia and the people of the Land of Israel over who actually gives ordination. Is it the Nasi of the Sanhedrin in the Land of Israel, or the Exilarch in Babylonia? And I also once spoke about this. What underlies the dispute there in the Talmud is the question: who gives the secular authority to the judge? Who ordains him on the professional level? Who checks his halakhic abilities? That is the Nasi in the Land of Israel. Ordination happens only in the Land of Israel. But the fact that you are ordained merely means that you are a professor of law, as it were, in Jewish law — that you are an expert. But who gives you permission to judge? Permission to judge is governmental authority. It turns your authority into formal authority, not substantive authority. One must listen to you not because you are a Torah scholar but because you are a judge.
That power — “the scepter shall not depart from Judah, nor the ruler’s staff from between his feet.” The scepter comes from Judah, from the king of the house of David. The scepter is the rod, yes, the authority to enforce, formal authority. “The ruler’s staff” — meaning the professional authority, that you are a Torah scholar, you know the laws — “from between his feet.” That does not come from the king; it comes from the Sanhedrin.
And every judge, by the way, is like a judge in any state. When you take a legal scholar and appoint him to be a judge, who determines that he is a judge? Law professors who say he is the greatest expert? Of course not. The judge also is not necessarily the greatest expert. Who determines it is a political, governmental committee. And rightly so. Why? Because the judge needs to receive formal governmental authority after we understand that he is an expert, and that will be determined by the experts in law, or in Jewish law, or whatever it may be. Now the secular ruler will come and determine that this one is a judge, or that one is a judge; one must listen to him because he has formal authority. This is governmental authority, the judicial branch. Okay? That certification is a secular certification, not a religious one. And therefore the Babylonians argued that this certification is given by the Exilarch, not by the Nasi of the Sanhedrin in the Land of Israel. Because the Exilarch was the king. “The scepter shall not depart from Judah” — these are the heads of the exiles in Babylonia. So that was basically the claim.
Same thing as, say, taking a psychiatrist and appointing him district psychiatrist. District. What is the meaning of that appointment? Every psychiatrist is an expert in psychiatry, and if he tells me something, then he is an expert, he is probably right, let’s say. Okay? So that is substantive authority. Once he is appointed district psychiatrist, he receives governmental authority. Governmental authority means, for example, that he can order involuntary hospitalization, which no psychiatrist can do. Only a district psychiatrist can order involuntary hospitalization. Is the sound not good? Can’t hear well? You hear well. So apparently the problem is on your end, Shmuel. In any case, when they appoint a psychiatrist to be district psychiatrist, they give him enforcement powers, governmental powers. That is not professional recognition — he is not necessarily a better psychiatrist than other psychiatrists — but he is the psychiatrist who has the authority to carry out various governmental and coercive actions. Okay?
So this distinction between substantive authority and formal authority is a very important distinction. And why? I’m going back to the distinction between facts and norms. When I speak about norms, then basically there can be formal authority regarding the norm. For example, let’s say the Sanhedrin determined that selecting is one of the thirty-nine primary categories of labor. And let’s say I think it isn’t. “Winnowing, selecting, sifting” — Talmud, tractate Shabbat, the chapter “Klal Gadol.” So let’s say I think it isn’t. I am obligated to listen to the Sanhedrin; I am not obligated to think like them. I can disagree with them in terms of my conception of Jewish law, but in practice I’m supposed to obey what they decided. They have formal authority; what they determined is binding.
[Speaker I] Despite, Rabbi, despite the value of autonomy, when I’m competent to rule?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, because this is the Sanhedrin. The value of autonomy exists when you are not facing formal authority, only substantive authority.
[Speaker I] So even if I research the whole passage from A to Z and I reach a conclusion?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the Sanhedrin ruled, then you have to listen to it.
[Speaker I] There’s a bit of—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Discussions at the beginning of tractate Horayot about someone who errs with regard to the commandment to obey the sages. There are various opinions there; there are places where, if it is clear to you that it is an error, maybe you are allowed to act otherwise. But in principle they have formal authority. There is the rebellious elder; one who does not listen to them is a rebellious elder. Now, a rebellious elder is only someone qualified to issue rulings, a Torah scholar. He thinks differently, and the fact that he thinks differently is very nice, but he still has to obey. What?
[Speaker I] I think he said “do not turn aside.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, “do not turn aside,” right. “Do not turn aside” is the verse from which the formal authority of the Sanhedrin is derived. In any case, regarding norms one can speak about formal authority, and you need to obey even though you do not agree. And one can also speak about substantive authority. A Torah scholar — if he determines that Jewish law says such-and-such, he is probably right because he is a Torah scholar, he is an expert in it, so one should listen to him because he is right. Okay? That is substantive authority with respect to norms. As I said earlier, there is also formal authority with respect to norms.
But with respect to facts there cannot be formal authority. There could maybe be — no, sorry — there can be substantive authority, but there cannot be formal authority. Meaning, let’s say a physicist or a doctor or an expert in some field tells me something — then he has substantive authority because he is an expert, he understands it. Okay? So if he said it, he is probably right. If I don’t understand it and he does understand it, then he is probably right. So he has substantive authority. Can someone have formal authority with regard to facts? No. I’ve argued no. Not only an expert — nobody. There cannot be formal authority with regard to facts. Why not? Let’s see, let’s try to think what formal authority with respect to facts would even mean.
Formal authority with respect to facts means, for example, I think that outside right now it is night. Now the Sanhedrin comes and rules that right now it is day. Now this is a factual question, not a halakhic one, okay? The question whether right now it is day or right now it is night. I’m claiming — yes, “calling right left,” in short — yes, they rule that right now it is day. Now they tell me: look, the Sanhedrin has formal authority, so you have to listen to them even if you don’t agree with them. Regarding facts, such a demand cannot even be defined. One can say: even though you think selecting is not a primary category of labor forbidden on the Sabbath, if the Sanhedrin determined that it is, then do not select on the Sabbath. And you cannot force me to think that selecting is a primary category of labor on the Sabbath; I think what I think. You cannot force me to think otherwise. That is what I think. You can force me to behave otherwise. Therefore regarding norms one can talk about formal authority. Formal authority tells me: behave not in accordance with what you think. Think differently if you want, but in behavior you have to act the way the authority told you to. With facts, there is no difference between behaving and thinking. If I think that outside right now it is night, then you cannot demand that I think that outside right now it is day because the court ruled so. You can demand different behaviors from me, that’s fine. But you cannot demand that I think differently, okay? Because that is what I think.
You understand, even if, say, they demanded this of me — if they demand that I think otherwise, can I fulfill that demand, comply with that demand? No. What can I do? After all, I have become convinced that right now it is night outside. I may be mistaken, but that is my conclusion; I’m convinced that right now it is night. And they tell me: look, but the authorities said that right now it is day. You are obligated to think that right now it is day. I’m obligated, but I don’t. I think that right now it is night.
[Speaker D] I can — the question is what it means to think. I can indeed think — if he tells me, think this way, then I say: since he says so, I decide from now on to think this way; I can think this way. Meaning, I can’t agree, but as it were I can think this way.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thinking — there is no difference between thinking and agreeing. When I speak about thinking, I mean agreeing.
[Speaker D] I can reach—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thinking is not just running ideas through your head.
[Speaker D] Not only running ideas through my head — I can convince myself in a certain sense that if they are great people and they decided, and from now—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again, you’ve gone back to substantive authority. That’s exactly the point. If you say, look, they are great people and understand better than I do, and therefore I accept what they say — that is substantive authority, because I obey them because I think they are right. No, I’m saying in the end I can convince myself even with nonsense, I can convince myself to reach a certain conclusion, right?
[Speaker D] I don’t know what it means to convince yourself. If in the end you are convinced, then you were convinced—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And if not, then not. What should one do, self-hypnosis? I don’t know, autosuggestion, I don’t know. Not hypnosis, not hypnosis, not—
[Speaker D] Doesn’t matter, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I think X, then that’s what I think. And people can demand until tomorrow that I think Y — I don’t think Y, I think X. If you convince me, no problem. Or if you convince me that you are a genius and despite the fact that I think otherwise, you are probably the one who is right, that’s also no problem — you convinced me. Even if not directly, you convinced me indirectly. But you cannot demand that I think Y even though I think X. You can demand that I do Y even though I think X. But you cannot demand that I think Y even though I think X, right? That’s simply an oxymoron. You cannot make such a demand. Therefore… what?
[Speaker B] So doesn’t that prove that according to Maimonides, principles of faith are not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait, I haven’t gotten to principles of faith yet; we’ll get there.
[Speaker J] But the formal authority figure usually doesn’t deal with the subject of your thoughts; when he determines facts, he determines them incidentally to a halakhic ruling or a ruling he has to issue.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: if he determines those things, then I have no problem. But if he wants to determine a theological or conceptual position, he cannot have formal authority regarding that. Okay, have we agreed at this hypothetical level?
[Speaker J] That, yes, but there isn’t even any initial assumption like that at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not only is there such an initial assumption, there is even such a conclusion. Nachmanides, for example, thought so. Okay? And I think it cannot be — it simply cannot be.
[Speaker J] There may be an example — there’s that example of Rabbi Yehoshua, when Rabban Gamliel told him—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there it’s Jewish law; there it’s a demand to behave.
[Speaker J] Yes, but he determined for him that he has to think it’s Yom Kippur.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, he did not determine for him that he has to think it’s Yom Kippur. He determined for him that he has to behave as though it’s Yom Kippur. What you think, think to yourself, but I determine what is to be done.
[Speaker J] So what it says in the Torah, even if he tells you— what it says in the Sifrei, I think, in this week’s portion—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Only about norms.
[Speaker J] Only about norms, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, in the realm of facts this cannot be. It cannot. I’m saying this is a conceptual analysis, not because — we’ll get to principles of faith and then we’ll see Maimonides. What I’m claiming here is not based on sources. Notice, I’ve done a conceptual analysis. In this conceptual analysis it emerges clearly and unequivocally — I don’t think anyone can argue with such a thing — that there cannot be formal authority regarding facts. There isn’t. It simply is not definable at the conceptual level. I don’t need to bring sources for this, whether it says this in the Talmud or that in Maimonides or this in the Torah. Even if the Holy One, blessed be He Himself, came and said to me, “Look, right now it is day outside,” I would say to Him, “You haven’t convinced me; try to convince me. I think that right now it is night.” And again, if I have full trust in the Holy One, blessed be He, and He says that right now it is day, then it is clear to me that I simply got confused — no problem — then I am convinced. But if the Holy One, blessed be He, comes to me with a demand by virtue of formal authority — not that He convinces me, but by virtue of formal authority — “even though you don’t think so, you have to think so,” that has no meaning. Even the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot make such a demand, because conceptually it cannot be correct.
Yes, this is my favorite well-known little story — just a second — about the difference between two students of the Brisker Rav. No, of Rabbi Chaim, sorry. Yes, Rabbi Chaim had two outstanding students: his son, the Brisker Rav, and Birkat Shmuel, Rabbi Baruch Ber. And they always say, what is the difference between them? The difference is that if Rabbi Chaim had said that this table is a cow, then the Brisker Rav would say: well, if father said so — after all, “do not turn aside” — then he is probably right. Strange, but if he said it then it is probably true. Rabbi Baruch Ber wouldn’t stop there; he would run to bring a bucket and a stool in order to milk the table. So that is absolute faith even in factual determinations. But again, that faith can stem from the assessment that Rabbi Chaim is right, but not from Rabbi Chaim’s formal authority. Formal authority regarding facts is undefined — there cannot be such a thing. Okay? That is basically the claim. Therefore, for example — what?
[Speaker B] I didn’t understand. If, say, I met Herzl, and he would try to convince me that “If you will it, it is no dream,” that it’s possible to establish a home for the Jewish people in the Land of Israel. And I say to him: listen, I checked the data, it doesn’t seem realistic to me. He would say to me: but yes, if you will it, it is no dream. So what, was he talking nonsense?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand that question.
[Speaker B] The concept of knowledge about facts also includes a concept of belief in facts.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no difference at all between knowledge and belief; they are synonymous.
[Speaker B] In everyday life you see that in life it’s not exactly identical.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In life they are completely synonymous.
[Speaker B] Meaning, that statement “If you will it, it is no dream” has no meaning? What does that have to do with anything? Either it’s a dream or it isn’t; is that forced on me?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not correct. “If you will it, it is no dream,” Herzl says, means: if you have determination, then yes, it is possible — that’s his claim.
[Speaker B] And if someone thinks it isn’t possible, if you really want it to happen then suddenly it won’t seem like a dream?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, if you want it to happen, then it really can happen in realistic terms as well. It’s not mysticism. If you are determined and fight for your goal, you can achieve it — that’s the claim, nothing more sophisticated than that. And if someone thinks not, then he disagrees with Herzl and indeed won’t accept it. What’s the problem?
[Speaker J] It’s simply “If you toiled and found, believe it.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. In any case, for our purposes, what I want to say is that the conclusion is this: authority regarding norms can be substantive authority and can be formal authority. Regarding facts, there can be substantive authority — an expert in the field can make factual determinations and I will accept them because he understands it, because he is right. But formal authority regarding facts cannot exist. Even if he is the greatest expert, then I will accept what he says because I am convinced he is right — that is, by virtue of substantive authority. But to accept it by virtue of formal authority is basically to say that he is right even though I think he is wrong. There is no such thing. If I think he is wrong and I say he is right, then I’m just mouthing words; it doesn’t really mean that he is right.
Yes, one can demand that I recite the mantra that the messiah will come. If I’ve reached the conclusion that there will be no messiah and he will not come, then I can say the words “the messiah will come,” but to believe that the messiah will come — only if you convince me. If you don’t convince me, then I simply do not believe it. Such a demand has no meaning; you cannot fulfill such a demand of formal authority regarding facts.
Now maybe just to complete the picture of authorities: formal authority comes from “do not turn aside,” as someone here noted earlier, and that authority is given to the high court, to the Sanhedrin. And not regarding — no, even regarding future facts it is not possible. Regarding any fact of any kind, it is not possible. I’ll get to that — the coming of the messiah and so on. Regarding authorities: authority concerning norms, which comes from “do not turn aside,” is first and foremost formal authority. The verse “do not turn aside” does not reveal to me that Torah scholars are Torah scholars — that I know on my own. The verse “do not turn aside” gives formal authority to the Sanhedrin, that you may not turn aside from what they say, not because they are right — and perhaps they are right too, and perhaps not, well, they are also experts — but that is not why they have authority. Because there are experts also outside the Sanhedrin. Rabbi Akiva was greater than the whole Sanhedrin, but he was the son of converts, so he was not on the Sanhedrin. So if Rabbi Akiva said something to me, I would not be obligated to obey. Only if I became convinced that he was right. And if the Sanhedrin, who were smaller than him, said something, I would have to obey because they have formal authority. Okay?
So formal authority was said only regarding norms, and it was given only to the high court. I said that the Talmud too is commonly ascribed formal authority, except that it comes from below, not from above. Meaning, the public accepted upon itself the authority of the Talmud, and therefore there too there is formal authority. Apparently not by force of “do not turn aside,” but there is formal authority there too. Maybe also a local rabbinic authority has it from his community. But in principle, formal authority in the old sense exists only for the Sanhedrin and the Talmud. That’s it. After the Talmud, all the Torah scholars throughout the generations down to our day have, at most, substantive authority. They have no formal authority whatsoever. There is no halakhic decisor in the universe — there was not and there is not, after the sealing of the Talmud — such that I need to do what he says because he said it.
[Speaker I] Wait, Rabbi, but when Jewish law today is based on the Talmud, then it has formal authority, after all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. What is based on the Talmud, yes. You know, very few things can actually be pinned to the Talmud itself. There are always interpretations, and you can interpret it this way and you can interpret it that way; the Talmud is a pretty open text. But okay, I won’t get into that here.
[Speaker I] But also today’s halakhic decisors who issue rulings not based on the Talmud — things that belong to today.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. So if you think they’re right, do it. But if you think they’re not right, then you have no obligation whatsoever to obey. There is no formal authority after the Talmud. I said, substantive authority exists. There are Torah scholars today too.
[Speaker I] I’m asking about formal authority. Has it disappeared today? It doesn’t exist today?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, of course it doesn’t. Once ordination disappeared and there is no Sanhedrin, there is no formal authority. The verse “do not turn aside” is not relevant today. All the mantras of “according to all that they teach you” and “do not turn aside” and all this nonsense — these are Haredi inventions; they have no meaning whatsoever.
[Speaker I] And “make for yourself a rabbi”? Isn’t that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of the Haredim — actually of Sefer HaChinukh — but that’s a puzzling lone opinion, which is not—
[Speaker I] Is the matter of “make for yourself a rabbi” substantive authority?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, “make for yourself a rabbi” can also be interpreted as formal authority that you create for yourself. If you establish, like a community does with a rabbi — if a community appoints a rabbi, then when the rabbi determines something, that binds them. Not because he is right, but because they accepted his authority upon themselves. The community needs to obey the rabbi not because he is right but because they accepted his authority. So therefore a rabbi, with respect to his community, also has a kind of formal authority that comes from below, like the Talmud with respect to the Jewish people as a whole. Okay? But formal authority in the sense of the Sanhedrin — the Sanhedrin had authority not because we accepted them upon ourselves, but because they were ordained, ordained from one ordained authority to the next back to Moses our teacher.
[Speaker I] Authority from above, not from below. So the Rabbi is saying that it’s not that formal authority disappeared; it only disappeared from above. Today it exists only from below.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, but that depends on you. If you don’t accept it upon yourself, then there isn’t any. The Sanhedrin you didn’t need to accept upon yourself; you were obligated to accept it. Meaning, you could not refuse to accept it. It didn’t depend on you.
[Speaker I] Okay, so how is that expressed today? Meaning, today I can accept Rabbi Ovadia upon myself, for example, and not another decisor.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, although you know, there is a discussion in the book Zikhron Yosef, the son of the Rosh, a responsa work by the son of the Rosh, where he argues that a rabbi or a community cannot accept upon itself to act according to the rulings of Maimonides. There is no such thing. Meaning, the rabbi has to decide according to what seems correct to him, and that is what will bind the community. So Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Kovetz Shiurim talks about this a bit. He argues that this is not correct. Doesn’t matter, but there is discussion about this too.
[Speaker I] But what is the meaning of a community? A community could be a neighborhood community; it could also be the whole country or the whole world.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. Any group that defines itself as a group. Like the Palestinians. They became a people because they defined themselves as a people. Okay.
[Speaker I] No, I mean a community could even be, supposedly, members of the Eastern communities, Sephardim, let’s say. Right.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay.
[Speaker B] In any case, so the claim is that a person is obligated to decide according to his own view, and especially halakhic decisors. And the Rabbi has spoken about this in the past and in other series, about the autonomy of “you have only the judge of your own days,” and that you must decide according to your own judgment. So how — without thinking “and with them forever and ever”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, there is no such verse. The obligation of autonomy does not come from verses. It comes from reason. Second — and I’ve also talked and written about this quite a bit — the Talmud, the Mishnah, or the Talmudic corpus in general, was not defined as a closed text. It is an open text. It is not the Shulchan Arukh. It is passages with give-and-take this way and that way, and in most passages there is no conclusion at all. In the overwhelming majority of passages there is no conclusion at all. You cannot know what the Talmud finally arrived at. So what we have here is some determination of a framework for discussion and not really a determination of a binding code of law. And I think that is not accidental. Again, I don’t know whether they thought of it in advance, but at least there is some very impressive collective intelligence here, even if it was not conscious when they established the Talmud as the binding framework.
I think I said that if they had established a code of law as a binding text, that would have broken apart within not very many years. And if they had not established any binding text at all, then we would not be here today. Everyone would do whatever he wanted in a totally different way from his fellow; there would be no Judaism. Meaning, under either of these two extreme options, we would not be here today — whether they had established a code of law as a binding canonical text, or whether they had established nothing at all. And the reason we are sitting here today is thanks to the Talmud. Thanks to the fact that they established a binding framework whose contents are open in an almost unlimited way. But it does establish the discourse, the bringing of proofs, the mode of looking at things. It allows us to discuss with one another, to bring proofs this way and that way, and also to remain in dispute yet still within a framework of discussion. And therefore the establishment of the Talmud and the Mishnah as binding does not at all contradict my autonomous approach. On the contrary, I think autonomy needs to be conducted within some kind of framework that sets the boundaries of the discussion. Because otherwise, you think this way and I think that way; we have nothing to discuss, we have nothing in common. It would turn into a collection of ten million religions: ten million Jews, ten million religions.
[Speaker B] So if in some wondrous way we managed to persuade the Jewish people to think truly freely, each one on his own, but in the end to remain one people somehow, to live as one culture?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That everyone would say, right—
[Speaker B] I have opinions on all kinds of specific things, but in the end we remain one people? No, no, again, not that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Understand, you’re drawing the wrong conclusion from what I said. I did not say that the Talmud is a means for our survival. I said that the Talmud is what caused our survival. That’s not the same thing. Don’t confuse correlation with causation. It wasn’t done in order to survive. Survival is not a value. Jewish law was not intended for the sake of survival. And therefore if you ensure survival in some other way, it will change nothing in the principles of Jewish law. It is not a means for the survival of Jewish law.
Okay, in any case, for our purposes — I lost my train of thought a bit. So the claim is that formal authority was given from above to very specific institutions, and from below of course one can create formal authorities. But all of that is with respect to norms. With respect to facts, as I said before, there is no formal authority.
Now notice that this conceptual analysis that I did, without any source, without anything — look what implications it has. For example, if a factual conclusion emerges for me from the Talmud, is that binding on me? The answer is no. Even though the Talmud ostensibly has something like “do not turn aside,” yes, formal authority. But regarding facts there is no formal authority. Meaning, it’s not that I don’t accept what Maimonides says, or what Rashba says, or what Rabbi Akiva Eiger says. In the factual realm I do not even accept what the Holy One, blessed be He, says. I do not accept it by virtue of His being the Holy One, blessed be He. I will accept it because I think He is right — that is, I will be convinced. But that is substantive authority. Formally, regarding this it was said — yes, the Talmud in Chullin — “Even if Joshua son of Nun had said it, I would not obey him.” There are things that even if Joshua son of Nun told me, I would not obey. So with facts it’s not only Joshua son of Nun; it’s even the Holy One, blessed be He.
[Speaker J] Do you have an example where the Talmud determines some factual determination—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that I need to—
[Speaker J] or that I can wonder whether to obey or not?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have quite a few such examples, and my goal is to get to them. Right now I’m just laying out the map or arranging the pieces on the board; afterward we’ll start to play.
Okay, so in any case, my claim is — notice — this is the conclusion, and it is a far-reaching conclusion: factual determinations from any source whatsoever, including the Talmud, have no binding force on the formal level. If someone comes and says: look, the Talmudic sages were all exalted fiery beings, and they knew everything, and everything they say is by divine inspiration, and therefore clearly they are right — then fine, so you accept what they say because you are convinced they are right. That is substantive authority. But if you want to say that the Talmud said it and therefore it has to be accepted because the Talmud has formal authority regarding facts — that is irrelevant.
Now I have often said that when we deal with the substantive authority of the Talmud — or sorry, the formal authority of the Talmud, meaning regarding norms — then yes, I think most of us were educated on these legends that the Amoraim knew how to revive the dead and that they all had divine inspiration. Some people go even further: everyone mentioned in the Talmud had divine inspiration, all kinds of things of that sort. I think these childish conceptions stem from a childish need. People fail to understand the concept of formal authority, and therefore they think that in order to persuade people to obey the rulings of the Talmud, you have to prove to them that the Talmud is certainly right — that it is so wise that it is certainly right — so: divine inspiration, and so on and so forth. But that is not correct. The authority of the Talmud is formal authority. Not because it is right, but because it is the Talmud. And therefore there is no need whatsoever to reach these conclusions — that they had divine inspiration and could revive the dead — in order to ground the obligation to obey the laws written in the Talmud.
[Speaker D] It doesn’t have to be something so childish; it’s more that if we start thinking for ourselves, there’s a pretty significant chance that the public will start going off in all directions, that’s all. It’s not something childish. Let it come. That’s exactly the problem — they want to preserve something.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Holy lies. So I say—
[Speaker D] What holy lies? That’s for children.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the childish way of thinking I’m talking about.
[Speaker D] Not necessarily children; there are very mature people who decide that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Very mature people who behave like children, right. We’re not talking about children essentially, not children in age.
[Speaker D] Yes, yes, I know, but they’re not essentially children. They say: if all your faith depended on things being crystal clear, then the moment I see that it isn’t so clear — excuse me, with all due respect — and there’s something irrational here—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then he really doesn’t believe. So what’s the question? I don’t understand. So what do you want from me?
[Speaker D] No, therefore it’s not so childish in that respect.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Completely childish. Since you assume that if you tell him they revived the dead, then he will believe? What?
[Speaker D] There are those who believe that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I say, there are those—for whom it’s up to age five. Up to a mental age of five. Anyway, the claim that in order to persuade people to obey, they invented all these theories—basically, I don’t know, I find these theories hard to accept. Not that I met the sages of the Talmud, but I find these theories hard to accept, just as I don’t accept the stories people tell about the sages of our own time. I don’t think the sages of the twentieth, nineteenth, and eighteenth centuries had something our contemporary sages don’t have. And I don’t know where exactly this thing stops—why in Babylonia in the sixth or fifth century it was somehow different. I find that hard to accept. But again, that’s just my own issue. In any case, maybe they did have divine inspiration; I’m only claiming that you don’t need to assume they had divine inspiration in order to demand obedience. That’s the point I want to make. And you have to understand the concept of formal authority. People don’t understand this concept; they hang every authority on substantive authority, and therefore you have to prove to them that the authority figure is right. But you can also demand formal authority, and then I don’t need to show you that he’s right in order to demand that you obey. What—
[Speaker K] But what’s the logic of obeying formal authority? It seems like formal authority is something that developed—as if at first there’s only substantive authority, and then in the end…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If the Holy One, blessed be He, said that one must obey the sages, then there is formal authority.
[Speaker K] Yes, but the simple assumption is: why should one obey them? Because…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the Holy One, blessed be He, said so. Yes, but why—
[Speaker K] Why did the Holy One, blessed be He, say that one must obey them? Because He wanted to build a framework, for example.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then it doesn’t matter what they say.
[Speaker K] Why does it matter why He said it? No, no, right, I’m just asking—not to challenge what you’re saying, I’m asking why, say, if there is such a thing, then why specifically the one who can have formal authority is specifically the wisest, most knowledgeable, most expert, and so on and so on.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But notice: because if you appoint a judge or a district psychiatrist, obviously you take an expert in his field. You don’t give formal authority to some child who knows nothing. Why? You want his determinations to be as close to the truth as possible. But that doesn’t mean his authority depends on those determinations actually being true. Those are two different things. Yes,
[Speaker K] But isn’t it the case that if I knew for certain he was talking nonsense, it’s obvious I wouldn’t give—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —him authority? No, it’s obvious that you still have to obey him. That’s the case of the oven of Achnai—what’s the story there? A heavenly voice comes out and says that the Jewish law follows Rabbi Eliezer. And they say, “It is not in heaven.” What does “It is not in heaven” mean? If you ask me what the truth is, what the Holy One, blessed be He, intended—He said what He intended. He said Rabbi Eliezer is right. They say, “It is not in heaven.” Why not? Because we are supposed to conduct ourselves according to the halakhic rules even where we know that this is not the truth. Same thing as the Talmud says in Eruvin: the reason Jewish law was not ruled in accordance with Rabbi Meir and his colleagues was that his colleagues could not get to the depth of his reasoning. The question is—my logic says the opposite. If he was such a genius that they could not get to the depth of his reasoning—“I am sharper than my colleagues because I saw Rabbi Meir from behind”—yes, he was so sharp that someone who merely saw him from behind became sharpened by it. Meaning, he was such a genius. So then Jewish law should follow him everywhere. Why is that a reason not to rule like him?
[Speaker K] Fine, okay, because you need to understand that he’s right. If you can’t get to the depth of his reasoning, then with all due respect to the fact that he’s a genius, you don’t know that he’s a genius.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I do know he’s a genius. I know he’s a genius; it’s just that in this particular case I wasn’t convinced. Fine—if you ask me, since he’s a genius, then the fact that I wasn’t convinced probably means that I’m wrong and he’s right, even though I wasn’t convinced. So Jewish law should follow him. Why is that a reason that Jewish law should not follow him? It’s a reason because Jewish law is not determined only by the truth. There is a formal dimension in Jewish law. And a formal dimension means that even if this is not the truth, and you know it is not the truth, it can still be what you have to do. In Derashot HaRan, he writes—he says according to the naturalists’ view, yes, that someone who commits a transgression damages things in his body. So how can there be “do not deviate”? How can a rebellious elder have to obey the Sanhedrin when he knows that it’s a transgression? He reached the conclusion—and he is no less of a Torah scholar than they are; if it’s Rabbi Akiva then even more so—and he reached the conclusion that they are mistaken, and now he has to obey and damage his soul, his body, because of “do not deviate.” But the author of Derashot HaRan answers this by saying that if he violates “do not deviate,” that too will damage his body, because that is also a transgression.
[Speaker D] Why does that take precedence over the other? What? So why does that take precedence over the other?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the Torah said, “Do not deviate.”
[Speaker D] But even though that means he’s transgressing, as it were?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. That is the novelty of the Torah in “do not deviate.” I’m speaking according to the naturalists, this whole discussion is according to the naturalists. I’m saying: all these are examples that even in places where I know this is not the truth, sometimes Jewish law will require me to behave this way. It is not true that Jewish law is automatically identified with the truth. Of course we strive, we try to get as close to the truth as possible—that’s obvious. We don’t just do things that aren’t true because we feel like it. But there are sometimes situations in which Jewish law requires us to act in a certain way even though it isn’t the truth.
[Speaker K] But why? Just because?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, for example, in order to preserve a framework. Or for example because of the value of autonomy. Two opposite values, by the way. Preserving a framework means preserving uniformity. The value of autonomy, on the contrary, means preserving each person’s authenticity, each person’s uniqueness. But yes, sometimes that’s the explanation, and sometimes this is the explanation.
[Speaker K] What exactly is authentic about—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I do what I think, even though Rabbi Meir is a greater genius than I am, I do it because if he didn’t convince me, then I need to do what I think.
[Speaker E] And in the context of formal authority, could it be that this is the point of Plato’s rule of the philosophers—that he basically wanted to turn formal authority into substantive authority?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s related to that, but you have to add another point there as well. I’ve written and spoken about this more than once. You also have to add another point there about the meaning of democracy. But I can refer you to columns I wrote if you want. Okay, at this point we’ll stop. If there are questions or comments, you’re welcome.
[Speaker H] Rabbi, I wanted to ask—I was thinking a bit בעקבות what you said, about the Raavad’s response to Maimonides. There are principles that we know that even in the Talmud some of the amoraim disputed—for example, the last eight verses of the Torah, where according to Maimonides, someone who holds that opinion denies that principle.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone who holds that opinion apart from the last eight verses? What? Someone who holds the view that there is a verse not from Heaven apart from the last eight verses.
[Speaker H] No, for Maimonides it’s the whole Torah, no? Maimonides said even one verse.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even one verse מתוך what we received by tradition as being from the Holy One, blessed be He. And if there are eight verses about which it is written that not so, then not.
[Speaker H] If I remember correctly, okay, it sounds from Maimonides as though he does relate to it as—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not getting into that, but I don’t think that’s a difficulty. Fine—if you, it also depends whom you rule like, after all there is a dispute there in the Talmud. But, but, but if you think that the last eight verses were not given by the Holy One, blessed be He—Moses wrote them with tears, the Vilna Gaon is well known, and never mind, there are disputes there. But if you assume not, fine, then Maimonides was not talking about that; he was talking about the other verses.
[Speaker H] In any event, what I wanted to ask is regarding the Raavad’s difficulty: maybe it could be that the principles gradually take shape. Meaning, let’s say that once it was more common that people—the masses, and even sages—thought that God had a body, but after the historical clarification that took place within the Jewish people and the consolidation, the orientation of the situation—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re suggesting maybe yet another answer that Maimonides would give to the Raavad.
[Speaker H] Right, and maybe this also has some implication in our day. Meaning, maybe—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it has implications in every generation, not only nowadays. Fine, but that could be an explanation of Maimonides’ position. I leaned on the Raavad’s difficulty. Maimonides in any event is a dogmatist. We’ll talk more about that. But the Raavad attacks him precisely on that point. Again, as I said—not about principles in general, but at least about this principle of body and form.
[Speaker H] Okay.
[Speaker K] Regarding the Zohar—for example, to demand that one believe in the Zohar in the same way that you believe in the Talmud, that it’s a binding text—regarding the Zohar too. Even if it doesn’t have too many practical implications, but generally that there is such a thing as Kabbalistic teaching, one thing or another. Is that, say, a demand of what? Is that a demand about facts? Or is it…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s a normative demand, except that it has no basis. What do I mean—
[Speaker K] What do you mean it’s a normative demand? To believe—as if to believe that the Zohar has something serious in it and that it’s not—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To believe that there is something serious in the Zohar is a very general statement. But there are laws learned from the Zohar, and the question is whether they are binding. Fine?
[Speaker K] No, but even there, decisors who do believe in the Zohar can also disagree about it—whether a law from the Zohar is binding or not binding. The Magen Avraham… No, I’m saying, say, people who don’t believe in the teachings of Kabbalah for argument’s sake.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so what’s the problem?
[Speaker K] Is it possible not—I mean, could one similarly argue against them, say, regarding the obligation of Torah from Heaven, for argument’s sake? About that principle. Say that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they don’t think that it’s not part of the Torah; they believe that the Torah is from Heaven, they just think that this is not part of the Torah.
[Speaker K] What are you trying to argue? No, okay, I mean regarding the labeling of people. Meaning, can one say in the same way that we said that the Talmud is something we accepted upon ourselves and it’s a binding document—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But with the Zohar that doesn’t exist.
[Speaker K] Factually that didn’t happen regarding the Zohar. What, that the Zohar is a binding document? I mean, but how do you know when you say, “This is binding,” and “This is not binding”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The facts tell you. What do you mean? The Talmud was accepted by everyone, and the Zohar was not.
[Speaker K] No, but I believe that in the period of the Talmud there too there were those who challenged it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe… The period of the Talmud is a different matter, but in retrospect, the sealing of the Talmud, as is known, was not something done sharply by Rav Ashi and Ravina. It happened in retrospect. Fine, but in the end it was accepted. Say what? So the Zohar—if some amoraim disputed and some of the things entered into the Talmud…
[Speaker K] I understand. Do you maybe have another example of something that was accepted even though it had been pretty disputed before—I don’t know, before a certain period—and then over the years it sort of…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no example at all of something that was accepted generally. Regardless of whether it had been disputed or not. There is the Talmud and the Mishnah—that is, the Talmuds. That’s it. Apart from that, everything is with limited reliability.
[Speaker K] No, but say now there are Conservatives and such, and now they come and challenge the Talmud. Why shouldn’t they be considered, I don’t know, as within some sort of—here, now they challenged the Talmud itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why—if a consensus were to arise that cancels the acceptance of the Talmud, I think it really would be canceled.
[Speaker K] No, why does there need to be—why does there need to arise a consensus that challenges it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it was created by consensus. You know, it’s like “a matter decided by a count requires another count to permit it.” So what the entire public accepted upon itself—for changing that, it is reasonable to require that the entire public decide to cancel it. And certainly it has to be the entire public that is committed to Jewish law, not a bunch of riffraff.
[Speaker K] I understand.
[Speaker D] Rabbi? Yes. Can I ask the rabbi, speak with the rabbi for a second after the class ends? Okay.
[Speaker F] Regarding facts—what you explained, that it’s true there is no formal authority over facts—then how can one demand of us to believe in things like the Messiah, the World to Come, resurrection of the dead—things that you can’t prove in court? If it were possible to prove them, we would know. So what does it mean that I believe in this? What does “I believe” mean? I sing, I get all excited—but what is the thought?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the game we are going to play after we put all the pieces on the board. That’s what I’m going to talk about.
[Speaker L] As a general rule, can one say that intellectual commandments have no place? Meaning, can one say generally that intellectual commandments or intellectual transgressions have no meaning, essentially, according to this view?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct, in my opinion they do not.
[Speaker L] Meaning, there are commandments—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that fit to some extent with our simple intuitions, but the obligation to fulfill them does not stem from the fact that they are moral or fit our conceptions, but from the fact that they are commandments. That’s it, so—
[Speaker L] I have an interesting discussion about this that I attached—a picture of it—in the conversation “Eight Chapters” with Yeshayahu Leibowitz. He brings Maimonides there, who talks about the intellectual faculty, and then they ask him what it even means to believe in such things, and he developed a pretty interesting discussion there in which he basically doesn’t understand their question at all. Just as you have a machine that you can control, so too with the intellect you are supposed to control it. Things like that. It’s not clear whether he meant thought in the simple sense or the struggle between thought and imagination, but ostensibly this is really our discussion right now: whether there is such a thing as intellectual commandments at all. And it does seem that there is such a thing according to Maimonides, as far as I’ve managed to understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, what do you define as intellectual commandments? If you define commandments—say, let’s talk about morality, okay? Is “do not murder” an intellectual commandment?
[Speaker L] No—anything that has intelligible meaning. An intellectual commandment is anything that asks of me only something mental, not some practical result.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—what is usually called an intellectual commandment is in contrast to a revealed commandment, statutes versus ordinances. You meant commandments about thought, mental commandments.
[Speaker L] Yes, that’s what I meant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Commandments about thought—about that we’ll still talk, what is called “duties of the heart” by the author of Duties of the Heart.
[Speaker L] Because then again I come back—in Maimonides’ Eight Chapters, in its plain meaning, if we read it that way, then it really does seem that there is such a thing, because when he breaks everything down he gets to—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like his Thirteen Principles, and also his first positive commandment, yes, right—we’ll talk about that; that’s our topic.
[Speaker L] Okay, fine.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, good, so goodbye, Sabbath peace, good tidings.
[Speaker K] Sabbath peace, thank you very much. Goodbye. Sabbath peace.