Lesson 10: Chayei Sarah

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

---

With God’s help

Concepts

• De facto recognition of transgression
• Optimization of transgression
• Halakhic (Jewish-legal) pragmatism versus the aspiration to perfection

Abstract

This article begins with an intriguing claim by Maimonides: the dictum that a person’s match is fixed before birth is a rabbinic statement that halakha (Jewish law) does not accept in practice. Maimonides holds that every act of mitzvah (commanded religious act) is under human control and is not handed over to Heaven. From there we move to a much more far-reaching claim by Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman, according to which there was a group of sages in the Talmud who held a deterministic position.

Such an interpretation is difficult to accept, and so we ask what underlies it. This leads us to a discussion of whether one may recognize, de facto, human weakness and grant a certain legitimacy to transgression. In other words: when someone is about to sin, should we offer him options for reducing the gravity of the sin, or should we say here, “let the wicked gorge himself and die”? We are not dealing with the question of whether one may cause the wicked to stumble, and therefore will not discuss that rule itself, but rather with the question whether one can grant post facto legitimacy to sin.

In this context we will present a practical situation that arose in the Israel Defense Forces several years ago, together with two interesting talmudic discussions, one very well known and the other less so, from which such a conception seems to emerge. Apparently, however, neither discussion is accepted as halakha by the decisors, and not by accident.

The article concludes with a discussion of an unusual manifestation of the rule, “better that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than become deliberate sinners,” which is of course also related to our subject.

The Rules and Principles That Emerge from the Article

1. Some sages of the Talmud hold that in certain extreme cases one may grant de facto legitimacy to sin. In practical halakha, this is not accepted.
2. Every act of mitzvah is entrusted to the human being and is not in the hands of Heaven. God does not place a person in a trial he cannot withstand.
3. Apparently there is no deterministic position among the sages.
4. When a person asks how to minimize a sin, one should not recommend an optimal route; one should clarify the task laid upon him: not to sin.
5. A person cannot apply to himself the rule, “better that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than become deliberate sinners.”
6. An “impulse that cannot be overcome” is at most a consideration regarding punishment, not an instruction for conduct ab initio.
7. Prohibitions grounded in reason do not require enactment by a rabbinic court.
8. Even with respect to such prohibitions, an approach of “better that they remain inadvertent sinners” can appear.

On the Saying “A Wife for a Man Comes from the Lord”

A Look at Halakha’s Attitude Toward the Limits of Our Freedom of Choice, and Toward Granting Legitimacy to Transgression

Introduction

The standard halakhic attitude toward a person who sins is to see him as one who has stumbled. That is, sin is treated as weakness of will, not as an intentional program. The Jerusalem Talmud, Berakhot 4:2, cites the prayer of Rabbi Tanhum bar Iskolastika:

May it be Your will, Lord my God and God of my fathers, that You break and remove the yoke of the evil inclination from our hearts. For thus You created us: to do Your will, and we are obligated to do Your will. You desire, and we desire; who holds us back? The leaven in the dough, that is, the evil inclination. It is revealed and known before You that we have no strength to withstand it…

This prayer was copied, in several variations, into various prayer books; see also Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 17a, and many other places. It serves as a motto for Judaism’s attitude toward the condition of sin.

On the one hand, sin is depicted here as the influence of the inclination. The inclination causes a person to act contrary to what he truly wants.¹ On the other hand, the inclination is not considered a sufficient excuse for sin. A person who acted under the influence of the inclination is not regarded as coerced, except in extreme cases that in modern legal terminology would be called “an impulse that cannot be overcome.”

Thus, in general, the Torah recognizes the constraints that lead a person to sin, but it does not recognize the legitimacy of the sin itself. Surprisingly, there are several contexts in which halakha nevertheless appears to grant legitimacy to human weakness of will, and to regard human choice with reservation. In this week’s article we will discuss the limits of human choice, and then briefly describe several examples of halakhic legitimacy granted to sin.

A. “A Wife for a Man Comes from the Lord”

Introduction

When Eliezer goes to Haran to find a wife for Isaac, he comes to the house of Bethuel, recounts what happened to him at the spring, and then Laban and Bethuel say to him, in Genesis 24:50-51:

Laban and Bethuel answered and said, “The matter has come from the Lord; we cannot speak to you bad or good. Here is Rebecca before you; take her and go, and let her be a wife to your master’s son, as the Lord has spoken.”

Now the Gemara, in Babylonian Talmud, Moed Katan 18b, cites a statement of Shmuel:

The Gemara: Shmuel said: It is permitted to betroth a woman during the intermediate days of the festival, lest another precede him.

The Gemara there then asks:

Did Shmuel really say, “lest another precede him”? But Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: Every day a heavenly voice goes forth and says, “The daughter of so-and-so is for so-and-so; the field of so-and-so is for so-and-so”!

And it answers:

Rather: lest another precede him through prayer. As in the case of Rava, who heard a certain man praying and saying, “May that particular woman come to me.” He said to him: “Do not pray in that way. If she is fit for you, she will not pass from you; and if not, you are denying the Lord.” Later he heard him saying: “Either let me die before her, or let her die before me.” He said to him: “Did I not tell you not to pray about this matter?” Thus said Rav in the name of Rabbi Reuven ben Istrobili: From the Torah, from the Prophets, and from the Writings we learn that a wife for a man comes from the Lord. From the Torah, as it is written, “Laban and Bethuel answered and said: The matter has come from the Lord”; from the Prophets, as it is written, “His father and his mother did not know that it was from the Lord”; and from the Writings, as it is written, “House and wealth are an inheritance from fathers, but a prudent wife is from the Lord.”

Rava, following Rabbi Reuven ben Istrobili, maintains that there is no point in praying for a suitable match, since these matters are entrusted to God: “a wife for a man comes from the Lord.” Proofs are brought from the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings. The proof from the Torah is the verse cited above.

Indeed, Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 2a and Sanhedrin 22a brings a parallel formulation:

Is that so? But Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: Forty days before the formation of the embryo, a heavenly voice goes forth and says: “The daughter of so-and-so is for so-and-so.” This is not difficult: one case refers to a first match, and the other to a second match.

As we see, the heavenly decree is not absolute. There are distinctions between a first and a second match, and Tosafot on Sanhedrin explains that one can pray and change the situation, although compare Rava’s words in the passage above:

Forty days before the formation of the embryo. Nevertheless, prayer within those forty days helps to turn it either into a male or into a female, as we say in Berakhot 60a: within forty days before the formation of the embryo, a person may pray that his wife bear a male. Even a first match can be changed through prayer, as stated in Moed Katan 18b: one does not marry women during the festival, but one may betroth, lest another precede him through prayer.

It is clear that the sages did not mean merely that God supervises this area, for He supervises everything that happens under the sun. Their intent is that the matter is not in our hands, and God orchestrates it. This also emerges from what Rashi cites from the words of Laban and Bethuel: for that reason they could not refuse the proposal.

Interpretive Doubts About the Proof from the Torah

It should be noted, however, that the proof drawn specifically from our portion is problematic. Quite apart from the fact that the speakers are Laban and Bethuel, from whom it is very difficult to derive halakhic principles,² there is also a specific problem here: in this case there was apparently concrete evidence that God had indeed directed this match, since the words are spoken after Eliezer tells of the remarkable sequence of events that befell him.

Rashi indeed comments there, based on Genesis Rabbah:

We cannot speak to you — we cannot refuse this matter, neither by a negative reply nor even by an appropriate one, because it is evident that the matter has come from the Lord, according to your account that He arranged it for you.

Apparently the sages understood that if the Torah places these words in their mouths, it presumably intends to teach us something.³

Theological Doubts: Maimonides’ Objection in His Letters

Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman, in “Be’urei Aggadot al Derekh ha-Peshat,” printed in his Kovetz Ma’amarim, in the section “Everything Is in the Hands of Heaven Except Fear of Heaven,” cites words of Maimonides, who objects to this position. He writes similarly in chapter 8 of Shemoneh Perakim:

But the formulation found among the sages — “Everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven” — is true, and accords with what we have said. But many people err with regard to it and imagine that some human voluntary acts are compelled, such as marrying a certain woman or having a certain sum of money in one’s possession. This is not true. For if this woman was taken in a permitted marriage, by proper betrothal and marriage, and he married her for the sake of procreation, then this is a mitzvah, and God does not decree the performance of a mitzvah. And if there is something flawed in marrying her, then it is a transgression, and God does not decree a transgression.

This is a conception that appears consistent with the famous saying of the sages, in Babylonian Talmud, Niddah 16b and parallels: “Everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven.”

According to Maimonides, marrying a woman is an act of mitzvah, though not necessarily in the formal halakhic sense; see our discussion in the article on the Torah portion Bereshit. Therefore such an act is not in the hands of Heaven. God’s providence extends over everything that occurs, except for human choices in value-laden contexts, that is, acts of mitzvah. Presumably this is not dependent on the dispute among the medieval authorities over whether there is a formal halakhic commandment to marry. Any act that has a value dimension is entrusted to the human being and not to Heaven. Conversely, contrary to a common assumption, not every decision and action is entrusted to the human being; only actions and choices that have value dimensions are.

Is There a Dissenting View? The Words of Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman

In the previous passage Maimonides does not mention the Gemara we cited concerning “the daughter of so-and-so for so-and-so.” But in one of his letters he argues that the dictum about the preassigned spouse is not accepted as halakha, because we have a received principle that everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven.

This determination raises the opposite question: do the authors of that dictum, Rav Yehudah in the name of Rav, disagree with the principle that everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven? In other words, is there anyone among the sages who holds that everything is in the hands of Heaven including fear of Heaven — that nothing at all is entrusted to the human being, not even acts of mitzvah? Moreover, how does Maimonides decide, on the basis of reasoning, to reject a statement found in the sages without any explicit dissent?

Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman raises these questions there, and quite astonishingly answers them in the affirmative: indeed, such a view does exist among the sages. To show this, he cites the well-known statement of Rabbi Ila’i, on the previous folio, Babylonian Talmud, Moed Katan 17a; see the context there:

It was taught: Rabbi Ila’i says: If a person sees that his inclination is overpowering him, let him go to a place where he is not known, let him wear black garments and wrap himself in black, and let him do what his heart desires — but let him not profane the Name of Heaven in public.

Rashi comments:

Let him do what his heart desires — meaning, a transgression. Since no one knows him there, there is no desecration of the divine name. And Rabbi told us in the name of Rav Hai Gaon: “let him do what his heart desires” means that certainly, once he has dressed in black and so on, I guarantee that from then onward he will no longer desire the transgression.

Rashi thus presents two interpretations. The first understands this problematic instruction literally. There is indeed legitimacy to sin, but one should at least minimize the desecration of the divine name. The second interpretation, cited in the name of Rav Hai Gaon, understands it as advice on how to avoid the sin.

Rabbi Isaac Alfasi, the Rif, on the spot, writes in the direction of the first interpretation; the same appears in Rabbeinu Asher, the Rosh, there, section 11:

The law is not in accordance with Rabbi Ila’i. Rather, even though his inclination overpowers him, he must set his mind aright, for we hold that everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven.

Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman understands from the words of the Rif and the Rosh that in their view the author of this statement, Rabbi Ila’i, disagrees with the dictum that everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven, and that this is why they rule against him. If so, then although as practical halakha a person does indeed have choice and control over his value judgments and value-laden acts, there is nevertheless an opinion in rabbinic literature that disputes this and advocates complete theological determinism.

Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman explains there that Maimonides apparently classifies Rav Yehudah in the name of Rav, the author of the saying about forty days before the embryo’s formation, in the same camp. He too, apparently, holds like Rabbi Ila’i that a person has no freedom even with respect to acts of mitzvah and transgression. Therefore Maimonides does not rule in accordance with them regarding the forty days before the formation of the embryo.

The Problematic Nature of the Matter Itself

This is a highly problematic position, and it raises difficult questions regarding punishment, the demand to serve God, and the obligation to keep His commandments. But we will not discuss that here. As in Midah Tovah articles generally, our concern here is mainly with the halakhic aspects.

There is also a problem here from the halakhic perspective. To understand it, let us first ask why Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman himself arrives at such a problematic and drastic interpretation. Could one not instead interpret that, in certain extreme cases, when a person feels that he cannot withstand the trial, Rabbi Ila’i says that halakha permits him to choose a course that will reduce the sin to a minimum? Even the words of the Rif and the Rosh cited above could have been read in that direction. Their assertion that we hold “everything is in the hands of Heaven except fear of Heaven” could mean only that such an extreme situation does not exist, and that whenever a person stands in a trial, success in it is presumably within his control.⁴

Why then does he conclude that there is a completely deterministic opinion among the sages? Rabbi Elhanan apparently refuses to accept the assumption that halakha is prepared to advise a sinner in ways that will reduce his punishment. When a person sees that his inclination is overpowering him, halakha tells him to strengthen himself and prevail anyway; it certainly does not grant him legitimacy to sin. Therefore he concludes that Rabbi Ila’i cannot possibly think that there is a genuine possibility of overcoming the urge, and yet halakha is still willing to recognize human weakness, even if only de facto.

But in truth, it seems that this is precisely what the Rif and the Rosh did mean. Because of this very problem they rule not in accordance with Rabbi Ila’i. Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman, however, appears unwilling to accept such a halakhic position at all, and therefore explains that Rabbi Ila’i does not hold it either. He is simply a determinist, and therefore that person truly has no ability to overcome his inclination.

What Is the Halakhic Position?

At least as practical halakha, this does indeed seem to be the position. Even if Rabbi Ila’i holds this, and even if Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman is correct in his reading, as halakha we rule that there is no halakhic legitimacy whatsoever to sin. Halakha will never recommend to a sinner a mode of action that brings his sin to a minimum, because that would amount to de facto recognition of his weakness.

A Contemporary Debate

About two years before this article was written, a private conversation gave rise to a debate on this subject between Michael Avraham and Professor Ravitzky, in a contemporary context. At the time these lines were written, Professor Ravitzky was lying unconscious in intensive care after a serious car accident, and we mention the matter here with a prayer for his recovery.

At that time the Israel Defense Forces entered Gaza, and there were fallen soldiers whose bodies were found in the area in Palestinian hands. A dilemma arose: should the forces leave Gaza before the Sabbath and then reenter after the Sabbath in order to recover the bodies, or should they remain in Gaza over the Sabbath — although that would involve combat on the Sabbath — so that the renewed entry into the area would not cost additional lives?

The starting assumption was that, halakhically, one is not justified in risking the lives of soldiers in order to rescue the bodies of the fallen.⁵ In addition, the assumption was that from the standpoint of security considerations, the combat was no longer necessary in itself, but only for the sake of recovering the bodies. On the first question the army did not consult the Military Rabbinate and decided to enter. On the above assumption, that decision stood in opposition to halakha. The General Staff then approached the Rabbinate and asked whether, from its perspective, there was permission to remain in the area and desecrate the Sabbath, or whether it was preferable to leave for the Sabbath and reenter afterward.

Michael Avraham argued that since the entire operation stood in opposition to halakha, namely the laws concerning the value of life and pikuah nefesh (the duty to preserve life), the Rabbinate should not even entertain the question of how to commit the transgression in an optimal way. If the military authorities are acting against halakha, there is no room to recognize that reality even de facto, and therefore one should not advise them how to reduce the intensity of the transgression.⁶ Professor Ravitzky, on the other hand, argued that one should indeed act in the way that minimizes the transgression as much as possible. The goal should always be to reduce the sin as much as one can, and a maximalist aspiration is not the right approach in cases of this sort. He linked this to a broader ideological position that prefers pragmatic compromise to an extreme aspiration to perfection.

Between Halakha and Ideology: Should One Eat Kosher on Both New Moon Days?

From our discussion above, it seems that this is not merely an ideological question but a halakhic one. And at first glance it also follows from what we have said that, according to halakha, there is indeed no place for de facto recognition of human weakness and no place for recommending a route that optimizes the transgression. It should be added that in the case at hand, the decision of the military authorities did not arise from weakness or surrender to impulse, but from a moral-political conception, mistaken on the assumptions above, according to which it is proper to endanger soldiers’ lives in order to recover the bodies.

This distinction adds even greater weight to the consideration of the Rif and the Rosh. If they were unwilling to accept de facto recognition of human weakness, then certainly one should not accept de facto recognition of deliberate halakhic lawbreaking, or at least lawbreaking born of negligence or refusal to recognize the authority of halakha.

Against this background, one may recall the well-known story of the Jew who came to a rabbi and asked: “I have the custom of eating kosher all year, from the New Moon of Elul until after Yom Kippur. From when should I begin — from the first New Moon day or from the second?” Usually this story is told as a joke at the expense of the ignorant. But there is also a serious question here: should the rabbi answer that Jew that he should begin from the first New Moon day, in order to gain one more day of eating kosher, or should he say that he refuses to address such questions? Professor Ravitzky argued that he should indeed answer. One should try to achieve the best possible result under the given circumstances.

A Surprising Example from Berakhot: Should One Live Near His Teacher?

Yet we find a surprising example in tractate Berakhot that seems to support Professor Ravitzky’s principled approach.

In Babylonian Talmud, Berakhot 8a, two contradictory baraitot are cited:

Rabbi Hiyya bar Ami said in the name of Ulla: A person should always live in the place of his teacher, for as long as Shimei ben Gera was alive, Solomon did not marry Pharaoh’s daughter. But was it not taught: He should not live there? This is not difficult: one case is where he is submissive to him, and one case is where he is not submissive to him.

On the one hand, it is better for a person to live in the place of his teacher, since if his teacher’s awe is upon him he will not sin. On the other hand, if he knows that he will not obey him, then it is better that he live far from him. In that case he will indeed sin, but he will not add disobedience to his teacher on top of it.⁷

At first glance we find here de facto recognition of a person’s decision to sin without obeying his teacher. The Gemara recommends a path that optimizes the transgression. According to the approach of the Rif and the Rosh, we would have expected the Gemara to rebuke that person and tell him to master his inclination and obey his teacher, and certainly not to sin. Yet the Gemara recognizes his weakness and even suggests that he distance himself to another place — that is, away from his teacher — and do what his heart desires.

It should be added that here we are not necessarily dealing with surrender to a powerful impulse that one feels cannot be resisted. The context appears more like an ideological decision not to obey one’s teacher. If our analysis is correct, then this Gemara is even closer to Professor Ravitzky’s claim, for it is not a matter of surrender to impulse but of recognizing an ideology opposed to halakha. It is, however, possible that here too the issue is an impulse-driven transgression, such as marrying an unsuitable woman, and the matter requires further study.

From the practical halakhic standpoint, however, it should be noted that the words of this sugya are also not cited by the decisors. In light of that, it may be that this position as well can be joined to the opinions of a minority who maintain that in extreme cases there is room for de facto recognition of transgression, but as we have seen, this is not the halakha. If our analysis is correct, then this sugya too is not proof for the conception under discussion, since even if our interpretation is right, it represents a position that was not accepted as halakha.

Better That They Remain Inadvertent Sinners: The Sugya at the End of the Third Chapter of Bava Batra

We have found yet another principle that points in a similar direction. In several places the sages establish the rule: “better that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than become deliberate sinners.” At first glance this rule itself points in a direction similar to Professor Ravitzky’s, since we leave a person to sin, assuming that he will not listen to us, and we try to minimize the sin by ensuring that he sins inadvertently.

There is, however, a great and important difference between this rule and the approach we saw above. Here we are dealing with the way one person relates to another, and halakha tells him that if he estimates that the other person will not listen and will sin anyway, then it is sometimes better to leave that person as an inadvertent sinner. But in the previous discussions, the decision belongs to the actor himself. As it were, a person “grants himself a concession” and allows himself to sin in an optimized way, instead of fighting the sin and the lawbreaking. Thus, there is indeed novelty even in the rule “better that they remain inadvertent sinners,” but it is not comparable to our case.

Another important difference appears here as well: this rule deals with inadvertent transgression, and here there is certainly more room for legitimacy, at least de facto. We merely refrain from acting in a way that would place the offenders in a worse condition, namely deliberate transgression.

If so, at most we have here a rule that conflicts with the principle “let the wicked gorge himself and die”; see the entry in Encyclopedia Talmudit, and Michael Avraham’s article in Tzohar 25, together with the response there in issue 27. It should be noted that this principle itself seems to support Michael Avraham’s approach, and even goes further than that, but this is not the place to elaborate.

“An Impulse That Cannot Be Overcome”: Three Levels of Discussion

One must still examine the relationship between this whole discussion and the legal concept of “an impulse that cannot be overcome.” To be sure, there too we are dealing with a situation in which a person does not succeed in overcoming his urge. Even so, at first glance this is a different context from our case.

First, an “impulse that cannot be overcome” is at most a consideration for a court as to whether to exempt the person from punishment, but in no way a consideration for permitting transgression ab initio. We do not find a legal system that permits a person to commit offenses on the basis of a claim that he is coerced. At most it can exempt him from punishment after the fact.⁸

Beyond that, in ordinary legal systems the determination that this is the situation is an objective determination made by an expert, who of course can err in so complex a question. Here, by contrast, the person himself diagnoses his condition as one that cannot be overcome. The concern that the person does not perceive his own condition correctly is immeasurably great; indeed, Rabbeinu Hananel and Rav Hai Gaon hold that in essence he is mistaken about this.

Therefore it seems that if an expert were to diagnose that this really is such an impulse, the person would indeed be exempt from punishment. This is a clinical condition, and the person is coerced. Halakha too recognizes states of temporary insanity, such as a person seized by delirium or by epilepsy. But in our sugya we are dealing with a psychologically healthy person who estimates that he will not withstand his inclination and will commit a transgression. Here he is obligated to try harder and overcome it anyway. Halakha views his assessment as opening the door to sin, not as an objective evaluation of his mental state.

True, there is an exemption of irresistible impulse in halakha as well, but only in a context in which overpowering desire has overcome the person; see Babylonian Talmud, Ketubot 51b, and the commentators there. That is an exemption granted in a situation where any reasonable person would be coerced, and therefore it still has an objective dimension.

Thus, it seems that this discussion should be divided into several levels:

1. One may ask whether a person who sees his condition this way may, from the outset, commit a lesser prohibition.
2. One may ask whether a rabbinic court or the sages instruct him to do so.
3. One may ask whether he is exempt from punishment in such a situation.⁹

Our conclusion is that, as practical halakha, the answers to all these questions are negative.¹⁰

An Interesting Example: Error in Reasoning

By way of our discussion of this topic, let us cite an interesting example of the application of this rule. The Gemara at the end of the chapter Hezkat ha-Batim brings the following statement, in Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 60b:

It was taught: Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha said: From the day the Temple was destroyed, strict justice would have warranted that we decree upon ourselves not to eat meat and not to drink wine. But one does not impose a decree on the community unless the majority of the community can abide by it. And from the day the wicked kingdom spread forth, issuing harsh and evil decrees against us, depriving us of Torah and mitzvot, and not allowing us to enter the celebration associated with the birth of a son — and some say, the celebration of a son’s deliverance — strict justice would have warranted that we decree upon ourselves not to marry women and not to beget children, so that the seed of Abraham our father would come to an end on its own. But leave Israel be; better that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than deliberate sinners.

The decree not to eat meat and not to drink wine was not enacted because the public could not abide by it. With respect to the second decree as well — not to marry and not to beget children — we would have expected a similar explanation, namely that the public could not endure it. But the Gemara gives a different reason: “better that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than deliberate sinners.”

It is important to distinguish between these two rules. The first is indeed a standard reason for not enacting decrees. The second, however, does not concern the enactment of decrees. On the contrary, it is always said in a case where a prohibition already exists, but some people do not comply because they do not know of it. In such a situation we must consider whether to reveal the prohibition to them, and thereby risk that they will violate it deliberately, or whether it is preferable not to reveal the very existence of the prohibition, and thus leave them as inadvertent sinners.

But in our case, the decree not to beget children was ultimately never enacted. If so, there is no prohibition at all in having children.¹¹ In such a situation, the principle “better that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than deliberate sinners” is plainly irrelevant, for one who has children is neither an inadvertent sinner nor a deliberate sinner. He is performing a permitted act, and in fact also fulfilling a mitzvah. At most one could have cited here the rationale that one does not enact a decree on a public that cannot be expected to uphold it.

Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir, the Rashbam, writes there:

But leave Israel be; better that they remain inadvertent — in that they take wives, not thinking that there is any prohibition in the matter.

Rather than deliberate sinners — for since they would not be able to abide by it, they would set it aside and would thus be deliberate sinners; therefore we do not decree it.

From the Rashbam’s words it emerges clearly that even without the decree there is already a prohibition here, and the discussion concerns only whether to disclose its existence to the public. But how can there be a prohibition if no decree was ever enacted? How can the mitzvah of procreation be suspended without any special enactment to that effect?

The Tosafists write similar things there:

Better that they remain inadvertent sinners rather than deliberate sinners. In a matter where it is not known whether they will accept rebuke or not, one must rebuke them, as is evident in the chapter “Bameh Behemah,” Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 55a, where the Attribute of Justice said: “If it is revealed before You, is it revealed before them?” and they were punished. But in a matter where we know with certainty that they will not accept, we say: better that they remain inadvertent sinners, and so on.

Most striking of all is Hatam Sofer, in his novellae there, who brings this as practical halakha in the name of the decisors, Mordekhai and Beit Shmuel:

“And from the day the wicked kingdom spread forth… strict justice would have warranted that we decree upon ourselves not to marry women.” In Mordekhai on Yevamot this is understood literally, and he therefore writes that today we do not compel the fulfillment of the mitzvah of procreation, nor do we compel one who has remained ten years without children to divorce, because in any case it would have been proper to decree not to marry women, and so on. Beit Shmuel cites this in Even Ha-Ezer, section 1.

That is, even though no decree against procreation was ever enacted, in practical halakha today we assume that there is no obligation of procreation, or at least that no coercion is applied in this regard.

All this shows that the discussion here did not concern whether to enact the decree. The conclusion that one should not procreate was apparently the result of reasoning based on the dire circumstances, not the result of any decree. The Gemara’s discussion concerned only the question whether this law should be disclosed to the public. The answer was that it should not: “better that they remain inadvertent sinners.”¹² In other words, the discussion of whether to enact the decree was not about creating the halakhic novelty of suspending procreation, but about publicizing it to the many. It existed even before any decree of the court, and even without it.

Here we have an unusual case of “better that they remain inadvertent sinners.” Usually we say this regarding a known and fixed law, whether biblical or rabbinic. The error is the result of lack of information. Here, by contrast, the error is the result of faulty reasoning, not lack of halakhic information. And even about that we say: better that they remain inadvertent sinners.

Footnotes