A Look at Torah and Torah Study – Lesson 18 – Rabbi Michael Abraham

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Basically, last time I finished the discussion about commandment and its meaning. We saw there that, at least from various sources in Maimonides—though of course I only used Maimonides—it also seems obvious to me from simple reasoning, that the basis obligating us in the observance of commandments is the command. And even if commandments have goals or positive outcomes that we want, the commandment in the matter is the response to the command. That is, even if I do something that leads to some results that are positive in my eyes, and maybe I would have done it even if the Holy One, blessed be He, had not commanded it—at least if I knew those would be the results—that is not where the commandment lies. The commandment lies in the fact that I do it מתוך המחויבות לזה שצוויתי. Now, I also said that this does not mean I have to suppress my natural impulse or natural inclination to do it, or my identification with doing it, but it does require me not to make the act dependent on that. Meaning, if one morning I wake up and I do not have that inclination or that identification, I am still supposed to keep doing it. I brought an example of this from the Aglei Tal there, from his introduction regarding Torah study, where he says about Torah study and enjoyment that people are mistaken when they think it is forbidden to enjoy it, but they are right that enjoyment is not supposed to be the reason I study. I said that the command basically plays two roles. One role is to define the motivation from which I approach halakhic observance. Right? Responding to the command. But that direction is less important for our discussion, at least. For our discussion, what interests me is the command as constituting this domain called Jewish law. And we talked about how, within the Torah, Rashi’s very first comment—when he asks why the Torah did not begin with “This month shall be for you the first of the months”—assumes that the essence of Torah is really Jewish law. Everything beyond Jewish law in the Torah needs justification or explanation, because it is not really supposed to be there. Fine, there are various explanations—we talked a bit about these things—but it still seems to me that Rashi’s question, and the fact that he places it at the opening of his commentary on the Torah, echoes the idea that even in the end, the assumption remains that Torah is fundamentally Jewish law. That is, the other things—fine, they have one role or another, there are reasons why they were brought, and so on—but basically, this is the essence of Torah. Now what I want to do is move a bit outside the halakhic framework and see what is wandering around out there. In other words, what else is there in this concept that one might call Torah beyond Jewish law. Okay? Maybe I’ll mention one more thing I talked about at the beginning of the semester: when I want to define Torah study, I have to define both what “study” is and what “Torah” is. So right now we are dealing with the question of the definition of Torah, and I said that the core is Jewish law, and now we’ll talk a bit about the periphery, the areas outside Jewish law. But this discussion itself is also very closely connected to the discussion of what study is. Because we will see—or at least I’ll try to show—that the way we deal with the various domains is different. And in my opinion, only when we study Jewish law are we really studying. So in that sense, the discussion I’m doing now projects both onto the definition of Torah and onto the definition of study. When we speak about Torah study, we need to clarify both of these components for ourselves. Okay, so let’s begin.

[Speaker B] Does it matter whether I do it, understand it, or don’t understand it? Again? Understanding. In terms of commandment—do I understand what I’m doing, or am I just going along like the herd?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “understand what you’re doing” mean? The results of what you’re doing? Who understands what he’s doing? I don’t know anyone who understands the results.

[Speaker C] When you read the Talmud, you understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. When you—

[Speaker C] You understand the depth, I don’t know, you don’t understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What—the question is whether that counts as Torah study? Is that what you meant? We’ll get there; I’m not there yet.

[Speaker D] Like, for example, honoring parents. You do it because there’s a command, but there are times when you do it enthusiastically and all the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, enthusiasm is a different discussion. Let everyone get enthusiastic however he wants, I’m not… But that relates to the observance of Jewish law, and that’s less what I’m dealing with. I want to talk about Torah study. So when I speak about areas outside—outside the halakhic realm—let’s just first try to throw out what we know. We know there’s maybe the area of ethics, values, ethics and the like. There are factual, historical areas—the parts of the Torah that describe Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Egypt, the Exodus, entering the Land, all kinds of things like that—let’s say historical facts or something like that; maybe the whole Hebrew Bible, not just the Torah. There is aggadic literature, meaning the non-halakhic parts of the Talmud. Right. There’s ethics, we mentioned that. The Hebrew Bible of course—studying the Hebrew Bible—but studying the Hebrew Bible is made up of the two components that are in it, meaning the stories and historical facts and the law. So I’m not making that a separate category. We can talk about Hasidism, Jewish thought—that more or less seems to me, right? Commentary on the Torah means studying the Torah, I mean. Hasidism, Jewish thought, and that’s about it, I think, more or less. Okay? You can say Jewish philosophy, Jewish thought—it doesn’t matter, it’s all the same thing. Those two fields don’t really exist, so it doesn’t matter whether they’re the same thing or not. I’ll get to that later. Those are more or less the fields. Okay? Kabbalah? Kabbalah, right, Kabbalah too, yes, okay. Thought? Yes, yes, absolutely. In fact, there in my view it does come closer to Torah study—closer to Torah study than the other fields. Fine, I need to define things in order to make these claims. So I’ll start, first of all, with values, ethics, and so on. That’s more the subject of tomorrow’s classes, of Wednesdays, so here I won’t really go into all the moves I discussed there, but briefly: in the Torah itself there are also value-based and moral lessons, right? That’s pretty clear. “And you shall do what is right and good” is even some kind of command to do good things. “You shall be holy,” if you like, is going beyond the letter of the law—it’s not exactly ethics, it’s beyond the letter of the law. Maybe that too should be included as a category: beyond the letter of the law. Piety, going beyond the letter of the law—that’s not ethics. Or at least not only ethics. So there are verses in the Torah that convey to us an expectation that there are additional expectations of us besides simply observing Jewish law, okay? So that’s what perhaps constitutes the domains of ethics and values and the like. So first of all, one initial point, which I dealt with last Wednesday, is that these verses are not included in the count of the commandments. Meaning, they are verses formulated like commands. In the Torah, when you read them grammatically, they look like commands, but in the count of the commandments you won’t find them—at least not among the enumerators of commandments that I remember. Maybe there’s someone who does count them, I don’t remember. But in general, no. The main authorities don’t. Now why not? So in principle, with “You shall be holy,” for example—maybe I should distinguish first: “You shall be holy” and “You shall do what is right and good”—what’s the difference between them? There’s a famous Nachmanides on both of them. On “You shall be holy,” Nachmanides says this means not being a scoundrel within the bounds of the Torah. Right? Doing certain things that go beyond the letter of the law. “And you shall do what is right and good” refers to moral behavior. Now that’s not exactly the same thing. For example, Nachmanides in the portion Kedoshim speaks about gluttony and drunkenness, right? Or sexual relations beyond some reasonable measure. To spend your whole life constantly occupied only with those things—and sexual relations are permitted. From his perspective that is a violation of “You shall be holy.” Now these are not things connected to ethics. You’re not harming anyone. Everything is fine. Maybe something about your human image is damaged, I don’t know. It’s not about your relations with another person, okay? If you want, maybe it’s even the spirit of the law. Meaning, I don’t do it because I know that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me not to behave that way. Even though He didn’t command it—meaning, it’s not part of Jewish law. So for the sake of our discussion I’ll define here: going beyond the letter of the law, or being a scoundrel within the bounds of the Torah. Going beyond the letter of the law is the positive side; scoundrel within the bounds of the Torah is the negative side. But both are basically improper acts, we might say, in the halakhic sphere, even though we’re not obligated. By halakhic I mean, yes—not the moral sphere. Meaning, yes, the religious sphere if you like, but they do not enter into the framework of obligation. By contrast, “And you shall do what is right and good” speaks about the trait of Sodom, about the law of the adjacent neighbor, “this one benefits and that one does not lose.” In other words, to behave morally toward others, toward our fellow human beings. Now regarding “You shall be holy,” the question arises—what I want to explain now is why this is not included in the count of the commandments. Regarding “You shall be holy,” this is especially interesting because Nachmanides himself, who explains “You shall be holy” as not being a scoundrel within the bounds of the Torah, looks for explanations within the approach of the Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot. The Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot counts “You shall be holy,” and Maimonides attacks him for that in the fourth root, because Maimonides says that commandments that encompass the whole Torah are not counted, and Maimonides interprets “You shall be holy” simply as meaning to do the commandments, not as Nachmanides does. Okay, so he says there’s no point in counting it. The commandments, in any case, we already have to do—they are already counted. There’s no point in counting a commandment that says “And you shall keep all My commandments.” Fine. The commandments are commandments, so of course they need to be observed; a meta-command that calls on us to keep all the commandments is not itself a commandment, there is no point in counting it separately. Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot—one of the Geonim. There is a dispute among the medieval authorities who he actually was, whether Rabbi Shimon Kayyara or Rabbi Ahai Gaon, but the book is Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot. What? Spain? The Geonim are Babylonia. Rabbi Shimon Kayyara is from Egypt, from Cairo. By the way, there were Geonim—Rabbi Saadia Gaon was also in Egypt. Egypt or Babylonia, meaning either Iraqis or Egyptians, so to speak. Anyway, when Nachmanides defends the Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot against the attacks of Maimonides in the fourth root, in his glosses on the fourth root, he tries to explain why the Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot counted “You shall be holy.” He doesn’t write it explicitly. He tries to explain what the content of this commandment would be according to the Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot, but he does not write the “beyond the letter of the law” idea there. More than that: in the additions to Maimonides’ count of the commandments at the end of Sefer HaMitzvot, where Nachmanides adds and subtracts—there are commandments he removes and commandments he adds in order to remain at 613—okay? In the framework of the positive commandments, you won’t find “You shall be holy.” Meaning, he defends the Ba’al Halakhot Gedolot, but he himself does not really include it in the count of the commandments. So Maimonides does not include it because it is redundancy—after all, it is already written that we must keep the commandments—but Nachmanides, who says that it means not being a scoundrel within the bounds of the Torah, why does he not include it in the count of the commandments? It seems that the required explanation for that is what might be called the paradox of the scoundrel. What does that mean? If we put this into the count of the commandments, then doing the forbidden behavior would no longer be a scoundrel “within the bounds of the Torah.” I would be nullifying a positive command if I do it, right? Because it would then be a positive commandment. But the Torah wants this category to remain exactly that. It wants it to remain scoundrel behavior, but within the bounds of the Torah. It intentionally does not want to forbid these things on the halakhic level. It expects us to avoid them without their being halakhically forbidden. And therefore, it cannot be entered into the count of the commandments, because if you entered it into the count of the commandments, it would become a halakhic requirement. The Torah has some interest in our showing commitment, or fulfilling things, even beyond the clear, pure halakhic obligations. And this is what is called going beyond the letter of the law, or being a scoundrel within the bounds of the Torah. Therefore, in principle, it cannot be entered into the count of the commandments, because that creates a paradox. Okay? As for “And you shall do what is right and good,” that does not create a paradox. “And you shall do what is right and good” means to behave morally, right? So what’s the problem if the Torah or Jewish law requires moral behavior from me? Why not? It requires certain kinds of moral behavior from me too—there is honoring your father and mother, do not steal, do not murder, charity, things like that. So there are such things in Jewish law. So why does “And you shall do what is right and good” remain outside this framework? Here—and again, I won’t go into the whole argument, I discussed it last Wednesday—but broadly, what I claim is that ethics and Jewish law are two foreign, independent categories. I mentioned earlier that Jewish law requires from us all kinds of moral demands—but that’s exactly what it does not do. Jewish law does not require from us a single moral demand. Even the things that seem to us like moral demands are not; they are halakhic demands. Ethics obligates us not because it is a halakhic command but because it is a separate, independent normative source.

[Speaker F] If there’s a case of contradiction here, who’s the mistress and who’s the maidservant?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no mistress and no maidservant. You’re in a conflict, and each time you have to decide however one decides. There is no rule saying who prevails. But that really belongs more to the Wednesday series. For our purposes here, I only want to define the domains in the periphery of Jewish law. So I’m saying one domain is going beyond the letter of the law—the religious norms that did not enter the framework of commandment. And then there are moral norms, which by their essence did not enter the framework of commandment. Moral norms and religious norms are two independent categories; they are foreign to one another, and therefore “And you shall do what is right and good” is not counted among the commandments. Briefly, I’ll say that the Holy One, blessed be He, basically has two types of expectations of us. One expectation is to respond to commands, and that is called Jewish law. The second expectation is to behave morally, and in that we are not commanded. That remains at the level of expectation; there is no command there. We talked about imperative statements versus statements of obligation, right? So there there is no command, but there is an expectation of us—“And you shall do what is right and good”—to behave morally. Therefore both of these things are, in fact, God’s will. So when I have a conflict between Jewish law and ethics, for example, that is a conflict internal to God’s will. Meaning, God’s will wants both this and that, and therefore there is no room here to speak of any built-in superiority of one side over the other. It is a conflict like any other conflict; even within Jewish law there are conflicts: a positive commandment overriding a prohibition, saving life and the Sabbath, and so in every normative system conflicts are also built in, and they have to be dealt with. But the fact that there are conflicts creates nothing problematic—there is no principled or theoretical problem in that. So both the domain of ethics and the domain of going beyond the letter of the law are non-halakhic domains. There is perhaps what one might call aesthetic values as well, but I think that is part of “You shall be holy”—not becoming coarse, right? Though becoming coarse may even be a lower level. For example, self-actualization. Self-actualization—meaning realizing the potential you have, in terms of character traits, in terms of intellect, in terms of what? Intellectually, yes, all kinds of things like that. So a certain kind of value; it’s hard to call it a moral value because it doesn’t concern another person, it concerns me. But it is some kind of faithfulness to the image of God within me—meaning, making myself as good as I can be, not morally good, but as elevated as possible, you could say. Okay? So you can put this under “You shall be holy” too; I have no objection. I once called this aesthetic values. Yes, there is what Maimonides calls at the beginning of Guide of the Perplexed the “accepted opinions” versus the “intelligibles.” People think that the “accepted opinions” are ethics, but if you look carefully you’ll see that he isn’t talking there about ethics at all. The point from which he starts is going around without clothes. Adam and Eve, who walked in the Garden of Eden without clothes, and then suddenly “they saw that they were naked” and were ashamed, and so on. So Maimonides says that they basically entered a sphere in which they became aware of the accepted opinions. Until then they had only intelligibles, and from then on there were accepted opinions. Accepted opinions are types of human conduct, manners, things like that. There is a psychologist named Jonathan Haidt who brings all kinds of examples of what I’m calling here aesthetic values. He calls it morality, but in my opinion that’s simply wrong. For example, you buy a frozen chicken at the supermarket. A frozen bird. You have sexual relations with it, and afterward you cook it and eat it. What is wrong with what you did? Sorry for the graphicness. From the standpoint of Jewish law? No, not from the standpoint of Jewish law. What is wrong with it? What is the problem? Was anybody hurt by it? The bird was already dead. Other people didn’t see and don’t know anything. Who was hurt by it? Nobody was hurt by it. But still there is some feeling that there is something problematic here, right? Something not… Or the neighbors’ dog gets run over, and you take it at night, cook it, and eat it. Why is that different from cooking a chicken? What, just because we’re used to one and not the other? Because it grew up in our house as a pet? I don’t know exactly. Ariel Sharon said that at Havat HaShikmim he had huge flocks of sheep. They asked him if he ate them, and he said, “You don’t eat friends.” Right, “I don’t eat friends.” But he didn’t mean sheep in general; he meant his sheep. Meaning, he had some kind of connection with the sheep in his flock, and he wasn’t willing to eat them. So what is this—what is wrong with such a thing? Here I’m not even sure it’s wrong, to be honest, but there’s some convention like that. But there are all kinds of acts like this that are just not done. I think that within Jewish law there is, by the way, a halakhic expression for this called “do not make yourselves detestable.” That is basically: don’t do things that are debased on the human level, disgusting things, things of that type. There that category probably does already enter Jewish law. But fine, that’s the category of “You shall be holy,” and “And you shall do what is right and good” is ethics. There is, for example, a discussion in Tractate Nazir that speaks about “a transgression for the sake of heaven.” A transgression for the sake of heaven—yes, there are situations in which you stand at a certain crossroads and in order to save something or reach some desirable result, you need to commit a transgression. Now there is no halakhic permission to commit a transgression—no, there is no halakhic permission to commit the transgression. Saving life overrides the Sabbath is not a transgression for the sake of heaven; saving life overrides the Sabbath is a halakhic rule that one is permitted—indeed required—to violate the Sabbath in order to save a life. A transgression for the sake of heaven is a situation in which there is no halakhic permission. I’m already stating my opinion here, but to me this is clear in the passage, because many later authorities did not say this; they think it is like a positive commandment overriding a prohibition or saving life on the Sabbath, but it is clear that that is not correct. The passage deals with a case such as Yael wife of Hever the Kenite, who had sexual relations with Sisera and then killed him, okay? So the sages bring this as an example of a transgression for the sake of heaven. Now what is a transgression for the sake of heaven? Why was she allowed to do it? Sexual immorality—a married woman, wife of Hever the Kenite—sexual immorality is not permitted even in a case of saving life. There is no halakhic permission to do it, and yet it is seen as a transgression for the sake of heaven, meaning something worthy of praise. Why? There are situations where the consequences are momentous or something of that kind, and the person on the ground is not going to ask the Sanhedrin or, I don’t know, the leading halakhic decisor. A person on the ground makes a decision: here it is right to commit a transgression, even a grave transgression of sexual immorality, okay? Why? Because in this situation it is clear to me that this is what the Holy One, blessed be He, expects of me. That, for example, is an instance of what I said earlier—that Jewish law does not always prevail over ethics in such conflicts; it depends. There are situations where it does, and situations where it does not.

[Speaker F] And what’s the difference between a transgression for the sake of heaven and a commandment that comes through a transgression?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a commandment that comes through a transgression, they tell you that in order to perform a commandment there is no justification for committing a transgression. But in order to save the Jewish people, yes—that’s what Yael did there. Or Lot’s daughters—also an example the Talmud brings there. Lot’s daughters: later on, the Talmud there brings Lot’s daughters, not necessarily in the context of a transgression for the sake of heaven, but it comes right afterward, and I think the context is pretty obvious. Lot’s daughters—the Talmud greatly praises Lot’s daughters for what they did there. Right, they thought they had been left alone in the world, everything had been destroyed; they saw everything around them destroyed, and the only ones left were their father and the two of them. So what do you do now? In principle it is sexual immorality; there is no justification for doing such a thing. You’re not even saving lives here—the lives are already gone. All you’re doing is producing new lives. Okay? Continuity, certainly. Ammon and Moab. But their calculation basically was: we will commit sexual immorality with our father because otherwise humanity will become extinct; this is the only way to preserve humanity. We know that humanity did not become extinct there, but they thought it had. The verses themselves say this—it’s not speculation. The verses themselves say that they said, “There is not a man left in the land, so let us come to our father and preserve seed from him.” Their reasoning is written explicitly in the verses; these are not interpretations. And the sages praise them for it, saying that it was a fitting act, a correct act, a good act. The fact that they don’t say the names explicitly—Ammon and Moab—they don’t state it outright, that is only because it is better to keep the act understated, not because the act was bad, but simply because it is immodest to speak of it openly. But the act itself is praised there in the Talmud in Nazir. Why? Because it is a transgression for the sake of heaven. A transgression for the sake of heaven in the sense that you see humanity facing extinction, and if you are a halakhic formalist—sexual immorality, what can you do, “there is neither counsel nor wisdom against the Lord,” “why involve yourself in the hidden things of the Merciful One”—I can bring you sayings from now until tomorrow. But practically speaking, Lot’s daughters understood that it was more correct to save humanity even at the cost of sexual immorality, and the sages agree with them on that. How can I learn this from the passage? It’s simply written there. It doesn’t say there that it was positive, so the sages tell us. What is written is only a description of the act. The sages tell us that it was also a positive act, okay? Okay, so now—where do these foreign domains come from? And this already touches somewhat on the question of study, not just the question of what Torah is. Where do they come from? This is a very important question. There are two kinds of expansion that we can make from Torah. There is interpretive expansion, and there is expansion from reasoning—reasoning that innovates. Maybe to sharpen this, I’ll say what the difference is between a Torah-level prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition. People often think the difference is chronological: that a Torah-level prohibition is what was given at Sinai, and a rabbinic prohibition is what developed over the generations. But that is not correct. There are Torah-level prohibitions that are created today, and rabbinic prohibitions that were created at Mount Sinai. Chronology is not the parameter that determines whether you are dealing with a Torah-level prohibition or a rabbinic prohibition. What does determine it? What determines it is the hat worn by the person or institution that created this law. Are they functioning as an interpreter, or as a legislator? The sages were given authority to legislate—“לא תסור מכל אשר יורוך” (“Do not turn aside from all that they instruct you”), okay? So they can establish a new law—say, it is forbidden to eat poultry with milk lest one come to eat meat with milk; handwashing; Hanukkah; Purim; it doesn’t matter, all kinds of things like that. So that is a new law based on the sages’ judgment, and the Torah says that it is binding. Here the sages are functioning as legislators, right? The product of legislation is rabbinic law. Once the sages act as legislators, the result—the thing that comes out of that act—is rabbinic law. But the sages also created most of the Torah-level laws we know, only they created them not through legislation but through interpretation. When they interpret verses in the Torah, then from our perspective, since they also have authority to interpret—“Do not turn aside” gives both authorities—then that interpretation is, from our perspective, what the verse says. So now it is a Torah-level law. It doesn’t matter that only the sages are the ones who interpreted the verse that way. “את השם אלוהיך תירא”—to include Torah scholars. Or “להקים שם לאחיו המת”—does that mean giving the child the dead brother’s name or not? The very fact that the child is born is establishing a name for the dead brother, so the Talmud says no, you don’t have to give him the dead brother’s name, okay? All these are interpretations of the sages, but they are Torah-level laws. Why are they Torah-level laws? Because the sages are basically interpreting the verses. So once I have interpreted the verse, I understand that this really is what the verse says. If that is what the verse says, it is a Torah-level law. Okay? Therefore, the difference between Torah-level law—the essential difference between Torah-level law and rabbinic law—is the question of what role the sages played in the creation of that law: did they act as legislators or as interpreters? But what lies behind this is actually something deeper. Torah-level law is law that was given to us at Sinai. That doesn’t mean it was literally given at Sinai, but it was interpreted out of things that were given at Sinai, and so from our perspective it grew out of what was given at Sinai. That is Torah-level law. What was not given at Sinai does not belong to Torah-level law—or to law at all, I’ll maybe comment on that. But the sages can create new laws that are not based on interpretation of what we received at Sinai. New laws that they decide are the correct way to act. The Torah gave them that authority, and that is rabbinic law. Rabbinic law, in essence, is not part of Torah. Torah is what we received at Sinai and the various interpretations given to it. Rabbinic law is not part of Torah; rabbinic law is part of Jewish law. We are obligated to follow it, but when I study it—I wrote two columns about this, I won’t go into it now, maybe later we’ll see—when I study rabbinic laws, in my opinion I am not studying Torah. There is no Torah study here. I am learning what I need to do. Of course rabbinic law is binding, and I need to study it in order to know what is required of me in practice. But all this analysis to understand the conceptions behind it and so on—in my view, that is not Torah study. It is not the same as analyzing a Torah-level sugya, a passage that deals with laws transmitted to us from Sinai. So in effect, you see that Torah is what was given at Sinai. But of course in the broad sense, including all the interpretations of what was given to us at Sinai and everything—but not including things that are not interpretation of what was given to us at Sinai. Okay? And this is a very important point, because it also defines the concept of Torah.

[Speaker C] Right, because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I need to know what to do.

[Speaker C] Okay, so if you’re studying Talmud, then you’re not necessarily studying Torah either. Right—you need to know which books.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right. Part of the Talmud, in my opinion, is studying Jewish law; it’s not studying Torah. Studying Jewish law means learning what I need to do. In another language, I say: it’s a preparation for a commandment. Torah study is a commandment, but studying in order to know what to do is a preparation for a commandment. I study, and then I know what to do. I have to study because otherwise I won’t know what to do, so it’s a preparation for a commandment, like building a sukkah, because otherwise I won’t be able to sit in a sukkah. But building the sukkah is not a commandment; it is only a necessary condition, because otherwise I cannot fulfill the commandment. Okay?

[Speaker F] Is that also why in the counts of commandments it gets left out… why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why do you think—how is that connected? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] There’s an argument I heard about why Maimonides doesn’t count it among the commandments. According to Maimonides… So he says in the same way as a sukkah—that the commandment is to build… it’s a preparation for a commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, I tend to think that that is the explanation—that it’s a preparation for a commandment. There are other explanations, but in my opinion they’re… mainly some later authorities from the Religious Zionist camp, but also earlier later authorities, want to argue that Maimonides didn’t count it because it is an all-encompassing commandment. If, in a Zionist conception, the Land of Israel is everything, then from their perspective it is an all-encompassing commandment, and so Maimonides didn’t count it. But that’s a mistake, because what Maimonides calls an all-encompassing commandment in the fourth root—I mentioned this earlier—is simply a commandment that tells me to observe all the commandments. That is called an all-encompassing commandment, not a foundational commandment. They understand “all-encompassing commandment” to mean “foundational commandment.” You can argue whether the commandment of settling the Land of Israel is really that foundational, but even if it is, there is still no such root in Maimonides saying that foundational commandments are not counted. There is a root saying that all-encompassing commandments are not counted because of redundancy. “ושמרתם את כל מצוותיי”—“And you shall keep all My commandments”—is not counted because the commandments are already counted. Why do I need to count a commandment that tells me to keep the commandments? Okay? That is what “all-encompassing commandments” means in Maimonides. There is Tzitz Eliezer and others who want to go in that direction, but in my opinion they are mistaken. Yes, I tend to think that this is the reason—that it is a preparation for a commandment—and Maimonides has a root on that, I think the tenth root, where he says one does not count preparations that serve toward fulfillment of the commandment.

[Speaker C] Is there, at the bottom line, a commandment to conquer the Land? There isn’t a commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so according to Maimonides it’s a preparation for a commandment. Meaning, in order to fulfill the land-dependent commandments, the land has to be yours. Fine. Nachmanides says there is indeed a commandment—positive commandment number 4 in Nachmanides’ additions—but Maimonides does not count that commandment. Let me perhaps bring another example, because this is an important point; it’s almost the focal point of everything I’m going to say from here on. This definition of Torah and what lies outside it—that is a very important point, almost the center of the whole move. The Talmud in Berakhot discusses the question: what is the source for blessings over enjoyment? Why bless over food before eating it? Right—when you eat, “Who creates the fruit of the tree,” or something like that. Why? From where do we learn that one must bless? The Talmud offers various suggestions, and in the end none of them is sufficient, and then the Talmud says that it is reasoning. That it is forbidden to derive benefit from this world without a blessing, and anyone who derives benefit from this world without a blessing is as if he misappropriated sacred property. That is reasoning. So the Pnei Yehoshua asks there: if it is reasoning, then why do we rule leniently in cases of doubt about blessings? Reasoning is Torah-level, after all. How do I know? Because the Talmud in several places says: why do I need a verse? It is logical. Meaning, if there is something I can ground in reasoning, there is no need to bring a verse for it. Now, if what comes from reasoning did not have the status of Torah-level law, then there would be no point in asking, “Why do I need a verse? It is logical.” I would need the verse in order for it to be Torah-level if you think that what comes from reasoning is only rabbinic. If the Talmud sees reasoning and a verse as equivalent options, then that means that what comes from reasoning is Torah-level. So the Pnei Yehoshua says: if so, then blessings over enjoyment are a Torah-level obligation, because they come from reasoning. So doubt should have the status of Torah-level doubt requiring stringency. Why do we rule leniently in doubtful cases of blessings? Why, if you are in doubt, do you not bless? So the Tzelach—the Noda B’Yehuda’s commentary on the Talmud, Tziyun LeNefesh Chaya—writes there that he disagrees. He says that when the Talmud says “Why do I need a verse? It is logical,” this is always about derivations that specify details within an existing commandment. Now, if I have reasoning, then the reasoning will explain to me what that existing commandment is. Okay? Therefore I don’t need a verse to explain it. But if I’m talking about a law that is not a detail within an existing commandment—rather it is itself a new commandment—for example blessings over enjoyment—blessings over enjoyment are not a detail within an existing commandment; they are a new obligation. You must bless over food before eating it. Okay, blessing afterward, Birkat HaMazon, is Torah-level when you have eaten a meal. But blessing before is not, and it’s not even a detail within an existing commandment. There, says the Tzelach, even if you have reasoning, it won’t turn it into Torah-level law. It can’t be that reasoning without a verse turns something into Torah-level law. You need a warning in order to punish; things have to be written in the Torah. If they were not legislated, then they are not binding law. It cannot be Torah-level. Therefore he says that blessings over enjoyment are rabbinic law, and therefore doubt concerning them is treated leniently—hence in doubtful cases of blessings we are lenient—even though it is based on reasoning, because this is reasoning that constitutes a new law. All the places where it says “Why do I need a verse? It is logical”—that is reasoning that comes to interpret an existing law. There you don’t need… for example, in the two famous places where it says this, one is “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted.” From where do we learn “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”? And the second is “the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract from another.” In both these places, the Talmud brings a verse and then asks, “Why do I need a verse? It is logical.” I have reasoning; I don’t need a verse. Now, in both these places we’re dealing with details related to legal procedure. After all, it is written: “בצדק תשפוט עמיתך” (“Judge your fellow with justice”). Now you ask yourself, what counts as “with justice”? It means defining rules of procedure, evidence, laws of evidence, things like that. So here both “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted,” which is part of the laws of evidence, and “the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract from another,” which is about procedure—who has to bring proof, possession, and so on—all of these are details within “Judge your fellow with justice.” So no problem: there, if reasoning tells me that this is good evidence, then no problem—within the laws of evidence I’ll integrate it. Why do I need a verse? I know on my own that this is good evidence. But the fact that evidence must be used—that the verse tells me. What counts as good evidence and what does not—that reasoning can tell me. Okay? So there it makes sense to say, “Why do I need a verse? It is logical.” But with blessings over enjoyment, says the Tzelach, this is a new obligation that you have now generated. If there is no verse for it, how can it be Torah-level law? How? So what if there is reasoning? You serve the Holy One, blessed be He—not your own reasoning. Okay? Therefore, says the Tzelach, reasoning may perhaps tell me that if reasoning says something, then one ought to fulfill it. That’s true. But that does not mean it has the status of Torah-level law. Fine? If I had a line of reasoning—let’s say, for example, that the sages had never enacted the blessing before food, blessings over enjoyment—I would still have had to bless, even without their enactment. Only there would not have been a halakhic obligation to do it. Once they enacted it, since rabbinic law has halakhic force, it became a halakhic obligation at the rabbinic level. For example, a practical difference: the Pnei Yehoshua asks that if blessings over enjoyment are based on reasoning, then doubtful cases should require stringency, right? Why do we say in doubtful cases of blessings that we are lenient? That was his question. So the response is: granted, in doubtful cases one really should be stringent. If you are in doubt, you are obligated to bless. But without God’s name and kingship. Because God’s name and kingship are only the wording the sages established for how one must bless. That is already a rabbinic doubt, and since there is a prohibition on uttering God’s name in vain, we don’t do that in cases of doubt. But the basic obligation to bless—yes. If you are in doubt, you should bless without God’s name and kingship. I blessed the Holy One, blessed be He, for the apple He gave me. Say that sentence. And that’s it. You have fulfilled the Torah-level obligation of the blessing—if indeed there is a Torah-level blessing—that you are not deriving benefit from this world without a blessing, that you are not misappropriating sacred property, that you acknowledge the Holy One, blessed be He, for what you are about to enjoy. And indeed, if you are in doubt, then you should be stringent and bless—but without God’s name and kingship. And when we say that in doubtful cases of blessings we are lenient, that means not to bless in the formula the sages established, with God’s name and kingship, because that formula is indeed only rabbinic. Okay? What is it?

[Speaker F] Could you explain again the Tzelach’s answer to the Pnei Yehoshua?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Tzelach argues that if there is reasoning that establishes the obligation to bless over food before eating it, that is reasoning that creates a new law, not reasoning that interprets an existing law. Right? It is not a detail within an existing law. Such reasoning does not create Torah-level law, because for Torah-level law you need a Torah source; you need a command. If there is reasoning that interprets some law written in the Torah, there you don’t need a verse, because the reasoning tells me that this is what that law means—but that law has a source. Let’s say, for example, “את השם אלוהיך תירא”—to include Torah scholars. So the word “et” comes to include Torah scholars, but after I have included them, I understand that this is what the verse itself means, “את השם אלוהיך תירא”. So that means there is a Torah-level commandment to revere Torah scholars. The verse—that is the intention of the verse. So if that is the intention of the verse, then it is Torah-level law. Yes, think for a moment about Maimonides in the laws of rebellious elders. Maimonides there says something a bit strange. On the one hand he says that in order to change a Torah-level law—well, let’s start with the Talmud. In the Talmud there are two rules that seem at first glance to contradict one another. One rule says: a matter established by count requires another count to permit it. I think that’s in Eruvin. Meaning, if something was written and ruled by the Great Court, then another Great Court is needed to permit or revoke it. Okay? Say in a hundred years they want to repeal it—if it was established by the Sanhedrin, then it has to be a Sanhedrin. Okay? But there are no further limitations on the later Sanhedrin. If it is a Sanhedrin, it can revoke it. But elsewhere it says that the later court must be greater in wisdom and number. Meaning, it’s not enough that it be a Sanhedrin; it has to be greater in wisdom and number than the first court. What does “greater in wisdom and number” mean? After all, the Sanhedrin is always seventy-one. What does “greater in wisdom and number” mean? So Maimonides says that the sages of the generation are somehow added to the Sanhedrin or something like that. In any case, it has to be greater. Maimonides says—and so does the Ritva and other medieval authorities—how do you reconcile these two apparently contradictory rules? The first rule speaks about Torah-level laws. Okay? And the second rule speaks about rabbinic laws. With rabbinic laws, in order to repeal them, you must be a court greater in wisdom and number. It is not enough simply to be a Sanhedrin. Not every later Sanhedrin can revoke what an earlier Sanhedrin established. With Torah-level laws, any later Sanhedrin can revoke or change a law established by an earlier Sanhedrin. Okay? That is what Maimonides says. Meaning, this is Torah-level and that is rabbinic. Now the obvious question is: what is the logic behind that? After all, at first glance it should be harder to change a Torah-level law than a rabbinic one. It seems to me that the logic is this. Usually people say the sages strengthened their own words even more than Torah law. Sometimes we indeed find that because a rabbinic law is “only” rabbinic, and there is concern that people may belittle it because it is less severe, the sages reinforce it more strongly. But I think it goes beyond that. When you come to revoke a Torah-level law, you are not really arguing with the previous court at all. The previous court did not say, “This is what should be done”; the previous court said, “This is what the verse means.” And therefore this is what should be done—it is Torah-level law, right? So when I say, no, that is not what the verse means; in my opinion the verse means something else—then I have no dispute with the previous court. I am not contending with something that draws its authority from the authority of the previous court. I am simply disagreeing with them about what the verse means.

[Speaker C] If the circumstances changed?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—if the circumstances changed, then maybe that’s fine. But even if the circumstances did not change, I disagree with them. I simply don’t agree with them. No, so I’m saying: I disagree with them, the circumstances didn’t change. I’m just taking an extreme case to sharpen the point more. Meaning, if the circumstances changed, maybe that’s not even called a change. But if the circumstances didn’t change and I disagree with them, I read the verse differently. Okay? Fine. If that is what the verse says, then that is what obligates me. They can’t argue with the Holy One, blessed be He—the earlier sages. From my perspective, they are arguing with the Holy One, blessed be He. Because if I understand that this is what the verse says, then why should I listen to them? If the master says one thing and the student says another, to whom do we listen? To them, or to the Holy One, blessed be He? But if I am disagreeing with a rabbinic law, then my disagreement with them is not about interpretation of a verse. They claim that one should act in a certain way, and they established a rule, a law, that obligates us to do it—for example, it is forbidden to eat poultry with milk. Now I come and want to permit eating poultry with milk. I am going directly against their authority. In order to do that I have to be a court greater in wisdom and number. Even though rabbinic law is lighter than Torah-level law, the nature of the dispute between the later court and the earlier one is different. In Torah-level law we are arguing about what the verse says. In rabbinic law I am going directly against your authority. You established a certain rule by virtue of your authority as the Sanhedrin, and I now want to uproot it. Regardless of who is right. Maybe your judgment is correct. But I am confronting the authority of the Sanhedrin here. In order to uproot something based on the authority of the Sanhedrin, I have to be a greater Sanhedrin. Okay? Then I can.

[Speaker F] But why does it matter what the source of their law is, if it’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Torah-level law it isn’t about authority?

[Speaker F] Again. Why specifically when it’s rabbinic am I going against authority, but when I disagree with them on Torah-level law it’s not about authority?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because I’m not going against their authority; they are going against the Holy One, blessed be He. When I interpret this verse, from my perspective the Holy One, blessed be He, is now telling me to do such and such. Now that earlier court told me to do something else. If the master says one thing and the student says another, to whom do we listen? In Torah-level law it is enough that I understand the verse differently; I do not need to be greater in wisdom and number. So why should I obey them when the verse tells me something else? But in rabbinic law, even if they are right, that doesn’t matter. Suppose I’m equal to them, and suppose I’m even smaller than them—then obviously they are right. Sorry, suppose I’m greater than them—then obviously they are not right. Fine? Still, their enactment has force because they established it as law. So I am confronting their force beyond the question of whether this is the right or wrong way to act. I am attacking the authority itself. That does not happen in Torah-level law. In Torah-level law—

[Speaker F] If I oppose your Torah-level law, I also oppose a rabbinic one—for example the interpretation of “You shall not cook—”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A kid in its mother’s milk.

[Speaker F] Yes. I say it’s not talking, for example—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I am opposing what they understood in the verse, not their authority. Because even the one who obeyed them then did not obey because of their authority; he obeyed because that is what the verse means. It is Torah-level law; it is not rabbinic law. They only revealed to him what the verse means. And now, why does he do it? Because he is commanded in the verse to do it. The sages only revealed to him what is written in the verse. So that law is not based on the authority of the earlier Sanhedrin. The earlier Sanhedrin only told us what the verse says. And the later Sanhedrin says, yes, but in my opinion that is not what is written in the verse. Fine. I am not going against their authority; that’s simply not what is written in the verse. I am doing what the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded. What did He command? What I understand Him to have commanded. Okay? Here now there is a later law in Maimonides that is actually explained by this. Just a second. I’ll read it to you—I didn’t turn this source on. In law 1 it says: if the Great Court derived one of the laws by one of the hermeneutical principles according to what seemed right in their eyes, and afterward another court arose and saw a reason to overturn it, then it overturns it and rules according to what seems right in its eyes. Fine. And in law 2: if a court decreed a decree, enacted an enactment, or established a custom, and the matter spread throughout all Israel, and afterward another court arose and sought to cancel the earlier matters and uproot that enactment, that decree, or that custom, it cannot do so unless it is greater than the first in wisdom and number. Fine. Those are the two laws we discussed earlier. Is that in the laws of rebellious elders?

[Speaker F] Yes, Laws of Rebellious Elders, chapter 2.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now he says in law 4—first, in law 3: to what does this apply? To matters that were not prohibited in order to make a fence for the Torah, but were like the rest of Torah law. But matters that a court saw fit to decree and prohibit in order to make a fence—if the prohibition spread throughout all Israel, then no later great court can uproot and permit them, even if it is greater than the first. That is law 3. Law 4: Yet a court may uproot even these matters temporarily, even though it is smaller than the earlier one. If you are doing it only temporarily, not repealing it entirely, you can do that even if you are smaller than the previous court. Why? So that these decrees should not be more stringent than Torah law itself, for even Torah law any court can uproot as an emergency measure. How so? Meaning, there is an emergency provision by which you can uproot Torah law. What kind of strange a fortiori argument is that? He says: look, if you can do it with Torah law, then certainly you can do it with rabbinic law. But in the first two laws of this chapter, you established exactly the opposite hierarchy: rabbinic laws are harder to change than Torah-level laws. For rabbinic laws, you must be a court greater in wisdom and number. For Torah-level laws, any court can revoke or change them. Meaning, rabbinic law is harder to change. And now suddenly in law 4 he says: surely it cannot be that you cannot uproot it temporarily—even Torah law can be uprooted temporarily. It’s like an a fortiori argument: if Torah law can be, then certainly rabbinic law can. That’s not true! Rabbinic law is harder to uproot than Torah-level law, as we saw in laws 1 and 2. So what kind of a fortiori argument is this? It is one law later. So I want to argue that the fact that rabbinic law is harder to change than Torah-level law is not because it is more severe, but simply because of the character of the dispute—that’s all. Meaning, if you are arguing with sages, you have no permission to argue unless you are greater in wisdom and number. If you are uprooting Torah-level law, you are not arguing with sages. You are not arguing with them, so you don’t need to be greater in wisdom and number. When you uproot temporarily, it is obvious that you are not arguing with them, right? What does it mean to uproot rabbinic law temporarily? Why… what are you doing here when you uproot it temporarily? Are you saying they weren’t right? On the contrary—that means circumstances have changed. You say: now the circumstances have changed, and in my opinion this no longer helps—perhaps it even harms—so I want to uproot this law temporarily. I have no dispute with them; I only claim that the circumstances have changed. Ah—where there is no dispute with the first court, you do not need to be greater in wisdom and number. Exactly like what we saw with Torah-level laws, that you can change those laws even if you are not greater than the first court. So with rabbinic law that you uproot temporarily—where there is no dispute with the first court—certainly you can uproot it temporarily. Why not? That is Maimonides’ a fortiori argument. If the difference between law 1 and law 2 were not because of the character of the dispute but because of the difficulty of change, then this a fortiori argument wouldn’t even get off the ground. It is much harder to change rabbinic law than Torah-level law. According to my explanation, no—it is not harder to change rabbinic law than Torah-level law. The character of the dispute is simply different. You cannot go against the authority of the sages. In Torah-level law you are not going against their authority, so there is no problem. When you uproot temporarily, there too you are not going against the authority of the sages, so that is like Torah-level law, and therefore any court can do it. Okay?

[Speaker E] Can I suggest another interpretation? You’re not going against the authority of the sages? What? When you offer another interpretation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because it is not based on their authority; it is based on a command of the Torah. I want to do what the Torah said. In order to do what the Torah said, I need to understand what is written in the Torah, what it says. Now the fact that that court thought the Torah said one thing and I think it says something else—if it were by virtue of their authority, and I had to do it because they established it, then fine, I would be going against their authority. But no: I do it because that is what is written in the Torah. Okay? According to my interpretation? According to my interpretation, and they interpret differently, but I am obligated to the Torah, not to them. What do you want, that I should violate Torah law because I’m obligated to you? I am more obligated to the Holy One, blessed be He, than to you. Okay? I’m bringing this in order to sharpen what I said earlier. What I said earlier basically means that Torah-level law is law that emerges from the tradition we received at Sinai, from the command we received at Sinai. That is Torah-level law. Therefore, when I observe that law, even though the sages created it, I do so because the verse commands it. The sages are simply the ones who told me that this is what the verse commands. That’s all. But in the final analysis, I do it because the verse commanded it. That’s all. So this sharpens even more what I want to show here.

[Speaker C] If you look at it from the problematic side, it’s the same thing. When you change a Torah-level interpretation, supposedly the verse still remains, the Torah is eternal and it will always remain. If you start changing rabbinic law every two days, things will keep changing, so they want to anchor it so you won’t desecrate the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s true that the verse remains, but what it says changes. Is that such a help? Why is that important? The verse remains, but basically we now do the opposite of what they did until now. So the words remained. Okay.

[Speaker C] No, there’s an anchor for what you’re doing in interpretation. Otherwise every court will come and say the previous court wasn’t good.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it really thinks so, what’s the problem?

[Speaker C] No, so that’s why they limit it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why limit it? But why? If it really thinks it wasn’t good, why limit it? But if—

[Speaker C] But you’re not obligated to the court; in the end you want people to do what the Torah says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but rabbinic law is not related to that; the Torah left it open.

[Speaker C] Right. The fact that they gave the sages the ability to add commandments or add laws or add things not written in the Torah—they gave them that ability not so that every two days they should start adding things.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s for the court’s judgment. Again, that’s a consideration for the court. Exactly. If it’s needed, then it’s needed.

[Speaker C] I think someone wanted to limit it—not to let them do too much, so that every court every two years wouldn’t start adding things. Replace one court—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then tell them not to add things. It depends on the court.

[Speaker C] No—bring a bigger one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Torah is always—

[Speaker C] You understand—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That this is Catch-22, because the moment you require a greater court, it will never happen. What court ever considers itself greater than the courts of the past? It never happens. There’s a nice anecdote in the Ra’avad, who asks Maimonides. He says Maimonides says that even if the reason has lapsed—even if the reason has lapsed—you still need a court greater in wisdom and number to change a decree. Okay? So the Ra’avad says: then how did Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai change the ordinance about adorning the markets of Jerusalem with fruits? When they would go up for pilgrimage, they would decorate the streets of Jerusalem with fruits. And after the Temple was destroyed, he canceled it. So he says: the reason lapsed, right? That’s why you cancel it. But Maimonides says that even when the reason lapses, you still need a court greater in wisdom and number. So how did Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai do it? Now what a strange question. He did it because he was greater in wisdom and number. What’s the problem?

[Speaker C] It can’t be that he was—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ra’avad assumes that if he came later, then obviously he was not greater in wisdom and number. But then according to the Ra’avad, what Maimonides writes here becomes a dead letter. Because by definition every later court is always not greater in wisdom and number. So the requirement that there be a later court greater in wisdom and number is an oxymoronic requirement. If it comes later, then it is not greater in wisdom and number. Of course that is not true. According to Maimonides, no—it is possible for a later court to be greater in wisdom and number. The Talmud even says that Rabbi was greater than all who came before him. There are many times—the Chafetz Chaim, I think, and Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman brings this in his name—that at the end of every period there is… what? Rabbi Yehuda? Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. At the end of every period there is some beacon that suddenly shoots upward. So there is a decline of generations, and at the end of the period suddenly there is someone who jumps up, and then they continue declining. It’s like a sawtooth function.

[Speaker C] They rise—boom—and that’s Rabbi—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Rav Ashi and Ravina, and then a sawtooth decline of generations. What? I don’t know.

[Speaker C] No, the closer you are to Moses and Aaron, the greater you are. It can’t be otherwise; you only decline.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the old assumption—

[Speaker E] The old assumption, the naive assumption.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Maimonides apparently does not assume that, because if he did, he would not write that a court greater in wisdom and number can repeal, because it simply doesn’t happen. If it comes later, it is not greater in wisdom and number.

[Speaker C] If you find such a thing—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But you won’t find it, until the Messiah comes. In any case, for our purposes, what I want to say is that I want to strengthen further this conclusion we have reached, because it is the important conclusion for our discussion. Torah is defined by what was given to us at Sinai. That is called Torah. That’s it. And the interpretations we add to it. Anything else, even if it comes from reasoning, ethics, whatever you like—that is not Torah. It is not Torah. Torah is only what was given to us at Sinai. I’ll still speak about what was given to us at Sinai that is not law—say, the stories, the facts in the written Torah. We received that at Sinai too; the Torah we received at Sinai, but they are not laws. Exactly what the status of that is—we’ll still discuss. But for now I want to claim that Torah is what we received at Sinai plus the additions—interpretations, not additions in the sense of add-ons, but interpretations, expansions, and so on—that were made to it over the generations. Right, exactly. Prophets and Writings are not Torah; they are called, in the language of the Talmud, words of tradition. Or rabbinic laws are not Torah. Later I’ll qualify this a bit—I’ll speak about Torah in the subject and Torah in the object—but for now I’m saying that these do not enter the definition of the concept Torah.

[Speaker C] But in the Talmud they do use verses from the Prophets to ground laws? That’s only clarification?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everywhere, everywhere the Talmud brings a verse from the Hebrew Bible, you’ll see that the medieval authorities ask: what does a verse from the Hebrew Bible help me? I’m looking for Torah-level law. Verses from the Hebrew Bible are not Torah-level.

[Speaker C] But the Talmud relates to it as though—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, they ask why the Talmud brings it, and they explain that the Talmud brings it only as clarification. For example, “ויעש לו צדקיה בן כנענה קרני ברזל”—“Zedekiah son of Chenaanah made for himself horns of iron.” And from that they learn that a horn made of iron is also called a horn, in the laws of damage by horn at the beginning of Bava Kamma, on page 4 there. So they ask there: what does “And Zedekiah son of Chenaanah made” have to do with anything? That’s from the Hebrew Bible. I’m looking for Torah-level law. So they explain that it is only clarification. From the fact that the Hebrew Bible calls them horns, we see that the term “horn” also includes horns of iron. And now when I go to the Torah and see that it says there “if it gores,” goring is with a horn, then I understand that this also includes iron horns, detached horns, attached horns—there are all kinds of discussions there. So on the one hand, one has to understand that there is here both a narrowing principle and an expanding principle. What do I mean? On the one hand, I am narrowing Torah very much to what was given to us at Sinai plus the interpretations we give to that thing. Anything beyond that—no. For example, Mesillat Yesharim by the Ramchal is not Torah. Why not? Because what he writes there was not given at Sinai; those are moral recommendations. He thinks this way or that way—that is not really interpretation of what was given at Sinai. The Kuzari is not Torah. Guide of the Perplexed is not Torah.

[Speaker C] Mishneh Torah of Maimonides?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Mishneh Torah, yes, because it is Jewish law.

[Speaker C] It’s halakhic rulings.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But studying it analytically is Torah study. So the claim is that on the one hand there is a narrowing principle here: only what was given to us at Sinai plus the additions around it is Torah. On the other hand there is also an expanding principle here. There are many valuable things even though they have no source in what was given to us at Sinai and are not interpretation of it either. For example, values, ethics, going beyond the letter of the law—all those things were not given at Sinai. If they had been given at Sinai or were interpretation, then they would be Jewish law. All these things do not enter Jewish law; they are non-halakhic domains—piety, all these things. So this means that there is room to add to what we call Torah other valuable things. And for that one does not always need to search where it comes from in Torah. In connection with what people say today, always looking for where democracy comes from in Torah, where rule by the majority comes from in Torah, where this value or that value comes from in Torah—you don’t need to look for where it comes from in Torah. If reasoning gives it to me—moral reasoning—then those values obligate. It doesn’t really matter whether I have a verse for it or a passage that teaches it or not. Okay? So in that sense, this is actually a very expanding principle. But it expands not the concept of Torah, but the concept of valuable things. Torah is a technical concept, narrower: what we received at Sinai and the accompanying interpretations. Okay? But around that concept of Torah there are all kinds of things that do not come from Sinai or from accompanying interpretations, yet are still valuable things. They can obligate us. The Holy One, blessed be He, even expects us to do them. But not by way of commands, and they do not have to be learned from Torah or from anything else. Let me give you another example of the significance of this. Let’s stay, first of all, in the realm of values—say democratic values. Liberal democracy. Fine? Often the feeling is that there is some built-in tension between fidelity to Torah and commitment to the values of liberal democracy. Right? More Jewish or more democratic—all these games we’ve been playing in recent years. But the claim I want to make is that values do not have to derive from a source in Torah. That’s the expanding dimension I mentioned earlier. And if I believe that liberal democracy is the most moral form of government, or the least immoral if you prefer—fine? Government in principle. Right, exactly. Therefore it obligates me now. It is not Torah. I am not going to claim that I find it through letter skips in the Torah, or in the Talmud, or in Rashba. Even if I do find it there, it doesn’t interest me, because then what? Then Rashba invented it and not I. That is not interpretation of what the Torah says, so it does not interest me, it is not called Torah. Often people use a replacement tag, as it were: if you found it in Rashba or in Rashi’s letters, then it’s Torah, it’s Judaism, of course, it’s something else. No—what suddenly? Rashba also invents things, and some of those things have value and some do not, but they are not Torah. Torah is only what Rashba interprets—halakhic passages, verses, whatever it may be—halakhic sources. Therefore, on the one hand I do not look for a source for it. On the other hand, I do see it as binding even though it has no source. And third, now when it conflicts—we spoke earlier about a conflict between ethics and Jewish law—it is not clear what prevails. It is not one-sidedly obvious that Jewish law prevails. Because we spoke about how the Holy One, blessed be He, expects of us moral conduct as well, like “And you shall do what is right and good.” Okay, things can conflict. Liberal democracy says you cannot burn churches in this country, right? It’s just not done. You cannot harm believers of another religion like that, right? Jewish law says that you should do it.

[Speaker C] Which law? “לא תחונם”.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not only “לא תחונם”, but destroying idolatry—

[Speaker C] What do you mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also abroad, not only in the Land. They believe, so what if they believe? Idol worshipers believed too. Okay.

[Speaker C] No, so maybe you could say there’s some filter—Buddha too, burn it. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I can add more for you: burn the New Testament, things like that. Spit at monks in the Old City.

[Speaker C] Why am I not riding a horse and instead driving a car? Because there’s progress in the world.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with progress? But there is a law. What is progress? Explain to me: in the name of progress, will you eat meat and milk together? There’s progress in the world. No—the Torah forbids eating meat and milk. But Jewish law says to destroy all idolatry. It is a counted commandment according to all enumerators of the commandments, a Torah-level commandment to destroy idolatry and its appurtenances and all its accessories.

[Speaker C] In Israel, meaning?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Anywhere in the world, but especially in Israel. Here it is also “לא תחונם”—you are not supposed to let them remain here at all.

[Speaker C] Do I have a commandment today to travel around the whole world and destroy churches?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. So what now? Everybody gets tangled up with this. Everyone understands that this just isn’t done—you can’t do such a thing. So some explain: you can’t do such a thing because otherwise they’ll do it to you too—ways of peace.

[Speaker C] Like the Muslims.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Exactly. Jewish law is like the Muslims. Jewish law is exactly like the Muslims. Now the usual halakhic decisors, the conservatives—I don’t know what to call them—they get tangled up with this, because they also understand that you can’t do such a thing. Fine—our hand is not strong, and we are worried about Jews abroad, and antisemitism, and they’ll do it to us, and all sorts of things like that. But that’s nonsense, because most of them themselves understand that that isn’t the real reason. In theory, yes. But they themselves would not do it. At least I want to believe they wouldn’t do it even if they could. In secret, no non-Jew sees you, nobody sees anything, you are in some protected bubble, there are no journalists, nothing—you can burn all these idol worshipers with their monastery. No. In my opinion, most of them would not do it.

[Speaker C] No, fringe extremists maybe would.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if we’re talking about major, significant halakhic decisors, even if they are conservative, I don’t think they would do it. These excuses—“our hand is not strong,” “who knows what they’ll do to Jews abroad,” and so on—are excuses that come after you have already decided not to do it. But if you ask my opinion, they wouldn’t do it even without that, even on a desert island. I want to hope they wouldn’t. If they would, then unfortunately… I don’t know whether that would make them more sophisticated or not, but they’d be more consistent. I don’t know about more sophisticated. And my claim is: so how can you justify it? Jewish law says yes—so what? And if there is no concern for Jewish lives, and none of that, and the law says to do it, then what justifies not doing it? What justifies not doing it is that it is immoral. There is a clash here between a moral value and a halakhic value, and you are in conflict, and you have to decide who prevails. Right, there is a dilemma, but I decide in favor of one side of the dilemma.

[Speaker F] There aren’t many cases like that, though, in my opinion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, not many, but there are some. That changes a lot about the relevance of this commandment in our time. It’s just that the reason they give is not the real reason.

[Speaker F]

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. I claim it isn’t even the reason they themselves think. Meaning—one thing with the mouth and another in the heart? Yes, but again, that’s superficial. “One thing with the mouth and another in the heart” means that inwardly I know and outwardly I lie for all kinds of reasons. Often it’s deeper than that. They lie to themselves. Their heart doesn’t reveal itself to their mouth. You cannot tell yourself that you are directly going against Jewish law. That’s Reform, isn’t it? What is it? “This halakhah doesn’t apply today, and therefore we don’t follow it.” Isn’t that Reform? Okay, so no serious decisor is willing to say that to himself, even inwardly, not only outwardly. But in my opinion, if he didn’t have the external excuse and he had to decide now whether to do it in practice—not how to justify it, but whether to do it—he wouldn’t do it. And then he would be forced to give himself some other explanation. And those who would do it simply have a childish way of thinking. People like the hilltop youth. The hilltop youth act exactly according to the rules—the halakhic rules, so to speak. That’s the weakness of the religious leadership with respect to them. The weakness of the religious leadership toward them is that everybody understands they’re right. Everybody understands they’re right. They also understand that everybody understands they’re right, and they feel that they are the ones taking the—yes, the zealous Pinchas who is willing to do what everybody really understands should be done, while the others are timid and weak, folding before the gentiles and before threats and this and that, or just progressivism, I don’t know what. But we all really understand that we are right—the hilltop youth. Yes, of course, of course—ask them and they’ll tell you. Absolutely. That’s the spirit there, unequivocally. That’s the spirit there. And all in all, they were educated on this, they learned this, they were raised on this, and it’s true. Now go explain to a fifteen-year-old kid that there are things which are indeed the right thing to do, and yet we still don’t do them. There are things you just don’t do. At age thirty you can understand something like that; at age fifteen it’s harder. Right—but you can’t manage to stop him, because he’s sure that you also agree with him, and when you say something else it’s only because you’re afraid and you want to curry favor with the gentiles.

[Speaker C] And that’s exactly what I mean—that these rabbis probably would do it; they wouldn’t do the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They wouldn’t do it. They’re not deceiving anyone else.

[Speaker C] I’m not sure. I don’t think so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The fact is that now, once it becomes extreme, rabbis too come out against it directly. No longer with difficulty. No longer with difficulty. No, now they really come out.

[Speaker C] And what reason do they give?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Many of them raise the moral reason. Yes, many of them—not all. Many say, no, what will happen abroad, what about Israel’s public image, and all that. But when it starts—

[Speaker C] To become such a thing, yes—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But “You shall be holy” doesn’t tell you not to fulfill a halakhic command. Jewish law says to do it. You can’t—

[Speaker C] You can’t now go and steal other people’s land.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course—“לא תחנם”. What do you mean? To leave them here on the land? A Torah-level prohibition. “לא תחנם”. You need to wipe them out—they also want to kill us. All true. All true. That is exactly the point. Everything is true, except that in the end, in the end, it is not right to do it. Now this is a consideration that someone raised on commitment to Jewish law cannot really live with so easily. It is not simple to do such a thing. It’s Reform. What do Reform Jews say? That Jewish law indeed says such and such, but today that is not practical, that is not how one should behave.

[Speaker C] It’s like all the settlements in the seventies, and after that you could say all immigration to the Land in general at the beginning of the last century. How did people just suddenly—it’s the same hilltop youth.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What suddenly? No—they didn’t harm anyone, they came to the Land.

[Speaker C] No—they bought land from Arabs, no—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They didn’t harm anyone, they came onto land. How is that related? They didn’t expel. They didn’t expel. They didn’t expel. Even when they didn’t always make sure that the land was not privately owned—I understand that Rabbi Tzvi Yehuda did tell them to be careful about that. But they didn’t always make sure the land wasn’t privately owned. Still, they didn’t expel people. These are people registered on that land because Hussein distributed lands before ’67 to all kinds of people who had never even seen the land. The private ownership there is private ownership on the legal level, but it’s not that anyone was removed from his house. Nobody was removed from his house there.

[Speaker C] I didn’t understand—from those hilltops they don’t expel?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. I’m not talking about the land they take. The problem with the land they take is not that they take the land; the problem is that it’s against the law. But their actions—not the taking of the land—the violence, the terror they use.

[Speaker C] But how did you make settlements in the seventies?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There was no terror and no violence. I was there. I can tell you. There wasn’t. There wasn’t. There wasn’t. Not until the end of the eighties. I was in Sebastia, I was in Nabi Tzuf, I was in all those places. No—there was no violence, nobody used violence against Arabs. What suddenly? They took land? That’s true. They didn’t always make sure it wasn’t private ownership? Also true. But there was no violence.

[Speaker C] I was in the eighties even in Hebron—you’d run—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After kids who were throwing at them, and they were throwing stalls at them and throwing—

[Speaker C] That’s not related, because in Hebron it’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not settlements—that’s hilltop youth, not settlement. Not related. That’s not settlement; those are struggles, power struggles, where there really is a conflict. But the settlement movement—when you built a community, you didn’t remove anyone from there. Nobody removed anyone from there, so that’s not relevant.

[Speaker C] Depending on how you look at it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That too is some kind of violence. No, there is no way to look at it otherwise. Nobody was removed, no violence was used against anyone. You can say the act itself is violent because you are taking over land that isn’t yours—fine—but not violence against people. No one was removed. I don’t care—slippery slope, okay—but no violence was used against people, no one was removed. That didn’t happen. Again, as far as I remember. Maybe there was some case, but—

[Speaker C] There was the whole Jewish Underground—they blew up—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not related. That’s not settlement—that’s what I’m saying, you’re mixing things together. That’s terror. It’s terror. It’s not the settlement movement. No, it’s terror, not the settlement movement. They came—so what if they came? They came. I also came from Hungary. There are antisemites there who kill Jews—so am I also an antisemite? What is this? So what if they came? There’s a group that uses terror, true, but that’s not the settlement movement; it has nothing to do with it. On the contrary: when they were exposed, they were strongly condemned—the Jewish Underground—by all the settlement leadership as well. And by the way, unlike the punks of today, first, most of them repented, and second, they harmed mayors, inciters—at least in most cases, not always, but in most cases they targeted inciters, which is more justified than just entering a house and burning it or terrifying people in the middle of the night and driving them out with children. Horrifying things are happening there. They should be shot. Those people are terrorists. They should be shot.

[Speaker C] No, no, clearly it’s horrific. But I’m saying this didn’t just come out of nowhere.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can argue that. It’s not important. But those acts were not done earlier. You’re asking from what soil it grew? I don’t know. But it wasn’t done earlier. This phenomenon is new—certainly in its scope. A new phenomenon. It’s a phenomenon of terror. It has nothing to do with settlement. Settlement is settlement—you can agree with it or disagree with it—but there was no force used there against Arabs.

[Speaker C] And what about the hilltop youth who abuse them?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s part of this phenomenon. By the way, Arabs abuse them too.

[Speaker C] Fine, but put the Arabs aside.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I won’t put that aside. I’m saying when you respond to provocations done against you, or to threats against you, that’s one thing. When you just enter a house in some random village—he’ll tell you they’re all—he didn’t curse her or anything. They go in because from their perspective all Arabs are like that. They don’t make distinctions. We need to make distinctions too. Meaning, even our criticism of them needs to make distinctions, just as I demand that they make distinctions. We have to understand: some things, yes; some things… By the way, even the hilltop youth themselves, whom I consider terrorists in every sense, sometimes respond in ways that one can justify. If there are Arab attacks there, and as is well known the State of Israel simply isn’t really present there, then there is no protection for Jews and no protection for Arabs either—there is no protection for anything. It’s the Wild West. And when there’s a Wild West, the Indians come out. In the end it’s the state’s fault. The state is not there, and when the state isn’t there, this is what happens on both sides, both Arabs and Jews. The state isn’t there? No, it isn’t. It really isn’t. It isn’t there. In the end, I was there—

[Speaker F] I was in Einav… Fine, so you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Saw someone, so it doesn’t matter. In the end—

[Speaker F] In Sebastia the jeeps went into Bethlehem—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I mean by “not there.” I didn’t mean physically not there… there is no rule, no governance.

[Speaker F] But there is some level of cooperation between the Civil Administration and these cases.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True. And the regional defense too—the soldiers are basically people from those communities, some of whom also belong to those circles, and they are a military unit. Sometimes you see people in uniform cooperating with these guys. We’re talking about 500 punks, that’s the whole story. On weekends another few thousand probably join them from around the country. But these punks who are on the hilltops—that’s what I heard yesterday on some podcast—it’s something like 500 people. If there were a decision to move against this, the story would be over in two days. Two days. All these guys would get orders, or they’d be arrested, or they’d be prevented from entering the area.

[Speaker C] No, I don’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Think they’d get the High Court.

[Speaker C] I think that at these stages there already is no High Court. I think the Second Aliyah, when they came to the Land at the beginning of the last century—they came, and at the same time more than close to a million Jews went to America, the good normal people. Who came here in the Second Aliyah? People like hilltop youth. So they came, took land from people, conquered it by force.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. I don’t know where you’re getting that from. That’s not true.

[Speaker E] Land was purchased.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s simply not true. It’s simply not true. The colonies—land was bought. Yes. Maybe here and there there was something, I don’t know, but fundamentally that’s not true. Land was always bought before it was settled.

[Speaker E] There was a—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ottoman rule, British rule—this wasn’t a lawless world. That’s not true. It’s simply not true.

[Speaker E] If it had been unlawful, then simply—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course there were things. Fine. But to say that the whole movement was a movement of hilltop youth—that’s simply not true. On the margins there are always all kinds of hilltop youth. Everyone draws inspiration from some, I don’t know who—so what does that mean, that I too am a Nazi? Fine—these are very amorphous accusations. You can go very far with that.

[Speaker C] Okay, fine. He saw the trend, and it really is being realized.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but I think that this trend stems not only from the fact that occupation corrupts, but also from the fact that the occupation is not being run properly.

[Speaker C] How is an occupation supposed to be run?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is—there is an occupation that imposes governance. Enlightened and—first of all, before it’s enlightened, let it impose governance. Were the soldiers beating Arabs?

[Speaker C] No.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not beating Arabs, but protecting, or enforcing the law. I’m not talking about beating, I’m talking about dealing with rioters, dealing with problems as needed. If there had been governance, in my estimation many of these incidents would not have happened. That’s my estimate. Of course it’s counterfactual—how can you know what would have happened.

[Speaker C] No, but you have to use unreasonable force here to reach governance. That’s reasonable force.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then it isn’t unreasonable; it’s reasonable. To cancel rights altogether—

[Speaker C] To feed the whole thing whatever is needed—no problem, whatever is needed.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, if that’s what is required in order to impose governance, then that is the reasonable force required. It’s not unreasonable force.

[Speaker C] In Singapore, by the way, a person—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in Singapore that isn’t needed. They do it even though it isn’t needed—that’s exactly the problem. How is it not needed? Besides, the citizens there are mostly very happy with it.

[Speaker C] Of course. They’re not allowed to think otherwise.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not because of that. Not because of that.

[Speaker C] They don’t know they’re oppressed. Animals in a zoo.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe, but bottom line, they’re satisfied. Animals in a zoo—a tiger in the safari is satisfied. No problem, he’s satisfied. I’m not sure. But if he’s satisfied, then everything’s fine. If he eats… Fine. We’re drifting. This isn’t… In the end you have to do whatever is necessary in order to impose governance. And if that requires major force, then that is the reasonable force needed. Whatever is needed. And if you have to burn a village, then burn a village. No problem. If that’s what it takes in order to impose governance. But not that punks should go in and do whatever they want. There was that story with one of the ministers or members of Knesset, I don’t remember, who said to use an atomic bomb on Gaza. Everyone was horrified. What’s the problem? He is entirely right. He is right only in this sense: if that really is what is required because otherwise we cannot destroy the terror there, then I’m entirely in favor. But the people who latched onto it are people who say, “No, no, they deserve it, they’re all little terrorists, you should kill them while they’re small.” That’s a problematic statement, you understand? Everything depends on whether the means are necessary. Means cannot be judged in and of themselves. There are good means and bad means. You have to see what is needed, what your goals are, whether they are reasonable, and how best to achieve them.

[Speaker C] To impose governance on the Jews too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no—on both I impose it.

[Speaker C] That’s what I’m saying.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also on the Jews. Thank God. Absolutely. Right now, even more on the Jews than on the Arabs.

[Speaker C] Those are unreasonable means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those are entirely reasonable means. They should be shot. That’s the reasonable means. Shoot them. Simply shoot them. Without hesitation.

[Speaker F] Even—

[Speaker G] Jews too?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, yes. Anyone who comes to harm Arabs should be harmed. Anyone who comes to harm a person should be shot. He is a terrorist. That’s all. What difference does it make whether he is a Jew or an Arab? A state is supposed to protect its citizens—or the people under its responsibility, even if not its citizens. That’s all.

[Speaker C] So what is the means?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no problem of means. Every means is acceptable so long as it is the means required. That’s all. If you need to kill him, then kill him. What’s the problem? I don’t understand. If he keeps carrying out terror all the time. If he doesn’t obey orders, if he doesn’t obey the law, then he should be killed. That’s all. Very simple. There’s nothing unreasonable about it. Obviously there is. Terrorists need to be killed. Anyone who threatens people should be killed. I didn’t catch who they’re threatening. If he walks around with a weapon and starts shooting toward an Arab village, he should be shot in order to kill. That’s all. Unequivocally he is a terrorist. What difference is there if he threatens an Arab or a Jew? I see no difference at all. Clearly, this is terror in every sense. Twelve Arabs were killed in the last two months. In the last two months, according to the podcast I heard—it was from a few days ago. Seven of those twelve were killed by bullets from IDF soldiers, who are regional defense. Now maybe some of that was justified. I don’t know. No—regional defense.

[Speaker E] It happened, and it’s happening now.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, I’m saying: there are actions where the IDF kills Arabs because it is in an operation and has to do it—fine, I have no objection. There they were talking about probable cooperation—that’s at least what the people speaking there claimed—between regional-defense soldiers and these hilltop-youth punks.

[Speaker E] “Cooperation” sounds to me like murder. But if you’re now talking about IDF operations, then we know that when Arabs go out to demonstrate we get October 2000, and when Jews go out to demonstrate you get a road blocked for four hours.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Each thing on its own merits. Where one has to kill, one has to kill. Where one does not have to kill, then whoever kills is a murderer. Each thing on its own merits. You can’t lay down sweeping general rules. Whoever kills is a murderer? No—it depends on the circumstances, depends… everything’s fine. I’m only saying there is no difference between Arab and Jew. Terrorists need to be killed. That’s all. There is no difference between Arab and Jew.

[Speaker E] We’re here studying Torah, and we know there is a difference between a Jew and an Arab.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no difference. We already said—

[Speaker C] On the moral level there is no difference.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, yes—there is no difference. What about—

[Speaker E] The Torah now? The life of a non-Jew—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The law of the pursuer applies to Arabs too. The law of the pursuer applies to a non-Jew too. Someone who threatens the life of an Arab is also a pursuer.

[Speaker C] We’re talking about Jewish law. It was in the daily page two weeks ago—if a non-Jew falls into a pit.

[Speaker E] Ah, we have—

[Speaker C] We have on—

[Speaker E] We have on—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That the non-Jew falls into a pit. “You raise him out but do not lower him in.” Our heretics too are “raised but not lowered,” so let’s start with our own heretics. Rabbi, not to bring a non-Jew out on the Sabbath?

[Speaker E]

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not bringing a non-Jew out on the Sabbath is not the law today either. We’re talking about an idolatrous non-Jew, some kind of non-Jew—I don’t know what kind of non-Jew—but it’s not correct. The Meiri already wrote that it’s not correct. Today one must save the life of a non-Jew even at the cost of violating the Sabbath. Unequivocally. The Meiri in the eighth chapter of Yoma—this shouldn’t need to be said. Yes, right, agreed.

[Speaker F] Rabbi, what do you mean by an enlightened occupation? What does enlightened mean?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—an occupation that imposes governance. If you want to occupy, occupy. No problem, if it’s needed. I’m not in favor of occupation as an ideal, but there are situations where you need to carry out an act of occupation. If you occupy, then occupy properly. Give equal treatment to the population on all sides, but let there be governance over the population on all sides. That’s what I call an enlightened occupation.

[Speaker C] There’s discrimination here, because if all these settlements had not been legal from the outset, then if there were governance they should have said to them: leave. They should have shot them, like when they go to demonstrations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not true. First of all, they don’t shoot them because they are not threatening anyone.

[Speaker C] Don’t exaggerate—that’s one thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Second, that’s not true. So what if they went up illegally? There were demonstrations there, and in the end they got government approval. That’s how many things are done in this country. Fine—what is unlawful should be evacuated. Again: what is unlawful and then receives government approval, or Knesset approval, is lawful. The fact that they achieved it by means of demonstrations—so what? Many things in this country are achieved through demonstrations. What does that have to do with anything?

[Speaker F] But the fact—every demonstration creates facts. When you block a road, is that not a fact? When you go on strike, is that not a fact? Everything creates facts, right? That’s how things are achieved in a democracy, through demonstrations too. If it is unlawful and the government decides it doesn’t want it, it will evacuate them—that’s perfectly fine. But after the government approves it, it’s legal. That’s all. I see here a critical mass of evidence against being in the territories at all—that it corrupts and also that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem. Then don’t be there. I’m not arguing right now about whether we should be there or not. I don’t know how much of an option we really have there, but fine, maybe you’re right. That’s not the dispute. I’m saying: once you’re there, do it properly. Meaning, you can’t be there and not be there. You’ve created the Wild West. You removed Hussein from there, you removed the Jordanians from there, and you didn’t enter in their place. You didn’t really enter in their place.

[Speaker F] There’s nothing to do—that’s true. What is being done right now, that’s the point. It’s not a bug, it’s a feature. The rights you have as an Israeli Jew as opposed to the Arab are there in order—

[Speaker F] To motivate the Arabs to flee from there, to leave.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But again, that is exactly what I am saying is wrong to do. But you can also do it as a bug rather than a feature.

[Speaker F] Then annex it, annex—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Do whatever you want. Decide on a policy—I don’t care, I’m not going into policy. No, decide on whatever policy you want, but do it properly. That’s all. You can say: okay, let’s get out of the territories entirely. You can say not. Both are legitimate. But today we’re doing neither one nor the other. We are there, and we make sure that it remains the Wild West.

[Speaker F] In terms of sovereignty and so on, what would be the moral thing to do toward those Arab residents?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nothing special. If they behave properly, then full rights, everything fine. Give them everything. If they pose a threat, then deal with them harshly. Everything according to circumstances. What do you mean? Again, you can say there’s no chance and no point—let’s get out of there. Fine, I’m not arguing with that right now. That’s another discussion. But I’m saying: if you do it, do it properly.

[Speaker C] Give them blue ID cards, give them voting rights.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, I don’t know. No—by the way, voting rights are, in my opinion, overrated. Right, exactly, or something like that. You don’t have to give them voting rights. I don’t see the sanctity of voting rights.

[Speaker F] No, because demographically that could change everything here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, you need to ensure all their human rights. Civil rights are a somewhat more delicate matter. Human rights, certainly. What do you mean?

[Speaker F] Is there an example of that in other countries?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Of course. Puerto Rico? Yes, for example. Puerto Rico, and there are others.

[Speaker C] South Africa is famous for that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No—Africa, yes, partial rights. Ah, voting rights are not—

[Speaker C] Yes, all the rights and—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. How did we get to all this? Ah, yes. So this is an example. Exactly. When I say that ethics is outside Jewish law but is still God’s will, that means that when there is a clash between ethics and Jewish law, there is a real dilemma. The solution is not self-evident; it is not one-sidedly clear who prevails over whom. And that’s why we reached all these examples. People who don’t accept the picture I presented here—for them, everything has to come out of Torah, and if it doesn’t, then it has no validity. So it didn’t come out of Torah. Therefore they cannot explain something by saying that democratic or liberal values require it. In their framework that is not a legitimate argument. They need to explain that through letter skips in the Torah we can derive that one should—I don’t know what—give equality to everyone. Yes, but I’m saying there’s no need to get there, and it’s not persuasive anyway. There’s no need to get there. Ethics is a category that stands on its own. It is valid even though it is not Jewish law. And according to the definition I’ve given now, it is not even Torah. Later I’ll refine that a little. I said Torah in the subject and Torah in the object? Yes, yes—that’s what it is. Whatever they may say, that’s what they say. Right. Why should I care where I got it from? I think it’s correct. What difference does it make where I got it? Even the pants I’m wearing—I didn’t invent them. Someone invented them. But they seem comfortable and appropriate to me, so I wear pants.

[Speaker C] And which morality do you want to adopt?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: what I think is correct. So what? Do whatever you want. I’m telling you what is moral in my view. If in your view something else is moral, then we can argue, agree, disagree—but in my view this is moral. What difference does it make now whether it’s found in the West or in the East?

[Speaker F] There’s a negative charge here—it’s from the West and all that—wait a second, wait a second. Jewish law is determined by halakhic rules, absolute rules. And morality—wait a second—how is it determined?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only by what you understand. Yes. Conscience, logic, moral perspective, moral intuition—whatever you want to call it. Yes. Each person understands. In morality, there are far fewer disagreements than in Jewish law, you need to understand that. People recoil from what I’m saying as if Jewish law is clear—there are rules, this and that—while morality is free-for-all, everyone does whatever he wants. It is exactly the opposite. In morality the disagreements are fairly marginal. There are disagreements, but they are relatively marginal. By and large we agree on what is moral and what is not. In Jewish law there is nothing that does not involve disagreement.

[Speaker C] Because—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so I’m saying: there are disagreements on the margins, usually over applications, not over the moral principles themselves. But in Jewish law there is nothing without disagreement. So the fact that there are rules there and that everything is from Sinai—wonderful. Does that mean there is uniformity? Does that mean it is clear to everyone what Jewish law says? Absolutely not. So there’s no need to recoil from the fact that there are no rules in the moral realm either. Okay, so there aren’t. There are fewer disagreements there than in Jewish law. Fine—we went a bit off track today, but that’s okay.