Beshalach (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Midah Tovah — Sabbath eve, Parashat Beshalach, 5765

The mixed hermeneutical principles:

• gezerah shavah (verbal analogy)
• hekesh (juxtaposition-based inference)
• im eino inyan (“if it is not needed for that matter”)

Questions:

• A few words about the law of techumin (Sabbath boundary limits).
• Asmachtaot (scriptural supports for rabbinic laws) as defective expositions.
• What do the inadvertent manslayer, the cities of refuge, and the law of techumin have to do with one another?
• Semantic and substantive gezerah shavah.
• On a midrashic sorites: the meaning of an exegetical chain.
• Does the author of Torah Temimah hold that there is no hermeneutical principle of im eino inyan at all?

A. The gezerah shavah of techumin

“See that the Lord has given you the Sabbath; therefore on the sixth day He gives you bread for two days. Let each man remain where he is; let no man go out from his place on the seventh day.”

— Exodus 16:29

Where are these two thousand cubits written? For it was taught: “Let each man remain where he is” — these are four cubits. “Let no man go out from his place” — these are two thousand cubits. From where do we know this? Rav Hisda said: We learn “place” from “place,” and “place” from “fleeing,” and “fleeing” from “fleeing,” and “fleeing” from “boundary,” and “boundary” from “boundary,” and “boundary” from “outside,” and “outside” from “outside.” For it is written: “You shall measure from outside the city, on the eastern side, two thousand cubits,” and so forth. But why not derive it from: “From the wall of the city and outward, a thousand cubits”? We derive “outside” from “outside,” but we do not derive “outside” from “outward.” But what difference does that make? Did not the school of Rabbi Ishmael teach: “And the priest shall return, and the priest shall come” — this returning is the same as this coming? That rule applies only where there is nothing more similar to it; but where there is something more similar, we derive from the more similar.

“Two thousand cubits in a circle.” And as for Rabbi Hanina ben Antigonus, whichever way you take it: if he accepts the gezerah shavah, then “corners” are written there; and if he does not accept the gezerah shavah, from where does he get two thousand cubits? In truth, he does accept the gezerah shavah, but here it is different, because Scripture says: “This shall be for them the open land of the cities” — for this you give corners, but you do not give corners to those who rest on the Sabbath. And the Rabbis? It was taught: Rabbi Hananiah says: all who rest on the Sabbath shall be like this.

— Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 51a

“Let no man go out from his place on the seventh day.” These are the two thousand cubits that constitute a person’s Sabbath domain, within which he may walk in every direction from the place where he spent the Sabbath. How is this implied? Hisda said: We learn “place” from “place.” Here it is written: “Let no man go out from his place,” and there it is written: “And I will appoint you a place to which he shall flee” (Exodus 21:13). And “place” we learn from “fleeing,” for in that verse it says: “to which he shall flee.” And this “fleeing” we learn from “fleeing,” for there it is written: “And if the manslayer at any time goes out beyond the boundary of his city of refuge, to which he fled” (Numbers 35:26). And this “fleeing” from “boundary,” for in that verse it says: “the boundary of his city of refuge.” And this “boundary” from “boundary,” for there it is written: “And the avenger of blood finds him outside the boundary of his city of refuge” (ibid., v. 27). And this “outside” from “outside,” for there it is written: “You shall measure outside the city, on the eastern side, two thousand cubits” (ibid., v. 5). Thus we have learned that the Sabbath boundary is two thousand cubits. And if you say that these two thousand cubits were stated with regard to the cities of refuge, behold it is written: “From the wall of the city and outward, a thousand cubits round about” (ibid., v. 4). And if you say that the two thousand cubits were fields and vineyards and the thousand cubits were open land, nevertheless we learn the Sabbath boundary from here by hekesh and by gezerah shavah. A hekesh is where the matters are not similar to one another either in writing or in pronunciation, yet since they are both written in the same verse we learn one from the other, such as “place” from “fleeing,” “fleeing” from “boundary,” and “boundary” from “outside.” A gezerah shavah is where two matters resemble one another, and even though they are not in the same verse we learn one from the other, such as “fleeing” from “fleeing,” “boundary” from “boundary,” and “outside” from “outside” — and so throughout the Torah. And the Rabbis said: an a fortiori inference is given to every person to expound, but gezerah shavah and hekesh were not given to be expounded except in what the Sages expounded according to the tradition in their hands.”

— Sekhel Tov (Buber edition), on Exodus 16, s.v. “Let no man go out”

Introduction

The sugya (Talmudic discussion) of the Sabbath boundary is a difficult and obscure one in halakha (Jewish law). The Talmudic passage cited above deals with the question of how we know the law of two thousand cubits, and it adduces a complex gezerah shavah built out of a chain of links, alternating gezerah shavah and hekesh, each of which looks like an independent exposition in its own right.

There are a number of discussions of this exposition, and among the Sages there are also other expositions, some parallel to it and some contradictory to it. We will begin with a general, brief, and necessarily superficial survey of the law of techumin, its components, and its sources.

General survey

The law of techumin forbids a person to leave his place on the Sabbath, at least when he has not established an eruv (a legal device extending one’s Sabbath residence) for boundaries. The Talmud in Babylonian Talmud, Eruvin 17b states:

“Let no man go out from his place.” Rabbi Hiyya taught: One is liable to lashes for violating the Sabbath boundary by Torah law. What is the reason? Because Scripture says: “Let no man go out from his place.”

The source for the prohibition of techumin is the verse “Let no man go out from his place,” and in several sugyot it appears that this verse also serves as a source for the prohibition of carrying from one domain to another. See, for example, Tosafot on Eruvin 17b and on Shabbat 2a, and compare the Talmud at the beginning of chapter 11 of Shabbat. With respect to techumin, the Sages and the medieval authorities offer opinions in both directions: whether this is indeed a biblical prohibition, or whether it is merely an asmachta, as discussed below.

From the wording of our midrashic passage it appears that there are two measures of “place” with respect to the prohibition of techumin. There is what is called “where he is,” and there is what is called “his place.” The measure of neither is explained in the verse. The Talmud, in Eruvin 48a, learns that “where he is” means four cubits, when he is not situated in a defined place such as a city, in which case the whole city is regarded as his four cubits,¹ on the basis of the following consideration:

“Let each man remain where he is.” How much is “where he is”? Four cubits — three for his body, and one cubit so that he may stretch out his hands and feet.

What remains, then, is to determine the measure called “his place.” This is the subject of the Babylonian sugya and the midrash Sekhel Tov cited above, both of which set the measure at two thousand cubits.

In contrast to our exposition, the Jerusalem Talmud in Eruvin 3:4 and 5:4 mentions a different measure: “Rather, the boundaries are twelve mil, like the camp of Israel.” This exposition implies that the measure of techumin is twelve mil, not two thousand cubits.

In addition to these sources, it is important to know that there is a tannaitic dispute in the Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 5 of Sotah between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean as to whether techumin are biblical or rabbinic. This is how the Talmud there, Sotah 30b, explains their disagreement; compare also the dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah in Eruvin 35b-36a.²

The parameters and scope of this dispute are a complicated matter. Broadly speaking, the halakhic decisors divide into three camps with respect to the law of techumin:

1. According to many decisors — Maimonides in Hilkhot Shabbat 27:1, the Rif, Meiri on Eruvin 17b, and others — the halakha follows the Jerusalem Talmud cited above. Therefore one is liable only for going beyond twelve mil, which was the area of the Israelite camp, and Moses commanded Israel not to go outside the camp. According to these decisors, the measure of two thousand cubits is only a rabbinic stringency, and the gezerah shavah described in the Talmud above is apparently a mere asmachta.
2. In contrast, several decisors maintain that all techumin are rabbinic, and that even the measure of twelve mil is rabbinic. What is said here — that one is liable to lashes for techumin — is only according to Rabbi Akiva in the Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 5 of Sotah, who holds that techumin are biblical, whereas we do not rule in accordance with him. This is the view of the Ran, Nahmanides, Rabbeinu Asher, Rashi, and others.
3. A third group of decisors holds that techumin are biblical already from two thousand cubits onward. This is chiefly the view of the Geonim: Halakhot Gedolot, She’iltot, and others. See also Maimonides, Sefer ha-Mitzvot, negative commandment 321.

In any event, it follows that the gezerah shavah in the Talmud from which the law of two thousand cubits is derived is itself disputed: some hold that it is rabbinic, while others regard it as a full biblical exposition. Yet an examination of the Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 5 of Sotah shows that even according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that the techum of two thousand cubits is a biblical prohibition, the exposition from which he learns the measure of two thousand cubits is a different one, derived from the Levite cities, as stated in Mishnah Sotah 5:3:

On that day³ Rabbi Akiva expounded: “You shall measure outside the city, on the eastern side, two thousand cubits,” and another verse says: “From the wall of the city and outward, a thousand cubits round about.” It is impossible to say “a thousand cubits,” since “two thousand cubits” has already been said; and it is impossible to say “two thousand cubits,” since “a thousand cubits” has already been said. How so? A thousand cubits were open land, and two thousand cubits were the Sabbath boundary. Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean says: A thousand cubits were open land, and two thousand cubits were fields and vineyards.

With respect to the Levite cities, two verses are stated in the Torah: one teaches that they are given one thousand cubits around the city, and the other teaches that they are given two thousand cubits. How is this to be reconciled? Rabbi Akiva resolves it by saying that they are given one thousand empty cubits around the city for open space, while the verse of two thousand cubits teaches the Sabbath boundary, by means of an im eino inyan derivation. In contrast, Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosei the Galilean learns that both verses concern the Levites. Most commentators understand his view to mean that they are given two thousand cubits, of which one thousand are empty and one thousand are for fields and vineyards. According to Maimonides, however, they are given three thousand: one thousand empty and two thousand for fields and vineyards.⁴ Even so, in this exposition there is certainly room to ask how Rabbi Akiva infers a conclusion specifically about the Sabbath boundary rather than any other context.

Returning to our exposition

At first glance, it would seem that even Rabbi Akiva, who holds that techumin are biblical already from two thousand cubits onward, learns this from the Levite cities and not from our exposition. On that view, our gezerah shavah is only a mere asmachta. And according to Rabbi Eliezer, it is certainly an asmachta, since on his view techumin are altogether rabbinic, at least below twelve mil. If so, it would appear that everyone agrees that this exposition is an asmachta. The question is: why?

At this point one should note something very important for the study of the hermeneutical principles. Many fail to notice that when we conclude that a certain exposition is an asmachta, it is not enough merely to point out that the law that emerges from it is rabbinic. There must also be something defective in the exegetical inference itself. Imagine the matter well: if the exposition were properly constructed and conformed to the rules and methods of halakhic exposition, then it would itself be proof that the law derived from it is biblical. In such a case one could not say that it is an asmachta, for even if we had no prior tradition concerning that law, we would have had to derive it ourselves by means of this very exposition, and it would thereby become a biblical law.

Since we have seen that among the decisors there is a substantial position that this exposition is only an asmachta, we must therefore look for the structural defect in the exposition itself. Some commentators indeed tie this to the halakhic and scriptural context. For example, the author of Torah Temimah explains on this passage that the exposition is an asmachta because the plain sense of the verses concerns the taking out of the manna, not leaving the Sabbath boundary. This is a difficult claim, for if so, we ought to have derived the law of two thousand cubits with respect to taking out the manna — for example, that the prohibition of carrying from one domain to another applies only at a distance of two thousand cubits. Beyond that, why do we not say, with respect to the exposition that “an eye for an eye” means monetary compensation, that this contradicts the plain sense of the verses? Since when does the fact that an exposition contradicts the plain sense deprive it of halakhic force?⁵

The author of Torah Shelemah (Beshalach, addenda, sec. 22) explains that this exposition is an asmachta because the same verse is also used to derive the law of carrying, as we mentioned above. This claim too can be discussed from several angles, but this is not the place.

In light of all this, we will try to examine whether there is an essential defect in the exposition itself that causes it to be classified as a mere asmachta. But before we deal with that, we should trace the course of this complex exposition.

The course and structure of the exposition

The point of departure is that we have a law of techumin, but its measure is unknown. We know that in the case of the Levite cities the Torah explicitly gives a measure of two thousand cubits. The Talmud offers a long exposition, built out of seven successive stages — as detailed by the midrash Sekhel Tov cited above and by Rashi on the Babylonian sugya — in order to connect those two endpoints:

1. We learn the meaning of the verse “Let no man go out from his place,” in which the word “place” appears, from the verse concerning the inadvertent manslayer: “And I will appoint you a place to which he shall flee.” This is a gezerah shavah of “place” from “place.”
2. Then, from that latter verse about the inadvertent manslayer, we make a hekesh between “fleeing” and “place.” By means of the comparison in the previous step, we transfer this connection also to the word “place” in the context of techumin, as though the word “fleeing” were written there as well.
3. We now connect the verse about the manslayer’s flight to another verse dealing with his leaving the city of refuge: “the boundary of his city of refuge, to which he fled.” This is a gezerah shavah of “fleeing” from “fleeing.”
4. Then, within that very verse, we connect by hekesh “fleeing” and “boundary.” At this point we are in a situation as though “boundary” were also written in the verse about techumin.
5. We now connect by gezerah shavah of “boundary” from “boundary” the verse “and the avenger of blood finds him outside the boundary,” through the intermediary verses just mentioned, to the verse of techumin.
6. From that last verse we make a hekesh between “boundary” and “outside.” We are now in a situation as though “outside” were written in the verse about techumin.
7. Finally, we connect the verse regarding the Levite cities — “You shall measure outside the city, on the eastern side, two thousand cubits” — to the verse about techumin, and conclude that there too the measure is two thousand cubits.

This is a highly unusual structure of exposition, in which all the intermediate stages look like semantic links that convey no substantive content. Nothing is learned from the word “outside” to the word “outside,” or from “fleeing” to “boundary,” and so on. In its external form, such a structure resembles the formula known in Greek logic as a sorites.⁶

The relation to the exposition in the Mishnah in Sotah

We can now see that this exposition does not necessarily contradict the exposition in the Mishnah in Sotah. Once Rabbi Akiva teaches us there that the exposition rests on an im eino inyan consideration, as a result of which we learn from the verse of the Levite cities to the Sabbath boundary, it now becomes possible to carry out this entire exegetical movement, beginning with the Levite cities and proceeding through all the intermediate stages to the Sabbath boundary.

The very fact that we require im eino inyan teaches us that this is indeed an exposition and not a mere linguistic clarification. If it were nothing more than a kind of dictionary that tells us the meaning of terms such as “boundary” and “outside,” then we could have learned it even if we applied the verse to the area of the Levite cities, and there would have been no need to employ the principle of im eino inyan.

If so, one may conclude that according to Rabbi Akiva this is a full-fledged exposition, and that the exposition brought in the Mishnah in Sotah is merely a shortened expression of the Talmudic exposition in Eruvin concerning the Sabbath boundary.⁷ This would also explain what troubled us earlier: how do we learn from there specifically to the Sabbath boundary? See below, possibility C in Rashi’s view. Of course, one may also understand that the exposition in the Mishnah in Sotah really is a different one, and that the derivation is a direct im eino inyan from the Levite cities to the Sabbath boundary, without the intermediary stages. On that reading, our exposition is only an asmachta even according to Rabbi Akiva.

The logical-midrashic structure of the exposition

There are two ways to understand the logic of this exegetical chain:

1. In fact, only semantic expressions are being transferred, and the substantive derivation is only from the first stage to the last — that is, from the Levite cities to the Sabbath boundary.
2. We are dealing with a series of alternating gezerot shavot and hekeshim: each time one word is compared to an identical word elsewhere, that is a gezerah shavah; and in between, two different words that appear in the same context, that is, in the same verse, are connected to one another by a kind of hekesh.⁸

From Rashi on the sugya it seems that he understood the exposition in the first way. At each stage he is careful to emphasize that the situation created is as though the word being learned were explicitly written in the target verse. Indeed, only at the very end of his remarks, at the last stage, does he mention the term gezerah shavah. It therefore seems that he understands there to be only one gezerah shavah here, while the intermediate steps are merely semantic expansion connecting the source verse to the target verse.

In contrast, Meiri on the passage appears to understand it in the second way, since from the Talmud’s rejection he draws a methodological conclusion regarding gezerah shavah. His language is as follows:

Terms that are equal in meaning, even if they are not similar in wording, may be used for gezerah shavah from one to another. This is what they meant when they said: “and the priest shall return” and “and the priest shall come” — this returning is the same as this coming… From here you also learn, in connection with what they said that one does not derive a gezerah shavah unless he learned it from his teacher, that they were not in receipt of every particular of the gezerah shavah. Rather, they had received in tradition that there was a matter of gezerah shavah in that term, and afterward the choice was in their hands as to from which similar term they would derive it by gezerah shavah…

— Meiri on Eruvin 51a⁹

Meiri understands each stage of the derivation as a gezerah shavah, and therefore he draws from a single stage in the exposition a methodological conclusion about the ways of hermeneutical reasoning. According to Rashi, such a conclusion seems difficult, since perhaps what we have here is only a semantic-associative link and not a genuine gezerah shavah. Beyond that, it is clear from Meiri that he understands this gezerah shavah as a full-fledged exposition, and therefore he derives from it both a halakhic conclusion and a conclusion about the meaning of the rule that a person does not derive gezerah shavah on his own. According to Rashi, however, it is not clear whether such a conclusion can be drawn.

There is another difference between these two modes of understanding. According to the first mode, that of Rashi, we cannot conclude with respect to all the intermediate contexts that the final result — the measure of two thousand cubits — also applies to them. There is not a series of gezerot shavot here, but one gezerah shavah with mediating steps. In contrast, according to the second mode, that of Meiri, this is a series of gezerot shavot, and therefore the law of two thousand cubits can be applied to each of the intermediate contexts as well.

The logical justification

Meiri’s approach appears straightforward. This is a chain of exegetical derivations, one derived from another — what the Sages call deriving something from what is itself derived. In halakha, such a complex exegetical step is employed everywhere except for certain combinations in sacrificial law; see the sugya in Babylonian Talmud, Zevahim 50. As noted, however, it seems from Rashi that he understands the matter in the first way. The question, then, is: what is the justification for such an understanding?

Rashi’s approach requires explanation on two distinct levels:

1. How can verses be connected to one another without any halakhic-exegetical significance? If the intermediate stages are not actual derivations by hekesh or gezerah shavah, then it is not clear what justifies making this kind of associative link.
2. Why does he not accept the understanding that these are ordinary gezerot shavot, as seems to emerge from Meiri’s words quoted above? What difficulty did he see in that?

With respect to the second issue, why Rashi did not accept Meiri’s understanding, one can say quite simply: perhaps Rashi holds that every gezerah shavah must be received in tradition from Moses at Sinai, and that a person cannot derive it on his own at all. Perhaps one can point out, as we already noted, that the term “fleeing” has no intrinsic meaning to which the law of two thousand cubits can be attached, and therefore it cannot serve as an intermediate step in a genuine exposition. As for the first issue, one may suggest three explanations for Rashi’s position:

1. Each stage in the chain is not a genuine gezerah shavah or hekesh, but only a lexical clarification. In reality there is no hekesh here at all; rather, a certain substantive message is being conveyed by means of this circuitous route. On this approach, however, it would seem that every stage along the way must indeed be interpreted in the same manner. In our case, all the stages are taken from the section of the inadvertent manslayer, and therefore the conclusion of two thousand cubits is indeed relevant to all the stages along the the way.¹⁰ In another exposition of this type, in which the intermediate stages were taken from different sections of the Torah, there would be significant halakhic consequences for every stage.
2. This is not a genuine gezerah shavah, and not even a lexical clarification. It is merely an associative asmachta, while the law is known from some other source. On this approach, it is quite clear that the learned halakha cannot be applied to any of the intermediate stages.

Perhaps this is why the decisors treat this exposition as an asmachta. In truth, we have here only an associative support, not a full-fledged exposition, and therefore no general conclusions — whether halakhic or methodological — should be drawn from it.

3. It may be that once we already have an im eino inyan exposition in the Mishnah in Sotah, the only remaining problem is: to which context should that derivation be applied? In that case, perhaps one may use a kind of associative lexical clarification of this sort, which merely helps us identify the context in which the law of two thousand cubits written in the verse is to be applied. On this approach, the exposition in our midrash is an im eino inyan derivation, not a gezerah shavah and not a hekesh. Those are only linguistic clarifications that direct us to apply the law of two thousand cubits to the Sabbath boundary.

Understanding the law of techumin

It may be possible to connect the discussion here to two different ways of understanding the nature of the prohibition of techumin. For this purpose, let us return for a moment to Rav Hisda’s exposition in Eruvin. Above, we presented the exposition as a clarification of the meaning of the word “place.” But it is entirely possible to understand the law of two thousand cubits as an interpretation of the word “go out,” not of the word “place.” On this reading, the Talmud is not defining two kinds of places — four cubits and two thousand cubits — but only one: “where he is” and “his place” both point to four cubits. The second measure, that of two thousand cubits, is the distance of walking that is considered “going out” from that place.

These two modes of understanding express two ways of conceiving the essence of the prohibition of techumin: is it a Sabbath labor prohibition, forbidding a human act — leaving one’s place — or is it a prohibition of a different character from the ordinary Sabbath labor prohibitions, like the prohibition of carrying, which is also derived from the same verse and whose nature in this context is also not entirely clear — namely, a prohibition on being outside one’s place of Sabbath residence? On this understanding, the prohibition concerns a state of being rather than an act or a labor.

We find a dispute about this among the medieval authorities. In Kehillot Yaakov on Eruvin, sec. 16, see also the references cited there, the author discusses the case of a person who was taken outside the boundary passively — that is, he was sitting on something, like a ship, that carried him beyond the boundary, though he performed no active act for that purpose. The author of Kehillot Yaakov ties this dispute to the two possibilities mentioned here: whether techumin are a prohibition on action or an obligation concerning being in a certain state. If it is a prohibition on action, then it requires the active involvement of the person himself, and therefore when it is done passively there is no prohibition. But if it is a prohibition on being in a certain place, then there is no difference whether he went out by an act or passively.

It should be noted that from the Jerusalem Talmud, which derives the law of twelve mil of techumin from the camp of Israel, it appears that this is an obligation concerning being in a place and not a prohibition on the act of leaving, since that derivation too deals with defining the measure of a place rather than the measure of an action.

If one accepts Rav Hisda’s exposition cited above, then it is clear that the basis of the prohibition of techumin is an obligation concerning being in a place and not the act of leaving. After all, the entire derivation teaches us what “place” means. There is no clarification there at all regarding the act of going out. By contrast, if one understands the prohibition of techumin as part of the Sabbath labor prohibitions, then the prohibition concerns the act of leaving, and the term “place” has significance only as four cubits — not as two thousand cubits, which are merely the parameter that determines what counts as “going out,” not what counts as “place.”

Accordingly, Rashi perhaps understands the matter in the second way, namely that the prohibition of techumin concerns the act of leaving, and therefore he sees Rav Hisda’s derivation as a mere asmachta.¹¹ Meiri, by contrast, sees here a prohibition concerning being in a place, and therefore he sees this exposition as a full gezerah shavah.¹²

Tosafot’s remarks on the exposition in Sotah

We conclude with a discussion of several points raised by Tosafot on Sotah 30b, s.v. “One master holds.” Tosafot write:

One master holds that techumin are biblical, and one master holds that techumin are rabbinic. This is puzzling, for here it implies that if the verse of two thousand cubits were speaking about the Levites, he would hold that techumin are rabbinic; rather, the reason is because it speaks about the Sabbath. But in the chapter “One Who Was Brought Out” the Talmud derives techumin from the gezerah shavah of “place” from “place,” and “place” from “fleeing,” etc. If so, even if the verse were speaking of fields and vineyards, one could still derive by gezerah shavah that the “place” written with regard to the Sabbath means two thousand cubits, for there the Talmud asks: “Let us derive it from the verse ‘from the wall of the city and outward,'” even though that verse, according to all opinions, speaks of the Levites.¹³ And in the first chapter of Eruvin, 17b, it appears that the one who holds that techumin are biblical derives them from “Let no man go out from his place.”

— Tosafot to Sotah 30b

Tosafot write that the Talmud here implies that if the verse were dealing with the Levite cities, then it would follow that techumin are rabbinic. Tosafot object that in our exposition this measure is learned from a different source, and nevertheless it is biblical.

Tosafot assume several things:

1. The exposition is a full-fledged exposition.
2. The derivation in Eruvin is different from that of the Mishnah in Sotah, which learns by a direct im eino inyan and not as a shortened form of our exposition.
3. The derivation here is a gezerah shavah.

This is Meiri’s conception all the way through. The exposition is a gezerah shavah that creates a full Torah law, while the exposition in Sotah is a direct im eino inyan. It is now clear why Rashi did not want to adopt Meiri’s direction, which seems rather problematic here. All the directions we proposed in explaining Rashi’s view answer these objections of Tosafot.

As for Tosafot’s final difficulty, from Eruvin 17b, one may say that the sugya there deals with twelve mil, and that is biblical according to everyone. Here, by contrast, the discussion concerns only two thousand cubits — especially if we understand the discussion of two thousand cubits as dealing with the labor prohibition of leaving, whereas the law of twelve mil is a law concerning being in a place, as we saw from its source in the Jerusalem Talmud.

Footnotes