Terumah (5764)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help — Midah Tovah — On the eve of the Sabbath, Parashat Terumah 5765

Questions

1. Are the dimensions of the altar indispensable, and for what purpose?
2. What is the altar’s dual role in the Temple?
3. Can any interpretive method be extracted from Maimonides’ halakhic (Jewish legal) rulings?
4. What is a “free” term?
5. What is to be made of a gezerah shavah (verbal analogy) based on a new kind of free term?
6. What motivates the use of a gezerah shavah: tradition or textual compulsion?
7. Why does the Torah repeat the details of the command when it describes the execution?

The Hermeneutical Principle

Gezerah shavah.

A. What Does “Square” Mean?

“You shall make the altar of acacia wood, five cubits long and five cubits broad; the altar shall be square, and its height shall be three cubits.”
(Exodus 27:1)

“You shall make an altar for burning incense; you shall make it of acacia wood. Its length shall be one cubit and its breadth one cubit; it shall be square, and its height shall be two cubits; its horns shall be of one piece with it.”
(Exodus 30:1-2)

“He made the altar of burnt offering of acacia wood, five cubits long and five cubits broad; it was square, and its height was three cubits.”
(Exodus 38:1)

Rabbi Yehuda is consistent with his own view, for he said: The altar that Moses made was large, as it was taught: “Five cubits long and five cubits broad” — the words are to be taken literally; this is the view of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Yehuda says: Here it says “square,” and there it says “square.” Just as there the measuring was done from the midpoint, so here too the measuring was done from the midpoint. And how do we know it there? As it is written: “The altar hearth shall be twelve cubits by twelve, square on its four sides.” Or perhaps it means twelve by twelve in the ordinary sense? When the verse says “on its four sides,” it teaches that the measuring is from the middle. And Rabbi Yosei? When he derives by gezerah shavah, he derives only with respect to the height.

As it was taught: “‘Its height shall be three cubits’ — the words are to be taken literally; this is the view of Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yosei says: Here it says ‘square’ and there it says ‘square.’ Just as there its height was twice its length, so here too its height was twice its length. Rabbi Yehuda said to him: But has it not already been said: ‘The court shall be one hundred cubits long, and five cubits high, etc.’ Is it possible that a priest would stand on top of the altar with the service in his hand and all the people would see him from outside? Rabbi Yosei said to him: But has it not already been said: ‘the hangings of the court, and the screen for the gate of the court, which are by the Tabernacle and by the altar’ — just as the Tabernacle was ten cubits high, so too the altar was ten cubits high. And it also says: ‘hangings of five cubits for the side.’ So what then is the meaning of ‘five cubits’? From the lip of the altar and upward. And what then is the meaning of ‘its height shall be three cubits’? From the edge of the surrounding ledge and upward. And Rabbi Yehuda? When he derives by gezerah shavah, he derives only with respect to the breadth.
(Babylonian Talmud, Zevachim 59b)

Introduction

In the first verse cited above, Moses is commanded to make the altar of burnt offering, that is, the bronze altar, or outer altar. The plain sense of the verse instructs him to make the altar with an area of five by five cubits and a height of three cubits. So too in chapter 38, in the description of the execution. By contrast, in chapter 30 Moses is commanded to make the golden altar, that is, the inner altar or incense altar, and there the area is one cubit by one cubit and the height is two cubits.

Rashi, at the beginning of chapter 27, cites the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei that appears at the end of the talmudic passage quoted here. According to Rabbi Yehuda, “the words are to be taken literally”; that is, the height of the altar of burnt offering was indeed three cubits. According to Rabbi Yosei, it was ten cubits high — twice its width, by a gezerah shavah from the word “square” in connection with the golden altar — and the phrase “its height shall be three cubits” in the verse refers only to the section from the surrounding ledge upward. According to Rabbi Yosei, the altar’s total height was ten cubits, and halfway up, at a height of five cubits, there was a bronze grating one cubit wide. Above it was a decorative strip one cubit wide, called the surrounding ledge — apart from the functional ledge on the top of the altar, which was one cubit wide on the inside toward the horns.¹

At the beginning of the talmudic passage there is a parallel dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, but there the positions are reversed: according to Rabbi Yosei, “the words are to be taken literally,” meaning that the altar was five by five cubits. According to Rabbi Yehuda, the altar was ten by ten cubits, by a gezerah shavah from the word “square,” but for him the comparison is to the altar in Ezekiel’s Temple.

The Reason for the Gezerah Shavah: Tradition or Textual Consideration?

There are three points here that deserve attention:

1. Both sages derive a gezerah shavah from the word “square,” and both depart from the plain meaning of the verse. They disagree only about the location of the other end of the gezerah shavah — Ezekiel’s Temple or the golden altar — and about what exactly is learned from it, that is, which element is taken away from its plain sense. Rabbi Yosei learns about the height from the golden altar, whereas Rabbi Yehuda learns about the width from Ezekiel’s Temple.

2. Both parts of the passage begin specifically with the detailed view of the sage who holds that “the words are to be taken literally,” and only afterward do they present the view that departs from the plain meaning.² This suggests that the editor of the passage thought that specifically the sage who maintains literal meaning must justify his view — and he does so by appealing to the somewhat banal principle, “the words are to be taken literally.” Clearly there is some prior background here that leads toward a non-literal interpretation, and the proponent of literal meaning is defending himself against it by arguing that his reading is preferable because it preserves the verse’s plain sense.

3. In the second part, after both positions have been presented, Rabbi Yehuda’s attack on Rabbi Yosei does not appeal to the fact that the plain meaning of the words supports him. Instead, he invokes a side-consideration: the modesty of the officiating priest.

All this makes it quite clear that the disputing sages shared a common datum: the word “square” serves as the basis for a gezerah shavah that removes the verse from its plain meaning. Their disagreement concerns only what it removes from plain meaning: the height or the width. The discussion is not about whether the words should be read literally at all, but only about the point at which one must depart from the plain sense. For this reason, the plain wording itself does not appear as an argument in the debate.

The reason for the a priori pressure to employ a gezerah shavah can be one of two things:

1. The sages possessed a gezerah shavah received by tradition.

Nahmanides and other medieval authorities — see the page for Parashat Miketz — write that although a gezerah shavah is indeed received by tradition from Sinai, the tradition does not give us the full picture, and therefore disputes about gezerah shavah are possible. For example, there are cases in which the very fact that there is a gezerah shavah from a certain word is received, but the law learned from it is not known, or the target word to which the gezerah shavah points is not known, and so forth. Here we see that neither the law learned from the gezerah shavah is clear — height or width — nor the target word: the word “square” in connection with the golden altar, or the same word in Ezekiel’s Temple.

2. It is possible that no tradition was available, but there was some textual indication that instructs us to remove something in the verse from its plain meaning, or directs us to make a gezerah shavah from the word “square.”

This direction is difficult, since one may not generate a gezerah shavah on one’s own. Something about the gezerah shavah must have been received by tradition. Perhaps what was received by tradition was only that the verse should not be interpreted literally.

At this point it is worth recalling what we saw earlier in the approach of the author of Kena’at Soferim, in his commentary on the second root in Maimonides, discussed on the page for Parashat Miketz. In his view, even the gezerah shavah was not transmitted to Moses at Sinai, since he treats it as “rabbinic teaching,” like all laws derived through the thirteen hermeneutical principles. According to Maimonides, only the Great Court can do this, not a lesser judge.

At first glance, there seems to be no need to go that far, because according to this second direction the gezerah shavah is based on a “free” term³ — that is, we have a textual hint that guides us toward using the gezerah shavah. Perhaps in such a case no tradition is required in order to employ a gezerah shavah. From the plain sense of Babylonian Talmud, Niddah 22b-23a, and from the view of most commentators, this does not seem to be the case.⁴

The Word “Square” in the Command and in the Execution

Let us now examine the basis of the gezerah shavah itself. At first glance, one can easily point to the word “square” as a “free” term — that is, a superfluous one, available for interpretive use — since the dimensions of the altar are five by five cubits, and it therefore follows automatically that it is square. If so, we do not need an explicit instruction commanding that the altar be square. We can now understand the wording of the parallel teaching, as cited in the Baraita de-Melekhet ha-Mishkan, chapter 11:

“The altar of burnt offering — its length was five cubits [and its breadth five cubits], as it is said: ‘He made the altar of burnt offering…’ This is the view of Rabbi Meir.⁵ Rabbi Yosei said to him: From the fact that Scripture says ‘five by five,’ do I not already know that it was square? Why then does Scripture say ‘square’? It is a free term, available for comparison and for judgment by gezerah shavah. Here it says ‘square,’ and there it says ‘square.’ Just as there [the word ‘square’] teaches that its height was twice its breadth, so here too [the word ‘square’] teaches that its height was twice its breadth…”

This teaching states unambiguously that the gezerah shavah is learned from the word “square” because it is a free term. That fits the second direction proposed above.

Without this teaching, however, one might have rejected that conclusion and argued that the instruction to make an area of five by five cubits is only a minimum requirement, and in practice the altar may be made larger. In that case, the word “square” is not superfluous, because it tells us that even if we make a larger altar, we must preserve a square shape. This indeed seems to emerge from Babylonian Talmud, Zevachim 62a:

The Sages taught: The horn, the ramp, the base, and the squareness are indispensable, but the measurements of its length, width, and height are not indispensable. From where is this derived? Rav Huna said: Because the verse says, “the altar” — wherever Scripture says “the altar,” it indicates indispensability… Rabbi Mani said: Provided only that one not make it smaller than the altar that Moses made. And how much is that? Rav Yosef said: One cubit. They laughed at him: “Five cubits long and five cubits broad; the altar shall be square!” Abaye said to him: Perhaps the master means the place of the pyre. He said to him: Since the master is a great man, he knows what I mean. He recited concerning them…

The Gemara here determines that the altar’s dimensions are not indispensable; they are only minimum dimensions. By contrast, squareness is indispensable. How, then, can this law be reconciled with the teaching cited above? Does the Baraita de-Melekhet ha-Mishkan disagree with the rule that the altar’s dimensions are not indispensable? That would be surprising, since, as can be seen from several sources, throughout history the altar that was actually built had different dimensions at different times.

If we look again at the teaching we cited, we find that the gezerah shavah concerning height — according to Rabbi Yosei — is learned from chapter 38, not chapter 27. At first glance this may seem a merely technical point, but it is not so at all. The reason is that chapter 27 describes the command, and there, as we have seen, the word “square” is not superfluous, because the Torah commands that even if a larger altar is made, its shape must remain square. By contrast, chapter 38 describes the execution, the actual construction of the altar, and there the word “square” is certainly superfluous. If Moses actually made the altar with an area of five by five, then it is obviously square. In that context, then, the word “square” is free according to all views, and one may learn a gezerah shavah from it.

Our conclusion is that the Baraita de-Melekhet ha-Mishkan treats the word “square” as a free term because it learns from the execution, whereas according to everyone, in the context of the command the word “square” is not superfluous.

But this raises a difficulty in our talmudic passage, because there the derivation is made from the command, not from the execution. This can be understood in one of two ways:

1. Even in the command, the word “square” is superfluous, because the measurements of length, width, and height are all indispensable, and therefore a square shape follows automatically. In that case, we have motivation to make a gezerah shavah even without tradition. As we saw above, however, this possibility is problematic because of the historical evidence.

2. The word “square” is indeed not free, but a gezerah shavah may nevertheless be derived from it. According to this possibility, there is no doubt that the reason the sages derive a gezerah shavah here is some tradition concerning the word “square” as the basis for a gezerah shavah, even though it is not free.

We thus encounter here the same two possibilities raised above regarding the motivation for the derivation. The Baraita de-Melekhet ha-Mishkan derives the gezerah shavah from a free term, that is, there is a textual compulsion to employ the gezerah shavah. There is a superfluous word in the Torah, and this forces us to make a gezerah shavah. In such a situation, it may be that no tradition is needed at all in order to make the gezerah shavah. By contrast, the Babylonian Talmud derives a gezerah shavah from a term that is not free, and therefore the reason for using the gezerah shavah must be tradition. There is no textual compulsion directing us to derive a gezerah shavah from that word.

By way of conclusion, we may note that departing from the plain meaning of Scripture without some tradition seems even more problematic. According to the Baraita de-Melekhet ha-Mishkan, we would still want to find some reason that explains why this particular gezerah shavah was chosen, since it removes the verse from its plain meaning — especially because the gezerah shavah speaks about height rather than width, something that is not connected at all to the word under discussion, namely “square.” What does height have to do with the word “square”?⁶ By contrast, if there is a tradition instructing us to make a gezerah shavah that departs from the plain meaning, things become easier, because that tradition can also hint at the halakhic direction in which the derivation should proceed.

B. Halakhic Expressions

In this section we will try to see several halakhic expressions of the discussions we conducted in the previous section concerning the gezerah shavah derivation. We will see possible connections between the interpretive plane and various halakhic meanings, and vice versa.

Maimonides’ Rulings

Maimonides discusses the laws of the altar in chapter 2 of the Laws of the Chosen House. He writes there, in halakha 3:

“The measurements of the altar are highly exact, and its form is known by tradition from one person to another. The altar that the returnees from exile built was made like the altar that is destined to be built, and one may neither add to its measurements nor diminish them.”

Maimonides rules that one may neither add to nor subtract from the dimensions of the altar. If so, all the measurements are indispensable, and not only the squareness. Of course, in that case the square shape follows automatically, and the word “square” in the Torah is free. Thus, at first glance, he understands our teaching as in the Babylonian Talmud and not as in the Baraita de-Melekhet ha-Mishkan: the gezerah shavah is from the word “square” in the command itself, except that in his view it is already superfluous there, and there is no need to arrive at the verses describing the execution — perhaps because it is difficult to assume that practical laws are learned from a mere description of what was done.

By contrast, in halakha 17 Maimonides rules in accordance with Zevachim 62a that the altar’s dimensions are not indispensable:

“The four horns of the altar, its base, and its squareness are indispensable. Any altar that lacks a horn, a base, a ramp, or squareness is invalid, for all four are indispensable. But the measurements of its length, width, and height are not indispensable, provided only that it not be less than one cubit by one cubit and three cubits high, corresponding to the size of the place of the pyre on the wilderness altar.”

From here it appears that the gezerah shavah is not based on a free term. Still, if Maimonides learns as in the Baraita de-Melekhet ha-Mishkan, that is, from the execution, then one may still view the gezerah shavah as based on a free term. This becomes necessary according to those opinions that hold that without a free term — that is, without a superfluous word in Scripture — no gezerah shavah can be derived at all; see the amoraic dispute on this point in Babylonian Talmud, Niddah 22b-23a. According to that view, if one understands that in the command the word is not free, then one must understand the gezerah shavah as resting on the verses of execution.

In any event, on the halakhic plane Maimonides’ rulings seem to contradict one another. We will consider here two ways of explaining the matter.

Rabbi Aryeh Leib Malin: Two Laws Concerning the Altar

Rabbi Aryeh Leib Malin, in his novellae, volume 2, section 27, resolves the contradiction by means of a classic analytic move built on the method of “two laws,” or “two aspects.”⁷ He begins with the following premise: the altar fulfills two different functions. First, it serves as the place where sacrifices are offered. Second, it constitutes part of the structure of the Temple.⁸

This approach implies that sometimes sacrifices may be offered even without a Temple building, and yet an altar is still required in order to validate the offering. Conversely, even when sacrifices are not being offered, there is still a need to build an altar and place it in the Temple, as part of the mitzvah (commandment) of building the Temple.

Rabbi Aryeh Leib argues that with respect to every detail in each of the Temple vessels, one must clarify whether it is a condition for the fitness of the sacrifices, or whether it is merely one of the details of the Temple structure and does not affect the fitness of the sacrifices. The practical implication concerns an altar that is not located in the Temple, upon which, in certain times or places, sacrifices may nevertheless be offered. In that case we can examine whether a given rule pertains to the validity of sacrifices, in which case it applies even to an altar outside the Temple, or whether it is a rule pertaining to the Temple structure, in which case it is irrelevant to an altar outside.

With respect to the altar’s dimensions, Rabbi Aryeh Leib argues that the exact measurements are necessary only in order to fulfill the mitzvah of building the Temple. For the fitness of sacrifices, by contrast, the measurements are only minimum conditions, if they are conditions at all. This is also suggested to some extent by the wording of Maimonides’ rulings. According to this view, if we build a larger altar, the sacrifices offered on it are valid, but we have not thereby fulfilled the mitzvah of building the Temple.

Implications for Our Derivations

These definitions have implications for our issue as well. With respect to the laws of building the Temple, exact dimensions of the altar are required. If so, the derivation concerning height is in any case learned from a gezerah shavah based on a free term, as in the Baraita de-Melekhet ha-Mishkan, whether it is made from the verses of command or from the verses of execution. True, all of this is relevant only to the Temple structure, not to the fitness of the sacrifices. In other words, the requirement of a height of ten cubits applies only from the standpoint of the mitzvah of building the Temple, not from the standpoint of offering sacrifices.

We can now see that the comparison between the altar of burnt offering and the golden altar also depends on this question. If the issue is the validity of sacrificial service, then there is no reason to learn the proportion between height and width in the altar of burnt offering from the proportion between height and width in the golden altar. The golden altar is not intended for sacrifice at all. In that case, if we derive a gezerah shavah at all, it will be a purely formal derivation, and presumably one would need a free term for that. But if the discussion concerns the structure of the Temple, then there is reason to learn one from the other even on the substantive plane, since both altars are part of the Temple structure. In such a situation there is room for a gezerah shavah even without a free term. We may note that even when a free term exists, it is preferable to learn a relevant aspect rather than a merely formal one.

It may be that this is the dispute of the sages in the teaching: according to Rabbi Yosei, this is a law concerning the Temple structure, and therefore it makes sense to compare the altar of burnt offering to the golden altar, so the gezerah shavah is applied to height. According to Rabbi Yehuda, however, this is a law concerning sacrifices rather than Temple structure, and therefore the comparison is made to the altar in Ezekiel’s Temple, and it concerns width and length.

According to this, Maimonides — who rules like Rabbi Yosei, deriving the gezerah shavah with respect to height rather than width — understood that the altar of burnt offering should be compared to the golden altar and not to Ezekiel’s Temple. Therefore he understands the derivation as dealing with the laws of the Temple structure rather than the fitness of sacrifices. For the purpose of sacrificial validity, only minimum dimensions are required, and therefore height too would not be indispensable there. This is exactly what Rabbi Aryeh Leib explained in Maimonides’ view.

A Second Possibility: The Command as a Framework

Maimonides writes as follows in chapter 2, halakha 5:

“The altar made by Moses, the one made by Solomon, the one made by the returnees from exile, and the one that will in the future be made — all of them were ten cubits high. And what is written in the Torah, ‘its height shall be three cubits,’ refers only to the place of the pyre. The altar made by the returnees from exile, and likewise the one destined to be built, had a length and width of thirty-two cubits by thirty-two cubits.”

From his words it is clear that the altars made by the returnees from exile, at the beginning of the Second Temple period, and the altar that will be built in the future, differ in width from that of Moses; see also Rashi on Zevachim 59b, s.v. “so here too.” According to Rabbi Aryeh Leib, it would follow that in all these cases they did not fulfill the obligation of building the Temple. Moreover, Maimonides himself writes there that one may not reduce or increase these measurements. That is wholly implausible.

It may therefore be that Maimonides means something else. In fact, he understands that the dimensions of length and width are given for each Temple separately by virtue of specific prophecy. In halakha 3 he states that with respect to the words of the prophets one may neither add nor subtract. The actual measurement is not dictated by the command given to Moses, and therefore Maimonides rules in halakha 17 that length and width are not indispensable. By contrast, squareness is dictated by the Torah and is not left to the prophets, and therefore squareness is an indispensable law.

Does the Rule Concerning Height Follow the Same Pattern as Length and Width?

What about height? At first glance, height too is one of the altar’s dimensions, and its law should match that of all the other dimensions. In halakha 17 Maimonides indeed does not distinguish between height and length and width, and it appears that none of them are indispensable. Yet in practice, as described in halakha 5, the height was always ten cubits, exactly as in the altar of Moses, whereas only the length and width changed. Of course, that could have been accidental: perhaps in each case the prophets happened to fix the same height for the various Temples.

But here we must note two additional difficulties in Maimonides’ words:

1. After Maimonides gives the height of ten cubits, he pauses to explain the verse that states “three cubits” — see the quotation above from halakha 5. By contrast, when he gives the length and width as thirty-two cubits, he does not bother to explain the verse in the Torah that says “five cubits.”

2. Maimonides also does not rule the law that emerges from the gezerah shavah, namely, that length and width must be half the height. The height is ten cubits even though the width is entirely different. Even the minimum dimensions in halakha 17 — one cubit by one cubit with a height of three cubits — do not satisfy that proportion at all.

From the first observation it follows that, according to Maimonides, the three-cubit height stated in the Torah is indeed exact, and not merely a minimum measurement; rather, it is the measurement of the place of the pyre alone. If it were only a minimum measurement, Maimonides would have had no need to explain it. He could simply have said that the Torah fixed three cubits as the minimum, and Solomon and the returnees from exile chose to build higher.

More than that: Maimonides’ very remark shows that the height stated in the Torah is a binding command. By contrast, he makes no effort at all to explain how the dimensions of length and width correspond to what is written in the Torah. Evidently those are not binding measurements. It is therefore quite clear that the uniformity in altar height throughout history is not accidental. The Torah’s law is that the altars must be ten cubits high. Where in the Torah is such a command found? Undoubtedly, this is Rabbi Yosei’s gezerah shavah.

But why is the law of height, learned from a gezerah shavah, regarded by Maimonides as clearer and more binding than the dimensions of length and width, which are written explicitly in the verses? This becomes even sharper in light of what we saw on the page for Parashat Yitro regarding Maimonides’ view that the halakhic status of laws derived from interpretation is lower than that of laws written explicitly in the verses.

From the second observation above it follows that, according to Maimonides, this gezerah shavah does not teach us at all that height must be double the length and width. The command concerning five by five cubits was addressed only to Moses, not to later generations. Why, then, did the Torah need to write a command that does not apply to later generations? Presumably it was written only in order to teach indirectly that the height is ten cubits, and nothing more. If so, as a matter of law there is no rule at all that height must be double the length and width, nor is there any rule that the length and width must be five cubits. All of that was written only to reveal that the height must be ten cubits. That is why these two laws — the width and the proportion — do not appear in Maimonides.

From this one can understand an additional point. Even if one accepts Rabbi Yosei’s gezerah shavah, that the height must be double the width and length, one could still satisfy it in two different ways: one could set the width and length at one and a half cubits, half the height,⁹ or one could set the height at ten cubits, double the width and length. As is clear from the Gemara, Rabbi Yosei chose the second way. In light of our remarks here, the reason is very simple: the length and width need not be half the height at all. There is no such law. The gezerah shavah does not command any proportion between them; it only serves as an indirect way of teaching that the height must be ten cubits.¹⁰

A Surprising Conclusion: A Special Type of Gezerah Shavah

Let us now return to the verse. According to Maimonides, it follows that the descriptions of length and width in the command are superfluous, since there is no command at all concerning the area. By contrast, the word “square” is necessary, because it teaches that although the dimensions are only minimum measurements, squareness is an indispensable law. If so, the derivation concerning height would apparently have to come from the verse describing the execution, not from the verse of command. But above we saw that in the Babylonian Talmud the gezerah shavah relates to the command.

Perhaps there is room to interpret the Babylonian gezerah shavah as being made specifically from the words that describe the dimensions of length and width, and not from the word “square.” As noted, according to Maimonides those words are superfluous specifically in the command, since the Torah does not command any particular length and width. The word “square,” which in itself is not superfluous, points us in a direction that explains the meaning of those superfluous words. All of these together are an indirect teaching about height.¹¹

This leads to a surprising conclusion. According to Maimonides, the gezerah shavah of the Babylonian Talmud is not made from the free words — “five cubits long and five cubits broad” — but specifically from a necessary word, “square.” The free words merely serve as an indication that one should look for a gezerah shavah; but once the search is underway, one finds a word that also has meaning on the plain level and uses it to perform the gezerah shavah.¹²

The logic of a gezerah shavah based on a free term certainly allows such a structure. Precisely in a gezerah shavah of this type, where the free term is only a textual hint that prompts the derivation rather than the source actually used in carrying it out, there is no obstacle to separating the two functions: the word used to carry out the gezerah shavah, and the word that provides the textual hint directing us to do so. We may add that in Maimonides’ view this is even more plausible, since according to him the gezerah shavah is not received by tradition but created by the Great Court. Even if the difficulty lies in a free word from which there is no reasonable way to perform a gezerah shavah, the sages of the Great Court still have the possibility of using another word in the verse that will illuminate the meaning and necessity of the free words.

Here we return to the point with which we ended part A. We asked there: if the motivation for the derivation is textual compulsion rather than tradition, how do we conclude that the law learned concerns height, which has no connection at all to the word “square” used in the gezerah shavah? In light of our remarks here, this may be easier to understand. The superfluous words are “five cubits long and five cubits broad,” not the word “square.” With respect to those words, we know from some source that they are not binding as the required area of the altar. We therefore infer from the gezerah shavah that they probably serve only as an indirect expression of the requirement concerning the altar’s height.

We may add that, on our account, the gezerah shavah is based on a free term even if it is performed from the verses of command, since the word “square” is not the superfluous word. Perhaps this is precisely the point at issue between the Babylonian Talmud and the Baraita de-Melekhet ha-Mishkan.

An Implication for the Meaning of Interpretive Derivations in General

This point connects to a broader question that we raised on the page for Parashat Vayera, and also on the page for Parashat Hayyei Sarah: are the hermeneutical principles merely formal tools of interpretation, or are they textual and other hints to the existence of substantive analogies between halakhic contexts? If these principles are only different ways of hinting to a likeness between legal contexts, then it is very easy to arrive at a conclusion like the one proposed here. In the end, the textual hint merely sends us to find a substantive resemblance between the halakhic contexts, and what determines the result is that substantive resemblance, not the specific words used in carrying out the derivation. Of course, in order to ground this conclusion we would still need to identify the substantive similarity between the altars, or the sanctuaries, that are being compared by the gezerah shavah discussed here — but this is not the place.

Footnotes