Vayetze (5765)

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Hermeneutical Principles by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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Midah Tovah — On the eve of Shabbat, Parashat Vayetze, 5766

The Questions

• Did Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael disagree over the question of the optimality of the Torah’s wording?
• Is the assertion, “The Torah speaks in human language,” a reason that blocks ribbuy-derivations, or on the contrary, does it enable them?
• Is a mufneh word—that is, a word contextually “free” for interpretation—required for a gezerah shavah (verbal analogy)?
• What motivates exegetical derivation? Must there be some difficulty in the plain sense in order to justify it?
• What connection, if any, is there between the meaning of the rule “The Torah speaks in human language” in aggadic interpretation and in halakhic interpretation?
• Why does the school of Rabbi Akiva also make use of the principle “The Torah speaks in human language”?

The Principles

• ribbuy (inclusive extension)
• gezerah shavah (verbal analogy)
• “The Torah speaks in human language”

A. Summary of Last Year’s Article

“And now, you have gone, yes gone, because you yearned, yes yearned, for your father’s house…”

— Genesis 31:30

“‘Circumcising, he shall be circumcised’—from here we learn two circumcisions, one for circumcision itself and one for uncovering… Up to this point, this follows Rabbi Akiva, who says that doubled expressions are inclusive. According to Rabbi Ishmael, who says that they are merely doubled expressions, the Torah spoke expansively in its usual manner: ‘gone, you have gone,’ ‘yearned, you have yearned,’ ‘stolen, I was stolen.’”

— Jerusalem Talmud, Shabbat 19:2; Yevamot 8:1; Nedarim 1:1

“And to the children of Israel you shall say, and to the children of Israel you shall speak, say to the children of Israel, speak to the children of Israel, command the children of Israel, and you shall command the children of Israel. Rabbi Yose says: the Torah speaks in human language, in many expressions, yet all of them require exposition: ‘Israel’—these are Israelites; ‘ger’—these are converts; ‘the ger’—to include the wives of converts; ‘among Israel’—to include women and slaves.”

— Sifra, Kedoshim, beginning of parashah 10

In the sheet for Parashat Toledot 5765, we discussed an example that reflects a fundamental dispute between the school of Rabbi Ishmael and the school of Rabbi Akiva regarding the methods of drash (interpretive derivation), and especially the thirteen hermeneutical principles. We saw there that the school of Rabbi Ishmael adopts an interpretive approach that accepts the possibility that Scripture speaks in human language, whereas the school of Rabbi Akiva rejects this. We also cited a medieval source that states this clearly and sharply: Tosafot Yeshanim on Babylonian Talmud, Kereitot 11a, which quotes the Jerusalem Talmud cited above and says:

“And so too the Jerusalem Talmud says: these are doubled expressions, and the Torah used them—‘gone, you have gone,’ ‘yearned, you have yearned,’ ‘stolen, I was stolen’—and Rabbi Akiva disagrees. And everywhere the Talmud says, ‘This works well according to the one who says, “The Torah speaks in human language,” but according to the one who says…,’ the reference is to Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva.”

We further suggested there that although the expression “The Torah speaks in human language” usually refers to doubled expressions in Scripture—in three different senses; see the entry “The Torah Speaks in Human Language” in Encyclopedia Talmudit—its actual meaning is broader and more programmatic. It may also include formulations such as “Scripture speaks of the usual case,” and the like.

In last year’s article we noted that if one examines all occurrences of the dictum “The Torah speaks in human language” in rabbinic literature, one finds it only in the Babylonian Talmud. It does not appear at all in the Jerusalem Talmud, and in the halakhic midrashim we found it only in two places: the passage in Sifra quoted above, and Sifrei on Numbers, section 112.

This is an interesting indication. Sifra is a midrashic work generally attributed to the school of Rabbi Akiva, even though it opens with the baraita of Rabbi Ishmael’s thirteen principles. Malbim, on the Mekhilta to Mishpatim 21:17, section 66, proves from several places that the anonymous voice of Sifra is Rabbi Judah, who expounds doubled expressions like Rabbi Akiva and does not hold that the Torah speaks in human language. On the other hand, in the Babylonian Talmud we do find many such references, but as the above Tosafot Yeshanim already noted, these are always associated with the school of Rabbi Ishmael.

We also noted that the author of Mishneh La-Melekh, in Laws of Character Traits 6:7 and Laws of Rebels 5:1, argues at length that as a matter of halakha (Jewish law) we do not follow the view that the Torah speaks in human language, and he proves that this is also the position of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Judah.

Later in the article we addressed the question whether there is indeed a principled disagreement here between the two schools. Rabbi Menachem Kasher, author of Torah Shelemah, on our parashah, section 31, no. 69, argues that this rule was said only with respect to quotations that deal with the language of human beings, and not with respect to the Torah’s own language.

Rabbi Kasher then continues and claims that a survey of rabbinic sources regarding this expression shows that in fact all references to “The Torah speaks in human language” concern only the Torah’s own language, and not the speech of people quoted in Scripture. He therefore proposes that with respect to such quotations, even Rabbi Akiva would agree that they are not to be expounded.¹ If that conclusion is correct, then the principled significance of the disagreement between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael is greatly diminished.

However, the Jerusalem Talmud that we cited above seems to prove otherwise, and Rabbi Kasher himself noticed this there. After all, the expressions cited there are quotations from Laban the Aramean, and the Jerusalem Talmud assumes that the disagreement between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva is relevant to them as well. The same follows from the consistency that can be found in other disputes between these two schools, which also appear in other formulations—such as “Scripture speaks of the usual case”—that branch out from this dispute.

In the end we concluded that this is indeed a principled and comprehensive disagreement. It seems that the reason most occurrences of the discussion about human language concern the Torah’s own language rather than quotations of human speech is very simple: halakhic drash emerges from commanding verses, and its results are halakhot. Commanding verses are spoken to us by the mouth of the Almighty, not by any human being quoted in Scripture.

Last year we already noted that a survey of the various Talmudic discussions suggests that this disagreement becomes increasingly narrowed over the generations, until it yields a synthesis that fuses these two schools into a single exegetical method. We brought several examples of this process. We then explained that the historical discussion is indeed relevant and important for the systematic examination of that synthesis, precisely because the tradition we possess regarding the methods of drash and their interrelations is not sufficiently clear. Still, as we wrote in this year’s article on Parashat Vayera, the historical discussion is not enough; it is only a foundation for understanding the conceptual development of the different approaches and the emergence of the later ones.

At the end of our remarks, we discussed the question of interpretive determinism—that is, whether every text has only one possible interpretation—and we saw that the disagreement about this goes back at least to the time of Maimonides and Nahmanides.

We may add here that in last week’s article we discussed an extension of this subject, namely the question of the optimality of the biblical text. According to the school of Rabbi Ishmael, Scripture would seem not to be fully optimal, since it speaks in human language even where this requires the addition of apparently unnecessary words. According to the school of Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, there seems to be an assumption that the wording is optimal. In the course of that discussion we saw that the division is not so simple, and certainly as an initial assumption, so long as the contrary has not been proven, everyone assumes optimality. This conclusion fits what we saw above: even midrashim from the school of Rabbi Akiva are not absolute in their commitment to textual optimality.

B. A Different Look at the Dispute Between the School of Rabbi Akiva and the School of Rabbi Ishmael: The Trigger for Derivation

Introduction

In last year’s article we explained that Rabbi Ishmael’s interpretive approach is based on two distinct claims: one concerns the level of peshat (plain sense), and the other concerns the relation between peshat and drash.

1. The peshat assumption: the Torah really does speak in human language.
2. The assumption about the relation between peshat and drash: this plain-sense principle prevents the need to expound doubled expressions and the like.

We saw there that, accordingly, the basis of Rabbi Akiva’s position can be understood in one of two different ways, since he may disagree with either of the claims that underlie Rabbi Ishmael’s approach:

1. The Torah does not speak in human language. In that case there is no need to invoke the assumption of autonomy.
2. The Torah does speak in human language, but according to Rabbi Akiva the Torah must also be explained fully and autonomously on the level of drash, independently.

According to the second proposal, the plain-sense principle that the Torah speaks in human language—especially when it quotes human beings, where this is even more plausible—is indeed correct. However, it does not help us fill a gap on the level of drash. Each level stands on its own.

In fact, the difference between these two possibilities lies in the question whether midrash is based on some difficulty in peshat, or whether drash is an autonomous interpretive level. According to the first possibility, both Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva assume that a derivation appears only where there is some problem in peshat—an extra word, an unusual expression, and so on. According to the second possibility, Rabbi Akiva disagrees with Rabbi Ishmael precisely on this point: according to Rabbi Akiva, although the Torah indeed speaks in human language, the fact that the Torah’s wording has a plain-sense explanation does not prevent an exegetical derivation.

A New Light on One of the Difficulties in the Article on Parashat Hayyei Sarah

As we saw in the article on Parashat Hayyei Sarah, the school of Rabbi Akiva and the school of Rabbi Ishmael also disagree about gezerah shavah. The school of Rabbi Akiva derives a gezerah shavah even from a word that is not mufneh, whereas the school of Rabbi Ishmael requires a mufneh word. We raised the difficulty there that, at first glance, the sides do not fit their general positions. It is Rabbi Ishmael, one would think, who should not require a mufneh word, because in his view the Torah speaks in human language and not every word is carefully calculated. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, holds that every word is deliberate, so we would expect him to derive only from mufneh words. See there for the explanation we proposed.

According to the second possibility outlined here, however, it seems they may indeed be following their own broader methods. According to Rabbi Ishmael, the levels of drash and peshat depend on one another. The focal question is not whether the Torah speaks in human language, but what that means for drash. According to Rabbi Ishmael, the rule “The Torah speaks in human language” tells us not to derive from an apparently extra word if it fits ordinary human usage. According to Rabbi Akiva, by contrast, one should derive from it even if it fits ordinary human usage. Therefore, according to Rabbi Akiva, gezerah shavah can be derived even from words that are not mufneh, because the fact that those words have a plain-sense meaning does not prevent deriving from them. According to Rabbi Ishmael, the fact that there is a plain-sense meaning does prevent derivation, because for him drash comes in order to solve problems in peshat. Therefore he derives gezerah shavah only from mufneh words.

If so, then both Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva agree that the Torah speaks in human language, and the disagreement concerns only the question whether this fact has implications for the level of drash. According to Rabbi Ishmael, this principle blocks derivation, because there is no plain-sense problem that requires it. According to Rabbi Akiva, there is indeed no problem—but the absence of a problem does not prevent derivation. In his view, derivations are not a tool for solving problems in the plain-sense reading.

A Note on the Wording of the Sifra Here

In the Sifra passage quoted above, the principle “The Torah speaks in human language” apparently appears. As noted, that principle usually appears with respect to repeated words in Scripture; Encyclopedia Talmudit, in the entry “The Torah Speaks in Human Language,” virtually defines it that way. But here it is not dealing with repeated words. Rather, it deals with distinctions among synonyms. In human language, different words are used to express the same ideas. The question is what we should do in cases where the Torah uses synonymous terms. Must we necessarily conclude that its intention in each context is different, or does the Torah too speak in human language?

It should be noted that a simple application of the principle “The Torah speaks in human language” to such a case would constitute a significant expansion of it. It would mean that substituting one word for another in the Torah’s wording is not done for any specific reason: just as people speak loosely, so too the Torah is not exacting about its formulation. True, when the Torah repeats words we also treat that calmly, because such is human usage. But when the Torah substitutes different words, a somewhat different problem arises: why does the Torah trouble itself to switch among different words when there is no need to do so? Human beings can also use the same word repeatedly, so why does the Torah choose different words to express the same idea without any need? This seems to be a different problem with respect to the assumption of the optimality of the biblical wording.

We should also note that we found one additional source that uses this rule in the same way, namely a passage in Sifrei on Numbers, parashah 23, under the heading “From Wine and Strong Drink”:

“‘From wine and strong drink he shall abstain’—but wine is strong drink and strong drink is wine. Rather, the Torah used two terms. Similarly, slaughtering is sacrificing and sacrificing is slaughtering; taking a fistful is lifting up and lifting up is taking a fistful; deep is low and low is deep; a sign is a portent and a portent is a sign. Rather, the Torah used two terms. So too here: ‘From wine and strong drink he shall abstain’—but wine is strong drink and strong drink is wine; rather, the Torah used two terms. Rabbi Elazar ha-Kappar says: ‘wine’ means diluted wine, ‘strong drink’ means undiluted wine. Do you say that ‘wine’ means diluted and ‘strong drink’ undiluted, or perhaps that ‘wine’ means undiluted and ‘strong drink’ diluted? Scripture therefore says: ‘And its libation shall be a quarter of a hin for each lamb; in the Sanctuary you shall pour a libation of strong drink to the Lord’ (Numbers 28:7). It is undiluted that you pour as a libation, and not diluted. You therefore have no choice but the first formulation: ‘wine’ means diluted, ‘strong drink’ means undiluted.’”

In all these pairs, the Torah is not merely repeating a word, as in the usual cases in which the rule is applied; here it is also switching between synonyms. The expression used here is: “The Torah used two terms.” In any event, here the derivation based on duplication is rejected on the claim that the Torah speaks in two terms. It has already been noted that in some of these cases the change of wording is not treated merely as duplication, but is actually expounded; that lies beyond our present scope.²

Difficulties in Understanding Rabbi Yose’s View

However, one must notice that in the wording of the midrash Rabbi Yose does not say that here the Torah spoke in human language in the usual sense. On the contrary: even where the alternation of terms is natural in human speech and we would not look for any specific reason, in the Torah’s language we are still required to expound it.³

Rabbi Yose’s wording is difficult. First, he does not explain at all what he derives from these changes of language—between “command,” “say,” “speak,” and so on. His actual derivation concerns something else. But there is a more fundamental difficulty, and it concerns our rule itself. On the one hand, Rabbi Yose says that the Torah speaks in human language, and then it would seem that we should ignore the changes among synonymous words. On the other hand, Rabbi Yose concludes precisely the opposite: because of the changes, we must expound these different terms, since the Torah does not switch between them for no reason—and this is precisely unlike ordinary human speech.

A further difficulty is that Rabbi Yose is generally associated with the school of Rabbi Akiva, and therefore he would not seem to be one who should invoke the rule “The Torah speaks in human language” at all.

The commentators on Sifra proposed several directions in explaining Rabbi Yose’s words. The Raavad and Rabbi Samson of Sens, in his second explanation, explained that every such expression must be expounded according to its context. In the first explanation there, Rabbi Samson writes that we ought to expound these terms, but we do not have the power to do so.⁴ Some scholars emended the text and omitted the words “and all of them require exposition”; see Pesikta Zutrata ad loc., and Encyclopedia Talmudit, note 64 there. According to that version, Rabbi Yose’s statement has the accepted meaning. In the next subsection we shall leave the text as it stands, and propose a possible solution that may shed a different light on the rule “The Torah speaks in human language.”⁵

A Possible Resolution of the Difficulties

It now seems that, according to our approach above, these matters can be settled quite smoothly. Rabbi Yose does indeed hold that the Torah speaks in human language, and therefore there is no plain-sense difficulty in its alternating among synonymous words. This is a legitimate mode of expression for the Torah, just as it is for human speech. Nevertheless, we must still ask ourselves why it does so, when it could have made do with the same word in all the contexts. At that point, the answer comes on the level of drash: on the level of peshat, the Torah indeed speaks in human language, but on the level of drash we must answer the question why it does so—and we do so by means of derivations based on the differences among the synonyms.

If so, Rabbi Yose is indeed part of the school of Rabbi Akiva. He agrees with the school of Rabbi Ishmael that the Torah speaks in human language, but in his view this does not prevent derivation. More than that: non-optimal surplus is itself to be resolved through derivation. Here there is an answer to the question why the Torah employs non-optimal wording. According to Rabbi Yose, and perhaps according to the entire school of Rabbi Akiva, the Torah does so in order to hint to us that we should perform a derivation.⁶

The Basis Required for Derivation: A Difficulty or Some Other Trigger

As we saw above, according to the school of Rabbi Akiva no actual difficulty is required in order to perform a derivation. The level of drash is parallel to the level of peshat, and each of them must offer a full explanation of the biblical text. If so, derivation does not require the existence of any difficulty in peshat. On the other hand, there is no doubt that some plain textual phenomenon is needed to signal the possibility of a derivation. An ordinary, unremarkable biblical formulation is not a reasonable basis for derivation. Even if no actual difficulty is required, there must still be some trigger that leads us to understand that a derivation is to be made here.⁷

In gezerah shavah, the trigger is verbal similarity, and perhaps also a mufneh word, at least according to the school of Rabbi Ishmael. In the hermeneutical principle of general-and-particular, what is required is a shift in the form of the sentence, from plural to singular or vice versa. Again, these phenomena are not regarded as difficulties in peshat, but as triggers for derivation.

According to Rabbi Ishmael, some difficulty in peshat is probably required in order to perform a derivation. According to the school of Rabbi Akiva, no difficulty is required—but a trigger certainly is. And according to the nature of the trigger, we choose the particular hermeneutical principle that should be used in that case.

Therefore Rabbi Yose, in the Sifra passage quoted above, explains to us that Scripture alternates among synonyms, and that there is no difficulty here on the level of peshat, because the Torah speaks in human language. But there is certainly a trigger for derivation here, because the alternation among the words itself says, as it were, “Interpret me!”

“The Torah Speaks in Human Language” and Ribbuy-Derivations

In the overwhelming majority of occurrences of the rule “The Torah speaks in human language,” we are dealing with ribbuy based on verbal duplication. Rabbi Ishmael does not expound the duplication, because he says that the Torah speaks in human language, whereas Rabbi Akiva does expound it. The Jerusalem Talmud cited above is an excellent example of this.

One should note that ribbuy-derivations belong only to Rabbi Akiva’s methods of drash. Rabbi Ishmael expounds by means of general-and-particular, whereas Rabbi Akiva expounds by means of inclusions and exclusions; see Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 26a and parallels. True, in that discussion the point is that they disagree over how to understand shifts of language between general and particular forms in Scripture—whether the shift narrows or broadens the law, a topic we have discussed several times in the past. But, as is well known, Rabbi Akiva is the one who expounds inclusions, such as occurrences of the direct-object marker et and the like, whereas Rabbi Ishmael does not בדרך in general expound inclusions. That is, they disagree not only over this particular case, but over the very hermeneutical principle of ribbuy.

Accordingly, when there is a doubled expression in Scripture, Rabbi Ishmael treats it as human language and does not expound it. This is part of the school of Rabbi Ishmael’s broader conception that inclusions are not to be expounded. But as we can see from the Jerusalem Talmud cited above, Rabbi Akiva expounds ribbuy from extra letters or connective particles such as et, and therefore he cannot ignore the duplication of words either; there too he derives ribbuy.

There is no doubt that ribbuy is not a mode of plain-sense interpretation. It is one of the hermeneutical principles of drash. True, it does not appear in Rabbi Ishmael’s list, but at the beginning of the second root in Maimonides’ Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, which deals with the status of laws learned through derivation, when he defines the topic under discussion he states that this root concerns the thirteen hermeneutical principles and ribbuy. Thus ribbuy is one of the principles of drash.⁸

If so, then when Rabbi Akiva expounds a doubled biblical expression, it is clear that he is doing so through drash—through ribbuy—but as far as peshat is concerned he offers no explanation. The necessary conclusion is that on the plain-sense level there is indeed no problem, and the duplication serves only as a hint, a trigger for derivation, not as a difficulty. It follows from this that even for Rabbi Akiva the Torah speaks in human language. We do not look for a plain-sense explanation of such duplication; we merely use it as the basis for ribbuy-derivations.

This consideration strengthens our conclusion that the disagreement between Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva does not concern questions of plain-sense interpretation of the verses, but the level of drash: Rabbi Ishmael does not expound ribbuy, whereas Rabbi Akiva does.

Indeed, in the commentaries on Jerusalem Talmud, Sotah 8:10—see Korban Ha-Edah and Penei Moshe there—we find that they linked the dispute over whether one expounds an extra vav to the question whether the Torah speaks in human language. That is exactly our point.

“The Torah Speaks in Human Language” in Aggadic Midrashim

The rule “The Torah speaks in human language” in aggadic midrashim—non-legal midrashic interpretation—sometimes appears with a different meaning.⁹ There it means that the Torah uses imprecise language in order to bring the matters described closer to human understanding. In most cases this concerns verses in which the Torah gives seemingly physical descriptions of the Creator. The sages then tell us, in this formulation, that this is merely human idiom and not an actual description of God. For example, Pesikta Zutrata (Lekah Tov) on Genesis 6, under the heading “And the Lord said,” writes:

“‘For I regret.’ The Torah speaks in human language. For when a person destroys his handiwork, it is evident that he regrets having made it; therefore it says, ‘For I regret.’ But before the Divine Glory there is neither regret nor remorse, as it is said: ‘Also the Eternal One of Israel neither lies nor repents, for He is not a human being that He should repent’ (1 Samuel 15:29).”

Maimonides, too, in Guide of the Perplexed I:53 and III:13 חוזר on this principle in that sense, as do other medieval authorities; see Encyclopedia Talmudit there, note 68.

What is common to these two meanings of the rule “The Torah speaks in human language”? Are they two entirely different meanings? It would seem that there is indeed something common to both.

According to our approach, the use of human language is meant to bring matters closer to human intellect; it is not done casually. There is a reason for it, even though the simple meaning is not precise—or, if one prefers, not optimal. In the aggadic context there is a message about the Holy One, blessed be He, that cannot be conveyed to the human ear in any other way, and so an inaccurate mode of speech is used, namely anthropomorphism. In the halakhic context, we are dealing with language that appears non-optimal; yet even that is not adopted casually. There is a reason the Torah chose such language, and that reason lies on the level of drash.

In both these cases, one may say that the true meaning of the “superfluous” or inaccurate words is the midrashic meaning. In the aggadic context this is obvious, since God does not literally “regret” what He does. In the halakhic context, the word lacks an explanation on the level of peshat, but that does not disturb us. That is, it has no explanation on the plain-sense level, yet we are not troubled by that. The Torah hints to us to perform a derivation even in ways that carry a certain “cost” on the level of peshat—not the cost of an incorrect plain meaning, but a cost in terms of the optimality of the biblical wording.

Uses of the Rule by the School of Rabbi Akiva

Several scholars have already noted that we find midrashim in which the school of Rabbi Akiva also uses the principle “The Torah speaks in human language.” Even if these are only isolated cases, a single case is enough to establish that the possibility of a non-optimal text exists even according to the school of Rabbi Akiva. If that possibility really exists, then it is not clear why one should not apply it to the same extent as Rabbi Ishmael does. There must be some sharp difference between the two schools; otherwise it is unclear what their dispute is really about.

According to our approach, the school of Rabbi Akiva also accepts the rule “The Torah speaks in human language.” The disagreement concerns only its implications for the level of drash: does one derive ribbuy from the duplication of biblical words, or not? If so, we should not be surprised that the school of Rabbi Akiva also uses this principle from time to time. The disagreement is not about the principle itself, but about its implications for drash.

According to this approach, it should follow that when a midrash from the school of Rabbi Akiva uses the rule “The Torah speaks in human language,” it does so only on the level of peshat. There should not be a case in which the school of Rabbi Akiva uses this principle in order to say that some derivation may not be made. To test this thesis, we would have to review the exceptional cases and ask whether the discussion there concerns only peshat or also drash.

The main exception is the Sifra passage quoted above. As noted, the speaker there is Rabbi Yose, and Sifra as a whole is generally considered a midrashic work stemming from the school of Rabbi Akiva. Yet there, a principle associated with Rabbi Ishmael’s school is being used.

But as we have seen, this occurrence of the rule “The Torah speaks in human language” is exceptional in several respects. First, it does not concern the duplication of a biblical word. Second, it really seems to say that we do expound differences in wording even though human beings do not distinguish among them. If so, it seems to be a distinctly Akivan approach: on the level of peshat they accept that the Torah uses human language, but this does not prevent them from engaging in drash on the basis of those changes.

A Note on the Exceptions in the Babylonian Talmud

As stated, the expression “The Torah speaks in human language” appears only in the Babylonian Talmud—31 times—and in aggadic midrashim. It does not appear at all in the Jerusalem Talmud. In the halakhic midrashim it appears twice: once in the Sifra passage with which we have been dealing here, and the second time in Sifrei on Numbers, parashah 112, under the heading “Because he spoke.” There Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Ishmael do in fact disagree regarding this rule.

As we have already mentioned, within the Babylonian Talmud itself there are several midrashic interpretations that can be associated with the school of Rabbi Akiva and yet they use the rule “The Torah speaks in human language.” Medieval and later authorities—see last year’s article and Encyclopedia Talmudit, section 3—have already noted contradictions in the views of various Tannaitic sages regarding this rule. The Tosafists and the author of Mishneh La-Melekh proposed different ways of resolving these contradictions and preserving coherence within each sage’s own position. Some proposals suggest that everyone expounds duplications, and only when no possible interpretation remains do they conclude that the Torah speaks in human language.¹⁰ Others suggested that, according to certain Tannaitic positions, a duplication is expounded only in order to anchor an already known law—not to create a new law.¹¹

According to our approach, one might consider yet another possibility. Perhaps at least some of the Tannaim use the rule “The Torah speaks in human language” in Rabbi Akiva’s sense. Therefore, even though they state that the Torah speaks in human language, this does not prevent them from expounding the duplication. To confirm this proposal, however, we would have to examine all of those cases, and this is not the place for that.

Footnotes