Lesson 19: Vaera

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concepts

• Forms of reference.
• Names and appellatives.
• The logical function of a name and of a description.
• The relation between a name and the object it designates.

Summary

In this article we discuss the names of God. We present the standard distinction in analytic philosophy between two forms of reference: a name and a definite description.

We show several planes on which names and descriptions relate to one another: the logical-philosophical-grammatical plane; the plane of spiritual rank, in relation to the spiritual worlds of Beri’ah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah; the plane of the distinction between lovingkindness and judgment; the ontological plane, in relation to matter and form; and the halakhic (Jewish legal) plane, from several perspectives: the erasure of the divine name, oaths, blasphemy, and the requirement of lishmah in a get.

In light of this distinction, we explain the division of the divine names into three categories:

1. The unique name: an arbitrary reference, that is, underived, in Maimonides’ terminology, and also unique, that is, not applicable to a class.
2. The other names that may not be erased: derived names, but not class-applying, and therefore their logical function is still that of names rather than descriptions.
3. Appellatives: derived and class-applying descriptions.

From this picture we propose an explanation for the words of the early commentators in our Torah portion, who describe the shift in God’s manifestation from the names Elohim and Shaddai in the book of Genesis to the name Y-H-V-H from the book of Exodus onward.

The Rules and Principles Arising from the Article

On Names and Appellatives

A Look at the Logic of Reference

Introduction

The names of God are many and varied. They are divided into names and appellatives, into proper names and other names, and so forth. These distinctions also have several halakhic implications, but it is clear that underlying them are ideas and principles.

In this week’s essay we will discuss the significance of names in general, and of the divine names in particular. This question is tied to the problem of reference, which has been discussed extensively in analytic philosophy since the beginning of the twentieth century. In fact, Bertrand Russell’s article “On Denoting,” which deals with names and descriptions, is regarded as one of the major milestones that opened the analytic period in philosophy.

After clarifying the different kinds of names and their meanings, we will briefly examine the halakhic implications of this inquiry.

A. From Elohim to Y-H-V-H

The Transition from Genesis to Exodus

In our Torah portion, God informs Moses of a transition from the mode of divine manifestation in Genesis to a different mode (Exodus 6:2-3):

“Elohim spoke to Moses and said to him: I am Y-H-V-H. I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob as El Shaddai, but by My name Y-H-V-H I was not known to them.”

In the verse that opens the portion, a being called Elohim reveals itself and presents itself by another name: Y-H-V-H. In the second verse, it becomes clear that throughout the book of Genesis God appeared to the patriarchs under the name El Shaddai, or Elohim, and that the name Y-H-V-H was not known to them. These verses mark the transition to the new period, from Exodus onward, during which God is destined to appear under the name Y-H-V-H.¹

What is the meaning of this transition? More generally, what is the meaning of the names of God, and what is the difference between them? Why should there be a difference between the various names by which we refer to God? Is a name not merely a handle, that is, a means of grasping something so as to refer to the entity it points to? And what is the relation between the names of God and names in general?

We know Rashi’s comment on the first verse of Genesis:²

“‘Elohim created’—and it does not say ‘Y-H-V-H created,’ because at first it arose in thought to create the world with the attribute of judgment. He saw that the world could not endure, so He gave precedence to the attribute of mercy and joined it to the attribute of judgment. This is the meaning of the verse below: ‘On the day that Y-H-V-H Elohim made earth and heaven’ (Genesis 2:4).”

Rashi distinguishes between the name Elohim, which expresses the attribute of judgment and dominates chapter 1 of Genesis, and the name Y-H-V-H, which expresses the attribute of mercy and dominates chapter 2. In this essay we will broaden this discussion somewhat.

Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides

Ibn Ezra, on this passage, explains the difference between these names as follows:

“For we know that El Shaddai is the glorious God, and there is no difference between them except that the name Shaddai is a title, while the glorious Name sometimes functions as a proper name and sometimes as a title, as I have explained.”

The name Shaddai, or El Shaddai, is a title, whereas the name Y-H-V-H sometimes serves as a proper name and sometimes as a title.

Nahmanides cites Ibn Ezra’s words here as follows:

“Thus God said to Moses: I appeared to the patriarchs through the power of My hand, by which I overturn the constellations and help My chosen ones. But by My name of Yod-Heh, by which every being comes to be, I was not known to them, in order to create for them new things by changing the course of nature. Therefore say to the children of Israel, ‘I am Y-H-V-H,’ and later make known to them again the great name, for by it I act wondrously for them, and they will know that I am Y-H-V-H who does all. All the words of Rabbi Abraham in this matter are correct, except that he is like one who prophesies without knowing what he prophesies…”

Here El Shaddai is explained as deriving from the idea of overturning the systems of nature; that is, it is the name by which God changes nature and rules over it. By contrast, the name Y-H-V-H is the name by which reality was created out of nothing. It is not entirely clear where Nahmanides found this distinction in Ibn Ezra. Presumably this is how he understood the distinction made by Ibn Ezra himself, as cited above.

Nahmanides then writes:

“By the path of truth, the verse comes according to its plain sense and meaning. It says: I am Y-H-V-H; I appeared to them through the lens of El Shaddai, as in ‘Through a vision I make Myself known to him’ (Numbers 12:6). But I Myself, Y-H-V-H, was not known to them, for they did not gaze through the illuminating lens by which they would know Me, as in ‘whom Y-H-V-H knew face to face’ (Deuteronomy 34:10). For the patriarchs knew the unique Name, but it was not made known to them prophetically. Therefore, when Abraham speaks with the Name, he mentions the unique Name together with Adonai, or Adonai alone.”

That is, the name El Shaddai is a revelation through a vision, hence indirectly, whereas the name Y-H-V-H is a direct revelation, through the illuminating lens.

Introduction to the Explanation: Matter and Form²

Ibn Ezra continues there with the following:

“Now I will reveal to you a little of the secret of El Shaddai. We know that the Name created three worlds, which I have mentioned. The lower world receives power from the middle world, each of its particulars according to the higher configuration. Since the human soul is higher than the middle world, if the soul is wise and recognizes the works of the Name, both those without intermediary and those with intermediary, and abandons the desires of the lower world and secludes itself to cleave to the glorious Name, then if there is some evil in the configuration of the stars at the time of conception that is destined to come upon him on a certain day, the Name to which he cleaves will bring about causes to save him from that evil. So too, if the configuration decrees that he will be barren, the Name will correct his generative power and he will beget. Therefore our Sages said that the Name said to Abraham: ‘Go forth from your astrology.’ And close to this idea is the statement: ‘Israel is not subject to constellations.’ I will explain this further in the section Ki Tissa. Therefore the Name said to Abraham, before ‘I will multiply your seed’: ‘I am El Shaddai’ (Genesis 17:1), whose meaning is: the One who overcomes the higher configurations—not that the configuration itself is destroyed, but that one who cleaves to His name knows that He renews good for him which was not in his configuration. Therefore Jacob said, ‘The angel who redeemed me from all evil’ (Genesis 48:16), meaning from the evil that was poised to come upon me. This is the secret of the entire Torah, as I shall explain further. The patriarchs did not attain the level of cleaving to the Name as Moses did, who knew the Name face to face. Therefore Moses was able to alter the natural order of the lower world and to bring about signs and wonders that the patriarchs could not bring about.”

Ibn Ezra explains that there are three created worlds, and that the name Y-H-V-H belongs to the upper world, whereas the names El and Shaddai belong to the two worlds below it. The patriarchs attained perceptions corresponding to the two lower worlds, whereas Moses reached the higher world. The difference between the names, and between activity in the various worlds, lies in the power of miracles and the degree of control over nature. In the upper world of the name Y-H-V-H there is complete control over nature, to the point that nature is as though nonexistent. In the two lower worlds, by contrast, nature remains, but God is able to rule it, intervene in it, and even alter it. It should be noted that many commentators say similar things.

In the terminology of the esoteric tradition, what is meant here are the three worlds of Beri’ah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah. These are the separate worlds beneath the Throne of Glory and beneath the world of divine emanation. To understand their philosophical meaning, we must distinguish between the matter and the form of objects.

The form of an object is the set of its characteristics. Its matter is its bare selfhood abstracted from form, that is, without any characteristics at all. The way an object appears to us is through its characteristics. We cannot encounter its essence as such, but only through its properties. Therefore form is called “garments” in the esoteric literature. Any claim made about an object concerns its form. The only thing that can be said about its essence is that it exists. Only sheer being relates to essence; everything else belongs to form.

We can now see that the names of these three worlds indicate their nature. The world of Beri’ah concerns the bringing forth of being out of nothing, or, in other words, the emergence of being as such. In our language, the term “creation” denotes bringing something out of nothing. The world of Yetzirah, by contrast, is the world in which separate forms, that is, angels, exist. This world parallels the Platonic world of ideas, in which abstract ideas exist as entities in their own right. The world of Asiyah is the world in which form joins prime matter, and thus the objects we know here come into being, with matter and form bound together. In our world, matter cannot be separated from form: prime matter without form, or form without matter, are only abstractions.

This kabbalistic picture is Neo-Platonic. According to Plato, the first stage in creation was prime matter, which in his view was eternal, and only afterward did it assume form. Nahmanides himself cites this teaching of Plato in two places. At the beginning of Genesis, on the verse “In the beginning Elohim created,” he writes:

“The Holy One, blessed be He, created all creatures out of absolute nothingness. In our sacred language, only the verb ‘create’ is used for bringing being out of nothing. Nothing made under the sun or above it had its first beginning from nothing, except this. Rather, He brought forth from absolute and complete nothingness a very subtle element, lacking substantiality, but possessing the potential to receive form and to pass from potentiality into actuality. This is the first matter, called by the Greeks hyle. After the hyle, He created nothing further, but rather formed and made; for from it He brought forth everything, clothed it in forms, and perfected them.”

Here Nahmanides establishes the relation between creation, formation, and making, exactly as we described above. The upper world, the first one, is the world of Beri’ah, in which prime matter, that is, sheer being, is created. Out of it God then “formed,” that is, gave form in the world of Yetzirah, and “made,” that is, joined form to matter in the world of Asiyah, everything else. Nahmanides then cites Sefer HaBahir, a kabbalistic work attributed to Rabbi Nehunyah ben HaKanah, to the effect that this is the meaning of the words “waste and void” in verse 2; see there for his proofs.

By contrast, in his commentary to Song of Songs 3:9, Nahmanides cites a midrash (rabbinic exposition) from Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer that, in his view, reflects a Neo-Platonic approach according to which the world was created from something preexistent.³ He explains that this does not diminish God’s omnipotence, because creation out of nothing belongs to the category of impossibilities.⁴ Commentators have already challenged him on this, since in his commentary to Genesis 1:8 he rejects precisely that view and writes that the world was created out of nothing. Presumably his meaning is one and the same: prime matter itself was also created, but the world and the beings as we know them around us were not made directly out of nothing; rather, they were made out of something, namely prime matter. The creation of a being with both matter and form directly from nothing is impossible, and therefore there must be an intermediate stage of separate matter and separate form between absolute nothingness and the familiar reality in which matter and form are joined into one.

Explaining Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides

How does all this relate to the question of names and descriptions? In analytic philosophy, two forms of referring to an object are distinguished:

1. Direct reference, through its name.
2. Description, through its characteristics.

I can refer to Moses by his name: the man named Moses son of Amram. And I can refer to him through his descriptions: the leader of Israel at the Exodus, Aaron’s brother, and so forth.

What is the difference between these two forms of reference? A description refers to the characteristics of the object, that is, to its form. As noted above, everything we can say about an object concerns one or another of its properties. A name, by contrast, refers to its essence, and not to any of its properties. The relation between an object and its attributes is essential. By contrast, the relation between an object and its name is arbitrary. We attach some name to an object so that we can address it. The name describes nothing found in the object itself; it merely serves as a handle by which we can refer to it.

Thus we find that names relate to bare being, or to essence, whereas descriptions relate to the characteristics, that is, the attributes, of the object. In the terms of the worlds presented above, we may say that names belong to the world of creation, which is the world of being, whereas descriptions belong to the worlds of formation and action, in which the object already has form.

We can now see the link between the three planes of discussion in Ibn Ezra and Nahmanides. We saw that the name Y-H-V-H is the proper name, and therefore it is naturally responsible for the creation of reality itself. For that reason it belongs to the world of creation, the upper world responsible for the emergence of being as such. By contrast, El Shaddai is a title, not a name, and, as we saw, it relates to the form of reality, or to the form of God, that is, it describes it or Him, rather than their essence. Therefore Ibn Ezra assigns it to the two lower worlds.

The transition from Genesis to Exodus occurs on two opposing planes. Genesis is the book that describes the creation of the world itself, whereas in Exodus the world, or perhaps the people of Israel, begins to receive form. From that point on it also has a plan and a goal: the giving of the Torah. Yet God’s manifestation proceeds in the reverse order. The patriarchs in Genesis encounter God’s descriptions, as it were His “form,” whereas Moses in Exodus encounters His essence—“You shall see My back.”

As is well known, unlike all other prophets, Moses sees God through the illuminating lens, exactly as Nahmanides describes the manifestation of the name Y-H-V-H. The patriarchs, however, do not merit to see Him through the illuminating lens, but only through a vision, that is, through the name El Shaddai. The illuminating lens reflects the thing itself without coverings, whereas a vision is an indirect encounter, through His garments, that is, His form or attributes.

The Author of Or HaHayyim: The Relation Between the Name and the Object It Designates

The author of Or HaHayyim adds another important aspect to the explanation here:

“It says ‘I was not known,’ because the Holy One, blessed be He, is His name and His name is He; He is not like other created beings, which are distinct from their names and whose names are distinct from them. Therefore it would not be correct to say, ‘I did not make known,’ because the name itself is the speaker, and therefore one must say, ‘I was not known.’”

Something similar is also written in Sha’arei Orah, gates 3-4, and in Rabbi Moshe Cordovero’s Pardes Rimmonim (gate 19, “The Gate of the Four-Letter Name,” chapter 1; it is also cited by the Shelah in the section Beit HaShem, in his introduction).

At the root of these words lies an important distinction between a name and a description, already mentioned above. Attaching a description to an object depends on reality, that is, on the object’s characteristics. One cannot arbitrarily describe Reuven as the leader of Israel at the Exodus if he was not their leader at that time. By contrast, the name Reuven does not depend on any fact about reality. It is an arbitrary attachment of a word to an object, meant to allow us to refer to the object’s very essence, and not only to its properties and characteristics. Put differently: a description describes an object and addresses its form, whereas a name is a call, an address, a reference to the object as such, to its matter rather than its form.

The conclusion is that there should be no connection at all between an object and its name. Unlike descriptions, the attachment of a name to an object is arbitrary. But with regard to the name of God, as the author of Or HaHayyim writes, the situation is different: there is an essential relation between the name and the essence designated by it. When he says that “He is His name and His name is He,” he does not seem to mean an ontological identity between God and His name, but rather the existence of an essential connection between them, as opposed to the arbitrary connection between every other object and its name.

So too we find in the words of Cordovero, who writes:

“The name of the Infinite, that is, the one that indicates His essence—by way of illustration, just as the name Isaac is a handle for that person, by means of which speech can grasp him, and if we did not assign him a name we could not speak of him, because we would not know him—so too the Infinite: through emanation there is a handle and a name for Him, indicating His essence so that we may engage with Him, and so forth.”

Cordovero explains here in general the logical significance of a name and its arbitrary relation to the object designated by it. This is the source of the term “handle,” which we used above: it is that by which one grasps a tool that would otherwise be hard to hold. So too, a name is a means of referring to an object as such, something that cannot be done by descriptions alone.

Later Cordovero writes, similarly to the Or HaHayyim cited above, that the divine name differs from all other names precisely in that this attachment is not arbitrary:

“The four-letter name, and the other names, are not related to Him as a personal name is related to human beings, for their names are conventional. That is, Abraham our father chose to call his son Isaac for one reason or another, but the name Isaac is not attached to any particular trait, nor does it indicate his essence. It is not so with His blessed names, for all of them indicate the nature of the thing named by them, and so forth.”

These are exactly the points we made above.

The Link to the Distinction Between Judgment and Mercy

We cited Rashi’s explanation that the name Elohim signifies the attribute of judgment, whereas the name Y-H-V-H signifies the attribute of mercy. Is there a connection between that familiar distinction and what we have said here? To understand the connection fully, we would need a lengthy discussion of the relation between judgment and mercy, or lovingkindness, in kabbalistic terminology. Here we can only allude to it.

The term “judgment” denotes laws and limitations. Judgment establishes what one must and must not do, as in the halakhic realm. It distinguishes one thing from another, the exempt from the liable, the permitted from the forbidden, the impure from the pure, and so on. The term “lovingkindness,” by contrast, expresses the opposite. If giving according to law is the fulfillment of an obligation, then giving without any binding law is an act of kindness. It is action beyond the line of strict justice.

Form is the limitation of a thing. It marks the boundary between inside and outside and defines what is included in it and suits it, and what does not. A description is always a matter of limitations. When we say that someone is a human being, we distinguish him from an animal and from an inanimate object. Description is separation and definition through various rules. A name, by contrast, is not built on rules. It is free of rules and norms and is fixed arbitrarily, like an act of kindness. Therefore a name is linked to essence and a description is linked to form. Hence the name Elohim, which addresses form, is linked to judgment, whereas the name Y-H-V-H, which addresses essence, is linked to lovingkindness.

Grammatical Significance

To conclude this chapter, let us note one more distinction between a name and a description, this time on the grammatical plane. Grammatically, the name serves as the subject of the sentence, while the description appears elsewhere in the sentence. The reason is that the sentence refers to the object designated by the name. By contrast, a description that relates to that same object will use predicates, not names. The subject of the sentence is the essence, the entity to which the sentence refers. Form always appears as a predicate. When we assert something about an object, we do so by means of a predicate, and in this way we always refer to its form, that is, its characteristics, and not to its matter. Almost every claim about an object concerns its properties rather than the object itself.⁵ We will see the significance of this distinction later.

B. The Divine Names in Halakha⁶

Introduction

The names of God appear in halakha in several contexts. The main ones are: oaths, which must be made in God’s name, and the prohibition on mentioning God’s name in vain; the writing of Torah scrolls, tefillin, and mezuzot, especially the laws governing the writing of the divine names; the blasphemer and the one who curses another person, father or mother, a leader, a judge, a king, or God, where the use of God’s name is required for the act to count as a biblical transgression; and the prohibition on erasing God’s name, where a distinction is made between names that may be erased and names that may not. In this chapter we will discuss the divisions among the divine names and their legal consequences, in light of what we learned in the previous chapter.

The Sugya in Shevuot 35

The main sugya dealing with the divine names appears in the Babylonian Talmud, Shevuot 35a-b, in the context of the oath of testimony, that is, an oath by which a person adjures witnesses that if they know testimony on his behalf they should come and testify for him in court.

The Mishnah there discusses the status of names with respect to oaths, erasure, and cursing:

“If one says, ‘I impose an oath upon you,’ ‘I command you,’ or ‘I forbid you,’ they are liable. If he says, ‘By heaven and earth,’ they are exempt. If he says, ‘By Alef-Dalet,’ ‘By Yod-Heh,’ ‘By Shaddai,’ ‘By Tzevaot,’ ‘By Gracious and Compassionate,’ ‘By Slow to Anger,’ ‘By Abundant in Kindness,’ and by all appellatives, they are liable. One who curses with any of them is liable; this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages exempt. One who curses his father or mother with any of them is liable; this is the view of Rabbi Meir, but the Sages exempt. One who curses himself or another with any of them violates a negative commandment. ‘May the Lord strike you,’ ‘and so may God strike you’—this is the imprecation written in the Torah. ‘May He not strike you, but bless you and do good to you’—Rabbi Meir deems him liable, and the Sages exempt.”

So, for an oath one must use divine names or appellatives. Regarding curses and imprecations, there are disputes about appellatives. The Gemara there discusses the opening clause of the Mishnah:

“‘By Alef-Dalet,’ ‘By Yod-Heh,’ ‘By Shaddai,’ ‘By Tzevaot,’ ‘By Gracious and Compassionate,’ ‘By Slow to Anger,’ ‘By Abundant in Kindness.’ Is this to say that ‘Gracious’ and ‘Compassionate’ are names? But this is contradicted by a baraita: There are names that may be erased and names that may not be erased. These are the names that may not be erased: El, Elohekha, Elohim, Eloheikhem, Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh, Alef-Dalet, Yod-Heh, Shaddai, Tzevaot—these may not be erased. But ‘the Great,’ ‘the Mighty,’ ‘the Awesome,’ ‘the Majestic,’ ‘the Strong,’ ‘the Powerful,’ ‘the Formidable,’ ‘Gracious,’ ‘Compassionate,’ ‘Slow to Anger,’ and ‘Abundant in Kindness’—these may be erased!”

The conclusion is that an oath can be administered only with names that may not be erased. The others are erasable names, which are not really names but appellatives, and therefore an oath taken with them does not generate liability. This raises the question of “Compassionate” and “Gracious,” which are appellatives, and to that Abaye answers:

“Abaye said: The Mishnah means: by Him who is gracious, by Him who is compassionate. Rava said to him: If so, then ‘by heaven and earth’ should also mean: by Him to whom heaven and earth belong! He replied: Is that comparable? There, since nothing else is called ‘gracious’ and ‘compassionate,’ it certainly means Him who is gracious, Him who is compassionate. Here, since there are such things as heaven and earth, it means heaven and earth themselves.”

The upshot is that swearing by appellatives is ineffective, except in the case of appellatives that uniquely identify God. In such cases the oath is interpreted as being made by the One designated by them, not by the appellatives themselves.

The course of the sugya makes it clear that appellatives, unlike names, are descriptions of God. True, the descriptions “Compassionate” and “Gracious” are special, because no one else is actually called by these as names. There are indeed others who can be described by these predicates, but there is no one besides God for whom they function as names.

The names that may not be erased function logically as names, that is, as arbitrary designators. The appellatives are descriptions. Indeed, later in that Gemara we find that with respect to the name Tzevaot, Rabbi Yose disagrees with the tanna of the baraita and holds that it is an erasable name:

“Rabbi Yose says: The whole of Tzevaot may be erased, for He is called Tzevaot only with reference to Israel, as it is said: ‘And I will bring forth My hosts, My people the children of Israel, out of the land of Egypt’ (Exodus 7:4). Samuel said: The halakha does not follow Rabbi Yose.”

Rabbi Yose’s reason is that God is called thus in order to describe the fact that He is the God of the hosts of Israel. Why should that claim be a reason for saying that this is an erasable name? Presumably, the point is that “Tzevaot” is a description rather than a name, and therefore it is an appellative and belongs to the class of erasable names. As noted, names that may not be erased are names, not descriptions.

Are the Non-Erasable Names Not Descriptions?

But when one looks at the list cited above, one sees that even the names that may not be erased are descriptions. True, Y-H or Shaddai may seem meaningless in themselves, but Shaddai has an explanation in rabbinic literature: “He who said to His world: Enough.” The names El and Elohim have the sense of power. The name Adonai derives from lordship. Even Ehyeh Asher Ehyeh, surprisingly enough, is also a meaningful name—its meaning is precisely the impossibility of assigning a descriptive meaning to God. There is no doubt that this expression functions as a description, not as an arbitrary name.⁷ If so, what exactly distinguishes the names that may not be erased from the appellatives?

At this point we should note that the name Y-H-V-H has no meaning beyond being God’s name. It is the only name that, logically speaking, truly functions as a name rather than as a description. The same applies to its derivatives, such as Y-H.

Maimonides’ Approach: Erasing the Name and Oaths

Maimonides lists the names that may not be erased and the appellatives in Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 6:1-2, 5, in the context of the prohibition on erasing the divine name. He writes:

“1. Anyone who destroys one of the holy and pure names by which the Holy One, blessed be He, is called receives lashes from the Torah, for it says concerning idolatry: ‘You shall destroy their name from that place; you shall not do so to the Lord your God.’

2. There are seven names: the name written Yod-Heh-Vav-Heh, and that is the explicit Name; or the one written Adonai; and El, Eloah, Elohim, Elohai, Shaddai, and Tzevaot. Anyone who erases even one letter of these seven receives lashes.

3. The other appellatives by which the Holy One, blessed be He, is praised, such as Gracious, Compassionate, Great, Mighty, Awesome, Faithful, Jealous, Strong, and the like, are like the rest of sacred writings and may be erased.”

Thus, with respect to erasing the name, there is a clear distinction between names and appellatives.⁸

By contrast, in Mishneh Torah, Laws of Oaths 2:2, Maimonides rules in accordance with the baraita cited above and writes:

“Whether one swears, or another causes him to swear, by the unique Name, or by one of the appellatives—for example, if he swears by Him whose name is Gracious, or by Him whose name is Compassionate, or by Him whose name is Slow to Anger, and the like, in any language—this is a complete oath. Likewise, an imprecation and a curse are equivalent to an oath, provided that he mentions one of the names or one of the appellatives. How so? If he says, ‘By imprecation,’ or ‘Cursed be to the Lord,’ or ‘to Him whose name is Gracious,’ or ‘to Him whose name is Compassionate,’ [concerning] anyone who eats such-and-such a thing, and he eats it, he has sworn falsely. And so too with the other kinds of oaths.”

So the oath is valid with the unique Name or with an appellative. Maimonides does not refer here to the other names that may not be erased, apart from the unique Name.⁹ It is quite clear that an oath by them is valid, for if even appellatives suffice, certainly those names do as well. But it is not clear why Maimonides does not mention them at all in this law.

Lehem Mishneh, on that passage, notes that Maimonides here treats “Compassionate” and “Gracious” as names. One should notice that the wording of the Gemara is “by Him who is compassionate,” whereas Maimonides writes “by Him whose name is Compassionate.” That is, he treats “Compassionate” and “Gracious” as names, not as appellatives. True, in this very law Maimonides brings these two as examples of appellatives.

Maimonides’ Approach: Three Categories of Divine Names

From this it emerges that the two terms “Compassionate” and “Gracious” apparently constitute an intermediate category, which in some sense joins the other names that may not be erased, apart from the unique Name, and all of these are at times also called “appellatives.” It therefore seems that Maimonides has three categories: the unique Name; names that are not unique, which are sometimes also called appellatives; and actual appellatives, some of which are at times also called names, as we saw above with “Compassionate” and “Gracious.”

This indeed emerges clearly from Mishneh Torah, Laws of Idolatry 2:7, where Maimonides discusses the laws of the blasphemer:

“These are the laws of the blasphemer: the blasphemer is not liable to stoning until he explicitly pronounces the unique four-letter Name, which is read as Adonai, and blesses it with one of the names that may not be erased, as it says, ‘One who pronounces the Name of the Lord…’ For the unique Name he is liable to stoning; with the other appellatives he is under a prohibition. There are those who explain that he is liable only for the name Yod-Heh-Vav-Heh, but I say that for both he is stoned.”

We see that “the unique Name” is only the name Y-H-V-H, though pronounced as Adonai. The blasphemer must use one of the other names that may not be erased. In the course of this discussion, Maimonides refers to the other names that may not be erased, apart from the unique Name, as appellatives.

Indeed, anyone who studies Guide of the Perplexed I:61 and onward, where Maimonides discusses the divine names, will see all of our points stated there explicitly. Maimonides divides the divine names into three kinds, not merely two:

“All His names, may He be exalted, that are found in the books are derived from actions; this is obvious, except for one name, namely Yod-Heh-Vav-Heh, which is the name distinctive to Him, may He be exalted. Therefore it is called the explicit Name. Its meaning is that it indicates His essence with a clear indication in which there is no shared application.”

Thus the first category is “the unique Name,” namely Y-H-V-H. What distinguishes it is that it is not derived from any action of God,¹⁰ and that it refers only to God Himself. These are the two marks indicating that it is not a description but a name, in its logical function. We see here that the expression “the unique Name” indeed refers only to Y-H-V-H, exactly as we explained above.

In our terminology, Y-H-V-H is a name rather than a description. A description has two characteristics: in principle it refers to a class of objects and not only to one individual object, and it has meaning; it is not arbitrary like a name. For example, “red” applies to the class of all red objects, and the claim that this ball is red will be judged by reality, whether the ball is indeed red. A name, by contrast, belongs only to its bearer—and if there happens to be duplication, that is accidental rather than essential, like two men called Yosef ben Shimon in one town. In addition, a name is arbitrary and not dependent on reality. Any word can in principle be chosen as the name of any object.

Maimonides then continues:

“As for His other venerable names, they indicate by shared application, because they are derived from actions, and things like them are found among us, as we have explained…”

The other names that may not be erased are names that have meaning, that is, they are derived, but they are not general: they do not refer to anyone other than God, that is, not to a class but only to Him. This is the second type. Let us recall that in the sugya in Shevuot it was permitted to swear by the name “Compassionate” and “Gracious,” because although they have meaning, that is, they are predicates, they nevertheless function as names only with respect to God. In Maimonides’ terms, one may say that they are derived but not general. It is now clear why Maimonides in the Laws of Oaths mixes them together with the other names that may not be erased, apart from the unique Name. All of these are derived but not general.

“But His other names, such as Judge, Shaddai, Righteous, Gracious, Compassionate, and Elohim, all of them plainly involve generality and derivation.”

The third category is the rest of the names, which are both derived, that is, meaningful as action-predicates, and also general, that is, they apply not only to God but to a whole class of beings. These are the appellatives, and they are full-fledged descriptions.

Immediately thereafter Maimonides returns and emphasizes:

“But the name whose letters are Yod-Heh-Vav-Heh has no known derivation, nor does anything else share in it…”

That is, this name is not derived, it has no action-meaning, and it is not general, for it refers only to God.¹¹

Later, Maimonides explains that all the other names arose only after the creation of the world, for only then did the descriptions arise; only then were the classes of other beings, and the broader meanings of actions, created:

“And in Pirkei de-Rabbi Eliezer it says: Before the world was created, the Holy One, blessed be He, and His name alone existed. Consider how this reveals that all these derived names came into being only after the coming-into-being of the world. This is true, for they are all names assigned according to the actions found in the world. But when you consider His essence—pure, unique, stripped of every action—He can in no way have a derived name. Rather, there is one unique name to indicate His essence, and we have no underived name except this one, namely Yod-Heh-Vav-Heh, which is the fully explicit Name; think nothing else…”

Maimonides concludes:

“The term ‘explicit Name’ applies to no name at all except this four-letter name, which is written but not read according to its letters. And it is explicitly said in Sifrei on ‘Thus shall you bless the children of Israel’: ‘Thus’—in this language; ‘thus’—with the explicit Name. There it is said: in the Temple, as written; in the provinces, by its substitute. And in the Talmud it is said: ‘Thus’—with the explicit Name. Do you say with the explicit Name, or perhaps only by its substitute? Scripture says: ‘And they shall place My name’—My name that is unique to Me. It has thus been made clear to you that the explicit Name is this four-letter name, and that it alone indicates the essence without any shared additional meaning. Therefore they said of it: ‘My name that is unique to Me’…”

Why Is the Category of Derived but Non-General Terms Counted as Names Rather Than Appellatives?

We have seen that there are three kinds of divine names:

1. The unique Name, which is neither general nor derived.
2. The other names that may not be erased, which are derived but not general.
3. The appellatives, which are derived and general.

The question is why the middle category is counted with names rather than with appellatives. Why is the dominant parameter the fact that they are not general, that is, they apply to only one object, like names, rather than the fact that they are derived, that is, predicates, like appellatives?

It is also well known in analytic philosophy that there are names whose origin lies in some meaning and that are therefore not arbitrary. A standard example is the city of Dartmouth, which is situated at the mouth of the River Dart, and from this it got its name. The city’s name thus has meaning and would seem, at first sight, to be a description rather than a name. Yet it is important to note that the logical function of the term Dartmouth is that of a name, not of a description. If the River Dart were to disappear tomorrow morning, the city’s name would not change. Even though its origin was not arbitrary, it now functions as a name rather than as a description. Similarly, the name Isaac was given to the patriarch Isaac because his mother Sarah laughed. In other words, the origin of the name lies in some fact about reality, and therefore it is not arbitrary. But grammatically and logically it functions as a name, not as a description.

This is the basic definition of a derived but non-general name. Such a name has meaning, and it is not arbitrary, yet it functions as a name rather than as a description. The fact that it refers only to this specific city and not to anything else is only an indication of its logical function, and therefore it is a reason to include it among names rather than among appellatives. The difference between this intermediate category and appellatives is not only the breadth of their range of application, one object as against many, but their logical function. Therefore, from the point of view of halakha, and also from a logical-philosophical point of view, these are names and not appellatives. This is why the fact that they are derived does not prevent them from being names, and why the fact that they are not general is regarded as more essential.

This may be the difference between “Compassionate” and “He whose name is Compassionate,” in Maimonides, or “He who is compassionate,” in the sugya in Shevuot. The term “Compassionate” is essentially an appellative, because logically it functions as a description: it is derived. But since it is not general, that is, it refers only to God, it can be converted into a name: “He who is compassionate.” Put differently, the word “Compassionate” itself sometimes functions as a name, in which case it should be read as meaning: “He who is compassionate.”¹²

Back to Chapter A: The Name Y-H-V-H and the Name Elohim

As we have seen, the name Y-H-V-H is distinguished thereby that it is the only word that functions fully as a name, neither general nor derived. By contrast, Elohim, El, and Shaddai are names that may not be erased, but they do have meaning: they are derived. What distinguishes them from appellatives is that, unlike ordinary predicates, they are not general, for the range to which they apply is only God and no one else. We have also seen that logically and grammatically they function as names rather than as predicates. Appellatives, by contrast, are predicates in every respect, for they have meaning and also apply to beings other than God.

This is exactly the meaning of the distinction presented in the previous chapter between Y-H-V-H and Elohim. The name Y-H-V-H is a name, whereas the names El and Shaddai are names whose foundations lie in descriptions. That distinction, however, is internal to the group of names that may not be erased. Beyond these two groups there are also appellatives, that is, erasable names.

Halakhic Implications

We can now perhaps understand some of the halakhic distinctions we encountered above. With regard to an oath, we saw in chapter 2 of the Laws of Oaths in Maimonides that a formal name is not required; an appellative is enough, provided that it is not general. The examples are “Compassionate” and “Gracious,” which the Gemara in Shevuot says refer only to God. These two are indeed not names in the full sense, since they are derived, but they are non-general appellatives. Therefore, as we saw, Maimonides sometimes refers to them as names as well. Why does an oath not require full names? The answer is that the legal force of the oath does not require a formal name, that is, a reference to God’s essence; rather, what matters is the content. An appellative that points uniquely to God is sufficient to define the oath as one that uses God and therefore generates liability. The oath does not take effect upon God Himself; it uses Him in order to create a new norm. Therefore, in the case of an oath, what matters is the content to which the name or appellative points, not the essence of the object itself, that is, God. For that reason, an appellative suffices, provided that it clearly points to God.

By contrast, the prohibition on erasing God’s name requires something that counts as a name in the written object itself. Erasing an appellative has no significance, because the appellative is not connected to God’s essence. Erasing the name is a prohibition against harming God Himself, not merely using His name, as in the case of an oath. Therefore, the erasure must be of a name and not of an appellative, because He and His name are one, and one who erases His name is as though he erased Him Himself. As we saw in chapter A, a relation of identity between the object and the name exists only with names, not with appellatives or descriptions. Therefore Maimonides, in chapter 6 of the Foundations of the Torah, rules that the prohibition of erasure applies only to a name and not to an appellative.

And what about blasphemy and cursing? Here the situation is more complex. On the one hand, it resembles an oath, because God is being used for the purpose of the curse. On the other hand, it resembles erasing the name, since the one being cursed is God Himself. We use His name in order to curse Him Himself.¹³ And indeed, in chapter 2 of the Laws of Idolatry we see that the name being cursed, that is, the target of the blasphemy, must be the proper name, but the name used in the curse may also be any of the other names, at least with respect to the prohibition, even if not with respect to stoning. According to Maimonides, this is true even with respect to stoning. Again, the explanation is very simple and lies in the grammatical distinction presented at the end of the previous chapter: the target of the curse is the object designated by the subject of the sentence. As we saw, the subject of a grammatical sentence is always a name. A description does not appear as subject, but as part of the sentence that relates to a subject represented by a name. For example: “David has an easygoing character.” The subject is David, expressed by a name. Semantically, the subject of the sentence is the object designated by the name. We saw that an appellative or description does not represent the object itself, but one of its properties, and therefore it cannot be the subject of the sentence; it will generally appear elsewhere within the sentence itself, as in “easygoing.” A sentence of blasphemy has the same structure: the subject is a name, not an appellative or description. But the reference to it can also be made by means of names that are descriptive in origin. Some attribute of God is what the blasphemer uses in order to curse God Himself. The basis of the prohibition is cursing God as an object, but within the available ways of cursing, it is enough that there be a uniquely identifying reference to Him, that is, a non-general expression, for this to count as using Him for the purpose of blasphemy.

Another Halakhic Implication: The Requirement of Lishmah in a Get

Halakha requires the scribe to write the get (Jewish bill of divorce) for the sake of the woman being divorced. The question that arises here is what the scribe must have in mind while writing the get. Must he think specifically of the woman’s name? Or perhaps he must visualize her image? Or perhaps some description of her would also suffice?

There is a very interesting discussion of this matter between the author of Tzafnat Paneah and Rabbi Mordechai Kalina in Mikhtavei Torah, nos. 193-194.¹⁴ In the course of the discussion, the claim arises that the scribe must think specifically of the woman’s name, and not of some other description of her, because the name is what represents the object itself. As we saw, a description relates to the form of the thing, that is, its characteristics, and only a name relates to the object as such. Incidentally, in the terminology we presented above, it seems that a woman’s image constitutes a description of her that is derived but not general. Therefore, the position that one may also refer to her image as satisfying lishmah parallels the demand that there be here a derived but non-general name, that is, a name from the intermediate category.

C. Between the Name of God and Names in General

Introduction

We have seen that there are three kinds of divine names:

1. The unique Name, which is neither general nor derived.
2. The other names that may not be erased, which are derived but not general and function logically as names.
3. The appellatives, which are derived and general and function as descriptions.

We noted that the characteristic of a name in general is arbitrariness. We then saw that there are names that are not arbitrary and that do have meaning. Only one name, together with its derivatives, has no meaning and remains arbitrary: the unique Name, namely Y-H-V-H. Thus all names function logically differently from descriptions and are not measured against some external reality, though some of them do have some root in reality.

Yet there are hints that even the divine name is not entirely exceptional. It too has some root of meaning. In this chapter we will discuss the divine name, its character, and its functioning as a name.

Maimonides’ Remark: The Meaning of the Divine Name

Within his discussion in Guide of the Perplexed I:61, Maimonides adds a problematic remark:

“Perhaps it indicates, according to a language of which only a little remains with us today, and according to what is also called the notion of necessary existence. In short, the greatness of this name and the care not to pronounce it derive from the fact that it indicates His essence, may He be exalted, in a way that is shared by no created being, just as the Sages of blessed memory said of it: ‘My name that is unique to Me.’”

That is, Maimonides raises the possibility that even God’s name has some meaningful root, namely that it points to God as necessary existence, and that this hint belongs to a language no longer fully known to us. If so, then even the unique Name is derived but not general, since there is no other being that is necessary existence. In what, then, is it unique? Why does it not belong to the middle category of names that are derived but not general?

It seems that the reason is that this name has no meaning in the earlier senses. Only after this name refers to God can it also be used in the sense of “necessary existence.” But that meaning did not precede the attribution of the name to God. This is unlike the other names in the middle category, whose meaning preceded their use as names, as we saw in the example of Dartmouth. This is why Maimonides determines that God’s name preceded the creation of the world, and therefore preceded reality. In this respect it differs from all the other names. True, once it exists, one can pour meaning into it, but that is an operation performed only after the name has already been attached to the designated object, namely God.

The Words of Or HaHayyim

We can now understand what we saw above, that the author of Or HaHayyim writes:

“It says ‘I was not known,’ because the Holy One, blessed be He, is His name and His name is He; He is not like other created beings, which are distinct from their names and whose names are distinct from them. Therefore it would not be correct to say, ‘I did not make known,’ because the name itself is the speaker, and therefore one must say, ‘I was not known.’”

We noted that similar statements appear in Sha’arei Orah and in Cordovero’s Pardes Rimmonim. Here too we see that God’s name is not arbitrary. Its attachment to the object designated by it is not merely an arbitrary act; there is a relation between the signified and the signifier. This connects with the remark of Maimonides we saw, that in some ancient language, whether real or hypothetical, the name Y-H-V-H has a meaning, namely necessary existence. With regard to God, the name does indeed describe the reality to which it refers.

Implications in Rabbinic Literature

Let us cite here two implications of these ideas in rabbinic literature, according to the explanation of the author of Tzafnat Paneah.¹⁵ He argues that God’s name has the same characteristics as the object designated by it, namely God. This expresses the non-arbitrary relation between them, as we have seen here.¹⁶ He gives two examples:

1. The Babylonian Talmud, Sotah 17a, expounds:

“Rabbi Akiva taught: If a man and a woman are worthy, the Divine Presence is between them; if they are not worthy, fire consumes them.”

Rashi explains there:

“The Divine Presence is between them, because He divided His name and placed it between them: the yod in ish and the heh in ishah.”

“If they are not worthy, fire consumes them, because the Holy One, blessed be He, removes His name from between them, and what remains is fire and fire.”

That is, the divine name Y-H is divided between man and woman, the yod in ish and the heh in ishah. If they are worthy, then the Divine Presence is between them; and if not, the name is removed from both, leaving only “fire” and “fire,” to teach that fire consumes them.

The Rogatchover explains that this is not a mere homiletic flourish, but has a deeper meaning. The name Y-H consists of two letters. Yet just as God Himself has no parts—He is simple and unified—so too His name has no parts. Therefore, if husband and wife are worthy, they create one unified entity, and then the two letters join to form God’s name. But if there is separation between them, the letters of the name are likewise separated: the yod in the man by itself and the heh in the woman by itself. In such a case there is no divine name present at all. The reason is that there is no such thing as half of God’s name. One letter taken from God’s name is not part of God’s name, because God’s name has no parts. It is merely an ordinary letter. Therefore, when there is separation between husband and wife, God’s name disappears from the picture.

2. If the previous example belonged to the world of homiletics, the next comes from the world of halakha. One incurs liability on the Sabbath for writing only if one writes two letters. As is well known, there is a dispute in the Talmud, see Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 103b and parallels, whether writing two letters from a longer name, such as shem from Shimon, on the Sabbath incurs liability. The dispute is whether to regard them as two ordinary letters, or whether there is something partial here and therefore no liability, despite the fact that two letters were indeed written. Now the Jerusalem Talmud, Berakhot 5:1, rules that if one wrote two letters from God’s name, in such a case he is liable according to all opinions, exactly as with writing any two ordinary letters.

The Rogatchover explains this by saying that God’s name has no parts, just as God Himself has no parts. Therefore two letters from God’s name are not regarded as part of a longer word, but as two ordinary letters, and therefore according to all opinions one is liable for writing them.

Footnotes