Lesson 21: Beshalach

From the book Mida Tova: Articles on the Principles of Halakhic Thinking by Rabbi Michael Avraham. Translated from Hebrew using gpt-5.4 (reasoning_effort=high, batch API).

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With God’s help

Concepts

• The act of a mitzvah (commandment) and the fulfillment of a mitzvah.
• The attributes and the essence of a mitzvah.
• Hidur is part of the act, not part of the fulfillment.

Summary

In this week’s essay we discuss hidur mitzvah (beautifying a mitzvah). At first glance, there is a verse that seems to command us to beautify a mitzvah: “This is my God, and I will beautify Him.” Yet in practice this is not counted among the enumerated commandments, and its status in halakha (Jewish law), as well as its logical and ontological status, is far from clear. We address several halakhic questions concerning hidur: What is the law in a case of doubt about hidur? Can one beautify a mitzvah after already fulfilling it? Can one recite a blessing over hidur by itself, and if so, over what exactly is such a blessing recited? Finally, we also touch on the question whether one may repeat a mitzvah a second time in order to beautify it. Our conclusion is that the prevalent meta-halakhic view of hidur is that it is part of the act of the mitzvah, but not part of the fulfillment of the mitzvah, a distinction that appeared in our essay on Parashat Vayeshev, 5767.

After that, we propose a philosophical analogy that points to hidur as something intermediate between an attribute of the mitzvah and part of its essence. We discuss the existence of attributes, and on that basis offer a clarification of our halakhic conclusion. We conclude with a proposal as to why the obligation to beautify a mitzvah is derived specifically from verses of song, by comparing hidur to poetry.

The Rules and Principles Emerging from the Article

On Hidur Mitzvah

A Look at the Ontology of Mitzvot

Introduction

The Song at the Sea opens with the following verse (Exodus 15:2):

“The Lord is my strength and song, and He has become my salvation; this is my God, and I will beautify Him; my father’s God, and I will exalt Him.”

That is, the song has two aims: to exalt the Holy One, blessed be He, and to adorn Him.

Rashi, ad loc., explains:

“And I will beautify Him” — Onkelos translated it as a term of habitation, as in “a tranquil habitation” (Isaiah 33:20), and “a pasture for flocks” (Isaiah 65:10). Another explanation: it is a term of beauty — I will recount His beauty and praise to all humanity, as in “What is your beloved more than another beloved?… My beloved is radiant and ruddy” (Song of Songs 5:9–10), and the whole passage there.

Thus, the term “beauty” is interpreted in two directions: beauty, and habitation.

Rashbam rejects Rashi’s first explanation:

“And I will beautify Him” — I will make Him beautiful, as in “the lovely and delicate daughter of Zion.” It is not a term of habitation, for the doubled ending proves it: “and I will exalt Him.” “And I will beautify Him” and “I will exalt Him” are both terms of honoring the Holy One.

By contrast, Ibn Ezra there adds another related interpretation:

“This is my God, and I will beautify Him” — as the Aramaic translator says; the meaning is: this is my God, and I desire to make Him a habitation so that He may dwell with me forever. The Gaon said that its meaning is: ‘I will go to His abode.’ And this accords with the continuation of the verse: ‘This is my father’s God, and I will exalt Him forever.’”

That is, the purpose of the song is not only that the Holy One dwell with us, but that we dwell in His tents.

Now the Sages derive from this verse the following teaching (Jerusalem Talmud, Peah 1:1, based on the Mekhilta traditions):

Rabbi Haviva said in the name of the Sages there: What is meant by “a third in value”? How does this work? If a person bought one mitzvah-object and then saw another more beautiful than it, how much do we trouble him? Up to a third. Rabbi Ishmael taught: “This is my God, and I will beautify Him.” Is it possible for a human being to beautify his Creator? Rather, I will beautify myself before Him through mitzvot: I shall make before Him a beautiful lulav, a beautiful sukkah, a beautiful shofar, beautiful tzitzit, and beautiful tefillin. Abba Shaul says: “I will be like Him” — just as He is gracious and compassionate, so you too should be gracious and compassionate.

The Jerusalem Talmud understands “and I will beautify Him” in the sense of beauty, but it assumes that one cannot literally beautify the Creator Himself, and therefore concludes that I beautify myself before Him through mitzvot.¹ This is the standard rabbinic source for the obligation to beautify mitzvot, and it appears in many places in the Talmud; see, for example, Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 133b; Nazir 2b; Sukkah 11b and 33a; and parallels.

A. The Halakhic Status of Hidur and Its Relation to the Core Mitzvah

Hidur as a Mitzvah

There are passages that treat the beauty of mitzvot as a mitzvah in its own right. For example, the Talmud in tractate Sukkah discusses a tannaitic dispute whether there is an obligation to bind the species of the lulav together. According to Rabbi Yehuda this is obligatory, whereas according to the Sages it is not. The Talmud then cites a baraita and attributes it to the Sages (Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 11b; Menahot 27a):

In accordance with whom is this baraita? “There is a mitzvah to bind the lulav, but if he did not bind it, it is valid.” If it follows Rabbi Yehuda — if he did not bind it, why is it valid? If it follows the Rabbis — why is it a mitzvah? It is always the Rabbis; and the reason is that it is said, “This is my God, and I will beautify Him” — beautify yourself before Him through mitzvot.

From here it seems quite clearly that hidur is itself a mitzvah. True, it does not invalidate the mitzvah of the four species itself, but there is nonetheless a mitzvah to beautify them. What, then, is the status of that mitzvah?

Various Possibilities Concerning the Halakhic Status of Hidur

At first glance, hidur is a marginal detail within the system of Torah commandments. Beyond the obligation to perform the various mitzvot, we are told that they should be beautified, that is, performed in an attractive way. What is the status of this demand? Is it one detail among the details of the various mitzvot? Is it an independent mitzvah? Is it even an obligation at all, or is it left to each person’s personal discretion?²

We may ask this with regard to someone who fulfilled a certain mitzvah without hidur — for example, someone who circumcised his son without removing the shreds that do not invalidate the circumcision; see Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 133b. By definition, such a person has fulfilled the obligation of circumcision as such. So what exactly is lacking here? Should we say that he fulfilled the mitzvah, but in an incomplete way? That he fulfilled it completely, but is not especially pious? Or that he fulfilled the mitzvah in full, but failed to fulfill the mitzvah of hidur — a full obligation, only one that does not invalidate the primary mitzvah itself?

We may note that similar questions can be asked about a number of such “cross-cutting laws,” both in relation to mitzvot and in relation to transgressions — for example: a half-measure, placing a stumbling block before the blind (that is, causing another person to sin), actively feeding prohibited food to a minor, a mitzvah that comes through a transgression, doubt, preparatory acts that enable a mitzvah, intention in a mitzvah, and so forth. All of these laws do not add one specific obligation; rather, they apply across the entire domain of mitzvot or transgressions. One may therefore ask what their status is in relation to the specific mitzvot, and whether they themselves count as mitzvot, and in what sense.³

It should be noted that an overwhelming majority of halakhic decisors regard hidur as a full obligation. There does, however, seem to be a dispute whether it is a Torah-level obligation or a rabbinic one, and that dispute is rooted in the discussion in tractate Bava Kamma 9.

The Discussion in Bava Kamma 9

In Babylonian Talmud, Bava Kamma 9a–b, there is a short discussion dealing with hidur mitzvah:

Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav Huna: For a mitzvah — up to a third. What is meant by a third? If you say a third of his household assets, then if three mitzvot happened to come his way, should he give away his entire estate? Rather, Rabbi Zeira said: with respect to hidur mitzvah — up to a third of the mitzvah. Rav Ashi asked: a third from within, or a third from without? Let it stand unresolved. In the West they said in the name of Rabbi Zeira: up to a third from one’s own funds; beyond that, it is from the Holy One, blessed be He.

The conclusion of this passage is that one is obligated to spend up to one-third more than the cost of the mitzvah in order to beautify it. It appears that this is indeed an obligation and not a mere description, for the Talmud challenges the initial assumption by asking how one could obligate a person to exhaust all his wealth on three mitzvot. On the other hand, from the words of the sages of the Land of Israel in the name of Rabbi Zeira, it seems that one may spend as much as one wishes on hidur, except that whatever exceeds the first third is not considered the person’s loss, since he will be repaid “from above.” Some have therefore interpreted spending beyond one-third as optional rather than obligatory.⁴

Rashi and Tosafot disagree about how to understand this Talmudic passage. According to Rashi, the case is one in which two etrogim are lying before him, and the more beautiful one costs more than the ordinary one. The obligation is to buy the more beautiful one if its price is no more than one-third above the ordinary one. Tosafot, however, in their comment on the words “up to,” explain that the case is one in which a person has already bought an etrog, and now encounters another etrog that is even more beautiful. According to their view, he must buy the second etrog as well, if the price of the more beautiful one is no more than one-third above the ordinary one.⁵

“From Within” and “From Without”: The Law of Doubt in Hidur

As we have seen, the Talmud raises a doubt whether the one-third is measured “from within” — that is, the addition is one-third of the original price itself — or “from without” — that is, the addition is one-third of the total including the addition. For example, if there is a valid etrog that costs NIS 30, must we look for a beautified etrog up to NIS 40 — measured from within — or up to NIS 45 — measured from without?

The Rosh, ad loc. (chapter 1, sec. 7), writes:

The beautification of a mitzvah is up to a third of the mitzvah. If one found an etrog fit to fulfill the obligation, the size of a walnut, he should add a third in order to buy one more beautiful than it. But he is not required to buy the most beautiful etrog he can find by adding a third to the etrog he originally wished to buy. And “up to a third” means from within, since the question was not resolved.

He rules that one must spend one-third of the cost of the mitzvah in order to beautify it. It is clear from his words that this is a full obligation, for he adds that there is no obligation to spend more than a third on a particularly beautiful etrog. He then rules, in the dispute over how to calculate the third, that it should be measured from within because the question remained unresolved in the Talmud. On this the Beit Yosef (Orah Hayyim 656) explains:

Regarding our question whether the third is measured from within or from without, the Rosh wrote that since it was not resolved, we take it to mean from within. The reason seems to be that this is a rabbinic doubt, and therefore we are lenient.

That is, the Beit Yosef understands the Rosh to have ruled leniently because the obligation of hidur is rabbinic, and in a rabbinic doubt we are lenient. So too writes the author of Pilpula Harifta on the Rosh, ad loc.

Rabbeinu Hananel, however, explicitly wrote there: “The matter remained unresolved, and we act stringently — from without.” Likewise the Rif there (16a in the Rif pagination) did not decide whether we follow the measure from within or from without, and the Ran understood from his silence that the law should be decided stringently, as with a Torah-level doubt.

If so, there seems to be a dispute among the medieval authorities whether hidur is a Torah-level or rabbinic obligation. Tosafot, under the words “does not exempt,” on Babylonian Talmud, Menahot 41b, were uncertain about this. See also the Ritva on Babylonian Talmud, Sukkah 11b, and the Meiri on Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 133b. The matter is also discussed by the Sha’agat Aryeh, no. 50. The Beit Yosef — and so too the Shulhan Arukh there — rules in practice in accordance with the Rosh. It seems that according to the Rosh and the Beit Yosef, the derivation from the verse “This is my God, and I will beautify Him” is merely a scriptural support.

Maharshal, however, in his Yam Shel Shlomo, Bava Kamma, no. 24, objects to the Rosh:

This is puzzling. Since it is a Torah-level doubt, should we not go stringently? Perhaps he held that this is not a Torah obligation in the full sense, since it is not a positive commandment, but only a general requirement to beautify the mitzvah.

Maharshal explains that even the Rosh does not hold that the obligation of hidur is a rabbinic mitzvah. Rather, it is a Torah-level matter in which we are not required to be stringent in cases of doubt, because it is only a general requirement to beautify mitzvot. It is not a full obligation but rather a Torah-level ideal.

This is a third approach to the status of hidur mitzvah: on the one hand, it raises the status of the duty to beautify, since it remains on the Torah plane. On the other hand, it is not a full obligation, but only an ideal in the first instance; in that sense, it is weaker than an ordinary rabbinic law.

It may be that this is also why Maimonides omitted entirely the law of beautifying up to one-third, since in his view this is not really a halakhic obligation, along the lines suggested by Maharshal.

The Relation to the Core Mitzvah

Rabbeinu Hananel, at the end of his comments there, adds:

And one who beautifies the mitzvah is praiseworthy, as we learned regarding the Hanukkah lamp (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 21b): “Those who beautify the mitzvah light a lamp for each and every member; and those who are most meticulous among those who beautify…”

It is not clear what Rabbeinu Hananel intended to add here. After all, we saw that according to him the obligation of hidur is at the Torah level, and therefore in cases of doubt one must be stringent. If so, what does the statement add that one who beautifies is praiseworthy? Moreover, what exactly is he proving from the Hanukkah lamp? What did he find there beyond the ordinary notion of hidur in every mitzvah?

One could understand him as simply praising the person who beautifies, just as the Sages sometimes say of one mitzvah or another that it is equivalent to the whole Torah, and the like. But more simply, his point is that the one who beautifies has enhanced the mitzvah that he performed, and not merely fulfilled an additional mitzvah — namely, the mitzvah of “This is my God,” that is, the mitzvah of hidur. In other words, there is a Torah-level obligation to perform the original mitzvah in an enhanced manner.

This may also help us understand what Rabbeinu Hananel found in the mitzvah of Hanukkah lights. There we see three levels of fulfillment of the mitzvah, and it appears that each of them constitutes fulfillment of the mitzvah of Hanukkah lights at a different level, not fulfillment of Hanukkah lights plus, in addition, fulfillment of the mitzvah of hidur — that is, the mitzvah to adorn the Holy One, blessed be He.

In this respect Rabbeinu Hananel comes close to Maharshal’s understanding of the Rosh, since Maharshal too apparently understood that the duty to beautify is not an independent law, but a detail attached to the primary mitzvah. Maharshal apparently understood hidur as an obligation to perform the mitzvah in a more excellent manner, and therefore it is not a full obligation but only an enhancement in the fulfillment of the main mitzvah. This is also why Maharshal holds that doubt in hidur is treated leniently: the reason we are stringent in Torah laws is the desire to make sure we have fulfilled the obligation under all circumstances. Therefore, if the obligation of hidur were separate from the core mitzvah, the logic would say that we should be stringent in cases of doubt, in order to ensure that we have fulfilled it. But if the obligation is part of the main mitzvah, then the core mitzvah has in fact been fulfilled, and the demand to beautify that mitzvah is not a full obligation; therefore, the reasoning that compels stringency does not apply here.

This reasoning may perhaps be formulated slightly differently. The requirement to be stringent in cases of doubtful Torah law stems from viewing the situation as though there is a presumption that I did not fulfill the mitzvah — or that I did commit the transgression — unless it is clear that I did fulfill it, or did not transgress. But if the duty of hidur is attached to the primary mitzvah, and especially since it does not invalidate the mitzvah itself, then once I have fulfilled the primary mitzvah a presumption arises that the mitzvah has been fulfilled — because in any case it has been fulfilled, since hidur does not invalidate it even if it was not observed. What remains uncertain is only whether it was fulfilled in the optimal way. Here the burden of proof lies on the one claiming that the mitzvah was not fulfilled properly, and therefore one may be lenient.⁶

B. Halakhic Aspects of the Law of Hidur

A Blessing over Hidur Mitzvah

Later authorities discuss whether one may, or must, recite a blessing over hidur mitzvah. In the responsa of Rabbi Akiva Eger, second edition, no. 13, he argues that one should recite a blessing even over hidur mitzvah. The question he addresses concerns someone who forgot to recite the blessing over lighting Hanukkah candles, and remembered before he had finished lighting all the candles. At that point, only the hidur of the mitzvah remains before him, and the question is whether he can still recite the blessing.⁷

Rabbi Akiva Eger argues that the halakhic authorities are divided on this question. The Pri Hadash, in Orah Hayyim 672, was asked about someone who lit six candles and then discovered that it was actually the seventh night. Should he recite a blessing over the additional candle? He rules quite simply that he should not, because one does not recite a blessing over hidur mitzvah. He then brings proof from the Beit Yosef, who wrote in the name of Orhot Hayyim:

Orhot Hayyim writes: If on the third night he lit only two candles, or on the fourth night only three — this actually occurred in Lunel — they ruled stringently that he should light what he had omitted to light, and he need not recite another blessing, because the blessing he made at the outset was made for the obligation of all the candles.

From this the Pri Hadash inferred that no blessing is recited over hidur. But from the straightforward language of the Beit Yosef it would seem to be exactly the opposite: the only reason no additional blessing is recited is that the original blessing already covered everything, which implies that, in principle, hidur too requires a blessing. And indeed, this is how the Eliyah Rabbah understood it there. The proof of the Pri Hadash is therefore rejected, but his own opinion remains that one does not recite a blessing over hidur.

Rabbi Akiva Eger concludes that this is a dispute between those two authorities, and therefore in cases of doubt concerning blessings one should be lenient. He adds, however, that in our case one should nevertheless recite the blessing, because as long as the candles are still being lit, this counts as a continuation of the performance of the mitzvah, and therefore the proper time for the blessing has not yet passed.⁸

In the responsa Da’at Mordekhai (Bnei Torah edition, 5760), no. 48, the author proves that one does recite a blessing over hidur mitzvah from the ruling of the Rema in Yoreh De’ah 263:3, who ruled that a blessing is recited over removing shreds that do not invalidate the circumcision. According to Rabbi Akiva Eger’s approach, however, that is not conclusive evidence, for in circumcision there is also a mitzvah of being circumcised, and only for that reason it may be possible to recite a blessing after the core act of the mitzvah. In that case perhaps everyone agrees.

Reservations and Distinctions

It should be noted that Rabbi Akiva Eger assumes that this dispute concerns the question whether one may recite a blessing over hidur. But the question he himself addressed was different: if a person forgot to recite the blessing over the core mitzvah, may he recite it when the core act is already over and he is now engaged only in hidur? It is possible that there could be an opinion according to which no blessing is recited over hidur as such, yet in Rabbi Akiva Eger’s case the person could still recite the blessing, because it is not a blessing over hidur but over the core mitzvah.

Accordingly, the connection to the sources Rabbi Akiva Eger cites is not entirely clear. As we saw, the Beit Yosef discusses a blessing over hidur when a blessing has already been recited over the core mitzvah. We saw that precisely because of this fact Rabbi Akiva Eger and the Eliyah Rabbah argue that the Beit Yosef holds that there is indeed a requirement to bless over hidur, but the first blessing has already discharged that obligation. Here, however, we are suggesting another implication of that very fact: even if the first blessing did not cover the hidur, it may still be that no blessing is recited over hidur in a case where the mitzvah itself had its own blessing. But in a situation where one performs hidur separately — or where no blessing was recited over the core mitzvah — it is possible that a blessing would indeed be required.

Similarly, the distinction Rabbi Akiva Eger introduces — that one may recite a blessing over hidur where there is “duration” to the mitzvah, that is, where the mitzvah continues over time — seems relevant specifically to a blessing over the mitzvah itself, not to a blessing over hidur. As long as the mitzvah continues, one may still recite the blessing over the mitzvah itself. But with regard to a blessing over hidur as such, this distinction does not seem relevant. Why should there be any difference, for purposes of blessing, between the hidur of a continuing mitzvah and the hidur of an instantaneous one?

Performing Hidur after the Mitzvah Has Ended

A discussion similar to Rabbi Akiva Eger’s, but with respect to hidur itself, appears in the responsa Beit HaLevi, part 2, no. 47, and in the novellae of Rabbi Yitzhak Ze’ev Halevi Soloveitchik on Maimonides, Hilkhot Hanukkah 4:1. They too distinguish between continuing mitzvot and one-time mitzvot, but not with respect to the question of blessing; rather, with respect to the question how late one may still perform hidur mitzvah. The basis of their discussion is the dispute between Maimonides and the Tur regarding the Talmudic passage about returning to the shreds that do not invalidate circumcision.

The Mishnah in Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 133a, says:

Mishnah: One may perform all the needs of circumcision on Shabbat: circumcise, uncover, suck the blood, and place upon it a dressing and cumin.

The Talmud there, on 133b, asks what is added by the phrase “all the needs of circumcision”:

Since it already teaches all of them, what does “all the needs of circumcision” come to include? It comes to include the following, as the Rabbis taught: One who circumcises, so long as he is still engaged in the circumcision, may return both to the shreds that invalidate the circumcision and to the shreds that do not invalidate it. If he has withdrawn: to the shreds that invalidate the circumcision he returns; to the shreds that do not invalidate it, he does not return.

Thus the Talmud says that as long as he is still engaged in the needs of the circumcision, he returns even to shreds that do not invalidate the circumcision. But if he has withdrawn from the circumcision — that is, he finished the mitzvah without cutting those non-invalidating shreds — then he returns only to the invalidating shreds, not to the non-invalidating ones. Later in the passage it is explained that the shreds that do not invalidate circumcision constitute hidur mitzvah, on the basis of “This is my God, and I will beautify Him.”

The Tur codifies this ruling in its straightforward form (Orah Hayyim 331 and Yoreh De’ah 264). Maimonides, however, codifies it as follows (Hilkhot Milah 2:4):

One who circumcises, so long as he is engaged in the circumcision, returns both to the shreds that invalidate and to the shreds that do not invalidate. If he has withdrawn, he returns to the shreds that invalidate; to the shreds that do not invalidate, he does not return. If he circumcised but did not uncover, it is as though he had not circumcised.

Maimonides rules in accordance with the baraita, but he does not so much as hint that the discussion is limited to Shabbat. From his wording it appears that even on a weekday, if he has already finished the circumcision and withdrawn, he does not return to the shreds that do not invalidate it.

The later authorities just mentioned explain this dispute in two ways.

According to Beit HaLevi, both authorities agree that one cannot beautify a mitzvah after withdrawing from the performance of the mitzvah. Their dispute is over whether circumcision is a mitzvah of action or a mitzvah of result. Maimonides holds that circumcision is only a mitzvah of action, and therefore once he has withdrawn, the mitzvah is over, and at that stage it can no longer be beautified. For that reason, even on a weekday he does not return to the shreds that do not invalidate circumcision. The Tur, by contrast, holds that circumcision is also a mitzvah of result — the mitzvah is to be circumcised, not only to circumcise — and therefore even after the circumcision act has ended, he is still fulfilling a mitzvah. Hence it is possible to beautify the mitzvah even after withdrawal. According to this view, it is still hidur during the time of fulfillment of the mitzvah.

According to the Griz, the dispute concerns precisely this very issue: whether one can perform hidur after the performance-act of the mitzvah has ended. In other words, both authorities agree that circumcision is a mitzvah of action, but Maimonides holds that one cannot beautify after the act of the mitzvah has been completed, whereas the Tur holds that one can beautify even after the mitzvah-act has ended. The Griz applies this dispute to Hanukkah lights as well.

Our concern here is not the nature of the mitzvah of circumcision itself — see our essay on Parashat Bereshit, 5767, where we discussed mitzvot of action and of result — but the question whether one can beautify after performing the mitzvah, and why. As stated, Beit HaLevi assumes that according to all views one cannot beautify after the performance-act of the mitzvah, whereas the Griz holds that at least according to the Tur this is possible. As noted, this dispute closely resembles the one we saw above in the responsa of Rabbi Akiva Eger, since there too the issue concerns the connection between the continued duration of the mitzvah and hidur. The difference is only that Rabbi Akiva Eger discusses the blessing, whereas these later authorities discuss the very possibility of performing hidur.⁹

C. The Conceptual Basis of These Halakhic Disputes

Introduction

In this chapter we will try to connect the previous two chapters. We will present the conceptual framework within which one can examine the halakhic positions regarding blessing over hidur and performing hidur after the mitzvah-act. We will try to show that these disputes embody different conceptions of hidur mitzvah, of which the halakhic disagreements are the outward expressions.

Blessing over Hidur

We saw that according to Rabbi Akiva Eger there is a dispute among the authorities whether one may recite a blessing over hidur. What is the basis of that dispute? At first glance, the basis would seem to be whether hidur is an independent obligation or merely one of the details of the mitzvah, corresponding to the possibilities we saw above. If it is a mitzvah in its own right, one blesses over it; if it is merely one of the details of the main mitzvah, the blessing instituted by the Sages is over the mitzvah itself, and no additional blessing was added for hidur.

But on closer inspection, the picture is actually the reverse. We must note that in Rabbi Akiva Eger’s responsum the issue is not a blessing such as “Who sanctified us… concerning hidur in mitzvot,” but the blessing that is recited over the primary mitzvah itself, such as “to light the Hanukkah lamp.” If so, specifically the one who says that such a blessing may be recited over hidur would seem to hold that hidur too is one of the details of the main mitzvah, and therefore it is appropriate to recite over it the very blessing of the mitzvah. By contrast, the one who holds that no blessing is recited over hidur can be understood as holding that hidur is not part of the mitzvah itself, and therefore the blessing over the mitzvah itself does not apply to it. If so, why is there no separate blessing over hidur, such as “to beautify mitzvot”? It may be that no blessing was instituted for the performance of hidur as such, perhaps because it is not a full-fledged mitzvah.¹⁰

Rabbi Akiva Eger himself, however, argued that if the mitzvah is one that continues over time, then one may recite a blessing even over hidur. Here both dimensions appear together: on the one hand, hidur as such is not the continuation of the mitzvah, and therefore in a mitzvah without duration there is no permission to recite a blessing over hidur. Permission to bless requires a rationale based on the continuity of the mitzvah itself, apart from the hidur. On the other hand, since the mitzvah itself does have duration, one may now recite the blessing, but the blessing is said over the hidur — after all, Rabbi Akiva Eger does not permit one to recite the blessing simply on the continuation of the mitzvah as such, such as reciting a blessing over circumcision long afterward when the person is already circumcised. In other words, it is possible to recite the mitzvah’s own blessing over the hidur, and in that sense hidur does appear to be part of the act of the mitzvah.

It seems that Rabbi Akiva Eger means that if the mitzvah has duration, then one may recite the blessing while engaged in hidur, but the blessing in question is the blessing recited over the mitzvah, not over the hidur. Not only is the wording of the blessing the wording of the blessing over the mitzvah; the blessing is in fact recited over the mitzvah and not over the hidur. The hidur merely counts, for this purpose, as though one is still occupied with the mitzvah so that it has not yet ended, and therefore one may still recite the blessing. If so, Rabbi Akiva Eger’s view seems to imply precisely that hidur is not part of the fulfillment of the mitzvah itself. Nevertheless, the act of hidur is regarded as part of the act of the mitzvah, and therefore one may still recite the blessing over the mitzvah itself. Accordingly, on Rabbi Akiva Eger’s view, hidur is part of the act of the mitzvah, but not part of the fulfillment of the mitzvah.¹¹ Below we will see further evidence for this conception.

We saw above that the Beit Yosef holds that in principle one should recite a blessing over hidur, but that the blessing over the mitzvah exempts one from any further blessing over the hidur. Here too we must ask what conception of hidur underlies this. It seems that he agrees with Rabbi Akiva Eger: hidur is a distinct element from the mitzvah, but the blessing of the mitzvah itself discharges one’s obligation with respect to the blessing over hidur. But if hidur is a separate element, why should that be so? What is the connection between the mitzvah and its hidur? We are forced back to the same distinction we made in Rabbi Akiva Eger’s approach: hidur is part of the act of the mitzvah but not part of its fulfillment. In the act of the mitzvah, two things are realized: the Hanukkah-lighting mitzvah and hidur mitzvah. So why does the blessing over the first element help for the second as well? Either because the second is not a full-fledged mitzvah — but then why recite a blessing over it at all? — or because the blessing is recited over the act of the mitzvah, not over the fulfillment of the mitzvah.

Fulfilling Hidur after the Mitzvah Has Ended

We saw that the medieval and later authorities disagree whether hidur can be performed after the fulfillment of the mitzvah has ended. The author of Beit HaLevi clearly assumes that it cannot. The Griz, by contrast, holds that at least according to the Tur, it can. What underlies the dispute? It would seem that this too is rooted in different understandings of the relation between the mitzvah and hidur, but now in the terms of the previous subsection. If the act of hidur is part of the act of the mitzvah, then it is fairly clear that it can be fulfilled only within the framework of the mitzvah-act itself. But if hidur is part of the fulfillment of the mitzvah, then it is reasonable that it can be performed even after the mitzvah-act, so long as the mitzvah continues to be fulfilled — for example, in circumcision, where the mitzvah continues as long as the person remains circumcised, even though the mitzvah-act ended with the circumcision.

In other words, in the subsection that dealt with hidur in the mitzvah of circumcision, we assumed that the dispute among the authorities revolved around whether circumcision is a mitzvah of action or a mitzvah of result. We are now proposing a different formulation: circumcision is a mitzvah of result, and therefore the fulfillment of the mitzvah continues as long as the person is circumcised. But the act of the mitzvah is only the act of circumcising. The dispute, then, is whether hidur is part of the fulfillment of the mitzvah or part of the act of the mitzvah, and the practical implication is whether it can be performed after the act of the mitzvah has ended but within the period of its fulfillment.

One might likewise ask, regarding Hanukkah lights, whether there too one can define the act as the lighting, and the fulfillment as the lamp’s continuing to burn. This discussion would have to be conducted in light of the Talmudic discussions concerning Hanukkah lights,¹² but that lies beyond our scope here.

D. Repeating a Mitzvah with Hidur

Introduction

We saw above that Rashi and Tosafot disagree about the interpretation of the Talmud in Bava Kamma regarding the obligation to beautify up to one-third. According to Tosafot, the case is one in which two mitzvah-objects are before me: one is more beautiful and costs one-third more than the other, which is merely valid but not beautified. In Tosafot’s view, we are obligated to buy the superior one even after we have already bought the first.

So far, we have dealt with the question whether one must buy a beautified mitzvah-object after already buying a merely valid one. But what happens in a case where one has already performed the mitzvah validly, without hidur, and then suddenly finds a beautified mitzvah-object? For example, suppose one bought a valid etrog for NIS 30, and after taking the four species one found an etrog that costs NIS 38 — less than one-third measured from within, so that according to all opinions, at least initially, one would have been obligated to buy it.

At first glance, the opportunity for hidur has been irretrievably lost. Since one has already fulfilled the obligation, there would seem to be no room to perform the mitzvah again, because there will no longer be a mitzvah-act. A well-known ruling of Rabbi Hayyim of Brisk deals with a case in which one has before him an etrog that is very beautiful but only doubtfully valid, and another etrog that is certainly valid but not beautified. Rabbi Hayyim says that one should first take the beautiful one, which is only doubtfully valid, and then, while one is still in doubt whether the mitzvah was fulfilled, one should take the certainly valid etrog in order to make sure one has discharged the obligation. If one were to do it in the opposite order, then after fulfilling the obligation with the certainly valid etrog, one would no longer be able to perform the mitzvah again with the beautified etrog. The possibility of hidur would have been lost, because the mitzvah had already been fulfilled.

And yet, we do find sources in halakha that teach that one can fulfill a mitzvah with hidur even after it has already been fulfilled in the ordinary way. In this chapter we will present those sources briefly, and then discuss the meaning of those laws in terms of the previous chapters.

The View of Beit HaLevi

The author of Beit HaLevi (in the same responsum, part 2, no. 47, end of sec. 1) discusses precisely our case. He writes that he had long been uncertain about a person who had already taken a valid lulav on the festival of Sukkot and afterward came across a more beautiful lulav: is he obligated to take the better one? He makes this depend on the assumption we saw above — namely, that there is no possibility of hidur without a mitzvah-act. Since here the hidur would be without a mitzvah-act, it would have no point.¹³

Counting the Omer

The Shulhan Arukh writes in Orah Hayyim 489:3–4:

3. One who prays with the congregation while it is still day counts with them without a blessing. If he remembers at night, he recites the blessing and counts.

4. If at twilight one’s fellow asks him how many days of the count it is tonight, he should say to him, “Yesterday was such-and-such,” because if he says to him, “Today is such-and-such,” he cannot then go back and count with a blessing. But before twilight, since the time for counting has not yet arrived, this is of no consequence.

At first glance, these two rulings of the Shulhan Arukh contradict one another. In paragraph 4 he rules that if one told someone how many days of the count it is today, he has thereby fulfilled the count and therefore cannot count again with a blessing. The underlying assumption is apparently that the counting of the Omer nowadays is rabbinic, and therefore at twilight — a time of doubt — one has fulfilled the obligation by way of doubt. But in paragraph 3 he says that after one counted during the day, if he remembers later he may count at night with a blessing.

On the simplest reading, both rulings concern both the fulfillment of the mitzvah and the blessing. The fulfillment of the mitzvah of counting the Omer, even if done without obligation, is not bound up with any transgression, and therefore there is no impediment to performing an act of counting even if one has already fulfilled the obligation and thus is not, strictly speaking, performing a mitzvah-act.

The Vilna Gaon, in his glosses there, explains that there is indeed a contradiction in the Shulhan Arukh, and that its source is in the writings of Abudraham, who changed his mind. In paragraph 3 the Shulhan Arukh rules in accordance with Abudraham’s earlier opinion, according to which if one has already fulfilled the mitzvah he can nonetheless go back and fulfill it again with a blessing, in order to perform it in a more complete, or more beautified, fashion. But in paragraph 4 the Shulhan Arukh rules in accordance with Abudraham’s final conclusion, that he cannot perform the mitzvah again with a blessing. So here we have a source that holds that one may repeat a mitzvah in order to beautify it, even after one has already fulfilled the obligation.¹⁴ This would seem to conflict with the assumption of Beit HaLevi mentioned above.

The Menahot Discussion: A Fat and a Lean Sin-Offering

In our essay on Parashat Vayechi, we discussed the Babylonian Talmud in Menahot regarding someone who offered a sacrifice twice. In the course of that discussion, it emerges that one who offered a lean sin-offering — a less beautified one — may go back and offer a fatter sin-offering on Shabbat in order to beautify the mitzvah, even though he has already fulfilled his obligation. The Sha’agat Aryeh, no. 50, learns from there that the same is true with respect to the remaining shreds of circumcision: one may return to them and even desecrate Shabbat. It follows that with regard to lulav as well, he would apparently say that one may repeat the mitzvah in order to beautify it, contrary to the view of Beit HaLevi cited above.

At first glance, this seems to be an explicit Talmudic source that one may repeat the mitzvah in order to beautify it. But one must remember that there the slaughter takes place before the sprinkling of the blood, meaning that the offerer has still not yet fulfilled the obligation of the mitzvah — bringing the sin-offering and obtaining atonement, since the sprinkling is the essential element of the atonement. It may be only for that reason that he may slaughter the fatter animal, since it now becomes his true offering. But if the blood had already been sprinkled, would he still be able to bring another sin-offering, slaughter it, and sprinkle its blood? It is quite possible that he would not.

Explanation of the Dispute

At first glance, this dispute too is rooted in how one understands the relation between hidur and the mitzvah itself. According to Beit HaLevi, who holds that one cannot repeat a mitzvah in order to beautify it, hidur must accompany the mitzvah itself. A mitzvah without hidur leaves no independent room for hidur. This can fit any of the understandings we have proposed so far with respect to hidur. But the opinions that hold that one may repeat a mitzvah in order to beautify it would appear to say that hidur is part of the mitzvah itself, and therefore without hidur the mitzvah is lacking; consequently one may perform the mitzvah again.

But it is actually more reasonable here to understand the matter in precisely the opposite way. These opinions hold that hidur is specifically not part of the mitzvah. If the person performed the mitzvah, the obligation of hidur still remains incumbent upon him. Yet the obligation of hidur cannot be fulfilled without the mitzvah itself, because hidur is the beautification of the mitzvah. Therefore one may repeat the mitzvah-act only in order to fulfill the obligation of hidur.

It should be emphasized that according to the explanation proposed here, hidur is not an independent obligation in the sense that it can be performed without the mitzvah itself. On the other hand, it is independent in the sense that its fulfillment is not part of fulfilling the mitzvah. Here again we return to the conception we saw above, according to which hidur is part of the act of the mitzvah — one cannot perform it without the mitzvah — but not part of the fulfillment of the mitzvah. Therefore, even when the mitzvah has already been fulfilled, one can still perform the hidur, but one cannot do so without a mitzvah-act.

Betrothal through an Agent

In this subsection we will see a surprising example of the principle that one can repeat a mitzvah in order to beautify it. The Talmud at the beginning of the second chapter of tractate Kiddushin states that betrothing a woman directly is preferable to betrothing her through an agent: “It is more of a mitzvah when done by oneself than through one’s agent.”

Now in the responsa of Rivash, no. 82 — and briefly also in no. 128 — he cites authorities who hold that one who betrothed a woman without a blessing goes back and betroths her again with a blessing, among them the Tashbetz. That ruling, however, could still be understood as a blessing over the original act of betrothal, while the repeated act is done only so that the blessing will not appear absurd. In other words, perhaps one cannot perform a mitzvah after already fulfilling the obligation, and what is done here is only to make it possible to recite the blessing without the act appearing odd, and perhaps also without leading to practical confusion in the future.

But Rivash there, in the course of his discussion, also cites the view of the Ra’avad, according to whom one who betroths a woman through an agent goes back and betroths her again himself, because “it is more of a mitzvah when done by oneself than through one’s agent.” At first glance, this is another source for the idea that one may perform a mitzvah after already fulfilling the obligation, in order to do it with hidur.

Here, however, the matter is even more puzzling, because betrothal is not merely a mitzvah — if it is a mitzvah at all; see our essay on Parashat Bereshit, 5767 — but an act that creates a legal status. If he betrothed her through an agent, then the woman is already his wife in halakhic terms. In such a situation it is entirely unclear how he can betroth her again. What meaning does the second act have? Where the mitzvah creates a legal effect, it is very difficult to understand how it can be repeated after the obligation has already been fulfilled and the legal status already created. Here it is already obvious that one cannot say that he repeats the mitzvah merely in order to accompany the hidur, as we explained above, because once the legal effect has already come into being, it is no longer factually possible to repeat the mitzvah. There is simply no longer an unbetrothed woman here to betroth.

From here it seems quite clear that those opinions which allow one to repeat mitzvot in order to beautify them do not mean that one really fulfilled the obligation with the first act and is now repeating it only for the sake of hidur. Rather, it seems that every person implicitly stipulates that if he can later perform the mitzvah with greater hidur, then he does not intend to fulfill his obligation through the first act of the mitzvah. Therefore, when an opportunity later presents itself to perform the mitzvah again in a beautified way, it turns out that from the outset he did not intend to fulfill the obligation through the first act, and he can therefore repeat it in a beautified form. From betrothal we may learn to other mitzvot as well, that perhaps the whole possibility of repeating a mitzvah in order to beautify it rests on this implicit stipulation, and therefore it can work even in mitzvot that create legal effects.

To be sure, according to the majority of the medieval authorities and decisors — see the above responsa of Rivash — one certainly cannot go back and betroth a woman a second time in order to do so more beautifully. But that does not mean that one cannot repeat a mitzvah. As we saw, there are opinions that hold, even in practice, that one may indeed repeat mitzvot in order to beautify them. Those opinions are to be explained as we proposed above: hidur is part of the act of the mitzvah, but not part of its fulfillment.

E. A Philosophical Analogy: What Hidur Has to Do with Poetry

Introduction

In this chapter I will present an analogy that may somewhat clarify the meaning of the different approaches we have encountered, the questions we asked, and also our conclusion — namely, that hidur is part of the act of the mitzvah but not part of its fulfillment. These remarks should be taken as an analogy only.

The Ontology of Attributes

The discussion here requires a brief ontological point — that is, a point about being as such.¹⁵ In our essay on Parashat Va’era, 5767, we discussed the question of reference. We saw there that one can pick out a particular entity in two main ways: by means of a uniquely identifying description, and by means of its name. The description relates to the form of the entity — that is, its characteristics and properties — whereas the name relates to its essence, that is, the entity stripped of its properties. For example, a table is tall, has four legs, is brown in color, its top has a certain degree of hardness, and so on. We also noted there that all our statements about the entity relate to its form, except for the statement that it exists. That statement relates to its essence. Indeed, it will usually use its name: “Moses exists.” “The chair is here.” But not: “My upstairs neighbor exists,” or “the four-legged object used for sitting exists.”

We may ask ourselves whether an attribute of a thing exists in reality. Is the brown color of the table an entity? Quite obviously it is not something that exists in the ordinary sense. But is it wholly subjective? Does it exist only in our consciousness?

It is fairly clear that the brown color is generated only within the consciousness of the observer. In external reality there is merely an electromagnetic wave reflected from that object into our eyes, and only after the stimulus reaches the eye and is processed in the brain does the sensation of brown arise in our awareness. If we had different sensory equipment, the electromagnetic wave might be translated by us into sound, as in the phrase “seeing the sounds.” That is what happens in an oscilloscope, which translates vocal signals into a visual image, that is, some sort of graph. So the brown color does not exist in concrete reality, but only in the consciousness that receives it.

There is an old question: if a tree falls in the forest and there is no ear there to hear the fall, can one say that there is sound there? The answer, of course, is no. There is no sound there, only acoustic waves. Only when those waves strike the eardrum, and the brain processes the signal, does the sensation that we know as sound arise. A creature equipped with different sensory apparatus could see that sound instead of hearing it.

And yet it is hard to escape the intuition that the color of the object has some source in reality itself. It is not a wholly subjective phenomenon like dreams, feelings, and the like. This can also be seen in the following way: the very same table, if painted a different color, will appear different to us. If two identical tables stand before us, one painted green and the other brown, we will perceive them in different colors. It is therefore clear that there is something in the table itself that causes its color, as it appears in our consciousness, to be brown rather than green.

That property present in the table itself is the character of its material, that is, its physical structure. The structure of the material determines the wavelength of the light reflected from the object, and therefore also its color. So the property we call “brown color” is indeed a phenomenon that exists only in our consciousness, but it has an objective factual source located in the object itself.

Thus, what we call the “properties” of objects are composed of two components, one built on the other: some property that characterizes the thing itself — such as a structure that reflects light rays at the wavelength associated with brown — and the mode in which that property appears in our awareness.¹⁶

Analogy to the Normative Plane

On the normative plane as well, one can discern a similar structure, though there it appears in a more complex form.¹⁷ There is the concept of “the good.” The essence of this concept is an idea devoid of specific properties. But that concept also has properties: moral imperatives. The concept as such exists as an idea in the world of ideas, and its properties characterize it there. In our world, by contrast, the structure is reversed: there are various actions, some of which we describe as “good” and some of which we do not. The actions we describe as “good” are actions whose characteristics correspond, in some sense, to the properties of the idea of the Good. The action is the “entity,” and its descriptions are attributes. Thus, in our world the idea becomes an attribute, while the actions — those derived from the properties — become a kind of entities.¹⁸

But one can examine this distinction with respect to a specific norm as well. For example, the norm of honoring parents. It has an essence, and it also has concrete expressions. When we describe it, we always refer to its expressions rather than to it in itself. Only when we say that such a norm exists do we say something about the norm as such.

The same applies to mitzvot. There is a mitzvah, which is a basic norm. The mitzvah has several characteristics or properties that characterize it, and it also has components of which it is made up. For example, the mitzvah of the four species has four parts, and there are also properties that determine which acts count as mitzvah-acts and which do not: they must be taken in a certain way, at a certain time, with a certain intention, and so forth.¹⁹

The Connection to Hidur Mitzvah

Where should we locate the obligation to beautify this mitzvah? Is it part of the mitzvah, like the lulav or the willow branch? Or perhaps it is a characteristic of the fulfillment of the mitzvah?²⁰ This mirrors the question we asked at the beginning: is hidur an independent obligation, or a mode of fulfillment of the mitzvah itself? We can now ask: is it part of the essence of the mitzvah, or is it an attribute of it?

In practice, hidur is usually an additional element beyond the core mitzvah — such as binding the lulav, which according to the halakha is required only by virtue of hidur; additional Hanukkah lights; the shreds that do not invalidate circumcision; and so forth. But sometimes it is a characteristic of the mitzvah as a whole — such as a beautified etrog, where there is no additional part beyond the valid etrog; rather, it is simply a different and more beautiful form of etrog. Yet in practice, in both cases the point of hidur is to characterize the mitzvah as a whole. That is, hidur is a characteristic that appears, at first glance, to be part of the mitzvah itself, but in reality its purpose is to characterize the mitzvah-act as a whole. When one performs a mitzvah with hidur, that gives a certain tone and spirit to the mitzvah as a whole.

The claim that hidur is part of the act of the mitzvah but not part of its fulfillment does not mean that hidur has no connection at all to the fulfillment. It means that hidur is a characteristic of the fulfillment, but not a constituent part of it. It is part of the mitzvah-act, but not a part that constitutes the fulfillment. It is an attribute of the fulfillment, not part of its essence. By contrast, hidur is part of the act of the mitzvah — though in most cases it is not an attribute of the act, except in examples such as a beautified etrog and the like.

As we have seen, however, the characteristics of a thing are rooted in the thing itself. They have a real basis, and are not all located in the consciousness of the observer. Therefore, hidur too expresses something about the mitzvah itself. For example, according to Rabbi Yehuda, binding the lulav is part of the mitzvah itself: a lulav requires binding. In practice we rule like the Sages that a lulav does not require binding, yet we do it as hidur. In what sense does the binding beautify the lulav? Does it make it prettier? Very doubtful. It seems that this type of hidur expresses something within the mitzvah itself. The Sages did not wish to obligate us to do it, but there can be little doubt that they too saw in it an expression of something about the fulfillment of the mitzvah itself.

A Concluding Note: The Connection to Shabbat Shirah

It is interesting that the command concerning hidur mitzvah appears within a song, the one read on Shabbat Shirah. When we think about how to define poetry, as opposed to prose, it is very difficult to offer clear characteristics. Poetry is a certain mode of presentation, in two senses:

1. The representation of some meaning.
2. The presentation of the poem itself in the written medium.

Prose represents meaning directly, whereas poetry, if it represents meaning at all, does so indirectly. The connection between the literal meaning of the poem and its “meaning” is not univocal. A poem may speak about a spring, a stream, and the sun, and be referring to something altogether different.

The form in which the poetic text is presented is probably meant to express this very point. One of the clearest characteristics of poetry in the Bible is the spacing between words. There are many more spaces between the words than in prose. Homiletic writers have already remarked that in poetry the essential content is found between the words, in the blank spaces, and not in the verbal content itself. Even in a Torah scroll there is sanctity to the margins — the stretches of parchment outside the written text. Therefore the Torah is called a “song,” to teach us that there is much in it beyond the plain content of the words.

We saw that hidur mitzvah reveals that there is something in the mitzvah itself beyond the bare act. Hidur reveals something that exists in the mitzvah specifically because it is not part of it — either because of its voluntary character, or because it is defined as something distinct from the fulfillment of the mitzvah, though still part of the act of the mitzvah. Performing a mitzvah with hidur reveals something about one’s relation to the performance of the mitzvah itself. Sometimes what is appended to a thing reveals more about its essence than what is included within it. That is the very essence of poetry. A poetic form, too, is an external mode of appearance of meaning that reveals something of the meaning itself. Perhaps that is why the law of hidur is derived from verses of song.

Footnotes