The Boundaries Between Sacred and Secular in the Library

Be'er – 2010

Short reflections (relatively 🙂 ) following the arrangement of the library in the study hall of 'Be'er'

Torah and Wisdom

From time immemorial, sages understood that there is value also in the study of fields that are not traditionally classified as 'Torah.' Maimonides already speaks about the path to the love of God, and writes as follows (Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah 2:2):

And what is the way to love Him and fear Him? When a person contemplates His deeds and His wondrous, great creations and sees in them His wisdom, which has no measure and no end, he immediately loves, praises, glorifies, and longs with a great longing to know the great Name, as David said, 'My soul thirsts for God, for the living God.' And when he reflects on these very matters, he immediately recoils, is afraid, and knows that he is a small, lowly, dark creature standing with slight and meager understanding before the Perfect Knower, as David said, 'When I behold Your heavens, the work of Your fingers… what is man that You are mindful of him?' In light of these matters, I explain great principles from the work of the Master of the worlds so that they may serve as an opening for one who understands to love the Lord, as the Sages said regarding love: through this you come to recognize Him who spoke and the world came into being.

If so, it seems that the study of science leads to love of God and fear of Him. Certainly these two are important values in the world of Torah and Jewish law, and therefore it is clear that engaging in them cannot be called neglect of Torah study. Does that mean that they are 'Torah'? That is not at all clear.

For example, engaging in earning a livelihood also justifies not studying Torah; that is, one who is occupied with something for his livelihood is certainly not neglecting Torah study. On the other hand, it would be difficult to justify the claim that earning a livelihood is Torah study. Perhaps one can say on this basis that earning a livelihood is a commandment, but it is not plausible to claim that it is literally Torah study. The same applies to any engagement in a commandment (for Torah study is suspended for any commandment that cannot be deferred).

The conclusion is that even if we find that some occupation has value, and is even a commandment, that does not necessarily mean that it is Torah study (there are another 612 commandments in Jewish law besides the commandment of Torah study).

Admittedly, intellectual engagement in different fields of knowledge is a more plausible candidate (than earning a livelihood) to be included within the term 'Torah study,' but as we have seen, this does not necessarily follow from the words of Maimonides.

And indeed, the Sages themselves see great value in wisdom, and even esteem those who engage in it, and yet they are careful to distinguish between Torah and wisdom. Their well-known statement is (in Eikhah Rabbah, Buber ed., parashah 2):

'Her king and her princes are among the nations; there is no Torah.' If someone tells you, 'There is wisdom among the nations,' believe him, as it says, 'I will destroy the wise men of Edom, and understanding from Mount Esau' (Obadiah 1:8). If he tells you, 'There is Torah among the nations,' do not believe him, as it is written: 'Her king and her princes are among the nations; there is no Torah.'

These ideas find expression even in Jewish law. For we learned (Berakhot 58a):

The Rabbis taught: One who sees the sages of Israel says, 'Blessed is He who has apportioned of His wisdom to those who fear Him'; [upon seeing] sages of the nations of the world, he says, 'Blessed is He who has given of His wisdom to flesh and blood.'

That is, one who sees a sage from among the nations recites a blessing over him, seeing this as a gift from the wisdom of the Holy One, blessed be He, to flesh and blood. This law is also brought as normative law in the Shulchan Arukh Orach Chayim 224:6-7, although today for some reason people are not careful about it (see a lecture from 5761 on the 'Yeshiva' website on the internet, by Rabbi Melamed: 'Seeing unusual people and creatures').

If so, the conclusion apparently is that other wisdoms do indeed have value, and they are even part of the wisdom of the Holy One, blessed be He, and yet they are not Torah. This is the distinction between 'wisdom' and 'Torah.'

There are interesting halakhic disputes among the decisors regarding the law of the blessing over a Jewish sage whose wisdom is in other disciplines (a non-Jewish sage who is wise in Torah wisdom apparently does not exist according to the Sages, and at the very least there is a prohibition against teaching Torah to a gentile, so clearly no blessing was instituted for that). Some maintain that one should not recite any blessing over him at all (see Responsa Mishneh Halakhot, vol. 15, sec. 74; and see there all the curses and insults that he heaps upon the heads of Jews who waste their time on nonsense like physics and the like, Heaven preserve us. And by contrast, see Pahad Yitzhak on Hanukkah, essay 9, which says this too but for other reasons, and without curses), some maintain that one should recite over him the blessing recited over non-Jews (Gedulat Elisha, 224:8), and some maintain that one recites over him exactly the blessing recited over a sage in Torah wisdom (Responsa Hitorerut LiTeshuvah, I, 60; and Responsa Aholekh BaAmitekha 14:1).

It follows, then, that the dispute over how to relate to external wisdoms finds an interesting halakhic expression.

Is there really a difference?

At this point we can add that Maimonides himself, over the course of about three chapters in Foundations of the Torah, immediately after the above introduction (about the path to the love and fear of the Holy One, blessed be He), details at great length several principles of science (of his time, and he even mixes physics and metaphysics there), and apparently he sees this as actual chapters of Torah, and not merely as means to the love of God.

And at the end of those chapters he writes the following (Foundations of the Torah 4:10-13):

10. All these matters that we have discussed in this context are but a drop in the bucket, and they are deep matters; but they are not like the depth of the first and second chapters. The explanation of all these matters in the third and fourth chapters is what is called the Account of Creation, and thus the early Sages commanded that these matters not be expounded in public; rather, these matters are conveyed and taught to one person.

11. And what is the difference between the Account of the Chariot and the Account of Creation? The Account of the Chariot may not be expounded even to one person unless he is wise and understands on his own; one transmits to him only the chapter headings. But the Account of Creation is taught to an individual even if he does not understand it on his own, and one informs him of everything he can know of these matters. And why is it not taught to the many? Because not every person has a sufficiently broad mind to grasp the explanation and clarification of all these matters properly.

12. When a person contemplates these matters and knows all created beings, from angel and sphere to human being and the like, and sees the wisdom of the Holy One, blessed be He, in all formed things and all creatures, he increases in love for God; his soul thirsts and his flesh yearns to love the Blessed One. He fears and trembles at his own lowliness, poverty, and insignificance when he compares himself to one of the great holy bodies, all the more so to one of the pure forms separated from matter altogether, and he finds himself to be like an empty vessel, full of shame and disgrace, empty and lacking.

13. The subjects of these four chapters within these five commandments are what the early Sages called Pardes, as they said: 'Four entered Pardes.' And although they were the great ones of Israel and great sages, not all of them had the capacity to know and grasp all these matters properly. And I say that it is not fitting to stroll in Pardes except for one whose belly is filled with bread and meat; and 'bread and meat' is to know what is forbidden and permitted and the like among the other commandments. And although the Sages called these things a 'small thing,' for the Sages said, 'A great thing is the Account of the Chariot, and a small thing is the dialectics of Abaye and Rava,' nevertheless they are fit to be learned first, for they settle a person's mind at the outset. Moreover, they are the great good that the Holy One, blessed be He, bestowed for the ordering of this world, in order to inherit the life of the world to come, and it is possible for all to know them, small and great, man and woman, broad-hearted and narrow-hearted alike.

The conclusion is that Maimonides sees these subjects as foundations of the Torah, and in his view they are more important than the study of Torah in its classical sense (Jewish law and Talmudic discussions). Some understood from his introduction to his Mishneh Torah that the whole purpose of this composition was also to shorten the way for those who engage in Jewish law, so that they could learn the 'classical' Torah (=Jewish law) quickly, and not be prevented from engaging in the things that are truly important. This conclusion, however, is not necessary, and this is not the place to elaborate.

Maimonides' source is in the Talmud (Sukkah 28a and parallels), which says:

They said of Rabban Yohanan ben Zakkai that he left untouched neither Scripture nor Mishnah, Talmud, laws and aggadot, the fine points of the Torah and the fine points of the Scribes, a fortiori arguments and verbal analogies, astronomical cycles and numerical interpretations, the speech of the ministering angels, the speech of demons, the speech of palm trees, the parables of launderers, the parables of foxes, a great matter and a small matter. A great matter—the Account of the Chariot; a small matter—the dialectics of Abaye and Rava. To fulfill what is said in Proverbs 8: 'That I may cause those who love me to inherit substance; and I will fill their treasuries.'

That is, the Account of the Chariot is the great matter, and Jewish law (the dialectics of Abaye and Rava, Torah in its 'classical' sense) is the small matter. And upon this Maimonides offers his surprising interpretation that the Account of Creation is physics and the Account of the Chariot is metaphysics.

And in the introduction to his Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides goes even further and determines with greater precision:

We have already explained in our Talmudic works certain principles of this subject and drawn attention to many matters, and we mentioned there that the Account of Creation is natural science, and the Account of the Chariot is divine science. We also explained their saying, 'Nor [may one expound] the Chariot to one individual unless he is wise and understands on his own; one transmits to him only the chapter headings.' Accordingly, do not ask of me here anything beyond chapter headings. And even those headings are not arranged in this treatise in order, one after another; rather, they are scattered and mixed with other matters that we seek to explain, for my intention is that the truths should flash forth from it and then again be hidden, so that you will not oppose the divine intention (which one ought not oppose), which has made the truths pertaining to the apprehension of Him hidden from the multitude, as it says: 'The secret of the Lord is with those who fear Him.' And know that natural matters too should not be revealed by teaching even some of their principles in a clear way as they truly are. You already know the saying of the Sages, 'Nor [may one expound] the Account of Creation before two.' If someone were to explain all those matters in a book, it would be as though he had expounded them to thousands of people. Therefore these matters too were presented in the books of prophecy through parables, and the Sages spoke of them in riddles and parables, following the way of the sacred books, because these matters have a great affinity with divine wisdom and they too are among the secrets of divine wisdom. And do not think that those tremendous secrets are known by any of us to their ultimate end and limit—not so. Rather, at times the truth flashes before us so that we think it is day, and afterwards nature and habit conceal it from us, until we return to a dark night close to what we were at first, and we become like one upon whom lightning flashes again and again while he is in the thick darkness of night.

That is, Maimonides interprets 'the Account of Creation' as physics (= natural science), and 'the Account of the Chariot' as metaphysics (= divine science).[1]

Where, then, does the line between Torah and wisdom pass? If indeed every science is Torah, and perhaps even on a higher level than Torah in its classical sense, then where is the line? What is wisdom that is not Torah? I will try here to offer a suggestion that occurred to me. I have no proofs for it, but I have a strong feeling that it is correct.

Introduction to the proposal

The source of the proposal presented below is the feeling that there is a clear Torah significance to the study of philosophy. Moreover, many books of Jewish thought are nothing but philosophy expressed in Torah language and with Torah tools (as we saw above in Maimonides). Regarding the worn-out question whether there is such a thing as 'Jewish philosophy,' I tend to think that there is not. There is no philosophy that is painted in one specific color or another (of course there is 'the philosophy of x,' which defines different fields of discussion, depending on what one inserts in place of x). There is correct philosophy and incorrect philosophy. Incorrect philosophy, even if it is Jewish, is incorrect. And correct philosophy, even if it is not Jewish, is still the correct philosophy. Therefore 'Jewish philosophy' is a synonym for philosophy (= mine).

Are books of thought, such as Guide of the Perplexed or the Kuzari, which present the thought of Jewish sages, 'Torah' in its full sense? That seems problematic to me. And again, a feeling: these books seem to express positions that took shape in the minds of their authors, and not an interpretation of the Torah that we received by tradition from Sinai. Some of them do not even refer to sources, but even when they do, the sources are more illustration than actual source (see the Maharal). But not everything that takes shape in the mind of a Jewish sage is Torah. Are the medical books of Maimonides Torah? Presumably not. Are the remedies that appear in the Talmud itself Torah? Presumably that too is not the case (some of them, apparently, are not correct at all).

The subject of these books is philosophy. The tools are human-philosophical tools (which were often learned and drawn from gentiles). The fact that the author is a Torah scholar is no guarantee that the composition is 'Torah.' If so, why is an important philosophical book, such as Critique of Pure Reason (= by Immanuel Kant), not a Torah book? What is the difference between it and Orot HaKodesh, or Guide of the Perplexed? Perhaps the author's intention (whether he intended it for the sake of the service of God and the clarification of faith, or simply for the sake of wisdom). But why should it matter to the reader for what intention the book was composed? Seemingly what matters is the content, and in that respect, as noted, there appears to be no essential difference. Is Aristotle, who serves as the basis for a considerable portion of the Guide, holier than Kant? So why does one who makes use of Kantian philosophy create less 'Torah' than one who deals in Aristotelian physics and metaphysics (which is probably also less correct. At least in the scientific realm, what Maimonides calls 'the Account of Creation'—on that, no one disagrees)?

A proposal: the distinction between Torah as object (heftza) and Torah as subject (gavra)

There is a feeling that the dialectics of Abaye and Rava may perhaps be a small matter, but they are a 'heftza of Torah.' The meaning is that whoever studies them is studying Torah that was given at Sinai. I do not mean to claim that everything that appears in Ketzot HaChoshen, or in the novellae of Rashba, was given to Moses at Sinai. But these books were composed out of a sense that they are books of interpretation. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) who deal with Jewish law do so out of a sense of deference toward the material they study, and even when they create an original and novel interpretation, this is done out of a deep sense that this is the interpretation of the word of God, that this is what is written in the Torah before us, or in the Oral Torah that we received by tradition. By contrast, books of thought do not awaken such a feeling in me. There one finds thought—original or less original, intelligent or less intelligent, correct or less correct—but without the continuity required for the matter to be considered a continuation of the Torah that we received at Sinai. It is a new creation, in the sense of creation ex nihilo.[2]

I know of two stories about great Jewish sages who, in a time of distress, vowed not to engage in aggadic literature, because engagement in it involves speculation, and generally people do not aim at the truth. This is how the author of the Penei Yehoshua describes it in his introduction, and if I remember correctly I heard the same also about the prodigy of Meitzhit.

If so, there are things to which the title 'Torah' is given because they reflect the form of the Torah that is in our hands today. This is, of course, a completely different form from the one it had when it was given, but it is still the most faithful incarnation of the Torah that was given there, within our present conceptual and intellectual framework. That is what characterizes Torah in its classical sense. In conceptual Talmudic terms, one may say that this is 'Torah as heftza,' that is, Torah in an objective sense, independent of worldview, opinions, and methods of study. All the incarnations of the Torah that we received at Sinai are Torah. If a person studies these books, even if he does not agree with their way of thinking, he is engaged in Torah. There is certainly no neglect of Torah study here.

By contrast, there are other parts of Torah that do not constitute a faithful incarnation of the Torah that we received. They were not produced with the aim of interpreting that Torah; rather, they express chiefly the original creativity of great people in different periods. There is divine revelation there, one that comes through human beings (see, for example, in the book by Shalom Rosenberg, Lo BaShamayim Hi, on continuing revelation). In conceptual Talmudic terms, one may say that this is 'Torah as gavra' and not 'as heftza'; that is, Torah in a subjective sense. For those people who created it, and for those learners who connect to those works, this is Torah. But if there is someone who does not connect to them, reading them is a waste of time (or neglect of Torah study).

And what about importance?

Perhaps this is the reason (beyond the known technical reasons) that the yeshiva world focuses on the study of Torah in its classical sense. This despite the fact that everyone knows the words of Maimonides cited above. The reason is that there is full confidence there that study of this kind is Torah study and not neglect of Torah study. Moreover, in these areas one can set classes that suit everyone, since even someone for whom the specific method of study in that particular yeshiva does not speak, is still learning something of value; he is engaged in Torah.

Does this mean that the study of fields of thought is less important? Absolutely not. Rather, its value is subjective. For those who study these fields and are enriched and built by them, these are the 'great matter,' whereas the dialectics of Abaye and Rava are the 'small matter.' But for one who is not built by this study, there is neglect of Torah study here, and for him this is not Torah at all. Exactly as we said: Torah in the subjective sense.

Implications: back to the library

Up to this point I have continued the initial line of thought, which began from philosophy and its Torah importance. But what about literature, or other fields of knowledge that can build a Jewish-Torah personality? It seems to me that the same is true with respect to these works as well. Any field of knowledge can be included within the subjective concept of Torah (= 'Torah as gavra'), so long as the learner is indeed built by it, and his Jewish outlook (see 'Jewish philosophy') is enriched by it. But for others there is no Torah here.

And what about place in the library? Should one separate secular books from sacred books, or perhaps specifically not? In my library they are placed intermixed (under the influence of a visit to Rabbi Lichtenstein in Jerusalem). But perhaps in a public library, such as a yeshiva, there is room for such a separation. In a public place, one should place on the Torah shelf (= the Jewish bookshelf) books that are 'Torah' for all the learners in that place. In a private library, Torah can be defined subjectively, but in a public library it appears in the objective sense. There one should place only books that are 'Torah as heftza.'

Let me repeat that, in my humble opinion, both Orot HaKodesh and Guide of the Perplexed (at least significant parts of it) do not belong there (and that indeed is the practice in the more 'old-fashioned' yeshivot). Exactly like Critique of Pure Reason and the like.

And what about bringing such books into filthy places (= toilets and bathhouses)? One should not bring 'Torah' there, and not study Torah there. That is certainly true with respect to Ketzot HaChoshen and the novellae of Rashba. Is there, in this regard, room to distinguish between a Jewish book of thought and a philosophy book? My personal feeling is that there is, but I have no justification.

"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent"… (the end of Wittgenstein's Tractatus).

Regards to all from Mikhi and Dafna.

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[1] And see also there Part I, ch. 17; Part II, ch. 2, chs. 29-30, and the introduction to Part III; and likewise Part III, chs. 13 and 29. Also in Maimonides' introduction to the Mishnah, under the heading 'The fourth: expositions,' and elsewhere.

[2] Of course, there are different levels, and the picture is not binary (yes or no). I am describing two poles in order to sharpen the argument. One may then try to place each work on the axis between the Torah given to us at Sinai and wholly original human creation.