Two Notes on Torah Study (Column 479)
In honor of the approaching festival of Shavuot, I shall “punish” you with another column this week—this time, two notes about Torah study. These are matters I have written about before, but I decided to gather and organize them ahead of the holiday that is “entirely for you.” The column is divided into two parts: A. The purpose of study. B. Between Torah study and the commandment of Torah study. At the end I will try to connect the two.
A. The Purpose of Study
Toil in Torah and Torah “for its own sake”
At the beginning of Parashat Bechukkotai we find (Leviticus 26:3):
“If you walk in My statutes and keep My commandments and perform them.”
There are three components here in the service of God: to walk in His statutes, to keep His commandments, and to perform them. The apparent duplication is clear, and not for nothing do the Sages explain it in the following midrash, cited by Rashi here:
“If you walk in My statutes”—one might think this refers to fulfilling the commandments; but when it says “and you shall keep My commandments,” fulfillment of the commandments is already stated. What, then, do I fulfill with “If you walk in My statutes”? That you should labor in Torah.
“And you shall keep My commandments”—be toiling in Torah with the intent to guard and fulfill, as it is said (Deuteronomy 5:1): “You shall learn them and keep to do them.”
Rashi explains that to “walk in His statutes” is to labor in Torah. “And perform them” is to be taken literally (it appears that in the first clause he refers to “and perform them,” not to “and you shall keep My commandments,” since the latter is explained differently immediately afterward), and “and you shall keep My commandments” refers to studying with the intent to do. We thus learn that “toil in Torah” is not “study in order to act.” These are different levels and different modes of study. It seems that “toil in Torah” is not merely “sweating” over Torah as commonly understood, but engaging with it as an end in itself, not as a means to know what to do.
R. Ḥayyim of Volozhin in Nefesh HaChaim, Gate IV (ch. 3), which is devoted entirely to the conception of study as a value unto itself, cites the Rosh’s comments to Nedarim 62a:
“The truth is that the term ‘for its own sake’ means ‘for the sake of the Torah.’ The matter is as the Rosh explained regarding the statement of R. Elazar b. R. Tzadok (Nedarim 51a): ‘Do deeds for their own sake, and speak of them for their own sake.’ His words: ‘Do deeds for their own sake’—for the sake of the Holy One, blessed be He, Who wrought all things for His sake. ‘And speak of them for their own sake’—let all your speech and dealings in matters of Torah be for the sake of the Torah: to know, to understand, to increase learning and dialectic—not to quarrel or to aggrandize oneself… He was precise to explain the shift in R. Elazar b. R. Tzadok’s language: in deeds he said “for their own sake,” and in speech he said “for its own sake.” Therefore, concerning action he explained ‘for the sake of the Holy One…,’ whereas concerning study he explained ‘for the sake of the Torah,’ etc. His intent is clear: the performance of a commandment should ideally be with cleaving and utmost purity of thought according to one’s intellect and attainment, to bring praise above and effect rectifications in the worlds and powers and supernal orders—this is “for their own sake,” for “all that the Lord has made is for His sake,” and our Sages said: for His praise. And even though in commandments the essential requirement is the action itself, and the additional intention and purity of thought do not invalidate (as explained earlier), nevertheless the holiness and purity of one’s thought join the action to arouse and effect greater rectifications than if the commandment were performed without cleaving and holy thought. But regarding a person’s conduct when engaged in Torah in the laws of the commandments, he said “and speak of them”—that is, speech in matters of the commandments and their laws—‘for its own sake,’ meaning for the sake of the words of Torah: to know, to understand, to increase learning and dialectic. (And Rashi had another reading there: “for the sake of Heaven,” hence he explained that all your intent should be for Heaven. But the meaning of ‘for its own sake’ that our Sages use everywhere—even Rashi would explain here like the Rosh according to his text—and Rashi here does not intend cleaving, rather he excludes study for the sake of strife and pride, as the Rosh wrote…). And this is what the Talmud concludes regarding Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai—that he did not neglect… to fulfill that which is stated, ‘To endow those who love me with substance’ (Proverbs 8:21)—for it is explained in that passage that the ‘speaker’ is the holy Torah itself, which ‘cries out outside,’ and that it has the power to bequeath and give good reward to all who meditate and engage in it out of love for it itself—to increase learning and dialectic. These are ‘those who love me.’”
Torah study should not be done “for the sake of God” nor for any other goal besides the study itself—not even in order to act.
Further reflection on the sources
Indeed, the Sages extolled in several places the importance of studying in order to fulfill. But some of the statements are negative, such as Vayikra Rabbah, Bechukkotai, parashah 35:
“R. Yoḥanan said: One who learns not in order to do—it would have been fitting for his placenta to have been turned upon his face and that he never come into the world.”
This invalidates study done without intent to do, but it does not say that the goal of study is action. Study should be done “for its own sake,” but of course one must fulfill what emerges from it. One who studies with no intention to fulfill invalidates the study. There are also positive hyperboles in the very same midrash:
“R. Aḥa said: One who learns in order to do merits the holy spirit. What is the proof? ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate upon it day and night, in order that you observe to do according to all that is written in it; for then you shall make your way successful, and then you shall act wisely’ (Joshua 1:8). And ‘act wisely’ means the holy spirit, as it is said (Psalms 89:1): ‘A maskil of Ethan the Ezrahite.’”
These do not mean that the aim of study is action; rather, one who studies in order to act merits certain distinctions. But study itself is not necessarily defined as an activity whose purpose is to act or to know what to do.
And behold, in Kiddushin 40b (and many parallels) we find:
“R. Tarfon and the elders were once reclining in the upper story of the house of Nitza in Lod. The question was asked before them: Which is greater—study or deed? R. Tarfon answered: Deed is greater. R. Akiva answered: Study is greater. They all answered and said: Study is greater, for study leads to deed.”
The structure here is puzzling: if study is merely a means to deed, then deed is greater, and study is at most an accessory to a commandment. How then did they conclude from the fact that study leads to deed that study is greater? Moreover, the saying opens with a dispute and ends with a full chorus of consensus, without any argument. Why did R. Tarfon retract his previously firm position?
I once suggested that perhaps one should emend: “Study is great that it leads to deed,” i.e., the inquiry assumes two things—study and deed—and asks which is greater. In the end, all realize it is a mistaken inquiry, for there is only one thing: a chain of study that culminates in deed. Consequently, there is no sense in asking about each component separately which is greater; they are inseparable. So why is the conclusion that study is great? Because “study” means a mode of learning that leads to deed. Deed is not the goal of study but the form of correct study: when we learn, we conclude with a practical ruling (and of course we must also fulfill it in practice). This is the proper form of study—not that deed is the goal and study the means.
Study should end with the learner’s practical conclusion. From here we learn that those who split “analytic study” from “halakhic study” are not doing right. It is common among us that in analytic study one airs every notion freely in every direction without testing plausibility, and in halakhic study one consults codes and responsa to know what to do. The conclusion from here is that there is no such thing as “studying halakhah” as a separate track. There is Torah study, and Torah study is study that ends with a halakhic conclusion. Halakhah is the bottom line that emerges from analytic study. Incidentally, it follows that halakhah is not learned by perusing the Mishnah Berurah or the Shulḥan Arukh alone, for it should be the learner’s own conclusion (of course after studying the sugya, its commentators, and also those sefarim).
If a person studies instrumentally “in order to fulfill,” then the study is an accessory to a commandment, not a commandment itself. Hence, in the verse with which I began, the Torah distinguishes between studying in order to fulfill—which is important, to be sure, but is not the commandment of Torah study; it is an accessory to the commandments (for without it one cannot fulfill—“an ignoramus cannot be pious”)—and the toil of Torah itself, which is study for the sake of study, though its form is study that ends in a practical conclusion.
This distinction resembles the difference between two approaches to science and scientific research. R. Ovadia Yosef and his students understand the goal of study as halakhic knowledge and practical instruction; consequently the form of their study is less analytic and theoretical (though in my view, even to rule halakhah one must study differently). This resembles technologists who see scientific research as a necessary means toward technology and practical applications. The prevalent Lithuanian yeshivah outlook is different: there, study is not viewed as a means to instruction and practical knowledge but as a value unto itself—much as most scientists view scientific research. From their perspective, technological applications are a by-product (which usually also yields money and grants), not the goal or value of research.
The place of halakhah
In several places I have written that the core of the Torah is halakhah. Nefesh HaChaim there elaborates greatly. I have already noted that in ch. 6 he treats halakhah as the will and word of God, while aggadah is “the word of God” alone (implying that the degree of cleaving to God differs between engaging with halakhah and with aggadah). This is not the place to cite his words in detail. As is known, Rashi at the very opening of the Torah brings R. Yitzḥak’s question: why did the Torah not begin with “This month shall be for you…” but with Genesis? The question assumes that the essence of the Torah lies in the commandments; hence, Genesis and the first part of Exodus are, seemingly, superfluous (and of course there are more such parts). Aside from Rashi’s somewhat technical answer, the underlying assumption is that the essence of the Torah is halakhah. This can be seen elsewhere as well, and it is also a straightforward reason (for all the rest does not teach us anything by itself; we project upon it our own ideas and values). How does this square with the picture drawn above? There it seemed that study is not a means to know what to do, so halakhah should not enjoy a special status.
That is a mistake. The principal content of the Torah is halakhah, and halakhah indeed consists of practical directives (what to do). But this does not mean that the goal of study is action. Halakhah should be studied for its intrinsic value, not only to know what to do. In fact, it would be inaccurate to say that halakhah is a mere collection of “what to do.”
Is halakhah a collection of practical directives? R. Yisrael Salanter’s essay
R. Yisrael Salanter, in his Or Yisrael, discusses this point at length. His words appear in the essay “Ḥok u-Mishpat,” in Ketavim of R. Yisrael Salanter, published in the Dorot Library of the Bialik Institute (ed. Mordechai Pachter, p. 160). The essay’s subject is precisely our point: that study is not merely a means to practical observance. I will bring just two gems from it.
The epigraph to the essay is the Gemara in Sanhedrin 71a:
“In accordance with whom is the following teaching? ‘A wayward and rebellious son never was and never will be; and why was it written? Expound and receive reward.’ In accordance with whom? R. Yehudah. Alternatively, it is R. Shimon, as it was taught: R. Shimon said: Because this one ate a tartimar of meat and drank half a log of Italian wine, shall his father and mother bring him out to be stoned? Rather, there never was and never will be; and why was it written? Expound and receive reward. R. Yonatan said: I saw him and sat upon his grave. In accordance with whom is the following teaching? ‘An idolatrous city never was and never will be; and why was it written? Expound and receive reward.’ In accordance with whom? R. Eliezer. As it was taught: R. Eliezer says: Any city that has even one mezuzah cannot be made an idolatrous city… R. Yonatan said: I saw it and sat upon its ruin. In accordance with whom is the following teaching? ‘A leprous house never was and never will be; and why was it written? Expound and receive reward.’ In accordance with whom? R. Elazar b. R. Shimon… R. Eliezer b. R. Tzadok said: There was a place within the boundary of Gaza that they called Ḥorvata Segirta. R. Shimon, a man of Kefar Akko, said: Once I went to the Galilee and I saw a place that they were marking, and they said: “Stones afflicted with leprosy were cleared there.”
Three halakhic topics appear here—wayward son, leprous house, and idolatrous city—none of which ever occurred nor will ever occur (apparently due to conditions the Sages imposed on their implementation). Yet in each case there is also an opinion that it did occur, supported by eyewitness testimony (“I saw it”). It is strange for a tannaitic opinion to flatly deny a reported fact, and this has been discussed.
In any case, RYS challenges the thesis that these laws were written merely so that we “expound and receive reward.” What—without them the Torah would not suffice to occupy us all our lives? Has anyone finished everything, such that only these “extra” non-practical passages keep him busy? What would be lost if these seemingly superfluous, non-practical passages were omitted?
He therefore explains that the Gemara should be understood differently: these passages were written to teach us the principle of “expound and receive reward”—that we do not study merely to know what to do. If study were a means to practical knowledge, then occupying ourselves with these passages would be a waste of Torah time. But they were not written for themselves; they were written to teach that the whole Torah is not only a means to know what to do but has intrinsic value: “Expound and receive reward.”[1]
He adds the Gemara in Nedarim 81a:
“Why is it that Torah scholars are not commonly found to have Torah-scholar sons? R. Yosef said: So that people not say: Torah is their inheritance. R. Sheishet son of R. Idi said: So that they not become haughty over the community. Mar Zutra said: Because they lord over the community. R. Ashi said: Because they call people ‘donkeys.’ Ravina said: Because they do not recite the blessing over the Torah first, as R. Yehudah said in the name of Rav: What is the meaning of the verse ‘Who is the wise man who will understand this?’ This matter was asked of the sages and of the prophets, but they did not explain it, until the Holy One, blessed be He, explained it Himself, as it is written: ‘Because they have forsaken My Torah’—i.e., they did not listen to My voice and did not walk in it. R. Yehudah said in the name of Rav: they did not recite the blessing over the Torah first.”
The conclusion is that they did not recite the blessing over Torah study, and the Gemara regards this as “not listening to God’s voice” and “forsaking His Torah.” RYS wonders: how could people who dedicate their lives and energies to Torah study “cut corners” on the blessing? And why does the Gemara see it as so severe that such a punishment results? He explains that this is not a matter of sloppiness but a principled stance.
The Gemara in Menachot 42b states:
“R. Ḥiyya son of R. Huna sent in the name of R. Yoḥanan: On the arm-tefillin one says, ‘…who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to lay tefillin’; on the head-tefillin one says, ‘…commanded us concerning the commandment of tefillin.’ But to make tefillin one does not recite a blessing. Why? Any commandment whose making completes the commandment—such as circumcision—even though a gentile may do it, the Israelite must recite a blessing. But any commandment whose making does not complete the commandment—such as tefillin—even though a gentile may not make them, an Israelite does not recite a blessing [on the making].”
The Gemara teaches that we do not bless on accessories to a commandment (e.g., making tefillin).
RYS explains that those Torah scholars regarded Torah as a means to know what to do—i.e., as an accessory to the commandments—and therefore did not recite the blessing over Torah. The result (not a punishment) is that their sons did not turn out to be scholars themselves, for a Torah understood as a means and not as an end will not be transmitted to the next generations. People then see no importance in study except to know what to do, so they study the Kitzur Shulḥan Arukh or Mishnah Berurah.
The blessing over Torah for women
And since we are speaking of the blessing over Torah, the Shulḥan Arukh rules at the end of §47:
“Women recite the blessing over the Torah.”
This is surprising, as the commentaries there already note: women are not obligated in the commandment of Torah study, so why should they bless? Their premise is that the blessing over Torah is a commandment-blessing—a matter hotly debated.
The Bi’ur Halakhah there summarizes the later authorities:
“The reason: for they are obligated to learn the laws that apply to them; and further, they must recite the passages of the offerings just as they are obligated in prayer; thus the blessing relates to that (Beit Yosef, Magen Avraham). According to this reason, a woman could discharge a man’s obligation in the blessing over Torah; so writes the Pri Megadim explicitly. The Vilna Gaon, in his commentary, disagrees with this reason, see there. Rather, the reason women may bless is that even though they are exempt from Torah [study], nevertheless they may bless and say ‘…commanded us,’ no worse than any positive time-bound commandment, over which we hold that women may recite a blessing (see §17:2). According to this, they cannot discharge a man’s obligation; and certainly a minor who has reached the age of training cannot discharge an adult in the blessing over Torah, according to the many authorities who hold that the blessing over Torah is biblical; so too writes the Pri Megadim.”
The Magen Avraham holds that they bless because they must learn the laws that apply to them. But this is puzzling: if so, it is incorrect to say that women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study—they are obligated in the laws that apply to them. We are forced to say that study in order to know what to do is not the commandment of Torah study. Women are exempt from the mitzvah of Torah study, but of course they too must learn in order to know what to do. Not for nothing do other later authorities say that women cannot discharge others’ obligation, because they are not truly obligated in the mitzvah, and their blessing is not a normal commandment-blessing (perhaps like women’s blessings on time-bound commandments).
But if we understand that the blessing over Torah is a blessing of praise rather than a commandment-blessing (and that is the straightforward reading; many hold it is biblical), then the question does not arise. Women too must offer praise for the Torah given to us, even if they are not obligated in the commandment of Torah study. This assumes, of course, that Torah study is not just one commandment among the 613; it is far more foundational. Not for nothing did the Sages extol its value as “equal to them all” (Pe’ah 1:1), and greater than many very great things. For that we must praise God with the blessing over Torah—and that obligation applies also to women. According to this, they indeed can discharge all of us with the blessing, since it is not a commandment-blessing and thus not tied to obligation in the mitzvah; see further below.
B. Between Torah Study and the Commandment of Torah Study
The Nedarim sugya: Is Torah study discretionary?
In Nedarim 8a we find:
“Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: From where do we know that one may swear to fulfill a commandment? As it is said (Psalms 119): ‘I have sworn and I will fulfill, to observe Your righteous judgments.’ But is he not already sworn at Sinai? Rather, this teaches that it is permitted for a person to motivate himself. And Rav Gidel said in the name of Rav: One who says, ‘I will rise early and study this chapter’ or ‘I will study this tractate’—he has vowed a great vow to the God of Israel. But is he not already sworn and standing, and an oath does not take effect upon another oath! What does this teach? That even mere self-encouragement (is valid)?—that is already Rav Gidel’s first teaching! Rather, this teaches that since, if he wished, he could exempt himself by reciting Shema in the morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him.”
Rav Gidel rules that since one can technically discharge oneself with Shema morning and evening from the commandment of Torah study, therefore an oath to study an additional chapter is a discretionary matter, and the oath takes effect.
The Ran on the page objects:
“‘Since, if he wished, he could exempt himself…’—It seems to me this is not precise, for one is obligated to study constantly, day and night, according to his ability; and we say in Kiddushin 30a: ‘And you shall teach them’—that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, such that if someone asks you, you should not stammer… and Shema morning and evening does not suffice for this. Rather, it seems to me a proof for what I wrote… that anything derived from a derashah, even though it is biblical, since it is not explicitly written in the verse, an oath can take effect upon it. And here this is the meaning: since, if he wished, he could exempt himself with what is written explicitly—“when you lie down and when you rise up,” with Shema morning and evening—therefore the oath takes full effect upon him, even to require a sacrifice, like a discretionary matter…”
That is, in his view there is an obligation (derived by derashah) to study all day and to know all Torah. Therefore, an oath to study an additional chapter is not discretionary; however, since this obligation is from derashah and not explicit, an oath can take effect upon it.
But the anonymous commentator there writes differently:
“‘Since, if he wished, he could exempt himself with Shema morning and evening’—for since he fulfilled ‘this book of the Torah shall not depart’ with Shema, as R. Shimon b. Yoḥai says in Menachot 99b: ‘Whoever recites Shema morning and evening, he has fulfilled “this book of the Torah shall not depart,”’ and since, if he wished, he could exempt himself from ‘and you shall teach them’ with Shema—he has discharged his obligation from that oath of Sinai; therefore, when he says ‘I will study this chapter,’ since he had already exempted himself, the oath takes effect.”
It follows that any study beyond Shema morning and evening is truly discretionary.
So, too, the Rosh on the page:
“This is Rav Gidel’s first teaching—this comes to teach that since, if he wished, he could exempt himself… therefore the oath takes effect upon him, for it is not an obligation but a discretionary good, like a vow to improve one’s lot.”
Here the language is explicit: Torah study beyond morning and evening Shema is indeed discretionary.
This is very difficult—beyond the derashah cited by the Ran. There is an obligation to know the entire Torah (see the essays of Birkas Shmuel, Kiddushin 27, etc.). One cannot arrive at knowledge of Torah via Shema morning and evening. Is it possible that Torah study as a whole is only discretionary? Moreover, the Gemara itself in several places uses the term “bitul Torah” (neglect of Torah). For example, in Berakhot 5a we find:
“Rava (some say Rav Ḥisda) said: If one sees afflictions coming upon him, he should examine his deeds… If he examined and found none, he should attribute them to neglect of Torah, as it is said: ‘Happy is the man whom You chasten, Lord, and out of Your Torah You teach him’ (Psalms 94). And if he attributed and found none, it is known that they are afflictions of love…”
Clearly, there is a demand upon one who did not study; hence it is not merely discretionary.[2]
Explanation: An obligation without a command
It is clear that the obligation to study and to know the whole Torah is a true obligation. But it does not stem from a command. The Torah expects us to study out of understanding what Torah is, not because we were commanded. A command to study Torah would reduce it to a regular commandment. This is akin to what I have written more than once regarding the commandment of repentance and other matters (see, for example, my essay here). Had the Torah commanded us to study, we would do so as “commanded and performing,” like any other commandment. The Torah chooses not to command, so as to leave this obligation great and foundational, rather than count it among the 613. Rav Kook writes something similar in his letters about the absence of an explicit obligation to work on one’s character traits (see my essay cited above).
Consequences of this distinction can be seen in my essay on sevarot (where the analysis of the Menachot sugya to be presented momentarily also appears). For example, this obligation devolves upon anyone who understands its significance; there are no formal exemptions as we find in other parts of halakhah—no exemption for minors, for women, for Israelites versus converts, and perhaps even not for a gentile. We shall return to this below.
The Menachot sugya
In Menachot 99b there is a sugya whose subtext, in my view, revolves entirely around this point:
“R. Ami said: From the words of R. Yose we learn: Even if a person learned only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled [the verse], ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth’ (Joshua 1:8). R. Yoḥanan said in the name of R. Shimon b. Yoḥai: Even if a person read only Shema morning and evening—he has fulfilled ‘shall not depart.’”
It seems like a contest of who can minimize the commandment of Torah study more: R. Ami suffices with a chapter morning and evening, while R. Yoḥanan raises him: since we recite Shema anyway morning and evening, there is no need to add another chapter. Shema itself discharges one’s obligation even in the commandment of Torah study. If R. Ami minimizes the commandment to a bare minimum, R. Yoḥanan empties it of content entirely.
No wonder the Gemara now brings a dispute:
“This matter should not be said before ignoramuses.” But Rava said: “It is a mitzvah to say it before ignoramuses.”
If truly there is no obligation to study beyond this, what is the problem with saying it before the ignoramus? At worst, he will not study—but from that perspective there is no problem. We are forced to say that even if there is no commandment to study, there is the problem of bitul Torah—that is, there is an obligation without a command.
What lies at the heart of the dispute about whether to say this before ignoramuses? It appears they disagree whether the fact that one can discharge himself with a chapter morning and evening means that the value of study is small, or that its value is so great that we were therefore not commanded. R. Yoḥanan holds: do not say it before the ignoramus, for he will not understand and will think he is exempt—an ignoramus is one who thinks that only what is commanded must be done. Rava holds: it is a mitzvah to say it before the ignoramus, for this will demonstrate to him how weighty and foundational study is, and will spur him to study—something a formal command might not accomplish.
Immediately thereafter the Gemara brings an episode:
“Ben Dama, the nephew of R. Yishmael, asked R. Yishmael: Someone like me, who has learned the entire Torah—may I study Greek wisdom?”
A student once asked me: if he knows the entire Torah, how does he not know this question? My answer: he knows everything the Torah commands—all the formal Torah and halakhah. There is nothing more for him to learn from the sources in that sense. But this question is not about a formal obligation, for as we saw, there is no such halakhic command. The question addresses the obligation beyond the formal: Ben Dama asks whether, since there is no formal command, there is also no obligation to study. It is not part of the formal halakhah, which he already knows in full.
His uncle, R. Yishmael, answered him:
“He recited about him this verse: ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate upon it day and night’—go and find a time that is neither of the day nor of the night, and then learn Greek wisdom.”
If you can find a time that is neither day nor night—you may neglect Torah then. In our terms: although there is no command, you are certainly not permitted to desist from study day and night. This is not a formal halakhic obligation but a meta-halakhic one. The commentators in Nedarim do not cite “shall not depart,” for it is a promise, not a command. R. Yishmael answers Ben Dama with a response beyond the formal obligation.
Now the Gemara brings an opposing view:
“And this disagrees with R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani…”
This is astonishing. If we seek someone who disagrees with R. Yishmael, we have them at the beginning of the sugya: two amoraim (R. Ami and R. Yoḥanan), and even a tanna (R. Shimon). Why does the Gemara seek out someone else? Evidently, R. Yoḥanan, R. Ami, and R. Shimon do not disagree with him. All agree there is an obligation but no command. They defined the command, and then R. Yishmael adds that despite that there is still an obligation—just as we saw in Nedarim. Only R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani truly disagrees with R. Yishmael and his colleagues.
How so? Note how the Gemara presents his words:
“R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani said in the name of R. Yonatan: This verse is neither an obligation nor a command, but a blessing. The Holy One, blessed be He, saw that Torah was exceedingly beloved to Joshua, as it is said (Exodus 33): ‘His attendant Joshua son of Nun, a lad, would not depart from the tent.’ He said to him: ‘Joshua, are the words of Torah so beloved to you? This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth…’”
We should note his phrasing: “neither obligation nor command, but a blessing.” What is the difference between an obligation and a command? It seems that “obligation” here means a formal halakhic command, whereas “command” means a non-formal obligation (one might reverse the terms, but beyond terminology this is the idea). We saw that R. Yishmael holds it is a “command” but not an “obligation” (in the Gemara’s idiom: a non-formal obligation). It is no surprise that R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani—and he alone—disagrees, saying it is neither obligation nor command, but a blessing (a benediction/promise). And indeed the verse “shall not depart” is a promise; all may agree to that. But from this promise we learn the value of Torah study, and it becomes clear that there is an obligation even without a command.
To cap it off, the Gemara brings this baraita:
“The school of R. Yishmael taught: Words of Torah should not be upon you as a burden, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.”
Note that the speaker is none other than R. Yishmael. He means: there is no formal obligation (and in that R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani is correct), but you are not permitted to exempt yourself (as Ben Dama thought). This is precisely the appropriate summation of the sugya. Incidentally, even R. Shmuel b. Naḥmani—who apparently disputes my conception—may accept it; he merely argues that it is not taught by this verse.
The contradiction to the Berakhot sugya
Several later authorities raised a direct contradiction between the sugya in Menachot and the sugya in Berakhot 35b (see, e.g., the appendix to R. Yehuda Levi’s article, HaMa’ayan, Tevet 5737):
“Our Rabbis taught: ‘And you shall gather your grain’—what does this teach? Since it is said (Joshua 1): ‘This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,’ one might think [to take] the words literally. Therefore it says: ‘And you shall gather your grain’—conduct yourself with them in the way of the world—these are the words of R. Yishmael. R. Shimon b. Yoḥai says: Is it possible that a man plows in the plowing season, sows in the sowing season, harvests in the harvest season, threshes in the threshing season, and winnows in the windy season—what will become of the Torah? Rather, when Israel do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by others… and when Israel do not do His will, their work is done by themselves… Abaye said: Many acted like R. Yishmael and succeeded; [those who acted] like R. Shimon b. Yoḥai did not succeed.”
R. Shimon, who holds that Shema morning and evening suffices, here does not compromise and demands constant, total study. And R. Yishmael, who there demands “day and night,” here reveals a rather liberal stance and permits involvement in other matters. This is a double, head-on contradiction—a “role reversal”—and it is no wonder many later authorities grapple with it.
But those later authorities overlook the words of the earlier ones we saw in Nedarim and the upshot of the Talmud’s flow in Menachot. On our approach, there is no contradiction. There is no fundamental dispute between R. Shimon and R. Yishmael; both agree that the commandment of Torah study is minimal, but the obligation is comprehensive. The debate in Berakhot is a secondary, downstream question: once we understand all this, may one go out to work, or should the non-formal obligation even preclude that? The tannaim disagree about this, but that does not touch the basic parameters of the commandment of Torah study.
In practice, the discussion is not about the parameters of the commandment of Torah study, but about Torah study itself. The commandment is fulfilled with Shema morning and evening, but the obligation—or “Torah study” plainly, not the commandment—is in force at every moment. This does not mean one may not engage in anything else, as R. Yishmael teaches. There are legitimate pursuits, and regarding them there is room for discussion (enjoyment, art, hobbies, livelihood, etc.—this is the question of leisure; see here), but in the background there is a sweeping obligation that every free moment should be filled with: Torah study.
C. Conclusion: The Connection Between the Two Notes, and Back to Women
What the conclusion about “study for its own sake” concerns
The conclusion that Torah should be studied for its own sake—not for any other purpose (including practical observance)—applies primarily to Torah study, not to the commandment of Torah study. One discharges one’s duty in the commandment morning and evening, and there it is clear that this is not study aimed at knowledge or observance. To know and to observe, one must study the whole Torah. But even there, study is not a mere accessory to a commandment; it is an act of intrinsic value. Even the study that does advance halakhic knowledge should be done for its own sake, not as a mere means to know what to do. As we saw, study in order to know what to do is not the commandment of Torah study but an accessory to the commandments. The commandment of Torah study proves this: there it is plainly about engagement itself (contact with Torah), not practical knowledge—hence Shema morning and evening suffices. And from the commandment of Torah study we learn about Torah study itself.
Conclusions regarding women’s Torah study and the blessing over Torah
In my essay on women’s obligation in Torah study I presented this analysis and concluded that although women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, they are obligated in Torah study. I argued there that any non-formal obligation admits of no formal exemptions: an obligation grounded in reasoned understanding of the importance of the matter binds anyone who understands it—women and even minors (!)—not in the commandment of Torah study, but in Torah study. I wrote similarly regarding minors’ obligations in commandments that are grounded in reason (see my essay on sevarot).
Note the implication: contrary to common belief, women are obligated to study—day and night, analytically—all areas of Torah, exactly as men are. In contrast to what might be implied by the Magen Avraham and the Mishnah Berurah cited above, it is precisely in the theoretical component that they are obligated. In the practical component—where study is a means to know what to do—there is an obligation only regarding the commandments that pertain to them. The exemption of women from the commandment of Torah study is perhaps a declaration, but it carries little practical significance (they would not need to recite Shema morning and evening, at least as a matter of the commandment of Torah study). But in Torah study they are fully obligated, and this pertains not only to commandments in which women are included, but to the entire Torah in all its parts.
Now you can understand why it is no wonder that women are obligated in the blessing over Torah. We saw this is a blessing of praise, not a commandment-blessing. Therefore, even if women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study and a commandment-blessing would not apply, Torah study itself applies to them just as to men; hence it is no surprise they must recite the blessing of praise for the Torah given to all of us. According to this, they can also discharge anyone else with the blessing.
[1] There is room to analyze how “three verses coming as one” can teach (and this is not the place).
[2] Specifically in that context one could interpret “bitul Torah” as neglect of fulfilling the commandments of the Torah; but the term certainly also refers to neglect of study.
Discussion
1. I dealt at great length with the definition of the domains of Torah study in the second book of my trilogy. That includes Tanakh and aggadot (which in my opinion are not included in Torah in the sense of the object itself, at most in the sense of the person, if at all. In my view one learns nothing from them, and I doubt whether those who said otherwise intended to teach anything beyond the little sermonettes heard today in synagogues and at festive meals).
Here I will comment briefly on your questions. When it comes to Torah laws, even the interpretive reasonings of the sages enter the category of Torah study, just like your reasonings and mine. This is study of the halakhah given at Sinai. The only difference is that the reasonings of the Talmudic sages were accepted as halakhah. That does not mean they are holier than your reasonings; it means they are binding in practice.
I really do think that studying the details of the definition of a rabbinic law is the study of halakhah, but not Torah study in the sense I defined here.
2. One of our problems with Hazal's halakhic exegesis (as opposed to aggadah) is that we do not understand their methods of interpretation, and we also do not know which of their conclusions are products of tradition and which the exegesis merely supports. Therefore the assumption is that we rely on what they said, so long as we do not have clear indications that they erred.
With God's help, 4 Sivan 5782
The importance of study that shapes the learner's world of faith and values, and connects his intellectual and emotional world with the wisdom and will of God and with the depth of the wisdom of the sages of the generations—is twofold.
Besides study being an 'act' in itself, since Torah study is one of the commandments—Torah study has 'added value' in that it is a cornerstone that brings the learner to careful observance of the commandments, both on the practical level, since without knowledge of Torah one cannot fulfill the commandments properly without error—but even more than that, profound study, which reveals to a person the conceptual and intellectual depths in the Torah, its general principles and its details—nothing is better suited to arouse the learner to fulfill his Creator's will in the finest way.
And not for nothing do we ask in the blessing over Torah: 'Please make the words of Your Torah sweet in our mouths and in the mouths of our descendants and the descendants of Your people the house of Israel.' The sense of sweetness in study—is the great guarantor that our study will lead to action.
With the blessing of receiving the Torah with joy, Hanokh Heinekh Fainshmakker-Palti
It is therefore clear that the content of study that arouses one to action differs from learner to learner. There are those whom conceptual analysis arouses to action, and there are those for whom Scripture, aggadah, Hasidism, Jewish thought, and clear-cut practical halakhot will arouse them to increase love and awe and to be more exacting in their deeds. It is fitting that each person examine what kind of study gives him life, and not afflict himself with 'important' and prestigious study in which his soul finds no taste or interest.
Halakhah is the main content of the Torah. Therefore, the main study is the study of halakhah. What is that if not studying in order to know what to do? In other words, what value is there in learning what to do if not in order to do it?
My feeling is that you wrote in a negative way (study is not to know what to do, halakhah is not a collection of instructions, etc.), whereas it should have been put positively (so what is the purpose of study? To know what? If halakhah is not a collection of instructions, what is it??)
I devoted an entire section to this. Halakhah is practical instruction, but studying it is not meant in order to know what to do; it is meant in order to cleave to God's will. Of course, once one studies, one must also fulfill it.
If so, does "Torah study" also make sense even without the Giving of the Torah?
At Sinai the normative sphere was created, but before that God's will had already appeared in one way or another (for example, when He spoke with our father Abraham), and if Torah study is studying His will in order to cleave to Him, then even before Sinai one could say that they were studying Torah, right? Or, in other words, if we take it far enough, is there really no connection between Torah study and the festival of Shavuot?
What about general principles that are not interpretation, like the discussion whether there is or is not retroactive clarification, when and why? Is that study of the halakhah given at Sinai? Do these reasonings derive from a specific interpretation of the halakhic corpus given at Sinai? Suppose someone says there is retroactive clarification—what would lead him to think there isn't, apart from an explicit verse that dealt with the law of retroactive clarification? If there is no such commandment, then apparently that line of thought is independent of the halakhah given at Sinai.
1. Regarding the ignoramus—it is unlikely that an ignoramus would make such a complicated pilpul, that if the obligation is only the recitation of Shema, this can only mean that Torah study is too important to be commanded. It is much more likely that the question was whether it is preferable that he be a wicked person in his own right (a discussion we hear a lot in our generation in the Haredi world: is someone who earns a living "second class"? It is possible that even within the study halls of the Tannaim, where there was hostility or contempt between the sages and the ignoramuses, there was this kind of motivation of "drawing close")
2. Regarding Torah study for women—the presentation makes it sound as though the ordinary person engages in the discussions of Abaye and Rava all the time, and women as well. It is more plausible that the command was given to men with the intention that they would engage intensively in all parts of Torah, whereas women are not required to do so, but merely permitted
3. It seems that both my questions stem from a disagreement over a basic conception—is it really reasonable to assume that Torah study is an "obligation without a commandment," or is the intuitive and simpler assumption more correct, according to which Torah study is a commandment in the nature of an optional one, like giving charity, which a person fulfills according to his ability (a definition the Rambam uses in similar contexts), but there is no need to aspire to the unattainable goal of knowing the entire Torah—only to be obligated to fulfill this commandment as much as possible.
4. Are the words of Nefesh HaHayyim written at the beginning of the column being taken as an axiom on which the entire column is built? The book was not given at Sinai.
What is the logic of studying something specific that has *only* formal authority? (Or whose component of substantive authority is highly doubtful.) Formal authority is directed toward practice, and it does not seem reasonable to study its contents for their own sake. Or is it?
I don't think so. Torah is God's will as expressed in commandment. The rest is at most God's word, not God's will (in R. Hayyim Vital's terminology).
1. When one says this to an ignoramus, one also explains the principle to him.
2. I presented my proofs and arguments. If it does not seem plausible to you—then it doesn't.
3. I did not understand what a commandment in the nature of permission is. A non-obligatory but fulfillable commandment? The Raavad at the beginning of his commentary to Sifra writes that women's optional laying-on of hands overrides a prohibition. Meaning that even a non-obligatory positive commandment overrides a prohibition, and it is plausible that in his view an oath also does not take effect against it.
4. An illustration.
I wrote above in response that rabbinic laws do not involve Torah study in the sense I am speaking of here, but only a means to know what to do. But in Torah laws, one can study any interpretation, authoritative or not, and that is engagement with Torah and therefore Torah study. Therefore even studying views that were rejected in practical halakhah is full-fledged Torah study. The difference between studying Rabbi Akiva's interpretation and studying mine is only with regard to knowing what to do (because he has formal authority).
Those principles too are interpretation of the Torah. They do not arise from it but from reason, yet they are interpretive tools for the Torah.
With God's help, 4 Sivan 5782
Knowing the 'reasons of the Torah,' the spiritual and ethical world of those who shaped halakhic literature—Hazal, the Rishonim, and the Aharonim—is of special importance for anyone who presumes to issue first-order halakhic rulings and assumes that changes in reality require changes in halakhah. For one cannot propose distinctions between the days of Hazal and our own unless one is aware of the depth of the reasons behind the halakhot.
Therefore one may wonder about the author of the post, who presumes to innovate in halakhah—how can he exclude from the category of 'Torah study' Scripture, Midrash and aggadic literature, and the literature of thought and philosophy by the sages of the generations, Rishonim and Aharonim? Without deep knowledge of the reasons of the Torah—how can we truly understand the tendencies and rationales of halakhah?
With blessings, Elisaf Gershon Brotzky (Bar-Tzadok)
I think the difficulty raised by EA is real, and I do not see your answer as an adequate response.
In principle, the position you express in the column here is that the will of God, expressed in the value of Torah study, precedes the divine command expressed in the Torah itself. But here you introduce the opposite idea (and hence the paradox): in order to ground the priority of the divine will over the command, you rely on the Torah itself—that is, you rely on the command in the Torah. This creates a kind of logical loop.
You may try to defend yourself by claiming that you infer the priority of the divine will from your reason, not from the Torah itself. You have tried to do that many times in the past. But such a defense, if it is to succeed, must show that the Torah at least allows such a move. I do not think that is the case.
As my predecessor hinted: at Sinai we were given a supreme norm—to see the Torah itself (that is, the "command") as the source of all norms whatsoever. Therefore I argue that your proposal to place the divine will before the divine command directly contradicts the Torah's central move.
I did not understand the difficulty. Obviously our obligation to God's will is not because of the Torah, since our obligation to the Torah itself derives from it. Rather, in His own will the Holy One told us that His will appears in two forms: in reason or prior revelation, and in what appears in the Torah as commandment (which is halakhah). So what is my contradiction here?
I do not disagree with your claim that obligation to God's will is not because of the Torah. I claim that the Torah is what disagrees with you, especially if we interpret "Torah" as you do—that is, by placing the commandments (halakhah) at the center.
If at the center of the Torah stands a normative "commanding" claim (as opposed, for example, to factual claims), telling us that Torah study is primary, then a simple thing follows logically: the command precedes God's will. This is a paradox, and EA already hinted at it earlier. Note that one cannot compromise here: the claim about the Torah's commanding character is a categorical claim.
As an aside, I would note that Leibowitz identified this paradox very well, though he located it in a somewhat different arena (the relationship between Written Torah and Oral Torah). Leibowitz's mistake was—and on this you and I actually agreed in the past—that he thought it was solvable because it exists in the religious sphere. That is, of course, nonsense.
Could I get a translation into Hebrew? Even with a microscope I don't see a question here, nor any connection between the premise and the conclusion. Really, the words just don't connect for me.
The term interpretation is vague. I asked from a certain angle: does this principle depend on any concrete content that was said at Sinai? The Torah said that a bill of divorce must be written for her sake and that one must separate terumah; then so-and-so came and said, in all matters there is retroactive clarification. Now I ask: if the commandment had been to summon the defendant with a writ written specifically for him, or to separate 4% of the persimmons and feed them to nursing camels, then too would that same person have held that there is retroactive clarification.
If I understand correctly, you are saying that it is possible that in every matter whatsoever that person says there is retroactive clarification, and his view is indeed independent of any concrete content given at Sinai, and nevertheless this is "interpretation" of the Torah and there is value in engaging that principle for its own sake. I don't understand that.
I'm not surprised.
1. Do you understand that I agree with you that God's will precedes the Torah, or the command, or even halakhah?
2. Do you understand that a body of knowledge whose essence is normative (commanding) cannot make factual claims about the world? For example, it cannot claim that there is a God, that there was a revelation at Mount Sinai, that the Torah was given there, and so on. All these are factual claims, and although the Torah in fact makes them, according to your own interpretation it cannot do so… Therefore I say that there is a contradiction between your position and the Torah's position.
3. For someone like you, who has dealt so much with the naturalistic fallacy, it should not have been hard to understand my words. I am not saying you have to agree or accept them… only to understand them.
Maybe EA understands and can help me..
Would you not change in the slightest the study for its own sake—meaning the directions of thought and the volume of engagement with a certain subject, and which line of reasoning to develop all the way and examine closely and in which directions (as distinct from your final conclusion)—if formal authority did not exist in the world at all, not for the Gemara and not for the Rishonim? Why study mainly Gemara and not the responsa of Avnei Nezer, or the Mishnah on its own?
As long as you are engaged in interpretation of commandments and halakhot, that is Torah study. Your own interpretation also includes your principles and insights, and that is part of interpretation. So too the principles of Hazal, like retroactive clarification, and of course also those that were not decided as halakhah (like retroactive clarification in Torah law). Authority pertains only to the question of what, out of what you study, is practical halakhah; but as for the definition of the study itself, it has no implication.
So yes, you understood correctly, and that seems to me very simple and very logical.
Did you translate it into Turkish (sorry, Turkian? They changed the name)? Still not a single word connects to the one before it for me. God's will precedes the Torah and halakhah. A body of knowledge can certainly make claims about the world (for example, a scientific body of knowledge). A normative body does not make claims about the world—that I completely agree with, of course. So far everything is correct. Where is the contradiction here? I am really at a loss. I do not understand a word.
I don't think so. It is only a question of efficiency. If one is already studying Torah, it makes sense to focus on sources accepted as halakhah because that also yields halakhic knowledge in addition to Torah knowledge. But from the standpoint of the study itself, it makes no difference at all.
They changed it to Turkian? That's news to me.
You characterized the Torah first and foremost as a normative body—"halakhah," "commandments," etc. So even by your own account it says nothing about the world.
I could suggest a historical comparison to another religious text, a competing one, and explain by contrast why the logical problem I am pointing to in the Torah does not exist there. In my view there is great didactic value in that comparison. But in any case I won't do it, because from my experience with you it really sours your mood… I don't want to burden you.
I am convinced about Turkian. As for the rest, you still haven't responded.
I would be glad for your response… if we have both already agreed that a normative body of knowledge (laws, halakhot) "does not make claims about this world," and if you already said that the essence of the Torah is its normative character (because in your view it is essentially halakhah), how can you still claim that according to the Torah itself God's will precedes the divine command?
I would really be happy to answer if I understood the question. You keep repeating an assortment of words that sounds to me like nonsense. I can't make sense of it, and I really tried.
There are two simple points here that you claim:
1. The Torah is essentially a normative body of knowledge (because it is essentially halakhah)
2. A normative body of knowledge does not allow factual claims ("information") about the world, only commands.
Have I described your position fairly?
I will answer in your place: you will probably say that in my last response I described your position fairly and accurately.
And then I will claim: given that the essence of the Torah is commanding (= normative), the most important theological principle from its standpoint is that God's commands must be given priority over His will.
The problem: this principle does not fit with your position (and mine too), according to which the will precedes the command.
I would be glad to hear responses from other readers as well (who at least understand my argument, even if they disagree).
This is a bit surprising, because there seems to be an accepted method among halakhic decisors to rule like so-and-so "since the Gemara discusses and debates according to his view." It would seem that the Amoraim thought there was no reason to discuss a view rejected in halakhah (unless it sheds light on the view that is accepted) from the standpoint of 'Torah study.' Is that too because of considerations of efficiency? (Efficiency of the discussion in the Amoraim's study hall, or at least efficiency in including the material in the Gemara?)
Approximately right. Just one small correction: a normative body of knowledge does not contain factual claims (not that it does not allow them).
But your question is beyond me. I do not understand it.
That really is puzzling. After all, there are quite a few explicit examples of sugyot that discuss a view that is not the halakhah.
One should distinguish between this claim and ruling in a case where an anonymous sugya proceeds according to that view—that does make sense.
Maybe there the discussion of a view that is not the halakhah contributes to understanding the view that is? If you have a handy reference to such a sugya, I will try to get a sense of the matter.
I think that is always true. When there is a dispute, clarifying one opinion helps to understand the other.
In the sugya of 'if one did it, it is ineffective,' opinions differ as to the halakhah (even in Rambam it is not entirely clear whether he ruled like Abaye). In the first chapter of Beitzah, right from the start there are quite a few discussions of Beit Shammai's view in various sugyot.
Now I see here https://daf-yomi.com/DYItemDetails.aspx?itemId=26099
It cites Tosafot on Sukkah 9 saying that there is discussion that helps clarify the dispute, and there is internal discussion within the opinion itself. And it seems to come out that in internal discussion within a view rejected by halakhah (formal authority!), they wonder, "What is so-and-so's reason coming to teach us?" That is, as a rule, what is rejected from halakhah is rejected from study except as a means.
Perhaps the question is what area of authority is covered only by formal authority without substantive authority. If that area is small—that is, the substantive area is large—then it makes sense and pays to reinforce substantive authority with formal authority (and as a rule of thumb there is no point discussing what is rejected from halakhah, because there is error there. And Gemara is more "Torah" than Yerushalmi and Mishnah and Avnei Nezer). And if that area is large, then the creaking begins (as in the voices raised in the conservatism columns on Midrasha)
You agree with me on almost everything, but then comes a "small correction" and somewhat ruins what you say. According to your correction, a normative body of knowledge merely does not contain facts (in practice), unlike what I said, where I categorically stated that it cannot even contain facts.
That is, according to your view there are possible worlds in which normative bodies of knowledge do contain facts… If that is your claim, then it is devoid of all meaning, and in any event my original claim needs no "correction."
Now let us return to the body of knowledge called Torah (the Pentateuch). By its own lights it cannot contain any information, and certainly does not distinguish between the normative-commanding function of which it is composed and "God's will." Its basic logical structure forbids this (because again: we are dealing with a purely normative body of knowledge that cannot convey to us anything but "instructions").
If nevertheless someone finds "divine will" in the Torah, it is only because he borrows the concept from his own reason and imposes it on the text. That is the essence of my claim.
Rabbi Michi,
It is interesting to note the words of R. Yitzhak Zev Soloveitchik in his novellae on the laws of blessings, in the name of his father R. Hayyim, which are identical to your words:
"…For in the blessing over Torah, the blessing is not over fulfilling the commandment of Torah study, but rather it is an independent law that Torah requires a blessing, as we derive in Berakhot 21a from the verse, 'For I will proclaim the name of the Lord; ascribe greatness,' etc…. If so, this is not a law that belongs to the commandment at all, but Torah itself requires a blessing. Women are exempt only from the commandment of Torah study, but they are not excluded from the very object of Torah study itself, and their study falls under Torah study, and therefore they may properly recite a blessing over their study, since we are not arriving at this by virtue of the aspect of commandment-fulfillment at all…"
And regarding the form of study, see the introduction to Teshuvot VeHanhagot, vol. 1:
"When we examine some halakhah, we begin with the root, namely the Talmud, from which our early rabbis drew; and when one connects the Rishonim to the Gemara, the matters truly become illuminated. From this we understand the rulings of the later authorities, to distinguish in their words what they intended and when their ruling applies. Every person is obligated to know that we must not divide things as though there were two Torahs, the Torah of study and the Torah of practical ruling. Rather, study is connected to ruling and ruling to study. Therefore 'the Lord loves the gates distinguished in halakhah' (Berakhot 8), meaning in practice, as explained by Maharsha there. And the intent seems to be study in Talmud and Rishonim in such a way that we can derive halakhah from it, and not like those who tie one thread to another merely to produce delicacies, where the reasonings are not fit to rule from, because they have no firm foundation such that halakhah may properly be established from them—for that is His blessed will."
Of course, I brought these things not because your words need external support, but as further interesting sources that also align with what you wrote.
I nitpick for well-known reasons. The expression 'does not allow' is imprecise and very vague, so I corrected it.
The Pentateuch contains a great deal of factual information: about creation, the Exodus, the existence of the Holy One, the fact that He commanded us, the fact that He wants things from us, and much more. Halakhah is a body with a normative character, but the Torah is not.
Indeed, halakhah tells us no fact whatsoever, not even that the Holy One wants or commanded something. That is an assumption underlying halakhah, not halakhic content. But the Torah certainly tells us that He wants and that He commands, and much other factual information besides (that there was a man named Abraham, Sarah, Moses, and that such-and-such deeds and events occurred).
This casuistry strikes me as similar to someone who asks how morality presupposes the existence of moral commands (not their validity, but their very existence), and infers from this that one must obey them even though they have no validity.
Indeed, these ideas are old, and there are other approaches and discussions on this too. Among others, his student also discusses it in Emek Berakhah.
Many thanks.
First, I see nothing at all "vague" in the expression "does not allow." There is a logical impossibility here: there are no possible worlds in which normative propositions suddenly, by miracle, become bearers of information. Period. If you know of such worlds, I would be glad if you told me about them. That would be a very interesting novelty…
Second, your claim that the Torah carries information is not under dispute and is not relevant to this discussion. My claim was that even if in practice the Torah distinguishes between facts and norms (and therefore carries information), in its self-understanding its very essence consists in canceling this distinction. "We will do and we will hear." In other words: the Torah gets caught in a paradox in which it itself violates the supreme principle it advocates (the centrality of the normative sphere).
If you do not see this, it is only because you refuse to take seriously the idea that a text may testify about itself that it is first and foremost of a normative character (halakhah). What can be done—this specific text does exactly that, and in my opinion an interpretation that ignores this is inconsistent and does not describe the basic tendency found in it.
P.S.
I have argued for many years that in this respect there is nothing special about the Torah. This paradox that I described exists in every position or "philosophy" that turns its back on metaphysical dualism, on intuitive human capacity, and the like. I could give many examples of this, but I don't want to weary you.
To conclude, I have suggested to you more than once making a comparison to your favorite control group. In human history there are other religious bodies of knowledge whose fundamental logical structure is built differently. In my view that comparison has great didactic value, and I therefore strongly recommend it to shed light on our topic. On the other hand, the last time I brought up the New Testament and Christianity, you reacted so emotionally that I started worrying about you ?
Maybe it is worth rereading the quote from the Maharal that you placed at the top of the site as a motto.
The stage has arrived (as expected) where we part as friends. All the best.
There is nothing new or surprising in that either. All the best.
There is a mistake in the reference in Nefesh HaHayyim. The Gemara is Nedarim 62, not Nedarim 61.
Thanks
Aside from Torah study by day and night, you claim there is no commandment to study Torah.
You write: "It is clear that the obligation to learn and know the entire Torah is a full obligation. But it is not the result of a command. The Torah expects us to study on the basis of understanding what Torah is, and not because of a command. A command to study Torah would diminish it into an ordinary commandment. This is similar to what I have written more than once about the commandment of repentance and others as well (see, for example, my article here). If the Torah had commanded us to study Torah, we would do it as commanded people, like any other commandment. The Torah chooses not to command us in order to leave this obligation great and foundational, and not to include it as one of the 613. Something along these lines was written by Rav Kook in his letters regarding the absence of an obligation to work on one's character traits (see my aforementioned article)."
If so, my question is: what is the understanding by virtue of which we would want to study Torah even if we had not been commanded to do so? Why is it important to study Torah if it is not a commandment?
With God's help, 16 Sivan 5782
To Yoni – greetings,
Rabbi Michael Abraham's words, that there is a command only regarding 'you shall meditate in it day and night,' are puzzling. After all, in the Torah we were commanded 'And you shall teach them diligently to your children,' and Hazal expounded: 'that the words of Torah should be sharpened in your mouth'—from here we learn a person's obligation to know the Torah clearly, so that he can pass it on to others.
With blessings, Hanokh Heinekh Fainshmakker-Palti
It should be noted that there is nothing comparable to this in other religions, in all of which there is no religious obligation to study and know their holy scriptures; that knowledge is imposed only on the clergy. Only in Judaism is there the idea that 'all your children shall be taught of the Lord.'
From understanding what Torah is, and that it is an expression of the Holy One's will and the way to cleave to Him and His will.
I can ask you in return: why is it important to fulfill what He did command? Because it is His will. This too is His will.
That is exactly the Ran's comment in Nedarim. Your complaint is not against me (and in any case it has no substance in itself, since this is not a definition within the Torah-level obligation of the commandment, as the Ran himself writes. And the other commentators there write that this is optional, which is also the plain sense of the sugya there; he was commenting on them).
The Ran writes (s.v. ha ka mashma lan de'i ba'i pater nafshei):
'It seems to me that it does not literally mean he exempts himself, for every person is obligated to study constantly, day and night, according to his ability. And we say in the first chapter of Kiddushin (30a): "Our rabbis taught: 'And you shall teach them diligently'—that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, so that if a person asks you something, you should not stammer and say to him…" And reciting Shema morning and evening is not enough for that.
Rather, from here it appears to me to be proof for what I wrote in the final chapter of Shevuot Shetayim, that anything derived through exegesis, even though it is from the Torah—since it is not explicitly written in the verse, an oath takes effect upon it. And here this is what we are saying: since if he wants, he can exempt himself from what is explicitly written in the verse, namely "when you lie down and when you rise up," with morning and evening Shema—therefore the oath takes effect upon it entirely…'
That is to say: according to the Ran, a person is Torah-obligated to know the Torah clearly, but since this obligation comes from the sages' exegesis and is not explicit in the text, an oath can take effect upon it.
With blessings, HPSH
There would be room to say differently: that 'And you shall teach them diligently'—'that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth'—does not obligate one to know the entire Torah, but only that whatever one studies must be known clearly; that the obligation concerns quality and not necessarily quantity. Something like this was written by R. Shneur Zalman of Liadi in his laws of Torah study: it is preferable to learn a little that will be retained in memory than to learn much and forget.
R. Shneur Zalman there also distinguishes between one who is capable of studying and knowing the entire Torah, who is obligated to study day and night according to his ability, and one who cannot attain this, who is fundamentally obligated only to set fixed times for Torah. If so, it may be said that regarding such a person it was said that 'he can exempt himself with morning and evening Shema.'
Exactly—and therefore the question is why this is not included in the command of the Torah itself, but only in the exegesis. Because even according to him, the commandment of Torah study does not include this. It is another obligation. And according to the Rosh and the commentator there, there is no such obligation at all in halakhah, but only outside halakhah (or perhaps it is a fulfillable commandment).
With God's help, 16 Sivan 5782
In the Ran's words it is explained that what 'comes through exegesis' is from the Torah, but one is 'already sworn and standing' only regarding what is explicit in the text.
What the commentator and the Rosh spoke of as 'optional' means learning 'this chapter' at 'this time'—for regarding that the Torah did not obligate him, and certainly not on the level of one who is 'already sworn and standing,' since the nature of the commandment of Torah study is that it should be done with desire and love. Therefore one must study in the place he desires, and specifically with a teacher who suits him (which is why 'his teacher is exiled with him'). There are periods in a person's life in which he is in a state of constricted consciousness, and days when 'its neglect is its fulfillment,' and situations in which 'his sleep overpowered him,' where one needs to 'lower the pressure' somewhat so as not to lose all desire entirely.
The commandment to know the entire Torah is an ideal 'greater than life,' about which it is said: 'It is not upon you to finish the work,' but on the other hand, 'you are not free to desist from it.' A commandment that is a lifelong ideal requires that it be done with desire and interest, and this requires flexibility and consideration for the ups and downs of one's inner powers. Therefore flexibility in conduct is a vital part of fulfilling the commandment effectively.
With blessings, Hanokh Heinekh Fainshmakker-Palti
Obviously, and it is still another obligation.
With God's help, 17 Sivan 5782
In any case, the enumerators of the commandments—the Rambam in positive commandment 11 and the Sefer HaHinukh 419—defined the commandment as 'to study Torah and teach it,' and both cite Hazal's exposition, 'And you shall teach them diligently—that they should be sharp in your mouth.' And the Hinukh explains: 'It is a positive commandment to study the wisdom of the Torah and teach it, that is, how to perform the commandments and guard ourselves from what He has forbidden us…' This implies that this is the main definition of the commandment of Torah study, and not some 'extra-halakhic obligation'..
With blessings, Eliam Fishel Workheimer
In general, it should be noted that 'you shall meditate in it day and night' appears in the book of Joshua, and it seems more likely that this is a positive commandment from the Prophets, not the main Torah-level commandment. It should also be noted that the Rambam's language regarding 'one who says: we will arise early and study' is 'this is like a vow,' and perhaps this is not a full Torah-level vow? This requires investigation.
The Rambam's language (Laws of Vows 1:29), 'One who says: we will arise early and study a chapter—this is like a vow,' can perhaps be understood to mean that the obligation is because there was a promise made to the study partner. But according to the version before us in the Gemara, 'I will arise early and study,' the obligation is toward Heaven.
With blessings, AFUR
The Rambam also used the expression 'this is like a vow' in chapter 2 regarding ownerless property, but there the Rambam explained 'even though it is not a vow,' whereas here the Rambam does not say 'even though it is not a vow,' but 'even though he did not utter a vow with his mouth,' which apparently implies that its status is that of an actual vow. This requires investigation.
I wanted to challenge your claim that the study which some sages forbade to women is the narrow obligation that applies to men every day, because of the concern for frivolity—which is not understandable in such a case (it is not plausible that reciting Shema would bring especially great harm). Afterward I saw that you answered this well in your article on women's obligation in Torah study (you linked to it in this article). I refer those troubled by the question there.
You reject the possibility that the purpose of study is action, on the grounds that this makes study only a preparatory act for a commandment.
One might suggest otherwise:
A legal principle says that ignorance of the law does not exempt from punishment. Nevertheless, many citizens are not familiar with the law books, apparently out of the intuition that most of their actions do not brush up against the law. Similarly, one could argue that the commandment of Torah study was meant to obligate study even for someone who feels that way regarding certain commandments of the Torah. Such a commandment could stem from a lack of trust in human beings' self-motivation, or from concern for the preservation of the tradition, especially regarding uncommon commandments that are liable to be forgotten. But this is only the reason for the commandment; in practice the commandment obligates and is not merely a voluntary act whose purpose is to serve another commandment—a preparatory act.
I didn't understand. Is it a preparatory act for a commandment or a commandment?
Continuation of my previous comment:
It is a commandment and not a preparatory act. Somewhat like searching for leaven, which is a commandment in its own right, even though its purpose is to assist the commandment of elimination. The purpose of study belongs to the reasons for the commandments, and therefore has no practical implications for defining the study as a preparatory act.
Then that is a much simpler claim. You are claiming that I am deriving law from the reason of the verse. My claim is that this is a definition, not a reason.
If so, why is searching for leaven not a preparatory act for a commandment?
You sought to rule out the possibility that the purpose of the commandment of Torah study is fulfillment of the commandments. My claim was that such a purpose does not necessarily turn study into a preparatory act, because one could say that this purpose is only the reason of the verse and not the definition (even though you can argue that it is the definition; but to rule out the second possibility entirely, an argument is needed).
I understand. But it is not plausible that Torah study is merely a preparatory act, even if this is only the reason. A preparatory act is not equal to all the other commandments combined. Beyond that, there are my other proofs.
That is apparently true. But once we are dealing with the reason for the commandment and not its definition, we are not bound by Hazal's conclusions and may disagree with them (there can be no ruling about what to think). To be sure, in Hazal there are clear voices that see Torah study as a value in itself ('equal to them all'), but it is hard to find such a direction in Tanakh. It seems that there the reason for the commandment of study is as an instrument for action, as in Joshua 1:8: "This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate in it day and night, so that you may observe to do according to all that is written in it; for then you will make your way prosperous and then you will have good success."
Fine, if you are proposing a conception of the commandment of Torah study different from Hazal's, then okay. I was speaking within Hazal's framework. You certainly will not be able to explain Rabbi Ovadia and others that way.
I will only remind you that I was speaking about the definition of the commandment and not only its reason, and there Hazal do have authority.
Agreed. I would note that I see in this an example of the fact that one can learn new things from Tanakh, since a priori I do not see a decision in favor of either direction, and Tanakh resolves the doubt.
Not at all. It is far from resolving the doubt. You only proposed one suggestion among several. Beyond that, of course one learns halakhot from Tanakh. I am talking about values and beliefs (beyond the trivial—God, creation, etc.).
I don't know how much you want to extend the discussion on this. Briefly, I would say that in my understanding Hazal amplified the significance of Torah study beyond what it is in Tanakh. Alongside that, they have halakhic authority and they chose to define Torah study as a commandment rather than a preparatory act. Therefore deriving conclusions from Scripture has non-trivial significance in the realm of beliefs, though not in the realm of halakhah (which is Hazal's domain of authority), even though that significance deals with halakhah (because it deals only with the conceptual realm of halakhah). Even if you disagree with me, you must agree that theoretically a person who held my assumptions would derive non-trivial conclusions from Scripture. Which means that learning from Scripture is possible.
Obviously, if you adopt enough assumptions, you can learn many insights from Tanakh and even from Kofiko, mutatis mutandis. My claim is that this does not happen. It simply does not happen that one posits assumptions of that kind that lead you to conclusions you did not already hold in advance.
I don't think I assume more than you; these are simply different assumptions (apparently about how to interpret Scripture, though I don't know exactly what keeps you from accepting my interpretation). I am convinced that many of your readers also hold similar assumptions, because they are widespread. Still, it seems that these assumptions are not enough to learn something from Kofiko (even for the simple reason that Kofiko is not authoritative for me as a description of reality, so I would accept things from it only if I believed them beforehand. By contrast, Tanakh is authoritative for me as an interpreter of the reasons for the commandments, and therefore I accept from it this interpretation of the commandment of Torah study, even though without it I certainly would rely on Hazal's tradition regarding the reason for the commandment).
How does your claim that women are obligated in Torah study fit with what Hazal said, that anyone who teaches his daughter Torah is as if he taught her licentiousness… and with the Rambam as well, who ruled that ideally a man should not teach his daughter Torah, etc.?
I assume they assessed that women in their day were not suited for this.
With God's help, 10 Elul 5783
To Ana – greetings,
Throughout the generations there were women who studied Torah, and the sages of their time treated them with respect. The author of the Perishah (Yoreh De'ah 246) explained that the sages' instruction not to teach one's 'daughter' means a minor girl, where one does not know how serious her intention is; but when one knows her intention is serious, she may be taught. Further reasons and extensive material on the subject can be found in Dr. Yael Levine's article, 'Rabbi Yitzhak Nissim's responsum on women and Torah study,' Akdamot 13 (on the Beit Morasha website).
With blessings, Fishel
Rabbi Eliezer's words, 'as if he taught her licentiousness,' were explained by Rashi as a concern about forbidden relations with men. The Rambam explained that the concern is distorted understanding of the words of Torah, 'since most women are not mentally directed toward study.' The expression 'mentally directed' is also used by the Rambam in the laws of prayer, where one whose mind is not directed is exempt from prayer, which proves that 'mentally directed' means 'the ability to concentrate.' On the face of it, it seems that in our generations women's capacity for attention and concentration in study has increased.
With blessings, Fishel
It should be noted that the Rambam wrote at the end of chapter 4 of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah that the matters he explained in those chapters are a 'great matter,' but the explanation of the commandments of the Torah to know what is permitted and forbidden are matters that anyone can know, 'adult or child, man or woman, broad-minded or of short understanding.' This implies that the Mishneh Torah was intended for women as well.
With blessings, Fishel
A – Does one fulfill the commandment even without articulating it verbally, for example if one does not say the words aloud when learning Gemara or the like?
B – What do you think the meaning is of "the Torah protects and saves"? I mean, since you evaluate things by empirical tests, as you said regarding prayer that it doesn't work because in the Nahshon Wachsman case it didn't work.
C – What is the logic for a person to study sciences (for pleasure, or to enrich knowledge, or any other purpose), if every moment he is losing the commandment of study? Should he not overcome this desire like any other desire, and calculate the reward of a commandment against its loss?
I forgot
D – Also, what is the meaning of "And keep and do them, for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the eyes of the nations, who shall hear all these statutes and say, Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people"—how exactly do the nations see the wisdom of the Torah? It seems specifically that the wisdom of the nations and their inventions and sages are rather greater.
A – Why not? He studied, so he fulfilled a commandment.
B – The meaning is probably an incentive to study Torah. In practice I don't believe this, at least nowadays (when the Holy One is not involved).
C – The decisors have already elaborated that the commandment of Torah study applies in the times when you can. Other pursuits are legitimate in reasonable measure, and otherwise try to study as much as you can. But beyond that, studying the sciences has value in itself (what I called 'Torah in the person').
Some explained this as referring to intercalating the year and sanctifying the month, and that is a wisdom everyone recognizes. But beyond that, I do not accept the Rambam's claim that the commandments are the wisdom that everyone will see. Perhaps the result of engagement in Torah and commandments is that the Jewish people are wise, and everyone notices that even today.
A – So if I understand you correctly, then even by studying sciences (even before finishing the entire Torah), one fulfills the commandment of Torah study? Look, I'm counting on that in the World to Come; at the moment (more accurately, until this moment) I am on the level of worrying about reward in the World to Come.
B – Your interpretation of "for this is your wisdom and understanding" is puzzling. Have you not seen Avigdor Amiti's pamphlet "The Mean Molad and Its Sources Throughout the Generations," showing that this was not connected to the Jews as people think? I don't know how to upload it here, but this is his email Mada.Hazal@Gmail.com; he sends it gladly, along with his other interesting pamphlets.
And as for what you wrote, "Perhaps the result of engagement in Torah and commandments is that the Jewish people are wise, and everyone notices that even today"—but unfortunately, all those whom the world recognizes for their wisdom and science, and who really contributed to wisdom and science, are people who do not observe Torah and commandments.
So it is not clear what the wisdom is. At the moment I see that not only non-Jews, but even secular Jews laugh at the Torah, as in your debate with Yaron Yadan?
A – Search here for 'Torah in the person' and 'Torah in the object.'
B – I haven't seen it.
No connection. The wisdom of Jews is probably a result of their general culture.
B – Here, I attached for you the pamphlet showing that the wisdom of intercalation is not our wisdom
https://daf-yomi.com/Data/UploadedFiles/DY_Item/31693-sFile.pdf
https://daf-yomi.com/Data/UploadedFiles/DY_Item/39443-sFile.pdf
I didn't understand your answer, "No connection." The Torah writes, "And keep and do them, for this is your wisdom and your understanding in the eyes of the nations, who shall hear all these statutes and say, Surely this great nation is a wise and understanding people"—that is, it is speaking about the wisdom of the Torah, not about "general culture"
Rabbi, have you had a chance to look at it a bit?
In any event, for our purposes, then to what was it said, "And keep and do them, for this is your wisdom and your understanding"?
To what was it said, "who shall hear all these statutes and say, Surely this wise and understanding people"?
Absolutely not. And I won't have a chance either.
I answered. Repeating the same question again and again is trolling.
Forgive me,
but you answered that it is not speaking about the wisdom of the Torah,
and I emphasized again in my question
that the verse explicitly does speak about the wisdom of the Torah, as written: "And keep and do them, for this is your wisdom and your understanding"—explicitly, this precisely,
and it is also explicit that this is because of "And keep and do them," meaning again, it is about the wisdom of the Torah.
And by the way, if you thought that the wisdom of intercalation really is connected to us, then it really would be worthwhile for you to read this short pamphlet by Rabbi Avigdor.
I would appreciate clarification regarding the rabbi's position.
At the beginning of the column, the rabbi straightforwardly quoted Nefesh HaHayyim, and in additional columns the rabbi also wrote that Torah study is a kind of communion with the Holy One, and so on.
On the other hand, according to your outlook (if I understood correctly), the Oral Torah was not necessarily given at Sinai word for word, but is to a large extent the creation and writing of Hazal, a kind of later development.
I ask: how can the study of the Oral Torah be seen as communion with the Holy One if parts of it are viewed as human creation?
And in general, according to what principles does the rabbi decide what to accept as divinely binding, and what to see as exaggeration? After all, with respect to all the words of Hazal about the commandment of Torah study I too can say that this is an invention and a later development. Basically, what do we accept and what do we not?
The Oral Torah is the development and interpretation of the Torah we received. It was given with that in mind. Therefore any engagement with the Oral Torah is engagement with Torah. On the contrary, the whole idea is that we should engage with the Torah and develop it, and that is the connection to the Holy One.
More power to you!
I would be very glad to hear your response regarding a few matters that trouble me a bit in this context –
1 – Torah study is a lofty and important value. In light of this, are we not obligated to define what is included in the content of that study? You referred to this in passing when you wrote about analytical study, but can truly anything found in the "books" really be called "Torah" just because Hazal, or the Rishonim, or the Aharonim discussed it?
Are civil procedures that seemed reasonable to Hazal really "the word of God," such that studying them might exempt the learner from his civic duties and from performing other commandments? An entire tractate—Ketubot—can be interpreted as Hazal's technical attempt to ensure that "it should not be easy in his eyes to divorce her." The same applies to various other topics in Hoshen Mishpat. True, there are matters Hazal left to the king's law, but are all of Hazal's reasonings regarding laws of acquisition, presumptions, and the like—basically the arrangements necessary for any society—really considered sacred?
And what about various aggadot, where it is not clear that one must accept the Maharal of Prague's approach regarding their depth?
And so on and so forth.
2 – The article focused on sayings of Hazal and of the Rishonim and Aharonim concerning Torah study. Don't you feel that Hazal rather forced their interpretation into sources that do not really appear to refer to the obligation of constant Torah study? I am referring here to verses like "And you shall teach them diligently to your children" (which after all refers to "these words which I command you this day"—not to every idea that comes up in the study hall, and not even to the book of Leviticus), "If you walk in My statutes" (the plain meaning is of course unrelated to toil in Torah), and "you shall meditate in it day and night" (a command to Joshua with a specific purpose stated later in the verse).
Especially in light of the fact that opinions are so divided regarding the nature of Torah study—as is also reflected in the article—can one really say that this is a clear divine command?
Thank you very much, Shabbat shalom and happy holiday