Leisure in Jewish Law

The Front in the Rear – 5768

Between Time and Leisure

The question I was asked to address is the question of free time. Within this framework arise points such as dealing with idleness in one’s role, making use of free time, and coping with an 'open' military system that does not dictate at every given moment what one is to do.[1]

The question of leisure is not unique to rear-area soldiers, although it does have several unique characteristics in the context of rear-echelon service. I will therefore begin the discussion with more general questions, such as the use of time and leisure in general, and only afterward will I try to touch on specific implications for soldiers, particularly in rear service.

A. The Question of Leisure: Basic Assumptions and Definitions

The very question of free time assumes several basic premises: 1. That there is 'free' time. 2. That there are several substantively different alternatives (that is, not studying tractate Berakhot as opposed to studying tractate Me’ilah) with which to fill that time. 3. That in the end the Torah has something to say about the choice among them.

However, these assumptions are not so simple. On the one hand, what is the basis for the assumption that there is any free time at all? Seemingly, at every moment we are to study Torah or fulfill commandments.[2] Is there nevertheless room for the concept of 'free time'? To answer that, we must examine the alternative proposal: that at every moment we are to study Torah or fulfill commandments.

As for fulfillment of the commandments, one must distinguish between two kinds of commandments: there are obligatory commandments, regarding which we almost have no choice. But these present themselves at specific times, and apparently those truly will not be our moments of leisure. What of non-obligatory commandments? Here it seems difficult to speak of an obligation to fill time with non-obligatory commandments. For if there were such an obligation, they could not be defined as non-obligatory commandments.

It is possible, however, that although there is no such obligation, there is still value in doing so. That is certainly true, but a moderated claim of that kind does not categorically negate the question of leisure. Modes of conduct that are not obligatory can no longer categorically deny the existence of leisure. At most, they can guide us regarding how it should be used.

If so, one conclusion has already emerged for us: it is plausible that the Torah can offer guidance for hours of leisure, even if such hours do exist (this is a partial justification of assumption 3).

But the commandments are not the whole story. What of Torah study? Here, seemingly, we must examine the more general concept of 'neglect of Torah study.' Such a concept, if it indeed exists, largely nullifies the notion of 'leisure,' for precisely the reason raised above in the discussion of obligatory commandments. We will therefore begin our inquiry by examining the concept of 'neglect of Torah study.' Let us note that our concern here is not with the concept for its own sake, but as an essential example of the question of leisure. Yet the consideration with which we opened this chapter indicates that this is not just any example, but the essential layer of the discussion. The only commandment that truly 'threatens' the concept of 'leisure' is the commandment of Torah study.

B. The Commandment of Torah Study and 'Neglect of Torah Study'

We cannot, here, exhaust the topic of the commandment of Torah study, and hence also not the concept of 'neglect of Torah study.' But we will touch on several important points that seem relevant to our subject.

It is well known that Torah study is the foundation of the entire Torah. Sages throughout the generations have greatly expanded upon and extolled the importance of this commandment. Thus Maimonides writes in commandment 11:

It is the commandment by which we were enjoined to study the wisdom of the Torah and to teach it. This is what is called Torah study, as He said (in the section of Shema): “And you shall teach them diligently to your children”… And there (in the Sifrei) it is said: “And you shall teach them diligently”—that the words should be sharp in your mouth, so that if someone asks you something, you should not stammer, but answer him immediately. And this command has already been repeated many times… and exhortation concerning this commandment, to be constantly diligent in it, is scattered throughout many places in the Talmud.

And at the beginning of the Laws of Torah Study Maimonides writes as follows (ch. 1, laws 8–10):

8: Every Jewish man is obligated in Torah study, whether poor or rich, whether physically whole or suffering afflictions, whether young or even very old and weak. Even if he is poor and supported by charity and goes from door to door, and even if he has a wife and children, he is obligated to set aside fixed times for Torah study by day and by night, as it is said: “And you shall meditate upon it day and night.”

9: Among the great sages of Israel were woodcutters, water-drawers, and even blind men; nevertheless they engaged in Torah study by day and by night, and they were among the transmitters of the tradition, each from the mouth of another, back to Moses our Rabbi.

10: Until when is a person obligated to study Torah? Until the day of his death, as it is said: “Lest they depart from your heart all the days of your life.” And whenever he does not engage in study, he forgets.

One of the strongest expressions of the importance of the commandment of Torah study is the concept of 'neglect of Torah study' (which already appears in the Talmud, and is also hinted at in Maimonides’ language in Sefer HaMitzvot). Seemingly, whenever a person is not studying Torah, not only does he fail to receive reward for the commandment, but he is punished for the prohibition of neglecting Torah study.

A striking illustration of the depth of this notion of neglect of Torah study may be seen in a famous difficulty. There is a well-known rabbinic statement: Torah study is suspended for the reading of the Megillah. Several commentators ask: what neglect of Torah study is there here? Is the reading of the Megillah not itself included in the category of Torah study?

Some answer this in light of the Hazon Ish’s determination that there is a concept of 'qualitative neglect of Torah study.' There are forms of Torah study that are included within the commandment of Torah study, but since they are of an inferior kind, they still contain an aspect of neglect of Torah study. This is neglect of Torah study from the standpoint of the quality of study. Reading the Megillah is an important commandment in terms of publicizing the miracle, and everyone is obligated in it on Purim. But from the standpoint of the commandment of Torah study, reading the Megillah counts as qualitative neglect of Torah study in comparison with analytical study of Jewish law. The depth of one’s analysis of Torah is what defines the quality of the study. If so, not only is there a concept of 'neglect of Torah study,' but even a use of time that is not of the highest quality contains a subtler aspect of neglect of Torah study.

This indeed also emerges from the language of the Talmud in Yoma 19b:

Rava said: One who engages in idle conversation transgresses a positive commandment, as it is said, “And you shall speak of them”—of them, and not of other matters. Rabbi Aha bar Yaakov says: He transgresses a prohibition, as it is said, “All things are wearisome; a man cannot speak of them.”

And this also indeed seems to follow from the language of the Mishnah in tractate Pe’ah, which we recite every morning in prayer:

These are things that have no fixed measure… and Torah study.

So too it appears from the Sages’ exposition in tractate Kiddushin 30a:

The Sages taught: “And you shall teach them diligently”—that the words of Torah should be sharp in your mouth, so that if someone asks you something, you should not stammer and tell him, but rather answer him immediately, as it is said: “Say to wisdom, ‘You are my sister’” etc. And it says: “Bind them on your fingers; write them on the tablet of your heart.” And it says: “Like arrows in the hand of a mighty man, so are the children of youth.” And it says: “The arrows of the mighty are sharpened.” And it says: “Your arrows are sharp; peoples fall beneath you.” And it says: “Happy is the man who has filled his quiver with them; they shall not be ashamed when they speak with enemies in the gate.”

This implies (and several halakhic decisors wrote likewise; see the Ran’s comments in Nedarim, quoted below, and others) that one must reach a state in which all the words of Torah are fluent in one’s mouth by heart. One cannot reach such a state without unceasing study (and even then, not every mind can bear it). There are also many other sources for the idea that the obligation of Torah study is unceasing. So too the Tosafists wrote (Berakhot 11b, s.v. 'shekvar'): For at every hour a person is obligated to study..

However, in Menachot 99b we seemingly find a dispute on this point:

Rabbi Ami said: From the words of Rabbi Yosei we learn that even if a person studied only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled the command “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai: Even if a person recited only Shema in the morning and evening, he has fulfilled “it shall not depart”; but this may not be said in the presence of the ignorant. Rava said: On the contrary, it is a commandment to say this in the presence of the ignorant. Ben Dama, the son of Rabbi Ishmael’s sister, asked Rabbi Ishmael: As for someone like me, who has learned the entire Torah, may he study Greek wisdom? He recited this verse to him: “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate on it day and night.” Go and find a time that is neither day nor night, and study Greek wisdom then. This disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani, for Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: This verse is neither an obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing. The Holy One, blessed be He, saw that words of Torah were especially beloved to Joshua, as it is said: “And his minister Joshua son of Nun, a youth, did not depart from the tent.” The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: Joshua, are words of Torah so beloved to you? Then “this book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.” It was taught in the school of Rabbi Ishmael: The words of Torah should not be upon you as a burden, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.

If so, on the one hand there is an opinion according to which we are obligated that the book of the Torah should never depart from us at all times. On the other hand, some hold that reciting Shema morning and evening is sufficient, and the rest is seemingly merely optional (more accurately: a non-obligatory commandment; see below). According to one opinion, the verse shall not depart is nothing more than a personal promise to Joshua alone.

One could understand that the discussion in this sugya concerns only the interpretation of the verse shall not depart, whereas there is still an obligation to study all day from another source (And you shall teach them diligently or And you shall speak of them). This seems to follow from the plain sense of the Talmud in Yoma, according to which anyone who speaks of other things is considered to have nullified a positive commandment or to have violated a prohibition (although the prohibition is based on the Writings). Yet the proof from the sugya in Yoma is not conclusive, for it may refer only to one who speaks of other matters, and not to anyone who neglects Torah study. Thus, for example, this clearly emerges from Rashi’s comments there, where he wrote:

"And not about other matters"—frivolity and childish chatter.

This also clearly emerges from the plain meaning of the Talmud in Nedarim (8a), which brings the following ruling:

Rabbi Giddel said in the name of Rav: One who says, “I will rise early and study this chapter; I will study this tractate,” has made a great vow to the God of Israel.

That is, an oath to study a chapter of Torah is a valid oath (rather than a vow). To this the Talmud objects:

But he is already sworn and bound—so how can an oath take effect upon an oath?

That is, an oath to do something that a person is already sworn and bound to do halakhically does not take effect. The Talmud answers this in light of Rashbi’s view, which we encountered above:

This is what it teaches us: since, if he wished, he could exempt himself with the recitation of Shema morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him.

The Talmud says that Rabbi Giddel introduces a novelty in the laws of Torah study. Following Rashbi’s position above, Rabbi Giddel teaches us that in practice there is no obligation to study any particular chapter or mishnah, and therefore this oath is an oath to do something he is not obligated to do. Such an oath is valid. If so, it follows from here that there is no Torah obligation, from any verse whatever, to study Torah beyond the obligation to recite Shema morning and evening. If there were such an obligation, whatever its source, the oath would not take effect.

However, the medieval authorities on that passage disagreed on this issue. From the Rosh’s commentary there (and so too it appears from the words of the commentator printed in place of Rashi) and the Ritva, it seems that there is truly no obligation at all to study Torah beyond Shema morning and evening. From the plain sense of their language, this appears to be literally optional. By contrast, the Ran there disagrees and holds that there is an obligation to study all the time, but that this is not quite a Torah-level obligation (rather, it derives from the exposition of And you shall teach them diligently).[3] In any case, it emerges that there is no ordinary positive Torah commandment to study all the time, or to learn the whole Torah.

How are these words of the Rosh and the commentator, and Rashi’s comments in the sugya in Yoma, to be reconciled with the concept of 'neglect of Torah study,' and with the sources that teach us the continuity of the obligation?

The medieval and later authorities elaborated on this matter in several directions. Some connected it to the disputes we cited above from the sugya in Menachot, and some connected it to the well-known dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and Rashbi regarding Torah study (Berakhot 35b):

The Sages taught: “And you shall gather your grain”—what does this come to teach? Since it is said, “This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,” one might think these words are to be taken literally. Therefore the verse says, “And you shall gather your grain”—conduct yourself in them according to the way of the world; these are the words of Rabbi Ishmael. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai says: Is it possible that a person plows at plowing time, sows at sowing time, reaps at harvest time, threshes at threshing time, winnows when there is wind—what then will become of Torah? Rather, when Israel do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by others, as it is said, “And strangers shall stand and pasture your flocks,” etc. But when Israel do not do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by themselves, as it is said, “And you shall gather your grain”; and not only that, but the work of others is also done by them, as it is said, “And you shall serve your enemies,” etc. Abaye said: Many acted in accordance with Rabbi Ishmael—and succeeded; in accordance with Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai—and did not succeed.

In practice, a superficial glance suggests that these two sugyot seemingly contradict one another. Rashbi, in the sugya in Menachot, who is satisfied with Shema morning and evening, makes maximalist demands in the sugya in Berakhot. Rabbi Ishmael, by contrast, who in the sugya in Menachot tells his nephew to find an hour that is neither day nor night, appears in the sugya in Berakhot as the 'lenient' one in the laws of Torah study.

Several commentators have already elaborated in explaining the matter, and it can be shown that the two views are not as opposed as they appear. As stated, there are different formulations of this, but we will note here only two basic directions, because of their importance for the questions with which we are dealing here. These directions will also explain how the position that Shema morning and evening is sufficient can be reconciled with the concept of 'neglect of Torah study.'

C. Two Proposals for Resolving the Sugyot and Explaining the Question of 'Neglect of Torah Study'

1. The obligation to study according to one’s ability.

Several commentators suggest a similar direction, each for different reasons (which we cannot enter into here). The author of Kehillot Ya’akov (Shabbat, no. 11, and Berakhot, no. 15) discusses the law that one who is engaged in one commandment is exempt from another, in relation to Torah study. He brings an example from the commandment of charity, in a situation where a poor person has no more than a third of a shekel to give to charity. Such a poor person is not considered under compulsion with respect to the commandment of charity; rather, he is simply exempt from it. No obligation applies to him at all.

The author of Kehillot Ya’akov continues and says that the same is true of the commandment of Torah study. The commandment is to study according to one’s ability, and beyond that measure he is not considered under compulsion; rather, no obligation applies to him at all (he is exempt). His conclusion is that when another commandment becomes obligatory, that obligation applies, and the rule that one who is engaged in one commandment is exempt from another does not operate here (even when the other commandment is time-sensitive and it is impossible to fulfill both), because whenever there is another obligation, the obligation to study Torah simply does not apply at all. The dilemma never arises.

The great question here, of course, is what is called 'beyond one’s ability.' How much effort must a person exert in order to study Torah, and what level of effort is no longer demanded of him?

An extreme position regarding this criterion may be found in Even HaEzel, Laws of Kings 3:6. The author of Even HaEzel there discusses the halakhic differences between a king and an ordinary person with respect to turning one’s heart away from Torah (through many wives and bodily pleasures), and this is what he writes there:

…And this applies only to a king. But an ordinary person is permitted to indulge himself even if this will cause neglect of Torah study through drunkenness or sexual relations. For an ordinary person it is forbidden only to neglect Torah study for no reason at all, for then if he removes his heart from Torah he transgresses “lest they depart from your heart all the days of your life,” along with many other verses concerning the obligations of Torah study. See the book Ma'alot HaTorah at its beginning, where he counts more than thirty positive and negative commandments relating to neglect of Torah study.

The author of Even HaEzel rules that the prohibition of neglecting Torah study exists only when there is no reason for it whatsoever. But neglect of Torah study for any reason at all, including the desire to indulge in various pleasures, is not considered a neglect of the commandment of Torah study. If so, the criterion for 'beyond one’s ability' is minimalist: any reason whatever. From the wording of the author of Kehillot Ya’akov, however, a different position emerges. In his view, whenever a person is not under compulsion, the obligation applies to him. Only in a situation of a passing commandment, when it is impossible to fulfill both (that is, when the conditions are met for the competing commandment to take precedence), do we say that in Torah study this is not a case of exemption due to compulsion (as in other commandments in similar situations), but rather an exemption from the outset.

This conception is lenient, but also stringent. On the one hand, when the person is under compulsion, there is no obligation upon him at all. On the other hand, when he is not under compulsion he is always obligated to engage in Torah, because 'it has no fixed measure.' This is a commandment that applies constantly and is not displaced by anything (except in situations in which it does not obligate at all).

According to these approaches, the resolution of the two sugyot is that there is a basic obligation of reciting Shema morning and evening. Beyond that, there is an obligation, if any, according to one’s ability. Such a combination can be said both according to Rabbi Ishmael’s view and according to Rashbi’s view (for, as we saw, with respect to both of them there appears to be a contradiction between the two sugyot), and the difference between them is subtler; this is not the place to elaborate.

2. 'Neglect of Torah Study' Is Not a Halakhic Concept

Against these two conceptions, one may find in Or Sameach, Laws of Torah Study 1:2 a formulation that moves in a fundamentally different direction, although its practical implications are not necessarily far from the previous approach. The author of Or Sameach argues that the halakhic obligation of Torah study indeed consists solely in the recitation of Shema morning and evening. Everything beyond that is not included in formal Jewish law, and is left to the choice of each person according to his ability.

The difference between him and the previous approach is that even if a person can study Torah beyond the minimum measure, no halakhic obligation is imposed upon him. According to Or Sameach, the obligation to do so is an extra-halakhic obligation.

The author of Or Sameach explains this by saying that formal Jewish law is supposed to be identical for every Jew. Therefore, any obligation that is not of a fixed and universal measure for every member of the Jewish people cannot be included within it. He explains in this way as well the fact that the Torah did not command character refinement, since in that area too it is difficult to establish uniform, fixed standards.[4]

According to this principle, the sugyot are reconciled with one another. One deals with the definitions and measures of Torah study from a formal-halakhic perspective; the other deals with the extra-halakhic question of what it is proper to engage in, and how much. According to Rashbi, the formal measure is Shema morning and evening, but it is proper to engage in Torah every single moment, and even not to plow and sow (at least in the ideal state). According to Rabbi Ishmael, by contrast, the formal measure is precisely every moment (apparently only according to one’s ability, similar to the direction of Kehillot Ya’akov). However, when one is obligated to work for his livelihood and to sustain the world, the obligation does not apply to him. According to his view, there is no minimal measure at all of Shema morning and evening. In this respect, he is more stringent than Rashbi.

A Difficulty in the Words of Or Sameach

The reasoning of the author of Or Sameach is difficult. We find in Jewish law quite a number of commandments that do not have a fixed measure: love of God and fear of Him, honoring parents, and more. If so, why can Jewish law not also include a commandment such as Torah study according to one’s ability? Therefore, were it not for his words, there would be room to explain differently both the halakhic definition of the commandment of Torah study and that of character refinement.

It seems that here we encounter an exceedingly fundamental Torah matter: Torah study. The importance of this subject is agreed upon by all the commentators and all the decisors, and there are countless sources for it in the words of the Sages. It is difficult to assume that anyone disputes this. And yet it is not included in its entirety within the formal halakhic framework (for example, in the count of the commandments, at least according to some opinions).

The reason for this is that it is precisely the most important commandments that are not counted among the commandments and are not included in formal Jewish law. Character refinement and Torah study are not excluded from Jewish law despite their importance, but because of their importance. When something is fundamental and essential, the Torah does not want us to do it as one who is commanded and acts, but specifically as one who is not commanded and acts. The voluntariness involved in fulfilling a considerable portion of the most basic commandments is an important part of their very essence, and therefore the Torah does not wish to command them.

There is, however, a basic component that the Torah does command: one chapter in the morning and one in the evening. And so too regarding charity and the like. This component is the obligatory part, which we are to do as those who are commanded and act. But everything beyond it we are to carry out as those who are not commanded and act.[5]

We will conclude this brief survey with a difficulty that students asked me at Yeshivat Yeruham during our study on the last night of Shavuot. As we saw, in the Talmudic sugya in Menachot 99b, Ben Dama, the nephew of Rabbi Ishmael, asks his uncle: As for someone like me, who has learned the entire Torah, may he study Greek wisdom?. Seemingly this is difficult, for this law itself is also part of the Torah. If he knew the whole Torah, he should have known the answer to this very question as well. If so, how does he base on this the desire to occupy himself with Greek wisdom?

According to what we have said here, the difficulty is very well resolved. Indeed, this question is not included in the Torah. From the standpoint of the formal halakhic obligation, it is enough to recite Shema morning and evening in order to fulfill the commandment of Torah study. The obligation to study at every free moment is an extra-halakhic obligation, and perhaps even an extra-Torah one. It is an obligation dictated by reason, imposed on anyone who knows what Torah is. Therefore, we should not be surprised that Ben Dama, who knew the whole Torah, still did not know the answer to this question. It is not included in the Torah. He asks his uncle an extra-halakhic question, or in today’s language, a question of da’at Torah: what is it fitting for one who has learned the whole Torah to do? The answer is that he should engage in Torah all the time, but not as a halakhic obligation; rather, as an obligation dictated by reason. It should be noted that the sage who answers him is his uncle Rabbi Ishmael, whose view we discussed briefly above.

D. Summary of the Discussion Regarding the Commandment of Torah Study, and Implications for Leisure

In the first chapter we noted that the question of leisure mainly concerns non-obligatory commandments and Torah study. In the two chapters that followed we dealt with the commandment of Torah study as a tool for clarifying the question of leisure, and we saw that it has an obligatory dimension and a non-obligatory dimension. The obligatory dimension focuses on two fixed times during the day at which every person is obligated to study Torah. With respect to the second, non-obligatory dimension, opinions are divided: first, the view of the Ran (Nedarim) and Tosafot (Shabbat), according to which there is a full obligation to study Torah during the rest of the time as well. According to this view, it seems that there is no such thing as leisure. By contrast, we saw the view of the Rosh and the commentator, according to whom there is no such halakhic obligation at all, and therefore it seems that according to them there is time that may be called leisure.

This dispute is essentially similar to the dispute between Rashbi and Rabbi Ishmael in the Talmud,[6] although there is not necessarily a dispute here in practical halakhic ruling (we have already seen that the synthesis can be stated, in different forms, regarding both approaches). Therefore one can apply to it as well the syntheses we proposed: there is a component that must be fulfilled as one who is commanded and acts. Beyond that, there is an additional component (which according to the Ran is a genuine halakhic obligation), but there are different definitions of what that time is: whether it is only time designated for necessary needs (livelihood and the like), or perhaps any occupation whatsoever (provided it is not mere idleness for no reason at all, as in the view of the author of Even HaEzel).

Up to this point we have been speaking on the halakhic plane. But beyond all this, we saw that even if there is time that counts as leisure (under whatever definition), there is an extra-halakhic obligation to fill it with Torah content and value. And so that we not come to belittle extra-halakhic obligations, let us cite the words of the Talmud (Kiddushin 40b, and Sanhedrin 7a):

And just as study precedes action, so too judgment concerning it precedes action, in accordance with Rav Hamnuna. For Rav Hamnuna said: The beginning of a person’s judgment is only concerning words of Torah, as it is said: “The beginning of strife is like letting out water.” And just as judgment concerning it precedes action, so too its reward precedes action, as it is said: “And He gave them the lands of nations, and they inherited the labor of peoples, in order that they might keep His statutes and observe His laws.”

If so, seemingly the conclusion that emerges from here is that, at least from a practical standpoint, the question does not exist: whenever we are exempt from other commandments, we are to study Torah. Whether this is a formal-halakhic obligation or an extra-halakhic one. But the picture is not so simple. In order to examine the implications of these matters, we must consider the factual, real-world aspects of the question of leisure, and in effect the basic motivations that stand at the root of 'neglect of Torah study.' We will do so briefly in the next chapter.

E. Real-World Aspects of the Question of Leisure

First, in any event (except in a case of absolute duress), there is at least one chapter in the morning and one in the evening. It is highly desirable that this be a chapter beyond the recitation of Shema in the prayers. We should note that according to some decisors there is a special law of setting fixed times for Torah study (so indeed appears from Maimonides, Laws of Torah Study 1:8, cited above, and in Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 246:1, and see the commentaries there), and some hold that this must be at a fixed time. And if someone relies on Shema itself, some hold that he must intend, when reciting it, to fulfill the commandment of Torah study thereby (at least according to the view that commandments require intention).

During the rest of the time, discussion arises when there is a need to engage in other matters (apart from one’s military role and various commandments). Such a need can stem from several causes, and we shall now discuss them one by one:

To rest. Rest is a basic human need, and for many people it is needed (in varying degrees) just like food and sleep. By rest I mean rest in several senses: physical rest, that is, lying down in bed to rest. Or mental and emotional rest, that is, engaging in sports or some other activity that has no value in itself, simply in order to get some air. In such a case, rest appears to count as a need like any other need. It is plausible that at least at a high level of need (certainly in the case of nighttime sleep) there is no problem here at all. Beyond that as well, if rest is needed, then there is full permission to take it without concern. True, we are not speaking only of a situation of total duress, and therefore one who is stringent with himself (without harming his military or spiritual functioning) and does something of value during such a time instead of resting, blessing be upon him. That is, there is no prohibition, but there is certainly a non-obligatory commandment. Of course, if lack of rest will impair his military or spiritual functioning, there is no permission for such stringency, and certainly one should not be stringent; it is a stringency that leads to leniency.
A person who wishes to enrich his world in various ways. For example, to read something, or to engage in some other pursuit that broadens his mind, does not seem to involve any prohibition, and perhaps there is value in it. Everything depends on the person, and on the time and place.
I would add that especially in the army (and not only there), in my humble opinion, sometimes this is even desirable and obligatory from the outset, and not merely permitted and fitting. I have personally encountered several cases of soldiers in the army who had no books available near them (these were combat soldiers, and indeed such a situation is usually more common among them), and they did nothing and became intellectually and humanly depleted. Their human condition was grave, for they walked about in idleness and in an atmosphere of gloom and complaint all day. In such a situation it is very important to find some elevated occupation, to read some analytical material, or literature of value, or to develop a discussion on some topic of value, if only because of the struggle against idleness itself, whatever the alternative may be.
Beyond the problem of idleness, there is a subtler problem of the 'image of God.' Every person has a tendency to concentrate on what he is required to do, and to be completely disconnected from pursuits that go beyond what is obligatory. His daily order is dictated entirely from outside, and his personal autonomy is harmed. In the army this is especially likely to occur, but many people are in such a condition in civilian life as well.
This is the main reason many householders do not go out to Torah classes and do not engage in anything of value apart from their work / their university studies and the like. In such a condition, the image of God in a person is damaged, for he is in the position of a slave to his surroundings (however positive they may be). The commandment And you shall choose life is not fulfilled. Even if he is occupied with life (= positive things), there is here no fulfillment of And you shall choose.

Therefore, there is great importance in engaging in things beyond what is obligatory, even if one does not specifically mean Torah-spiritual engagement. If only in order to preserve personal autonomy and the use of the power of choice.

As we saw above, even the obligation to study Torah is, at its root, an extra-halakhic obligation. Its purpose is to preserve and develop the image of God within us. If so, idleness, that is, the prohibition of neglect of Torah study, is also an extra-halakhic prohibition in most cases. It seems that from here one may draw the conclusions stated above.

The last two points ought to trouble as well soldiers (and people in general) who do not observe Torah and commandments. Engagement in matters of the spirit can serve as a model for imitation even among other soldiers in the religious soldier’s environment, and then the value of these pursuits is multiplied many times over. In certain cases there is value in engaging in subjects that perhaps are not included in the 'hard core' of engagement in Torah and commandments, but which nevertheless constitute spiritual engagement that is relevant also for the broader surrounding environment (for example, analysis of a poem or a story, or engagement in some ideological-social topic and the like), and in this way they can influence that environment as well.

The need to fill the time. In light of the discussion we conducted above, this does not seem to be an acceptable option. If there is time for which we have no significant reason to leave it empty, then there is no permission at all to do so. Of this were said the words of the Talmud in Yoma: One who engages in idle conversation transgresses a positive commandment…. Here we are dealing with a halakhic transgression, and not with what is extra-halakhic. For such a case is leisure without any reason at all. Even the lenient criterion of the author of Even HaEzel does not allow it.[7]

F. Summary: Implications for Rear-Echelon Service

We conclude with several points touching on rear-echelon service in the army. Rear systems are, by their nature, less crowded and less coercive than combat systems. The main difference is that the soldier generally operates more independently, and not as one individual within the framework of an entire unit carrying out some task together.

Sometimes there is a feeling of lack of activity in one’s role, or a problem in making use of free time. But instead of thinking in terms of coping, we ought to regard this as a gift, which admittedly also places a task upon us. Unlike the combat soldier, the rear-area soldier is given the possibility of engaging in things of value during his free time, and of carrying out his tasks more flexibly. Unlike his comrades in combat, the rear-area soldier can take upon himself tasks of value, particularly those that are difficult for him to reach at other times (outside the army). Studying a tractate in a broad way, or going through an analytical book dealing with foundational subjects, or subjects that interest him. This applies as well to valuable secular literature, whether nonfiction or fiction.

It is worthwhile to establish contact with someone outside the army (a rabbi, or a friend, perhaps an older study partner, a havruta) who can clarify matters for him or answer questions, in order that he progress in a steady and continuous way. A sense of accomplishment gives satisfaction, and the accumulating benefit creates further motivation. If there is an opportunity to engage in things at a higher level, that is very worthwhile. Sometimes it is precisely settling for superficial study that causes one not to persevere in the task.

We must not surrender to the prevalent military mood of neutrality, inertia, and passive dejection. This period can enable each person to accomplish things he will not be able to reach on very many other occasions. Here too is the place to mention engagement in areas of the spirit that may prove relevant for the other soldiers in the unit as well.

Leisure is an opportunity, and not only a burden one must get through. True, standing up to and making use of this opportunity requires determination and decisiveness, but It is not in heaven.. If we indeed meet this task, and understand that this is a golden opportunity, then we will no longer understand the difference between the two sides we raised regarding the question whether there is or is not time that falls under the category of leisure. For one who approaches the matter correctly, the question, from his point of view, does not really exist.

Appendix: Are There Acts That Are Merely Optional? Maimonides and Rabbeinu Bahya[8]

1. General Introduction

We saw above that from a halakhic perspective there is time that counts as leisure, but from a substantive perspective not necessarily. The question of leisure touches on what is seemingly a different question: whether there are actions that are in the category of optional matters, regarding which Jewish law, or the Torah, has nothing to say.

As we saw above, from the standpoint of formal Jewish law there are certainly such actions (actions that Jewish law neither mandates nor forbids). Some of them are actions of great value, and some are completely trivial actions. But from the standpoint of the Torah in its broader sense, it is quite clear that actions of value ought to be done, and they are not considered optional in the full sense of the word. Yet, on the other hand, there is room to hesitate regarding merely neutral actions. Is there permission to do them, or is there no permission at all? In other words: does the Torah have something to say about every step in our lives, or are there steps about which the Torah has nothing to say? An optional matter in the full sense of the word.

Seemingly we find here two differing opinions among our medieval authorities. On the one hand, Maimonides in his commentary to Pirkei Avot (his words will be quoted below in full) presents a position according to which there are such neutral acts.[9]

According to Maimonides, who holds that there are acts of this sort, it is not plausible that the act itself is permitted, but in practice should be forbidden because of neglect of Torah study, or simply wasting time (which is an extra-halakhic principle). It seems from his words that the act is genuinely permitted. It also appears, however, that there is some virtue in not engaging in such an act (see especially the citation from the approach of the sage in the Book of Character Traits there).

By contrast, from the words of Rabbeinu Bahya in his book Hovot HaLevavot (Duties of the Heart) it emerges that one cannot even conceive of the existence of such acts, and everything is divided into permitted and forbidden.

Even according to his view, however, one must distinguish between an act that one must do in any event, and where the only question is in what manner to do it, and the decision whether to do the act at all. For example, when a person decides to eat breakfast, that is a decision with value significance (to strengthen himself for the service of God, and, on the other hand, not to waste unnecessary time). By contrast, the decision what to eat for breakfast, when we are dealing with two alternatives that are equal from the standpoint of value (in terms of time, money, and health), is an optional matter. Let him eat what seems tasty to him. It seems that the author of Hovot HaLevavot would also agree to this.

We will now bring the words of these two medieval authorities in full, for they touch deeply upon our entire present discussion, and they are of great benefit to the readers of this book, who will be able to read and study them from here. Already now let us say that from the words of both of them it is included that there certainly is reason not to consume our time with permitted actions, even if such actions are available (as in Maimonides’ view). This can be seen in Maimonides’ words especially when he discusses that sage from the Book of Character Traits.

2. The Words of Rabbeinu Bahya

We will first bring the words of Rabbeinu Bahya, which are seemingly the simpler ones, and this is what he writes (Gate of the Service of God, ch. 4):

The Torah divides human actions into three categories: commandment, prohibition, and the permitted. Commandment is divided into two parts. One is the duties of the heart—matters realized in inner belief, such as the oneness of God, that the heart be wholehearted with Him, trust in Him, surrender to Him, acceptance of His decree, belief in His prophets and His Torah, fear of Him, observance of His commandments, reflection on His wonders, consideration of His goodness, and many similar things whose enumeration would take long. The second consists of duties of the heart and limbs together, such as the harmony of tongue and heart, reading the book of the Torah and studying it, prayer, fasting, charity, refraining from work on Sabbaths and festivals, and performing the commandments of sukkah, lulav, tzitzit, and the like. Prohibition is likewise divided into two parts: duties of the heart and duties of the limbs. Prohibited duties of the heart include associating anything with the Creator inwardly and through hypocrisy, loving to do what God has forbidden, pride, arrogance, haughtiness, contempt for others, mocking the prophets and the things that come from God through their speech, despising the good and those who embody it, finding satisfaction in evildoers, envy, coveting, wishing evil upon others, anger at God’s decree, and much more of that kind. Prohibited duties of the limbs include openly associating anything with the Creator, false oaths, lying, talebearing, eating what is forbidden, forbidden sexual relations, bloodshed, and many other such things. The permitted is divided into three parts: sufficiency, excess, and deficiency. Sufficiency is what a person cannot do without for the proper maintenance of his body and the conduct of his affairs, such as food and drink, clothing and shelter, and speech insofar as he needs it for ordering his affairs, actions, and commerce; and the use of all his movements, taking from them only what is sufficient and proper, by which his situation is set in order, as Scripture says: “A good man shows favor and lends; he conducts his affairs with justice.” The second part, excess, is when one goes beyond the limit of sufficiency into superfluity that a person does not need, such as excessive eating and drinking. The sage already warned against this, saying: “Do not be among winebibbers, among gluttonous eaters of meat.” Likewise excessive adornment in clothing, overexpansion in dwellings without need, and excessive speech, in which one cannot trust himself not to stumble, as the sage said: “In a multitude of words, transgression is not lacking.” So too he said: “He who keeps company with prostitutes squanders wealth”; and: “Do not give your strength to women”; and concerning a king: “He shall not multiply wives for himself.” Also excessive striving for possessions and gathering wealth; concerning this it is said: “Do not toil to become rich; desist from your own understanding,” and concerning a king: “Silver and gold he shall not greatly multiply for himself.” Everything we have mentioned regarding care of the body and its pleasures is ultimately blameworthy, because it leads a person toward what the Creator warned against and forbade. The third part of the permitted is deficiency, when a person does not reach the level of what is sufficient in food, drink, clothing, sexual relations, speech, sleep, engaging in the needs of sustenance, and the like. This too is divided into two parts: what is done as piety, and what is done for worldly motives. What is done for piety and to draw near to God by way of abstinence is praiseworthy and brings reward, as the sage said: “The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning, but the heart of fools is in the house of mirth.” But what is done for worldly purposes—such as to save money or win praise, by refraining from what is permitted and making do with less than one needs—is blameworthy, because it departs from the middle path and wrongs the body, all because of excessive love of this world. Some sages said: One who separates from the world out of love for the world is like one who extinguishes fire with straw. But with regard to speech and sleep, restraint in them is praiseworthy. Speech, because silence has a better end, as the sage said: “Do not be rash with your mouth, and let not your heart be hasty to utter a word before God; for God is in heaven and you are on earth; therefore let your words be few.” And as for sleep, as it says: “A little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to lie down.”

It has already been made clear from what we have said that all human actions fall under commandment or prohibition, together with what is sufficient. For whatever goes beyond the bounds of sufficiency, whether by excess or deficiency, cannot escape falling under commandment, if it is for the sake of Heaven, or under prohibition, if it is not for the sake of Heaven. And when we investigate what is sufficient for obtaining sustenance from the world, we find that we are commanded concerning it, as stated at the beginning of creation: “And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth, and subdue it,” and afterward He said: “Behold, I have given you every seed-bearing herb that is upon the face of all the earth.” Thus what is sufficient in nourishment enters the realm of commandment. Since this is so, it has become clear that all human actions do not fall outside commandment and prohibition. The explanation is this: whoever performs an act that belongs to the commandments has done a good deed; if he refrains from doing it when he is able to fulfill his obligation, he falls short. Likewise, one who does something prohibited is a sinner; if he refrains from doing it, he is righteous, when he refrains out of fear of God, as Scripture says: “Indeed they do no wrong; they walk in His ways.” And if one performs permitted acts in a balanced and proper way, he is righteous, as it says: “A good man shows favor and lends; he conducts his affairs with justice.” But if he goes to excess beyond what is sufficient, he falls short, because he brings himself to what God warned against. And if he falls short of what is sufficient despite being able to attain it, and his intention is to discipline his soul in the service of God and to govern his desires in order to draw near to God, or to separate from this world and incline toward the World to Come, he is righteous and his deed is good; but if it is not for the sake of Heaven, then he falls short and his deed is reprehensible.

Human actions are divided into good and bad, and the wise person is one who weighs his actions before doing them on this scale, examining them with sound thought and the power of discernment; he chooses the better of them and abandons the rest, as David, peace be upon him, said: “I considered my ways and turned my feet to Your testimonies. I hastened and did not delay to keep Your commandments.” The proof for the correctness of what we have said concerning good and bad actions is what the sage said: “For God will bring every deed into judgment, concerning every hidden thing, whether good or evil.” He thus included all actions under good and evil, which is what we meant by praiseworthy and blameworthy. It has therefore become clear that human actions are divided only according to the two parts of the Torah, namely commandments and prohibitions.

As stated, according to Rabbeinu Bahya all human acts are divided into good and bad, and there are no permitted acts at all. By contrast, Maimonides holds that there are permitted acts. We will now bring his words, which speak for themselves.

3. The Words of Maimonides

In the Mishnah in Pirkei Avot (1:16), Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says the following:

His son Shimon says: All my days I grew up among the sages, and I found nothing better for the body than silence. Study is not the main thing, but action; and whoever multiplies words brings on sin.

In his commentary on that passage, Maimonides cites the words of one of the sages in the Book of Character Traits (apparently not that of Aristotle), who divided the kinds of speech into four parts, and then Maimonides adds one more.

The sage already said: “In a multitude of words, transgression is not lacking” (Proverbs 10:19). The reason is that most speech consists of superfluities and sins, as we shall now explain; for if a person multiplies his words, he will necessarily sin, because among his words there will be at least one thing that ought not be said. One of the marks of the wise is few words; they said: “A fence for wisdom is silence.” And many words are a mark of fools—“and the voice of a fool comes with many words” (Ecclesiastes 5:2). The sages also said that few words indicate noble lineage and distinguished status: “Silence is a mark of pedigree.”

It is stated in the ethical works that one of the students was seen to be exceedingly silent, to the point that he spoke only a very little. They said to him: What is the reason for your extraordinary silence? He replied: I examined speech and found that it is divided into four categories. The first is speech that is entirely harmful with no benefit, such as cursing someone, obscene talk, and the like; uttering such things is sheer folly. The second is speech that has harm on one side and benefit on the other, such as praising a person in order to gain some benefit from him, where that praise may anger his enemy and harm the one praised. This too should be left aside and not spoken. The third is speech that contains neither benefit nor harm, like most of the talk of the masses: how the city wall was built, how such-and-such a palace was built, descriptions of the beauty of a certain house, the abundance of produce in a certain land, and similar superfluous talk. He said: speech of this category too is unnecessary and without benefit. The fourth is speech that is entirely beneficial, such as speaking about wisdom and virtues, and a person speaking about what pertains specifically to him for the maintenance of his life and the continuation of his existence. About this it is fitting to speak. Whenever I hear speech, I examine it; if I find it to belong to this fourth category, I speak it, and if it belongs to the others, I remain silent. The masters of ethics said: Consider this man and his wisdom, for he eliminated three-quarters of speech, and this is a wisdom in which one ought to be trained.

And I say that speech, according to the obligations of our Torah, is divided into five categories: commanded, forbidden, repugnant, beloved, and permitted.

The first category, which is commanded, is reading the Torah, studying it, and reflecting upon it; this is an obligatory positive commandment: “And you shall speak of them” (Deuteronomy 6:7), and it is like all the other commandments. Much has already been said in strengthening the duty of study—more than this work can contain even in part.

The second category is speech that is forbidden and against which we were warned, such as false testimony, lying, talebearing, informing, and cursing; the verses of the Torah indicate this category, and it also includes obscene speech and evil speech.

The third category is repugnant speech: speech that brings no benefit to a person in his soul, neither obedience nor rebellion, such as most stories told by the masses about what happened and what was, how a certain king conducted himself in his palace, what caused a certain person’s death, or how another became wealthy. Among the sages these are called idle talk, and people of virtue strive within themselves to abandon this kind of speech. It was said of Rav, the student of Rabbi Hiyya, that he never engaged in idle conversation in all his days. This category also includes when a person denigrates a virtue or praises a vice, whether moral or intellectual.

The fourth category, which is beloved, is speech in praise of intellectual and moral virtues, and in condemnation of the vices of both kinds, and the stirring of the soul toward the former through stories and poems, and restraining it from the latter by those same means. Likewise, praising the excellent and extolling them for their virtues, so that their conduct will be pleasing in people’s eyes and others will follow their path; and condemning the wicked for their deficiencies, so that their deeds and memory will become repugnant in people’s eyes, and people will keep away from them and not follow their ways. This category—meaning the cultivation of noble traits and distancing oneself from inferior traits—is sometimes called proper conduct.

The fifth category, which is permitted, is speech concerning matters specific to a person’s business, livelihood, food, drink, clothing, and other things he needs. This is permitted; there is nothing beloved or repugnant about it. If he wishes, he may speak about it as much as he likes, and if he wishes, he may refrain. Even in this category, a person is praised for speaking little, and ethical works warn against speaking much. As for the forbidden and the repugnant, there is no need for further words or commands that one should be entirely silent about them. But regarding the commanded and the beloved, if a person were able to speak of them all his days, that would be the ideal. Still, two things are required of him. First, that his deeds accord with his speech, as they say: “Words are fitting when they come from those who practice them.” This is the point of the statement here: “Not study is the main thing, but action.” And the sages say to a virtuous person who teaches virtues: “Expound—for it befits you to expound.” And the prophet said: “Rejoice in the Lord, O righteous; praise is fitting for the upright” (Psalms 33:1). The second matter is brevity: he should strive to express many ideas in few words, not the reverse. This is what they meant when they said: “A person should always teach his students in a concise manner.”

Know that composed poems, in whatever language they may be, are judged by their content; they follow the same rules as speech, which we have already divided into categories. I have explained this, even though it is obvious, because I have seen elders and distinguished men of our nation who, when at a wine-feast, wedding, or the like, if someone wished to sing an Arabic poem—even if the poem praised courage or generosity, which belongs to the beloved category, or praised wine—they would condemn it utterly and regard it as impermissible to hear. But if the poet sang one of the Hebrew poems, they would not condemn it or regard it as serious, even though the speech contained what had been warned against or what is repugnant. This is complete foolishness, for speech is not forbidden, permitted, beloved, repugnant, or commanded on account of its language, but on account of its content. If the content of the poem is virtuous, it should be said in whatever language it may be; if its content is base, it should be abandoned in whatever language it may be. Moreover, I add something further: if there are two poems with the same content—arousing the power of desire, praising it, and gladdening the soul with it, which is base and belongs to the category of repugnant speech because it stirs and incites an inferior trait, as will be explained in the fourth chapter—and one of the two poems is in Hebrew and the other in Arabic or another language, then hearing the Hebrew one and speaking it is more repugnant from the Torah’s perspective, because of the excellence of the language, which ought to be used only for exalted matters. All the more so if this is coupled with the use of a verse from the Torah or from Song of Songs for this purpose; then it passes from the repugnant category into the forbidden category, against which we were warned, since the Torah forbade making the words of prophecy into songs for base and disgraceful things.

And the words of the wise are gracious…

[1] Questions also arise here concerning work ethic, use of military property, and more. I will not deal with those questions).

[2] It may be that this is merely a use of assumption 3 in order to solve problem 1.

[3] He adds a far-reaching novelty, namely, that an oath takes effect with respect to laws learned through exegetical derivation, but this is not the place to elaborate.

[4] Or Sameach there also explains on this basis the distinctiveness of the commandment of Torah study with respect to the rule that one who is engaged in one commandment is exempt from another (which the Kehillot Ya’akov above discussed).

[5] Rabbi Kook, in his letters, writes this regarding character refinement. In his view, the Torah did not command this because it preferred that we do it as those who are not commanded and act.

[6] So it appears from the words of Birkat Shmuel, Kiddushin, no. 30, subsec. 6.

[7] There are, however, situations in which a person does not have the strength to do something, even if it is incumbent upon him. And in the army such a situation is indeed common. Usually, in Jewish law, we tell a person in such a condition that he must make an effort and do what is incumbent upon him, and we do not advise him how to sin in the easier way. Sometimes, however, we do find in Jewish law a discussion that does advise a person who feels he will not withstand the test how he should sin in the less severe manner. For example, the Talmud in tractate Mo’ed Katan 17a (and see also Kiddushin 40a) says as follows:

For it was taught: Rabbi Ila'i says: If a person sees that his inclination is overpowering him, he should go to a place where he is not known, dress in black, wrap himself in black, and do what his heart desires—but let him not desecrate the name of Heaven publicly.

However, the Rif and the Rosh there write that the Jewish law does not follow Rabbi Ilai, since as a matter of law we maintain that everything is in the hands of Heaven except the fear of Heaven. From this it follows that we may not advise a person who cannot stand up to fulfilling his obligation how he should act in order to violate a lesser prohibition.

With regard, however, to an obligation that is not halakhic, there is room to discuss the matter differently, for there certainly is room there to guide a person how to act in a less bad way. But in our case one must distinguish, for the fact that Torah study is not a halakhic obligation does not stem from its being an obligation of lesser importance; on the contrary, it stems from its being too important to be included within formal Jewish law. Even so, this still requires further thought.

In any event, it is clear that the more value-laden the activity is, the less it involves neglect of Torah study. We already noted at the beginning of our remarks the category established by the Hazon Ish of 'qualitative neglect of Torah study.' Therefore, even in a time when there is no permission not to study or to occupy oneself with commandments, and hence there is no permission to occupy oneself with something else, it is clear that there is a difference between engagement in matters of the spirit and pursuits that are utterly without value.

[8] This is the place to thank two of my dear students, R. Yoni Cohen and R. Shmuel Gleizer, who drew my attention to the two sources cited here (already years ago).

[9] Maimonides there deals with speech, but it is clear that according to his approach the same applies to actions.