A Perspective on Women's Torah Study and Women's Scholarship

• Introduction • A. The theoretical plane: between Torah study and the commandment of Torah study – the commandment of Torah study and neglect of Torah study; analytic study and Jewish law; two parts of study for its own sake – women's obligation; the blessing over the Torah for women; conclusions; back to the Sages • B. The relation between the Menachot passage and the Berakhot passage • Appendix: the practical plane and the form of discourse; the status of policy considerations; several remarks on the discourse; the content of study; the current situation; obstacles to the discourse; practical directions • Conclusion

Introduction

In recent years, there has been major development in the field of women's Torah study, to the point that many present it as a kind of revolution. This development is taking place on two main planes: theoretical-halakhic (or meta-halakhic) and practical.

On the theoretical-halakhic plane, agreement has increasingly expanded that although women are not obligated in Torah study—and although the Talmud contains various expressions and sayings from which it would seem that Torah study for women is forbidden, or at least lacking in importance and perhaps even harmful—in practice such study is not prohibited, and at least in our day it also has great value and importance. On the practical plane, women today study Torah on a broader scale and in areas in which it was not traditionally customary for them to engage; some of them even advance and reach a high level of study and even issue halakhic guidance in various fields.

In this article I wish to address both of these planes and to consider several relevant aspects that, in my view, do not receive sufficient attention. I should say at the outset that I write these remarks as someone who strongly supports the development in question and has contributed and continues to contribute to it as best I can. I see a need to note this fact because, following remarks that I wrote in the past (hereafter: my article in Makor Rishon)[1] many misunderstandings arose, and there were even those who did not understand at all the direction toward which my remarks were aimed. This article is therefore intended to clarify the picture.

I should note that several halakhic, methodological, and meta-halakhic aspects are involved in this discussion, and within this framework I will not be able to exhaust all of them or ground them as fully as they deserve. Nor will I be able to address here contradictory sources and opposing views;[2] my main intention in this article is to express a reasoned position on the issue of women's Torah study and to sketch the picture—as I see it—in broad strokes and from an analytic perspective (while, where necessary, referring to places where I have elaborated more fully on some of the points). Indeed, an important part of the inquiry into this issue is the meta-halakhic discussion that also touches on current reality and the form of discourse; the analytic clarification can illuminate and improve that as well, and therefore part of the article will address these aspects.

The article is divided into two chapters and an appendix: in the first chapter I will distinguish between Torah study and the commandment of Torah study,[3] and I will argue that women are obligated in Torah study even if they are not obligated in the commandment of Torah study; in the second chapter I will demonstrate the theoretical distinction through a detailed analysis of a Talmudic passage; and in the appendix there will be a discussion of the implications of the theoretical picture for women's Torah study in practice.

A. The theoretical plane – between Torah study and the commandment of Torah study

The accepted halakhic picture is that women are not obligated in the commandment of Torah study. Beyond that, various sources in the Mishnah, in both Talmuds, and in the literature that followed them indicate that women's study is not appropriate and perhaps even harmful (though not necessarily prohibited). Even if we do not adopt the stringent interpretation that sees in this an actual prohibition, it is still difficult to deny that the current reality departs from the model presented to us by the Sages and by our medieval and later authorities (Rishonim and Acharonim).

Of course, even in the past there were exceptional women who engaged in Torah study, but the exception proves the rule: encouraging every woman to study Torah, and cultivating female excellence in study, seem contrary to the policy of most sages throughout the generations, and this fact occasionally arouses polemic around the matter (though my impression is that it is steadily diminishing).

Some justify this phenomenon as a kind of surrender to the spirit of the times, and thereby invite criticism about a 'Reform spirit,' or feminism—that is, surrender to external values and fashions. Others see it as a policy that is proper from the outset and speak of an important female contribution to Torah study (though they usually do not address the sources that reject it). Indeed, in order to place the matter in its proper context, we must begin with a theoretical, halakhic, and meta-halakhic discussion concerning Torah study and the commandment of Torah study.

The commandment of Torah study and neglect of Torah study

The Talmud (Nedarim 8a) states:

And Rabbi Giddel said in Rav's name: One who says, 'I will rise early and study this chapter; I will study this tractate'—he has made a great vow to the God of Israel.

But is he not already under oath and bound, such that an oath cannot take effect upon an oath? What then does this teach us? That it is effective even if only for encouragement. But that is the same as Rav Giddel's earlier ruling! This teaches us that since, if he wished, he could discharge his obligation with the recitation of Shema in the morning and evening, therefore the oath takes effect upon him.

From the language of the Talmud it emerges that in order to fulfill the commandment of Torah study, it is enough to recite Shema in the morning and in the evening (or to study one chapter in the morning and one in the evening, as explained in the Menachot 99a passage; see below in chapter B); and from the plain sense of the Talmud it appears that anything beyond this minimum is not truly a commandment, and therefore an oath can take effect with respect to it.

The commentators there (see the Mefarash, Rosh, Ran, and others) noted this point and related in different ways to the status of study beyond the minimum: some indeed held that study beyond these two chapters is optional; others spoke of a non-obligatory commandment fulfilled when performed; and some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) saw the additional study as an actual obligation, though not as part of the essential commandment of Torah study, but rather as derived from an exposition or from prophetic writings (see Ran, there, s.v. 'this teaches us').

How does this fit with the concept of 'neglect of Torah study'? Even if, in some of its Talmudic appearances, this concept can be understood in different ways,[4] in the accepted understanding it means that one is obligated to study whenever possible, and that one who does not do so is guilty of neglecting Torah study. Seemingly—at least according to some of the views in the Nedarim passage—there is no basis for a claim against a person who did not study Torah in his free time, for he is not obligated in that at all; even if we say that there is here a non-obligatory positive commandment fulfilled when performed, it is still not clear how refraining from it can be considered a prohibition.

It is difficult to dispute the value of Torah study and its centrality, and yet it seems that although the Torah certainly wants us to study as much as we can, it obligates us only with a minimal obligation and leaves everything beyond that to the person's voluntary decision. Presumably we are expected to do this even without a formal halakhic obligation,[5] out of recognition of the importance of Torah and its study; and although there is no halakhic obligation to study at every possible moment, there is a demand to do so, and there is also a claim made against one who neglects Torah study. According to this suggestion, the concept of 'neglect of Torah study' is not halakhic, but rather concerns the extra-halakhic remainder of the matter (as with a person who does not conduct himself in the way morality requires, or one who does not act beyond the letter of the law).

In my article on sevarot, I explained these matters on the basis of the claim that there are two types of norms that are not defined as a formal halakhic obligation: norms that are not basic or important enough (such as pious conduct or acting beyond the letter of the law); and norms that are basic and very important. The first type does not enter the halakhic framework because in truth there is no obligation to fulfill it; but the second type does not enter formal Jewish law precisely so as not to diminish its importance—that is, so that this norm will not be seen as an ordinary commandment equal to any other commandment.[6] According to my proposal, the meaning of the statement 'and Torah study is equal to them all' (Mishnah, Pe'ah 1:1) is that Torah study is so fundamental and important that precisely for that reason it is not defined as a binding halakhic requirement. Below, in chapter B, I will demonstrate this distinction by means of an analysis of two Talmudic passages and a comparison between them.

Analytic study and Jewish law

At the beginning of Parashat Bechukotai (Leviticus 26:3) it says: 'If you walk in My statutes and keep My commandments and perform them.' Rashi (ad loc.) explains the threefold series of verbs, following the Sages, and writes:

'If you walk in My statutes'—could this mean the observance of the commandments? Since it says 'and keep My commandments,' observance of the commandments is already stated. How then do I fulfill 'if you walk in My statutes'? That you should toil in Torah.

'And keep My commandments'—toil in Torah in order to keep and fulfill, as it is said, 'and you shall learn them and keep to do them.'

From his words it emerges that there are three planes of relating to the commandments: 1. 'If you walk in My statutes' — toil in Torah; 2. 'keep My commandments' — toil in Torah in order to learn and observe;[7] 3. 'and perform them' — practical fulfillment.

If so, the picture presented in Rashi is that beyond the practical observance of the commandments, there is also an obligation to study so that we can observe—that is, study that functions as an instrument for the practical fulfillment of commandments—and alongside it there is an obligation to study for the sake of study and understanding themselves (and this is what he calls toil in Torah).

It seems that this category is what we call 'analytic study'—that is, study for the sake of understanding and mastery, but not necessarily for the sake of actual observance (though it obviously has halakhic and practical implications). In Nefesh HaChaim (gate 4, chapter 3), Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin relates to this as study 'to increase learning and dialectical analysis,' and in that connection he cites the words of the Rosh (Nedarim 62a, s.v. 'and speak of them') who explains that studying Torah for its own sake means 'for the sake of the Torah.'

Both Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin and the author of the Tanya (Likkutei Amarim, chapter 6) argue that the purpose of studying this part is to cleave to God (that is, to His will); this is study whose essence is the service of God and cleaving to Him through the study itself, in addition to the service of God performed through observing the commandments. Clarifying the mode of thinking of the Torah and the deep ideas that underlie Jewish law is cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, and is the essence of Torah study.

This may be compared to the difference between science and technology. Scientists engage in scientific research in order to understand nature, while empirical experimentation is only a means of arriving at that understanding; their aim is understanding nature, not application. People in technology, by contrast, use the laws of nature in order to create various useful applications; for them, scientific study is a means and not an end. These remarks may nicely illustrate the difference between Jewish law and analytic study: halakhic study parallels technology, whereas analytic study parallels scientific research.

Rabbi Israel Salanter, in his article Hok U-Mishpat,[8] greatly expands the discussion on this matter. One of the proofs he brings is from the section of the rebellious and wayward son. The Talmud (Sanhedrin 71a) cites a baraita teaching that 'the rebellious and wayward son never was and never will be; why then was it written? Expound it and receive reward'; and Rabbi Israel Salanter asks whether we truly need these verses in order to receive reward for Torah study, and why passages intended for practical application are not sufficient.

Rabbi Israel Salanter explains that the Talmud's intention is that the section of the rebellious and wayward son was written in order to teach the principle of 'expound it and receive reward'—that is, to teach us that the study of all Torah passages (and not only the passage of the rebellious son, which emerged to teach about the whole) has value in itself and is not intended only for application. And the converse is likewise true: study for the sake of fulfilling the commandments is only an instrument for a commandment, and it is not about that that the sources describing the importance and centrality of Torah study were speaking. We thus learn that the essence of Torah study is the first category in Rashi above: study for the sake of study itself, that is, analytic study.

It seems to me that the words of Rabbi Israel Salanter and Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin reflect the basis of the accepted approach in the yeshiva world: Torah study for the sake of study itself (and not only for the sake of observing Jewish law) as the focus of religious life; regarding this it was said, 'and Torah study is equal to them all.'

Two parts of study for its own sake – women's obligation

If we return to the distinction made two sections ago—the distinction between the halakhic obligation (the commandment) and the obligation grounded in reason—we can ask: which of the two categories of study does the commandment of Torah study address, and which category belongs to the remainder grounded in reason? Reciting Shema, or reviewing one chapter in the morning and one in the evening, does not lead to knowledge of Jewish law nor to the observance of any particular law; and if that is the model of fulfilling the commandment of Torah study, then it is plainly evident that this is not study whose purpose is practical observance. Admittedly, the recitation of Shema is an act whose content is the acceptance of the yoke of heaven, but from the perspective of Torah study what we have here is engagement with Torah for the sake of the engagement itself. The obligation grounded in reason—the obligation to study at every free moment—also concerns study as such, for the value of study as an instrument is assessed through its contribution to observance. Put differently: if I know the practical laws and do not stumble in observing them, there is no reason to make a claim against me for neglect of Torah study merely because I did not study Jewish law; and therefore it stands to reason that this claim too concerns the analytic category.

We thus learn that the essence of the commandment of Torah study is to engage in Torah at a minimal daily measure; beyond that there is an obligation grounded in reason to deepen our understanding of the ideas underlying Jewish law as much as we can (toil in Torah). Both of these obligations concern study whose goal is not application. Study for the sake of halakhic knowledge and for the sake of observing the commandments is not included in Torah study and is only an instrument for the fulfillment of commandments.[9]

Who is obligated in each of these categories? We saw that, in Jewish law, women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, but that applies to the halakhic obligation (the commandment). As we have seen, the commandment is a minor part (reciting Shema morning and evening), and therefore we must ask: what about the part grounded in reason? Are women exempt from that as well?

In my article on sevarot I showed that obligations whose basis is reason bind all human beings, or at least all those who understand the rationale on which they are based and for whom that rationale is relevant. For example, gentiles too are obligated in every obligation whose basis is reason, as Rav Nissim Gaon wrote (in his introduction to the Talmud, printed at the beginning of tractate Berakhot): 'Whatever is grasped by the understanding of the heart has always been binding on a person.' In that same place I brought proofs that minors too are obligated in obligations grounded in reason (such as keeping an oath, the prohibition of bestiality, and other obligations incumbent on the descendants of Noah). Despite this, gentiles are not obligated in Torah study, and it is even forbidden to them (see Sanhedrin 59a), and apparently this study is not relevant to them (because their mode of connection to the Holy One, blessed be He, differs from that of a Jew; and proof of this is that they are also exempt from fulfilling the commandments that are studied in this kind of learning).

The basis of the matter is that with obligations whose source is the Torah's command, the Torah itself determines who is obligated in them, and therefore one who is not commanded in them is exempt from them; but with obligations whose basis is reason, everyone who understands the rationale, and everyone to whom the rationale applies, is obligated in them. There is no reason to exempt anyone who meets those criteria. The conclusion for our issue is that women are indeed exempt from the commandment of Torah study but are obligated in Torah study; and the same is true, of course, for deaf persons and minors (as long as they understand the rationale).

If so, by force of reason, anyone for whom the observance of Jewish law and the Torah is relevant (that is, anyone who is Jewish), his or her Torah study is the highest form of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, available to that person; and anyone who understands this rationale is obligated to fulfill it. The conclusion to which we have arrived, surprisingly enough, is that the fixed binding standard of reading two chapters each day does not apply to women, but the obligation to study and to delve as far as one can, whenever this is possible, applies to women exactly as it does to men.

The blessing over the Torah for women

A sharp halakhic expression of this picture is found in the laws of the blessing over the Torah, and in particular in the rules concerning the blessing over the Torah for women.[10] If the blessing over the Torah were the ordinary blessing over commandments, it would have to be recited over the commandment of Torah study and whatever is included in it; but in my article on the blessing over the Torah I showed that the more plausible explanation for the blessing over the Torah is what several later authorities wrote (Emek Berakhah, section 1, p. 5, and others), namely, that it is a blessing of praise and not a blessing over commandments.

In that article I argued that the basis of the blessing over the Torah is praise for the greatness of the Torah, and that its meaning is thanksgiving to the Holy One, blessed be He, for our having received the Torah; and from this it follows that the blessing concerns primarily the part of Torah study grounded in reason (analytic study) and not the commandment of Torah study.[11] The recognition of the importance of analytic study as a way of cleaving to the Holy One, blessed be He, and to His will is what brings us to understand that there is an obligation to study Torah to the extent of our ability; and that same recognition is what arouses the need to recite a blessing of praise upon receiving the Torah.

And indeed, in the Shulchan Arukh (Orach Chaim, section 47, paragraph 14), the Mechaber rules: 'Women recite the blessing over the Torah'; and the Magen Avraham (there, subsection 14) and the Bi'ur Halakhah (there) explained that this is because women are obligated to study the laws relevant to them. From their words it emerges that they assume this is a blessing over commandments, and therefore the matter is very puzzling: after all, women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, so why should the obligation to study the laws that concern them require a blessing over commandments? Above we saw that study in order to know how to fulfill is an instrument for a commandment and is not of the essence of Torah study.

In light of the foregoing, it seems that the matter should be explained differently. First, since women are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, the fact that they are obligated to study the laws that concern them proves that such study is not within the category of the commandment of Torah study but is only an instrument for the fulfillment of commandments (as we saw above); and from this it follows that if they are obligated in the blessing over the Torah, it is proven that this is a blessing of praise and not a blessing over commandments. It then becomes clear that women recite the blessing over the Torah because they too are included in the praise for the giving of the Torah to the Jewish people.

As stated, the praise is for the greatness of the Torah and its study (analytic study) and not for the commandment of Torah study (whose obligatory part is only reciting Shema morning and evening), and in this we saw that women belong just as men do; therefore, the question of why they are obligated in the blessing over the Torah does not arise at all. The blessing over the Torah is the pre-study declaration of intent said before the non-obligatory part of study, and its purpose is to deepen the understanding of why we do this. If this is not a commandment, then the study is because of the greatness of the Torah; and the blessing expresses recognition of this and praise to the Holy One, blessed be He, who gave us this Torah.

Conclusions

From the brief discussion of the parameters of the blessing over the Torah, one can discern the initial distinction between the commandment of Torah study and Torah study, and also conclude that women are obligated in (or at least included within) Torah study—and, in particular, surprisingly enough, in the analytic part of Torah study. Of course, they also need to study in order to know how to fulfill, but that is not the essence of Torah study; it is only an instrument for a commandment. The conclusion from all of the above is that women's exemption from the commandment of Torah study is minor and not very significant (they are not obligated to recite Shema morning and evening, at least not by virtue of Torah study). Of course, one must not forget the flexibility that characterizes the second part of study: they are supposed to study only to the extent that they can within the framework of their constraints, but this limitation is equally true for men as well (except for reciting Shema morning and evening).

As a marginal note, I would add that even instrumental study—that is, study in order to know what to do—is not necessarily study from books of abridgments and collections of rulings. Anyone familiar with Jewish law knows that the broader the scope of study, the more observance itself is improved. Even study of non-halakhic and non-practical passages contributes to halakhic decision-making in various ways (through proofs for a certain mode of thinking, halakhic analogies, and the like), and sound analytic analysis is a condition for halakhic decision-making. Therefore, even study in order to know what to do—which by all opinions also obligates women—can (and perhaps should) find expression in comprehensive analytic study of all parts of Torah. The difference between study for the sake of observance and analytic study for its own sake lies mainly on the level of motivation for study, and less in the essence of the study, its contents, and its form. Once again we see that there is no significant difference between men and women with respect to Torah study.

Back to the Sages

As I mentioned, in the words of the Sages there are several sources from which it emerges that it is not appropriate to teach Torah to women, and that the matter may even be harmful. For example, the Mishnah (Sotah 3:4) says:

From here Ben Azzai says: A man is obligated to teach his daughter Torah, so that if she drinks, she will know that the merit suspends the punishment for her.

Rabbi Eliezer says: Whoever teaches his daughter Torah is as though he taught her frivolity.

Rabbi Yehoshua says: A woman prefers one kav and frivolity to nine kavs and abstinence. He used to say: a foolish pietist, a cunning wicked person, a self-denying woman, and the afflictions of the Pharisees—these are destroyers of the world.

The Talmud there (21a) says:

Rabbi Abbahu said: What is Rabbi Eliezer's reason? As it is written, 'I, wisdom, dwell with cunning'—once wisdom enters a person, cunning enters with it.

In the Jerusalem Talmud (Sotah 3:4), even sharper statements are brought:

A matron asked Rabbi Elazar: Why, for a single sin in the incident of the calf, did they die by three kinds of death? He said to her: A woman's wisdom is only in her spindle, as it is written, 'And every wise-hearted woman spun with her hands.'

His son Hyrcanus said to him: Because you would not answer her one matter of Torah, you have caused me to lose three hundred kor of tithes every year?! He said to him: Let the words of Torah be burned rather than handed over to women.

These words were brought into Jewish law by Maimonides (Mishneh Torah, Torah Study, chapter 1, halakhah 13):

A woman who has studied Torah receives reward, but not like a man's reward, because she was not commanded; and anyone who does something he was not commanded to do is not rewarded like one who was commanded and did it, but less than him. Even though she receives a reward, the Sages instructed that a person should not teach his daughter Torah, because most women do not direct their minds toward learning; rather, they turn the words of Torah into nonsense according to the poverty of their understanding. The Sages said: whoever teaches his daughter Torah is as though he taught her frivolity. To what does this apply? To the Oral Torah. But the Written Torah should not be taught to her at the outset; and if he did teach her, it is not like teaching her frivolity.

From Maimonides' words it emerges that, strictly speaking, this is not an actual prohibition but an exemption; nevertheless, the Sages instructed that one should not teach her Torah because most women do not direct their minds toward learning.[12]

We must now ask: to which part of Torah study were all these sayings directed? Would reciting Shema morning and evening bring women to cunning? And what would happen if they recite Shema for the sake of accepting the yoke of heaven and not for the sake of Torah study? It is implausible to say that this refers to halakhic study done in order to observe, for women too need to know what to do; and from this it follows that these discussions do not concern the commandment of Torah study but Torah study itself. What is meant here specifically is Talmudic and halakhic analysis—analytic study. Although we saw that women belong in Torah study and are even obligated in it, meaning in the study of halakhic and Talmudic analysis, and are exempt from the commandment of Torah study, it is precisely about the analytic part that the Sages instructed that they should not be taught, lest they turn the matters into nonsense and transform them into cunning.

B. The relation between the Menachot passage and the Berakhot passage

The Menachot passage (99b) spells out more fully the insight that we saw in the Nedarim passage (8a). First, we will see this through a step-by-step study of the passage:

Rabbi Ami said: From the words of Rabbi Yosei we learn that even if a person studied only one chapter in the morning and one chapter in the evening, he has fulfilled the commandment 'This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.'

Rabbi Ami drastically minimizes the commandment of Torah study; in his view, one chapter in the morning and one in the evening suffice to discharge the obligation.

Rabbi Yohanan, in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, goes even further and says:

Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai: Even if a person recited only Shema in the morning and evening, he has fulfilled 'it shall not depart.'

In practice, Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai empties the commandment of Torah study of all practical content, since reciting Shema morning and evening is a commandment that one does anyway in any case.

Why is it so important to Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai to empty the commandment of Torah study of content? It seems that his intention is that Torah study is not identical with the commandment of Torah study: the commandment of Torah study is a formal and minor matter, and everything else is something that does not belong to formal Jewish law. Because of the importance of Torah study, it should be done not because of the command, but because of an understanding of the importance and fundamental character of the Torah, like one who acts without having been commanded.

At this point the Talmud presents a dispute between two versions regarding the words of Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai:

And this matter is forbidden to be said in the presence of the unlearned.

And Rava said: It is a commandment to say it in the presence of the unlearned.

Why, according to the first version, is it forbidden to say this before the unlearned? It seems that the reason is concern lest they content themselves with reciting Shema morning and evening and not continue to study more; but this reason is difficult on its own terms, for that is in fact what the commandment of Torah study requires, so what exactly is the concern? We are forced to say that the Talmud assumes that reciting Shema in the morning and evening is the defined halakhic obligation, but that it is entirely clear to it that there is also an obligation to study beyond this—and the concern is that the unlearned will not understand that.

According to Rava, it is a commandment to say this before the unlearned. According to our approach, we will say that it is a commandment to say this in order to explain to them the importance of Torah study, because of which it is not included within the formal parameters of the commandment of Torah study. According to our proposal, Rava does not disagree with the first version regarding the parameters of the commandment of Torah study and Torah study itself, but only regarding the tactic of how to behave toward the unlearned.

At the next stage the Talmud brings a story:

Ben Dama, the son of Rabbi Ishmael's sister, asked Rabbi Ishmael: In a case such as mine, where I have learned the whole Torah, what is the rule concerning studying Greek wisdom?

He recited this verse concerning him: 'This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth, and you shall meditate on it day and night'; go and find a time that is neither part of the day nor part of the night, and study Greek wisdom then.

Several years ago, a student asked me about a contradiction contained in this story: if Ben-Dama had indeed learned the whole Torah, how did he not know the answer to this very question? After all, this is part of the laws of Torah study and neglect of Torah study. I answered him that Ben-Dama knew everything that Jewish law requires, but this question concerns what lies beyond the formal halakhic part; neglect of Torah study and the obligation to occupy oneself with Torah all the time do not belong to formal Jewish law, and therefore Ben-Dama asked whether there is nevertheless an obligation to do so. Rabbi Ishmael's answer is that there is an obligation to study day and night beyond the formal command, and therefore one cannot neglect Torah study even if a person has learned and knows the whole Torah (for there is an obligation to deepen one's analytic study). Rabbi Ishmael thus joins the view of Rabbi Yohanan and Rava that was presented at the beginning of the passage.

Seemingly, Rabbi Ishmael disagrees with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, for Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai is satisfied with reciting Shema morning and evening, whereas Rabbi Ishmael demands actual day-and-night study. But according to our approach, there is no disagreement at all: Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai deals with the first part of the verse, the command, for which reciting Shema morning and evening suffices; and Rabbi Ishmael deals with the second part, study for the sake of study itself (analytic study).

In light of all the foregoing, the continuation of the Talmud now becomes clear: 'And this disagrees with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani.' The Talmud states that Rabbi Ishmael's words are contrary to the statement of Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani, which is brought immediately afterward. This is puzzling, for Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani is an Amora, and seemingly his words contradict those of the Tannaim; yet this fact did not trouble the Talmud, and it notes the dispute matter-of-factly. Likewise, it is not clear why the Talmud ignores the fact that Rabbi Ishmael disagrees with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, whose words appeared earlier in the passage, and notes only the dispute between Rabbi Ishmael and the Amora Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani.

According to our approach, the matter is not difficult. We have seen that Rabbi Ishmael does not disagree with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai; both agree that for the fulfillment of the commandment of Torah study, reciting Shema morning and evening is enough, but Rabbi Ishmael adds that there is an additional part beyond the formal obligation. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani disagrees with both of them (as we shall soon see), and therefore the Talmud notes only that dispute.

Let us now look at the words of Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani:

For Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: This verse is neither a formal obligation nor a commandment, but a blessing. The Holy One, blessed be He, saw that the words of Torah were especially dear to Joshua, as it is said, 'And his attendant Joshua son of Nun, a youth, would not depart from the tent.' The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: Joshua, are the words of Torah so dear to you?! 'This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth.'

In the Talmud's words, unusual expressions appear. What is the difference between a 'formal obligation' and a 'commandment'? What does Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani come to add? We saw above that Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai and Rabbi Ishmael hold that Torah study is not a formal obligation (= formal obligation) but an obligation grounded in reason (= commandment); now Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani comes and disagrees with them. He argues that Torah study is neither a formal obligation nor even a commandment, but only a blessing with which Joshua was blessed by the Holy One, blessed be He. From here the Talmud learns that Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani indeed disagrees with the Tannaim who held that this is a commandment, for he not only rejects the conception of formal obligation but also the conception that this is a commandment.

Seemingly, Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani is the first to disagree with the position that all his predecessors agreed upon; but if we examine his words, we see that he does not say that there is no such obligation, but that the verse 'it shall not depart' is not a formal obligation and not a commandment, but a blessing. If so, Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani disagrees with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai and Rabbi Ishmael only about the interpretation of the verse, not about the law itself. In practice, he joins the opinion of all his predecessors and agrees that Torah study has two parts: 1. the obligation derived from the command, for which reciting Shema morning and evening is enough; 2. the commandment—to study day and night.

From where does Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani derive these obligations (according to his view that the verse 'it shall not depart' is only a blessing)? It seems that in his view this is reason even without a verse (and perhaps from the very fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, blesses Joshua, we learn about the importance of the Torah), exactly as we explained above. It is now clear why the Talmud does not challenge Rabbi Shmuel bar Nahmani from the words of the Tannaim who disagree with him: there is no legal dispute here, only a disagreement about interpretive meaning, and there is no difficulty in an Amora disagreeing with Tannaim about interpretive meaning.[13]

The passage concludes with the following saying:

A teaching from the school of Rabbi Ishmael: The words of Torah should not be upon you as an obligation, yet you are not permitted to exempt yourself from them.

Rashi, admittedly, explained that the intention is that we should study lovingly and that this obligation should not rest upon us as a burden; but according to our approach, this can be explained as a direct continuation of the movement of the passage: the school of Rabbi Ishmael says that although Torah study is not a formal obligation but a commandment, and seemingly this is a matter of mere voluntarism, nevertheless one is not permitted to exempt oneself from it, because there is an obligation grounded in reason to study day and night. The fact that there is no formal obligation does not indicate that such study is unimportant; on the contrary, it is more important and more fundamental than an ordinary halakhic obligation. As we saw, according to Rava, this is exactly what should be taught to the unlearned so that they understand the magnitude of the importance of Torah study.

We can now also resolve the contradiction between the Menachot passage (99b) and the Berakhot passage (35b), to which many later authorities pointed.

In the Berakhot passage we find the following:

The Rabbis taught: 'And you shall gather your grain'—what does this come to teach? Since it is said, 'This book of the Torah shall not depart from your mouth,' one might think these words are to be taken literally. Therefore Scripture says, 'And you shall gather your grain'—conduct yourself according to the way of the world; these are the words of Rabbi Ishmael.

Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai says: Is it possible that a person should plow in plowing season, sow in sowing season, reap in reaping season, thresh in threshing season, winnow in windy season—what then will become of Torah?! Rather: when Israel does the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by others, as it is said, 'Strangers shall stand and pasture your flocks,' etc.; and when Israel does not do the will of the Omnipresent, their work is done by themselves, as it is said, 'And you shall gather your grain.' Not only that, but others' work is also done by them, as it is said, 'And you shall serve your enemies,' etc.

Abaye said: Many acted in accordance with Rabbi Ishmael—and succeeded; in accordance with Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai—and did not succeed.

In the Menachot passage we saw that according to Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai, reciting Shema morning and evening is enough, meaning that he is the lenient one with respect to the commandment of Torah study; whereas Rabbi Ishmael is the stringent one and demands study day and night. By contrast, from the Berakhot passage it seems that they switch sides: it is Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai who is stringent and demands constant study and even refraining from work, while Rabbi Ishmael is the lenient one. The later authorities dealt extensively with this contradiction and proposed various resolutions.[14]

But according to our approach there is no difficulty at all. As we saw in the discussion of the Menachot passage, Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai do not disagree with one another at all; they agree that the formal obligation of Torah study is reciting Shema morning and evening, and that what lies beyond that is a commandment grounded in reason. In the Berakhot passage, the discussion concerns the parameters of neglect of Torah study, that is, it relates only to the commandment grounded in reason and not to the formal obligation, and here we find 'reversed' opinions: according to Rabbi Ishmael, one may neglect Torah study in order to earn a livelihood (at least after the fact), whereas according to Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai there is no permission at all to neglect Torah study. But all of this concerns only the category of the commandment, not the formal obligation. As I wrote above, in the Menachot passage Rabbi Shimon bar Yohai was careful to empty the commandment of Torah study of content only in order to say that the obligation grounded in reason is primary and important and that there is nothing beyond it; if so, it is no wonder that here he is very stringent about it.

We thus learn that the unifying thread running through the parts of the Menachot passage is the idea that Torah study is not a commandment among the 613 commandments. The basis of the obligation to study Torah day and night is understanding what Torah is, and not a command concerning it. More than that: the Torah was careful not to insert this obligation into a formal halakhic framework, so as not to lower Torah study to the level of an ordinary commandment among the 613 commandments.

Appendix: the practical plane and the form of discourse

In the two previous chapters I dealt with a halakhic-analytic clarification of Torah study in general and women's obligation in particular; this appendix, by contrast, touches on current reality. Even so, anyone who reads it attentively will see that all the points in it are direct implications of what we saw above. This is a clear example of the importance of conceptual and analytic clarification and of its implications for the form of discourse and for our starting points.

The status of policy considerations

As we saw, the Talmudic statements that reject Torah study for women are rooted in policy and in an assessment of reality. Determinations of this sort are not Jewish law, and therefore they must be examined in light of changing reality. It seems to me that this is one of the reasons that in our day many ignore the guidance of the Sages and recommend that women study Torah to the best of their ability. The present assessment of reality is that women's study is important and certainly not harmful, and that it is incorrect to take recommendations that were said in one reality and apply them to a reality that is radically different.

Indeed, there are holders of essentialist conceptions who see in the Talmudic recommendations an eternally valid assessment regarding the essential character of woman as such, and therefore support even today a policy that rejects women's Torah study. At times one also hears the claim that the burden of proof in this matter rests on the one who comes to change things (on the principle that the party altering the status quo is at a disadvantage).

It seems to me that implicit at the basis of this approach is the assumption that women have no obligation to study, and therefore it is easy to forbid it to them for one consideration or another; but the picture presented in the previous chapters shows that this is a mistaken assumption. As we saw, women are obligated in Torah study in its analytic sense, and therefore an essentialist directive of this kind is in fact instructing them not to fulfill their obligation. Of course, there can be room for such a directive, but only if the assessment of reality indeed requires it. It therefore seems that if one comes to cancel for women an obligation that rests upon them, the burden of proof in our day rests specifically on those who forbid, not on those who permit.

The meaning of this picture is that Torah study is not a response to women's requests or to their needs, and it does not necessarily involve the adoption of values such as feminism (though even in that there is no principled defect). The demand to allow women to study Torah is a demand to allow them to fulfill an obligation that rests upon them; but it seems to me that those who ordinarily deal with this issue do not see it this way. It is commonly assumed that this is a concession, some sort of privilege, the adoption of modern winds, surrender to them, and the like. In my understanding, that is not the case, and therefore the entire discussion is deficient; what has been written above should therefore completely change the point of departure for discussion of the issue.

Several remarks on the discourse

Many speak about the need to allow women to study Torah because of the contribution that women's study is supposed to contribute (and perhaps is already contributing) to Torah and its study; and some also speak about a female mode of study that is lacking in the male study hall and in halakhic decision-making, and the like.[15] But I am not at all sure that a distinctively female mode of study really exists; on the contrary, at most this is a generalization that is not very important (and is usually influenced by feminist literature). But all of this discourse is irrelevant to the very question of women's Torah study. The demand to allow women to study Torah, and to encourage them to do so, does not come in order to benefit anyone, to contribute to the Jewish people, or to contribute to the Torah.

This demand is based on two fundamental aspects: a. women's obligation to study (as we saw above); b. their right to study. If there is no impediment to women studying, then they have the right to study and no one has any authority to prevent them from doing so. Therefore, even if women contribute nothing new in study, and even if the Torah would lose nothing from women not studying it—and the same is true even if there is no distinctively female mode of study—women's obligation to study and their right to study remain intact.

It follows that stereotypical generalizations on this matter—such as whether women are suited to study, or whether their essence is care for children and the home—are irrelevant to the discussion. Quite apart from the debate over the essence of woman (if there is any such distinct essence at all) or the extent of her contribution, her right and obligation are to study Torah, just as the encouragement of men to study is not based specifically on learning abilities or on a unique mode of study of this or that individual man, but simply on the fact that this is his right and this is his obligation.

Moreover, if someone thinks that a woman's desire to study may interfere with running the home, let him kindly seat the husband with his wife and let them divide their shared tasks as is customary in every other context. The woman is obligated in Torah study exactly like the man, and she has the same right to study.

The content of study

Because of traditional inertia, it is customary to recommend that women not focus on analytic study but on study of non-Talmudic and non-halakhic subjects (Tanakh, Hasidism, ethics, and Jewish thought). Even when halakhic topics are already being addressed, they are advised to focus on laws more relevant to them, such as the laws of niddah—and primarily on the practical plane rather than the analytic one. But from the picture, as it has been sketched thus far, it emerges that for women too, study should focus on analytic study, exactly as with men (in the yeshivot), and there should be no difference in this respect—at least no difference dictated a priori—in the spirit of 'A person studies Torah only from the place that his heart desires' (Avodah Zarah 19a).

The current situation

The situation today is that very few women engage in analytic study, and certainly only a small number continue such study over the course of years. There are many reasons for this: some are deeply built into our society; but some stem from a mistaken conception of women's Torah study (failure to recognize their obligation and right to study exactly like men, and in particular to study broadly and in depth, and not only the laws that concern them). Beyond that, women begin studying relatively late, and in most places they are not encouraged in this. Women also lack an occupational horizon in Torah fields; it is difficult to find reasonable funding that would allow them to sit and study over time; and there is a lack of trust in their ability to advance in Torah study. The overwhelming majority of Torah journals (including Religious Zionist ones) does not allow women to publish articles,[16] which gives them no motivation to advance and create in this direction. And of course, the process is still only at its beginning, and from a small number of learners it is obvious that one cannot produce a substantial quantity of high-level scholars. Therefore, it is not right to judge the process at this stage.

In any event, as a matter of fact there are indeed very few women today who are at a high analytic level, and we should not be surprised by that. In my above-mentioned Makor Rishon article, I wrote that there are a few women who are at the study level of a serious kollel student, and I do not think there is any woman who is at a truly high level. Many men and women protested this, but I stand by my opinion. The discourse on this matter is deficient, and it is very important to stop sweeping the facts under the rug.

Obstacles to the discourse

Those who are familiar with this problematic state of affairs tend to conceal it. Several years ago, to my astonishment, I discovered that Torah journals—including those associated with Religious Zionism—do not accept articles by women. This struck me with amazement, and I turned to several women active in the field (among them heads of women's midrashot and women who teach in them), asking whether the situation was known to them and what could be done in order to change it. I thought it would be proper to publicize the matter, and also to establish a journal that would accept articles by women. The voices I received in response were very surprising: there was in them a tone of deep despair; almost all of them told me that there was no point in such a struggle because there is hardly anyone who would write, and there is not really a supply of relevant articles and women writers for high-level Torah articles. It became clear to me that women who speak enthusiastically outwardly about the revolution in women's Torah study reveal deep despair in internal conversation.

I should note that I am not accusing them of dishonesty; it is indeed a revolution—even if there are still almost no women who can truly teach and write at a high level—and nevertheless there is a tendency to conceal this side of the coin so that spirits not fall and so that the wheels of the revolution not stop. But to the best of my judgment, sunlight is the best disinfectant, and concealment—even when done with good intentions—interferes with advancing the process in question. If the problematic condition of women's analytic study is not exposed, awareness will not be created and there will be no one who will address this situation.

On the other side of the coin: others who expressed identification with my remarks saw in this situation proof of an essentialist conception of women, as though by their nature women are not suited to study, and proof that this is a senseless feminist insistence. In this they joined the same despair from the other side of the divide.

Indeed, this is a mistaken conclusion in at least three respects: a. one cannot determine such an essentialist claim at such an initial stage of the process, especially when the impediments are so strong and difficult (as stated); b. we saw above that even if the essentialist claim were correct, that would not negate women's study, since women have both the right and the obligation to study; c. even if the essentialist characterization were both correct and relevant, we should not forget that women constitute about half the public, and one cannot deny that within so large a number of women there are certainly some who are indeed suited to grow in analytic Torah scholarship; there is no justification for preventing these women from advancing merely because of the general stereotype, and there is no justification for conducting ourselves on the basis of group judgment and characterization.

Many men and women among those active in the field with whom I have spoken are not aware of the importance of women's advancement in analytic study. Whether we like it or not, within the Torah tradition there developed an esteem for the Torah scholar based on his analytical ability; and in light of what I described in this article, this attitude is also justified to a considerable degree, since this is the very essence of Torah study. These matters are all the more sharply true in our period, in which many people can locate sources in information databases and on the internet and write a Torah article at a reasonable level. Therefore, as long as there are no women who are at an impressive analytic level, we are doomed to continue hearing dismissive essentialist statements about women.

I have already heard more than once the claim that one cannot find an article by a woman that resolves a difficulty in Maimonides, or that offers a novel line of analysis in a difficult Talmudic passage. Articles by women (from among the few that exist) generally deal with a non-Talmudic, non-analytic subject (aggadic literature, Tanakh, Hasidism) or with halakhic surveys and relatively simple rulings, and almost all of them focus on halakhic topics relating to women (primarily the laws of niddah).

In this context it is important to internalize that analytic study—beyond being a central value in Torah study (as stated)—also has a central role in the politics of the process. Women will prove themselves and gain recognition from the rabbinic and Torah establishment only if they demonstrate a high analytical level. Articles that merely collect halakhic material or offer simple applications of halakhic principles to rulings—and that is most of the women's material published today—will not do the work, and rightly so.

Another possible response—which I have indeed heard from several women—is that women should not be measured by male parameters (and this too is part of the women's revolution: breaking out of male standards), but in my opinion this is too easy a solution and is in fact an escape. Since, as we have seen here, these parameters are substantively correct and not merely 'male whims,' and since acquiring Torah standing has important significance and depends on analytic study, I recommend to all of us not to ignore all that has been said here. This does not mean, of course, that all writings by women must deal with analytic study, just as not all men deal with it; nor does it mean that all analytically inclined women must write in the Brisker method or any other particular method; rather, what is needed is high-level analytical writing of any kind whatsoever. The present situation is that there are almost no analytic writings by women; and in my understanding, if there is indeed a desire to advance, the next step of the revolution must be in the analytic sphere.

Practical directions

If the next goal is progress in women's analytic study—important both tactically and essentially—it seems to me that there are several steps that can be taken to assist this process. First, it is important to promote women's analytical writing, and of course to allow women to publish articles in Torah journals. I must say that closing the journals to articles by women contributes to intensifying the problem (and beyond that, I see no justification for it whatsoever). As a result, women who want to write and advance turn in academic directions, and then, of course, the criticism comes that women do not write in a traditional yeshiva-style analytical idiom.

About three years ago the journal Derishah was established in the Bar-Ilan midrashah, intended for articles by women. It is my duty to note that after the publication of my article in Makor Rishon, some claimed to me that there are no articles by women because they are not allowed to publish them. To all those respondents I replied that this is precisely why the journal Derishah was established, and as a member of the editorial board I invite all of them to send articles. It is also my duty to say that despite the help we offer and despite appeals to women everywhere, we receive almost no analytical articles, and that is regrettable. It turns out that women's analytical writing does not succeed in filling even a single platform. Does that not call out for explanation?!

Beyond that, it is important to encourage the delivery of Torah teachings by women, the giving of classes in Talmud (and especially in analytic study), and the opening of female teaching channels as an occupational horizon and an avenue of advancement for women in the analytic direction. It seems to me that if someone is looking for a target for contributing to the advancement of Torah study, he should take into account channels of women's analytic study more than any other Torah-educational direction.

Conclusion

In this article I distinguished between the formal commandment of Torah study, which includes reciting Shema in the morning and evening, and the obligation of Torah study grounded in reason, which focuses on analytic study. On the theoretical plane I argued that women are obligated in Torah study despite their exemption from the commandment of Torah study; and on the practical plane I drew from this several conclusions regarding the state of women's Torah study, and in particular women's analytic study, and regarding the paths required in order to improve it.

[1]     Rabbi Michael Abraham, "Exclusion that Produces Mediocrity," Sabbath Supplement, Makor Rishon (24.2.2017). I note that all my articles to which I refer here, including those printed in various places, are available on my website, "Responsa and Articles" (mikyab.net; hereafter: "the site"). Citations of the sources are taken from Bar-Ilan University's "Responsa Project."

[2]     For useful surveys of the basic sources on this issue, see: Rabbi Chaim Navon, "Torah Study for Women," Tehumin 28, 248 (5768); Rabbi Yehuda Levi, "Maimonides' View on Torah Study for Women," HaMa'ayan 34(1), 10 (Tishrei 5754); Rabbi Yehoshua Pfeffer, "Torah Study for Women," on the website "Tevunah" (tinyurl.com/y7zwwhnq), and many others. Opinions on both sides can be found in abundance online.

[3]     Apart from what will be said below, see on this in greater detail in two places on the site: in my video lectures — "Between Torah Study and the Commandment of Torah Study" — and in my article "The Halakhic Status of Sevarot," accepted for publication in the journal Beit HaVa'ad (hereafter: my article on sevarot).

[4]     The expression appears in the Talmud in several places: Shabbat 32b, Chagigah 5b, Ta'anit 4b, and others. From the Chagigah passage it seems that the intention is the neglect of commandment observance (the removal of Torah from Israel), and not necessarily the neglect of study. Even in places where this expression is interpreted as neglect of study, it does not necessarily refer to a moment in which one is not studying, but to a phenomenon of significant interruption in study.

[5]     On this distinction, see my article "Commandment, Reason, and the Will of God," Tzohar 30, 15 (5767).

[6]     Some have made such a claim on the basis of Maimonides' fourth principle in Sefer HaMitzvot, which deals with the non-enumeration of commandments that encompass the whole Torah, but this is a mistake (albeit a common one). Maimonides there deals with commands that instruct us to keep all the commandments of the Torah—such as 'and you shall keep My commandments and perform them' (Leviticus 22:31)—and they are not counted because of redundancy (since we are already commanded regarding each commandment separately). Fundamental norms in the sense in which I am speaking here are unique norms and are not redundant.

[7]     With respect to this category, there seems to be a contradiction in Rashi's words (on the question whether this is actual observance or study for the sake of observance), but this seems to be the best way to interpret the overall picture from his words and from the language of the verse.

[8]     Writings of Rabbi Israel Salanter (edited by Mordechai Pachter, 1973), p. 160.

[9]     Though of course one can also fulfill Torah study through it. According to our approach, the demand to 'study in order to observe' does not concern the goal of the study, but its form or its implications. In terms of form, the study should end in practical conclusions in accordance with Jewish law; and in terms of implications, the study should also be implemented (leaving aside one who studies and does not apply).

[10]    See my article (written together with Gavriel Hazut), "The Blessing over the Torah," Midah Tovah, Parashat Ha'azinu (5767) (hereafter: my article on the blessing over the Torah).

[11]    I suggested there that the blessing Ahavah Rabbah, which also has the status of a blessing over the Torah, is the blessing over commandments and is therefore positioned before ('immediately prior to its performance') the recitation of Shema—the formal part of the commandment of Torah study.

[12]    According to this, it is not clear why Maimonides concludes that even regarding the Written Torah it is preferable not to teach them. As is known, the "Tur (Yoreh De'ah, section 246) wrote the opposite, and many have already expressed surprise at him.

[13]    In several places in the Talmud we find Amoraim disagreeing with Tannaim regarding interpretive meaning. For example, in the passage on saving life (Yoma 85a–85b), Shmuel disagrees with all the Tannaim about the source of the rule that saving life overrides the Sabbath. There too this is said matter-of-factly, and the Talmud even concludes specifically in accordance with him.

[14]    See, for example: Birkei Yosef, Yoreh De'ah, section 246; Even HaEzel, Kings, chapter 3, halakhah 5; Or Sameach, Torah Study, chapter 1, halakhah 2; Minchat Asher, Exodus 24:2; and others.

[15]    It is worth seeing in this context Esti Barel's article "On Patriarchy and Women's Voices," Akdamot 20, 39 (5768). She protests against precisely these statements from a feminist point of view.

[16]    Editor's note: The editorial board of the journal "Tzohar" publishes articles by women, and has even initiated direct appeals to quite a few women, but articles written by women remain few among the submissions sent to the board.