Lots — A Look at Randomness and Providence / Parashat Pinchas
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Lots — A Look at Randomness and Providence / Parashat Pinchas – Forum of Torah Seminaries for Women
The Lots for the Division of the Land
The lot is mentioned in Scripture only in two contexts: the two goats on the Day of Atonement (Leviticus 16:8-9) and the division of the land. In our portion, the Torah commands us regarding the division of the land, and the use of a lot for that division. The lot is mentioned in the Torah with respect to the division of the land in four passages, all of them in the book of Numbers. In our portion (Numbers 26:55-56), we find:
But the land shall be divided by lot; they shall inherit according to the names of their fathers’ tribes. According to the lot shall its inheritance be divided between the many and the few.
The basic division by lot was the division of the portions of the land among the tribes. There was also a division within each tribe among the various families, which according to most opinions was also conducted by lot (as inferred from the phrase “according to your families”).[1]
Rashi (26:54) describes the process of the drawing among the tribes on the basis of the Sages:[2]
To the larger you shall increase its inheritance — to the tribe that was more numerous they gave a larger portion. Yet although the portions were not equal, for the portions were allotted according to the size of the tribe, they did this only by means of a lot, and the lot was directed by the Holy Spirit, as is explained in Bava Batra 122a: Eleazar the priest was clothed in the Urim and Tummim and would say by the Holy Spirit, “If such-and-such a tribe comes up, such-and-such a boundary comes up with it.” The tribes were written on twelve slips, and the twelve territories on twelve slips, and they mixed them in a ballot box. The prince would put his hand into it and take two slips. In his hand would come up a slip with the name of his tribe and a slip with the boundary specified for it. And the lot itself would cry out and say, “I, the lot, have come up for such-and-such a boundary, for such-and-such a tribe,” as it is said, “According to the mouth of the lot.” And the land was not divided by measure, because one region is better than another, but by appraisal: a beit-kor of poor land against a beit-se’ah of good land, all according to value:
The goal was to match a portion of the land to each tribe, while the division of the land into twelve parts had already been fixed in advance. Naturally, we would expect there to be twelve slips for the portions of the land, and each tribal prince to draw one slip that would determine which portion his tribe would receive. But it turns out that they used a double and problematic system: there were twelve slips with portions of the land and twelve slips with the names of the tribes. Each prince approached the ballot box and drew two slips; on one was written the name of his tribe, and on the other appeared the portion of land. This is a problematic system, for one would seemingly expect that when a prince drew a slip, it would not specifically bear the name of his own tribe; and this is especially puzzling in light of the fact that it could have been done in a clearer and safer way, had each prince drawn only one slip with the inheritance allotted to him by lot.
The Purpose of the Lot
Why was it done in this way? It seems that the reason was that the aim was to show that these portions did not emerge from the ballot box randomly, but that there is a portion assigned to each tribe from above. Therefore a miracle was needed, in which each tribal prince would draw, apparently at random, a slip bearing his own tribe’s name. The coincidence that each prince drew the slip of his own tribe was what proved that the results of the lot had been determined from above.
One may ask: if the game is fixed, why do this by lot at all? Why should the Torah not itself determine the various portions for each tribe without any drawing? We usually understand a fair drawing as something based on complete randomness (under the supervision of accountants and public representatives), for otherwise there is concern about bias. The whole purpose of a drawing is the fairness inherent in randomness. If there is no such purpose, and everything is managed from above and predetermined, then why enter into a process of drawing at all? It seems that the lot is a means through which God expresses His will when He does not reveal Himself to us directly.
Is this the purpose of every lot?
In Jewish law, lots are used in various situations (see, for example, Bava Batra 106b and elsewhere; for a survey see Encyclopedia Talmudit, entry ‘Goral’).[3] These are mainly questions of division, when it is not possible to carry out an equal division in practice. Why is a lot required? On the simple level, the reason is similar to that of drawings conducted in the other spheres of our lives as well. The purpose of such drawings is to leave the decision to randomness, when that is the fair solution. This is a case in which there is no substantive and equal division or decision possible in the situation before us. For example, when we have property to divide among partners or heirs, but there is no way to divide it equally among them all.
If the deceased left 20,000 NIS to two heirs, it is easy to divide it equally, that is, to give ten thousand to each. But what are we to do if the deceased left behind a cat and a pair of boots? In such a case, the inheritance cannot be divided equally between them both (for the sake of simplicity, let us ignore the possibility of selling them and dividing the money). Therefore, a drawing is conducted between them to determine who receives the cat and who receives the boots. What is the role of the drawing? Instead of dividing the property, one divides the chance of receiving it. This is a different kind of equality. In economic terms, this may be seen as equality of opportunity instead of an equal division of the property itself.
It should be noted that in such drawings there is no intention of discovering any truth. They are meant to find an optimal solution of division or decision when there is no way to achieve, or even approach, an equal division — that is, the truth. The drawing is a substitute for the truth.
Some commentators propose viewing every lot in Jewish law as a device for uncovering the truth, as we saw above regarding the division of the allotments. On their view, the lot is a means of carrying out the word of God; that is, the results of every drawing are God’s handiwork. According to this, the role of the halakhic lot differs from that of the ordinary drawings with which we are familiar. If those are meant to offer equality and alternative distributive justice when equal division is impossible, the halakhic lot reveals God’s will — that is, the truth. The halakhic lot is not carried out in order to create equality, but in order to expose and realize the truth. There is support for this from several sources, especially the lot cast regarding Achan. There Scripture explicitly describes the lot as a means of revealing the truth and not of creating equal opportunities. So too with the lot cast by the sailors in the book of Jonah before they threw him into the sea. This was, of course, also the conception underlying the lot that was cast following the fall of the fighters of the Convoy of the Thirty-Five on the way to the besieged Gush Etzion, where Rabbi Aryeh Levin conducted a lot (the Vilna Gaon’s lot) whose purpose was to identify the bodies.[4] There too the lot was a revelatory lot, not a mechanism for creating equality, of course.
An Alternative Conception of the Halakhic Lot[5]
But it seems to me that this sweeping conception of the lot in Jewish law is mistaken. On the simple understanding, in Jewish law as well the lot usually functions in the same way we saw above. When property cannot be divided equally, it is divided by lot in order to create an alternative fairness. A clear proof of this is the need to ensure the fairness of the lot. If everything is directed from above, there is no reason to worry about fairness, for God will in any case give what He wants to whomever He wants. The requirement that the lot be conducted fairly means that we really do see it as a random process and not as the implementation of a divine will.
And perhaps the special form in which the lot over the inheritances in the Land was carried out also testifies to this. The special form of the lot here may teach that this particular lot was indeed supervised from above, unlike ordinary lots, which are genuinely random processes. Even in Jewish law, when a lot is conducted for the division of property, the intention is to create alternative justice and not to implement God’s will.
I will now present two implications of my proposal.
– The Conception of Providence
First, these matters are of course connected to a more general conception of God’s providence over the world. It is commonly thought that everything that happens here is the realization of God’s will. But if the conception proposed here is correct, the meaning is that there are events that occur here which are not directed from above, but proceed in the ordinary course of the world, according to the laws of nature and randomness.
– Drawing Lots with Trepidation
Second, within the Torah outlook there is great concern about excessive use of lots. For example, some cite Sefer Hasidim as prohibiting the use of a lot concerning human lives (although in my article in Tehumin 25 I showed that this is an interpretive mistake). The Vilna Gaon’s lot, too, as carried out by Rabbi Aryeh Levin, was conducted with trepidation and with special preparations, in a very grave and serious atmosphere. It is generally accepted that such a lot should be conducted only by righteous people who are worthy of it.[6]
The verse (Numbers 34:1-2) states:
The Lord spoke to Moses, saying: Command the children of Israel, and say to them: When you come into the land of Canaan, this is the land that shall fall to you as an inheritance, the land of Canaan according to its borders:
This verse is interpreted by the Sages in Pesikta Zutrata (ad loc.) as follows:
To warn the court not to cast aspersions on the lots.
The Gemara in Sanhedrin 43b likewise expounds:
Joshua said to Achan: I beg you, do not cast aspersions on the lots, for the Land of Israel is destined to be divided by lot.
In Responsa of the Geonim (Kushta, 1535, no. 60; Vilna, 1885, no. 57) it is written:
A Jew has no permission to go against a lot, for the lot comes only from Heaven, as it is said: “According to the lot shall the land be divided.” And one who violates the lot is as one who violates the Ten Commandments.
So too in Responsa Havot Yair, no. 61, immediately after he brings the above responsum of the Geonim, he writes:
For we see from the Torah, from the Prophets, and from the Writings that they relied on the lot, insofar as it is done without human calculations and human intervention by way of clever manipulation; rather, “the land shall be divided by lot.” Likewise, they relied on the lot regarding the death of Achan and of Jonathan, had the people not redeemed him, and not because of his admission. And it is said, “The lot is cast into the lap, but all its judgment is from the Lord” (Prov. 16:33). Even among the nations this was accepted, as with Jonah and the wicked Haman, according to the plain sense of the verse. +See the responsum of the author of Yad David in Responsa Meged Shamayim, no. 14, who rejected the author’s words because Achan confessed on his own, and furthermore there it was by direct divine instruction.+ For it is likely that if the lot is conducted properly, higher providence attaches itself to it, as it says, “Give a perfect lot” (1 Sam. 14:41).
Havot Yair writes that the basis for trust in the lot is that it is done without human intervention, and then the hand of providence rules over it. Later in his words he adds that one need not obey a defective lot, on the grounds that had it been conducted properly it might perhaps have come out differently.
But from what I wrote above it emerges that all this applies only with respect to a revelatory lot. A lot for dividing property, intended to achieve alternative justice, is not of this kind. It does not require special preparations, nor is it connected to fear of Heaven or prayers that it come out properly. There one need only ensure fairness (supervision by an accountant and public figures), so that equality of opportunity is truly achieved — nothing more.
[1] There is a contradiction in the words of the Ra’avad, who apparently retracted. See Shitah Mekubetzet to Bava Batra 121b and 117a in his name. See also Ramban on Numbers 26:55, and Responsa Devar Avraham no. 10, who discusses this at length.
[2] See also Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra 122a, and Jerusalem Talmud, Yoma 4:1.
[3] See also Magen Avraham no. 132, sec. 2, regarding the recitation of Kaddish, and likewise the priestly lotteries that distributed the service (Yoma 22a; Jerusalem Talmud, Yoma 2:1; Maimonides, Hilkhot Temidin u-Musafin 4:1 and 4:3). And regarding the division of their portions (see Shabbat 148b, and Maimonides, Hilkhot Yom Tov 4:20).
[4] On this see Simcha Raz’s book Ish Tzaddik Hayah, pp. 111-117
[5] See my article in Middah Tovah for Parashat Pinchas, 5767.
[6] See also Netivot HaMishpat no. 154, sec. 6, who writes that the law of the lot applies only where the very body of the land is being divided, which is what we learn from the division of the land. But in disputes under the laws of neighbors one may not decide by means of a lot, and they have no remedy other than reaching a compromise between themselves. Likewise, in Pithei Teshuvah no. 173, sec. 2, he cites from Shevut Ya’akov (vol. 3, no. 162) that a lot is effective only where the division is not done in a sequential order. That is, if partners want to divide in such a way that whoever comes up first in the lot may choose his share, this is not effective. Only in a division like the division of the land — namely, that whenever the name of a tribe came up, its portion came up with it — there is the lot effective. Admittedly, here it seems that the problem is the parties’ firm consent, and yet it still stands to reason that if everything is decided and fixed from above, the issue of firm consent should not trouble us. See discussion of this, for example, in Responsa HaElef Lekha Shlomo (by R. Shlomo Kluger), Orah Hayyim no. 62, and elsewhere. See also my above-mentioned article in Middah Tovah.