On the Reasons for the Commandments – Parashat Chukat

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With God’s help

On the Reasons for the Commandments

Parashat Chukat opens with the section of the Red Heifer, and the opening verse is, “This is the statute of the Torah” (Num. 19:2). Rashi here writes:

“This is the statute of the Torah” – because Satan and the nations of the world taunt Israel, saying, “What is this commandment, and what reason is there for it?” therefore Scripture wrote of it, “a statute”: it is a decree from before Me, and you have no permission to question it.

That is, the Red Heifer is a commandment whose reason we do not understand, and we have no permission to question it. I wanted to take this opportunity to touch briefly on the question of the reasons for the commandments and their significance.

The dispute over deriving law from a verse’s rationale

There is a tannaitic dispute over the question whether one derives law from a verse’s rationale. For example, the Gemara in Sanhedrin 21a cites the prohibition on taking collateral from a widow (“You shall not take a widow’s garment in pledge,” Deut. 24:17):

For it was taught: Whether a widow is poor or rich, one may not take collateral from her, as it is said, “You shall not take a widow’s garment in pledge” – these are the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Shimon says: From a rich widow one may take collateral; from a poor widow one may not take collateral, because you are obligated to return it to her, and you thereby give her a bad name among her neighbors. And we ask: What is he saying? This is what he is saying: Since you take collateral from her, you are obligated to return it to her, and you thereby give her a bad name among her neighbors. It follows that Rabbi Judah does not derive law from the rationale of the verse, whereas Rabbi Shimon does.

According to Rabbi Judah, this applies both to a poor widow and to a rich one, since Scripture does not distinguish. But Rabbi Shimon derives the rationale of the verse; that is, he explains why the Torah forbids taking collateral from a widow and infers from this that if she is rich it is permitted. Thus Rabbi Shimon derives law from the rationale of the verse and Rabbi Judah does not. As a matter of law, we rule like Rabbi Judah (Maimonides, Laws of Creditor and Debtor 3:1, and Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat 97:14).

Back to the commandment of the Red Heifer

In light of this dispute, it is not clear what the prohibition on dealing with the reasons for the Red Heifer means. After all, as a matter of law we are not supposed to derive law from the reason of any commandment. Moreover, many sages throughout the generations have dealt with the reasons for the commandments, chiefly commentators on the Torah, though not only they. From this it is clear that there is no prohibition on engaging in the reasons for the commandments. The question disputed by Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon is only whether one may draw legal conclusions from the purposive interpretation given to a commandment. This is very similar to the debate among jurists about the legitimacy of a judge relying on purposive interpretation of a statute. In other words, it is certainly permitted to discuss the reasons for the commandments, but we should not derive legal conclusions from such a reason, such as distinguishing between a rich widow and a poor one. It follows that with regard to the Red Heifer there is a prohibition even on discussing its reasons.

However, quite a few sages and thinkers have dealt with the reasons for this commandment as well. It therefore seems that Rashi here is not speaking of a prohibition on discussing the reasons for the Red Heifer, but of a prohibition on questioning its reasons. In the language of the Sages, “to question” something does not mean to think about that thing, but to challenge it and wonder whether it is correct, to cast aspersions on it. That is what is forbidden, not discussion of the reasons themselves. Still, an intriguing conclusion follows from this: with regard to the other commandments, which are not scriptural decrees like the Red Heifer, it would seem that it is even permitted to question them. That is very puzzling, for this would amount to permission to cast doubt on commandments if they are not rational, since adopting a rational interpretation is not an option, because that would already be deriving law from the rationale of the verse, which in practice we rule is forbidden.

It is more plausible that there is no permission to question any of the commandments. The fact that this was said specifically with respect to the Red Heifer is probably because there, due to the internal contradictions that exist in the parameters of this commandment, there is a reasonable possibility that such doubts will arise in us, as with the nations of the world described in Rashi above.

Deriving law from a verse’s rationale in the case of a king’s multiplying wives

The Mishnah in Sanhedrin 21a discusses the prohibition on a king’s multiplying wives for himself:

He may not multiply wives for himself beyond eighteen. Rabbi Judah says: He may multiply them for himself, provided that they do not turn away his heart. Rabbi Shimon says: Even one who turns away his heart he may not marry. If so, why was it said, “He shall not multiply wives for himself”? To teach that even women like Abigail are included.

At first glance, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Judah disagree about when a king is forbidden to multiply wives for himself, beyond eighteen; the Gemara there explains how that number is derived. According to Rabbi Judah, he may multiply them if they are righteous women, who do not turn away his heart. But more than eighteen wicked women are forbidden. Rabbi Shimon holds that righteous women may not be taken beyond eighteen, but wicked women may not be taken at all, since even one would turn away his heart.

The Gemara there is puzzled by this dispute, for as we saw, Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Judah disagree on the question of deriving law from the rationale of the verse, and on the face of it their positions here seem the reverse of what we saw. Here Rabbi Judah follows the reason, whereas Rabbi Shimon, surprisingly, does not.

The Gemara indeed asks this:

The Gemara: Does this mean that Rabbi Judah derives law from the rationale of the verse and Rabbi Shimon does not? But we have heard the opposite from them…

After bringing the baraita mentioned above, regarding collateral from a widow, the Gemara answers:

In general, Rabbi Judah does not derive law from the rationale of the verse, but here it is different, because the rationale of the verse is stated explicitly: What is the reason that he shall not multiply wives for himself? So that his heart not turn away. And Rabbi Shimon could say to you: Since in general we do derive law from the rationale of the verse, then the verse should have written only “He shall not multiply wives for himself,” and remained silent, and I would have said: What is the reason that he shall not multiply? So that his heart not turn away. Why then do I need “that his heart not turn away”? To teach that even one woman who turns away his heart he may not marry. What, then, do I make of “He shall not multiply”? That even women like Abigail are included.

A king’s multiplying wives is a special case, because in this case the verse itself explicitly states the reason for the commandment: “He shall not multiply wives for himself, lest his heart turn away” (Deut. 17:17). Therefore here the positions really do reverse. Rabbi Judah, who ordinarily does not derive law from the rationale of the verse, presumably because we have no way of knowing what the correct reason is, does so here because the verse itself gives the reason, and then there is no concern that we will err. Therefore, on his view, it is permitted to multiply righteous wives. Rabbi Shimon, by contrast, who ordinarily does derive law from the rationale of the verse because in his view there is no need to fear error, asks himself why here the Torah took the trouble to write the reason explicitly rather than relying on us to derive it. From this he infers that it is apparently not a reason but an additional prohibition. Therefore, according to him, there are two prohibitions: 1. A prohibition on multiplying wives, from the first half of the verse, “He shall not multiply wives for himself.” 2. A prohibition on marrying women who turn away his heart, in any number whatever, and this is learned from the latter half, “lest his heart turn away.”

As an aside, I would note that Maimonides, in his fifth root principle, discusses the legal status of reason-verses and determines that they are not to be counted as commandments in their own right, but as reasons for commandments. This is one of his examples for that principle. Notice that he assumes that there are reason-verses in the Torah, that is, verses whose purpose is to give a reason for a commandment. According to Rashi, there are no such verses, because on his view every reason-verse is actually an independent command. Beyond that, it is clear that Maimonides rules like Rabbi Judah, who understands that when a reason for a commandment appears in the Torah, it is not an independent commandment but a reason for the commandment to which it relates.

Maimonides’ legal ruling

Let us now examine Maimonides’ ruling, Laws of Kings 3:2:

He shall not multiply wives for himself. By tradition they learned that he may take up to eighteen wives; wives and concubines together total eighteen. If he adds even one more and has relations with her, he is lashed, and he must divorce her and may marry another in place of the one he divorced.

He rules that a king may not multiply wives, whether righteous or wicked. But as Nahmanides notes in his glosses to the fifth root principle, this fits neither of the tannaitic positions. Several questions arise here: How did Maimonides derive this rule? Which Mishnaic sage is he relying on? And what is his relation to deriving law from the rationale of the verse?

In his Commentary on the Mishnah to Sanhedrin, Maimonides writes a very strange sentence about our mishnah:

The law does not follow Rabbi Judah. Nor Rabbi Shimon.

He rules neither like Rabbi Judah nor like Rabbi Shimon. This indeed fits what we saw in his legal code, but it is not clear how he permits himself to disagree with all the Mishnaic sages. It seems to me that this is a clue that will solve all the riddles in these remarks of Maimonides.

Most of the medieval authorities, such as Nahmanides in the glosses mentioned above, read the mishnah as an opening statement: He may not multiply wives for himself beyond eighteen, after which a dispute is brought between two Mishnaic sages: Rabbi Judah says: He may multiply them for himself, provided that they do not turn away his heart. Rabbi Shimon says: Even one who turns away his heart he may not marry. If so, why was it said, He shall not multiply wives for himself? To teach that even women like Abigail are included.

But Maimonides does not see this as an opening statement, but as an additional view of the anonymous first opinion. In his view, there are three opinions in the mishnah, not two: the anonymous first opinion holds that one may not multiply wives of any kind, neither righteous nor wicked. After it come two further opinions, Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon, which we have already described. Maimonides rules like the anonymous first opinion and not like Rabbi Judah.

I already mentioned that in the discussion of deriving law from the rationale of the verse Maimonides explicitly rules like Rabbi Judah, namely, that one may not take a widow’s garment in pledge even if she is rich. But here he departs from that path and rules like the anonymous first opinion rather than Rabbi Judah. My claim is that he does not rule like Rabbi Judah anywhere, but always like the anonymous first opinion. To understand this, I will explain the basis of the anonymous first opinion, and of Maimonides who follows it.

We saw above that Rabbi Judah does not derive law from the rationale of the verse because he fears that we may not arrive at the correct reason, that our purposive interpretation may be mistaken. Therefore, when the reason is written explicitly in the verse, he does derive from it and interprets it purposively. But the anonymous first opinion does not derive law from the rationale of the verse even when there is no concern about error, that is, even when the reason is written explicitly in the verse. Therefore, even in the case of a king’s multiplying wives, where the reason appears explicitly in the verse, the anonymous first opinion does not derive from the reason.

As noted, Maimonides rules like the anonymous first opinion, which does not derive law from the rationale of the verse not because of a fear that we may have erred, but because there is a general rule that one does not derive law from the rationale of the verse irrespective of any fear of error. Therefore he does not derive from the reason whether the reason is written, as with the king, or not written, as with the widow. Contrary to what is usually thought, in the discussion of a verse’s rationale Maimonides does not rule like Rabbi Judah but like the anonymous first opinion.

The basis of the anonymous first opinion: why one does not derive law from a verse’s rationale

Why, indeed, does the anonymous first opinion not derive law from the rationale of the verse? If it has no concern about error, as in cases where the reason is written explicitly in the verse, then why not take the reason into account when shaping the law? This is especially puzzling when the reason is written explicitly. Moreover, on its view, did the Torah write the reason for nothing? What was its purpose?

I think the explanation is this. Whenever we discuss whether to derive law from the rationale of the verse, this is always in a situation where there is tension between the wording of the verse and its rationale. If there is full harmony between them, the dilemma does not arise, because whether we derive or not, we will reach the same result. For example, the prohibition on taking a widow’s garment in pledge is formulated with respect to every widow. Therefore the wording of the verse indicates that the prohibition applies to every widow. But deriving from the reason leads to the conclusion that it applies only to a poor widow. A tension is created here, and therefore there is a dispute whether to follow the wording of the verse or the reason. The same is true regarding the king. From the wording of the verse, multiplying women of every kind is forbidden, and from the reason it follows that the prohibition applies only to wicked women. Again a tension is created, and again the debate arises whether to follow the wording of the verse or the reason, which in this case is written explicitly in the Torah.

I want to argue that the anonymous first opinion holds that the reason one does not derive law from the rationale of the verse is the assumption that the Torah’s wording is complete and contains no error. Hence, if a tension arises between the verse and the reason, apparently we have not understood the reason correctly. Therefore, in such situations one should follow the wording of the verse rather than the reason. Let us take the multiplication of wives as an example. As noted, in this case the reason is written explicitly in the Torah, and at first glance there seems to be no concern that we have not understood it correctly. I will now show that even in such a case the concern about error still exists. The interpretation of the reason proposed by Rabbi Judah is that it is forbidden to multiply only wicked women, because only they turn away his heart. The anonymous first opinion argues that on this approach the wording of the verse comes out imprecise, since the verse forbids the multiplication of every kind of wife. Therefore the anonymous first opinion contends that Rabbi Judah necessarily did not understand the reason correctly. What turns away the king’s heart is not the wickedness of the women, for otherwise even one such woman should indeed be forbidden, but the very multiplication of wives. A king whose harem contains many women spends all his time occupied with them instead of with the matters he ought to be occupied with, and in that way his heart turns away. If one understands the reason-verse this way, the conclusion is that it is forbidden to multiply wives of every kind, righteous or wicked. This is the view of the anonymous first opinion, and this is also how Maimonides rules.

Summary of the dispute: does every verse come to teach law?

We learn from this that even if the reason is written explicitly in the Torah, although there is no concern that we have latched onto the wrong reason, there is still concern that we may misunderstand the written reason and derive incorrect legal conclusions from it. Therefore it is always preferable to adhere to the wording of the verse, since it is always precise. This is the reason one does not derive law from the rationale of the verse, and therefore this remains true even when the reason is written explicitly in the verse. So why was the reason written? To teach us the reason for the commandment, as Maimonides himself writes in the fifth root principle. Study it and receive reward. The claim of the anonymous first opinion, and of Maimonides following it, is that not every verse comes to teach laws. Sometimes verses teach ideas and other insights, especially reason-verses.

Maimonides’ claim in the fifth root principle is precisely this: reason-verses did not come to teach laws. Nahmanides, in his glosses there, learned from this talmudic discussion that both Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon hold that the reason-verse comes to teach laws, and their dispute is only which laws. Therefore, in his view, there are no verses, at least verses written in a legal context, that did not come to teach law but rather some conceptual idea. That is what he argues there against Maimonides’ remarks. Nahmanides thought that if there is a consensus between Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon, it is impossible not to accept this conclusion. But Maimonides argues against him that there is a third tannaitic view here, and that the law follows it. According to this view, contrary to the consensus of Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon, reason-verses did not come to teach law.

Back to the Red Heifer

As stated, in the case of the Red Heifer the reason is not written, and there are difficulties and contradictions in the parameters of the commandment, so it is hard for us to understand or derive it. Therefore the possibility of error is certainly present there. But the discussion there is not about deriving the reason, for we do not know the reason, but about the concern that we may come to question the commandment, precisely because of the absence of a reason. Even when a reason is written, we have seen that it is very easy to fall into error in understanding it. If so, in a case where it is difficult to understand any reason at all, there is no real basis for questioning it.

Source (Google Doc): https://docs.google.com/document/d/1yHeIOYexlwKUNA7uVhPc7kqAfpQNsyuI/edit?usp=sharing&ouid=103054435058019085063&rtpof=true&sd=true