Parashat Eikev (5761)

With God's help, on the eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Eikev, 5761

The Concept of Holiness

In this portion, Moses our Teacher recounts the sins of the Israelites, first and foremost the sin of the calf,

and his response to it: the breaking of the tablets. The author of Meshekh Chokhmah, on Parashat Ki Tisa, explains the

meaning of the sin of the calf and of the breaking of the tablets. After Moses our Teacher ascended Mount Sinai to receive the

Torah, the people of Israel remained without a leader, and in practice also without any real representation of God. It was difficult

for them, especially against the background of the culture of that period, which believed in various idols, to continue believing

in an abstract entity that had no concrete representation on earth. They thought that holiness could be ascribed only

to tangible objects and not to abstract ones. Because of this situation, the people decided to set up for themselves an image that would serve as a

concrete representation of God. When Moses our Teacher saw what was happening, he understood that this was the root of the sin,

and therefore he decided to break the tablets. His purpose was to show the people that tangible objects possess no holiness

in themselves. The only holy reality is God, precisely the abstract being. One who ascribes holiness

to physical objects, or even to a person, is engaging in idolatry. The tablets were 'the writing of God,'

that is, God Himself wrote them. Ostensibly, this is the holiest object one can imagine. Moses

our Teacher chose to break precisely that, in order to show the people that if they do not relate properly, there is

no significance to the holiness of a material object. In the terms of that period, this was a revolutionary conception.

Holiness is linked to an abstract entity that exists above and outside the world. In fact, this is the belief that the world

is governed not by entities that exist within it, but precisely by an entity that exists outside it.

To illustrate the point, I would say that the sensitivity of the Torah, and of Jews generally throughout history,

to the problematic nature of giving visual embodiment to things caused art—at least visual art—to occupy

a very limited place in Jewish culture. Spirit, too, occupied a far more dominant place than

the body. By contrast, Greek culture, which was idolatrous in its essence, accorded

great importance to visual art. As is well known, Greek culture was highly physical, and sport was highly

developed and important within it, just like art.

In light of this description, it is surprising to discover that the Torah and Jewish law give a significant place to the concept

of holiness, and even more surprising to discover that its legal manifestations are generally directed toward material

objects. A Torah scroll is holy. So too are phylacteries. A sacrifice is holy. The Land of Israel and the Temple

are holy places. Ostensibly, we would expect that in Judaism the concept of

'idolatrous' holiness—that is, holiness of objects—would have no place at all. Ostensibly, we would expect such holiness to be

reprehensible, and to be classified as idolatry.

This is doubly surprising in light of the fact that in Jewish law the concept of holiness denotes, more than any other concept,

the object. The Talmud at the beginning of tractate Nedarim distinguishes between laws pertaining to the object and laws

pertaining to the person. The point is to distinguish between laws whose meaning is a command addressed to the person

(that is, the person), and laws that are imposed upon the object (that is, the object). For example, an oath is an obligation upon

the person, whereas a vow is a legal status that rests upon the object. If a person swears not to eat bread, this is a prohibition

upon the person himself not to eat bread. If a person vows not to eat a particular loaf of bread, then that loaf

becomes a prohibited object for him, like pork.

The source of all laws that pertain to the object—that is, laws whose legal force takes effect in things and not upon the person—is

the sacrifices, and more generally, holy objects. Holiness is the concept most strongly connected

to object-based categories. Ostensibly, there is here a complete reversal of the lessons of the sin of the calf and the prohibitions of

idolatry. How can it be that we ascribe holiness to objects, and it is especially strange that precisely the concept

of holiness, more than all the other laws of the Torah, symbolizes the legal characteristics of material

objects.

The implication is that the Torah's attitude toward holiness is complex and fraught, and it is very easy

to err in this matter. On the one hand, holiness attributed to objects in and of themselves is invalid, and tantamount to idolatry.

On the other hand, holiness that does not exist in the world, but is merely abstract, is likewise not the Torah's way, for

the Torah is meant to bring God's holiness down to earth and not leave it in heaven. All

the commandments are intended to cause God's presence and holiness to dwell in this world, and not to be satisfied

with an abstract philosophical awareness of His existence in the highest heavens. Therefore, on the one hand, there is indeed no holiness detached

from God, and from the ways He commanded that it appear on earth. On the other hand, one who completely denies

the holiness of objects ignores the Torah's primary aim: 'to make a dwelling for the Holy One, blessed be He, in the lower realms.'

There is here a tightrope walk, on which many may stumble. Ascribing holiness to an object in a way detached

from the mode and the command of God is idolatry. Such an act suggests, as it were, that there are in the world

two independent authorities of holiness, contrary to the belief in divine unity. On the other hand, ignoring the possibility of holiness

in objects is also fundamentally mistaken. This is the principal difference between the attitude of philosophy and that of

religion toward the concept of holiness and toward God.

It is important to remember these two types of error when, in these days, we come to discuss concepts such as the Temple

Mount, the Temple, and also the Land of Israel as a whole. Both those who perceive in them holiness in and of themselves, and

those who claim that there is no holiness at all in land, or in material objects, are mistaken.

A peaceful Sabbath.

It may be deposited in the repository for sacred writings in any synagogue or religious seminary. Comments and responses will be gladly received.

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