Parashat Re'eh (5761)

With God's help, on the eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Re'eh, 5761

Prophecy and Skepticism

Our portion deals, among other things, with the concept of prophecy. One of the characteristics of prophecy is the certainty

of the prophet that God is indeed speaking to him, and his ability to 'see' ideas, that is,

to be completely certain of them.

A striking example of this is found with our forefather Abraham in the account of the Binding of Isaac, where several

commentators explain that one of the difficulties he faced was how to relate to the divine command. Ostensibly, Abraham

had many reasons to doubt that God was indeed commanding him to carry out this terrible command. It

apparently contradicted earlier statements of God ('for through Isaac shall your offspring be called' [Genesis 21:12]), as well as the spirit

of His commands in general. Abraham bound his son only because he had absolute certainty that

God was indeed revealing Himself to him and commanding him to do this.

Certainty is a concept very much under attack nowadays. The skeptical spirit blowing through the world is taking hold of

all of us, and causing us to cast doubt on everything. One who does not doubt is not 'enlightened', and in fact

he is naive, for, as is well known, there are different opinions in the world, and who is to say that he is right rather than someone else?

On the other hand, the tradition is charged with total demands. A Jew must believe with absolute faith in the Torah

and in the Giver of the Torah, and he is required to perform acts that are very difficult to carry out without such absolute faith

('binding' acts). The question is how one can hold fast to the path of faith in our skeptical age,

when prophecy is far removed from us.

Modern skepticism generally arises from the insight that all human thought is based on

foundational assumptions (axioms). One can prove various claims on the basis of certain axioms, but

the axioms themselves cannot be proven. Therefore, all human knowledge, of whatever kind, stands

under the sign of doubt. If so, apparently each person is free to adopt or reject foundational assumptions

as he wishes, and a skeptical worldview naturally emerges.

The basis of doubt can be formulated somewhat differently. Experience teaches me that in the past I erred

and retracted various beliefs that I once held. If so, what guarantee is there that my current belief

is not of the same sort? The problem is sharpened especially in light of the fact that the certainty I feel characterizes

another person as well, even when he thinks precisely the opposite. The description above, which points out that all human knowledge is based on

foundational assumptions, is often only an after-the-fact explanation of the experience described here. This is

a fact that points to the possibility of error in every one of my conclusions, regardless of the degree

of confidence I have in it.

When grappling with these issues, several points should be noted. First, this skepticism ought

to characterize our attitude toward every field of human knowledge. Science too is based on foundational assumptions, as is

every other body of knowledge we possess. If doubt is based solely on the fact that all knowledge rests on foundational

assumptions, then our attitude toward science too should be skeptical, and to the same degree. The fact is that generally

this is not the case. With respect to science, very few will feel a similar doubt (I mean here only the

natural sciences. The social sciences and the humanities are not included in the category 'science'; that is merely a shared label).

If so, the fact that human knowledge is based on foundational assumptions is not, in itself, sufficient

to create real doubt in us. True, the possibility of error exists in every case of knowledge acquired

through ordinary human tools, including scientific knowledge, but the possibility of error in itself is not

a sufficient basis for skepticism. The possibility of error can create a certain measure of doubt about the certainty of my conclusions,

but there is a difference between 'a certain measure of doubt' and doubt.

In discussions of skepticism, we often tend to forget the distinction between doubt and majority presumption.

There is a situation in which I am not certain of my conclusions, yet it cannot be said that I am wholly in doubt about them,

or that they are no more true than their opposite. Such a situation parallels the legal situation in Jewish law in which there

is a 'majority presumption'. For example, when a person is sued to repay a debt, and he claims that he already paid it before the

stated due date, the court will take into account the consideration that there is a 'majority presumption' that people generally do not repay

debts before the due date to which they committed themselves. In other words, that person's claim will be

inadmissible, because most people do not behave that way. Clearly, there is a theoretical possibility

that this person did in fact repay his debt within the allotted time. Nevertheless, we treat him as though he did not repay, because

the odds are that the plaintiff is right in such a case (of course, if the plaintiff too says that the debt was repaid, there is

no problem). So too in all areas of life. Even when there is a possibility of error, that is not a basis

sufficient to turn us into skeptics. We act according to the best of our understanding, even if it is proper to take

into account the possibility that we were mistaken.

The fact that there are others who hold positions different from mine, and they are no less certain of their position than I am,

is likewise not, in itself, a sufficient basis for skepticism. In such a situation I must examine their claims

and reach a conclusion. It should be noted that usually those who are so sure of their positions have not truly examined

the various possibilities. This is true even when they have an 'enlightened' and 'open' appearance. In my experience,

people who are prepared to examine an issue seriously and honestly from all its aspects will generally

reach fairly similar conclusions.

Our ability to arrive at truth even in thought that is based on axioms that cannot be proven

is a remnant left in the world from the prophetic power. The power we have to discern truth not by way of

logical proofs is a kind of prophecy. It is true that because the prophetic power has been taken from us,

the possibility of error still exists, but, as stated, this does not suffice to pull the ground out from under

our principled ability to arrive at truth.

Have a peaceful Sabbath

This may be deposited for respectful disposal in any synagogue or religious academy. Comments and responses are welcome.

Biton101.doc