The halakhic justification for using the divine appellation in the book "God Plays Dice"

With God's help

2016

Introduction
The purpose of the book is to fill an intolerable lacuna in the discourse about evolution. The dominant voice in the public discourse is the atheistic one. The theistic voice is hardly heard at all (certainly not in Hebrew), and even when it is heard, it is presented in a distorted and harmful way. The book is intended to present a theistic position (a believing one, on the philosophical level, not necessarily specifically Jewish-religious), one that is based on recognition of the findings of evolution (unlike the prevalent creationist literature). The book is meant to be accessible and attractive to every educated reader, and especially to those who are not believers.
There is another problem in the public discourse, connected to the previous one. Contemporary discussion of evolution is a priori distorted. The situation in public consciousness today is such that writers advocating the neo-Darwinian thesis that supports atheism are perceived as scientific and philosophical writers, whereas writers (to the extent that there are any at all) on behalf of belief are perceived as producing literature of religious preaching, shallow and biased. Naturally, such literature will not be read by the broad public (except by those who are already convinced).
For these reasons, if the book had referred to God using spellings such as 'Elokim' or 'E-lohim', it would immediately have been tagged as literature of religious preaching, and would not have achieved its purpose. Most of the readers who most need to read it would not even have bothered to pick it up.
One might perhaps avoid the problem if the divine name did not appear in the book at all. But that would make it impossible to deal with the topic. The problem of pronouncing the name can be solved only by writing 'Elokim' and not 'E-lohim', which is pronounced the same way.
One could have reduced the problem by avoiding use of this appellation in the title of the book. The appearance of this appellation not only within the book but also in its title, on the one hand intensifies the halakhic problem (since it appears on the exterior of the book and not inside the covers, and since the title of the book is a phrase that will be uttered by those who use it and those who publicize it). But on the other hand, it advances the goal more forcefully: that the name of Heaven be on readers' lips, and that God cease to be a subject of preaching and begin to be a legitimate interpretation of the theory of evolution (indeed, a much more plausible one than the atheistic alternative).
For all these reasons, my decision was to use the appellation 'Elohim' even in the title, and not to make do with substitutes that are ostensibly more 'kosher'.

The problem itself
The use of such an appellation in a book (and especially in its title) may give rise mainly to two kinds of problems: 1. Disrespect for the divine name (bringing the book into foul places, throwing it away when it becomes worn out). 2. Pronouncing the name in vain (when describing the book, and especially its title). These, of course, are prohibitions that readers of the book might transgress, and therefore the prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block" stands in the background. If readers might indeed transgress these prohibitions, then the author, by causing them to do so, would have violated "do not place a stumbling block," or at least the prohibition of assisting another's transgression, in a case where the person could have sinned without his help.
The discussion here will be very brief, and I will only summarize the main points relevant to our issue.

Proper names and appellations with respect to erasure and pronouncing in vain
Jewish law distinguishes between proper divine names and appellations. There are disputes over what counts as a proper name, what counts as an appellation, and what falls into neither category. The name conventionally transliterated 'Elohim' is written in the Bible everywhere (!) in defective spelling, without the letter vav. Therefore, when it is written in plene spelling, with a vav, it is certainly not a proper divine name, but at most an appellation. This is similar to spellings such as 'E-lohim' or 'Elokim'. There is no essential difference with respect to writing (though there is with respect to pronunciation; see below).
The only place one finds discussion of a similar spelling is with respect to a divine title written with or without a vav (see, for example, Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah sec. 276:9, and Taz ad loc. s.k. 7, in his second explanation and at the end of his remarks there). Regarding that, the decisors wrote that no distinction should be drawn and that both count as divine names, because in Scripture that title itself is written in both forms. From that very point, however, one may infer the opposite regarding 'Elohim'. It is always written in Scripture without a vav, and therefore it certainly should not be treated as a proper name.
This is reminiscent of a name that used to be written in prayer books with two yods, regarding which Rema, Yoreh De'ah sec. 276:10, wrote that it may be erased. It would seem that the same applies in our case as well.
And the Vilna Gaon, ad loc. s.k. 24, wrote:
And the name that they write, etc.—since it is not the actual letters of the Name; and although it alludes to the Name, and as the Rosh wrote in Shevuot there, 'every Solomon,' etc., he did not say this with regard to whether it may not be erased, but only so that one know its meaning, etc. And so too he wrote in a responsum, klal 3, sec. 15, and so too wrote Maimonides and other decisors, for he counts only the seven names mentioned above. And although the name Elohim and the like often refer to mundane matters, he nevertheless counted them, but did not count these.
That is, only these seven names are prohibited, as is explicit there as well in sec. 9: the prohibition of erasure applies only to one of the seven divine names. True, later in his remarks he cites Tosafot as uncertain regarding the prohibition of erasure.
In our case, however, this is only indirect causation of erasure, since no one is erasing it manually, and therefore there is certainly room to be lenient (as in the Talmudic discussion in Tractate Shabbat 120b, from which it emerges that there is no prohibition of indirect erasure even where there is no need. See also Shakh, Yoreh De'ah sec. 276 s.k. 12, who permitted it where there is a need, as there is here. See, however, the dispute on this in Har Tzvi, Yoreh De'ah sec. 231 and sec. 233. See also Achiezer, vol. 2, Yoreh De'ah sec. 48, who permitted it ab initio).
Hagahot Maimoniot, at the beginning of chapter 6 of Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, cites the Ra’em as saying that if one did not intend to sanctify the name, it is not sanctified and there is no prohibition against erasing it. See Havot Ya'ir sec. 16, who explains that when the name is written on utensil handles, the concern is that the writer may have intended to sanctify it. See also Achiezer there, s.k. 3.
Havot Ya'ir there also discusses the permissibility of writing it on a ring, and whether it is permitted to place it on a woman's hand. Seemingly, a ring too enters places of disrespect, and this still requires clarification.
Havot Ya'ir there further discusses whether writing is like speech, so that when one writes the name it should count as pronouncing it in vain. But he rejects this. All the more so in our case, where it was written by a machine and not by a human being; that is even further removed, and certainly cannot be treated as writing-as-speech. Even with respect to sanctity, this is more problematic, as with machine-made matzot: even there, when a person stands by the machine and explicitly intends the process to be for its required purpose, the decisors discuss whether that is effective. Here, where there is no such intention at all, how could the name become sanctified?
To this one may add the argument that the intention of the term 'Elohim' in the book is a philosophical God, not the religious God (the giver of the Torah). It is a name for a general philosophical idea that is not directed toward the Holy One, blessed be He, in His full religious sense, but toward a broader idea.
In any event, even with a full divine name, at most this would be a rabbinic prohibition, as Tzitz Eliezer, vol. 17 sec. 31 s.k. 1, demonstrates. Therefore all the considerations above certainly suffice to permit it without difficulty, especially since it serves an important need (see my remarks above).
Likewise regarding entry into foul places, see Yoreh De'ah sec. 282: what is forbidden there concerns sacred writings and amulets containing divine names, unlike books of this kind containing appellations. We do not find that people are careful not to enter the lavatory with a newspaper that contains words such as peace or merciful, and the like.

Pronouncing the name in vain
The prohibition against pronouncing the name in vain is not entirely clear. As is well known, the medieval authorities disputed whether a blessing recited in vain is a Torah prohibition ("taking the Name in vain") or only rabbinic. Even those who see it as a violation of "You shall not take the Name in vain" may hold that this is only because there is an act being performed with God's name, whereas mere mention of the name as such is not problematic, at least on the Torah level. When Sabbath songs are sung, many people customarily sing the divine name explicitly, even though these are not biblical verses and there is no need to do so. Song booklets also contain the divine name, and no one worries about the stumbling blocks that might result from this.
It should be remembered that there is certainly no prohibition here of pronouncing the Name as it is written, which is a Torah prohibition, for that was said only about the Tetragrammaton, when one reads it as it is written, Y-H-W-H, rather than as it is pronounced, A-donai. See Encyclopedia Talmudit, entry 'One Who Pronounces the Name'. From this itself there is proof for what I said above, that there is no Torah-level prohibition on mentioning some other divine name in vain.
And even if one were to say that there is a prohibition here, one must still ask what counts as 'in vain'. It seems reasonable that when one is speaking about God, mentioning His name is certainly not in vain. It is no worse than reading for the sake of learning, which is certainly permitted.
See also the responsa Har Tzvi, Yoreh De'ah sec. 234, who discusses a teacher who writes the formula 'With God's help' on the blackboard and erases it. In the course of his remarks he writes that mentioning the name for educational purposes is not considered saying it in vain. Here too, our purpose is educational. He further argues there that even if there were a prohibition, it would be overridden by the obligation of education, and that this commandment can override even a Torah prohibition. However, because he is discussing there the writing of the name by a teacher on a blackboard in order to teach students, his practical conclusion tends to reject the leniency, since the prohibited act is done by the teacher while the transgression is committed by the students. In our case, however, even the prohibition, if there is one, is committed by the readers. Moreover, here we are discussing pronunciation, not writing and erasure.

"Do not place a stumbling block" for the benefit of the one who stumbles
In the final analysis, one should remember that all these prohibitions are merely concerns that a reader who does not observe the commandments, or who is unaware of the prohibition, may transgress them. In practical terms, everything said until now matters only from the perspective of "do not place a stumbling block". Were it not for that, there would certainly be no prohibition here at all, since the reader can take care not to pronounce the name, just as he is careful when reading from a prayer book or a Pentateuch, and the like.
But here an additional consideration enters, namely, that it is not certain that any prohibition will be transgressed. And even if one is, this is not the classic case in which the sinner could not have acted without my assistance. Finally, we are dealing with a case of "do not place a stumbling block" that is for the benefit of the person caused to stumble (in order to draw the reader who is not committed to Jewish law closer to faith). On this point several decisors have already written that there is room for leniency. For example, serving food to someone who does not recite a blessing so that he should not come to hate those who observe Torah (Rabbi Shlomo Zalman Auerbach), or even inviting someone who does not observe Torah and commandments to a Sabbath meal even though this entails driving, so that he may be drawn closer to Torah observance.

Summary
In sum, it is highly doubtful whether any prohibition is involved here at all, and even if there is, it is only rabbinic. Above all, from the author's standpoint this is causing possible stumbling for the benefit of the person who stumbles, and in such a case there is certainly room for the view that the prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block" does not apply.