Limiting Childbearing in Jewish Law

With God's help

2011

Limiting Childbearing and Contraception

Miki Abraham

To the rabbis, may they live long and well, who are reading this responsum.

Even if, for whatever reason, you decide to skip a line or two in the responsum, I draw your attention to the fact that at the end I added chapter 6, which contains discussion of the more principled and general points, intended for you and not for Lior, may she live long and well (who by that stage will no doubt be lying there without a spirit of life). These are aspects that it would not have been right to include in a responsum to the questioner.

The responsum itself tries to begin from the beginning and to bring the relevant sources discussed in it in full, so that it can be read continuously and critically. A considerable part of what follows is familiar and well known, and it was written as part of the structure of an ordinary responsum (for Lior and for me, not for you).

There are fewer quotations and references to responsa, as part of my halakhic outlook, as I explained last Sabbath. Precedents that do not come from the Sages (and somewhat beyond the medieval authorities as well) are not so important in my eyes. I certainly think it is worthwhile and proper to go through them in order to see that nothing was missed, but in my view they do not carry real halakhic weight.

Since I generally do not engage in preaching (for fear for my life, and also because of lack of ability), nor in thought and worldview (for fear of neglecting Torah study), I focused on the halakhic aspects. But as you will see, they are saturated with assumptions and worldviews, and that is done here explicitly and consciously. For the principled aspects, see the fine and balanced discussion in Rabbi Yigal Ariel's article, 'Spacing Between Pregnancies (A Halakhic Perspective),' in Tzohar 10, which is also mentioned in my responsum (as its title indicates, there is discussion there of the halakhic aspects, but he also resorts to the other aspects).

Even so, I could not avoid writing passages addressed to the questioner, both at the beginning and in chapter 5 (regard this as part of the Kipa website). The brevity in these matters, which really require length, especially for a questioner who does not strike me as deeply interested in the words of the Ketzot in this Talmudic passage, stems from the criminal tendencies mentioned above.

Therefore, please read the letters as though they were written to her, but the responsum should be read as though it were written to you. And please regard it as though I had not spelled these things out.

For your convenience, I am attaching a table of contents.

Table of Contents

The question – limiting childbearing
Accompanying letter to the responsum (may be published on the Kipa site J )
Brief halakhic introduction
A. The commandments of "be fruitful and multiply," "in the evening do not let your hand rest," and "He created it to be inhabited"
B. Canceling or postponing the obligation of procreation and multiplication
C. A note on contraception
D. Summary: the practical halakhic conclusion
E. The meta-halakhic questions
F. An appendix for the rabbis who are reading

The question I received – limiting childbearing

Hello Rabbi,

I grew up with an education that taught me that in general one should give birth to as many children as possible, unless I have no strength or there are other problems. I also know that one has to turn to a rabbi in order to receive permission to space children.

But I cannot make peace with that.

Simply put, I do not want many children. I am healthy, we have good financial means, and an excellent environment. It is not because of problems. I do not want them because it does not suit me, it does not suit what I want to do in life, and it does not suit me because life will become enslaved to children.

Simply put, I do not want someone interfering in the question in my bedroom. I do not understand why I need a rabbi in order to decide my intimate questions. I also do not understand what the rabbi knows that I do not know. If he knows something in Jewish law, then let him tell me what the law is and I will decide whether to apply it. He is not a psychologist, and in truth there is nothing he knows that I do not know apart from the law. On the contrary, I know myself better than he does.

So what am I really asking? I am really asking whether, if I decide on my own what to do according to what is comfortable for me – am I sinning?

Lior

The responsum

Hello Lior.

Beyond the halakhic dimension, your question also involves several broader aspects, such as: one's attitude toward Jewish law, the status of considerations of convenience or career, the standing of the ordinary person vis-à-vis the halakhic decisor (the question of autonomy), 'make for yourself a rabbi' (the duty to consult a rabbi), the authority and area of expertise of the halakhic decisor, the limits of the scope of Jewish law, and more.

Even before the discussion begins, I feel obliged to preface by saying that, contrary to the conception of Jewish law implicitly reflected in your question, the decision in every area of life, including the halakhic one, is yours and no one else's. Even where Jewish law speaks unequivocally, you are the one who must decide whether to respond to that obligation or not. This is not a privilege or some sort of special right, but a duty that the Torah places upon us when it writes, 'choose life.'

This duty has two aspects: first – to choose; second – to choose correctly. To choose, one needs an autonomous spiritual-psychological stance, and from my impression that certainly exists in you. To choose correctly, information is also needed, and that is perhaps somewhat lacking in your case. Therefore I see my role as assisting, to the extent of my ability, in the decision-making process, both with information and with advice. After that, you will be able to fulfill in the best possible way the command to 'choose life.'

One further clarification is needed. Your question is phrased as though it were the question of an individual. But by the nature of things, both spouses are involved, and both together must make the decisions in these matters. Moreover, as we shall see below, from the standpoint of Jewish law it is specifically the man who is commanded in the commandment of 'be fruitful and multiply,' while the woman primarily assists him in that. Therefore I relate to the question as though it were raised jointly by both spouses.

As is the way of Torah, my responsum will begin by clarifying the halakhic dimension. I assume that you as well are aware of its importance, and of the fact that it is the fundamental infrastructure of the discussion. If the path is difficult for you, you may read the practical summary in chapter 4. After that, in chapter 5, I will also try to touch on the additional aspects that you raised.

With blessings,

Miki

Halakhic introduction

From your question one may understand that you are not speaking about postponing the obligation but about canceling it. That is, you are interested in stopping the effort to bring children into the world, and not merely postponing it. Even so, your words are not unequivocal: are you speaking about canceling or suspending? It is also still unclear whether you already have children, and how many; these too are important questions before one can formulate a response. Therefore I will take the opportunity to clarify the topic from all of these angles together.

I will divide the halakhic layer of the discussion into three chapters dealing with the three main aspects of the question:

The obligation to bring children into the world: the parameters of the commandment of "be fruitful and multiply," "in the evening do not let your hand rest," and "He created it to be inhabited."
Canceling a halakhic obligation that is incumbent upon me, or postponing its fulfillment to a later time. What possible grounds are there for doing so, if any? Here we will distinguish between a situation in which the commandment of procreation has already been fulfilled (there is a son and a daughter) and a situation in which it has not yet been fulfilled.
The use of various contraceptive methods (the prohibition involved in them, if any). On this subject I will comment only briefly, since it is a technical issue that is usually not essential to our present discussion unless some special problem arises. Here we will mainly address the principled problems that touch on the law of procreation and multiplication (= P&R).
After that I will add one more chapter containing a summary of the practical halakhic conclusion of my remarks, and I will conclude with a chapter touching on the meta-halakhic questions.

A. The commandments of 'be fruitful and multiply,' "in the evening do not let your hand rest," and "He created it to be inhabited"

In this chapter I will survey the parameters of the commandment of procreation and multiplication, and the two rabbinic commandments that branch off from it: "in the evening do not let your hand rest," and "He created it to be inhabited."

Sources of the obligation and initial parameters: "be fruitful and multiply"

The first commandment that the Torah imposes upon us (see Sefer HaChinukh, commandment 1) appears already in the account of creation on the sixth day, with the creation of man. The Torah there describes the creation of the animals, and afterward it writes (Genesis 1:26-28):

And God said, "Let us make man in Our image, after Our likeness, and let them rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over the cattle and over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth." And God created man in His image; in the image of God He created him; male and female He created them. And God blessed them, and God said to them: "Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and subdue it, and rule over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over every living thing that moves upon the earth."

That statement, which could also be interpreted as a blessing, is understood by our Sages as a command (they understood the verse to mean that the 'blessing' preceded the 'saying': 'be fruitful and multiply,' and that saying is a command).[1]

And thus the Mishnah in Yevamot 61a states:

Mishnah: An ordinary priest may not marry a barren woman unless he already has a wife and children. Rabbi Judah says: Even if he already has a wife and children, he may not marry a barren woman, because she is the harlot mentioned in the Torah. The Sages say: The only such harlot is a convert, a freed slave-woman, or a woman who had illicit intercourse.

The Talmud there asks why the command is stated specifically regarding a priest:

Gemara: The Exilarch said to Rav Huna: Why is that? Because of procreation? Are priests the only ones commanded in procreation, and Israelites are not? He said to him: Because it wanted to teach the latter clause: Rabbi Judah says, even if he has a wife and children, he may not marry a barren woman, because she is the harlot mentioned in the Torah. Since only priests are commanded regarding a harlot and Israelites are not, therefore it taught the case of a priest.

We see that there is an obligation to be fruitful and multiply, both upon priests and upon every Jew.[2]

And in the next Mishnah there, on 61b, we find:

Mishnah: A man may not desist from procreation unless he already has children. Beit Shammai say: two males; Beit Hillel say: a male and a female, as it is said: "Male and female He created them."

That is, one has no permission to stop and desist from procreation and multiplication unless he already has offspring. As a matter of law, we rule like Beit Hillel, that one fulfills the obligation only when one has a son and a daughter. Admittedly, some brought a proof from the Jerusalem Talmud (Yevamot 6:6), which understood Beit Hillel to mean that if he has two sons he certainly fulfills his duty, and that the dispute between Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai concerned only a son and a daughter. So too the Meiri and an early Tosafist wrote on the Babylonian Talmud, Yevamot 61b. But as a matter of law, most decisors ruled otherwise, and fulfillment of the commandment requires specifically a son and a daughter.

And this indeed seems to be the ruling of the Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer sec. 1:

1. Every man is obligated to marry a woman in order to be fruitful and multiply. And anyone who does not engage in procreation is as though he sheds blood, diminishes the divine image, and causes the Divine Presence to depart from Israel.

5. Once a person has a male and a female child, he has fulfilled the commandment of procreation, provided the son is not a eunuch and the daughter is not barren.

From the formulation of the law at its conclusion, we see that the obligation to be fruitful and multiply is not merely an obligation to bring children into the world, but an obligation to ensure, to the best of one's ability, the continuation of the chain. The offspring themselves must be capable of procreation, and without that the father has not fulfilled the commandment.

This can also be seen in the continuation of the Shulchan Arukh there, sec. 6:

If a male and a female were born to him and they died but left children, he has fulfilled the commandment of procreation. When is this so? When the grandchildren were a male and a female, and they came from the male and the female, even if the male was his daughter's son and the female was his son's daughter; since they came from his two children, he has fulfilled the commandment of procreation. But if he had a son and a daughter and they died, and only one of them left a male and a female, he still has not fulfilled this commandment. Gloss: If the son was a mamzer or deaf, mentally incompetent, or a minor, he has fulfilled the commandment (Beit Yosef in the name of the Rashba).

We see that there is an element of continuity here. Below we will discuss whether the commandment lies in the act (the sexual act) or in the result (establishing offspring).

We have seen that this is the first commandment, and it is brought by the Torah with the very creation of man. To such an extent is the command perceived as fundamental that the baraita in Yevamot 63b brings:

It was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says, anyone who does not engage in procreation is as though he sheds blood, as it is said, "Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed," and immediately afterward it is written, "And you, be fruitful and multiply." Rabbi Jacob says: it is as though he diminishes the divine image, as it is said, "For in the image of God He made man," and immediately afterward it is written, "And you, be fruitful…" Ben Azzai says: it is as though he sheds blood and diminishes the divine image, as it is said, "And you, be fruitful and multiply."

As we saw above, at the beginning of Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer, this exposition is brought in order to sharpen the fundamental nature of the obligation. Even so, immediately afterward the Talmud raises a difficulty about Ben Azzai himself:

They said to Ben Azzai: Some preach well and practice well, some practice well and do not preach well, but you preach well and do not practice well! Ben Azzai said to them: What shall I do? My soul longs for Torah. The world can be sustained through others.

Thus, despite so fundamental and severe an obligation, Ben Azzai allows himself to separate from women and not engage in procreation and multiplication because his soul longed for Torah.

It is hard to avoid the feeling that there is a measure of irony here: Ben Azzai greatly intensifies the importance of engaging in P&R, and then announces that he himself takes no part in it because his soul longed for Torah. It may be that his intention is specifically thereby to stress the importance of Torah study (below I will suggest another explanation). In any case, as a matter of law his words were accepted and ruled accordingly. Thus we find in the Shulchan Arukh there, sec. 1:4:

One whose soul longs for Torah, like Ben Azzai, constantly, and who cleaves to it all his days and does not marry a woman, incurs no sin, provided his inclination does not overpower him.

The formulation of the law in the Shulchan Arukh and in Maimonides quoted above indicates that the commandment to be fruitful and multiply is incumbent on the man. This is also explicit in sec. 13 there:

A woman is not commanded in procreation.

The source of this is in Yevamot 65b, which derives it from the wording of the verse 'and subdue it':

Mishnah: The man is commanded regarding procreation, but not the woman. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: regarding both of them it says, "And God blessed them and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply."

Gemara: From where are these words derived? Rabbi Ilai said in the name of Rabbi אלעזר son of Rabbi Shimon: The verse says, "Fill the earth and subdue it"—the way of conquest belongs to a man, not to a woman.

As stated, as a matter of law we rule like the Sages and not like Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

The fact that the woman is not obligated in the commandment of P&R does not mean that she may simply opt out of it. Below we shall see that there are views according to which she is obligated in it rabbinically (through the commandment of 'inhabiting the world'), but according to all views she bears an obligation to assist her husband in fulfilling the commandment. Some see in this the purpose of betrothal and marriage: to serve as an instrument for the commandment of P&R. It is true that if she wishes not to marry at all, and not to enter into that obligation, one could perhaps see in these rulings a possible basis for that. Here we will not enter into the parameters of the commandment of marriage upon man and woman, since the question before us concerns a man and woman who are already married and their obligation as such.

Sources of the obligation and initial parameters: "in the evening do not let your hand rest"

In the passage in Yevamot 62b we find the following baraita:

As it was taught: Rabbi Yehoshua says, if a man married a woman in his youth, he should marry a woman in his old age; if he had children in his youth, he should have children in his old age, as it is said: "In the morning sow your seed, and in the evening do not let your hand rest, for you do not know which will prosper, this or that, or whether both alike will be good."

From here it emerges that a person is obligated to continue bringing children into the world even after he has fulfilled the basic commandment. This obligation is learned from the verse in Ecclesiastes: 'In the morning sow your seed, and in the evening do not let your hand rest…'

But from the flow of the discussion there it emerges that this baraita is not universally agreed upon, since, as we saw above, the Mishnah on 61b states that if one has a son and a daughter he may indeed desist from procreation and multiplication. Thus the Talmud there on 62b indeed raises that question. But in the conclusion of the passage we find:

Rav Mattana said: The law follows Rabbi Yehoshua.

Prima facie, that is the law.

Maimonides brings this law in Hilkhot Ishut 15:16:

Even though a person has fulfilled the commandment of procreation, he is commanded by rabbinic law not to desist from being fruitful and multiplying as long as he has strength, for whoever adds even one soul to Israel is as though he built an entire world. Likewise, it is a commandment of the Sages that a man should not remain without a wife, lest he come to improper thoughts; and a woman should not remain without a man, lest she fall under suspicion.

He gives two reasons for the obligation to marry a woman: in order to continue being fruitful and multiplying as long as one has strength, and in order not to come to improper thoughts. In any event, this is a rabbinic obligation.

But the Rif writes here:

This matter is rabbinic, but by Torah law, once he has a male and a female, he has fulfilled the commandment of procreation.

It appears that the Rif sees no dispute at all between the Mishnah and the baraita; rather, the Mishnah deals with Torah law and the baraita with rabbinic law. The ruling like Rabbi Yehoshua is on the rabbinic plane.

The Ba'al HaMa'or there wrote that the practical difference resulting from the fact that this is only rabbinic is that one does not sell a Torah scroll in order to marry a woman after one has already fulfilled the commandment of P&R, and he himself disagrees with the Rif on this point. In his view, the practical difference is that one is not obligated to divorce his second wife if she has not borne children after ten years.

But Naḥmanides, in Milchamot Hashem there, wrote that this is not really a commandment but rather a proper human practice, and therefore one does not compel it:

Still, it is only like a rabbinic commandment, or like proper worldly conduct, since the Talmud bases it on "In the morning sow your seed" and does not mention any prohibition here. Rather, marrying a woman is a commandment in the ideal case; we do not compel, and we do not call a person a transgressor if he does not wish to engage in it. But he should never remain without a wife…

Naḥmanides maintains that we are dealing here with something like a recommendation of proper conduct and not a real law, and therefore one does not compel it.

This dispute is brought in the Shulchan Arukh in sec. 8 there:

Even though he has fulfilled procreation, it is forbidden for him to remain without a wife, and he should marry a woman capable of bearing children if he has the means, even if he already has many children. If he cannot afford to marry a childbearing woman unless he sells a Torah scroll, then if he has no children he should sell it in order to marry such a woman. But if he has children, he should not sell it; rather, he should marry a woman who cannot bear children, but he should not remain without a wife. Some say that even if he has children he should sell a Torah scroll in order to marry a woman capable of bearing children.

Gloss: However, if he knows that he is no longer capable of fathering children and is no longer fit to beget, he should marry a woman who cannot bear children. Likewise, if he has many children and fears that if he marries a childbearing woman quarrels and disputes will arise between the children and his wife, he may marry a woman who cannot bear children. But it is forbidden to remain without a wife on account of this concern.

But there is not necessarily a dispute here with Naḥmanides; rather, only a dispute whether one sells a Torah scroll or not. I later saw that this is indeed what Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer IV, end of sec. 32, writes:

And on this your honor rightly wrote that this is according to Naḥmanides. For as a matter of law we do not find that the Shulchan Arukh disagrees with him; even the "some say" in sec. 1:8, who hold that one sells a Torah scroll in order to marry a woman capable of bearing children, imply that Naḥmanides holds so as well. Therefore one should rule that way, and this is explicit in Beit Shmuel sec. 1 subsec. 14, which cites Naḥmanides for practical law.

Thus, although the Ba'al HaMa'or certainly disputes Naḥmanides (and the language of the Rif and Maimonides does not naturally suggest his approach either), it appears from Iggerot Moshe that in practice we rule like him. Let us note that quite a few later authorities adopted specifically the approach of the Ba'al HaMa'or, but even they agree that there is room for very sweeping leniencies in this commandment (see Chatam Sofer, Even HaEzer sec. 20, cited in Tzitz Eliezer VI:42 ch. 4 sec. 2; Chelkat Yaakov III sec. 62; Nishmat Abraham, Even HaEzer sec. 5 p. 60; and Otzar HaPoskim I, pp. 125-126).

Sources of the obligation and initial parameters: "He created it to be inhabited"

There is yet another category brought in the words of the Sages regarding the obligation of being fruitful and multiplying, and that is from the verse in Isaiah: 'He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited.' For example, in the passage in Pesaḥim 88a (and in parallel passages) we find a baraita:

As we learned: One who is half slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, according to Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say: you have remedied his master, but not him. He cannot marry a slave-woman, because he is already half free; he cannot marry a free woman, because he is still half slave. Shall he remain idle? Was the world not created only for procreation, as it is said: "He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited"? Rather, for the better ordering of the world, we compel his master and make him fully free, and he writes a note for half his value. And Beit Hillel retracted and ruled like Beit Shammai.

We see that there is an obligation to free the slave so that he can engage in P&R. Now the source brought for this in the Talmud is specifically the verse in Isaiah, and not the foundational Torah source for the commandment of P&R, 'be fruitful and multiply.' Why indeed is specifically this secondary source brought in the discussion?

We find two main directions among the medieval authorities: 1. The commandment of 'inhabiting the world' is an additional commandment with broader implications beyond the ordinary commandment of P&R (for example, women are also obligated in it). 2. There is no additional law here; rather, this is only an explanation and sharpening of the importance of the commandment of P&R. According to this view, the verse 'He created it to be inhabited' is meant to prove the importance and centrality of the commandment of P&R, by showing that the whole earth was created only so that we should settle it by establishing offspring.

In Tosafot, s.v. 'kofin,' there on 88b, we find:

We compel his master—in the case of a half-slave woman we do not compel her master, except where people have treated her promiscuously. The reason is that even if she were freed, perhaps she would still not fulfill it, since she is not obligated.

Tosafot begins by saying that one does not compel the freeing of a maidservant unless people are behaving with her promiscuously. It appears that the reason is that a maidservant has no obligation of P&R, just like an ordinary woman. If so, why did they not bring here the verse 'be fruitful and multiply'? It seems that the continuation of Tosafot addresses this point:

And if you ask: why do we compel him? Do we tell a person, "Sin so that your fellow may benefit," when one who frees his slave transgresses a positive commandment? One may answer: a great commandment is different—namely, "He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited"—as is answered in Berakhot 47 regarding Rabbi Eliezer, who freed his slave: a communal commandment is different.

Tosafot explains that P&R is a 'great commandment,' and that it is more important than other commandments. In order to prove this, it cites the verse in Isaiah, since the verse in the Torah teaches only that there is a commandment, but does not testify to its importance. In Isaiah, as stated, it is presented as though this were the whole purpose of creation.

And in Tosafot, s.v. 'lo tohu,' Gittin 41b (see also Tosafot, s.v. 'shene’emar,' Bava Batra 13b):

He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited—why does it not cite the verse "be fruitful and multiply"? Because if he could have fulfilled even some minimal inhabiting by means of the commandment of procreation, we would not have compelled him, whereas here we do compel him, as we explained.

Further on Tosafot writes, as we said above, that the verse of 'inhabiting' was brought in order to show that this is a great commandment:

Alternatively, this verse is cited because it proves that this is a great commandment. So too in the last chapter of Megillah it is cited regarding selling a Torah scroll in order to study Torah and to marry a woman, where it says: Torah study is different, for the Master said, Great is Torah study… And with a wife as well: "He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited."

But afterward Tosafot brings another answer:

Rabbi Isaac son of Rabbi Mordechai explains that "He formed it to be inhabited" is cited because it applies even to the slave side, whereas "be fruitful and multiply" applies only to the free side. And this is also somewhat implied in the Jerusalem Talmud in our chapter and in the first chapter of Mo'ed Katan, where it says: There we learned, one does not marry women on the festival. Shimon bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: because of neglect of procreation—that is, lest he delay marriage until the festival, which is a time of joy and freedom from other concerns. They asked before Rabbi Asi: what about a slave, may he marry on the festival? He said to them: let us infer it from this: Shall he remain idle? Was the world not created except for procreation? And Shimon bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yoḥanan: anyone who is commanded in procreation may not marry on the festival—that is, anyone commanded by virtue of "He formed it to be inhabited," such as a slave; but he is certainly not commanded in "be fruitful and multiply."

According to this, 'inhabiting the world' applies to a slave-woman as well. And the reason we do not compel in the case of a half-slave, half-free woman unless people are treating her promiscuously is that since she is not commanded in procreation, perhaps even after she is freed she will not fulfill it.

Thus Tosafot here writes that the commandment of 'inhabiting the world' applies also to a woman and to a slave, even though they are not obligated in P&R.[3] This is also what the Beit Shmuel brings in Even HaEzer sec. 1, sec. 2, and so too other decisors.

On the other hand, Maimonides, and the Shulchan Arukh itself, mention the law of 'inhabiting the world' nowhere. The language of the laws exempting the woman from P&R in their rulings is absolute, and there does not appear to be any qualification to that. The author of Torah Temimah on Genesis there already noted this and wrote that according to Maimonides, 'inhabiting the world' is not an independent commandment but an explanation of the commandment of P&R.

That indeed emerges from several Talmudic passages that bring the law of 'inhabiting the world' in place of or in parallel to 'be fruitful and multiply.' For example, in the passage in Megillah 27a:

Come and hear: Rabbi Yoḥanan said in the name of Rabbi Meir: One sells a Torah scroll only to study Torah or to marry a woman. Learn from this that exchanging Torah for Torah is permitted. Perhaps study is different, because study leads to action. A wife as well—"He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited…"

Even here, however, this is not conclusive, since one could understand that the verse was brought in order to point to the centrality of the commandment of P&R, as we saw above.

So too we see in Yevamot 62a, which discusses the parameters of the commandment of P&R:

Another baraita: Rabbi Natan says, Beit Shammai say: a male and a female; and Beit Hillel say: either a male or a female. Rava said: What is Rabbi Natan's reason according to Beit Hillel? As it is said: "He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited," and he has indeed inhabited it.

Thus here too we see that the verse 'He created it to be inhabited' is brought only as an explanation of the parameter of the obligation of P&R, and not as an independent obligation.

To sum up: Maimonides apparently adopts the second approach brought above in Tosafot, according to which the verse of 'inhabiting' merely explains the idea in 'be fruitful and multiply,' and it is brought by the Talmud in order to prove the importance of the commandment of 'be fruitful and multiply.' That is, in his view there is no independent obligation here, but rather the reason of the verse of 'be fruitful and multiply.' For that reason, the commandment of 'inhabiting the world' is not brought in Maimonides or in the Shulchan Arukh. From this it is also clear that according to Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh there is no obligation at all upon a woman or a slave to be fruitful and multiply, neither by Torah law nor by rabbinic law.

Admittedly, we have found one who claimed that the obligation of 'inhabiting the world' is nothing but the obligation to marry a woman, and is not at all connected to establishing offspring. But the later authorities (see Minchat Chinukh, commandment 1 sec. 28, and Noda B'Yehuda, first edition, Even HaEzer end of sec. 1, item 6) rejected his words. Thus wrote the Noda B'Yehuda there:

As for what the rabbi of Brody thought—that "He formed it to be inhabited" applies even to one who is incapable of fathering children—that is an error. Did the rabbi say this while half asleep? Even though he is a great man, in this he erred. What led him to this mistake was that he saw in Tosafot that even where the positive commandment of procreation does not apply, "He formed it to be inhabited" nevertheless applies, even in a case where one does not fulfill the positive commandment of procreation. See their words in Gittin 41a, s.v. 'He cannot marry a slave-woman,' where Tosafot write: If you ask, even if he could marry a slave-woman, he still would not fulfill procreation בכך, as is proven in Yevamot, which says that all agree a slave has no lineage. And they answer: if he could have fulfilled even some inhabiting because of the commandment of procreation, we would not have compelled his master… From this that rabbi inferred that if he were permitted to take a slave-woman he would fulfill inhabiting the world even though he would not fulfill procreation. But this is a mistake, for there at least he is begetting children and increasing the settlement of the world. Even though he does not fulfill procreation because the lineage is not attributed after him, he still fulfills inhabiting the world, because the world's settlement increases. But how could one think that a person who begets no children at all would be included in "He formed it to be inhabited"? That cannot be accepted. The opposite is explicit: even one who marries an old or barren woman does not fulfill inhabiting the world. This is the language of Naḥmanides in Milchamot on Yevamot: 'One should not object to our teacher… except to say that it is forbidden for a man to remain without a wife even though he is not obligated in procreation, and he always sells a Torah scroll even to marry a woman not capable of bearing children, even though there is no inhabiting the world there…' Thus it is explicit in his words that marrying a woman who is not capable of bearing children does not involve inhabiting the world. And the above words of Naḥmanides are brought in Chelkat Mechokek sec. 1 subsec. 10. Therefore this notion is an error. Even so, despite this, it is still a commandment to seek permission so that he not remain without a wife and constantly come to sinful thoughts.

Thus, 'inhabiting the world' means the obligation to fill the world with offspring, and there is a clear distinction between that and the obligation to marry a woman in order to avoid sinful thoughts and the like, as we saw above.

The definition of the commandment[4]

After seeing the general definitions of these obligations, we must discuss whether the definition of the commandment of P&R is the sexual act, or the establishing of offspring. In other words: is this a commandment of action/effort, or a commandment of result?

A simple look would seemingly indicate that this is a commandment of result. As we saw, the Torah wants us to establish offspring in order to settle the world, and the sexual act (as well as betrothal) is merely a preparation for the commandment. Therefore it is not enough merely that we established offspring; if they died, or if they themselves are not capable of producing offspring, the father has not fulfilled his duty. On the other hand, if his children died but left offspring of their own, he fulfills his own duty through them.

On the other hand, several sources indicate that this is nevertheless a commandment of action, not of result. True, the Torah's aim is the establishing of offspring, but that is only the reason of the verse (= the purpose and goal of the commandment). The halakhic definition of the commandment is the effort, that is, the sexual act. The explanation is fairly simple: the result is not in our hands, but in the hands of Heaven. What we can do is only the effort, namely the sexual act. Therefore the Torah imposes upon us the duty of effort, even though its goal is the result.

How, according to this view, can we understand the rules that deal with results? Presumably, this view will see the result as a condition for fulfillment of the commandment: the commandment itself is the act of intercourse, but once we have reached the result we may stop making the effort, since we have fulfilled the duty of effort. In other words: the obligation to engage in marital relations is conditioned on the absence of children (a son and a daughter). Once they exist, the obligation falls away.

Perhaps one can connect the approach to this question to the two conceptions presented above regarding the commandment of 'inhabiting the world': if that is an additional rabbinic commandment that also obligates women and slaves, then it seems that there indeed we have a commandment of result (that the earth be inhabited and not remain desolate), but that would be only with regard to the rabbinic commandment. By contrast, the Torah-level commandment of P&R is a commandment of action, meaning the sexual act, and therefore it is plausible that it is imposed only upon the man (in several places the law treats the woman as passive in the sexual act, 'the ground of the world,' and therefore the act is performed only by the man). By contrast, according to the views that 'inhabiting the world' is only an explanation of the essence of the Torah-level commandment of P&R itself, we have here a conception of a commandment of result, for the commandment of P&R is aimed at settling the earth.

This is a complex conceptual question, and much could be written about it. Since our concern here is the halakhic ruling regarding refraining from P&R or postponing engagement in it, I will bring only a few primary sources in order to delineate the discussion.

The commandment of procreation and multiplication as a commandment of result: the view of the Minchat Chinukh

In Minchat Chinukh sec. 5 it is brought that if the son was born healthy, and after his birth became incapable of having children, the father has not fulfilled the commandment of P&R. And in sec. 25 he adds that if a deaf-mute or an incompetent person fathered children and later became competent, he has fulfilled the obligation of P&R, similarly to a gentile who converted.

Prima facie, this is a distinct conception of a result-commandment, since at the time of the act they were not obligated in commandments. On the other hand, this is not conclusive proof, since it is no better than the general claim itself that this commandment depends on results (the birth of a son and a daughter who themselves are capable of reproduction). Therefore one can still see the result as a condition, while defining the commandment itself as the act of intercourse.

A better proof can be brought from the Beit Yosef, Even HaEzer sec. 1, who cites several medieval authorities to the effect that even if a person fathers a mamzer, he has fulfilled the commandment. The Minchat Chinukh proves (there, end of sec. 8) that this refers even to a case where the intercourse itself was sinful. On this he asks (there, s.v. 've-zeh zeman'): how can one fulfill the commandment of procreation and multiplication through the birth of mamzerim, when this is a commandment that comes through a transgression?[5]

The Minchat Chinukh resolves the difficulty on the basis of the reasoning of later authorities that a commandment is defined as one that comes through a transgression only if the transgression is committed at the time the commandment is fulfilled.[6] We can now understand that the commandment of procreation and multiplication is fulfilled even through a mamzer, because in that case the transgression is committed at the time of the forbidden intercourse, whereas the commandment is fulfilled when the child is born. This is a clear proof that in his view this is a result-commandment.

The Minchat Chinukh there continues and adds accordingly that the sexual act is not a commandment at all but only a preparation for the commandment, since the one is impossible without the other. He brings evidence from the law that if one did not father children at all, or if he fathered them and the children died (see Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer sec. 1:6), he has not fulfilled the commandment. He writes similarly there in sec. 14 as well.[7] This, however, we already rejected above.

In sec. 14 the Minchat Chinukh cites the question of the Turei Even on Rosh HaShanah 28a. There the Talmud explains that if someone was forced to eat matzah he has fulfilled the commandment of eating matzah. The Talmud there wonders who was forcing him, and raises the possibility that he was forced by a fit (= an epileptic seizure), and rejects it, since in such a case he does not fulfill the obligation, because an incompetent person is not subject to commandments, and fulfillment of the commandment at a time when he is exempt from it is ineffective. On this the Turei Even asks: how can a gentile who fathered children and then converted fulfill procreation and multiplication, when while he was still a gentile he was not at all obligated in P&R? The Minchat Chinukh writes there that in light of his remarks above there is no difficulty at all, since P&R is a commandment of result, and therefore if in fact the person has children he has fulfilled his duty. The rule that fulfilling commandments at a time of exemption is ineffective applies only to commandments of action (such as eating matzah) and not to commandments of result. In our case only the preparation for the commandment was done during the period of exemption.

Thus the view of the Minchat Chinukh is clear: the commandment of P&R is a commandment of result. The Turei Even, however, apparently understood differently. We will now bring further evidence that the matter is disputed, and that there are views that disagree with him.

The commandment of procreation and multiplication as a commandment of action: the view of the Tosafists

First, from the words of the Turei Even cited above it emerges that he apparently does not accept the opinion of the Minchat Chinukh, and in his view the commandment of procreation and multiplication is a commandment of action and not of result. Therefore, according to him, if the commandment was fulfilled at a time when the person was exempt from it, he does not fulfill his duty thereby (see there how he resolves the difficulty from the Rosh HaShanah passage about one who was forced to eat matzah).[8]

A source that clearly disagrees with the Minchat Chinukh is found in Tosafot, s.v. 'kofin,' Bava Batra 13a.[9] The Talmud there brings the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel regarding one who is half slave and half free:

An objection was raised: One who is half slave and half free works for his master one day and for himself one day, according to Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai say: you have remedied his master, but not himself. He cannot marry a slave-woman, and he cannot marry a free woman. Shall he remain idle? Was the world not created except for procreation, as it is said: "He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited"? Rather, we compel his master and make him fully free, and he writes a note for half his value. And Beit Hillel retracted and ruled like Beit Shammai.

The law is that such a slave cannot marry either a maidservant or a free woman, and therefore cannot fulfill the commandment of P&R. Beit Shammai argues that in such a case one compels his master to free him, and Beit Hillel later retracted and ruled likewise.

Now, as is well known, the rule in Jewish law is that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition. In light of this, Tosafot there asks:

We compel his master—if you ask: why do we compel him? Let the positive commandment of procreation come and override the prohibition of "There shall be no prostitute." Rabbenu Yitzḥak says: first, because at the time the prohibition is uprooted, the positive commandment is not yet fulfilled. The prohibition is transgressed from the initial stage of intercourse, whereas the positive commandment of procreation is fulfilled only at the completion of intercourse.

Tosafot asks: why not let the positive commandment of procreation and multiplication come and override the prohibition of 'there shall not be a prostitute'? It answers that a positive commandment overrides a prohibition only when the positive commandment is fulfilled at the same time as the prohibition is transgressed. Here the prohibition is transgressed at the initial stage of intercourse, whereas the positive commandment is fulfilled only at the completion of the act.

If the commandment of P&R were fulfilled in the result, as the Minchat Chinukh holds, the question would not even arise. Tosafot's answer too does not require the claim that this is a result-commandment. Therefore it clearly emerges from Tosafot that they understand the commandment of P&R to lie in the action and not in the result, for according to them the time of fulfillment of the commandment is the completion of intercourse and not the birth of the children.[10]

After writing all this, I saw that in Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer II sec. 18, it is written explicitly against the Minchat Chinukh, that the definition of the commandment concerns the action and not the result, and his proof is from this Tosafot (and he also explains this by the fact that the result is not in our hands):[11]

In my humble opinion, the matter may be resolved simply. It is not reasonable to say like the Minchat Chinukh that the commandment is not attached to the act. The act regarding which one is commanded in procreation is not the birth of the children, for that is not in his hands; rather, the commandment and obligation upon him are to have full intercourse with his wife in a way that may lead to children. Proof to this is Tosafot in Bava Batra 13a, s.v. 'We compel,' who write that from the moment of initial contact the prohibition is transgressed, but the positive commandment of procreation is not fulfilled until the completion of intercourse. Thus the completion of intercourse is considered fulfillment even though she has not yet conceived at all, because that is all that lies in his power to do. This obligation to have intercourse with his wife exists by virtue of procreation until a son and a daughter are born to him, at which point he is exempt. This also precisely fits the language of the Mishnah in Yevamot 61b, which does not say, 'How many children is a person obligated to father?' but rather, 'A man must not desist from procreation unless he has children'—meaning that the commandment of procreation incumbent upon him is intercourse, for only that is in his power, and he may not desist from it until he has children. Consequently, once he has children, even if they came from acts of intercourse he performed when he was not obligated—such as when he was a gentile or mentally incompetent, and he did not thereby fulfill a commandment in his acts—nevertheless we cannot obligate him again in this commandment, since he has children. The Torah did not impose this commandment on one who already has children, and he is therefore exempt, just like one who fulfilled procreation.

He too raises the difficulty from a convert who converted after fathering children, and explains that the existence of children is a condition for the commandment, and when there are children a state of exemption is created. We will now see the ramifications of this definition.

Intention: the view of Rabbi Zvi Elimelech of Dinov

As is well known, the tannaim disputed whether commandments require intention or not (see Eruvin 95b). Following them, the amoraim also disputed this (see Berakhot 13a, Rosh HaShanah 28b, and more), and later so did the decisors (see Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim sec. 60:4). The Minchat Chinukh there, sec. 29, explains that according to the opinions that commandments require intention, according to Tosafot it follows that in P&R too one needs intention in order to fulfill one's obligation, like all commandments of action. But according to his own view he writes that intention is not needed. The reason is that intercourse is only a preparation for the commandment, and a preparation for a commandment does not require intention (like building a sukkah or baking matzah). He does add that prima facie one would require intention when the son and daughter are born. But in the end he inclines to say that in a commandment where one does nothing and its fulfillment occurs automatically, intention is not needed in order to fulfill one's obligation. Thus, according to his claim, all agree that commandments of result do not require intention for fulfillment.

Now, in the book Derekh Pikudecha (sec. 1, beginning of the practical section and in introduction 1)[12] Rabbi Zvi Elimelech of Dinov cites the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer sec. 1, which wrote: 'Every man is obligated to marry a woman in order to be fruitful and multiply,' and he infers from this that a person must have intention, when marrying a woman, to fulfill the commandment of P&R.[13]

He further wrote there in positive commandment 1 (and see there also sec. 25):

For the law has been decided that Torah positive commandments require intention. And the nature of that intention is to intend to fulfill, through this act, the Creator's command. This intention is required immediately upon marrying a wife as a helpmate, and each time at the time of intercourse.

And in a commandment whose reason is explicit in the Torah, one is also obligated to intend that reason, and without it one does not fulfill the commandment. With this commandment too it says, "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth," but it is not in human power to fill the earth, and all that lies within one's choice is to make the effort by union with the helpmate.

It therefore appears that the explicit reason in the Torah is: I command you this in order to fill the world with worshippers of God. And even from the words "be fruitful and multiply" this too is apparent, for the Merciful One expressed this commandment in the language "be fruitful and multiply," even though that is not in human power. Many times people engage in union and labor in vain. The command should properly have been phrased, "Take a wife and have relations with her," because that is within human power and choice. Since it was expressed in the language "be fruitful and multiply," this is an explicit reason in the Torah, and one must have intention for this reason.

His claim is that the Torah's command 'be fruitful and multiply' is only a reason and not a command, since that result (= birth) is not at all in a person's hands. If so, it is clear that 'be fruitful and multiply' is not the command itself, but the reason for the commandment of betrothal; and the definition of the commandment is the act of intercourse. He adds there that wherever the reason is explicit in the verse, one must intend that reason in performing the commandment, and according to all views intention is indispensable.[14] Therefore he explains that the intention for P&R is indispensable within the commandment of betrothal according to all views (even according to those decisors who hold that commandments do not generally require intention).[15]

His view is thus that the commandment of P&R is a commandment of action and not of result (like Tosafot, against the Minchat Chinukh), even though he too agrees that the Torah is interested specifically in the result. For that reason he also writes explicitly that the intention required at the time of performing the commandment is intention in the action (in betrothal and intercourse). This fits what we said above, that the result is the reason of the verse and not the definition of the obligation.

He continues there and asks, by force of this principle (see Tur HaShalem there, note 30), about the law that a convert who converted and had children while still a gentile has fulfilled the commandment of P&R (at least if his children also converted), similar to the Turei Even's difficulty above. He claims that while he was still a gentile he did not intend the commandment, and therefore he could not have fulfilled his duty according to the views that commandments require intention.[16] He explains that this additional intention, beyond the intention to fulfill one's obligation (which is the ordinary intention of commandments), is not indispensable.

Let us note here that regarding the Turei Even's difficulty above, the Minchat Chinukh explained that since the commandment is a result-commandment, one can fulfill one's duty even if the preparation for the commandment was done during a period of exemption. So too one may answer the present difficulty similarly: result-commandments do not require intention, as the Minchat Chinukh wrote above (since the intercourse is only a preparation that does not require intention, and the birth of the children involves no act and therefore also requires no intention).

The passages in Bekhorot 47a

Prima facie, there is a source in the Talmud for viewing the commandment of P&R as a result-commandment. The Talmud in Bekhorot 47a brings two laws concerning the relationship between a gentile who converted and his children:

It was stated: If he had children while he was an idolater and then converted, Rabbi Yoḥanan says: he has no firstborn for inheritance, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says: he does have a firstborn for inheritance. Rabbi Yoḥanan says he has no firstborn for inheritance because he already had "the first of his strength," and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says he does have a firstborn for inheritance because a convert who converts is like a newborn child. And they follow their respective reasoning, for it was stated: If he had children while he was an idolater and then converted, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: he has fulfilled procreation, and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: he has not fulfilled it. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: he has fulfilled it, for "He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited." Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: he has not fulfilled procreation, because a convert who converts is like a newborn child.

The first law deals with the laws of inheritance regarding his sons after his conversion, and the second deals with the laws of procreation and multiplication. Immediately afterward, the Talmud performs a necessity-analysis between these two disputes:

And both were necessary. For if only the first had been stated, one might have said that there Reish Lakish says so because while he was an idolater those children were not subject to inheritance. But here, I might have said that he concedes to Rabbi Yoḥanan, because "He did not create it for emptiness; He formed it to be inhabited," and he has indeed inhabited the world. And if only this had been stated, I might have said that here Rabbi Yoḥanan says so, but there he would concede to Reish Lakish. Therefore both were necessary.

The Talmud says that if only the first dispute had been brought, we would have thought that the gentile son was not subject to inheritance while he was still a gentile, and therefore when the father converts, a son born later as a Jew would indeed inherit double as a firstborn (the gentile son who preceded him is not considered his son for that purpose). But with respect to P&R, we would have thought that Reish Lakish would concede to Rabbi Yoḥanan that he fulfilled the commandment, for in the end he already 'inhabited the world.'

Prima facie, the Talmud is saying that a gentile who converted fulfilled P&R because already in his gentile state he fulfilled that commandment, and thus one could preserve the conception that this is a commandment of action. The action of the commandment was done while he was a gentile. However, Tosafot, s.v. 've-ha,' there, writes about this:

And he has inhabited the world—in Yevamot 62 it is stated in another formulation, that from the outset gentiles are people of procreation, and it does not say people under obligation, for in Sanhedrin 59 it is proven that they are not commanded in procreation. Rather, it means that his offspring are genealogically attributed to him, and that is what is meant here by "he has inhabited the world." And regarding a slave it says in Yevamot 62 that all agree he has no lineage.

Tosafot states that a gentile is not obligated in P&R (because it is a commandment stated before Sinai and not repeated afterward), and therefore the meaning of the Talmud is that this is a result-commandment, as the Minchat Chinukh wrote above: he fulfills P&R because in the end he in fact has children who are genealogically related to him, even if their creation took place during a period of exemption.

A third possibility: between fulfilling a commandment and reaching a state of exemption

In the Chelkat Mechokek, Even HaEzer sec. 1 sec. 8, it is written that a woman who became pregnant in a bath from a man's semen and gave birth to a son or daughter thereby enabled the man to fulfill the commandment of P&R. He brings a proof for this from Sefer HaYiḥud (attributed to Rav Hamai Gaon), which wrote that Ben Sira was the son of the prophet Jeremiah by his wife, who conceived from him in a bath. Here there was no intention of a commandment, nor even an act of intercourse (the conception took place only indirectly). So too wrote the Beit Shmuel (there, sec. 10), who proved it from the Bach, Yoreh De'ah sec. 195, in the name of the Semak. See also the Taz, Even HaEzer sec. 1 sec. 8, who disputes the proof from his father-in-law (= the Bach).

This example of conception in a bath is a striking example of the conception of P&R as a result-commandment. Here no act at all was done, nor was there intention, and nevertheless the father fulfilled his obligation. The reason is that in the end he actually has a son, and that is the definition of the commandment.

Rabbi Ariel, in the responsa Ohalah Shel Torah, Even HaEzer sec. 69, cites the words of Rabbi Tzvi Pesach Frank, in Har Tzvi on the Tur, Even HaEzer sec. 1. Rabbi Frank resolves the Minchat Chinukh's question above: how can one fulfill one's obligation through a mamzer, when this is a commandment that comes through a transgression? He explains that one who fathers a mamzer indeed did not fulfill the commandment of procreation and multiplication, and will not receive reward for fulfillment of the commandment; but nevertheless he is exempted from the commandment of P&R. In practice he has a son who is related to him, and therefore there is no room to obligate him to bring another child into the world.[17]

He compares this to a gentile who had children while still a gentile and then converted. As we mentioned, according to most decisors a gentile is not obligated in P&R, and yet after conversion he has fulfilled the commandment. Above we proved from this that this is a result-commandment, but Rabbi Frank defines it differently: although there was no commandment-act here and he will not receive reward for fulfilling the commandment, in the end he actually has children related to him, and therefore there is no room to obligate him to bring more children into the world. He sees it as a commandment of action, except that once the desired result has been attained, the condition has been met and there is no further room to obligate the action.

Rabbi Ariel explains similarly the views of the Beit Shmuel and the Chelkat Mechokek just cited, that in a case of conception in a bath one fulfills the commandment of P&R. He asks: where was the intention here, given that even awareness that conception had occurred was absent?[18] According to his suggestion, the explanation is as Rabbi Frank said above: admittedly, the commandment of P&R was not fulfilled here, but in practice, since the result was attained, there is no room to obligate him to bring more children into the world. This may be compared to one who is born circumcised: even if we define the commandment as a commandment of action, there is still no sense in obligating him in circumcision in such a case, because the result already exists.

It seems that this is the required explanation of the language we saw above in the Talmud: 'that he inhabited the world.' That is, we exempt the gentile who converted from bringing additional children into the world because he has already inhabited the world. Admittedly, there is no actual fulfillment of the commandment here, but the desired state has already been created.

Prima facie, we have here a sharper definition of a result-commandment. But until now we understood that if a given commandment is defined as a result-commandment, then when the result is attained the commandment has been fulfilled, and there is even reward for that (perhaps less reward, since reward is according to the effort). Now, however, we distinguish between two different levels of fulfillment: 1. Fulfillment of the commandment (and receiving reward). 2. Discharge of one's obligation, or reaching a state of exemption. There are situations in which the commandment was not fulfilled, but the person's action brought him into a state in which he is exempt from the commandment. Fulfillment is attained only through the action, but one can reach exemption from the commandment through attaining the state, because the will of the Torah has in the end been realized.

Another example of such reasoning, from a different angle, is the Minchat Chinukh in commandment 325 sec. 10.[19] He brings Tosafot's difficulty: why is a special source needed to invalidate a stolen sukkah, and why is it not enough to say that this is a commandment that comes through a transgression? He explains that without the additional source we would think that eating in a stolen sukkah is still eating in a sukkah, and certainly is not considered eating outside the sukkah. The additional source invalidates the sukkah and turns eating in a stolen sukkah into eating outside the sukkah. Here too there is a situation in which the commandment was not fulfilled, but there is also no obligation to fulfill it (we are in a state of exemption).

Summary

Up to this point we have seen that there is a commandment of P&R imposed on the man, and the woman is at most expected to assist him. The commandment is to bring into the world a son and a daughter who are themselves capable of reproduction. We have stood on the importance and centrality of the commandment, and on two conceptions regarding its relation to the commandment of 'inhabiting the world': whether 'inhabiting the world' explains the essence of the commandment of P&R, or whether it is an additional rabbinic commandment, and there are opinions that in such a case it is also incumbent upon women. We saw that this may have implications for the conception of P&R itself, and we brought various sources showing that one can find three conceptions of the definition of the commandment: 1. A commandment of action (with the result as a condition). 2. A commandment of result (with the action being only the necessary effort, a preparatory device for the commandment). 3. A commandment of action that no longer applies once we have reached a state of exemption.

B. Canceling or postponing the obligation of procreation and multiplication

In this chapter we will discuss whether one may postpone or cancel the commandment of P&R. We will not enter here into questions of contraceptive methods (see the next chapter), and our assumption is that this is done without the prohibition of wasting seed. Likewise, we will not discuss postponement and cancellation for various medical reasons (though we will comment on that), since the question before us concerns canceling P&R because of economic constraints, career, or convenience.

Of course, one must distinguish here between a situation in which there is already a son and a daughter, that is, a state of exemption has been reached, and a situation in which the commandment has not yet been fulfilled. The matter will depend on whether there is a commandment of 'inhabiting the world' and what its nature is, and also on whether the commandment of P&R is a commandment of action or of result. Therefore we will divide the discussion into two separate parts: a case where the commandment has already been fulfilled, and a case where it has not yet been fulfilled.

Let us note that on this issue there are different approaches, some of them very stringent and some more lenient. Admittedly, the main discussions in the decisors concern cases of prevention for medical reasons, and the question of wasting seed, which we are not dealing with here. We will discuss the matter according to the sources surveyed above.

Primary sources

The Mishnah in Yevamot 61b states:

Mishnah: A man may not desist from procreation unless he has children.

And so too in the baraita on 63b that we saw:

It was taught: Rabbi Eliezer says, anyone who does not engage in procreation is as though he sheds blood… Rabbi Jacob says: as though he diminishes the divine image… Ben Azzai says: as though he sheds blood and diminishes the divine image…

All these formulations teach of an obligation to engage in the commandment, and not merely to fulfill it.

This also emerges from the language of Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh cited above. In sec. 1:1 the Shulchan Arukh writes:

Every man is obligated to marry a woman in order to be fruitful and multiply. And anyone who does not engage in procreation is as though he sheds blood, diminishes the divine image, and causes the Divine Presence to depart from Israel.

There is an obligation here to engage in P&R. In simple terms, that means there is no room to refrain from this 'engagement,' which would seem to render our whole discussion unnecessary.

It is unclear whether the obligation to engage in it derives from 'be fruitful and multiply' or from 'inhabiting the world,' and this will depend on the different understandings of these commandments. Prima facie these are formulations of a commandment of action rather than of a result-commandment, but as we saw it is possible that they nevertheless express a result-commandment, while the action is imposed on us only as a preparation for the commandment (because only that is in our hands). In any event, it certainly emerges from here that there is an obligation to engage in the commandment, at least rabbinically, or as a preparation for the commandment.

A case in which the commandment has not been fulfilled: when there is still no son and daughter

When the commandment has not yet been fulfilled, there is certainly an obligation to be fruitful and multiply to the best of our ability. Even so, one can raise two reservations here:

We saw that Ben Azzai exempted himself because his soul longed for Torah, and that this was also ruled in practice. Are there additional reasons that justify complete abstention from P&R?
Even if one cannot abstain entirely from the commandment, one must discuss whether its fulfillment may be postponed to a later time.

Relating to constraints: Ben Azzai's exemption

We saw above that Ben Azzai ruled that a person whose soul longed for Torah is exempt from P&R. These words were brought as law in the Shulchan Arukh, sec. 1:3-4:

3. It is a commandment for every man to marry at age eighteen, and one who marries at thirteen fulfills the ideal form of the commandment. But before thirteen he should not marry, for that is like promiscuity. In no case should he pass age twenty without a wife. If twenty years pass and he does not want to marry, the court compels him to marry in order to fulfill the commandment of procreation. However, if he is occupied with Torah and engrossed in it, and he fears marrying lest concern for his livelihood burden him and interrupt his Torah study, he may delay.

Gloss: Nowadays the custom is not to compel in this matter. Likewise, if one has not fulfilled procreation and comes to marry a woman who cannot bear children, such as a barren woman, an old woman, or a minor, because he desires her or because of her money, even though by law one ought to protest, for many generations it has not been the practice to be exacting in matters of matches. Even if he married a woman and remained with her ten years, the practice has not been to compel him to divorce her, even though he has not fulfilled procreation, and similarly in other matters of matches, provided she is not forbidden to him.

4. One whose soul longs for Torah, like Ben Azzai, constantly, and who cleaves to it all his days and does not marry a woman, incurs no sin, provided his inclination does not overpower him.

That is, there is a basic obligation to marry a woman. One may postpone it if it interferes with Torah study, at most until age twenty. After that, only if one's soul truly longs for Torah may he continue and be exempt entirely from P&R (admittedly, see Chelkat Mechokek there, sec. 5, who wrote that anyone may continue as long as he is learning and marriage interferes with him. But that is not the view of most decisors, and certainly not the plain meaning of the author of the Shulchan Arukh).

And so too we find in the Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah, laws of Torah study, sec. 246:2:

A person should study Torah and afterward marry a wife, for if he marries first he will not be able to engage in Torah, since a millstone will hang from his neck. If he cannot do without a wife because his inclination overpowers him, he should marry first.

That is, every person is advised to study Torah and only afterward to marry, because married life and establishing a household interfere with study. The ages are spelled out in Even HaEzer, in the law cited above.

These laws raise several fundamental difficulties:

What is unique about the commandment of Torah study, as opposed to other commandments?
What is unique about Ben Azzai? Marriage interferes with study for everyone, and yet we do not exempt everyone. Only one whose soul longs for Torah like Ben Azzai is exempt from P&R. What distinguishes such a state, and what is the basis of the exemption?

It is true that the commandment of Torah study is equal to all the commandments, as we find in the Mishnah in Pe'ah and at the end of the first chapter of Kiddushin: 'and Torah study is equal to them all.' On the other hand, in the Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah sec. 246:18, we find:

Torah study is equal to all the commandments. If one is faced with the performance of a commandment and Torah study, if the commandment can be performed by others he should not interrupt his study, and if not he should do the commandment and return to his Torah.

That is, Torah study is indeed equal to all the commandments, and yet when it conflicts with any passing commandment, that commandment overrides it. Why indeed is that the law?

The source for this law is the Talmud in Mo'ed Katan 9b:

They then sat and considered: It is written, "She is more precious than pearls, and all your desires cannot compare to her"—your personal desires cannot compare to her, but heavenly desires can compare to her. Yet it is also written, "And all desires cannot compare to her"—even heavenly desires cannot compare to her! The answer: here it speaks of a commandment that can be done by others, and there of a commandment that cannot be done by others.

The Talmud rules that a commandment that cannot be done by others overrides Torah study. And Tosafot, s.v. 'kan,' there, wrote:

Here it speaks of a commandment that cannot be done by others—performing the commandment is preferable, for even רבי שמעון בר יוחאי would interrupt for making a sukkah and taking a lulav, as appears in the Jerusalem Talmud. But for interruption for prayer and Shema, Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai does not interrupt, and in the Jerusalem Talmud it says: this one and that one were taught, and one does not interrupt repetition for repetition.

There is an opinion here that fulfilling a commandment overrides Torah study even for Rabbi Shimon bar Yoḥai, who resembles Ben Azzai; even he must stop to build a sukkah and the like. That is, there does not seem to be here any qualification for one whose soul longs for Torah.

Why, indeed, does an ordinary commandment override Torah study, which is equal to all the commandments? Moreover, the Meiri here asks that even one who is occupied with an ordinary commandment (not only with Torah study) is exempt from another commandment, so surely all the more so one occupied with Torah study should be exempt:

Although they said that one who is engaged in a commandment is exempt from another commandment, Torah study is not included in this. Rather, if one was engaged in Torah and a commandment came before him, if that commandment can be performed by others he need not interrupt for it. Do not answer from interrupting Torah for carrying out the dead or accompanying a bride, for those too are cases that cannot properly be done by others, since all are needed there to increase honor. But if it cannot be done by others—such as where there is no one fit for it except him, or it is a commandment incumbent on his own person, such as lulav, shofar, honoring parents, or burying an unattended corpse where there is no one else to bury it, and the like—the commandment takes precedence, and he interrupts Torah to fulfill it. The obligation is not removed from him by virtue of the fulfillment of Torah study, not even for a minor commandment. And although one engaged in a commandment is exempt from another commandment, this was not said of Torah study, because its essence is to know in order to fulfill the other commandments; therefore it is set aside for any commandment that cannot be fulfilled by others. Such is the way of the great commentators.

And some ask: but the same is true of other commandments, for in Kiddushin 32a they said: if his father said to him, "Give me water," and he has another commandment to do, if the commandment can be done by others, honoring his father comes first. The great commentators answered that Torah study needed a special teaching, because one might have thought that since its essence is the fulfillment of commandments, it should be interrupted for every commandment, even one that can be done by others. And later authorities explain that honoring his father is a passing moment, and if it were not a passing moment he could have postponed it for the commandment even if it could be done by others. But Torah study, even though it is not a passing moment, is not left in order to fulfill a commandment that can be done by others, because within Torah study every moment is a passing moment. If the commandment cannot be done by others, Torah study is set aside even though its time is passing.

He explains that Torah study too is a passing commandment, since the hour I lost will not return. Even so, fulfillment of any other commandment that cannot be performed by others overrides it, because the value of Torah study is that we should carry out the commandments (to study in order to do), and if study prevents us from doing, it loses its significance. Therefore specifically with respect to Torah study, despite its great importance, it is displaced before any other commandment.

At this point our difficulty only sharpens: why is the commandment of P&R exceptional, such that it is displaced before Torah study? And even if it can be delayed, since one could view it as a commandment that can also be fulfilled later (although that is not clear, since the result is not in one's hands), it is still not clear why Ben Azzai can be exempt from it entirely.

One might explain that Ben Azzai, who always engaged in Torah, from his perspective Torah study was itself like a passing commandment, since he could not recover the hour he lost. By contrast, an ordinary person who does not study all the time can make it up later. But this is a forced explanation, since every person reduces the value of his study because of the distractions involved in establishing and maintaining a household.

Therefore, it seems to me that this should be explained differently,[21] and I will begin with an example. As is known, the Maharik in root 167 ruled that a person is not obligated to obey his parents regarding the choice of a spouse. These words were brought as law in the Rema, Yoreh De'ah sec. 240:25:

Gloss: Likewise, if a father objects to his son marrying a certain woman whom the son desires, the son need not listen to the father.

Prima facie, this follows from the rule that if one's parents tell him to violate Torah law, he may not listen to them. But closer study of the Maharik there, sec. 3, shows that another rationale also appears in his words:

As to what you asked, whether a father has the power to prevent his son from marrying a woman whom the son desires—in my humble opinion, if she is suitable for him, the father has no power to prevent the son. First, for even regarding money the Sages conceded that the obligation comes from the father's resources, and so all the halakhic decisors I have seen ruled. All the more so here, where the matter involves bodily distress—to leave the woman he desires and be forced to take another woman who is not as pleasing in his eyes. Moreover, it seems close to my mind to be like commanding him to violate the Torah, for our Sages said that it is forbidden for a man to betroth a woman until he sees her, though nowadays this was permitted lest another precede him, as Tosafot and the decisors wrote. This shows that they were careful that he take a woman whom he desires and who finds favor in his eyes. And in several places the Sages were concerned to make a wife beloved to her husband.

And Rabbenu Asher already replied that if a father commands his son not to speak with a certain person and not to forgive him for what was done to him until a fixed time, if the son wishes to make peace, he need not heed his father's command, because it is forbidden to hate any Jew, as brought in the Tur, Yoreh De'ah. Here too it is no different in my humble opinion, since there is in the matter at least a trace of sin, as I explained above.

I think his intention is that there is a limit to the force of the obligation of honoring parents. When the matter concerns substantial harm to the way the son wants to live his life, the parents have no authority to command him, even were this not a matter of commandment at all. The same holds for the Rosh's case, in which parents command a person not to speak with someone. There too one might say there is no duty to obey them even apart from the prohibition involved, because this is interference in an area not subject to their control. A person is not obligated to give up substantive elements of his life in order to honor parents. This is the a fortiori argument the Maharik makes from the fact that honoring parents comes from their money and not his own, to the law of taking a wife.

The same is true with respect to various rights a person has, such as the right over his own property, or the right to form relationships, or the right to choose a career as he wishes, and not only with respect to halakhic or moral values. All these are possible boundaries that delimit the territory of commandments such as honoring parents from within. Limiting a commandment by force of collision with an opposing value is an external limitation. But here we encounter internal limitations, that is, limitations arising from the very definition of the commandment of honoring parents itself. Parenthetically, I would say that perhaps even the prohibition of listening to parents when they command me to commit a transgression stems from the same principle (and not from an external clash between two opposing normative forces). The command to commit a transgression, like the command to change something substantial in my way of life, lies outside the legitimate territory of parents.

One may perhaps say that so too in our case. A person whose soul longs for Torah – that is the way he wants to live his life. For that reason he was permitted not to marry a woman, because doing so would alter his whole form of life. Note well: the consideration here is not based on the importance of Torah study, but on the meaning and importance of study for that specific individual. That is also the language of the Talmud: Ben Azzai 'his soul longed for Torah.' The Talmud did not use a formulation about the importance of the commandment of Torah study. Ben Azzai's uniqueness lies in the decision to devote his life to Torah, without necessary connection to the importance of the commandment of Torah study as such. Therefore this applies only to Ben Azzai, and not to every learner.[22]

Admittedly, it is very plausible that if the matter had no value in itself, that is, if this were merely a subjective whim of some person, the Sages would not have permitted him to refrain from the commandment of P&R (just as with honoring parents above). But since we are dealing with a value that is worthy in itself (or with a legitimate right, such as ownership of property), then even if in itself it is not more important than the commandment standing opposite it, it nevertheless overrides it. The meaning of this is that a person has the right to intensify a given value and place it above other values, and thereby alter their usual halakhic order of importance. Of course, this does not apply with respect to every commandment (a person cannot eat pork even if he dedicates his life to researching the lives of pigs), but rather according to what we have received and according to common sense.

In light of this, there is room to understand Ben Azzai's words differently from the usual understanding: on the one hand, he greatly intensifies the importance of the commandment of P&R, and rules that one who does not engage in it is both as though shedding blood and diminishing the divine image. At the same time, he also rules that if one's soul longs for Torah, he is exempt even from so lofty a value. His purpose is to point to the mechanism of limiting the commandment of P&R from within, that is, by force of territorial considerations, and not limiting it from without (because of the importance of Torah study). Therefore he uses the language that one's soul longs for Torah, instead of bringing the expected rationale that Torah study is equal to all. This is also why this permission is unique to Ben Azzai, even though marriage harms the study of every person. The displacement of P&R is not because of injury to study, but because of injury to something essential in the lifestyle I have chosen for myself. That exists only for Ben Azzai, and not for others.

After writing all this, I saw that similar formulations appear among several later authorities, except that usually their words concern only postponing the commandment and not canceling it, as we proposed here. See Maharit, Yoreh De'ah sec. 47; Shulchan Arukh HaRav, Kuntres Acharon 1; Ha'amek She'elah, Bereishit, She'ilta 5 sec. 4; Kovetz He'arot, Yevamot 70. See also She'iltot, Emor, She'ilta 103, cited in Tosafot Avodah Zarah 13a. Their words suggest that Torah study overrides P&R because this is a lifelong commandment (like Torah study), and its very stringency is its leniency. Since it is relevant throughout life, it has no special time, and therefore it is displaced and postponed before a passing commandment. According to our approach, there may perhaps be room to explain Ben Azzai's exemption similarly.

There are considerations indicating that the Sages and the decisors themselves treat the commandment of P&R in a qualified and not sweeping way. For example, the Shulchan Arukh in sec. 1:3 writes:

It is a commandment for every man to marry at age eighteen, and one who marries at thirteen fulfills the ideal form of the commandment, but before thirteen he should not marry, for that is like promiscuity. In no case should he pass age twenty without a wife. If twenty years pass and he does not want to marry, the court compels him to marry in order to fulfill the commandment of procreation. However, if he is engaged in Torah and engrossed in it, and he fears marrying lest concern for his livelihood burden him and interrupt his Torah study, he may delay. Gloss: Nowadays the custom is not to compel in this matter. Likewise, if one has not fulfilled procreation and comes to marry a woman who cannot bear children, such as a barren woman, an old woman, or a minor, because he desires her or because of her money, even though by law one ought to protest, for many generations it has not been the practice to be exacting in matters of matches. Even if he married a woman and remained with her ten years, the practice has not been to compel him to divorce her, even though he has not fulfilled procreation, and similarly in other matters of matches, provided she is not forbidden to him.

We see here that the commandment does not begin at age thirteen like other commandments, but at a later age (see Maimonides, Hilkhot Ishut 15:2, who sets it at age seventeen). The commentaries (see Chelkat Mechokek and Beit Shmuel there) indeed ask why this commandment is exceptional and does not begin at the usual age of majority. They explain that the postponement is due to the commandment of Torah study. But according to our approach the answer is simpler: a person is not mature for marriage at a younger age, and therefore he was not obligated. The parameters of the commandment are not formal but are determined in light of additional constraints and in light of the normal way of life.[23] If so, it seems simple that other considerations too may be taken into account in this context.

Another example is found in Maimonides, at the beginning of chapter 15 of Hilkhot Ishut, who wrote:

If a woman, after marriage, authorizes her husband to abstain from her conjugal rights, this is permitted. In what case is this so? When he already has children and has fulfilled the commandment of procreation. But if he has not fulfilled it, he must have intercourse at every conjugal interval until he has children, because it is a Torah positive commandment, as it is said: "Be fruitful and multiply."

Maimonides ties the commandment of P&R to the commandment of conjugal duty. The later authorities (see Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer III sec. 28, and Ha'amek She'elah, She'ilta 164 sec. 1) asked: why should a person not make the effort to have intercourse every day until he fulfills the commandment (like the frequency assigned to travelers of leisure)? In other words: how was a person permitted to become a sailor, whose conjugal intervals are distant, and not required instead to engage in a livelihood that would allow intercourse every day? They answer this, each in his own way.

But according to our approach the matter is simple (and something close to this was written by Iggerot Moshe there), since the Torah does not obligate a person to depart from a reasonable way of life. The commandment of P&R is not a formal commandment; it is meant to fit within the framework of ordinary life and not to disrupt it. For that reason they attached the commandment to conjugal duty, despite the fact that, as the Maggid Mishneh notes there on Maimonides himself, there is no essential connection between them. As stated, other considerations of normal life are certainly no worse, and therefore it seems that they too may be taken into account.

As stated, all these are considerations that concern postponing the commandment and not canceling it, but perhaps from them one can also learn regarding cancellation, at least in extreme cases. The matter still requires a decision.

To summarize, according to our suggestion there are two laws regarding postponing P&R because of Torah study: postponing marriage and the commandment of P&R as long as one is studying Torah (until age twenty) derives from the importance of study. Ben Azzai's postponement is a different law, and its point is the territorial delimitation of the commandment of P&R because of the lifestyle a person chooses for himself.

It seems that the matter depends on the two understandings we presented above regarding the commandment of P&R. If we see the commandment as a result-commandment, then there is more room to postpone it and wait for the result until later (see below regarding postponement and the law of coercion on the last day). But if it is a commandment of action, then refraining from it for such considerations is less plausible. We bear an obligation to keep trying all the time until we fulfill the commandment. Even so, one can also view the duty of effort as itself subject to postponement, at least in the formulation we saw among later authorities: we are dealing with effort within the framework of a normal lifestyle, and not obsessive effort every moment.

To sum up, the meaning of all this for us is that there may be situations in which substantial considerations justify canceling the commandment of P&R, if its fulfillment would harm in a very extreme way the shape in which I have decided to live my life. Admittedly, this still requires more grounding here, since the thesis presented here is only a suggestion. Moreover, this permission certainly depends on how positive that way of life is, how acute it is for the couple's life, and how much fulfillment of P&R would actually harm it. Therefore it is difficult to rely on this reasoning with respect to canceling the positive commandment of P&R, except in very extreme cases. Still, as we saw and will further see below, this argument can serve as a more significant rationale in simpler questions, such as postponing P&R to a later time, and certainly in the question of bringing additional offspring after one already has a son and a daughter.

Spending one-fifth of one's assets on the commandment of P&R, constraints, and bodily suffering

Although for some reason I did not find explicit treatment of this point, one should note here another aspect that touches on canceling the commandment of P&R.

Jewish law rules that one should not spend on the commandment of charity more than one-fifth of one's assets ('one who gives generously should not give more than one-fifth'; see Ketubot 50a and parallels). Now the Rema in Orach Chayim sec. 656 writes (see Beit Yosef there for the sources of the law):

Gloss: One who has no etrog, or some other time-sensitive commandment, need not spend a vast amount on it, as they said: one who spends generously should not spend more than one-fifth, even for a time-sensitive commandment. And this is specifically for a positive commandment; but for a prohibition, one must give all his money before transgressing.

That is, the decisors expand the words of the Talmud to positive commandments in general, and rule that one should not spend more than one-fifth of one's property on a single positive commandment, even if the commandment is time-sensitive.

Now we must remember that fulfillment of the commandment of P&R is a positive commandment, and as such it would seem that it too is subject to the halakhic limitation that one should not spend more than one-fifth of one's assets on it. If a couple is in difficult financial condition, there is certainly room to take that into account as well.

It might be argued that this commandment by its very nature requires financial investment, and that is not what the Torah was speaking about. Similar to what the Minchat Chinukh writes, that in the commandment of war one does not apply considerations of danger to life because that is part of the very definition of the commandment. But in my best judgment the cases are not comparable, since raising a child is not necessarily bound up with such significant expenses, at least not for a couple in a reasonable financial situation.

And I found in Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer IV sec. 32 (whose language is brought in full below), that he wrote:

Therefore, not only when she is ill and pregnancy is difficult for her, in which case he certainly cannot compel her; even when it is difficult for him for some reason and not for her—for example, he is by nature a weak man and it is hard for him to work enough to cover the increased expenses, and the like—it would seem that by law he should be permitted. Nevertheless, in this case he ought to trust in God that He will provide ample sustenance even when there are many sons and daughters, and one should not permit him to refrain from procreation, for certainly from Heaven livelihood is prepared for all that he will beget. But when it is difficult for her, one may permit them.

Prima facie, he distinguishes between constraints of bodily suffering and economic constraints, and he does not permit taking economic constraints into account with respect to the commandment of P&R. Yet anyone who studies his words there will see that he is not speaking about a legal prohibition, but about proper religious conduct (that is, it is proper to trust in God, but this is not a legal obligation). One should remember, however, that his words concern the obligation of 'inhabiting the world,' and not one who has not yet fulfilled the commandment of P&R itself. It follows that with respect to such a person he gives no permission at all, and as a matter of law. But, as stated, his words require examination because of the principle of not spending more than one-fifth on positive commandments. It may be that he is speaking about mere apprehensions, and not about a realistic assessment of the future (see regarding this Rabbi Yigal Ariel's article cited above, ch. 6). Regarding reliance on future assessment, see further discussion below.

At this point it is worth adding that one may compare severe non-economic distress, and certainly bodily suffering (as in the Iggerot Moshe quoted above), and say that it is no less significant than a financial burden of one-fifth of one's property. In the absence of clear criteria, perhaps one can assess non-economic constraints in the following way: how much would a person be willing to pay in order to avoid this distress? If the answer reaches one-fifth of his assets, there may be room to permit canceling P&R in such a case.

It is true that before making a decision in such a matter one should consult and think very carefully, because it is possible that the distress is part of a deficiency in fear of Heaven. If the couple understands how important and central the commandment is, they may evaluate their distress differently. But in the economic sense the decision seems simpler, because there we have a sharp and easily assessed line. Admittedly, the decisors already wrote that if a person can bear a higher expenditure in light of his financial condition, he may be stringent with himself, and it therefore seems that here too blessing comes upon one who is stringent.

Let us add another important point. The woman's suffering is even more significant, primarily because she herself is not commanded in P&R (except perhaps in 'inhabiting the world,' and even that does not appear in Maimonides or the Shulchan Arukh). True, she is commanded to assist her husband in fulfilling the commandment, but fulfillment of the husband's commandment at the expense of his spouse is not justified when the price she pays is high. I later saw that this is what the author of Minchat Yitzchak V sec. 113 writes:

If she was forced to prevent him from marital relations for a period of time, by doctors' orders because of weakness and exhaustion, he has no claim against her at all, even if he has not fulfilled procreation. Why should her own case be worse than his own, for it is stated there… everything according to his strength… If so, the woman's commandment, which is only because she assists the husband, certainly cannot be greater than his. Therefore, where she makes use of a sterilizing potion for a time, with respect to her obligation toward him this is certainly no worse than not having relations with him at all.

And similar words are found in Meshekh Chokhmah, Genesis 9:7, where he explains why women were exempted from the commandment of P&R:

"Be fruitful and multiply…" It is not far-fetched to say that the reason the Torah exempted women from procreation and obligated only men is because the laws of God and His ways are "ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace," and the Torah did not impose on the Jew what the body cannot bear… Therefore women, who are endangered by pregnancy and childbirth—and for that reason they said death is common there—were not commanded by the Torah to be fruitful and multiply. For that reason too she is permitted to drink a sterilizing potion, as in the story of Judith the wife of Rabbi Ḥanina at the end of Yevamot. Rather, for the preservation of the species, nature implanted in her a stronger desire to bear children than in a man. Thus we find Rachel saying, "Give me children, or else I am dead." This explains the statement of Rav Yosef in Yevamot 65b, that women are not commanded in procreation from the verse "I am God Almighty; be fruitful and multiply," and not from "Be fruitful and multiply." For with Adam and Eve, who were blessed before the sin, when childbirth entailed no pain, both were commanded in procreation, and therefore He said to them, "Be fruitful and multiply." But after the sin, when childbirth involved pain and often danger—as they said, when a woman crouches to give birth she jumps and swears she will never again submit herself to her husband; therefore the Torah said she should bring a sacrifice—therefore with Noah, although it is written "And He said to them, Be fruitful and multiply," קודם it says "And He blessed Noah and his sons," but does not mention their wives, because they are not included in the commandment of procreation. And with Jacob it says "be fruitful and multiply" in the singular, and this is correct. The Maharsha in Sanhedrin 58 left this with 'it can be explained,' but intended this, and consider it carefully.

If she is obligated to assist her husband, then what did the Torah gain by exempting her? Necessarily, the obligated husband must take his wife's suffering into account, especially since she herself is not obligated, and he cannot fulfill his obligations at her expense. That is why the Torah exempted her from this obligation.

Preventing P&R because of future assessment: 'What have you to do with the hidden counsels of the Merciful One?'

The questions we raised earlier concern considerations that depend on assessment of the future. This leads us to Berakhot 10a, where the visit of Isaiah to the sick King Hezekiah, who stood before death, is described:

What is the meaning of "for you shall die and not live"? "You shall die"—in this world; "and not live"—in the world to come. He said to him: Why all this? He said to him: Because you did not engage in procreation. He said to him: Because I saw through the holy spirit that unworthy sons would come from me. He said to him: What have you to do with the hidden counsels of the Merciful One? What you are commanded to do, you must do; and what is pleasing before the Holy One, blessed be He, let Him do.

Isaiah tells him that death was decreed upon him because he had not engaged in P&R. Hezekiah's consideration was that he saw through divine inspiration that wicked sons would emerge from him, and he therefore preferred to refrain from P&R. To this Isaiah says: 'What have you to do with the hidden counsels of the Merciful One?' – that is, it is not for him to reckon the Holy One's calculations, and if the commandment of P&R is imposed upon him, he must engage in it without such calculations.

One may discuss what the basis of their dispute was. Hezekiah thought one may refrain from P&R if it will cause harm. Isaiah could answer him in two ways: 1. Accept his halakhic premise but reject his deterministic assessment of the future: to argue that it is not certain that it will indeed cause harm. 2. Reject his halakhic premise and say that even if it will cause harm in the future, he is still obligated to fulfill the commandment.

Hezekiah now turns to him and asks that he give him his daughter, and perhaps good sons will in the end emerge from him:

He said to him: Now give me your daughter; perhaps my merit and your merit together will cause worthy sons to come from me. He said to him: A decree has already been decreed against you. He said to him: Son of Amotz, finish your prophecy and leave! Thus I have received from the house of my father's father: Even if a sharp sword rests upon a person's neck, he should not withhold himself from mercy.

Isaiah tells him that a decree has already been issued, and in simple terms the intention is that a decree has been issued that the sons will be wicked. If so, it is clear that Isaiah's argument was not that the foreseen future is not necessarily true, but a halakhic claim: one must not refrain from P&R because of considerations regarding the character of one's offspring.

Rashi here, however, did not explain it that way:

A decree has been decreed—that you will die.

We see that he sensed the double meaning and took care not to explain that the decree concerned the character of the sons. The decree was that he would die. It seems that according to Rashi one should punctuate the Talmud differently: 'worthy sons' ends that exchange. Afterward a new discussion begins, regarding death, and it continues onward. I later saw that the Maharsha in Ḥiddushei Aggadot here sensed this and reinforced Rashi's interpretation from the continuation of the passage.

In any event, according to Rashi it is still possible to understand that the character of the sons was not entirely fixed by the decree. Evidence for this is Hezekiah's request that Isaiah give him his daughter as a wife, and by the merit of both of them different sons might emerge.

Hezekiah's answer is that one may not despair of mercy, but it is unclear whether one must not despair of healing (as Rashi apparently understands it), or of changing the decree regarding the sons (according to our suggestion; see Maharsha there, who rejects this). The continuation of the Talmud implies that the intention is the decree of death, since Hezekiah's practical conclusion was to pray that he should live:

It was also stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan and Rabbi Eleazar both said: Even if a sharp sword rests upon a person's neck, he should not withhold himself from mercy, as it is said: "Though He slay me, yet will I hope in Him." Rabbi Ḥanan said: Even if the master of dreams tells a person that tomorrow he will die, he should not withhold himself from mercy, as it is said: "For in the multitude of dreams and vanities and many words—rather fear God." Immediately: "And Hezekiah turned his face to the wall and prayed to the Lord."

Thus the conclusion is that one should not make such calculations when deciding whether one may refrain from P&R. It is possible, however, that this is only where the character of the sons is not entirely fixed, that is, where the future assessment is not certain. Moreover, here the future assessment rests on prophecy and not on a realistic evaluation (see further below).

The Meiri here sums up the passage as follows:

With respect to the positive commandment of procreation, a person should not set it aside on the ground that he suspects that he or his mate will not produce worthy offspring—whether based on received tradition, reason, or experience—for a person has nothing to do with God's hidden counsels, as they said, "What have you to do with the hidden counsels of the Merciful One?" Nevertheless, one should do his utmost in choosing a spouse as one ought, so that it appears he intends in his marriage to bring forth worthy children, as they warned about examining her brothers, marrying the daughter of a Torah scholar, and the like.

His words too can bear the two meanings mentioned above, though his language somewhat suggests that Isaiah's argument was that the future is not really fully fixed, and not the halakhic argument. That is, he accepts Hezekiah's halakhic claim: if it were indeed known that the children would turn out wicked, there would be justification not to fulfill P&R. As we noted above, Rashi's words indicate that this applies even in a case where the future is not entirely certain.

We must now ask whether an ordinary person may refrain from P&R on the basis of an assessment that his children will turn out to be unworthy. If divine inspiration is not enough for this, then ordinary human estimates and calculations presumably are certainly not enough. Yet if we understand Isaiah to have argued that the future is not certain, it is possible that ordinary human assessment would be better than divine inspiration. Divine inspiration predicts what is likely to happen absent choice and divine intervention. But human assessments serve us in every field, and there is no reason to assume they will not come true. Moreover, it may be that specifically on a realistic assessment one may rely, whereas on prophecy one may not (something like the rule that 'it is not in heaven').

One must also ask whether a person may refrain from P&R because of the consideration that perhaps he will not be able to support his children at a reasonable economic level. Here this seems even less plausible, for if wickedness is not a sufficient reason, then financial condition certainly is not. On the other hand, the economic condition reflects on the rest of the family as well, and perhaps for that reason it is a legitimate consideration. By contrast, the character of the children in itself is not a justified reason to refrain from P&R, since it concerns mainly those same children under discussion, and with respect to them one may not enter into calculations that belong to the hidden counsels of Heaven. Moreover, economic considerations are legitimate, for if I fall into economic ruin I have not thereby settled the world. By contrast, the character of the children is not a legitimate consideration that is imposed upon me to weigh.

Again I saw that the decisors already addressed this and wrote similar things. Maharshal, in Yam Shel Shlomo, ch. 4 sec. 6, wrote:

If her children are not following an upright path, and she fears that she will raise more such offspring, she has permission (to drink a sterilizing potion).

Admittedly, he is speaking of a case where P&R has already been fulfilled (for there are already offspring), but note that he even permits drinking a sterilizing potion, which may involve a prohibition of wasting seed. When one merely refrains from intercourse at the time of ovulation, that may well be easier (see below).

I again found in Sefer Ḥasidim sec. 376, which wrote:

If a man takes a wife whose brothers and mother are wicked and not kindhearted, it is presumably known that the offspring will be bad; about such a case it was not said, "What have you to do with the hidden counsels of the Merciful One?"

Even if one does not accept his worldview, which derives the character of offspring from their mother's brothers or family in a deterministic way (and the decisors have already written that today this is not correct), we still see that a realistic assessment can be taken into account with respect to P&R, and it does not fall under the rubric of the hidden counsels of Heaven.

There is room to connect this entire discussion too to the question whether the commandment of P&R is a commandment of action or a commandment of result. Hezekiah's whole consideration seems to be based on the fact that this is a result-commandment. He argues that the expected result is not positive, and therefore he is exempt from the commandment. One can sharpen this even more by claiming that if we see the essence of P&R as 'settling the earth,' that is, effectively the commandment of 'inhabiting the world,' then there is room to argue as Hezekiah did, that settling the earth with wicked people is not a worthy goal.

The question is: what does Isaiah answer him? Does he argue that the commandment concerns the action, not the result (which belongs to the hidden counsels of Heaven, and, as we saw, is also in God's hands and not ours)? Or does he argue that the commandment indeed concerns the result, but divine inspiration is not fully reliable in predicting outcomes? Alternatively, he could argue that even if the commandment is result-oriented, the character of the children still does not exempt one from carrying it out (settling the earth is not only with righteous people but with any human beings; our task is to see that it not remain desolate).

In this context it is proper to refer here to the remarkable Talmudic passage at the end of the third chapter of Bava Batra (60b):

It was taught: Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha said: Since the day the Temple was destroyed, strict law would require that we decree upon ourselves not to eat meat and not to drink wine, but we do not impose a decree on the public unless most of the public can endure it. And since the wicked kingdom spread, imposing upon us evil and harsh decrees, nullifying Torah and commandments for us, and not allowing us to enter a week of celebration for a son—and some say: a son's salvation feast—strict law would require that we decree upon ourselves not to marry and not to have children, and thus the seed of Abraham our father would cease on its own. But leave Israel alone: better that they remain inadvertent than become deliberate transgressors.

That is, in a place and time in which commandments cannot be kept, strict law would seem to dictate decreeing upon Israel not to fulfill P&R, and the seed of Abraham would then perish by itself. The Talmud rejects this conclusion on a technical ground: 'better that they remain inadvertent sinners than deliberate ones.' Prima facie, then, the conclusion itself is correct; only the public would not be able to endure it.

One should add that the Talmud's terminology seems imprecise, for as long as no decree was issued against P&R there is no prohibition here at all. So why is one who violates this called 'inadvertent'? The correct formulation should have been that they did not issue the decree because the public could not bear it. Therefore it seems clear that the meaning of the Talmud is that this is a Torah-level principle and not a rabbinic decree. Torah law itself is that where commandments cannot be kept, there is no commandment of P&R. That is the meaning of 'to be inhabited': that the earth be populated by servants of God and observers of His commandments (and not by the wicked, as with Hezekiah's expected sons). It is now clear that the Talmud is explaining that the Sages did not reveal this to the public so that they should remain only inadvertent rather than deliberate.[24]

In any case, it appears from here that a realistic assessment of the future can be a justified reason for refraining from P&R. These considerations may be relevant with respect to preventing pregnancy where there is a realistic concern (based on medical assessment) that ill children will be born, though that is not our subject here.

Postponing P&R to a later date

When dealing with the question whether one may postpone fulfillment of the commandment of P&R to a later time, we enter into the broader issue of postponing commandments generally. First, there is the whole collection of rules (most of them quite similar to one another, and there is no need here to enter the distinctions among them): delaying a commandment, the principle that the zealous perform commandments early, one should not pass over commandments, when a commandment comes to your hand do not let it become leavened, a commandment is beloved in its proper time, and so on. All these are rules concerning all commandments, and they establish the duty to perform the commandment immediately when its time arrives. Some commentators explain these rules out of concern lest the commandment ultimately not be carried out. But there is certainly also here an expression of fondness for commandments and the duty to hurry in fulfilling our obligations.

Admittedly, the halakhic status of all these duties is not completely unequivocal. They are not literally positive commandments in their own right, but rules and principles as to how one should relate to positive commandments. And indeed some decisors wrote that these principles are set aside where various constraints are present (see, for example, Sdei Chemed, B 149a and D 114b; Ḥazon Ish, Yoreh De'ah sec. 153 sec. 5, and more). It is important to understand that postponement is not cancellation, since canceling the commandment of P&R is a transgression of neglecting a positive commandment, whereas postponement is only a violation of those principles, and that is obviously lighter.

It is true, however, that such postponement should take into account the possibility that in the end we may become prevented and fail in fulfilling the commandment itself, in which case there is an actual neglect of a positive commandment (in most cases postponement does not endanger fulfillment itself, except perhaps by forgetfulness).

Even so, one must discuss more generally the question of coercion itself: if a person postponed and delayed the commandment, thereby perhaps violating the principles mentioned above, and in the end was prevented and did not fulfill it at all, is he considered coerced or not? This brings us to the issue of 'coercion on the last day,' which I will mention here only briefly.

Much ink has already been spilled on the issue of coercion on the last day. The source is the Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah, in the laws of vows, sec. 232:12, in the Rema:

One who swore or vowed to do something within a year, or on a certain day, should do it immediately, or in the morning when that day arrives, lest he later forget and fail to do it and thereby violate his vow or oath. But if he did not do it immediately, saying, "I still have time to do it," and later forgot or was prevented and did not do it, some say that this is considered coercion. And some say that it is not considered coercion.

From the Rema's opening words it appears that according to all views one ought to hurry and fulfill the commandment at the beginning of the period, because of concern that in the end he may forget and it will not be done (in our case, the concern is weightier, since we are not dealing with forgetfulness but with the fear that they will not succeed in establishing offspring).

The reason for the duty to hurry, brought at the beginning of the Shulchan Arukh's words, is apparently the cluster of laws mentioned above. Later in his words a dispute is brought regarding the law after the fact: if he did not do so and was later prevented, is this considered coercion or not?

Here the matter is presented as a dispute between the Agudah (also cited by the Beit Yosef, sec. 204), who held that this is not coercion, and the Nimukei Yosef (and not the Ran), who held that it is coercion.[25] Let us note that this question too may depend on the two conceptions presented above. If the commandment of P&R is a result-commandment, then the person is coerced regarding the result. But if it is a commandment of action, then regarding the action he was not coerced, but only during part of the time.

In any event, the Taz there, sec. 19, rejected the Agudah's view and ruled like the Nimukei Yosef; see also Sha'arei Teshuvah there sec. 6, who brought further proofs for the Taz's ruling. Thus, as a matter of law, coercion on the last day is coercion.

Let us now look at the laws of postponement as they appear in the halakhah itself. Maimonides in Hilkhot Ishut 15:1 writes:

If a woman, after marriage, authorizes her husband to abstain from her conjugal rights, this is permitted. In what case? When he already has children and has fulfilled the commandment of procreation. But if he has not fulfilled it, he must have intercourse at every conjugal interval until he has children, because this is a positive commandment of the Torah, as it is said: "Be fruitful and multiply."

These words were copied as law in the Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer sec. 76:6. It is proved from them that as long as the commandment has not been fulfilled, there is an obligation to have intercourse with one's wife at every designated conjugal interval (which is set for each type of person, and in general is at least once a week at the permitted times; see Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer sec. 76, and Orach Chayim sec. 240:1).

Above we already noted that the connection between the commandment of P&R and the obligation of conjugal duty is not clear, for conjugal duty is an obligation of the man toward his wife, whereas P&R is a commandment toward Heaven. Some later authorities wanted to infer from here that Maimonides sees the two commandments as one, that is, that the commandment of conjugal duty is also part of the commandment of P&R, since all betrothal is an instrument for P&R. In other words: a person is obligated to behave in a marital way in order to fulfill the commandment of P&R. Yet the Maggid Mishneh there already writes that from Maimonides himself it can be seen that there is no connection between the commandments (for there is a duty of conjugal relations even after fulfillment of P&R). Others distinguished between these two laws (see Maggid Mishneh there, Rosh Ketubot ch. 1 sec. 12, Meromei Sadeh Pesaḥim 72b, Ha'amek She'elah, She'ilta 165 sec. 1, and more).

Above we suggested another explanation of the words of the Shulchan Arukh and Maimonides. There is indeed no direct connection between the two commandments, but the obligation of effort for P&R is according to how much one can do within the framework of one's normal life. The commandment of conjugal duty determines how much the woman requires her husband under the laws of their marital relationship, and therefore the Sages ruled that the duty of P&R tracks the duty of conjugal relations. We also saw there that postponing P&R because of a passing commandment (according to Maharit, Ha'amek She'elah, Kovetz He'arot, and others), and perhaps also because of normal lifestyle, is possible.

In light of our remarks above, it is important to note that in any case the obligation to have intercourse with one's wife at every conjugal interval is not itself a simple fulfillment of the commandment of P&R, for if he postpones it and in the end is coerced, that is considered coercion regarding this (coercion on the last day). And likewise conversely, if he did not hurry but did fulfill the commandment, he certainly has in hand the commandment of P&R and did not neglect this positive commandment. Therefore it is clear that the duty to have intercourse at every interval exists only because of the overall set of principles (such as not delaying a commandment; see above) that establish the duty to hurry and make an effort in the commandment and to fulfill it at the first possible time, and not because of the internal parameters of the commandment of P&R itself. Above we cited the language of the Shulchan Arukh in sec. 1:3, which says that one should not delay marriage beyond age twenty, but he certainly does not see that as literal neglect of the positive commandment of P&R, but only as a duty to hurry.

Admittedly, the language of Maimonides in Hilkhot Ishut 15:2 is:

A man is commanded in procreation, but not a woman. From when is a man obligated in this commandment? From age seventeen. Once twenty years pass and he has not married a wife, he transgresses and neglects a positive commandment. But if he is occupied with Torah and engrossed in it and fears marrying lest concern for his livelihood burden him and cause him to neglect Torah, he may delay, for one who is engaged in a commandment is exempt from another commandment, and all the more so in Torah study.

Prima facie, he does see this as neglect of a positive commandment. But it seems simple that he does not mean there is literally neglect of a positive commandment here, for if later he brings a son and a daughter he has certainly fulfilled the commandment. His intention is that there is here a neglect of the duty of effort toward fulfillment of this positive commandment (compare Maimonides, Hilkhot Milah 1:2, and this is not the place to elaborate). It seems that for this reason the author of the Shulchan Arukh (sec. 1:3) carefully did not copy Maimonides' language, so as not to use the expression of neglecting a positive commandment.

Thus we have seen that if a person delayed the commandment, he did not transgress the commandment of P&R, and even if in the end he was prevented and failed to establish offspring, that is considered coercion. This is only a duty by force of zealousness in commandments, not delaying, and the like.

Admittedly, one might say that after the Sages established as law that there is an obligation to have intercourse at every conjugal interval, if one did not do so and in the end was prevented and has no children, he should not be regarded as coerced but as inadvertent. A basis for such reasoning may be found in the Rashba there on Shevuot 18a, who discusses a person who had intercourse with his wife near the time of her menstrual cycle (which is a rabbinic prohibition), and she saw blood, so it turns out that he transgressed a prohibition punishable by karet. The Rashba there rules that although there is no Torah prohibition against intercourse near the cycle, and therefore he does not have a Torah transgression regarding the act itself, his intercourse with a menstruant is not coercion but inadvertence. See at length on this in Kli Chemdah, Balak, item 4. Yet this view does not seem to have been accepted as practical law.

The practical implication is that postponing the commandment of P&R is apparently not considered neglect of a positive commandment, but at most less than ideal conduct, because one is letting the commandment slip and not fulfilling it with alacrity. From this one can learn that there is room to permit this where the couple face serious constraints.

We already mentioned above what some decisors wrote (Sdei Chemed and Ḥazon Ish), that there is room to postpone the fulfillment of a positive commandment where there are constraints. We also saw above that where the constraints are more severe (such as spending one-fifth of one's assets), this may even justify canceling the commandment.

And if we add also the territorial reasoning from above, that in cases where the matter causes serious harm to the form of life the couple have chosen, this may perhaps even permit refraining from bringing children into the world. As stated, that still requires a decision, and certainly the law depends on how positive that way of life is, how acute it is for their lives, and how much fulfillment of the commandment of P&R would harm it. But for the purpose of postponing fulfillment of the commandment there is room to include that reasoning too as a leniency.

Admittedly, in Eruvin 63b we find:

And this disagrees with Rabbi Abba bar Pappa, for Rabbi Abba bar Pappa said: Joshua was punished only because he deprived Israel one night of procreation, as it is said, "And it came to pass, when Joshua was by Jericho, that he lifted up his eyes and saw…" and it is written, "And he said, No, for I am the captain of the host of the Lord; now I have come." He said to him: Yesterday you neglected the afternoon continual offering, and now you have neglected Torah study. For which of them have you come? He said to him: Now I have come. Immediately, "And Joshua went that night into the midst of the valley." Rabbi Yoḥanan said: this teaches that he went into the depths of the law. And we have a tradition that whenever the Ark and the Divine Presence are not in their place, marital relations are forbidden.

Joshua was punished even though there was a reason to suspend Israel from P&R. Yet we see that there is a dispute there about this, and perhaps it is precisely on this point that they differ. I also saw that Rabbi Aviner brings in the name of Rabbi Auerbach of Tiberias,[26] who explained that Joshua was punished because he suspended all Israel from P&R, but that this is not the law for an individual person.

A case in which the commandment has already been fulfilled: when one already has a son and a daughter

When the commandment has already been fulfilled, we saw above that there are obligations such as 'inhabiting the world' or 'in the evening do not let your hand rest' (see Maimonides Hilkhot Ishut 15:16 and Shulchan Arukh sec. 1:8). Therefore, permission to stop with P&R merely because one already has a son and a daughter is certainly incorrect. From this it follows that what we just saw – that if he has fulfilled P&R he may forgo his wife's conjugal duty if she waives it – does not mean he may stop entirely, but only that he may waive intercourse on some occasions. But he certainly must continue trying to increase additional offspring. See on this Mishneh Halakhot V sec. 210 and more.

Admittedly, some later authorities wrote that these obligations are lighter, since they are rabbinic obligations. This is certainly so according to Naḥmanides above, who wrote that they are only a good practice of proper conduct, and we cited above from Iggerot Moshe that the law follows Naḥmanides and that we have not found anyone who disagrees with him in practical law. We also saw in Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh that if his wife waives it and he has already fulfilled P&R, he is certainly allowed to forgo conjugal duty for several intervals, unlike the case of the Torah-level commandment of P&R. One can also add here the reasoning we brought at the beginning, that when the matter significantly harms the important way of life of the couple, there is greater room to be lenient.

Thus writes the Chida (Birkei Yosef, Even HaEzer sec. 1:2):

For the sake of the commandment of "in the evening," it is enough at infrequent times… The verses say this: "In the evening do not let your hand rest"—that is, he should not desist entirely. As long as there is some marital visitation between intervals, even distant ones, this is called "do not let your hand rest," and he fulfills the rabbinic commandment.

We see that even without any constraint at all, infrequent marital visitation is enough in order to fulfill the duty of 'in the evening do not let your hand rest.' That is, there is no prohibition against spacing pregnancy in such a case. The discussion arises only with respect to complete cessation. Complete cessation is forbidden (according to those who rule like the Ba'al HaMa'or), or at least not recommended (according to Naḥmanides above).

All this is without constraint. But what about a case where there is some constraint? Regarding this, Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer I sec. 102, writes:

As for the commandment of conjugal duty itself, if the woman wholeheartedly waives it, he is exempt; all the more so if she is a woman who does not want intercourse, in which case the commandment of conjugal duty does not apply at all. But even without that commandment, the woman is obligated to submit to intercourse if the husband wants it, and therefore if both want to refrain from intercourse they may. All this is when the husband has fulfilled the commandment of procreation, namely when he has a son and a daughter. But if he has not yet fulfilled it, he is obligated to have intercourse at every conjugal interval until he fulfills procreation, as is explicit in Rambam, beginning of chapter 15 of Ishut, and likewise in Shulchan Arukh Even HaEzer sec. 76. This also resolves your first question: before he has fulfilled procreation, he may not skip the days when conception is possible and have relations only on the days when, according to the doctors of our time, conception cannot occur, for he has an obligation of intercourse for the sake of procreation. But if he has already fulfilled procreation and the obligation is only מצד conjugal duty, they may do so if pregnancy is difficult for her or the burden of raising the children is difficult, for otherwise there is the rabbinic commandment of inhabiting the world from the verse "and in the evening do not let your hand rest," as brought there in the Taz and the Shulchan Arukh.

We see that in his view, if pregnancy is difficult for the woman or the burden of childrearing is difficult, he may waive her conjugal duty. It is clear from his words that he does not mean merely temporary spacing, that is, missing a few intervals; rather, the matter is permitted even permanently.

And similarly in Iggerot Moshe, Even HaEzer IV sec. 32:

What I wrote in part I, Even HaEzer sec. 102, that if they already have a son and a daughter they may skip the days on which conception is possible and have relations only on the days when, according to doctors today, conception cannot occur, if pregnancy is difficult for her or the burden of childrearing is difficult—because otherwise it is forbidden on account of the rabbinic commandment of inhabiting the world—your honor wrote that this is according to Naḥmanides at the end of Yevamot, who holds that the commandment of "and in the evening do not let your hand rest" is not a full obligation. But this is explicit in Shulchan Arukh Even HaEzer sec. 76:6: "If a woman, after marriage, authorizes her husband to refrain from her conjugal rights, this is permitted. In what case? When he has fulfilled the commandment of procreation. But if he has not fulfilled it, he must have relations at every conjugal interval until he fulfills it." It is thus explicit that for the sake of inhabiting the world he may refrain for many intervals, and he is not obligated to have relations at every interval when she has authorized him, because there is then no conjugal obligation every interval. We must therefore say that the rabbinic obligation of inhabiting the world was not framed like the Torah obligation. The meaning is not that the Sages enacted a lifelong obligation of procreation, such that there would be no room for leniency merely because it is rabbinic, except in cases of illness, great suffering, or loss. Rather, it is a different obligation, the one Rabbi Yehoshua derived in Yevamot 62b from Ecclesiastes: that he should not desist entirely. This also fits the language of the verse, "do not let your hand rest," which implies not ceasing entirely. The Gemara says that the Mishnah is not like Rabbi Yehoshua because the language of the Mishnah, "A man may not desist," implies that once he has children he may even desist entirely; as Rashi explains, the Mishnah implies that if he has children he may indeed desist, which is not like Rabbi Yehoshua. We thus learn that even according to Rabbi Yehoshua they did not obligate him in procreation without any measure; rather, there is a new obligation not to desist from procreation altogether. Therefore the practical requirement is only that he marry a woman capable of bearing children, from whom in the ordinary way he may father children, even if he refrains from intercourse when it is difficult for him, even if the difficulty is only slight; and this is enough for fulfilling the obligation of inhabiting the world. So too the language of Rambam, who wrote in chapter 15 sec. 16, "Even though he has fulfilled procreation, he is commanded by the Sages not to desist as long as he has strength," shows that only total abstention is forbidden. It does not mean that just as by Torah law there is a requirement to father as many as possible, similarly by rabbinic law all his life. Had that been the meaning, he should have written simply that although Torah law fixed a measure for procreation, rabbinic law fixed no measure and he is obligated all his life. Rather, this is because it is not a rabbinic enactment within the Torah commandment of procreation, but a new obligation not to desist from procreation as long as he has strength. For this obligation they did not require him to have relations at every conjugal interval. Therefore, when it is difficult for him or for her, even where there is no fear of illness, it is permitted if she waives it, since then no conjugal duty rests upon him. But what I wrote there, that once he has fulfilled the commandment of procreation—that is, when he has a son and a daughter—they may skip the days on which conception is possible and have relations only on the days when, according to doctors, conception cannot occur, so that she will never again conceive and the whole concept of inhabiting the world will not be fulfilled at all—that is only because this is not a full obligation upon him but only a preferred command in the ideal case, to marry a woman capable of bearing children, and we do not compel him and do not call him a transgressor. Since we see that this is not a full obligation imposed by the Sages, then not only when she is ill and pregnancy is difficult for her, in which case he certainly cannot compel her, but even when it is difficult for him for some reason and not for her—for example, he is naturally weak and it is difficult for him to work enough to cover the added expenses, and the like—it seems that by law he may be permitted. Even so, in such a case he should trust in God that He will grant him livelihood in abundance even if there are many sons and daughters, and one should not permit him to refrain from procreation on that account, for certainly from Heaven there is sustenance prepared for all that he will beget. But when it is difficult for her, one may permit them. And on this your honor rightly wrote that this is according to Naḥmanides—but that is because as a matter of law we do not find that the Shulchan Arukh disagrees with him; even the 'some say' in sec. 1:8, who hold that one sells a Torah scroll in order to marry a woman capable of bearing children, imply that Naḥmanides agrees as well. Therefore one should rule that way, and this is explicit in Beit Shmuel sec. 1 subsec. 14, which cites Naḥmanides as practical law.

We see that he holds that even slight difficulty is enough to permit leniency, if the commandment of P&R has already been fulfilled.

Admittedly, among the later authorities there are also other opinions, which see the duty of 'inhabiting the world' as a full-fledged obligation. But it seems to me that the law is as stated above, and this is also the plain sense of the main decisors. Even those who are stringent and see the law of 'in the evening' as a full rabbinic law still find reason for many leniencies here, as we already brought above. For example, Chatam Sofer, III Even HaEzer I, 20, writes:

This is unlike other positive commandments, where a person must distress himself in order to fulfill the commandments of his Creator, may He be blessed. Here, however, the reason is the settlement of the world, and the settlement of his own body takes precedence. What settlement of the world is there through people afflicted with jaundice, the sick, and those endangered by childbirth? This is not settlement, and one is not obligated to destroy oneself in order to settle the world…

In my humble opinion, a woman who has not yet given birth and has not yet fulfilled even minimal inhabiting of the world should not drink a sterilizing potion except to save herself from jaundice, the pain of childbirth, and the like. But if she has already fulfilled some inhabiting of the world, it is permitted even without any suffering at all.

That is, he holds that there is a rabbinic commandment of 'inhabiting the world,' and yet in his view one may certainly make calculations about the future (and this is not included in the hidden counsels of Heaven), and take the woman's suffering into account, even without bodily suffering at all.

Of course, each couple must examine themselves regarding how difficult the matter truly is, for there is a clear directive that even if one has a son and a daughter, he should continue to engage in P&R. The point is only that there is permission to be lenient when the matter is difficult, and certainly blessing comes upon one who is stringent with himself.

C. A note on contraceptive methods

All the discussion until now dealt with the question from the perspective of the laws of P&R. In the background there is also the question of wasting seed, which raises the discussion of which methods may be used to prevent or postpone pregnancy even where it is permitted from the standpoint of the laws of P&R.

We saw in the words of Iggerot Moshe that he speaks about marital relations at times not suited to conception (that is, not at the time of ovulation). This is a permitted means of prevention, since it carries no concern of wasting seed, and it reflects only considerations of P&R. Admittedly, there are decisors who also regard this as wasting seed (such as Maharsham and others; see Minchat Yitzchak III sec. 26 and I sec. 115), but their words are hard to accept (for this is not essentially different from intercourse at times when there is no ovulation, which certainly is not wasting seed). Regarding a sterilizing potion (or the pill), there are also those who see this as permitted from the standpoint of the prohibition of wasting seed, since it neutralizes the woman and not the man. But some dispute this, and this is not the place to elaborate.

If one wants to adopt other means (such as in unusual situations of a short cycle, in which the woman has no permitted times without ovulation), one must resort to the question of using a barrier and the like. We will not need this question here, since it touches on entirely different discussions.

In any event, wasting seed is a formal halakhic question, whereas the substantive question is that of P&R. Therefore all that has been said until now should be applied as though we were speaking of marital relations on days when there is no ovulation, and in that way the principled discussion is conducted. Use of other contraceptive methods is a technical question, and it requires separate treatment and a separate question to a rabbi.

D. Summary: the practical halakhic conclusion

From all that has been said until now, the practical halakhic conclusion is as follows:

If you have not yet fulfilled the commandment of P&R, that is, you do not have both a son and a daughter, there is a full obligation upon you to fulfill the commandment. In addition, there is an obligation to hurry to fulfill it and not postpone it.
In principle, there is room to make the question of postponement depend on whether the commandment of P&R concerns the act of intercourse or the result (that there be a son and a daughter). If there is an obligation of effort, then there is less room to postpone. If it is an obligation regarding the result, there is room to wait and bring about the result later. We saw that the medieval and later authorities disagreed about this, and perhaps because of the doubt there is room to be stringent (as with a doubt in Torah law). In addition, as a matter of reasoning, Iggerot Moshe seems correct that the obligation concerns the action and not the result, which is not in our hands. As we saw, the result is a condition within the commandment (or a state of exemption, as defined above).
But even if the obligation is one of effort, if there are constraints (health-related, financial, or others), there is room to consider – at least where the constraints are extreme (as we saw in the territorial considerations) – canceling, and at a lower level of constraint, postponing. We saw that several decisors wrote that it is permitted to postpone fulfillment of a positive commandment where there is financial loss. True, one must here weigh the claim that there is concern that the commandment may not be fulfilled at all in the end, and in that respect there is less room for leniency in postponement.
In addition, we saw that if the financial situation is not easy and the expenses of raising the child will exceed one-fifth of your assets, then you may consider refraining, at least temporarily.

As stated, there is room for the reasoning that non-economic distress may perhaps also be measured in such monetary terms (that is, if we would be willing to pay one-fifth of our assets in order to be rid of it), and this may permit canceling the positive commandment. Here consultation with an outside factor (a halakhic decisor) is required, because in my opinion it is hard for you to make such a decision by yourselves. All the more so since assessment of non-economic difficulties is not objective, and depends on how much you understand the force and importance of the halakhic commitment to be fruitful and multiply.

Therefore, the intensity of the constraints and distress may justify postponement of the commandment, and in extreme cases even its cancellation. As we saw, future-oriented considerations are not necessarily part of the hidden counsels of Heaven if they are based on realistic concerns arising from a sober assessment of the situation.

I will mention here two cases in which there may be a need for postponement: it is reasonable that if there are several sons and no daughter, or the reverse, so that the commandment of P&R has not yet been fulfilled but there are already children, there is more room to be lenient about postponing the next pregnancy. Certainly this is so if there are very many sons or daughters, in which case the difficulty is greater. Also in the period immediately after a birth, many decisors are lenient and allow postponing marital relations for a certain period (some set it at a year or two, but there is no clear source for this and it is a subjective assessment).

Yet in postponing pregnancy one must take into account the fact that some women undergo early menopause, and therefore will not be able to become pregnant as early as expected. In the aggadah in Bava Batra 91a we find that sixty of Avtzan's children died, and only Oved the youngest remained alive. So too in Berakhot 5b, where Rabbi Yoḥanan reports that all ten of his sons died. Therefore one must bear in mind that the 'planning' spoken of today carries with it no small risks. Not everything is in our hands – not even birth itself, and certainly not the survival of the children and their own fertility.

Regarding the question of who should make the decision that suits each solution to the relevant level of constraint, and how that decision should be made, see the last chapter.

If the commandment of P&R has already been fulfilled, it is proper to continue trying to establish additional offspring, by virtue of 'in the evening' and 'inhabiting the world' (the decisors tend to mix these two together, and indeed the distinction is not unequivocal). We saw that in principle this effort requires only infrequent visitation (Ba'al HaMa'or and Birkei Yosef), and perhaps this is not even an ordinary rabbinic law at all but a norm of proper conduct (Naḥmanides). Since this dispute concerns rabbinic law, there is considerable room for leniency. Admittedly, where there are no constraints it is proper, where possible, to have relations according to one's strength. But in this case there is room to be lenient if the matter is difficult (such as immediately after a birth), and even with slight difficulty one who is lenient has what to rely on. The decisors set various boundaries for waiting after pregnancy (a year or two), but these do not seem to have a clear source and appear to be only estimates, and therefore I do not enter that here.
We also saw that regarding 'inhabiting the world' there is permission to make future calculations and that these are not part of the hidden counsels of Heaven. Concern about bad children or lack of proper education, as well as financial concerns, are possible considerations.

All this is on the halakhic plane. Even so, people of spiritual sensitivity will be stringent with themselves as much as possible, and in the language of Maimonides, 'according to their strength,' and will weigh the loss of the commandment against its reward.

We saw that making decisions on this subject based on assessments of what is expected in the future is problematic, unless they are realistic assessments based on the present.
All these things are said with respect to marital relations on days when there is no ovulation. Other contraceptive methods require a separate question and separate permission.

As emerges from the entire discussion until now, the consideration whether to refrain from P&R or to postpone fulfillment of the commandment is not unequivocal. Much is left to the judgment of those involved. This does not mean that the decision is unimportant or that Jewish law has nothing to say about it; rather, like many other decisions, although it touches the halakhic plane it also has a subjective dimension, connected to the evaluation of reality, values and aspirations, and above all fear of Heaven. This leads us directly to the final part of the discussion, which deals with decision-making in this subject and generally.

E. The meta-halakhic questions

In the introduction I mentioned several more general aspects that arose from the question. I now return to them briefly, while relating to the commandment of P&R in light of the conclusions of the previous section.

You stand before questions of fulfilling the commandment of P&R, and opposite them all sorts of constraints. In the background one must remember that this is an important positive commandment, one that some see as the very purpose of the world's existence. The considerations we take into account must reckon with that perspective. Even the assessment of the difficulties before us takes on a different proportion when that background is considered. It is important to take into account that one of our important desires is to serve God, beyond the other desires whose place is certainly honored. Even if one makes a lenient decision, it is important to ensure that we are aware of the spiritual price it carries, and that this too matters to us.

Several general aspects

Sages who dealt with these questions speak at length about the importance of the commandment of P&R, and about questions of faith, effort, and trust in God, especially when we enter into assessing the force of constraints and distress, and future assessments generally. Our calculations do not always materialize, and the Holy One runs His world in ways He sees fit; therefore not everything is handed over to us and our decisions.

For example, we saw the words of the author of Iggerot Moshe, who leans toward forbidding postponement of P&R for economic reasons, out of the need for trust in God. There I already noted that these are matters touching on worldview and the service of God rather than law, even though his language is not clear on this point.

Additional questions that you must take into account are the continuity of the Jewish people and its physical and spiritual strength. Focusing on ourselves is legitimate, but we are also part of the community, and therefore we bear an obligation toward the continuity of the generations, the transmission of Torah from Sinai into the future, and the continued existence of the Jewish people.

The duty of halakhic autonomy

As I said at the outset, even in questions where there is a definitive bottom-line ruling, the duty and the right to decide are in your hands. No one else can decide in your place. In a previous article[27] I showed that a person has a duty to decide Jewish law autonomously, of course if he is capable of doing so. On the other hand, if the person is not versed in the ways of Jewish law, he should ask a halakhic decisor. Even then, in the end the choice whether to obey the halakhic norm is his.

This is even more true with respect to questions in which there is no clear and unequivocal ruling, especially if the matter depends on feelings and constraints that by their nature are subjective. On the one hand, in such cases there is a serious concern that a person will follow his inclinations and fail to make correct decisions. On the other hand, the authority of the decisor does not exist in such areas, and he can intervene only so far as the person allows him to do so. In other words, the concern about incorrect decisions and damage to one's service of God should be your concern, not that of the decisor who responds to you. You are the ones who should bring the question to him, in order to make sure that you are making the correct decision. It is true that such a question need not be asked for a ruling, but for consultation. Therefore you should tell the rabbi beforehand that you are coming for consultation and not in order that he decide for you (especially since some rabbis themselves are not aware of this distinction), and then you will also receive an answer that takes that into account.

Therefore, whoever told you (if indeed there was someone like that) that you must receive 'permission' from a rabbi in order to space pregnancies was not correct. But it is certainly worthwhile for you to go and consult him.

The scope of the halakhic domain

In what I have written here I have apparently assumed that the scope of halakhic relevance is limited, and that there are questions that lie outside it. In my opinion that is certainly true. Yet precisely because of that, it is important to me to stress again that the question of P&R is certainly a halakhic question in every sense. Jewish law could have set fixed and unequivocal boundaries and obligated every person as it wished. But the fact is that it chose not to do so.[28] As we saw, it left the choice and decision to each person, according to his spiritual level and the degree of his commitment to the service of God. As we saw, in most cases the law makes the decision depend on assessment of constraints and distress, and therefore the matter returns to your own doorstep. Even so, I was careful to point to the importance of the commandment in the background of the discussion, so that you may make a more correct decision.

Halakhic territory: Jewish law and the rabbi

In your question you expressed puzzlement as to why Jewish law, or the rabbi, interferes in your private life. It is evident from your words that the problems to which you refer are not medical, and there is also no special financial distress. This is a desire for self-realization, to live your life as you wish without an unnecessary burden.

To that I say: Jewish law certainly does interfere in our lives. Everyone who is committed to Jewish law pays prices. You would not say that you want to eat pork or desecrate the Sabbath (after all, that too greatly limits our career), and therefore you do not understand why Jewish law interferes in those matters. Jewish law does so by right, since it was given to us by the One who created us.

Even so, I tried to show you that despite the Creator's principled right to interfere in our lives, there is still room for considerations of self-realization in our decision-making. Sometimes Jewish law recognizes the legitimacy of people's personal choices, and sees them as an area or personal territory into which it does not intervene, both with respect to honoring parents and with respect to P&R.

If there are things that are very, very important to you, there is room to weigh them in decisions about bringing children into the world, and perhaps even at the stage when the commandment has not yet been fulfilled, as I tried to show above.

But you must take into account that, with all due respect to the desire to realize yourself on the plane of career, the continuation of the chain is no lesser realization of yourself. And even if not – it has importance vis-à-vis the Torah, vis-à-vis the Holy One, and vis-à-vis the Jewish people. These important values are certainly not automatically displaced before desires and aspirations. Therefore, even in commandments such as these, where territorial considerations have principled room, the matter must be weighed with great care and with awareness of the prices attached to whatever decision we make.

This is all with respect to Jewish law. But unlike Jewish law, the rabbi does not interfere and cannot interfere in your life in anything whatsoever. At most he is an adviser, or a provider of information. In the end, you are the one who makes the decision. Precisely from your perspective it is important that this be done when the entire relevant halakhic, factual, and value background is in your hands, and that is why it is important to turn to the rabbi.

The personal dimensions

Until this point I have addressed the value-questions, the spiritual questions, and the dimensions of the service of God in this decision. But such a decision also has personal dimensions that are not always clear to young people.

Many times the constraints are not as difficult as they seem to you. Every couple embracing a first child is convinced that this is an impossible task. The fact is that billions of couples have already gone through this process, and most of them endured it honorably. Perspective is very important for you.

On the other hand, career is not everything. Sometimes, from the vantage point of the beginning of life, it seems that children may hold us back, and this frightens us away from bringing them. But from a more mature and calm perspective one sees that the difficulties can be dealt with in other ways as well.

As I wrote in the course of the discussion, avoidance and postponement may end with the result that we will no longer be able to bring children into the world at all. There is early menopause, and there is bad timing. Despite the feeling so characteristic of our generation, that we control our destiny, matters are not quite like that. When in the end we discover that because of the postponements and avoidance we were denied fruit of the womb, or alternatively we had one child and sometimes he is ill or disabled and we want to add more children but now it is already too late, we may fall into very great sorrow, into a distortion that cannot be repaired and a lack that cannot be counted. Here I am already speaking on the selfish plane and not only the plane of value.

Summary

You opened your question by saying that you were taught and educated that one should bring as many children as possible. In my responsum you have seen that matters are not so simple, and that this obligation is not unqualified.

Here I tried to show you that no one is interfering in your bedroom (to use your language), and in general no one is interfering with you even in halakhic questions. All the decisions are yours alone. Jewish law does interfere in our personal lives, but even it sometimes retreats from our personal territory.

The rabbi is first and foremost a halakhic expert. It is worthwhile to turn to him primarily in order to receive information. On the other hand, true, he is not a psychologist, but sometimes he is a person of experience, perhaps even a wise one, and it is worth hearing what he says on other planes too. Certainly so in areas that touch on the service of God. It is worthwhile to submit our decisions to the criticism of someone who is not personally involved, but it is definitely recommended to choose someone who will also understand the personal considerations and be willing to take them into account and to grant them legitimacy as much as possible (and certainly not every rabbi is like that).

It is very important that the decision be made out of familiarity with all the aspects – halakhic, philosophical, and others – and out of regard for the values at the base of Jewish law and the service of God. Even if one decides not to bring children, this should come out of a deep sense of dilemma, of tension between personal desires and duty. One who does not feel that tension when deciding not to bring children, even after fulfilling the commandment, is not a true servant of God.

In the end, the considerations are yours, and I am only an adviser. But you must know that with the right comes responsibility. Responsibility for the results of your decisions, both on the personal plane and on the plane of the service of God, rests on your shoulders and not on the shoulders of anyone else.

Good luck.

F. An appendix for the rabbis who are reading

A few methodological and critical remarks that occurred to me while studying the subject.

There is a kind of taboo accepted in the public regarding P&R. People do indeed allow themselves to cut corners, but everyone understands that halakhically this is not in order (therefore most of them do not go ask. And from their perspective, rightly so, because the answers will generally be negative unless there is a very good reason. And the permissions themselves are not publicized, and therefore there is reluctance to ask. See the next paragraph).
It seems to me that a similar taboo exists among the decisors as well. They too generally do not address questions such as spending one-fifth of one's assets on a positive commandment, and even if they do, it is done in an unreasoned footnote (as in Iggerot Moshe). The same applies to clarifying the legitimacy of future-assessment considerations ('what have you to do with the hidden counsels of Heaven?' – if it is referred to at all, it is cited almost automatically, without analysis and examination).
In my remarks I did not deal with questions such as overpopulation on the globe in general. Is it permitted/required/forbidden to take such considerations into account? This is certainly connected to the question of the hidden counsels of Heaven and to other deep questions.
Every leniency in this field is explained locally. In halakhic literature there is almost no direct discussion of considerations that justify canceling or postponing before fulfillment of the commandment, except at most in medical and similar circumstances, or postponement after fulfillment. In an initial study I did not find an exhaustive clarification of the principled Talmudic issue from its sources.
Beyond fixed norms, there are concerns and a tendency not to give publicity to delicate discussions. This avoidance of publicizing the discussion is understandable, out of concern for a slippery slope and tendentious interpretation. On the other hand, this too has no easy price. As a result of the lack of real public discussion, the rabbis themselves are not always aware of the different aspects and possibilities, and certainly not of the criticism and the needs, and therefore sometimes they formulate a position according to tendencies of heart, according to unexamined norms (which are also not necessary), and so on, while they themselves are convinced that this is the position of Jewish law. Even familiarity with the sources does not mean awareness of their significance and of the different ways of applying them.

Therefore, in my opinion, nowadays it is indeed worthwhile to publicize almost every halakhic discussion. This is better than a situation in which the one who publicizes the discussion is someone who is not really committed, and/or is not well versed in Jewish law, and afterward it will be difficult to repair the damage (and there are quite a few examples of this). In a generation in which information is open and accessible, there is a multiplicity of speakers and also rabbis of all sorts, and especially since public discussion is open and unregulated, there is no sense in keeping things inside because of such fears or others. The narrow gain is not worth the king's loss.

And even if a public debate has arisen, and even if it was opened by people who display ignorance or crude tendentiousness, in my humble opinion one should not suffice with denunciations or general statements, but should offer a detailed and reasoned discussion with sources. Afterward, of course, one can also denounce them (and should).

There is a confusion between considerations of wasting seed and considerations of P&R (just as there is between conjugal duty and P&R). In my responsum I was careful to distinguish between the questions. The question of wasting seed is technical in essence (to the best of my understanding), and therefore it can be solved technically. The principled questions with which I dealt concern P&R.
By way of analogy, a friend told me about a yeshiva graduate who went to an interview for medical studies. They asked him what he would do in a case of non-medical need for abortion. He answered: if it is the halakhic problem – I will sell the knife to a gentile. But as for the moral problem – I have no idea how one can solve it. His intention was of course to protest the fact that they were directing the question to him as a religious person, and did not understand that it ought to trouble them no less than him (and in my opinion, more).

As stated, here too there is a confusion between the question of wasting seed, which is technical (even if one links it to a prohibition akin to murder), and the more substantive questions that concern P&R.

An important part of decisions of this sort is based on norms that have become entrenched. Yet it seems to me that some of the norms according to which we act today were shaped under the influence of the period after the Holocaust (and certainly in exile), when there was a real problem of continuity and fear for the future of the Jewish people, and certainly for the survival of those who kept the commandments and of Torah (for example, Iggerot Moshe, Minchat Yitzchak, Chelkat Yaakov, and many other leading decisors, all experienced the Holocaust in their own flesh or in close proximity, and lived very intensely with the need to rebuild the Jewish people after it). It seems to me that today the situation is different (for all the dangers facing the state and the people). To the best of my judgment there is room for renewed examination and for formulating a more balanced approach, especially against the background of the importance of personal fulfillment.
True, a change in circumstances may lead both to leniency and to stringency. The affluent society that prevails today should lead to less tolerance for claims of the sort raised in the question. Today it is less difficult to raise children (though we are more pampered, and the standards we demand for our children are higher).

On the other hand, as R. Yisrael Yagel justly remarked to me, infant mortality has declined significantly in recent years, and therefore the fear that if we postpone fulfillment of the commandment we will not ultimately fulfill our obligation is indeed smaller (though of course it still exists).

Among the decisors there is no consideration at all of 'territory' arguments. If such a question were put to an ordinary decisor, he would dismiss it out of hand (with some measure of justice. The only question is whether that would be helpful). In my opinion this stems from three main reasons:
1. In general, decisors tend to see every question as a halakhic dilemma, and to translate everything into halakhic terms. At most they are willing to recognize a collision between one halakhic value and another.

2. Internal limitation of a halakhic value – that is, not because of collision with another halakhic value – does not enjoy much popularity among decisors. There is a sensitivity here lest Jewish law be limited to certain domains only, as though there are subjects in which it has no authority in the substantive sense. This is a conceptual error, since the matter does not necessarily indicate substantive inaccessibility. I referred to this in chapter 5, and pointed to the article of Yedidia Stern, who distinguishes between substantive and accidental inaccessibility.

3. The automatic negation that a decisor feels toward personal considerations, as though everything were merely the counsel of the evil inclination. Considerations of personal self-realization do not receive the consideration they deserve.

These phenomena can be seen in my articles on halakhic territory. There I brought the treatment of two important decisors (Rabbi Ariel and Rabbi Ovadia) of questions of honoring parents versus going to officer training and going to a Haredi yeshiva. Both analyze those questions as though there were here a dilemma between two halakhot (and therefore the question arises of honoring parents versus enhancement of a commandment and so on). In my opinion there is here an internal limitation of the duty of honoring parents and not an external one; that is, the limitation is not because of an opposing halakhah but because of the right to self-realization (this is what I called considerations of 'halakhic territory').

A phenomenon that appears very clearly in the literature dealing with postponement and cancellation of P&R is the failure to distinguish between worldview and law. Many issue unequivocal directives regarding questions of P&R, and rely on considerations of trust in God and effort, or other meta-halakhic considerations.[29] This is problematic on several levels:
1. A question of authority. A decisor has no automatic authority in these questions. The philosophical ability and depth of some decisors are also dubious in my eyes (to put it mildly) (for example, a rabbinic kashrut court removes certification from Pepsi Cola because of an advertisement that contains monkeys and evolution).

2. A moral consideration. Even if the decisor's worldview is correct, in questions of this type the decision should be left to the questioner, and the rabbi's role is mainly to inform him regarding the value-considerations that he ought to take into account. Only if the questioner hands the decision over to the rabbi is there room for the rabbi to take the decision itself into his own hands. Morally, in my opinion people ought to be given the right to decide about their own service of God, and one should not present them with the false appearance of recommendations as though they were binding halakhic rulings. When they come to ask halakhic questions, one should give them halakhic answers (and one may add advice and recommendations, provided they are presented as such), and when they come for consultation (see my letter to Lior), then of course it is permitted and obligatory to give them advice and recommendations.

3. A psychological consideration. Recommendations that are presented as binding law sometimes create a situation in which people do not keep the recommendations because they cannot withstand them, and now they are in a state in which, according to their understanding, they have violated Jewish law. From there the path is short to kicking away the entire halakhic commitment, or at least to not coming to ask in the first place (thus fulfilling on their own the dictum that it is better they remain inadvertent). It follows that the stringency of the decisors brings about a severe breach.

4. Since sources of information are accessible today, there will be questioners who discover after the fact that the decisor presented them with a recommendation as though it were binding law. As a result, people's trust in decisors declines (and these are everyday occurrences, for those who know).

5. A consideration of truth. No less than all the previous considerations, there is a basic duty to speak truth, and such a false presentation is not truthful. About this the Sages already said: Plato is beloved and Socrates is beloved, but truth is most beloved of all.

[1] There are additional sources; see the references and notes in Maimonides, Frankel edition, on Hilkhot Ishut 15:1.

[2] The Netziv in Ha'amek She'elah sec. 5 sec. 2 and sec. 165 sec. 2 brings a dispute among the medieval authorities regarding the obligation of gentiles in P&R. In practice it is commonly assumed that they are not obligated in this.

[3] Regarding a slave, see Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer sec. 1:7, and compare the sources brought in Minchat Chinukh, commandment 1 sec. 19. See also the sources cited in the note above regarding a gentile. If a gentile is obligated in P&R, it is likely that a slave certainly is.

[4] For further analysis of the questions discussed here, see the article on Parashat Bereishit in the book B'Netiv HaMitzvot, Gabriel Chazon and Michael Abraham, Midah Tovah, Kfar Ḥasidim 2011.

[5] Several medieval authorities wrote that in a commandment that comes through a transgression one does not fulfill one's obligation. Either by Torah law (see Tosafot s.v. 'mishum,' Sukkah 30a, and more), or at least by rabbinic law (Tosafot s.v. 'ha-hu,' Sukkah 9a, and more).

[6] See Sha'ar HaMelekh, Hilkhot Lulav 8:5, and the dispute of Rabbi Isaac and Rabbenu Tam in Tosafot s.v. 'amar Ulla,' Bava Kamma 67a.

[7] It should be noted that according to this, perhaps there is no need for his previous resolution, since later authorities wrote that result-commandments are not subject at all to the disqualification of a commandment that comes through a transgression. See on this Oneg Yom Tov sec. 30 and sec. 41 in the gloss, Sefat Emet Shabbat 105b, and Kovetz He'arot sec. 11.

[8] This source is not completely unequivocal, since one could have understood that although the commandment is a result-commandment, nevertheless if the action was done at a time when he was exempt he does not fulfill his duty thereby. From this it follows that even the Minchat Chinukh's proof from there is not completely unequivocal. Still, such reasoning already brings us very close to understanding the commandment as one of action and not of result.

[9] See also Tosafot, the second s.v. 'lisa,' Ḥagigah 2b.

[10] The Minchat Chinukh there also wonders how the commandment is fulfilled at the completion of intercourse, when it is not at all clear that the woman will conceive and that a child will come from that intercourse, and certainly it is not reasonable to assume that two children will come from it. As for the second question, there is no real difficulty here, because if the conception is that this is a commandment of action, then the completed acts of intercourse that lead to all the children together constitute the performance of the commandment. The commandment is fulfilled in the moments of completion of intercourse that lead to the first two children. The children are the condition that clarifies that the intercourse was a commandment-act.

Even the first difficulty is not so clear: Tosafot's claim is only that the prohibition of 'there shall not be a prostitute' cannot be set aside, because the positive commandment is not fulfilled at the same time as the prohibition. True, not every completed act of intercourse will count as the time of performance of the commandment, but it is clear that the commandment is fulfilled at some completed act of intercourse, and therefore in any event it does not occur at the time of the transgression, so there is no room to permit the transgression by force of a positive commandment overriding a prohibition.

[11] See further on this in Rabbi Baruch Finkelstein's article in Tehumin 27. He brings there ramifications of the dispute between the Minchat Chinukh and Iggerot Moshe regarding in vitro fertilization, and argues that according to Iggerot Moshe there is no fulfillment of the commandment of P&R through IVF.

But it seems to me that he is mistaken in this, because although according to Iggerot Moshe the definition of the commandment is the effort to bring children and not the result, it does not follow from this that the effort must specifically be through intercourse. It may be that IVF too is part of that effort (compare examples such as having had children while still a gentile, brought above). Indeed, Rabbi Finkelstein himself brings there the words of several decisors who hold that emission of semen for this purpose does not involve the prohibition of wasting seed, since it is done for the sake of P&R. It is highly plausible that those same decisors would also say that this effort counts as fulfillment of the commandment of P&R. I later saw that Iggerot Moshe itself writes this in his discussion there (see there that he discusses also the prohibition of adultery, which can exist even by hand, in addition to the prohibition of wasting seed).

[12] See the notes to Minchat Chinukh, Machon Yerushalayim edition, commandment 1 note 18, and Tur HaShalem, Even HaEzer sec. 1 notes 5 and 30.

[13] In the book Derekh HaMelekh it is brought in the name of his father-in-law, the author of the Minchat Chinukh, that when he conducted a wedding and betrothal ceremony he was accustomed to warn the groom to intend the commandment, in order to satisfy the opinions that commandments require intention. It would seem, however, that his intention was to the commandment of betrothal, and not to the commandment of P&R, which according to his own view does not require intention at all.

Indeed one may ask whether betrothal is an independent commandment, or whether it is only the legal form that prepares the way in which one carries out P&R (a preparation for the commandment, or the instrumental prerequisites of the commandment). From the precise wording of the Tur and Shulchan Arukh brought above it seems that it is only a means to P&R. But from the wording of Maimonides at the beginning of Hilkhot Ishut, and in his Sefer HaMitzvot positive commandment 213, and also from the language of Sefer HaChinukh, it seems that this is an independent commandment. Many have already discussed this, and this is not the place to elaborate.

[14] Something like this is written by the Tur at the beginning of the laws of sukkah, that one must intend 'so that your generations may know,' and see also the Mishnah Berurah there. So too it emerges from the Talmud in Rosh HaShanah regarding the sounding of the shofar, that there is a law of 'a memorial blast' requiring intention at the time of the blast.

[15] Here, however, the intention in question is a specific intention relating to the content of the commandment, and not the general intention to fulfill one's obligation (which is what the dispute over whether commandments require intention concerns), as in the case of sukkah.

[16] He claims that even if he did have intention, it would not help, because he still was not obligated in the commandment as a Jew. That assumption itself can be discussed, but this is not the place.

[17] A similar claim can be found in the Ḥiddushei HaGraḥ HaLevi on Maimonides, Hilkhot Korban Pesaḥ ch. 5, regarding a minor who came of age between two Passovers. He argues that a minor on whose behalf the Paschal sacrifice was offered fulfilled his duty (and therefore does not bring the second Pesaḥ after coming of age), despite the fact that he was not yet personally obligated. I elaborated on this and on other examples in my article on Parashat Vayeshev, in my book La'asot Mitzvotekha, Kfar Ḥasidim 2011.

[18] Above we explained that result-commandments do not require intention. We also brought that the Minchat Chinukh raised the possibility that one should have intention when the children are born, but in the end he rejected that.

[19] As is known, his words generated a major controversy among later authorities. See the sources in the Machon Yerushalayim edition of Minchat Chinukh, note 15.

[20] Rabbi Akiva Eger there noted a difficulty regarding the Shema from Shabbat 11a. It seems, however, that there is here a dispute between the Babylonian and Jerusalem Talmuds, and this is not the place to elaborate (see Sefat Emet there).

[21] See my articles on Parashat Aḥarei Mot and on Parashat Ḥukat, in La'asot Mitzvotekha, Kfar Ḥasidim 2011. More fully, see my article in Meisharim 4, Yeruḥam 2005.

[22] I call such considerations considerations of 'halakhic territory,' which limit the scope of application of a given commandment for reasons internal to that commandment, and not for reasons external to it. In the three articles just mentioned I bring many additional examples of this.

[23] I later saw that Rabbi Yigal Ariel explained this at length in his article 'Family Planning,' Tzohar 10, ch. 5, and he also brought this from the Maharal. In chapter 6 there he further argues that several basic human conditions must exist before marriage (such as preparing one's needs, and even the very selection of the woman with whom he wants to live and rejection of others), and these too are not displaced before the commandment of P&R.

[24] One may ask why the Sages themselves, who knew the law, did not refrain from procreation. Are we all today only the descendants of ignoramuses from that generation? That is not plausible. It seems that the consideration was that if they themselves refrained from procreation, what would remain of the Jewish people would be only the children of ignoramuses, and that is certainly not logical. If the seed of Abraham was not in fact going to perish, then it was preferable that it include the children of Torah scholars as well.

[25] See also Ketzot HaḤoshen and Netivot HaMishpat sec. 55 sec. 1, who raised additional difficulties against the Agudah. Rabbi Chaim, in stencil notes sec. 99, resolved their difficulties and argued that there is no dispute here at all. See also R. Shimon's novellae to Ketubot sec. 1 and sec. 50 sec. 2, Kehillot Ya'akov there sec. 2, and the novellae of the Ilui of Meitshet sec. 6, and more.

[26] http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/kitveyet/assia/tihnun-2.htm

[27] 'Autonomy and Authority in Jewish Law,' in Meisharim 1, Yeruḥam 2002.

[28] See relevant distinctions in Yedidia Stern's booklet (not an exhaustive one), Halakhic Ruling on Questions of Public Policy, published by the Israel Democracy Institute.

[29] For example, Rabbi Yigal Ariel's article is called 'Spacing Between Pregnancies (A Halakhic Perspective).' The weight of the philosophical and meta-halakhic principles there is very great. I should note that in my opinion he in fact integrates Jewish law and thought very successfully.