Why We “Killed” Yonatan, or: A Look at “Be Fruitful and Multiply” (Column 420)

Maharsha, Sanhedrin 59b:
Gemara: “But what about be fruitful and multiply, etc., for it is written ‘And you, be fruitful and multiply,’ and it was repeated, etc.” Since it challenges from this verse, which was written regarding Noah, and does not challenge from the verse regarding Adam, where it is written, “And God blessed, etc., and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply,” nor from the verse regarding Noah just above the verse brought here, where it is written, “And God blessed Noah, etc., and said to them: Be fruitful, etc.,” this implies that the Talmud holds that those verses are only a blessing and not a commandment, since it says regarding them “And He blessed,” as we say in the first chapter of Ketubot, where bar Kappara taught: since a blessing was stated for Adam. And likewise in the first chapter of tractate Avodah Zarah, where Rabbi Elazar said, “Come, let us show gratitude, etc.,” and it challenges from this verse of Noah, implying that had they not sinned they would not have reproduced—yet it is written, “And you, be fruitful, etc.” And it does not challenge from those other verses, because they are only a blessing, which could be fulfilled even by idol worship, since they were reproducing. And one may examine this further from chapter 6 of Yevamot, where we learned: “The man is commanded concerning be fruitful and multiply, but not the woman. Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka says: concerning both of them it says, ‘And He blessed them, etc.’” And the Gemara explains: what is the reason? Because it is written “and subdue it”—it is the way of a man to subdue, etc. This implies that he holds that those verses regarding Adam too were not stated as a blessing but as a commandment. And the Re’em wrote that that mishnah disagrees with bar Kappara’s baraita and with the sugya here, which holds that those verses were stated only as a blessing—this is the gist of his words. But this is strained, for the anonymous Talmud here and in the first chapter of Avodah Zarah follows bar Kappara’s baraita, which disagrees with the anonymous mishnah in Yevamot, whereas according to everyone they hold it was said as a commandment. And there is another difficulty: since Adam was already commanded concerning be fruitful and multiply, why was there a need to command Noah again regarding this? And regarding Noah himself—since it is already written of him, “And He blessed, etc., and God said: Be fruitful, etc.,” which according to the mishnah in Yevamot is a commandment—why then was there a need afterward to say again, “And you, be fruitful and multiply”? As for what the Re’em wrote on this, that Noah was worried about engaging in be fruitful and multiply until the Holy One, blessed be He, reassured him, etc.—end quote, see there—that is not correct, for the reassurance itself would have sufficed; why was there a need to command him a second time, and also in doubled language? And it appears that the Yevamot passage does not disagree, and it too holds that the commandment of be fruitful and multiply is from Noah’s verse, “And you, be fruitful and multiply.” And this is what it means: since it is written regarding Adam, “and subdue it,” and it is the way of a man to subdue, etc., necessarily the plural expression “be fruitful and multiply” written regarding Adam was not said about both of them, but about men generally. If so, similarly “And you, be fruitful and multiply” said to Noah, which was stated as a commandment, is not specifically to man and woman, but to men generally. And Rabbi Yohanan ben Beroka, who says “for both of them—‘And He blessed, etc., and said to them: Be fruitful and multiply’”—relies on Noah’s verse, “And you, be fruitful and multiply,” but brought the verse of Adam because there “be fruitful and multiply” clearly sounds as though it applies to both of them, and therefore “and subdue it” is not exact. Ramban’s words on this are close to ours. But there is a difficulty in that sugya of the school of Menasheh, where they derive castration for Noahides from “swarm upon the earth and multiply upon it,” and it asks, “And the other one?” and answers, “That one is only for a blessing.” According to our approach, why was there a need for another blessing, since it is already written regarding Noah, “And God blessed, etc., and God said: Be fruitful and multiply”? One may say that it does not suffice to say merely “that one is for a blessing”; rather, it means an additional blessing, as it says “swarm upon the earth,” that is, like these swarming creatures. Ramban wrote something similar in Parashat Bereshit regarding “be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth”; see there. But there remains a difficulty in Yevamot, where Rav Yosef says, “From here: I am God Almighty, be fruitful and multiply,” and does not say “be fruitful and multiply.” And Tosafot wrote: even though “be fruitful and multiply” was said to Adam, that was only for a blessing and not a commandment. End quote. But it is still difficult for you, since to Noah it was said “be fruitful and multiply,” and that certainly was stated as a commandment, as is evident in our sugya. And this can be resolved—consider it carefully.

I know only the figure reflected here and there in the columns, and I am pleased to report that this Yossi is a fine young man like a cedar, and his aphorisms are like the shamir worm 🙂

In Yalkut Shinnuyei Nuschaot (Frankel), Hilkhot Ishut 15:1:
In the translation of Sefer HaMitzvot printed in the editions, it has “you, be fruitful and multiply” [and on this wording Maharam Schick built a pilpul in mitzvah 1]. But “and you” does not appear in the Arabic original, nor in R. Yosef Qafih’s translation, nor at the beginning of the work… because the Sefer HaChinukh (which is always copied from there) cited it in Genesis. See Yevamot 65b, which derives it from the verse in Genesis, and Sanhedrin 59b (and Avodah Zarah 5a) from “you, be fruitful and multiply.” See also the Re’em, who says that the sugyot disagree, and the Yefeh To’ar, who cites the Mishneh LaMelekh, chapter 10 of Hilkhot Melakhim, halakhah 7, and the Maharsha on Sanhedrin, who reconciles the sugyot and explains that the verse in Genesis and the verse in Noah, Genesis 9:1, were said only as a blessing. And the Sema (beginning of sec. 49) wrote that the Torah warned about this in Parashat Bereshit and in Parashat Noah. R. H. Heller already commented on all this in Sefer HaMitzvot.

The rabbi wrote:
“If so, indeed in Parashat Bereshit a command regarding procreation was given, and it is not merely a blessing. But afterward a situation arose in which the commandment was nullified and humanity was destroyed. Noah, who survived, brings a sacrifice before the Holy One, blessed be He, and now the Holy One says to him that he has found favor in His eyes and therefore He again desires the continuation of the species.”
But before that, the Holy One had already said that He would no longer curse the ground… and strike down every living thing, so it is clear that the command reverts to its place and he does not need any further revelation from the Holy One!

The Holy One will no longer strike, but that still does not mean there is an active commandment of procreation after it was nullified. Beyond that, without a command there is no commandment. It is not enough to know God’s will. A command is also required.

A. It is a bit difficult to explain the phrase “it is right that we decree upon ourselves” as meaning a Torah prohibition with no formal ruling to that effect. Maybe one can distinguish differently. The destruction of the Temple is a public matter, and therefore the grief over it is like a perpetual public fast; in such a matter, if most of the public will not participate in the grief, then the whole point is not fulfilled at all, and even the individual is exempt. But giving birth to a child who will increase transgressions in the world (because of the decrees) is a private matter for each individual in his own right, and we should have decreed even if only a minority would keep it, because at the end of the day transgressions in the world would be reduced. And about this they said that, on the other hand, there is a problem in making some part of Israel—incidentally not necessarily most of them—intentional sinners in violating a rabbinic prohibition.
Incidentally, it seems that someone who is energetic and resourceful and knows he will be able to evade the authorities and circumcise and also keep the other commandments is permitted—and therefore obligated—to have children. And that is why we have lineage even from the very most diligent in commandments of that generation. After all, the line of the patriarchs from Hillel the Elder began before the evil kingdom and continued even after Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha; so we see that Torah scholars of that time also had children.
[And one could further distinguish by way of pilpul that if he violates the decree and has a child, and afterward does not circumcise because of coercion or negligence, then the father is considered an intentional violator of the Torah law by nullifying the commandment of circumcision, not an intentional violator of the rabbinic law by having the child. But one who violates the decree and eats meat is not intentionally violating any Torah law at all.]

B. One who does not engage in procreation is as though he sheds blood. You explained this on the basis that the species should not become extinct, and therefore if he had two children he is no longer like one who sheds blood, since if everyone did as he did the species would not become extinct (at least not so quickly). There is proof of this, because Ben Azzai is the source of that statement, and nevertheless he said, “My soul longs for Torah, and the world will be sustained by others.” That is, he really does not equate every failure to bring life into the world with taking life; rather, he is concerned with sustaining the world [and nevertheless he also said that the categorical imperative allows a tiny number of exceptions for the sake of another important goal].
But in any case, you rejected the equation between not bringing a life and taking one, because if so then even after one had two children he would still be considered as shedding blood, and you did not explain where we know that this is indeed not so.

C. It is hard to make value-claims outside halakhah without some binding framework, but even so I will take my life in my hand and let righteousness look down from heaven. Of course I have no arguments, only declarations and trumpet blasts. There are two sides to comparing not bringing Jonathan’s life into the world with taking it. One is that one who does not bring him is a murderer just like one who takes life; the other is that one who takes life is judged leniently, like one who does not bring life. I hold the latter. For this value of life (which you interpret as a public value, that the species continue, and a private value, not to take life)—I do not know what it is or whence this flower of insolence has sprouted. From the standpoint of the species’ continuation, I do not understand it at all; why should we care if a giant meteor came and in one stroke destroyed all humanity and the animals? In my opinion, someone who had such a meteor would be permitted to hurl it casually at planet Earth, and I am even inclined to say he would be obligated to do so, because this would prevent all the immense suffering in the world, and the absence of pleasures for the absent concerns me less. And even God, if He were good, would have had as the first lesson of wisdom to dissolve the world. And from the standpoint of the prohibition of taking life it is even clearer to me that it is nothing at all unless it increases suffering (to others, or in the form of the killing itself) and prevents pleasures (for others, and perhaps there is also a problem in preventing the future pleasures of the dead person), like any other moral prohibition. In general I am tempted to believe that all deontological prohibitions are merely an attempt to provide simple, sweeping mechanisms that on the whole will bring about the consequentialist goal of minimizing suffering and maximizing pleasures for those who care about this. But then philosophers came and turned those convenient rules of thumb into sweeping principles. [Incidentally, I think one can compare taking life to not bringing it into the world even without equating suffering with the absence of pleasure.]

Regarding what you wrote:
“The Gemara assumed that according to the basic law of the Torah there is a prohibition on procreation at a time when an evil kingdom rules over us and does not allow us to keep the commandments.”
But in the end the Gemara also says that “it is right that we decree upon ourselves not to marry a woman.” The Gemara could have said that it is right that we not marry women. The very use of the word “decree” shows that there is nevertheless an element of a decree here.

I thought to suggest that perhaps this is a matter of bringing children into the world through wrongdoing. From a halakhic perspective there is no prohibition on bringing children into the world through wrongdoing. But from a Torah perspective it is clear that the Holy One does not want us to bring children into such a reality (by logic). The decree merely gives halakhic force to the logic. The need to give halakhic force is like the need nowadays to legislate a law against abortions. True, logic tells us that abortions are forbidden, but in order to give this official force and enforcement authority, legislation by the Knesset is required. And if you would say that logic itself is Torah law—that is only regarding the fact that in cases of doubt we rule stringently, but without a command there is no commandment. And this also explains what the Gemara says, “better that they be inadvertent than deliberate,” for even one who violates a logical imperative is liable to bring an offering, just as one who benefits from this world without a blessing is as though he committed sacrilege (and here too we are speaking of a matter based on logic).

A. I don’t think that is forced. “Let us decree upon ourselves” not in the sense of a rabbinic decree, but in the sense of a harsh decree upon Israel. Especially since here they used “let us decree upon ourselves,” which is not the usual language of a halakhic decree.
I did not understand your suggestion. We ought to have decreed, and we did not decree. So where is the inadvertent transgression?
As for the diligent ones, one can argue at length. The question is whether when something is forbidden we tie it to the rationale of the law (both in rabbinic and Torah law), and the diligent are obligated in procreation. Simply speaking, when there is a prohibition it is prohibited for everyone, and we do not derive law from the reason of the verse.
B. If he had two children and does not continue, he violates “He created it to be inhabited,” and we do not find that he is considered like one who sheds blood. And certainly one cannot equate them completely, for if so this would literally be a prohibition of murder, and one would have to be killed rather than transgress. So in any case there is a difference between killing and not bringing into being.
We already said in the past that the categorical imperative is not the only player in the ethical arena. Sometimes another principle overrides it.
C. The private value is murder. The public value is like murder. No one said that one who does not engage in procreation is a shedder of blood and liable to death.
The claim that murder is nothing but preventing pleasures is so absurd that I do not know where to begin attacking it.
I understand that in your view, someone who did not bring into the world all the children he could have brought is a murderer liable to death. Your Master permit this to you. Your consequentialism has driven you out of your mind.

See my previous reply to Tirgitz. In my view, the term “decree” here is not in the sense of a rabbinic decree.
Not everyone who violates a logical imperative is liable to bring an offering. That rule applies only in a guilt-offering, and only regarding someone who violates a logical imperative that establishes a boundary and he enters into that realm (such as theft, adultery, or a vow).
As for your suggestion itself, it is quite similar to what I said, except that you claim this is logic and not a Torah obligation. But overall the direction is very similar. Moreover, a logical argument that introduces a detail within an existing commandment does not require a command. Only a logical argument that introduces an entirely new law does (see my article on logical arguments). It is true that the logic that nullifies the commandment of procreation is a detail within the commandment, but the logic that forbids engaging in procreation is hard to view as merely a detail within the commandment. See my footnote regarding the possibility that the commandment is nullified at the Torah level and now the Sages impose a prohibition. I raised the difficulty there that even then it would still not make sense to say, “better that they be inadvertent,” and your suggestion resolves that.

A. Just as the commentators understand that “better that they be inadvertent” is said only for rabbinic prohibitions. They are violating the rationale of the decree without there being a formal decree.
C. From the standpoint of the value of life (which does not exist), one who did not bring life is like a murderer, and in both cases there is no problem. From the standpoint of other reasons there is a difference, because a murderer causes suffering, whereas usually one who does not bring life does not. I do not see any practical difference resulting from this discussion, and therefore even if I am mistaken there is no need to trouble my master. Like one who errs about the number of gates in the Temple courtyard.

Actually there is a practical difference regarding abortion, which I indeed regard as murder, and nevertheless in my opinion it is permitted. There are additional conclusions that follow in this matter, and I hold them as well.

And perhaps it is permissible to read the words of Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha in a literary way? “It would have been fitting for us not to marry women,” etc. It seems to me this is justified given other things we know about him, or that were transmitted in his name—
It was taught: Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha said: Once I entered to offer incense in the innermost sanctuary, and I saw Akatriel Yah, the Lord of Hosts, sitting on a high and exalted throne, and He said to me: Yishmael, My son, bless Me! I said to Him: May it be Your will that Your mercy overcome Your anger, and may Your mercy prevail over Your attributes, and may You conduct Yourself with Your children according to the attribute of mercy, and may You enter with them beyond the letter of the law. And He nodded His head to me…
We see here that this is not exactly realism, but an aggadic, pictorial way to illustrate the pain and the prayer and supplication in the face of the destruction—a destruction of which Rabbi Yishmael was not only a witness, but as one of the Ten Martyrs of the Kingdom, also paid for with his body and soul.

A. The opposite. For rabbinic law they say “better that they be inadvertent” when the discussion is whether to rebuke someone for violating a rabbinic prohibition or not. But here the discussion is whether to enact the prohibition, not whether to rebuke. In such a situation there is no inadvertence if you did not enact it. You want to innovate that violating the rationale of the decree is the inadvertence, but that is really not plausible.

I did not understand why abortion would be permitted. Because the person did not yet exist? Why is that relevant? A person you murder now also does not exist afterward, so from whom did you withhold the pleasures? Who is the plaintiff?

That is not what is written in the Gemara. Regarding such a meaning, it would make no sense to say “better that they be inadvertent.”

In verse 22:
“And God blessed them, saying: Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let the birds multiply on the earth.”
From here it seems that “be fruitful and multiply” is itself the blessing and not a command, but the wording regarding man is different: “And He said to them.” Still, one can say that it is a blessing, since for that purpose He created them.

A. You brought the Rema that the rule “better that they be inadvertent” is said only for rabbinic matters. I said that anyone who interprets it that way generally will be forced to explain here too that this is not talking about a Torah transgression, and the language of “inadvertent” would have to be stretched to mean a violation of the rationale of the decree. But now I saw in the Rema you cited, Orach Chayim 608:2, that the rule also applies to Torah law if the prohibition is not explicit. If so, here, where the prohibition (to bring children into the world for sin) is not explicit, the rule also applies on the Torah level. So I retract.

The fetus is an existing human being just like all two-legged walkers, except that there is no more suffering or deprivation of pleasures in killing it than in any other case of not bringing a life into the world. Therefore, if the parents want to, it is permitted. The suffering of death itself is not counted, because it would happen at some point anyway. I will not state the conclusion regarding the age at which killing becomes permitted.

And why is that less suffering / deprivation of pleasures than killing a person? On the contrary, the person you killed is expected to have fewer years ahead of him than the fetus.

I think this is indeed what is written in the straightforward meaning of the Gemara.
The sugya at the end of the chapter Chezkat HaBatim deals with balancing the desire and obligation to mourn the destruction in an absolute and extreme way, against the need to preserve life and normalcy despite the destruction. One plasters one’s house, but leaves a square cubit unplastered as a remembrance. People do get married, but place ashes on the groom’s forehead, etc. There is halakhah there, but there is also a statement beyond halakhah about the need to find a balance between absolute mourning and life that continues. The point is not only “there is no choice and one must live,” but “whoever mourns for Jerusalem merits and sees its rebuilding.” That is, in the end the sugya opens a horizon toward emerging from mourning and toward redemption, until the concluding baraitot arrive.
The chapter ends with the two baraitot in the name of Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha, which, although they conclude the discussion with that same balance of “there is no choice,” entirely lack the horizon of redemption of the sort found in the preceding discussion. This can be explained by their antiquity—they echo in their wording the ancient Megillat Ta’anit and even, perhaps, “Yeshua ben…” and therefore it is reasonable to assume they are especially early, closer to the destruction and without the ability to sketch some new horizon. In any case, I cannot see here any actual halakhic ruling, and certainly not a “Torah prohibition.” The initial thought of not having children is entirely theoretical, intended only to illustrate something.
(Of course Rashi and Tosafot saw it differently, but in my view this is how the baraitot should be read in terms of the straightforward meaning of the Gemara.)

You did not explain “better that they be inadvertent.” After all, that alone is what I remarked on.

The use of halakhic terminology does not change the theoretical context. In terms of meaning, this is parallel to “the public cannot abide by it.”

Meaning, if one ignores what is written, then one can interpret it that way too. In my opinion one could just as well argue that this baraita comes to tell us that it is very important to eat matzah on Passover. If one ignores what is written, that too is conceivable.
After all, the rule “better that they be inadvertent” is essentially different from a decree that the public cannot abide by, as I explained. But even that rule does not fit your interpretation. In short, what you say is a correct description of the mood underlying the saying (which is fairly obvious to any sensible person), but it is really not its interpretation.

I disagree. This is called hyperbolic language. That is why I said it is literary in character. I am sure one can find more parallels to the phenomenon. I will try to look.

This is not hyperbolic language but simply incorrect speech. These rules of “a decree the public cannot abide by” and “better that they be inadvertent” do not belong here at all according to your suggestion. It is simply irrelevant, not merely exaggerated. Exaggerations certainly exist, even in Scripture. The Sages themselves noted that (“fortified cities in the heavens,” and the like).
The painful point is that it is impossible to bring additional examples, because if the examples you bring are really that far from the plain meaning, then there too I will not accept your interpretation. And if they are not that far, then they are not examples for your claim.
I wonder whether in the literary world (and in nonsense studies generally) there is no criterion at all for interpretation. Have we completely embraced the lazy and sloppy deconstructionist approach? Can one totally ignore the text and offer an interpretation just because one feels like it?

The whole idea of literature is that one says one thing and means something else. “The best of poetry is its falsehood.” To talk here about chametz on Passover is mere mockery. I am working on finding examples of halakhic terminology used in a literary-ideational context (only). Who knows—perhaps I will find more examples that you will accept and that will soften your Litvak reading. Hazal, what can one do, were not Litvaks. Not even a little.

Rabbi Elazar said: An ignoramus may be stabbed on Yom Kippur that falls on Shabbat. His students said to him: Rabbi, say “slaughtered.” He said to them: This one requires a blessing and that one does not require a blessing.

Rabbi Elazar said: It is forbidden to accompany an ignoramus on the road, as it is said (Deuteronomy 30:20), “For it is your life and the length of your days.” If he has no regard for his own life, all the more so for the life of his fellow. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmani said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: An ignoramus may be torn like a fish. Rabbi Shmuel bar Yitzhak said: And from his back.

It was taught: Rabbi Akiva said: When I was an ignoramus I used to say: If only someone would give me a Torah scholar and I would bite him like a donkey. His students said to him: Rabbi, say “like a dog.” He said to them: This one bites and breaks the bone, while that one bites but does not break the bone.

Please note the distinctly halakhic terminology:
“permitted,” “that falls on Shabbat,” “requires a blessing,” “and from his back,” and the like.
I am sure there are more examples (thanks to whoever supplied me with this one), but meanwhile—QED.

I wrote that killing a person is suffering to others. And the deprivation of pleasures is also to others. From the standpoint of depriving the person himself of pleasures, it is like not bringing him into the world (and perhaps even that is a problem). In abortion, others do not suffer (or the ones responsible are the ones who suffer; but in my opinion morality forbids a person to cause suffering even to himself, just as to anyone else). Therefore dissolving the whole world is permitted. There is a psychological difficulty in taking action, and that is a separate matter. There is something brutal about “moral” discussions that force one to define things sharply, and I circle around. If this discussion is omitted, no one will suffer.

Who told you not to read literally?
I agree that Hazal were not Lithuanians, but they were Hungarians. It is hard to say they were Hasidim.

Shmulik, the one who told us not to read literally is reason, and all the decisors from the Geonim onward. Search and find.

Chayota, I lost you. What did you see here? Let me stress again that I am not claiming there are no exaggerations in Hazal, in halakhah, and in aggadah. Even the Torah spoke in hyperbole, and so did the Sages. My claim was that the rules of “a decree the public cannot abide by” and “better that they be inadvertent” do not belong here according to your suggestion, not that they are exaggerated. I did not understand how the source you brought is relevant to this matter.

1. It is clear to me logically that in years of famine there is no Torah prohibition on procreation; the derivation from Joseph is merely a textual support. Here too it is forced to say that one who has children during the rule of the evil kingdom violates a prohibition.

2. If so, how is “better that they be inadvertent” relevant here?
In my opinion the explanation is entirely different: according to Rabbi Yishmael, a person who places himself in a state of coercion—for example, he has children in a situation where he will not circumcise his son—violates the prohibition just like someone who is not under coercion. “Deliberate” refers to the karet of the commandment of circumcision (or the nullification of the positive commandment of redeeming the firstborn), not to the decree—for if we do not decree, there will not even be any inadvertent violators.

3. According to Tosafot, one is permitted to place himself in a state of coercion if this occurs while fulfilling a positive commandment.

4. Also ideationally, the Gemara regarding Hezekiah holds that it is preferable to bring a child into the world even if he will become an idol worshiper like Manasseh. Therefore the whole move to say that there is a limitation in the commandment of procreation such that it applies only to times when the children will be observant does not seem right to me. If anything, the problem is with a child whose parent will have to violate prohibitions in order to raise him.

1. I do not argue with intuitions. I, however, had reasons and proofs.
2. This is a very strange explanation. Is there a commandment of procreation in such a situation? If so, why should we concern ourselves with the hidden things of the Merciful One? You are asserting a contradiction: there is a commandment, but we are held accountable for fulfilling it.
3. Then what does “better that they be inadvertent” mean?
4. That is prophecy about the hidden things of the Merciful One. Here we are dealing with an existing situation. There it was one person, and here it is the state of an entire generation. They are not comparable.

1. Is there proof that in years of famine this is a Torah prohibition?
2. If a person incurs karet because he is fulfilling a positive commandment, then there is no positive commandment; and according to Tosafot, in such a case he does not violate the positive commandment.
3. They were inadvertent בכך that they had many children and thereby caused themselves to nullify the commandment of circumcision. They thought it was permitted to have children even though this causes transgression, and in that they erred.
4. I agree that one can distinguish, but I think on the contrary: it is clearly more severe that an entire public not be fruitful and multiply. Regarding a specific individual, it is not the end of the world.

2. Avishai, above I suggested this too (that “deliberate” refers to circumcision and not to the birth). But only after the Sages decreed regarding giving birth. To me this is not strange, though I seem to recall that a Rashba was once cited on the site saying that one who violated a rabbinic prohibition and thereby entered into a state of Torah-level coercion is considered inadvertent (not coerced), but to regard him as deliberate is already an overstatement.

1. Not a proof for my interpretation in Chezkat HaBatim. In years of famine too they bring a verse, and by intuition you decided it is merely a textual support. But that is not what I was discussing.
2-3. I do not understand how you explain “better that they be inadvertent.” We are circling our tail, and there is no explanation of that in what you are saying.
4. One does not raise a difficulty from a mere possibility.

That is the Rashba on Shevuot 18 (actually it is the plain sense of the Gemara there). But Avishai’s words are untenable also because there is no decree here, and also because his words contain no explanation of “better that they be inadvertent,” and after all that is what this whole discussion is about.

Why is it not explained? Even without a decree it is Torah-forbidden to place oneself in a state of coercion (it is forbidden to have children if one will not be able to circumcise), except that people would place themselves there and think they would indeed manage to circumcise; and if they placed themselves there and in the end did not circumcise, that is considered inadvertent with respect to circumcision. If there is a decree and they violate it directly, then it would be considered deliberate with respect to the Torah law of circumcision.

If it is forbidden to be fruitful and multiply in such a situation because one is placing himself in a state of coercion, then why strain to say that there is no Torah commandment of procreation in such a situation, or to say that there is a Torah prohibition on being fruitful and multiply? If so, then he is explaining my claim, not disagreeing with it. I too never thought to claim that this is a prohibition of procreation as such. It is a prohibition on procreation because they will not be able to keep the commandments.
Perhaps in his way he only resolves the term “decree,” but I explained that too.
Perhaps according to Tosafot, who assumed that there is indeed a rabbinic decree, this could be the explanation.

4. One can further sharpen the difference between prophecy and an existing situation along the lines of what you wrote about dreams, that they neither add nor detract. Information attained in a subjective way, such as a dream whose reliability is apparent, or prophecy, has no halakhic weight even if the person holds it to be true.

[To properly account for the term “decree” is not “only” a minor thing. This whole matter is pilpul, because it does not sound as though they are deliberate regarding circumcision, but rather deliberate regarding giving birth; and also someone who violates a decree and enters coercion would not plausibly be considered deliberate in a Torah matter (unless there is a source for that). But aside from that, all is well. In your reading, “decree” is interpreted differently and has no practical implication, whereas according to this reading the decree is literal and has the practical implication that inadvertent sins become deliberate sins.]

With God’s help, 7 Cheshvan 5782

According to the reasoning of the “categorical imperative,” that if everyone failed to engage in procreation the human species would become extinct—it is understandable that the minimum measure of the commandment of procreation is “a son and a daughter,” since they are destined to take the place of the father after the father’s “one hundred and twenty years.”

With blessings, Yaron Fishel Ordner

I did not understand. How can there be a prohibition in the act of giving birth itself? What is its source? Even when I wrote that there is a prohibition here, I did not mean that there is a prohibition in the act of procreation itself. At most the commandment of procreation is nullified, but from where would a prohibition come? It is obvious that if there is a prohibition to be fruitful and multiply, it is because of the consequences.
As for inadvertent sins becoming deliberate sins, you already wrote (and so did I) that this is not correct.
Therefore there is no gain at all in his claim, which is also not correct in itself (because it does not become deliberate). The explanation I suggested is simpler and more correct.

And regarding “It is right that we decree upon ourselves not to marry…”—the Chatam Sofer explained (in his work Torat Moshe on Parashat Shemot, cited in the “Portal HaDaf HaYomi,” Bava Batra 60b, in the words of the Rebbe of Tolna): “The intent of the Sages was that it is well known that the Holy One, blessed be He, swore by His great name never to destroy the seed of Israel under any circumstances… The Sages acted shrewdly and said: let us bring upon ourselves a decree of destruction, that we will not marry women, and it will follow that the seed of our forefather Abraham will cease, and that cannot be; therefore necessarily God will arise and save.”

And the Chatam Sofer explains that such a “strike declaration,” which would force the Master of the Universe to save, would not succeed, since a considerable part of the public would not heed us and would continue to be fruitful and multiply, and therefore they did not decree “not to marry.” The original thought to refrain from procreation at a time of decree was Amram’s view during the Egyptian bondage, when he separated from his wife so as not to bear sons to be thrown into the Nile; but Miriam answered him, “Your decree is harsher than Pharaoh’s,” because salvation will not come from such a decree since not everyone will keep it, and those who do keep it are also decreeing against the daughters.

That same halakhah that Miriam established—to continue clinging to life even at the time of Pharaoh’s decrees of destruction—was decisive, and the Sages too refrained from decreeing the annulment of procreation even in the days of the decrees of destruction of the evil kingdom. And the Holy One supported Miriam’s reasoning and brought forth the redeemer from her.

With blessings, Yifa’or

All this is of no help whatsoever in explaining why here they used the rule “better that they be inadvertent” rather than “a decree that the majority of the public cannot abide by.” That, after all, is the fundamental question here.

A. Of course the prohibition is because of the consequences. If he had a child and in the end circumcised him, then it is like one who intended to eat pork but ended up with lamb. But from your explanation I understood that if he did not circumcise, he violated a Torah prohibition in the act of having the child.
You explain that even without a decree there is a Torah prohibition to have children (because of the consequences), except that the common people do not know this and are therefore inadvertent. The other explanation is that without a decree he is considered inadvertent regarding circumcision, since he thought he would succeed in circumcising, but in the end was coerced and did not circumcise; whereas with a decree he is considered deliberate regarding circumcision.
But you reject this explanation on two grounds and say that without a decree he is considered coerced (not inadvertent), and with a decree he is considered inadvertent (not deliberate), like the Gemara in Shevuot 18 (according to the Rashba; and all the more so if abstaining close to menstruation is a Torah fence, and nevertheless if she sees blood he is not deliberate regarding niddah). But this is a matter of reasoning, and it is possible that Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha held that without a decree he is inadvertent and with a decree deliberate. However, proof should be brought for your rejection, since Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha himself, in Shabbat 12, read and tilted the lamp and wrote in his notebook to bring a fat sin-offering, and did not regard himself as deliberate.

B. In your explanation there is no rabbinic decree, so it is not simple at all, and that is the whole gain in another explanation. This is not a small gain. As for why regarding childbirth they said “better that they be inadvertent” rather than “the public cannot abide by it”—in that regard this explanation indeed is no better than yours, since here there is a Torah prohibition.

C. [As for a correct explanation, as I said above, I think the plain meaning is that they are inadvertent in violating the rationale of the decree. And now I have seen what is written in Kovetz Shiurim based on the Mordechai, that if it were possible to warn, it would properly be a prohibition, and therefore it is called a stumbling block like in the case of a minor. And there too I suggested an explanation: only in a public matter do we not decree if most people will not comply, because then the whole thing is void—just as we do not decree against raising large livestock in the Land of Israel because in any case the majority will raise them and the farmers will be forced to watch their fields, and therefore there is no point in preventing the obedient minority from raising them. So too with public mourning: if the majority do not mourn, there is no point that the individual should mourn. But when making a fence for the Torah for each individual, we do decree even for the minority in order to save them from sin.]

So in light of B, we have agreed that there is no different interpretation here. Only an added clarification of the concept “decree.” My interpretation does not seem forced to me at all, but in Tosafot, who held that it really is a decree, perhaps that is the explanation. I already wrote all this.

[I hereby announce that I try to read your words carefully and to get to the bottom of your meaning to the best of my ability. In any case, usually. And if I repeated myself, it is because I thought—perhaps mistakenly—that there was some addition or clarification.]

Let us leave aside this specific sugya. What do you think, as a matter of logic, of the proposal that only in a public matter (such as raising large livestock, or the atmosphere of mourning over the Temple) does the decision whether to decree depend on the majority of the public? Because without a majority, the minority has no significance. But when making a fence for the Torah, surely it is worthwhile to decree in order to save the minority. This is somewhat like Rambam’s statement that if the truth will benefit one virtuous person and harm a thousand fools, one should say the truth for the sake of the virtuous person.
What is the logic of thinking that if the Sages estimated that most of the public would read and tilt, they would not decree and thereby leave the minority to stumble? Elsewhere you wrote that the majority of the public is feedback from laymen showing that the decree is mistaken, but that feedback is only one component and is not always right. Sometimes the laymen are simply lazy.

If Jews refrained from procreating as a result of the Roman government’s decree forbidding circumcision, this could also harm the government’s tax revenues, since the Jews constituted a significant source of tax burden. A reduction in the number of Jews could lead to a drastic drop in the government’s tax income, and that would give the authorities reason to “recalculate their route” regarding the advisability of the circumcision decree.

And indeed, within a few years the authorities repealed the circumcision ban imposed on the Jews among the population as a whole (a ban that led to the Bar Kokhba revolt). The prohibition, intended to prevent the conversion of gentiles, remained fully in force for gentiles, but was cancelled with respect to Jews. The trend that had spread in high Roman society, where many had drawn close to Judaism—so much so that Roman writers complained that “there is no house in Rome without a Jew in it”—was halted, and “a high mountain” was set between Jews and gentiles.

With blessings, Yifa’or

I do not know whether there is room for the question: why did the tanna, regarding the original thought to forbid meat and wine, use “we do not decree upon the public a decree that the majority of the public cannot abide by,” whereas regarding the original thought to forbid marrying and being fruitful and multiplying, he used “better that they be inadvertent than deliberate,” when on the face of it these are “two sides of the same coin.” We do not decree upon the public a decree they cannot abide by because such a decree would lead the public to rebel against halakhah deliberately and openly.

If one nevertheless wants to find a difference between the formulations, one could say that regarding a prohibition imposed on marriage, there is a chance that the majority of the public would accept such a decree and postpone marriage until better times. But because of the minority who would not be able to abide by a decree postponing marriage and would breach the fences of halakhah deliberately, the Sages did not want to enact such a decree.

Breaching the fences of halakhah, if there were a prohibition on marriage, would be far graver than breaching the prohibition on meat and wine, which perhaps would be violated only privately. Therefore there is concern only if most of the public would violate it. But with a prohibition on marriage, there is no possibility of violating it privately. Marriage is a public matter, and the public violation of halakhah would be much graver, even if done only by a minority.

One can say that Rabbi Yishmael in this baraita is proceeding according to his view that “the Torah spoke in human language,” and by extension, the Sages too in their decrees take into account the fact that most people are not “supremely pious” and cannot adopt the same ascetic practices that the supremely pious are willing to observe in their grief over the destruction and the decrees of annihilation.

Precisely “the holy tanna Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha,” who because of his great sanctity was able to see divine visions when entering “before and within” the Holy of Holies, is more aware than others of the need to follow what he asks of his Creator: “that Your mercy may prevail over Your attributes, and that You conduct Yourself with Your children according to the attribute of mercy.”

With blessings, Yifa’or

A lovely idea, Rabbi Yifa’or. It really does make sense that “better that they be inadvertent” is relevant even if most of the public would indeed comply with the decree and only a minority would act deliberately, if the breaching of the fence by the minority is especially severe. More power to you.

[I will add a little, although presumably here you will no longer agree. The Torah’s rule to follow the majority is very surprising. In a court we must follow the majority, because otherwise we would follow the minority, and that is less logical. But in prohibitions, if a piece separated from among several pieces, what is special about the arbitrary line of 50-50 such that the Torah said if there is more than 50 percent for permission it is permitted, and otherwise not? With exactly the same force they could have chosen any other arbitrary line, for example 34.998%. Explanations in the name of R. Gedaliah Nadel that this is how human beings view a whole are worthless. Therefore here, where there is a difference between the benefit received by the majority and the harm caused by the minority, and it is not exactly a zero-sum game, we return to our original point: there is no significance at all to the arbitrary line of 50-50.]

Let me explain again “better that they be inadvertent”: if a person has a child in a situation where he will not circumcise him, he violates a prohibition—a prohibition of nullifying the positive commandment of circumcision (inadvertently, if he does not know that it is forbidden to procreate in a situation where he will not be able to fulfill the commandment of circumcision), and not a Torah prohibition on procreation, which has no source. If we decree that it will be forbidden to be fruitful and multiply in such a situation so that he will not reach a state where he does not circumcise, then he will be considered deliberate, since he deliberately placed himself in a situation where he cannot circumcise. Therefore we do not decree, because better that they be inadvertent.

The only source that there is a Torah prohibition to be fruitful and multiply is this very post. And regarding famine years, according to Tosafot this is not even rabbinic, but merely a pious practice.

And regarding “little Jonathan” who was never born—
One cannot complain against Rabbi Michael Abraham for not bringing a seventh son into the world, for “you shall teach them diligently to your sons”—these are the students, and therefore “students” are like “sons.” Except that in order to say this we would have to regard him as an “educator,” heaven forbid 🙂

With blessings, Pill Pool

There is room for this reasoning. “Most of the public” is not necessarily 51%. The intention is a reasonable number, not a negligible minority.
Still, there is logic in not restricting the entire public because of a small minority. Perhaps that is the basis for the law of nullification by majority. You do not obligate a person to give up a lot of meat in order to avoid eating one forbidden piece that fell into the pot. According to this, perhaps one really does need an actual majority, just as in nullification one needs 51% (although one might have thought that with a majority of forbidden material we would still permit it so long as there is a significant amount of permitted material that would be thrown away). The point is that you are ignoring the other side of the equation: true, one saves a minority from sin, but there is a price paid by the large majority who are restricted by a rabbinic decree. Therefore it is reasonable that the balance was set at a majority of 51%.

Tirgitz, regarding the setting of 50%, see my reply to you above.

Shatzal, it is not correct that these two rules are two sides of the same coin. I explained very well in the post why that is not correct.

I already answered your remarks above. They contain no change relative to what I said, except for the explanation of “decree,” and in my opinion there is no difficulty there that requires explanation.

How can a pious practice nullify a Torah positive commandment? That was Tosafot’s very difficulty here—how can a decree nullify a Torah positive commandment?

A teacher, not an educator, heaven forfend.

Avishai, above Rabbi Michi brought the Gemara in Shevuot 18; there we see that violating a decree that leads to failing in a prohibition under coercion is considered inadvertent, not deliberate, and without a decree it is considered coerced. Also, in Shabbat 12 Rabbi Yishmael ben Elisha himself holds that one who reads and tilts brings a sin-offering. That is a conclusive objection to this interpretation.

With God’s help, 8 Cheshvan 5782

It is possible that the original thought that “we should decree upon ourselves not to marry women” because of the kingdom’s decree against circumcision is like Hezekiah’s reasoning, who did not want to marry because it was clear to him that worthy offspring would not come from him.

This original thought was rejected by the prophet Isaiah, who instructed him (in the language of the Gemara in Berakhot): “What you are commanded, do; what have you to do with the hidden things of the Merciful One?”—meaning that the commandment of procreation is not set aside because of fear of educational failure.

Also from Rabbi Yishmael’s wording, “It is right that we decree upon ourselves not to marry…,” it appears that the commandment of procreation is not nullified because of the inability to educate the children in the path of Torah. Therefore Rabbi Yishmael required a “rabbinic decree” not to bring children in such a situation, since because this is a stumbling block for the many, there is room to uproot the positive commandment of procreation by “sitting and not acting” in order to prevent a mass educational failure. But Rabbi Yishmael concludes that one should not decree, because “better that they be inadvertent…”

With blessings, Yifa’or

And perhaps Rabbi Yishmael himself holds that there was no room to refrain from procreation, since Isaiah concludes that one should not desist from procreation because of fear of educational failure. And his resort to the arguments of “a decree that the public cannot abide by” and “better that they be inadvertent” was only to mollify the pious, who thought we ought to express by extreme means—abstaining from meat and wine and from marriage—our pain over the destruction and the decrees of destruction. And for the sake of those pious people’s own approach, Rabbi Yishmael used the language of compulsion.

And perhaps one should distinguish Hezekiah’s case from a time of decree, because in Hezekiah’s refusal to marry he was completely nullifying the commandment of procreation. By contrast, refraining from marriage at a time of decree is only a “postponement” of the commandment’s fulfillment, since “a decree is destined to be annulled,” and there would have been room to demand and decree that one wait for better times (were it not for the consideration of “better that they be inadvertent”).

With blessings, Yifa’or

We already find the possibility of temporary postponement in the commandment of procreation in the custom to marry only at age 18, even though one is already obligated in commandments at 13, because there is great benefit in waiting for maturity and ripeness. Likewise, the permission to postpone marriage in order to study Torah is built on the fact that the postponement is only temporary.

Postponement in commandments is not relevant here. Postponement is a situation where the person is deferred from fulfilling the commandment (prevented), and then the question arises whether, when he returns and becomes fit again, he again becomes obligated or not.
Here we are dealing with postponing the fulfillment, which is not impairment or prevention of fulfillment, but at most the loss of the principle that the diligent perform commandments early, or that a commandment is beloved in its proper time. Here there is certainly room for considerations such as maturity, etc.
Can one postpone fulfilling the commandment because of decrees? Tosafot certainly thought not, and indeed it is hard to see this as mere postponement—who says the decrees will pass while his vigor still remains? Especially since the Gemara explains that refraining from procreation here is done so that the seed of Abraham should come to an end, not as a temporary postponement.

The rationale of “and it follows that the seed of Abraham will come to an end” as the purpose of the decree seems very puzzling on its face. Do the Sages have any interest in ending the existence of the people of Israel?

The Chatam Sofer (whose words I cited above) suggested that this is an act of protest toward the Master of the Universe, intended to compel Him to intervene and save in order to prevent the destruction of Israel. Similarly, I suggested that this is an act of protest toward the Roman authorities, so that they would understand that if the decree continues, the Jews will become far fewer, and with them their tax revenues will greatly decline.

Either way, the purpose of the protest is to bring about the annulment of the decree, so that it does not become a “permanent situation.”

Now another possible line of thought occurs to me: when we bring children into the world under decrees of religious persecution, we are bringing the child with our own hands into a situation where spiritually he will not be “the seed of Abraham.” But when we refrain from giving birth, the diminution of “the seed of Abraham” happens through “sitting and not acting”—“his seed comes to an end of itself”—and not by our hand.

The possibility of the complete destruction of the people of Israel was never on the table in practical terms—for the Jews of Babylonia, Media, and Persia, who were not under Roman imperial rule, were not subject to decrees of persecution, and there was no threat of the full annihilation of Israel. So clearly “his seed comes to an end” means “becomes diminished, weakened,” and the original thought was that it is preferable for that diminution to come by itself rather than through us.

With blessings, Yifa’or

What is this “the price paid by the large majority who are restricted by a rabbinic decree”? They are supposed to be restricted and pay that price. The price is that one causes the large majority to stumble in violating a rabbinic decree (and perhaps this also weakens the authority of the Sages, as Shatzal said). But in order to avoid that, to cause a minority who are doing the right thing to stumble, so that for example they read and tilt and violate a Torah law—that is surprising. And as mentioned, Rambam in the introduction to the Guide says that one should speak the truth if it will benefit one virtuous person and harm a thousand fools, and you too, as I recall, incline toward that idea. Do we really say to a person: commit a grave prohibition so that many of your friends may avoid a lesser prohibition?

As for the mysterious matter of nullification and following the majority (rather than any other line) in prohibitions, as distinct from a court, I think I should wait until the issue comes up again at the main table.

And perhaps the statement “and it follows that the seed of Abraham will come to an end of itself” is a reductio ad absurdum of the arguments of those demanding abstention from meat and wine because of mourning over the destruction. To that Rabbi Yishmael says that according to that same rationale we ought to refrain from marriage and bringing children into the world because of the decrees of persecution, and that is absurd, because then “it follows that the seed of Abraham will come to an end…”

Similarly, Rabbi Yehoshua brought the argument of the pietists to absurdity when they said one must abstain from meat and wine because there are no sacrifices, and agreed that according to the same logic one should also forbid drinking water, since the water libation too has ceased.

With blessings, Yifa’or

Paragraph 1, line 2
… it is a reductio ad absurdum of the arguments…

Paragraph 2, line 1
… Rabbi Yehoshua brought the arguments of the pietists to absurdity…

“Humanity would have become extinct, and that is of course a very problematic situation”—what is problematic about that?

What is problematic about death? That is the extinction of one person.

To Hillel—greetings,

Your question, “What is problematic about the extinction of the world?” follows your own view that “it would have been better for man not to have been created” 🙂

With blessings, Pill Pool

I am not sure that the opinion that it would have been better not to have been created is Beit Hillel’s. Incidentally, regarding the comparison between one person and all humanity, there is a difference: with one person, others know and feel pain, whereas with all humanity there is no suffering at all. “Do not weep for the dead nor bemoan him; weep sore for him that goes away, for he shall return no more, nor see his native land.”

With God’s help, 8 Cheshvan 5782

To T”G—good day,

It seemed obvious to me that Beit Hillel were the ones who said, “It would have been better for man not to have been created,” and therefore they tended to take account of human difficulty and lighten his burden; whereas Beit Shammai were optimistic about man’s ability to cope successfully with the difficulties of the world, and therefore held that one can demand from him a higher level of divine service.

It may be that Beit Shammai’s optimistic approach to the reality of human existence in the world is what leads them to increase the demand on a person to bring more children into the world. Beit Hillel, who see the world as a place not comfortable for man, suffice with “a male and a female”; but Beit Shammai, who see the world as a place comfortable for man, require him to bring two males and two females.

However, R. David Kokhav (Portal HaDaf HaYomi, Eruvin 13) understood that Beit Shammai are the ones who held “it would have been better for man not to have been created,” and for that reason the opinion “it would have been better for man not to have been created” is mentioned first, in the manner of Beit Hillel, who taught the words of Beit Shammai first. According to his words, one would have to say that “they took a vote and concluded” was a ruling in accordance with Beit Shammai.

With blessings, Otiphron Nafshtayim HaLevi

It seems obvious to me that if the author of the baraita had known who said what, he would have said explicitly: Beit Shammai say this and Beit Hillel say that, as in every other dispute. Rather, the tanna himself did not know. And why did he not know? Because once they “took a vote and concluded” and the dispute was settled, over time it was forgotten what each side had held. Therefore it seems to me that one cannot prove anything from the order of opinions in the baraita itself.

Incidentally, one has to understand what “they took a vote and concluded” means. On its face, the expression means that they stood for a count and decided by majority, as in the upper room of Hananiah ben Hezekiah ben Garon, where Beit Shammai outnumbered Beit Hillel and they decreed the eighteen matters.
But that would mean the dissenting side remained in its view, except that the halakhah was decided according to the majority.
If so, one has to understand why they took a vote and concluded specifically on this. If they suddenly found a way to follow the majority (and were not caught in a dispute whether to follow a majority of wisdom or a majority of numbers), then why did they decide specifically on these eighteen matters or on the dispute about whether it would have been better not to have been created, and not also decide all the many other disputes between them?
Also in the dispute about semikhah it says that on that day Beit Shammai gained the upper hand over Beit Hillel and sought to establish the halakhah in accordance with them (except that there was Bava ben Buta, “who knew that the halakhah was like Beit Hillel,” and he acted so that on that day Beit Hillel gained the upper hand and established the halakhah in accordance with them, and there was no one there who challenged the matter at all).

And perhaps for that reason there was a conclusive result here after “they stood for a count,” because ordinarily the minority has room to maintain its view even against the majority, since it believes the truth is with it. But in this dispute the question was not “what is the truth,” for surely if God created man, then His wisdom decreed that man needed to be created.

The question here is about man’s feeling—does he feel comfortable in this world or not? And the count, after deep discussion over two and a half years, proved that most people have a difficult feeling, and this is what the Sages are commanded to address.

The remedy for this difficult feeling is “let him examine his deeds.” Instead of walking around depressed without knowing why, let him examine his deeds in order to define precisely what is weighing on and bothering him; then he will discover that in most respects his condition is excellent, and only in a specific area must he focus and improve.

From a general “bummed-out” feeling that leads to despair, the distress becomes focused on defined points—which can be treated and improved!

With the blessing, “May it be a year of ficus problems,” Otiphron Nafishteim HaLevi

A. The invention is well known that the Holy One created the world and man because “it is the nature of the good to do good.” If man is not comfortable having been created, then there is no beneficence to man here. Apparently the beneficence is somehow to the Holy One.
B. I do not think this is a psychological dispute about what people feel. Such a dispute is not relevant to decide, because each person follows his own feeling, and certainly not according to the emotional feelings of a distinct group of Torah scholars.
C. I understand the dispute as follows: if a person is born, he accumulates pleasures and sufferings. Now suppose that for a certain individual the measure of pleasure exceeds the suffering. But in the end there is still suffering—for example, a bee stung him at age five. If he had not been born, he would have had no suffering at all, and the absence of pleasure would not have been felt by him as a lack. And this is the dispute: is it “worthwhile” to bring him into pleasure even at the cost of a small amount of suffering, or is the stillborn state preferable? And this really is, in my view, a subtle point with something one might call depth to it (and I, for example, wrestle with it a lot). And they took a vote and concluded that in terms of pleasures it is preferable not to be born and not to give birth, except that one was created to serve his Maker and for the benefit of the Creator.
D. You explained that specifically here they took a vote and concluded because this is a factual dispute and here they established an empirical halakhah according to the feeling of the majority, and therefore they did not decide the other matters. How will you explain the decision of the eighteen matters, that they did not take a vote and conclude all the other disputes?

As Ramchal explained, man’s good is that “he should be the master of his own good.” One who takes responsibility for his life and is constantly occupied with “examining his deeds” lives in a world in which things keep getting better. The path to “pleasantness/rest” is through “go forth.”

With blessings, A.N.H.

1. I did not manage to keep up with the pace of all the comments. The common side in our remarks is that there is a prohibition in the act of procreation; it is just that in my opinion the nature of the prohibition is not from the laws of procreation but because of the later prohibition, whereas I understood your words (mistakenly?) as saying that the prohibition is embedded in the very basis of the commandment of procreation itself.
2. Regarding Tosafot—it is clear that even in years of famine, someone who has not yet fulfilled procreation is permitted to have marital relations according to his view, and some of the decisors indeed held this way. (Incidentally, it seems to me that there the issue is really more the pleasure of intercourse than procreation, and it is forbidden even where no child would be born.)
3. Regarding “I will read and not tilt”—a good question, but I would answer that this is like someone who says, “I will read and it is not a big deal if I tilt,” because the people of that generation did not think they would succeed in circumcising despite the decree. According to this, in such a case he is close to deliberate and would not bring a sin-offering.

Likewise in Shevuot, it is clear he thinks he will have relations and she will not be a menstruant—just like “I will read and not tilt.”

Hillel’s “pessimistic” outlook, which assumes from the outset that a person’s existence in the world is bound up with discomfort, immunizes a person against emotional shocks. Therefore Hillel is not upset by the pestering questioner who disturbs him with absurd questions at the most pressured moment; Hillel is mentally prepared in advance for a state of troubles and unpleasant surprises, and therefore is not shaken by them. That is what he came into the world for: to cope with those “surprises.”

Hillel’s happiness does not come from outside, from comfortable living conditions. His happiness comes from within: “If I am here, all is here.” The responsibility rests on him—“If I am not for myself, who will be for me? And if not now, when?”—but total responsibility also requires him to recognize the vital role of others, for “if I am for myself alone, what am I?”

We thus learn that the world’s “comfort” does not derive from the “starting conditions,” but from a person’s demand of himself to “take responsibility” and cope with the challenges his world presents him with—and if he copes properly, he will succeed!

With blessings, Otiphron Nafishteim HaLevi

If they thought they would not succeed in circumcising, then why only with the rabbinic decree is it deliberate regarding circumcision, and not also without it?

Because they knew they would not succeed, but did not think that for this reason it was forbidden to be fruitful and multiply—after all, they were prevented from circumcising against their will. Once there is a decree, it will be clear and known that this is forbidden, and he will also be deliberate in violating the decree.

I incidentally agree that as practical halakhah this is probably all not correct, for we do not find, for example, that someone whose two sons died because of circumcision, and who will therefore not circumcise his next son under coercion, is forbidden to have more children. If he is indeed allowed to have more children, perhaps that proves that when one is doing a commandment he may thereby enter a situation where he will be coerced not to fulfill another commandment. Or perhaps there is a difference between danger to life and coercion by gentiles.

We are discussing the view that “deliberate” does not mean violating the decree (for then “inadvertent” without a decree would be unintelligible), but deliberate regarding circumcision.
Are you saying that the decree does not create any legal effect but merely publicizes to people that there is a Torah prohibition here? If so, then your interpretation completely merges with Rabbi Michi’s interpretation in the post, so what have you added for us?

Inadvertent regarding circumcision; deliberate both regarding the decree and regarding circumcision—because once it was decreed not to be fruitful and multiply, they certainly knew this, and he will be considered deliberate.
And the main point on which I came to disagree is the cause of the prohibition—nullifying commandments, not a law within procreation itself.

And perhaps the original thought that they should decree not to marry women and bring children into the world because they would not be able to circumcise them is similar to what some of the Rishonim explained as the reason for the prohibition on setting sail close to Shabbat: one who sets sail places himself in a situation where he will be forced to desecrate Shabbat for the sake of saving life.

With blessings, Yifa’or

And perhaps for that reason Terah did not want to continue his planned journey to the land of Canaan, since he learned that the custom in Canaan and Egypt was to take a beautiful woman for the king without her consent; by traveling there, Terah would be bringing his family into a risk of being forced into sin.

And therefore Abram had to come to the land of Canaan only by an explicit divine command, which would permit him to put himself at risk

1. I did not write that there is something problematic about death.
2. There is a problem with causing death to someone who is alive.
3. But causing death certainly is not like causing a theoretical someone not to be born.

That is not what you remarked. You asked what is bad about humanity becoming extinct. And I asked you what is bad about death (why should one act to prevent death?). And now I will add to ask: what is bad about causing the death of a living person?

A. After all this, I still came away without an answer to the piercing question: why did you murder Jonathan?

B. I once thought about a case in which my wife and I were the last ones left in the world, the ones tasked with turning out the lights of the globe. Even if we brought a son and a daughter into the world, there would be no chance of continuity unless there were an exact reenactment of the incest of Seth and Cain, from whom humanity was originally founded.

The doubt was based on the assumption that they would have no halakhic permission to have relations with each other, unlike Cain and Seth—who, if they were not yet forbidden, then they were not forbidden; and if they were forbidden, then they certainly were permitted by an emergency dispensation from which it is not clear one can learn.

And the question was whether there is value in preserving humanity for a few more years by having my son and daughter be the ones who turn out the light long after we close our eyes, or whether there is no value at all in bringing descendants into the world who cannot themselves bring children into the world.

When I discussed the matter, I also thought about the possibility that the son and daughter would have permission, and perhaps even a commandment, to marry and establish generations of mamzerim. Then one must discuss whether the descendants would indeed have the status of mamzerut, with a practical implication if over time someone were to sleep with another man’s wife and father a mamzer from her—would he be permitted to other women, since everyone has the status of mamzerim?

C. You simply assume they would be permitted, and you rely in your words on Lot’s daughters, whom Hazal praise greatly. I do not see praise, certainly not great praise. I see that Hazal make a kal va-chomer: if in the sorry state in which Lot’s daughters found themselves, and from their perspective they surely thought they were doing good, we see the results of zeal for a good cause, then certainly in a matter of commandment such as establishing worthy and pedigreed descendants, zeal will be even more worthwhile. But this is really a matter of interpretation, and I mainly wanted to show that the matter is not so simple.

It seems obvious to me that they would be permitted to have offspring together, like Lot’s daughters. They do not need to be commanded, because incest is like murder. Cain was not commanded, and yet he was punished for murder.
Nor can one ignore the context in the Gemara there, which speaks of a transgression for the sake of Heaven.
As for mamzerut, that is a good question. Perhaps there would be no law of mamzerut, since the law of mamzerut exists only when the rest are valid. If the whole world are mamzerim, then there is no law of mamzer. Like terumah (where one cannot separate terumah from the entire heap) and like animal tithes. But there is no practical implication, because even if they are mamzerim they are permitted to one another. And assimilation is irrelevant when everyone is a mamzer. Beyond that, if there is no permission of mamzerut in such a situation, then even today the whole world are mamzerim, since the beginning of humanity was through mamzerim. That itself is proof for my reasoning.

The problematic nature of sexual relations within the family does not seem to me as self-evident as murder. Regarding the context, you are right.
I mentioned a practical implication in the case of someone who would create his own mamzerut in addition to the original mamzerut.
As for the beginning of humanity being through mamzerut, the giving of the Torah came and purified all the mamzerim. (So it is explained by the Rishonim; see Tov Yodei Even HaEzer 2.)

I did not understand what you saw in Tov Yodei, Even HaEzer.

I was mistaken. When I studied the matter of the purification of mamzerim in the future, I innovated that this is similar to what happened at the giving of the Torah, that the prior mamzerut was annulled and a new reckoning began. I mistakenly thought this was already written by the Rishonim, but after searching I did not find it.
In any event, I do not think we need proofs that all the mamzerim from incestuous marriages within the family were rendered fit at the giving of the Torah.

In my opinion that did not happen at the giving of the Torah. The original mamzerut is not mamzerut at all—based on my reasoning. Anything created afterward: a family that became assimilated, became assimilated.

Regarding the original mamzerut, I rather agree with you. The question is about mamzerut that arose afterward; that indeed can be seen in the Beit Yosef there, that the permission of an assimilated family is based on the future purification. Likewise, the mamzerut before the giving of the Torah—if you want to validate it on the basis of assimilation, that is because of purification at a certain point in time, and presumably at the time of the giving of the Torah.
But aside from that, an assimilated family is not rendered fit when the disqualification is known, and I think you agree that known mamzerim prior to the giving of the Torah were not forbidden from the giving of the Torah onward. Correct?

Why would they not be forbidden? Only if you view it as conversion, and a convert is like a newborn child. That is, it works by a specific, familiar halakhic mechanism (conversion), not by virtue of the event of the giving of the Torah itself.

Future purification does not help someone who now marries a mamzer / mamzeret. True, that is in the case of a known mamzer. Regarding doubtful mamzerut, if the family became assimilated then it is at most a doubtful mamzer, who is forbidden only rabbinically because of the higher standard for lineage.

Do you really want to tell me that all those born from incestuous marriages (as Hazal expounded on “weeping by their families”) were doomed and excluded from the congregation of God?

“I” want to tell you? I did not understand. You know the law of mamzer, don’t you?

Oh, come on.
Of course I know the law of mamzer. I am asking you about people who in complete innocence married prohibited relatives in Egypt, and happy children were born to them who in turn also married and had sons—do you think the law of mamzer applies retroactively even to people who became mamzerim before the law was enacted?

If the law did not apply before the enactment, then there is no need to permit those mamzerim, because they are not mamzerim. And if they are mamzerim, then the law of mamzerut applies to them. Incidentally, the mamzer is never guilty of his condition, even after the law was enacted.
And regarding mamzerut before the giving of the Torah, it is not simple:

http://www.daf-yomi.com/DYItemDetails.aspx?itemId=26419
And one must discuss Jews even before the giving of the Torah in light of the well-known dispute brought in Parashat Derakhim, derushim 1-2, whether our forefathers departed from the category of Noahides stringently only, or leniently as well.

I now agree with your words.
(There is a difference between the mamzer, who indeed is never guilty, while his parents sinned, and those who neither sinned nor did wrong.)