Another Look at Altruism: The Categorical Imperative and the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Column 122)
With God’s help
In the column before last (120) I discussed the question whether there is an act that is done without a motive, or rather out of a value-based motive (without interest, utility, or payoff). There I supported the altruistic view, which holds that there are such human acts, as opposed to the utilitarian one, which holds that there are not. In the comments, positions were raised that are unwilling to accept the assumption that people perform altruistic actions. It was argued there that every action of ours is driven by some interest, that is, it yields some payoff (the satisfaction I feel after doing something good is, of course, also a kind of payoff). It is important to sharpen the point that their claim is not only that every action has a payoff, but that the payoff is the exclusive motive for doing it.
In this column I wanted to continue the discussion a bit and sharpen the disagreement, and afterward to show the similarity to the discussion of Kant’s categorical imperative. I have already dealt with it in the past (see column 13), but here I want to sharpen another aspect connected to utilitarianism versus altruism. There are quite a few rather twisted loops here, some of which have already made my head spin. Enjoy.
A few examples: sacrificing one’s life
I will open with an example. Soldiers risk their lives in battle. If they die, then of course even if victory is achieved it will not benefit them. Moreover, there are cases in which a soldier literally sacrifices his life for victory in war or for some other value (Natan Elbaz, Yehuda Ken-Dror, Roi Klein). Seemingly, this is a pure altruistic action, since it is done for a goal from which the person himself will not benefit.
However, many have already said (and there are also studies that show this) that soldiers do not fight for the state but for their buddies. Needless to say, I am skeptical about such “studies,” as part of my well-known skepticism toward the bogus sciences in general. But beyond that, it is very hard for the soldier himself to diagnose why he is fighting, whether there is a single exclusive motive here, and what would happen if some of his motives were neutralized—would each motive on its own be enough? Just as an example, see the spectrum of motives described in this article. Be that as it may, by my definition here, this too is altruism. The action/sacrifice is done for someone or something else.
Another example is Yigal Amir. He embarked on an action from which it was clear to him in advance that he would not come out alive. So why did he do it? Even in his case one might perhaps explain that he did it for reward in the World to Come (as he saw it), and so here too there was an interest. I very much doubt that this is a sufficient motive for so total a sacrifice, but perhaps.
In any event, if we focus on the extreme cases I mentioned above, why does such a soldier nevertheless cast his life away in the face of certain death? One can of course argue that he does this for the satisfaction he feels at the very moment of the act itself, that is, there is still an act here that is done for the sake of a payoff (as noted, satisfaction too is a payoff). But that is a strained argument that already seems to me like sheer stubbornness on the part of utilitarians. After all, that satisfaction, however great it may be (?), is momentary. Is it reasonable to sacrifice one’s life for that? Utilitarians are unwilling to accept the altruistic interpretation of any act, and so they insist on offering utilitarian explanations in all these cases, even if they are very strained. One might perhaps accept such an interpretation for an act done in a split-second decision, like that of Natan Elbaz or Roi Klein, who saw a grenade thrown and in that very second decided to throw themselves onto it in order to save their comrades. But in an act like that of Yehuda Ken-Dror, which was done out of a prior conscious decision to enter a prolonged dangerous situation (to drive a jeep in the Mitla Pass in order to draw Egyptian fire that would expose the firing positions), it is much harder to accept such an interpretation. How did he not regret it a moment after the decision, but continue carrying it out? This already seems a completely altruistic action.
Let me just sharpen that even those who endorse altruism do not claim that the act is done without any motive at all. Their claim is that it is done out of a value-based motive, and not for the sake of any payoff or interest/gain. In their/our view, it is done for the sake of realizing the value, not for the sake of any payoff whatsoever.
Evolutionary explanations
The standard evolutionary explanation for altruistic actions is that they win out in the process of natural selection because they have survival value. As Richard Dawkins has already sharpened (especially in his book The Selfish Gene), the survival with which evolution is concerned is not the survival of the individual but of the gene (or the species). When there is a group of creatures with similar genes trying to survive (to pass its kind of genes onward), the willingness of each one to sacrifice his life for the group has clear survival value for their genes. When the individual lacks willingness for sacrifice, the group will lose the war, become extinct, and its genes will leave the stage of history. Already in the fourth century CE, long before Darwin, the Roman writer Vegetius said: Si vis pacem, para bellum (if you want peace, prepare for war). Unfortunately, many in our region do not understand this simple truth.[1]
Seemingly, such an evolutionary explanation, even if one accepts it, still acknowledges the existence of altruistic actions. It merely explains them. If these were actions for the sake of interest or satisfaction, no evolutionary explanation would be needed at all. Nobody looks for explanations for the fact that I buy something that gives me pleasure, or go to work in order to earn money. Surprisingly, it would seem that evolutionary explanations actually accept the altruistic assumption. But that is not precise. One can still ask why this kind of satisfaction from such sacrifices arose in us. What is its evolutionary value? That is where the evolutionary explanation is proposed. Evolution explains to us that this satisfaction leads to sacrifice, and willingness to sacrifice has survival value. If so, the individual person who sacrifices himself acts for the sake of satisfaction, and this is not an altruistic action; rather, the mechanism that creates such satisfaction in us arose because of its survival value.
And even so, after all is said and done, a person says to himself: nobody will convince me that, once I know that my sacrifice is being made because of a mere feeling of satisfaction that evolution created in me, I should not simply forgo that feeling and refrain from sacrificing myself. Perhaps this can explain why in our era, when evolution has already penetrated and become familiar to everyone, the willingness to sacrifice oneself for values is indeed declining.
But even if we accept this explanation, the utilitarian or neo-Darwinist can still explain to us that, as a matter of fact, people do not stop sacrificing themselves (see the examples I brought above). Perhaps they offer themselves some altruistic explanation (see below on the categorical imperative), but that explanation itself is a product of evolution. Evolution created us in such a way that we are persuaded by silly explanations that cause us to sacrifice ourselves despite the awareness that this very willingness is itself an arbitrary evolutionary product. You will not defeat the utilitarian or the neo-Darwinist with any argument (I already explained in my book God Plays with Dice that neo-Darwinism is an unfalsifiable theory)[2].
One can bring yet another example here of a similar loop and question-begging. Think of a person who serves God not for its own sake. He does everything he does in order to receive maximum reward and minimum punishment, and so he is basically a utilitarian. He is of course punctilious about every commandment, minor and major alike, but everything is guided by consequentialist calculation. How can one persuade such a person to begin doing commandments for their own sake? What can we say to him? The only thing we can say is that the reward he will receive for service for its own sake is higher. But then he is once again serving not for its own sake, since he does everything for the reward (and therefore he will not receive a higher reward, of course). This is a no-exit situation, because from his point of view only utility considerations can persuade him; but how can one persuade a person, by means of utility considerations, not to act utilitarianly?! This somewhat reminds me of the story of Adam HaKohen, the well-known “maskil” (enlightenment intellectual), who on his deathbed considered repenting only in order to refute the saying of the Sages that The wicked, even at the entrance to Gehenna, do not repent. (even the wicked, standing at the entrance to hell, do not repent).
We see here that the utilitarian point of departure, or assumption, locks the door against every counterargument. One can always offer strained excuses that fit one’s paradigm. In truth, the same is true of the altruistic assumption as well, except that to the best of my judgment the utilitarian has no plausible counterexamples, and therefore the altruist does not need strained excuses in order to defend his position.
Back again to the dispute about altruism
We have seen that in the dispute between altruists and utilitarians, each side assumes its own position and entrenches itself in it in a way that cannot be refuted. And yet, in my opinion, those who hold the utilitarian position are on the defensive here. For some reason they assume that a person does not act without interest. On what basis? Why assume that? Why not accept what people themselves say, and what we all feel—that there are actions done for the sake of a value and not for the sake of payoff or interest? This is an assumption whose basis is really not clear to me, and it is what lies at the root of the argument. From this point on, every argument will meet excuses that deflect it, exactly as we have seen so far. If we nevertheless decide to accept the simple intuition that there are altruistic actions, we will not need excuses.
This must not be confused with the intuition of game theory that a person always acts so as to maximize his utility function, which I actually do accept.[3] But the term “utility” in that context does not include only interest or payoff, but also the realization of values (not the satisfaction that accompanies this, but the realization itself). From my point of view, the utility of the act is the payoffs I receive and the values I realize.
Thus, for example, when I ask a person why we should act morally, the answer will not be in terms of payoff but in terms of values. A person performs a moral act because one ought to be moral. Not for the sake of satisfaction, and not even for the sake of the results. By the same token, when a person observes the commandments and one asks him (or he asks himself) why he should do so, answers are sometimes given in consequential terms: it is useful for this or that (for me, or for others, or for the world). The utilitarian will not accept all these answers. Benefit to me—yes, but to others—no, unless I myself derive satisfaction from bringing benefit to others. This, of course, empties morality and the moral judgment of acts and human beings of all content. Altruism is the basis of all of these.
From my point of view, the more fundamental answer is: I do it simply because it is the right act. I have a utility function, but it includes not only payoff but also the realization of values. I think I mentioned in column 120 the mountain climber who, when asked why he climbs Everest, answered: because it is there.
This naturally brings us back once again to the categorical imperative. We will now see an analogy between the discussion we conducted here and discussions that are carried on about it.
The categorical imperative
These matters are elaborated in my fourth notebook, and their main points are described briefly in column 13. So here I will only review them briefly. Kant determined that the moral act is only an act done out of respect for the imperative. Not out of self-interested calculation, and not even out of any consequentialist calculation. You do not perform the moral act in order to create a better world, but solely in order to become a better person. According to Kant, the criterion is whether you would want your act to become a universal law. I sharpened there the difference and the similarity between this formulation and What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow.. The Talmudic principle tells you: do not do to another what you would not want done to you. One might understand this to mean: do not do this act, otherwise others may do the same to you. That is a consequentialist and even utilitarian consideration. By contrast, one can also understand it in the Kantian sense, that is, do only what you would want to become a universal law. The point is not the fear that in practice people will repay you according to what you did to others; rather, this is a theoretical criterion: if you want to know whether your act is moral, examine a hypothetical world in which everyone behaves this way. If in your eyes that is a good world—the act is moral; if not—the act is not moral. But this has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of payoff and result. You do not do, or refrain from doing, something out of fear that the same will be done to you. This is a criterion that functions like a thought experiment in order to make a moral diagnosis of an act about which you are wavering.
I explained there that the significance of this difference concerns acts that have no practical consequence. The categorical imperative sometimes obligates us to do acts even in situations where doing them is of no benefit and refraining from them causes no harm. I brought several examples of this. For example, tax evasion or failing to vote in elections. The sums I can pay or evade have no significance whatsoever on the scale of the state treasury. My vote in elections has no practical significance at all for the election results. Note well: as I explained there, we are not speaking about a small or negligible influence but about zero influence. And yet the categorical imperative tells me that I must pay taxes and vote in elections. Why? Because if everyone evaded taxes or did not vote in elections, the situation would be a catastrophe. I do not want such a situation (for it to become a universal law), and therefore I must vote and pay the tax. Note well that we are not dealing here with the argument that if I do not vote or do not pay, others will do the same as I do. That is not the argument (and as I explained, it is not true either). We are dealing with a thought experiment concerning a hypothetical world that cannot really materialize, in which everyone behaves as I do, and it shows us that this is an immoral act.
The paradox of the categorical imperative: altruism that leads to utility
I then explained that although the action is not taken for consequentialist reasons, surprisingly it is precisely this that is the only way to bring about the desired results. After all, if all people were utilitarians, the state treasury would be empty. The utilitarian is not supposed to pay taxes or vote in elections, since as we have seen these are actions that produce neither utility nor result. The utilitarian does not do such things.[4] So why, in fact, is the state treasury not empty? Well, because the potential evader fears being caught. And why is there voting at a reasonable rate in elections? Here the thing is permitted (there is no legal obligation to vote). Presumably the explanation is stupidity (people do not understand that they have absolutely no influence), or perhaps they are Kantians (usually unconsciously). We saw that in Kant’s moral theory there is a duty to go and vote not because of the result, but despite the fact that you have absolutely no consequential influence. And ironically and paradoxically, only such an altruistic action brings about the desired result.
What we have learned is that the only way to bring about the result that the state treasury not be depleted and that there be voting in elections is to persuade people of the validity of the categorical imperative. Paying taxes or voting in elections are completely altruistic actions, since such an action is not done for the sake of payoff, and not even for the sake of a result (because it has no consequential implications). It is done simply because this is the right act, no more and no less. A moral action according to Kant is pure altruism, To do what is true because it is true. (to do what is true because it is true) (see the words of Maimonides cited at the end of column 120). But only people who perform actions without consequentialist considerations bring about the desired result.
So is it consequential or not consequential? We saw that the action of the individual person is indeed not done for the sake of any result, but it is precisely such altruistic actions of individuals that bring about the desired result on the collective-public plane. If we did not act altruistically, there would be no such thing as result/utility. That is, the action is altruistic on the individual plane and has positive consequences on the collective plane (this is an imprecise formulation that will be corrected later).
In the terms of the evolutionary explanations discussed above, one can say that evolution is what created Kant’s categorical imperative in us. As my son Yossi likes to say, it convinced us of this nonsense (that one should act without consequentialist considerations, to do useless acts) because it has survival value for the gene (the collective, or the group). Therefore he himself (=Yossi) is happy that the public is foolish and behaves according to this silly Kantian principle, since he too would not want his actions to become a universal law, but he himself of course does not act that way (after all, nobody loses from this, so why should he go vote or refrain from evading taxes).
But I, as an altruist, deny all this. If I were indeed convinced that this is only an arbitrary evolutionary product, I would not do it (I would overcome my nature and forgo the satisfaction produced in me by the evolutionary process). I do it out of a Kantian-altruistic consideration and not out of a consequentialist-utilitarian one. One must understand that if the evolutionary explanation were correct, then there is no moral value whatsoever in such an act. It is only an infantile feeling implanted in us by blind and mechanical processes, and nothing more. Why should I obey such nonsense? And even if I did obey it, I certainly would not see this as a moral act. At most I would see it as a pastime (an activity for producing satisfactions). Therefore I am indeed willing to accept that evolution created this tendency in us, but at the same time I also believe that this is a correct and binding ethical principle. Evolution, bless it, did us a favor by implanting in us this binding moral principle. The fact that I have such a feeling does not mean that it is not correct (as they say: just because you are paranoid does not mean they are not after you).
Once again we see that there is an evolutionary explanation for every altruistic thesis, but in my view this is only a tendentious excuse. People assume that there are no actions done for the sake of values, that is, simply because they are morally correct. For some reason they are certain that people always act for the sake of utility. Therefore they are forced to explain that these actions are done for the sake of satisfaction, and that satisfaction was created by evolution out of survival considerations. And of course they further assume that we are all idiots, so that although we know all this, we still continue devotedly to act for the sake of this silly satisfaction. Well, as I said, these tendentious excuses do not really seem plausible to me.
Is this altruism in its everyday sense?
We have seen the relation between altruism on the individual plane and collective utility. In other words, a person sacrifices on the individual plane so that the collective comes out ahead (derives benefit). Seemingly, this is the connection that people always talk about between altruism and contribution to the collective. The altruist gives up something of his own, that is, he performs actions that have no value and no consequential utility, including actions that involve loss (paying taxes, military service, voting in elections—a loss of time), but he is willing to do this only so that the collective may benefit. What a saint.
But that is not precise. We have seen that the collective does not really benefit from the action of the individual, since it has no consequence whatsoever (for the state treasury or for the elections). If he did not pay or vote, the condition of the collective would be exactly the same. Therefore this is not altruism in its usual sense of contribution to the collective. There is something more sophisticated here. The collective in fact does not benefit from the act itself but from preserving the unwritten agreement among all the individuals to act this way. The altruism in our context is not action for the sake of the collective (as in its everyday sense) but a disinterested action (that is, without interest or payoff), simply in order to be good. In Maimonides’ terms above: To do what is true because it is true.. The benefit to the collective is a side effect that follows automatically. The general situation improves because all of us together act this way. But now the question returns: why should some particular individual (I myself) not violate this agreement? If he does so in secret, others will not follow him and will continue to act properly and beneficially, and then no harm will really be caused. He himself will keep his tax money and save the time of voting and military service, and the public will not be harmed. So each of us has to ask himself why not do this. Only because of the duty to keep a gentleman’s agreement? What value does such an agreement have, especially if violating it harms no one? And even more so, the utilitarian asks himself, and rightly so, what good does it do me? The utilitarian ought to reach the conclusion that there is really no reason for him to act this way. At most he should engage in propaganda to ensure that the others behave this way. But now note that a society made up of utilitarian individuals will collapse (its state treasury will be empty). There is a paradox here: although the violation of the agreement by any one of us causes no harm, nevertheless only keeping the agreement sustains society. To sharpen this, let us move for a moment to the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory.
The prisoner’s dilemma
In my fourth notebook I pointed to the parallel between this situation and the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory. Let us now look at a common version of this problem. The police arrest two criminals who committed a joint crime and separate them for questioning. If the police succeed in securing their conviction, each of them will go to prison for 15 years, but in the absence of evidence they will be tried for a lesser offense for which each of them will go to prison for one year. The police do not have sufficient evidence to prosecute them on the more serious charge, and therefore they offer each of them the option of testifying against the other, with the witness promised a reduced sentence as a reward: if both prisoners accept the police offer (and thereby lose any chance of marrying MK David Amsalem’s daughter)[5], each of them will go to prison for five years, and if only one of them testifies while his fellow keeps silent, the witness will immediately go free and his fellow will be imprisoned for 15 years.
This situation can be summarized in the following table, which summarizes the sentences that will be imposed on Prisoner A (large bold font) and Prisoner B (regular font) according to their actions:
| Prisoner B | |||
| Informs | Stays silent | ||
| 15, 0 | 1, 1 | Stays silent | Prisoner A |
| 5, 5 | 0, 15 | Informs | |
All these facts are known to both prisoners, but they have no possibility of communicating with one another, and therefore neither one knows which strategy his fellow is choosing. The dilemma facing each of them is whether to remain silent or testify. Prisoner A looks at the table and tells himself that regardless of the tactic chosen by B, in any case it is preferable for him to testify, because in any case if he testifies his sentence will be lighter than if he remains silent (compare the two cells one above the other in each of the two columns). Therefore it is clear that informing is the best strategy for him. Prisoner B, of course, analyzes the situation in a similar way (comparing the two cells in each row). Therefore a rational decision by both leads to both choosing to testify (to inform), and the result is that they both go to prison for five years. But now we must note that had they both chosen to remain silent, each of them would have gone to prison for only one year, that is, they would have reached a much better result for each of them.
The paradoxicality of the prisoner’s dilemma is that an ostensibly rational decision, that is, when each of them chooses the best strategy, brings about a result that is not the best for both of them. How can this be? Simply because each of them makes his calculation on his own. From that point of view, he did indeed choose the best strategy. But in order to reach the best result for both of them, the players need a different point of view, that is, to choose a joint strategy for both of them, namely a joint decision to remain silent (even though each of them knows that, on the assumption that his fellow remains silent, it pays him more to testify). Cooperation will bring each of them to a better result than self-interested conduct that sees the picture only from its own point of view. This is what is called coalition considerations in game theory.[6]
The catch, however, is that they must make this decision without making contact with one another. Therefore they cannot decide on cooperation by agreement. If each of them separately understands that it is better for both of them to create a coalition of silence and decides to do so even without an explicit agreement with his fellow, they will reach the best result. But one must understand that when Prisoner A chooses a strategy of silence, he must trust his fellow to do the same. If the fellow speaks, then the one who behaved cooperatively will lose and get fifteen years, while his egoistic fellow will go free.[7] In this regard it is very worthwhile to watch clips from the fascinating British television series (the BBC), called golden balls, which documents such situations in practice. I recommend that every reader watch a few of the clips (there are hundreds there) and get an impression of the richness of the situations and the endlessness of the tricks and calculations that arise in a game that is seemingly so simple. Truly amazing and almost always surprising.
The categorical imperative and the prisoner’s dilemma
This dilemma illustrates a situation that is not rare, according to which cooperation brings much greater benefit to both sides than an approach in which each side acts alone with the aim of achieving the maximum benefit for itself. Beyond that, and no less important for our purposes, the decision each one makes to cooperate with his fellow must be made out of trust between them. Each one separately would find it preferable to violate it, but if both violate it, both lose. In this sense, the situation in the prisoner’s dilemma is strikingly similar to the moral dilemma described above in the discussion of the categorical imperative, regarding income tax evasion and voting in elections. There too, the rational decision that each citizen separately makes is to evade taxes. But if everyone makes that decision, that is, if it becomes a universal law, all of us will be harmed (the state treasury will be empty). Therefore a reasonable way out is to behave as though we had all signed a social covenant of cooperation and to act against our own personal interest.[8] And why should one of us not decide to sign the agreement and violate it? After all, he will profit. In truth, there is no consequentialist-utilitarian explanation that will persuade him not to do so. But if everyone does so, all of us lose. Altruism (=action not for the sake of result or utility) is the only way to reach results. This is exactly the effect we pointed to above: ironically, altruistic behavior according to the categorical imperative, that is, acting in a way not aimed at achieving goals, utility, and practical results, is precisely what brings about the best practical result.
The categorical imperative and the prisoner’s dilemma: a second look
After I understood this connection between the prisoner’s dilemma and the categorical imperative, I looked around a bit to see whether there is scholarly discussion of the connection between these two issues. I found a few results, mainly in English, but as far as I saw at least some of them miss the point I made here. Ironically, it was specifically in a short Hebrew article by Oshi Shoham that I found a discussion that apparently touches this point, except that it ends in the middle (while promising a continuation. I did not find one).
Thus, for example, in the introduction to the survey given in chapter seven of John Robinson’s page on ethics, it is explained that on the face of it there is a contradiction between the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory and the categorical imperative. The prisoner’s dilemma is based on pure utilitarian calculation (maximizing utility), since that is the point of view of game theory. By contrast, the categorical imperative speaks of acts done out of pure altruism. Seemingly, these are really two opposites. But as we have seen here, there is a connection between the two. The altruism of each individual brings about maximal group utility. If we speak about the maximal utility of the collective and not of the individual (the survival of the gene and not of the individual), the solution will be altruistic action on the part of the individuals.[9]
Another look at the distinction between altruism and utility
It seems, then, that the distinction between altruism and utility is not so sharp. They are interwoven with one another constantly. And yet it does exist, at least on the moral plane and on the plane of intentions. The Kantian criterion is utilitarian (which act will bring the greatest general utility, at least if it is done by everyone), but the moral intention must be altruistic. More than that, the criterion itself is not really utilitarian, for I do not ask what the utility of my act is (because there is none) but what the utility is of a hypothetical situation in which everyone does this act. That is not really a utilitarian consideration.
In any event, whatever the exact nature of the Kantian criterion may be, it is clear that a moral act by each individual must be done out of an altruistic motive. The fact that such an act will also bring maximal utility on the group plane is a side effect, but it is not supposed to be the motive for the act; otherwise this is not moral action. This returns us to column 120, where we dealt with situations of overlap in which there is also utility, and that does not necessarily contradict action out of a value-based motive (see the example of Jonah’s CV).
However, there is also room for the reasoning that the intention to bring group utility does not disqualify the altruistic character of the act. If a person does the act for the sake of the utility of the collective action (for there is no utility in the individual act itself), can that not count as an altruistic motive? After all, this is not action whose purpose is utility and payoff for the actor himself. Here we have already returned fairly close to the everyday meaning of altruism.
Well, these twisted loops that wind around one another are already exhausting me, and forgive me if I do not continue with this any further.
[1] Israel (Robert) Aumann repeats this at every opportunity. Among other things, he made this point in the Nobel lecture he delivered in Stockholm on the occasion of receiving the prize, entitled “War and Peace”.
[2] And I also explained there why this does not mean that it is untrue, but on the contrary: because it is a tautology (“the survivor survives”) that is true by virtue of itself, it cannot be refuted (just like a mathematical proposition).
[4] As for satisfaction, if someone does in fact derive satisfaction from these annoying actions, I can suggest that he turn to a professional or focus on seeking more effective satisfactions. I have a few suggestions, but this is not the place to spell them out.
[5] See here: “My fantasy is that my daughter will not marry a state’s witness.” Even his wording is wonderfully amusing. He does not say that he would be very disappointed if his daughter were to marry a state’s witness, but rather that he has a fantasy (admittedly with slim odds, and indeed in light of the state of the Likud now it seems he is quite right) that she will not marry a state’s witness. Out of the whole set of candidates, almost all of whom are state’s witnesses, he hopes that perhaps she will find one who is not. And of that it is said: sometimes dreams come true (ibid., ibid.).
[6] See an interesting example of these considerations and their significance in volume 13 of the Talmudic Logic series, which deals with the division of an estate (the passage of the three marriage contracts, with which Aumann’s well-known article deals).
[7] Of course, even if the prisoners can communicate with one another, as long as they do not sign a binding agreement that somehow ensures that those who sign it will behave in accordance with their declaration, the choice of the strategy of silence is risky. It depends on the other behaving like a gentleman and keeping his commitment.
[8] The parallel between the cases is not complete. We saw that when I decide to evade taxes, this does not harm my fellows. Only if all of us evade taxes will there be real harm to all of us. Still, when I examine myself against society as a whole, the situation is similar to that in the prisoner’s dilemma.
[9] Somewhat reminiscent of the cake-cutting example (see on this column 119), where too an altruistic action brings about the best result, and a policy that keeps the result before its eyes misses the moral correction and the altruism (which itself is the desired result of the educational act, or, as we saw above, part of the utility function).
Discussion
It seems to me that the overwhelming majority of people who don’t believe in an altruistic conception simply don’t believe in the existence of values at all…
Does the rabbi think that, according to such an approach, one can justify the feeling of satisfaction that they claim is the cause of altruistic actions (for if there are no values, why should we feel satisfaction from their realization?… Or perhaps does the very feeling of satisfaction itself indicate that every person senses inwardly that there are values?)
A. And where does the determinist stand?
The determinist believes things could not have been otherwise. Is your altruist a disguised determinist? Can the utilitarian turn out to be a libertarian (for he believes the action is grounded in the person’s self-satisfaction, which may or may not be)?
B. For your attention: the utility function represents preferences (together with a few additional assumptions such as transitivity and the like). What causes the preferences is of no importance whatsoever.
“In their/our opinion” somewhere near the beginning of the column. It seems to me the slash should be a backslash.
Sh,
Even if that is the difference (and I don’t think it really is the root of the dispute; see below), it still doesn’t explain your position.
After all, even if I am deluding myself and in fact there are no binding values, I still, on my view, mistakenly believe that there are such values and therefore act in accordance with them. So this is still an altruistic act. It is just that in your opinion it is a foolish one, since the truth is that the values are not binding, contrary to my mistake.
Another possibility is that what you mean is that the illusion is not the assumption that there are binding values, but the assumption that I am acting altruistically, whereas that is not the truth (rather, I am acting out of self-interest). But then this has nothing to do with the question whether or not there are binding values. Even if there are such values, I am not acting in accordance with them.
Bottom line: in my opinion you are mistaken both about your actual position and certainly about the dependence you attributed to it in your last message.
If you are a determinist, feelings of satisfaction say nothing at all. That is simply how you are built, period. There need not be any reason for it.
As for the very connection to the question whether or not there are binding values, see my reply to Sh just above your message.
Actually, no. I meant in their/our opinion (because I too am included among them).
Y.D.,
A. I didn’t understand the questions. 1. If my altruist is a determinist, then at least according to his own view he himself is not an altruist. Someone who does not choose altruism is not an altruist. But of course it is possible that he is mistaken, and although in his outlook he is a determinist, the truth is that he is an altruist (that is, he performs actions by choice for the sake of realizing values). 2. The utilitarian certainly can be a libertarian. Why not? He freely decides to act for maximum utility. By the way, even if he is not a libertarian, that is only a statement about him (about what he thinks). The question is what the truth is (whether or not a person has free choice), not what he himself thinks about the matter.
B. That is exactly what I said. I didn’t understand what your remark was meant to add.
I will try to clarify the “utilitarian” position more. For that purpose I will sharpen the concepts “altruist” and “utilitarian”:
The root of the word “altruist” is “alter,” meaning “other.” But in truth one must distinguish between an action done “for the sake of the other,” meaning that the goal of the one doing it is the other person’s “good,” and an action not aimed “for one’s own sake” but also not for the friend’s good or for any “utility” whatsoever, but rather for “doing the truth because it is truth” (“doing what is right”), even if this causes harm to another (cf. the Nazi soldier who believes in “obeying the Führer,” as Bächler discussed at length).
Thus there are two “altruistic” actions: one seeks the good of another (to which the name “altruism” is more fitting), and the second—let us call it “the truthful one”—is motivated by the pursuit of “truth” and “the right.”
The “utilitarian,” as the name implies, acts for utility. And here too one can distinguish between the “egoist” (a private case of utilitarianism), who acts for his own benefit (obtaining pleasure, satisfaction, escape from suffering), and the “utilitarian” who acts for some “utility,” even if it is not his own utility.
Thus there are 4 levels (from bottom to top):
1. The egoist (his own good, like a worker laboring for his livelihood)
2. The utilitarian (utility, like peace officers striving to establish peace in the world)
3. The altruist (the good of the other, like the soldiers in the post)
4. The truthful one (what is right, like obedience to the categorical imperative)
Clearly all of these act out of “will,” and all of them have a “goal.” We are not talking about robots here. Therefore, the question of altruism (as you presented it) is whether there exists in humanity (that is, at least among some people in the world) such a will to do what is “right” and “true,” when these concepts are not defined in terms of “utility,” “good,” or “pleasure.” From here on, two claims:
1 – “Will,” by its very concept, refers to one of the three goals: utility, good, and pleasure. I now recall having once seen in Malbim this threefold division between “the good, the useful, and the pleasant.” For “will” (in its most general sense) is the soul’s “running” and aspiration. This running is its natural tendency toward the very essence of its own “being” and existence (and away from its absence), and every particular “will” is an expression of this general aspiration. And since this aspiration is not realized in the existence of “what is right,” because “the right thing” exists independently, is not connected to/dependent on my being, and its existence does not sustain me, there cannot be a will toward it.
[What is possible, however, is for me to “identify” with things outside myself (and thereby my narrow self expands), so that I will want those things to exist because my own being is realized in them. That is what happens to soldiers who identify with their comrades and see their comrades’ existence as their own existence, or their suffering as their own suffering. This is aside from the explanation you did not mention, namely that he may prefer to die rather than live with the guilt of not having saved them (when he could have), or worse, of having caused the other’s death.]
2 – The terms “right” and “truth” have no meaning at all when they are not accompanied by my identification with their object. Every judgment of truth requires/arises from an inner assessment of the degree of existence of the object being judged. But inward experience senses only pain and pleasure. Therefore, a value will not appear “right” to me unless I sense the good in it.
First, let’s synchronize.
There are only three different levels:
1. The utilitarian is the egoist (his own good, like a worker laboring for his livelihood)
2. The consequentialist (like peace officers striving to establish peace in the world)
This includes the ordinary altruist (who acts for the good of the other, like the soldiers in the post)
3. The truthful one (what is right, like obedience to the categorical imperative)
I defined in my remarks here that from my point of view the last three are all called altruists. They do it not for the sake of self-interest.
With that, more or less, the discussion is over. I will only note that I do not agree with your last remark.
The terms ‘right’ and ‘truth’ certainly do have meaning even when they are not accompanied by my emotional identification with their object. There is an intellectual-moral identification that has nothing to do with emotion or pleasure. And inward experience senses more things than just pleasure (where did that bizarre assertion even come from?), especially if it does not “sense” (in the sense of emotional experience) but rather thinks, or wants, or decides.
With God’s help, eve of the holy Sabbath, Vayakhel-Pekudei 5778
To R. M. A. — many greetings,
The idea you proposed is right and simple: if I, you, and he all act in a good and upright way, then the situation will also be pleasant and beneficial for all of us.
That is essentially how the Tabernacle was built. Beyond the “categorical imperative” obligating each person to give the half-shekel, from which the sockets that formed the foundation of the Tabernacle were cast— the rest of the Tabernacle was built from the voluntary donations that each person gave and contributed to the public wholeheartedly.
The contribution of most individuals was very small, but since everyone responded generously and contributed, the result was magnificent and successful beyond all expectations.
But altruism brings blessing not only to the collective, but also to the individual himself. For when left to himself, what is he and what is his worth? A grain of dust and windblown straw. But when the individual is part of a community, part of a nation—and not just any nation, but the pioneering force destined to illuminate all humanity and place eternal values before it—then every small step of the individual is a giant step for humanity!
With blessing, S.Z. Levinger
And by way of wordplay:
The altruist merits to become “alter,” to attain “length of days” in the sense of eternal life, which is granted to those “who go rightward in it,” who do good for His sake!
Paragraph 2, line 1:
…beyond the ‘categorical imperative’ that obligated each person…
The discussion has narrowed considerably, but it is not over. I acknowledge the existence of altruism in the first two levels (the consequentialist and the ordinary one, in your terminology). The main dispute concerns the third level (the truthful one).
The “bizarre” assertion grew out of an attempt to describe what happens inside me. I will try to sharpen it a bit. The basic concept around which the entire discussion in the post revolves is the concept of will. It seems to me you would agree that “obligation” too is based on will. The same goes for “morality”; if I have no will at all, no morality will move me.
Now, you claim that one can will something other than pleasure. But when I look inside myself, I do not find such a possibility. I see that in the depths of every will I may have there lies an aspiration for pleasure or an escape from pain. [More precisely, I would say that the pleasure sought is the pleasure of existence, life, being-there; and the pain rejected is their opposite: absence, negation, death. That is why I wrote that only if I find my existence in things broader than my narrow body and possessions (this is what is called “identification” — existential identity) can I desire them.]
If things appear differently to you, I would be glad if you would positively define the other inner experiences besides pleasure and pain (and not suffice with a negative definition: “not connected to emotion or pleasure” … “senses things besides pleasure”).
I should note that regarding thinking, willing, and deciding, I completely agree with you that these are not feelings of pleasure or pain, but these are examples from the second aspect of the soul—its movement ‘from within outward.’ We are discussing here the first aspect—its reception from outside inward. I claim that everything received is translated by it into terms of pain and pleasure, and therefore will can apply only to them.
[Another side note: I do not know what you mean by “emotion” (“emotional identification”). I distinguish between experience and emotion. Experience does not depend on joy, love, sadness, hope, and the like. These are emotions that may accompany experience, but experience itself is nothing other than the inner apprehension of the existence of things; the sense that feels that the thing exists, is present, nothing more. That is why I wrote that a judgment of truth and right requires my “identification”; what I mean is that I feel the thing’s existence, and thanks to that I can affirm that it is true that it exists, because the judgment corresponds (“truth,” emet, shares letters with “corresponds”) to my sense.]
[And I will not deny it: I am aware that when I claim that “there is no will except toward pleasure,” I am only projecting from what I find in myself onto all humanity. I do not really know what is in every person’s heart. Moreover, I admit that I do not think I would be capable of acting like the soldiers described in your words. Therefore I hesitate whether to see such acts as proof that there are people who operate differently from me (which seems to me a forced explanation because it is unfamiliar and undefined), or to explain their behavior by various excuses such as “identification,” feelings of revenge (“Let me die with the Philistines”), a momentary decision, or guilt feelings (which also seem forced to me, since they do not operate that way in me, as above)].
With God’s help, eve of the holy Sabbath, Vayakhel-Pekudei 5778 (and the close of ‘Mother’s Day’)
In the book Avnei Simchah on the Torah (by R. Simchah Klier, of the Gur Hasidim), he noted that the wording “the men came with the women” implies that in donating to the Tabernacle the men were secondary to the women. He offers a local explanation: since the women did not sin with the Golden Calf, their donation was a ‘pure donation,’ whereas in the men’s donation there was an element of personal need, to atone for the sin of the Calf.
However, in my humble opinion it seems that there is a more essential matter here: the trait of giving without calculation is embedded in the woman as the “mother of all living.” How much self-sacrifice there is in entering pregnancy itself, in the pain, suffering, and danger of labor, and in the hardship of raising children. How much toil, and how many difficulties, worries, disappointments, and anxieties, until the child grows up and “can stand on his own.”
Our foremothers received this trait of self-sacrifice from the mothers of the nation—Sarah and Rebecca, Rachel and Hannah, who endured prolonged barrenness until they were delivered; Rachel, who revealed the signs to her sister so that she would not be shamed; and Leah, who merited many sons but suffered from her husband’s emotional reservation toward her. How much self-sacrifice our mothers in Egypt had, to endure not only the harshness of enslavement but also the pain of pregnancy and childbirth, when the chance that the child would survive was nearly zero. From such mothers a nation was built of sanctifiers of God’s name, who give their lives and all they possess to preserve the people’s sacred mission.
It seems that the pinnacle of self-sacrifice we learn from Tamar, who was prepared to be cast into the fiery furnace—to die in torment, to lose her good name and be remembered forever as an adulteress, and to lose the fetus in her womb, the last chance to raise up a name for her dead husband—all this she was ready to forgo so as not to shame Judah publicly. And from her Judah learned the power of self-sacrifice for another, and was prepared to remain an eternal slave in Egypt so that his father should not be harmed by losing the son of his old age.
From the pure altruism shown by Tamar and Judah, a gateway of hope can grow for the redemption of the world!
With blessing, S.Z. Levinger
With God’s help, eve of the holy Sabbath, Vayakhel-Pekudei 5778
To Yisrael — many greetings,
Before man ate from the “Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil,” it was enough merely to know that something was true in order to desire it. It was clear to man that what is true is also pleasant and beneficial. After the sin, the factor of pleasure entered as a central motivating force, often overriding what the intellect obligates as good and true. More than once a person is torn between his intellect, which tells him one thing, and his emotion, which tells him the opposite—yet he still has the ability to force his emotion to what the intellect obligates, as R. M. A. says.
But it is very hard to live a constant life only on the basis of itkafya [self-restraint/subjugation]. It is very hard to stand in a constant war and inner split. In the end, one must strive to return to the healthy natural state of “before the sin,” in which truth and good are connected without interruption to the feeling of what is pleasant and beneficial.
This is possible both by contemplation, which brings us to inward identification with values (as you mentioned), and to the insight that what is good in terms of truth is, “at the end of the day,” also pleasant and beneficial (as R. M. A. demonstrated in this post); and also by means that bring accompaniment of delight and pleasure in the service of God—as the Tabernacle is full of splendor and beauty, and as Torah should be studied with melody and song so that we feel that the statutes are good and life-giving, and as the Sabbath is accompanied by delight and song, restoring the healthy nature in which there is no barrier between consciousness and experience.
With blessings for a peaceful Sabbath, S.Z. Levinger
Sources from the writings of Rabbi A. I. Kook and Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein of blessed memory on the need to connect obligation and accepting the yoke with a sense of delight in the service of God—I cited in my comments on Irit Halevi’s article, “To Stop the Rearguard Battles,” on the “Shabbat Supplement – Makor Rishon” website
Yisrael,
I think the discussion is drifting into the realm of semantics. If I understood correctly, by your definition even acting for the sake of truth is a kind of pleasure. Not an accurate or successful expression in my opinion, but so be it. In any case, even by your view it seems that this is not pleasure in the sense of enjoyment that I act in order to obtain. I act because it is right. The sense that it is right is what you called identification, whether you call it pleasure or not.
To be sure, one may discuss whether that feeling activates me in the causal sense. If so, then it is not my deed. Therefore I argue that this is a consideration because of which I decide to act (and not that it activates me). I assume we agree on that.
But on second thought, perhaps there is another subtle point here. The question is whether I act in order for a feeling of identification to arise in me—that is, some pleasant feeling that spreads through me after the act—or whether identification is an intellectual matter (this is what “right” and “true” mean for me) that already exists in me before the act and brings me (but not as a causal factor) to decide to act. That is, identification is not something achieved by the act, but an understanding that exists in me and because of which I act. The act is not done in order to attain something, but because it is right. Is this where we disagree? If so, then it is not just semantics.
To Rabbi Michi:
It seems to me that the current article was not sent to subscribers by email. It would be worth checking that.
I came across a fascinating article that was published not long ago. It’s a bit long, but worthwhile.
The article touches on points raised here in the article—that collectivist morality is good for society (whereas modern Western morality breaks it apart):
Worth every word. What a wonderful and thought-provoking article.
(Kopel is a friend of mine, and we have exchanged views more than once in these and similar areas.)
Thank you very much for the enlightening article; I went back and read it again.
I was persuaded by the article that there are situations in which people act out of altruism, and not as I had thought at first.
I would just like to note that altruism does not exist in every person. Moreover, it is very hard to influence a person to change his motivation and begin to observe the commandments or the laws for altruistic reasons, as you noted in the article.
The psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, who developed the theory of moral development, interviewed many people of various ages and asked their opinions regarding solutions to moral paradoxes. According to his conclusion, only about 10 percent of the population reach an understanding that obligates them at the highest moral level, namely observing the moral law out of pure commitment to ethics and the good.
Therefore, even if one can persuade a person that there is such a thing as doing the good simply because it is good, it is hard for me to imagine a way of bringing him to identification and behavior of that kind.
I don’t think surveys can teach us anything clear. What a person answers on a questionnaire is not the same as what he does in the field in real time. In real time, evil people may be revealed, but the good in them may also be revealed. My impression is that there are quite a few people who are altruists, but when you ask them why they act and how one ought to act, and they have to give an account to themselves of the logic of their actions, they do not describe it as altruism. It seems irrational to them to act without self-interest (the same basic assumption expressed in several of the comments here). So they develop a different theory, even though intuitively it is also clear to them that morality is altruistic and that they too support such morality. By the way, a similar phenomenon exists with respect to belief in God. Many people, in my opinion, believe in Him, but they themselves think this is irrational, and therefore deny the belief in their hearts and declare themselves rationalist atheists (because it seems to them that this is what rational thinking requires).
As for persuading someone to be altruistic, I agree only partially. If persuasion means converting his opinion to altruism, that indeed seems very difficult (like any conversion of opinion). But usually that is not what persuasion is. When you present him with the altruistic option and explain that it exists and is possible and even rational, he will suddenly stop denying the altruism that he too finds within himself, and thus acknowledge it and become an altruist. He always was such. And here too the same applies regarding belief in God.
Now look at yourself. You yourself say at the beginning of the message that you were persuaded by these articles of the existence of the phenomenon of altruism. I think that you always saw that there are such acts, only it sounded irrational to you and therefore you denied it and interpreted those acts in self-interested terms. Once such an option is presented to you as legitimate and rational, you stop denying and acknowledge the phenomenon that you always understood to exist.
At the margins of my remarks, allow me to wager that this very denial developed in you over the course of life. At first you did agree that there are altruistic acts, but when you came into your own mind and put the matter to a rational test, you thought it proper to deny it and interpret the acts differently. About this someone already said that there are absurdities so great that only intellectuals can say them. Our intuition often works far better than recursive-logical thinking (cf. Kahneman’s System A and B).
Something needs to be added here when discussing the partial overlap between morality and utility: the feeling that this result (maximizing utility for the correct act) is not accidental. A bit like a mechanism of reward and punishment—but even then it is not clear how the specific reward follows from the correct act.
Likewise, one must add, as a further stage, if we are dealing with the context of the right act under the umbrella of God (or karma or any other mechanism of providence—as opposed to the blind morality the rabbi likes to advocate), the sense of faith that in the end the individual will not be harmed by having chosen the common good, even if others decided to withdraw from the unwritten agreement, unlike in the prisoner’s dilemma. That is, perhaps in this specific case (taxes) he may lose, but in the long run he will gain (and will also be able to see the connection between choosing the right act and that gain). I do not regard a moral and stupid person (a sucker) as a good person (whatever exactly the word “good” may mean in this context; I simply identify good with quality, not with righteousness). There has to be some kind of feedback loop between morality and reality. It is one thing not to profit from the moral act, and another thing to be harmed by it.
Please also note, in light of the discussion in the previous-to-last column, that you said here, with regard to morality: “Altruism in our context is not action for the sake of the collective (as in its everyday meaning) but a purposeless action (that is, without self-interest or reward), only in order to be good.” Without intending to, you said that this is a purposeless action (and in a comment in that same column you said it is not purposeless), and that is intolerable to the mind. A moral act indeed ought to be purposive (not serving other purposes—it is itself a purpose), but not purposeless. It ought to be meaningful. This is indeed the problem with Kant’s conception of morality. I know you do not really think it is purposeless, but in practice that is the feeling created in the soul (in consciousness) when reading such things. Why is the good good? Why is the truth true? That is, why is it as it is? The fear that if we try to penetrate further and ask questions about values—why they are as they are—they will cease being values (and will start being means) is not justified. If I feel that something is a value, it will not cease to be such even if it serves higher values up to the final ultimate value. That is, the concept of value (it is a binary relation of value–means and not merely a unary relation) is also a relational concept. And a hierarchy of values is possible.
After all, someone can say to you that he sees no value in something. And if one believes in the objectivity of values, then we apprehend them in the world in which they exist (a Platonic world), and if so there is a way to show that person the value in it—that is, to persuade him. True, as in the case of mathematical propositions, there will also be foundational values (like axioms) that he will have to see for himself. But the feeling here that this does not happen is because, unlike axioms, which may be numerous, foundational values are supposed to converge into a single value. Purposes are supposed to coalesce into one purpose. (The same intuition as with unified field theory: one equation that captures all the fundamental laws of physics.) And so long as that is not done, the endless argument between you and the evolutionists and their like will continue.
Eilon, he is not stupid; he is moral. But he certainly can lose, even in the long run. I do not buy this mysticism that the good do not lose. Even Hazal and Job and others did not buy that (“the righteous who suffers”).
Beyond that, when I speak of a purposeless action, I mean an action without tangible utility. But it is not purposeless in the moral sense. It is done in order to act well and rightly. As in the previous point.
Michi, indeed we do have a disagreement. As you define it:
1. The action is not done in order to attain something, but because it is right,
2. “Right” means an intellectual understanding that exists before the action and brings one (not causally) to decide to act.
Whereas I say:
1. Actions are done in order to feel what is pleasant and to be saved from pain,
and I base this on the following claims:
2. The soul senses its own existence, and its basic will is to persist and continue this sense (parallel to its two aspects mentioned above: from within outward and from outside inward),
3. Every other existence (outside it) is translated by it into terms of identification (with that other existing thing, and therefore it wants its existence) and opposition (the other opposes me and threatens to negate me, and I want it negated),
4. Identification is “pleasant” because it strengthens the sense of its existence (fulfillment of the basic will), and opposition is “painful” because it negates it (contradiction of the basic will).
The moral picture, from this perspective, is as follows:
1. The concepts “right” and “true” are judgments uttered when the soul senses the “existence” of the thing, and “false” when it senses its absence. And so in the moral sphere, the soul judges a thing as right when it sees it as a means to existence (the pleasant, as above).
2. The level of people’s morality varies according to the level of their power of identification: the greater a person’s power of identification, the more he identifies with additional parts of the world and wants their existence (in accordance with the soul’s basic will, as above).
Religious obligation too is based on identification with God and His will (“Make your will like His will”). And here too we have a disagreement, in accordance with your well-known view to all who frequent this place, that the service of God does not depend on understanding God’s will (in the sense of the reasons for the commandments), but rather on being like a servant before his master (like a robot?).
My words stand. It seems to me we’re done.
If he loses because of his morality consistently, time after time, then he is indeed stupid (and also moralistic). And if not, then there is already a reasonable basis for saying that in the long run he always profits. There is a feeling that there ought to be some kind of feedback loop between morality and reality. I do not really believe in good deeds in a vacuum. I believe in wise deeds. The right act is ultimately the wise act. This is not mysticism. It is half observation and half a transcendental assumption about the world. After all, you yourself agree that morality is not the purpose of existence. So on your view it is just some entity floating in the void of the world with no connection to anything else (no reward and punishment, and also not the purpose of existence). In any case, this “mysticism” of mine is not much more mystical than your altruism. For me, without the assumption that “crime doesn’t pay,” morality loses a great deal (not all) of its meaning, so if I believe in it I must in any case also accept the assumption of reward and punishment. This is indeed not necessary, but the evolutionists too, on their view, do not accept morality itself (not the moral feeling, which is an evolutionary product), and from their perspective it is an illusion (but from such a perspective there is no truth either, and therefore no illusions).
In any case, I have never seen a person who is moral by your definition. It does not seem that there exists such a kind of stupid righteous man who suffers constantly. Nor do you live that way. Every person has a breaking point. So what you are talking about is in fact an abstraction that does not exist, and in my opinion (and I believe in the opinion of many others as well) there is no point in its existing either (aesthetically speaking it is ugly).
I don’t know why you need to “buy” something. It can stand quite nicely even without your buying it :). But one certainly cannot attribute your view to Hazal and Job. Among Hazal the discussion concerns “the righteous who suffers” in this world. Certainly he has the World to Come. And the World to Come is substance—that is, something real and not just an excuse (certainly from Hazal’s perspective) for balancing accounts of righteousness. The World to Come is the life of the spirit (meaning). That is, the righteous in the time of Hazal already experienced the reward awaiting them in the World to Come while still alive; therefore from their perspective the deal certainly pays off. The question is only why things are also not good materially for some of them. As for Job, it certainly does not apply to say what you said. The Holy One, blessed be He, told him that he did not understand the wisdom of the governance of creation (the ways of providence), because he was not there when God created the world. And if he had understood, he would have understood why “the righteous suffers.” And it seems to me that the Kabbalistic doctrine too strives for this, being the physics behind the ways of God’s governance. When one understands it, the assumption that crime doesn’t pay is supposed to recover. Job accepted this and came to peace of mind. Besides, afterward, as a result of this (and of his prayer for his companions), he also merited double good.
You are also invited to study a bit of Psalms with Da’at Mikra, and you will discover that substantial parts of Psalms deal with this question and reach this conclusion (“When I came into the sanctuaries of God, then I understood their end”).
I did not understand why what I am saying is mysticism. What I am saying is a simple description of reality for anyone who does not deny the obvious. By contrast, your assumptions about the connection between the moral and the beneficial seem to me entirely baseless. And since you mentioned Job—he was the one who raised the question of “the righteous who suffers.”
You cannot see a righteous person by my definition, because whenever you see such a person you will always give his actions a self-interested interpretation (it is roughly like my not being able to see miracles).
Well, it seems to me we have clarified the positions and we have a dispute.
A question for the rabbi
Many times when I hear the news I feel great despair over the situation, and then I tell myself that there is no point in taking it to heart, since rationally my feelings have no effect on reality. I fulfill my duties as a good citizen, and the question of whether I will be preoccupied all day with the situation in the country will not change reality in any way, so what is the point of taking it to heart….
My question is whether the rabbi thinks that “hardening one’s heart to the situation” is like evading taxes or not voting in elections, or whether the fact is that unlike taxes and elections, where my influence is tiny but still exists, here in taking it to heart there is not even the slightest influence.
On the other hand, if every citizen were indifferent to the situation, that would not be good for the country, would it?
There is no obligation at all to take something to heart. If there is an obligation, it is only to act. If taking it to heart will help you act—then it is worth trying to bring that about (assuming you can).
Taking it to heart is a mental or emotional state. I very much doubt whether there are commandments at all regarding mental states and emotions. See here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%90%D7%A4%D7%9C%D7%98%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%9C%D7%A8%D7%92%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94/
Good week, Rabbi,
I ask that you clarify one small point for me.
You argue that a good deed (helping another) does not have to be egoism (a desire to receive appreciation or satisfaction); it can be the result of values—the desire to do something because that is what one should do, because that is what the values require.
I don’t quite understand.
It seems to me that about this very desire one can ask: why are people committed to values? Why do they want to live value-based lives?
To this too one can answer that living this way gives them satisfaction. Or at least one can say that living according to values saves them from the feeling of guilt that results from non-value-based behavior.
So what have we gained by determining that helping another is because of a value-based motive?
Perhaps the question has already been discussed; I’ve only now returned to the topic, and I ask for your help (from altruistic motives).
Thank you very much
One can say anything, but the fact that one can say otherwise is not a question. Indeed, one can say that, but I say not so. You assume that one can always ask another “why” question, and I assume not. There is a primary motive that is not based on a prior motive. After all, about your explanation too—that a person does things for satisfaction—I can ask: and why does he want satisfaction? You stop at satisfaction, and I stop at values.
I will try to ask the question differently:
We as human beings are full of various kinds of feelings, which motivate us to perform all sorts of actions. So which motive is egoistic and which motive is altruistic? What kinds of motives are “allowed” to lead to an altruistic act, and what motives turn it into an egoistic one?
There is a person who was educated from childhood that sitting and not getting up for an old man on the bus is an ugly act. When he gets up for the old man on the bus, he does so because of an unconscious fear of feeling guilt. Is this an egoistic act or an altruistic one?
If a feeling motivates us to act, this is not an altruistic act. An altruistic act is an act done out of intellectual decision and not out of feeling.
The person who gets up for the old man because of fear of a feeling of guilt is not performing an altruistic act. But the existence of a feeling of guilt does not mean that this is why he gets up. Sometimes it only hints to him that it is proper to get up, and he gets up out of a decision that this is the proper thing to do. Similar to what the Aglei Tal wrote in his introduction about joy in Torah study—and consider it well.
Again, thank you very much.
I am currently busy with a course in social psychology, in the chapter on offering help. There are three kinds of explanations there for offering help. An explanation of “social exchange,” which includes external rewards and internal rewards. An explanation of “social norms,” which includes the norm of reciprocity (an obligation to repay good with good) and the norm of social responsibility (an obligation to do kindness to those who need it, such as the poor and disabled). And the evolutionary explanation.
At the end there is an extended discussion on whether pure altruism exists. It describes a long process of 25 experiments conducted by Daniel Batson on the subject; he is the mara de-shma‘ateta [leading authority] on the matter (doctorates in psychology and theology, and a philosophical background). He conducted a long debate and devoted a substantial part of his career to arguing with people who claimed that all helping behavior originates in egoism. Among other things, he brought evidence from soldiers who shielded their comrades with their bodies from exploding weapons, even though they had no time to weigh cost-benefit considerations (what you brought here in the post).
But his definition of altruism is a bit different from yours. He does not claim that altruism is helping because of an intellectual motive rather than an emotional motive, as you wrote to me. In his opinion, altruism originates in the “empathy” a person feels toward another when he identifies with him and feels his feelings (“puts himself in his shoes”). Such empathy is the result of other factors, such as attachment to the other, similarity to him, and the like.
Do you know the man and his views?
Do you know his research procedure? (In the book I am studying from, the description is lacking.)
Does his definition of altruism seem correct to you?
Thank you very much
(The book also has an amusing illustration from the opponents: “Abraham Lincoln argued that every good deed really has a selfish motive, in a debate with a friend while traveling by carriage. Suddenly he came across a sow grunting in distress because her piglets were about to drown in a swamp. Lincoln jumped out and saved them. On his return his companion asked, ‘Where is the selfishness in that episode?’ Lincoln answered, ‘It was selfishness incarnate. If I had abandoned that poor sow and her piglets, I would have had no peace of mind all day. I did it for the sake of my own peace of mind, you see?’”).
I do not know him, but I disagree with him entirely. His approach is typical of psychologists, since they will always look for something that can be tested experimentally (in the best case, when they are not confusing psychology with philosophy), whereas my claim cannot be tested experimentally (otherwise one could run an experiment and decide against determinism).
What he describes is still an automatic response and not a decision, except that it is a response of empathic emotion. It is done without deliberation, and therefore by my definition there is no altruism here in any philosophically significant sense. It can be defined as altruism, but only for psychological purposes. It has no philosophical or ethical significance whatsoever.
By the way, I did not understand what is amusing in the illustration you brought. That is exactly what I am claiming, and that is exactly where, in my opinion, Batson is also mistaken. He would define Lincoln’s act as altruism, and therefore he sees this as a joke. But of course he does not know what he is talking about. This really is not altruism, and there is no joke here.
But the second explanation I mentioned (at the beginning of the previous comment), “social norms” (“the norm of reciprocity” and “the norm of social responsibility”), could be another name for altruism, right? After all, these are moral considerations, and when those considerations are the primary motive, the person is acting altruistically, right?
The question is what exactly you mean. If we are talking about values and a decision based on them—then clearly yes. Social commitment and mutual responsibility are values. That is precisely what we are talking about. But if he does it only because it is accepted (= normative in society), then no.
Hello and blessings to the honored rabbi
First of all, thank you very much for all your endeavors, which help me very, very much
I had a thought following the matter of voting in elections. You write that voting in elections or not evading taxes is considered a moral act because of Kant’s definition that a moral act is what you would want everyone to do, even though your act has no effect. It is a bit hard for the heart to accept doing an act without benefit. I would like to suggest a new definition—perhaps someone already wrote it; I haven’t gone through all the comments here because of the shortness of my grasp.
The definition is this: a person should not think in a way that his actions are of no use, because today he won’t vote, tomorrow he won’t go to a protest, the day after tomorrow he’ll throw trash because the street is dirty anyway, afterward his son will learn from him, and at the end of the process damage will indeed be caused both to the world and to his soul. I find writing a bit difficult, so perhaps the honored rabbi could expand on the idea.
Hezi,
You inserted your comment into an existing thread. In the future, put it at the end as an independent comment.
As for your point, I already wrote that I do not agree with this utilitarian explanation. Even on a deserted island this is still the right way to act.
Hello and blessings to the honored rabbi
My remarks above were within a thread because of a hole in my technological skill
As for the matter itself, I did not understand what “a deserted island” means. How can there be a situation of a moral question on a deserted island in a way that there will be no effect whatsoever from the decision itself on the personality of the person making the decision? And even if there is, my claim is that a person should be the type of person who does not take that into account, and not because of a law utterly devoid of reason.
On this occasion I will write a request. I am very influenced by and enjoy your words—they truly illuminate my life, as well as that of many of my Haredi friends—but we have difficulty with the abundance of foreign words because of lack of familiarity. Now especially, since I read that you are working on a series of books, perhaps it would be possible to do something about this. Thank you very much.
I hope that in those books it will be better (there is an editor who is careful about that), though sometimes there simply is no fully suitable term in Hebrew.
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By “deserted island” I meant with two people—meaning, without long-term considerations. It is not a law devoid of reason, because there is a rationale that such a thing is right (to act in a way that should be a general law). Every explanation and rationale is based on assumptions that you will not be able to explain (muskal rishon, a first principle). The categorical imperative is like that, although in the column above I showed that not entirely.
Honored rabbi
I did not understand your intention. Do you mean to say that there is a situation where the decision has no long-term consequence whatsoever? Can you draw such a situation for me completely? Or do you mean that the definition of the moral imperative does not take that into account?
I came to solve something that perhaps we may call emotional. People say, “I won’t vote, nothing will happen,” like our friend Yossi. I say there is no such thing as “nothing will happen,” because something happens to you in your soul. It still lacks a bit of definition: how can it be that I do something that has no effect, or refrain from something that has no effect, and yet it affects me? The answer is that this is simply how a person is built. I hope the words are understandable; I am a bit heavy in writing.
And again, thank you very much for your important and influential voice.
I see that I explained the method of replying well. Nice. 🙂
It really is not important to draw such a situation. I am speaking at the principled level. Even if there are no consequences, there is still a categorical imperative. But there certainly are such scenarios. Suppose elections are being held for the Knesset and it is decided that from now on the system is being changed. There will be no more elections. What I decide now will not affect the future, and still there is a principled obligation to vote. But, as I said, it is a shame to argue about the example, because it is not important.
As I explained in the column here, I too agree that in the end there is an indirect influence on the collective plane. But even an effect on the soul does not constitute an explanation. So long as there is no real future effect, why should I care about the soul? Give me the soul, and take the property…
I have several things to say.
The prisoner’s dilemma is an abstract mathematical model of the real world. Ordinarily, the solution to a mathematical problem is usually not proof that the same result will hold in the real world, and therefore in my eyes Yisrael Aumann is a charlatan—he uses mathematics to claim things about the world without proving that the world in fact operates according to the game he describes. In the case of the classic dilemma, there is an implicit assumption that the only price is how many years the prisoners will spend in jail, but in reality there are additional considerations—for example, the chance that someone will murder the informer, or that no one in the future will want to work with him, or that he will feel pangs of conscience for betraying his friend, or that the number of years in prison is not deterministic but depends also on the skill of the lawyer and the mood of the judge. When you add these to the equation, the result changes.
As a rule, when game theory leads to a bad result for all sides, the only solution is to change the rules of the game. In the well-known game “the tragedy of the commons,” which is identical in principle to the prisoner’s dilemma, one can avoid disaster by charging the users of the field money. So too in human society, which enforces moral behavior by punishing deviants, from hanging and prison to shaming, and thus the rules of the game change. Tribes that failed to educate their inhabitants did not survive.
You claim that if you knew your feeling of pleasure from an altruistic act were an illusion stemming from biology, you would overcome it and perform the egoistic act. I am fairly sure you could not—people who can do that we call sociopaths. Fortunately, most people feel bad when they are egoistic.
From acquaintance with myself and with several other people who usually behave morally, I find that the reason for altruism is not a feeling of pleasure and not acquaintance with Kant’s writings, but mainly fear of guilt, fear of being caught, and a feeling of superiority over people who are not moral.
Although you admit that one cannot prove or refute the existence of genuine altruism, you believe you are right. I assume you derive pleasure from being right, and from being an altruistic person who has the free choice to be that way. And when you ask, “Why do I want to believe that I am a moral person?” you arrive at a tautology. In contrast, I believe I do not really have free choice, because I was not born a psychopath, and I have no problem with that, because even according to the Kantian imperative, I feel that it is good that all of us be altruists for a biological/evolutionary reason.
Do you really believe that a righteous person is simply a human goat and a wicked person is a human tiger, and that they deserve no appreciation or blame whatsoever?
By the same token that Rabbi Michi believes in altruism because of the pleasure he gets from it, one could argue that you do not believe in it because you lack that sense of pleasure. If you lack that sense, you have no way to experience it and judge its reliability.
(If you do not believe in free choice at all, then certainly you cannot judge the reliability of anything, since your conclusion is evolutionarily forced upon you and has no connection to objective truth.)
I think the main difference between me (someone who doesn’t believe in pure altruism) and you is that you have an intuition that binding values exist. I don’t have such an intuition, and therefore if a person thinks he is obligated to some value, then from my point of view he is simply deluding himself.
(But perhaps you’ll manage to use rhetoric to change my intuition… though I doubt it.)