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More on Complex Evaluation: Reflections on Shimon Peres (Column 30)

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The column uses Shimon Peres's death to sharpen what complex evaluation means: one can and should acknowledge a person's major achievements even when he arouses aversion, but the hard question is what to do when the achievements themselves are bound up with honor-seeking, self-interest, and intrigue. The conclusion is neither blanket acquittal nor blanket condemnation, but a distinction between gratitude and personal judgment, and between self-interested motives and the ability to harness them for value-laden ends.

Shimon Peres as a test case that refuses to become a sticky eulogy

The column opens by explaining why, precisely at the time of Peres's death, it is worth saying what is not being said amid the public glorification. On one side, the rabbi lists his vision and his personal contribution to the state's achievements and survival; on the other, his image as an intriguer, schemer, liar, and fixer. Even his later transformation into a unifying president and man of peace is not presented here as straightforward; suspicion remains that it too was tied to a pursuit of status, the Nobel Prize, and international prestige. Peres is therefore a clear example of a person whom it is hard both to praise and to dislike in any simple way.

When weakness is not only an obstacle but also the engine of the achievement

The previous column argued that flaws can increase our appreciation of virtues: if a person reached achievements despite his weaknesses, that is an additional achievement. Here the rabbi sharpens the boundary: if the achievement itself was born of a craving for honor, power, or comfort, it is not enough to say that despite the weakness he still did something good. From here the broader question arises about ostentatious philanthropists, officers and careerists, and Peres himself: does a contribution to the public deserve appreciation even when its main engine is personal interest.

Why it is not enough to say that everyone is self-interested or that we cannot know

The rabbi rejects two escape routes. The deterministic-cynical route, according to which all human beings always act out of self-interest, does not rescue evaluation but cancels it; if everything is compelled and egoistic, there is no place to praise anyone. He also denies the claim itself and holds that moral actions can indeed be done out of a value-based decision. The second route, to say that we have no way to know motives and therefore should judge only actions, is presented as evasive innocence: in practice we all assess motives, and the demand to ignore that is similar to the strange distinction between suspecting lashon hara and accepting it.

Rabbi Yehuda and Rashbi clarify the difference between gratitude and evaluation

To clarify the status of a good deed done from self-interested motives, the column brings the tannaitic dispute about the Roman public works. Rabbi Yehuda emphasizes the benefit we received from the markets, bridges, and bathhouses, while Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai argues that they should not be appreciated because everything was done for their own sake. The column notes that one can see this as part of a broader dispute about the place of intention versus the act, even though the halakhic picture is complex. But the main point is different: even if there is an obligation of gratitude for the good we received, gratitude is not a judgment of character. One can feel gratitude toward a person, and even toward an inanimate object like the Nile in the midrash, without concluding that his deeds or character deserve moral admiration. On that view, even if Peres acted out of self-interest, he may still deserve gratitude; that still does not compel admiration. And according to Rabbi Shimon, perhaps not even that is due.

Judging favorably means checking for a reasonable interpretation, not twisting the intellect

The column then turns to the principle judge every person favorably. The rabbi rejects the idea that giving the benefit of the doubt means inventing far-fetched excuses. In his view, one must honestly examine whether there is a reasonable alternative interpretation; if there is, one may not immediately decide for the bad interpretation. But when no good interpretation is plausible, there is no obligation to ignore the obvious conclusion. So here too, judging favorably does not exempt us from a real discussion of motives.

Most human actions arise from a mixture of interest and value

After all these qualifications, the rabbi returns to complexity itself: an act almost never has a single motive. Even when there is a clear element of honor, career, or power, genuine value-based motives can accompany it. For that purpose he brings the example of becoming religious or leaving religion: every such move has both a psychological explanation and a philosophical one, and the choice of which plane to emphasize often exposes the interpreter's own interest. Therefore, in substantive judgment it is better to focus on the value-philosophical plane and not reduce everything to psychology.

Do not extinguish the drive; harness it for the good

The practical conclusion is that it is wrong to demand absolute purity of motive from a person. The rabbi brings his experience in yeshiva, where students avoided publishing Torah writings out of fear of pride, and he argued that without drive there is no creativity: honor, desire, the search for meaning, and other drives are engines of action, not only obstacles. The wisdom is not to be overly righteous and suppress them, but to harness them for good goals. Accordingly, Peres's achievements can be seen not only as an expression of his flaws, but also as an attempt, successful at least in part, to harness weaknesses and drives toward achievements of value — and the column leaves the precise balance between criticism and appreciation to the reader.

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

With God’s help

In the previous column I discussed the complex evaluation of people. I argued there that we should look at the total person, and take his weaknesses as the basis for evaluating his virtues. In spite of the former, he attained the latter. This does not mean that one should excuse a person for every flaw he has, but that the flaws do not prevent us from seeing the virtues, and may even heighten the appreciation due to them (since he attained those virtues despite the flaws). Following the death of Shimon Peres, I thought this would be a good opportunity to practice this idea and sharpen and elaborate it further.

I assume that, upon reading these words, there will be readers who feel uncomfortable, since there is also sharp and piercing criticism of the man here (and, as is well known, there is an ancient ban against speaking ill of the dead). But it seems to me that my words here give voice to the feelings of many. It will not help to hide them and let the sticky gush enveloping us from all sides these days take over the conversation. I therefore thought that I should nevertheless write these things even while the deceased lies before us, and perhaps precisely then, and thereby give voice to the feelings of many, perhaps even channeling them to a more constructive place.

Shimon Peres as a person

I will not repeat his biography here, partly because there is no room here to write an encyclopedia, and partly because lately we have all been fed it morning and night. The man indeed accumulated many merits; he was a man of many deeds and of vision. His personal imprint is on many of the state’s achievements and on its survival (I assume also on some that did not really come from him). On the other hand, who does not remember the indefatigable intriguer (from Rabin’s service notebook), the incessant scheming, the dirty tricks and wheeling and dealing (together with his ill-remembered associate Aryeh Deri), the lies and the subversion. All these made me, like many others from every camp, whether close to or distant from his views, very much dislike this man. True, in recent years he became the champion of peace and underwent rehabilitation and won great affection, and as president he became the lovable and unifying father of us all (except when he didn’t). All this only intensified my feelings of revulsion toward him. As for his moves and conduct in those years as well, it seems to me that no one knows whether this was not simply more dirty, self-interested maneuvering undertaken for status (the Nobel Prize) and for the international and domestic honor that he enjoyed in very great measure already during his lifetime (almost no one has places and institutions named after him while still alive. It seems likely to me that Peres did not protest too vigorously when he heard of this). It is no wonder that Peres is a prime exercise in the complex evaluation of people. As he is being laid to rest, this is a good time to examine whether one can nevertheless see positive sides in him.

On motives and weaknesses

In the previous column I noted that a person’s weaknesses can, and perhaps should, increase our appreciation of his achievements. But that is contingent on the achievements indeed being achievements. A person who has weaknesses and nevertheless strives for greatness and attains genuine achievements certainly deserves appreciation for that. But what about a case in which the achievements themselves were attained out of those weaknesses, that is, out of self-interested motivation? For example, if a person suffers from a pursuit of honor and overcomes it and reaches human and moral achievements, even if he sometimes fails, one should appreciate his achievements and condemn his weaknesses. These are separate matters. But what about a person whose very achievements were produced by his lust for honor and by those very weaknesses themselves? Is there room to appreciate him as well?

This question arises with special force regarding Shimon Peres. In my assessment, many of his achievements (and perhaps all of them) did not stem from pure altruism but from personal motives. This is certainly true of his activity in recent years, which brought him international standing and impressive affection. I assume that the cocktails in international jet-set circles, with substantial budgets and institutes named after him for peace, equality, and brotherhood among nations, were quite pleasant for him. His maneuvering to receive the Nobel Prize together with his two distinguished partners (Rabin and Arafat) is public knowledge. I wonder how much he would have paid to be present at the funeral taking place today together with all the great ones of the earth. What a missed opportunity! Precisely this event he missed. Or perhaps not? Presumably he derives a good deal of satisfaction from seeing this distinguished gathering from above. And what of his impressive persistence – after all the political defeats he somehow managed to suffer (they say he could have lost even an election for the house committee of a villa), he continued his activity and did not give up; he stayed in the game. Is this steadfastness in the mission not worthy of appreciation? On the other hand, does it not itself stem from self-interest and the pursuit of power and honor? Well, enough of a little nastiness that apparently I cannot do without (it seems I too have shortcomings). Just don’t tell me that you yourselves did not think the same thing.

Let us now return to our discussion. A similar question also arises with businesspeople who donate charity with great fanfare. Should they be appreciated for good deeds done from self-interested motives? The same is true of army generals who always tell us that they devoted their lives for our sake, when it is quite clear that many of them did so simply because they wanted a military career, with everything that implies. It is comfortable, lucrative, gives power and influence, esteem and honor, a nice salary for uneducated young men, and financial security after retirement as well. Is it proper to appreciate a person who benefited us out of self-interested motives?

Eliminating two opposing viewpoints: determinism and uncertainty

Determinism. One can reject these things from a pessimistic and deterministic starting point, and say that all of us act this way. From that point of view, there are no altruistic human actions, since all of us act out of self-interested and personal motives.

To this I would say that from such a point of view precisely the opposite conclusion follows. Not the conclusion that the self-interested person should be appreciated, but rather that there is no room to appreciate anyone under any circumstances. True, in a deterministic worldview we too are compelled to appreciate people, but in any case this discussion becomes superfluous. Beyond that, I reject the thesis itself (both determinism and the cynical pessimism that follows from it). A person’s moral action can certainly be done because of his decision to be a moral person and to act in this way, and not out of self-interest. A person’s achievements can be the result of decision and effort, not of a mechanism forced upon him. My claim is that even if not all actions are like this, altruistic actions are at the very least possible.

Uncertainty. One can of course also say that we as human beings have no ability to know when an action is of that kind and when it is self-interested. We have no way of knowing a person’s motives in doing something, and therefore we must not take them into account when we come to evaluate and judge him. From this one can derive the conclusion that we should evaluate a person by his actions and ignore his motives. But it seems to me that this is sanctimony or evasion. True, it is difficult to judge with certainty, and yet we all have assessments. Should we ignore them? This is similar to the bizarre ruling in the laws of slander according to which one may hear and be wary of what one has heard, but may not accept it as true. Seriously? Can one really behave that way? (See below.)

A dispute among the Tannaim

In tractate Shabbat (33b) we find an interesting dispute among the Tannaim on this subject:

Rabbi Yehuda, Rabbi Yosei, and Rabbi Shimon were sitting together, and Yehuda ben Gerim was sitting with them. Rabbi Yehuda began and said: How fine are the deeds of this nation: they established marketplaces, they established bridges, they established bathhouses. Rabbi Yosei remained silent. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai responded and said: Everything they established, they established only for their own benefit. They established marketplaces—to place prostitutes in them; bathhouses—to pamper themselves in them; bridges—to collect tolls from them. Yehuda ben Gerim went and related their words, and they were heard by the government. They said: Yehuda, who praised, shall be elevated; Yosei, who remained silent, shall be exiled to Tzippori; Shimon, who denounced, shall be killed.

Rabbi Judah opened with gratitude to the Romans for all they had done: they established markets, bathhouses, and bridges, things from which we all benefit. Rabbi Shimon argues that one should not appreciate them for this, since they did it for their own benefit and pleasure (out of self-interested considerations). It is not entirely clear from the passage which of them was right, that is, whether the Talmud itself has a position in this dispute. At least judging by the outcome, it seems that Rabbi Judah’s words were ultimately adopted, and indeed several books state that the duty of gratitude does not depend on motives.[1]

Some see this dispute as an expression of a cluster of several systematic disputes between Rabbi Judah and Rabbi Shimon in the laws of the Sabbath and generally. For example, regarding an unintended act or a labor not needed for its own sake, that is, actions done for a purpose different from the prohibited one (digging a hole on the Sabbath when one needs only the dirt, or dragging a bench on the Sabbath and thereby making a furrow in the ground). Rabbi Shimon does not hold one liable for the furrowing, since for him the intentions are no less important than the act, whereas Rabbi Judah does hold one liable, because he ignores the intentions and relates only to the act. If there is indeed a connection between these disputes, then one should remember that the ruling of Jewish law is specifically in accordance with Rabbi Shimon (except for Maimonides, who in the case of labor not needed for its own sake ruled like Rabbi Judah).

And yet, even if Jewish law does not follow him, one may ask what Rabbi Judah’s reasoning was. Why ignore motives when judging a person’s actions? One might explain this by appeal to gratitude. If someone did something good for us, we owe him gratitude. But it is important to understand that gratitude is not judgment. One can be grateful to a person for the good he did me, and at the same time not appreciate his actions and his personality. See my article here on two kinds of gratitude, and on the connection between it and the effort the benefactor invested for my sake. Perhaps this is the meaning of the midrashim that explain that striking the Nile in Egypt was assigned to Aaron rather than Moses because Moses owed the Nile gratitude. The Nile is inanimate and certainly not a subject of personal and moral judgment regarding the heroic act of rescuing Moses our teacher, and yet gratitude toward it is still obligatory. This is of course a metaphorical midrashic story, but perhaps that itself is the message it comes to express: the separation between the duty of gratitude and personal judgment.

If so, even if we reach the conclusion that Shimon Peres acted out of self-interested motives, he is still certainly worthy of gratitude. But at the same time, this does not mean that we must judge him favorably and appreciate his personality and his actions. And all this is according to Rabbi Judah. According to Rabbi Shimon (!), there is not even any duty of gratitude toward him.

The nature of judging favorably

We saw above that we have no certain way of knowing a person’s motives. We have only assessments, and the question is whether one may rely on them. Some will bring as support the Mishnah in Avot (1:6), Judge every person favorably. (‘judge every person favorably’).[2] It is said in the name of Rabbi Chaim of Brisk that he wondered: if everything that was created has a purpose, why was a crooked mind created in the world? He answered that this was done in order to judge favorably. His assumption is that judging favorably requires interpretive creativity and crooked thinking, that is, a departure from what straight common sense says. However, the commentators on the Mishnah ad loc. (Rabbeinu Yonah and Maimonides and others) explain this differently. There is no obligation whatsoever to act with a crooked mind. To judge favorably means to judge a person honestly, but not to be swept along by the superficial interpretation. One must examine carefully whether what I see or hear about him necessarily expresses something bad, or whether another reasonable interpretation is possible. But if the harsher interpretation is indeed the reasonable one, there is no obligation and no logic in deviating from it. If one sees Mother Teresa chasing an engaged young woman with a drawn knife in her hand, the reasonable interpretation is that the young woman forgot the knife with her and she wants to return it. It is not plausible that Mother Teresa, who is known as a great saint, is chasing her in order to kill her. In this case the interpretation we found is the reasonable one, although it requires a measure of creativity. And perhaps that is also what Rabbi Chaim meant when he spoke of a crooked mind. His intention was to examine all the interpretive possibilities, whose very formulation requires creativity. But the examination should be done with straight thinking.

This may also be the meaning of the instruction I mentioned in the laws of slander: to be wary, but not to accept. It refers to a situation in which there is another possible interpretation, so that we do not know which is correct; then the instruction is that being wary is permitted, but deciding that the bad interpretation is the correct one is forbidden. But if there is only one reasonable and compelling interpretation, then it is also permitted to accept it. A person has a tendency to accept testimony or rumor at face value and in its immediate interpretation, and the Torah expects us to consider other interpretive possibilities before we reach conclusions. If so, even judging favorably will not really tip the scales if in our assessment a person’s actions were done out of self-interested considerations.

Back to complexity

But there is another aspect that we must take into account when judging a person’s motives. A human being is a complex creature, and it is hard to determine that a given act has a single motive. A person can do something out of an entire complex of motives. Therefore, when a person acts from a motive that appears self-interested, and even if we do not suspect that we erred in assessing his motives, we must still take into account that other motives may also be involved here, some of them purer. Sometimes we make use of self-interest and harness it to goals in which we truly believe (and of this it was said: to serve Him with both your inclinations (‘to serve Him with both your inclinations’)). In such a case, clinging to the self-interested interpretation is partial, and as is well known, a half-truth is sometimes worse than a lie. Perhaps this is why a person who acts out of self-interested motives – even if it is likely that these are indeed his motives (and we have no other reasonable interpretation) – can still be judged favorably because of the purer motives that accompanied the interests.

In this context I am fond of the example of a person who becomes religiously observant. His secular friends wonder what crisis he went through, what caused him to take such a foolish step. They raise various possibilities: perhaps he broke up with his girlfriend, or perhaps he is suffering at home? By contrast, his religious friends explain his step by saying that he discovered the supreme light of truth (in the Chazon Ish’s well-known phrasing in his letters). So the secular people are psychologists and the religious people are philosophers. Now let us look at a person who decided to leave religion. His religious friends explain that he wanted to permit forbidden sexual relations to himself, that is, he sought an easy life and momentary pleasures. This time, for some reason, they chose specifically the psychological point of view. And his new secular friends – lo and behold – explain that he finally understood the nonsense in which he had been living and discovered the truth. That is, this time they chose specifically the philosophical point of view.

So who is right? It is quite clear that both sides are right. Every step a person takes can receive an explanation on the psychological plane and also on the philosophical plane. A person who makes a change (certainly if it is a drastic change) sometimes does so because of one psychological crisis or another. But it is still likely that he takes the step in a direction that also seems philosophically justified to him. Even in times of crisis he will not go in directions that seem to him foolish and unfounded. If so, his step has a psychological explanation and at the same time also a philosophical explanation. Of course, every interpreter chooses for himself the interpretation that is convenient from his point of view. One for whom the step taken contradicts his worldview prefers to attribute it to psychological crises, because this saves him from confronting the questions his worldview raises. By contrast, the interpreter for whom the step taken fits his worldview will naturally prefer to interpret it on the philosophical plane. The choice of interpretive plane is self-interested, but both interpretive planes are correct. In parentheses I would note that substantive judgment would do better to focus on the philosophical plane, since we all have psychology and therefore it is not relevant to the discussion. It is better not to flee from dealing with the questions and challenges raised by the one who has left in relation to our worldview, and to examine his claims on the philosophical plane.

The same is true of a person’s actions and achievements. These are done from complex motives, including both interests and values. One can focus one’s gaze on the interests and condemn him, but one can also focus on the more positive and purer side and judge him charitably. Since most human beings operate on both planes, the self-interested and the value plane, when judging them it is preferable to focus on the value plane. As noted, they may even have harnessed their interests for the sake of values. If we do this, perhaps we too will learn to harness our own self-interest for the sake of valuable goals and achievements. In such a situation one can indeed say that the achievement was made out of self-interested considerations and motives, but equally we should not forget that harnessing the interest to that goal was done for reasons of value.

An example: on righteousness, impulse, and creative barrenness

This reminds me that during the period when I taught at the hesder yeshiva in Yeruham, we established a Torah journal for the yeshiva (Meisharim). At first there was no response from students to write articles for the journal, and suddenly I realized that at least some of them were far too righteous. They were afraid of the pride that would enter them when they received respect following the publication of their article. I then gave a talk in the yeshiva and said that in Hebrew ‘inclination’ shares a root with ‘creation,’ and without the use of our inclinations there will be no creativity. I told them that they must harness their evil inclination for positive purposes, not extinguish it. Extinguishing the inclination is extinguishing the person.

It is not for nothing that artistic creators are full of passions, for the one depends on the other. The Talmud tells that the Men of the Great Assembly abolished the sexual impulse (‘the impulse for sexual transgression’) (and idolatry), and then they could not find a hen’s egg anywhere in the whole Land of Israel. Without impulse there is no creativity. Freud already taught us the importance of the sex drive as a fundamental human engine in all areas of our activity. The same is true of the other drives (as other psychological schools maintain, such as honor, the search for meaning, and the like). A human being is driven by his impulses, and the wisdom is not to be overly righteous. One must harness the impulses for the benefit of the goals we have decided are positive. One who tries to be overly righteous and to extinguish his impulses and fight them extinguishes himself as a human being. He will probably get nowhere. The impulse was created not only so that we may overcome it, but also so that we may make use of it. Of this it is said (Ecclesiastes 7:16): Do not be overly righteous, and do not be excessively wise; why should you bring desolation upon yourself? (‘Do not be overly righteous, and do not be overwise; why should you become desolate?’).

I will leave the conclusions for our purposes – and out of respect for the memory of Shimon Peres – to the reader.

[1] However, see Maharsha there, who concluded in accordance with Rabbi Shimon, and even explained that Rabbi Judah said what he said only out of fear of the authorities.

[2] For more on this, see my article here.

Discussion

Michi (2016-10-30)

Arik:
The article is excellent and indeed expresses repressed feelings regarding Peres.
1. I do not understand what the difficulty is regarding “one must be concerned” in the laws of lashon hara. It actually sounds reasonable and psychologically possible not to accept a report as true, yet still to take it into account.
2. What you called a plausible, called-for interpretation is referred to in halakha simply as “evident matters,” so there is no new distinction here.
3. The approach of using the inclination for good things instead of breaking it sounds to me like something from foreign or Hasidic sources and requires proof. According to the plain meaning, the inclination is meant to test us and to give reward for overcoming it. True, if someone has an inclination that cannot be controlled, it is better to channel it positively; but there are those who try to cleanse away everything called “personal bias” (do the truth because it is true).
4. Personally, my estimation of people who do good for their own benefit (even if only in order to feel good about themselves) is the opposite of their estimation of themselves; that is: if the person is modest and claims (truthfully, even to himself) that all the good he does is for selfish reasons, I will think he is holy and righteous (and perhaps on the way to eliminating his “personal biases” and attaining pure righteousness). If he thinks (even without saying it) that he acts only for the sake of others and the Holy One, blessed be He (for the sake of Heaven), I will disdain him and assume he is deceiving himself and perhaps even sinning in secret (or on the way there).
A good year and may you be written and sealed immediately for good
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Rabbi:
1. Indeed there is no contradiction at all between not believing and still taking something into account. Every state of doubt is like that. The difficulty I spoke about is not because of a contradiction, but because when I understand that this is the truth, I cannot fail to accept it just because there is a command not to accept it, but only to be concerned about it. When a trustworthy person tells me firsthand that so-and-so did such-and-such, and it is clear to me that this is the truth, nobody in the world can command me and expect me not to believe it but only to be concerned. At most I can recite that I do not believe it but only take it into account, but that is empty chatter.
2. I did not understand. But if there is nothing new in it, then very good. The main thing is that we agree.
3. This approach arises from observation of reality. Without inclination, nothing happens. One who confronts it head-on (and insists on creating only when no personal bias whatsoever is involved) will get nowhere. My assumption is that we are indeed supposed to get somewhere. The fact that you see this as something from a Hasidic source does hurt me, but in honor of the Ten Days of Repentance I will forgive you for it. If only because even a stopped clock shows the correct time twice a day. 🙂
4. So here we have a disagreement. A person who is aware that he is bad is not good. At most, perhaps he can correct himself more easily. A person who murders and is aware that murder is bad is not a good person. Maybe this too is from a Hasidic source?…
A good year, and may you too be written and sealed immediately for good
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Arik:
1+2. In the book Chafetz Chaim he discusses this and brings sources that when the lashon hara really does sound true beyond any reasonable doubt, one may even accept it as true. This is called in the Talmud “evident matters.” So your difficulty is grounded in halakha, which therefore does not require one not to accept what appears to be true.
3. I respect your observation, but I have not emerged from doubt. And I also do not know whether one needs to get anywhere. “Would that my departure be like my arrival.”
4. My distinction was about two people who do good… perhaps even so you will not disagree?
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Rabbi:
1+2. Now I understand. I did not remember that he writes this, and if so then indeed there is no novelty in what I said (see the introduction to Mesillat Yesharim).
3. If so, then that is indeed the point of disagreement. In my view, a person does need to get somewhere and not merely survive so that his departure will be like his arrival. 4. It makes no difference. If we are speaking of someone who does good because of self-interest, my comparison stands completely. He is not a good person, and the awareness changes nothing regarding whether he is good or bad. And that is exactly what I said.
In fact, it is also not correct that this is a person who does good. Doing good is judged not only in light of the act itself but also in light of the motives.

Michi (2016-10-30)

Arik:
Sorry (genuinely) for the long-windedness, but I will try to explain my position.
From my observation of reality and from what I have learned in Torah and psychology, it emerges that a person’s leading consideration, even in performing mitzvot and good deeds, is primarily selfish. A desire for honor, appreciation, money, social acceptance, or even a desire for reward or fear of punishment (material or spiritual). A person who is arrogant and lacks self-honesty is unwilling to admit this (in order to feel good about himself – part of the sickness of the modern world), and that arouses in me a lack of esteem and causes him never to rise to the level of genuine “for its own sake.” It may be that for his transgressions too he will find excuses, since after all he is full of good intentions. Someone who is aware that even in his good deeds he is full of “personal biases” (all the more so in his failures) seems to me far more real and humble, and much more likely to rise higher; and he will not try to justify his failures because he is aware of his condition..
I would be glad to hear your response
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Rabbi:
My observation of reality suggests that what you learned in Torah and psychology is incorrect. A person also acts from altruistic motives. If you disagree with that, then we have a fundamental disagreement in metaphysics, and there is no point in dealing with its implications and derivatives. Clearly, if you assume an interest-based determinism of this sort (which in my opinion is equivalent to outright determinism, but that is another discussion), the result will be that there is no value at all to the positive or negative actions of any person in any area. Therefore there is no point in distinguishing between a state of awareness and lack of awareness. Therefore awareness is also unimportant, because all that can change, on the whole, is the interests. No better or worse person will be created here, and this entire discussion is pointless and futile.
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Arik:
Apparently I did not explain myself clearly.
I was not talking at all about the issue of determinism (which you are presumably an expert in; I am not).
I wrote in response to your post about complex evaluation of people, giving my opinion about most decisions of the average person in ordinary reality, and even there I did not claim an exclusively selfish consideration, only a high dosage of it…
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Rabbi:
Hello Arik, and a good year.
As for your remarks, I did not label them (labeling is an accusation); rather, I understood them (perhaps mistakenly) as expressing a kind of determinism. That is a legitimate position in itself (though mistaken in my eyes), except that I wrote that if this is the point of departure, there is no point in the argument. So this is not labeling but a substantive discussion, and perhaps a misunderstanding.
In any case, if as you now clarify, your intention was only to say that there are cases in which people act from self-interested motives, then I did not understand what you disagree with me about. I completely agree. Moreover, I also agree with your claim that if someone is aware of this, there is a chance he will correct himself. That is entirely true, but it does not seem to me related to what I wrote.
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Arik:
Hello,
Overall I was just trying to contribute my two cents to the rabbi’s recent interesting posts regarding the complex evaluation of people.
The dilemma as I understood it is that many good deeds come from an impure source, and good intentions can lead to bad deeds.
Unfortunately, most people like to emphasize, to themselves and to their surroundings, the motive you called “altruistic,” and to hide the motive you called “self-interested.” I do not like this approach. Regarding such people, as a counterreaction I refuse to give them credit even for the good deeds and good motives. For example: if someone tells me how good army career service is for him, I will acknowledge him also for his contribution (because presumably that too guided him), but I will hold in contempt an officer who boasts that he gave the best years of his life to the country (while downplaying what he received). From experience, the people who emphasize their giving are the ones looking to take, and those who emphasize their personal enjoyment give more…. (Another example: in my opinion a careerist high-tech worker contributes much more to the country than the head of a charity organization who draws a fat salary, even though specifically the latter will talk about a mission, and the former may sound selfish.)
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Rabbi:
In my first post I dealt with a different complexity: people with flaws who do good deeds from good motives. I wrote that one should separate the two, and I added that in fact the flaws even strengthen the appreciation for the good deeds. In the second post I dealt with the fact that every act has several motives on several levels, and therefore it is important to separate them in evaluating it and not attribute it only to one type of motive.
What you are now adding is a third discussion, about how to relate to what a person says beyond what he does and beyond his motives. I am not sure I agree with you, because for the deed he deserves appreciation regardless of what he says (so long as there are positive motives for the deed). Appreciation for the statements, in my opinion, he does not deserve either way. But this is another discussion.

Michi (2016-10-30)

Yosef:
A. Thank you for the article, and a good year to you, Rabbi Michi

B. I thought to say that perhaps the lesson of Rashbi’s leaving the cave (or more accurately, his being returned to it) is that one should not judge immediately at first glance, but that even in a negative reality there can be positive points. And perhaps this is what Rashbi lacked when he immediately judged Rome negatively, unlike Rabbi Yehuda. According to this explanation, the Talmud does indeed side with Rabbi Yehuda, that one should also recognize the positive aspects of an action.
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Rabbi:
Thank you, and a good year to you as well.
Regarding your remarks, it is not clear from the Talmud whose side it takes. As for the explanation you suggested, it seems to me quite similar to mine (that in many cases actions have mixed motives).

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