Michi’s Three New Laws: The Self-Echo Fallacy (Column 571)
In Column 517 I discussed the four Michi Laws (the term isn’t mine), which concern failures that surface in our judgments about positions and other people. These laws point to the (unfortunate) fact that I usually judge myself pragmatically (even if the theory is problematic, I forgive myself because practically I’m fine), whereas I usually judge the other theoretically (because his theory is bad even if his practice is fine). Needless to say, that usually works out very conveniently for me, and a bit less conveniently for him (see also Column 507). In this column I wish to add three more Michi Laws, which also deal with faulty judgments about other people and their actions, but focus on the relation between actions and the motives of the person performing them.
A WhatsApp exchange about moving Hungary’s embassy to Jerusalem
A few days ago I was sent this article about Hungary’s decision to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. Beneath it someone wrote:
Birds of a feather flock together… and both graduated from your school… Shame! Shame! Shame!
The intent is, of course, the well-known friendship between Orbán, the president of Hungary, who is perceived as a nationalist who violates human rights, and our beloved, revered Bibi. This act was read as an expression of the reprehensible friendship between the two.
Someone else in the group added:
There is room to suspect that Orbán, as a populist leader who seizes independent media and appoints judges personally loyal to him, is a Hungarian starling who found an Israeli raven.
I won’t get into how reprehensible our Orbán really is, if at all—if only for the fact (here’s a disclosure) that yours truly is a devoted citizen of the Hungarian empire, one who even receives persuasion letters from Orbán before elections there. Still, I cannot help noting that my initial tendency is not to believe media portrayals of him all that much. I see the descriptions of the State of Israel’s conduct, and of various figures here (mainly from the right), in the world press (and at home) as an apartheid state and other baseless nonsense, and I understand that the value of journalistic depictions of right-wing leaders (especially if they are friends of Israel, all the more so if they are friends of Bibi the raven) is quite limited. Not for nothing are our friends in the world usually leaders from the right, since the left typically opposes us (as is known, they are always for the “weak.” For them everything is allowed—see “The Racism of Low Expectations”). But for the purposes of the present discussion I will assume that this Orbán is in fact a reprehensible person. We still need to discuss the premise underlying that message.
When I received that message I responded as follows:
What’s shameful? That there’s a country behaving normally and free of the global brainwash? A point in Orbán’s favor. Black-and-white thinkers judge acts by the actor rather than people by their acts.
The claim is that we have a tendency to judge actions by the person who performs them. If it’s an act by a person we deem reprehensible, the act will be judged strictly and perceived as reprehensible as well. Instead of judging the person by his acts, we judge the act by the person who did it. I know the author isn’t truly opposed to moving embassies to Jerusalem—on the contrary, he strongly supports it. But if Orbán does it—then it’s apparently a reprehensible act, because someone like him couldn’t do the right thing. That’s how we arrive at black-and-white judgment: there are people who are all black and people who are all white. If he’s black, then by definition all his deeds are black, and vice versa. Needless to say, within so fatalistic a framework, that person has no chance of escaping the status he holds in our eyes. He is condemned to remain black forever.
In my view, precisely because Orbán is so reprehensible in the eyes of the media and the liberal world—rightly or not—he is indifferent to their criticism and brainwashing, since in any case he will be wicked in their eyes. There you have the advantage of being presumed wicked: you can do the right thing without fearing the brainwash you’ll receive from the knights of liberal morality. Thus, the wicked—or those considered wicked—can sometimes do the right thing.
The starling and the raven: judging the act vs. judging the actor
My claim was that one should judge the act in itself and not through the actor. In response they cited the proverb (Chullin 65a): “The starling did not go to the raven for nothing, but because he is of his kind.” Both are non-kosher birds, and no wonder they connect with one another. This proverb indeed speaks to the actor and not the act, and seemingly the Talmud too evaluates actions via the actors.
To that I say that, as a starting point, this cannot be correct. Actions should be judged in themselves, and the actor can be judged in light of them—not the other way around. A person is bad if his acts are bad; it’s not that the act is bad because the person is bad. Therefore, even this rabbinic maxim will not persuade me to judge according to the actor. I infer that its intent is likely to say that if one sees a bad person doing a bad act, there is room to suspect that this didn’t happen by chance: a bad person tends to do bad acts. Therefore, when he did a bad act, his intent was probably bad. But if he does a good act—there is no necessity to assume his intent was bad. And even if so—the act itself is good.
Incidentally, in its Talmudic source the proverb speaks about animals and is not presented as a parable for humans. With animals, whose actions flow deterministically from their nature, indeed the starling doesn’t go to the raven for nothing. But with human beings it is a matter of choice, and their nature does not necessarily dictate the character of their actions. It can result from a decision they took against their nature. And even if one speaks of a bad person by choice rather than nature, even that doesn’t dictate that every one of his actions is bad.
The question of cost
Someone else remarked that Orbán didn’t really pay a price for the act and therefore doesn’t deserve appreciation for it. To this I wrote that one should appreciate a right act even if the actor didn’t pay a price for it. Moreover, he does pay a price for his actions, except that here the price for this specific act is swallowed up by the overall price (his condemnation in the media and liberal society). Again, we see the same black-and-white perspective that insists on withholding appreciation from a bad person even if he did a good deed. The truth is that bad people can do good deeds, and sometimes, as noted, being (considered) bad enables them to do good deeds.
The question of complexity: between gratitude and judgment
I have often emphasized the need to judge things or actions in a nuanced way (see, for example, Column 29, 90, 244, 372, and more). An action can be good in one respect and bad in another. So even if Orbán did what he did to curry favor with Netanyahu—so what? Do all of us perform good deeds only from pure motives? Is every charity we give devoid of interest or the desire to feel satisfied, and the like? When a person performs a good deed, he deserves credit for it, even if his motives are mixed—good and self-interested together. In Shabbat 31 there is a dispute between R. Shimon bar Yochai and R. Yehuda regarding the appreciation due to the Romans for establishing markets and bathhouses. R. Yehuda’s claim there is that we should acknowledge gratitude to them even if their motives were bad. In the end, they benefited us.
But that concerns the question of gratitude and is not necessarily relevant to the question of judging the person and the act. It may be that gratitude depends on the act and not on the motive (I owe him thanks since, after all, I benefited from what he did), but the judgment of the person certainly depends on motive. Therefore here I advance a more modest claim: motives may well be mixed, both good and bad, and in such a case our judgment should recognize both components and not erase one in favor of the other.
The question of motives and circularity
Even if Orbán’s motives were bad—which is by no means certain—there is still no reason to say that the act is bad. In Column 372 I drew a distinction between judging an act and judging a person. My claim was that the act is judged according to what it is, but the person is judged according to his motives. If so, there is room to judge Orbán the person negatively—if we concluded that his motives were bad—even if the act, in itself, is positive. But this brings us to the question of circularity.
For our conclusion about Orbán’s motives derives from our evaluation of him as a bad person—especially since the act in question is, in itself, good. So why presume a bad motive? Only because I hold that he is a bad person. But if so, there is blatant circularity here. This act is adduced as evidence for his problematic character, but that “evidence” rests on the premise that his motive for this (positive) act was bad. And how do I know they were bad? Because he is a bad person, and “as is known,” a bad person always acts from bad motives. Thus the assumption that he is bad returns to reinforce the conclusion that he is bad. Sounds circular, doesn’t it? Had I not assumed he was bad, I would have judged this act positively, and from there concluded that he is a good person. The assumption that he is bad leads to the conclusion… that he is bad. Since we are dealing with an act that, in my eyes, is positive in itself, then if I want to avoid circularity the proper conclusion is that the act actually undermines my current evaluation of him (that he is a bad person). Behold—he did a good deed.
Self-echo
This is the phenomenon of “self-echo.” A person who holds a certain view, position, or evaluation about a person or event will relate to every phenomenon connected to the object of his views in a way that recurs and reinforces them. Thus our views echo again and again, and the facts we encounter don’t change them. This echo fixes our views and renders them unchangeable and irrefutable. If, in my eyes, a person is bad, nothing he does—however positive—will help him. He will always remain bad, and his actions, even if manifestly good, will only recur to strengthen my perceptions of him.
This of course links to the echo phenomenon I discussed elsewhere, especially in the context of the media and social networks (see Column 335, 451, and more). Social networks and websites present us with data, arguments, and articles that will “please” us, connect us with people and writers in our own image, and thereby echo our positions again and again. That’s how our sense of absolute justice about our views arises. But here we’re speaking of self-echo, not echoing done to us from the outside. This echo we do to ourselves via circular judgments like the one I described here.
Alongside the Michi Laws mentioned above, I can now formulate two new Michi Laws:
- The Factual Law (Motives). When one sees a person performing an act, negative or positive—if it’s not me or my friends (i.e., if he is bad in my eyes)—then in both cases his motives are obviously dark. If it’s me or my friend (i.e., if he is good in my eyes), then the act in both cases should be attributed to noble motives.
- The Normative Law (Judgment). If it’s a positive act, then one must judge the other according to his motives (which I determined circularly under the first Michi Law), whereas I should be judged by my acts and not my motives (which in any event are, of course, always noble). For a negative act—naturally, the reverse.
But that’s still not self-echo. It is built on these two and adds another story on top of them.
The connection to confirmation bias
These failures evoke the association of confirmation bias, according to which a person tends to interpret information he encounters in a way that fits his current views. There is indeed a connection between the failures, but they are not identical. Confirmation bias exists when the information before me allows two interpretations, and I choose the one that fits my assumptions. Alternatively, from among all the information before me I choose to focus on the portion that confirms my current views. But here we are dealing with information that ostensibly contradicts my views, and I force an interpretation to confirm them. Up to this point these are the two Michi Laws presented above. Beyond this, however, there is the problem of circularity that does not exist in confirmation bias. Here I use my interpretation to return and confirm and reinforce my views. Confirmation bias is a fallacy because it is not necessary; self-echo is a fallacy because it is not true.
This brings me to the third Michi Law:
- After you have reached the conclusion that the other’s motives are dark and bad, you may, by virtue of this, further strengthen your view that he is a bad person.
This is already a step beyond confirmation bias as such (which deals only with interpreting things without the conclusions drawn from it).
Is the circularity necessarily problematic?
On second thought, the picture I drew deserves discussion. Suppose I know Orbán to be a very bad person. He has no interest in doing good. Then it makes sense to assume that his act, even if in itself positive, stemmed from dark motives (i.e., from self-interest, and certainly not from a desire to benefit or to do the right thing). If so, I truly conclude that Orbán’s act was an unworthy act. This is, to my mind, a reasonable and warranted conclusion. If so, my conclusion is that Orbán here did another bad deed. So why isn’t this further evidence that he is a bad person? In practice he did a bad deed, no? Why should it matter what led me to the conclusion that he is bad? If the bottom line of my conclusion is that a bad deed was done, then again there is additional confirmation of his being bad.
I will try to formulate this argument more precisely:
Assumption A: My certainty in judging the goodness or badness of a person and his acts depends on the number of bad deeds (i.e., deeds done from bad motives) he performs.
Assumption B: In light of what Orbán has done so far, I assume that he is probably a bad person who does bad deeds with a certainty level of 80%.
Assumption C: A bad person generally acts from bad motives.
Intermediate Conclusion 1 (from B–C): Moving the embassy to Jerusalem is a deed likely done from bad motives.
Intermediate Conclusion 2 (from A and Intermediate Conclusion 1): My certainty that Orbán is probably a bad person who does bad deeds has increased (say, to 90%).
Q.E.D.
What, exactly, is wrong with this argument? Is self-echo truly a fallacy? Perhaps it is merely a warranted and consistent inference from one’s premises?
Does a bad person always act from bad motives?
In principle one can challenge Assumption C. Consider, for example, a cruel Nazi who murders Jews in cold blood. He now sees a suffering dog, brings it home, and cares for it. Were his motives necessarily bad here? Is it not possible that he does good deeds from good motives? Likewise, when he sees a person in need of help and comes to his aid (my wife’s grandmother fled with her daughter from Germany in 1939, and the people who helped her load her suitcases onto the train were two polite S.S. officers). Such a person has a distorted conception that one may and ought to murder Jews, but in other aspects of his life he can certainly function as a good person. Therefore, even if I concluded that a person is bad, there is no necessity that all his deeds are done from bad motives. Still, I will continue the discussion assuming Assumption C is indeed correct.
Example: Becoming religious and leaving religion
I believe I have given this amusing example in the past. Suppose a person becomes religious (does teshuva). His former, secular friends tend to explain this on a psychological plane (he had a crisis, his grandmother died, he broke up with his girlfriend, etc.). His new, religious friends explain it on a philosophical plane. He discovered the “light of lights of truth” (a phrase from the letters of the Chazon Ish). What about someone who leaves religion? There the situation is reversed: his former, religious friends offer psychological explanations (he wanted to permit forbidden relationships to himself), whereas his new, secular friends explain it philosophically (he realized he had been living in error and finally decided to abandon the primitive, ridiculous notions he had held).
I have pointed out more than once the tendentiousness in such interpretations. Each of us dons the hat of psychologist or philosopher according to our stance—whatever is more convenient and suitable for us. And still one can ask: so who is right? Seemingly both sides are right. Every human action can be interpreted on a philosophical plane and on a psychological plane, and there is no contradiction between them. These are parallel layers of explanation (see at length in the fourth gate of my book, That Which Is and That Which Is Not), and both can be true at once. When one looks at psychological motives one obtains an explanation on that plane, and when one focuses on the philosophical plane one obtains philosophical explanations.
Yet there seems to be tendentiousness nonetheless: each group prefers to focus on the plane convenient to it. If a person takes a step that fits my view, I am a philosopher; if he takes a step that contradicts my views, I suddenly become a psychologist. That is, even if both interpretations are true, the choice of which to emphasize seems biased. What an objective person ought to do is discuss matters on the philosophical plane. The psychological plane is irrelevant to the debate, even if it is true. If a person takes some step and presents arguments that justify it, I should engage those arguments philosophically and ignore his psychological motives. Those are his affair alone and/or his psychologist’s.
But that is not quite accurate. Consider a religious person whose friend leaves religion. Philosophically, he thinks it’s a mistaken step, since from his perspective religiosity is the correct and rational path. He now asks himself: why is that friend taking an irrational/immoral—or, more generally, unjustified—step? The obvious answer is psychological. Apparently there was a crisis that led him to deviate from the path of reason, hence he made a mistaken decision. Likewise with a secular person looking at someone who became religious. In his view it is natural to attribute this to psychological explanations, since in his opinion there is no philosophical justification for it. The same goes for steps that accord with my view, secular or religious. When I see someone taking a step that is reasonable in my eyes, why should I seek psychological explanations? It is natural to attribute it to rational consideration (i.e., to adopt a philosophical explanation).
The conclusion is that what at first glance looks biased is, in fact, reasonable and logical. It just indicates that each person is consistent with his views. We expect a person to analyze reality in light of his assumptions and views. This is nothing but basic consistency. If so, the same would seem to apply to the case of self-echo: what appears to be a circular fallacy is merely consistent judgment, warranted inference from my assumptions and intermediate conclusions.
Why isn’t it analogous?
In the example of becoming or leaving religion, this analysis is indeed correct. There it isn’t necessarily tendentiousness, but warranted consistency. In the case of self-echo, however, the situation seems different. Why? Because there I bring “evidence” for my view that rests on begging the question. The strength of the “evidence” is the strength of the assumption. If so, it isn’t reasonable that such evidence will return and bolster the strength of that very assumption on which it is based. And yet one can still wonder where the mistake lies in the logical structure I presented above.
Surprisingly, it seems the mistake is precisely in what appears to be the most innocent premise in the argument: Assumption A. It is not true that the number of bad deeds determines my certainty about the badness of the person performing them. It depends on how I know they are bad. If I “know” they are bad only because I assess him to be a bad person, then the conclusion that this act was done from bad motives is probably correct (i.e., it follows from my assumptions), but it is not correct to infer from it that my degree of certainty about his badness should increase beyond my current assessment.
I will now offer two further examples of similar failures, where I judge the person before me by his motives and thus allow myself to ignore the arguments he raises.
First example: the soldiers who were killed in the attack
A few days ago there was a report of an attack by an Egyptian soldier in Sinai in which three of our soldiers were killed. Two of the three were a male soldier and a female soldier who guarded together at an isolated post for twelve hours. On Channel 14 there was a reporter who argued that this is an impossible situation and raised the possibility that perhaps those soldiers were engaged in other matters, and therefore the Egyptian succeeded in killing them. Predictably, the Pavlovian criticism of Channel 14 and its tendencies erupted. Setting aside whether it is appropriate to consider the families’ grief and postpone this discussion for later, shortly after the mourning period, the claim itself certainly warrants examination. It obviously has implications for the roles of female soldiers, the nature of their service, and proper integration. But the outcry against Channel 14 didn’t allow a serious discussion of this claim on its merits.
Here I wanted to focus on another criticism raised by Rotem Izak on YNET, where she explained that the criticism in question is designed to prevent the service of women and to perpetuate their military and social exclusion. Beyond the question of my view about exclusion claims, and beyond the question of whether preventing exclusion justifies deploying women in the army in a way that is not appropriate (assuming it is not appropriate), the toughest question is: even if we assume all this is true and the criticism is indeed meant to exclude women, does that mean the arguments of the criticism are wrong? If indeed the joint guard of a male and female soldier at an isolated post is improper militarily and humanly, then that requires discussion and examination. What to do about the exclusion of women that follows is a good question to be debated separately. It doesn’t sound reasonable to operate for the sake of non-exclusion of women at the price of their lives. I imagine that soldier would have preferred to live, even if somewhat excluded, rather than to die in perfect equality.
Again, the discussion of the proponent’s motives replaces engagement with the argument itself. True, if the argument is incorrect, then there is room to probe the proponent’s motives (why is he advancing incorrect arguments? Probably to exclude women—much like with becoming or leaving religion). But the author didn’t even bother to present the claim that the criticism is incorrect, much less to substantiate it. She immediately jumped to the proponent’s motives, and in her view that sufficed to exhaust the discussion.
We can formulate this in a way that fits the self-echo fallacy more closely: Rotem Izak came to prove that Channel 14 and its gang are misogynists. And behold the proof: they raise an incorrect claim only because it will help them exclude women. How does she know the claim is incorrect? Because the proponent is a misogynist and because his claim leads to misogynistic conclusions. This is precisely the circularity I described above. At the very least it is confirmation bias, if one assumes that two interpretations are equally possible. And if one chooses, for some reason, not to ignore the ordinary human urges of a 19-year-old boy and girl on duty together in an isolated post for many hours, it seems there is even self-echo here.
Second example: Haredi female apologetics
Another example of this phenomenon can be found in the many articles and interviews recently published by Haredi spokespeople explaining their position. Usually these are journalists who appear to the public as open and familiar with broader society, and time and again people are surprised to discover that they hold the full set of Haredi beliefs and dogmas with all their might, just like any yeshiva man. Here is my self-echo fallacy in a nutshell: my sense is that a Haredi person who is open to general society and familiar with its arguments cannot truly hold these foolish dogmas, and therefore I tend to interpret this as a desire to ingratiate themselves with their Haredi peers who criticize their “dissolute” lifestyle and openness to society at large. Expressing emphatically Haredi positions in the astonished ears of the general public indeed gives them satisfaction and perhaps even points among their peers. But to avoid the fallacy and the circularity entailed in it, I will leave this interpretation as is and not adduce these utterances as proof for my thesis.
A clear example is Naama Lerner’s op-ed in Haaretz: “You don’t want us to serve or to work, you want to change us. Not happening.” From the headline you can already grasp the gist. I copy here the entire article since, in my estimation, many readers may be highly impressed by it—by both its arguments and its author.
| My name is Naama. I am Haredi. My sons and grandsons do not work; they study in Talmudei Torah and kollel. My husband, too, studied Torah until about seven years ago, and for thirty years I was the sole breadwinner. At fifty he began working in a Torah position. If you ask me, I would have been happier had he continued to study Torah.
I am seventh generation in the country. My grandparents lived here and maintained a Haredi way of life long before the State of Israel was established. My grandchildren look back and see nine generations of Torah life in this place. None of us has any intention of breaking this chain of generations. I am the sector you love to hate. I am the sector that lives in a way that contradicts all the values you recently imported here and that you promote so vigorously. I don’t suit your taste—with what you see as stagnation, ignorance, laziness, fearfulness, and primitiveness. You pity me, a discriminated and oppressed woman (who doesn’t even understand that she is), channeled to bondage, inferiority, childbearing, and taking care of the family’s livelihood, instead of personal development. A handmaid. You are condescending to me, eager to educate me to what seems to you the pinnacle of enlightenment, trying to save me from myself. Give up on drafting the Haredim. The solution is shortening mandatory service. Democracy contradicts the beliefs of the Haredim. Do Haredi women want to advance at work? Yes, very much. But to tell the truth, I think your concern for my rights as a Haredi woman is not sincere. I also think that the reason you press our sector to go out to work and to enlist in the army is not concern for Israel’s economy or security. You don’t really fear the state’s economic collapse. Haredi households rely on a single breadwinner (who pays income tax like any other citizen). I know many secular families that rely on a single breadwinner. No one attributes to them the state’s future economic deterioration. Certainly no one scorns them or sees them as parasites. You also don’t really need us in the army, with the stringent kashrut, Shabbat, and modesty constraints we bring with us. So why is it important to you that we work and enlist? You want us to assimilate. You want to melt us in the melting pot you created, which runs through the army and the world of work. And above all, you are very angry when we don’t cooperate. You have learned nothing from the attempt to melt new immigrants upon the state’s establishment. That was bad then, and it’s awful now. No, we don’t want to assimilate, and we do not intend to give up our identity and a way of life entirely different from yours. Consumer culture and a life of comfort are foreign to us. We measure quality of life in a completely different way. We see value precisely in lives of modesty and contentment. We spend our best money on establishing large families and on fully paying for the education that we see as optimal. You exalt the individual’s right to freedom, equality, and a life of comfort. We exalt the individual’s duties—toward his Creator and his community. You pity me, a discriminated and oppressed woman (who doesn’t even understand that she is), channeled to bondage, inferiority, childbearing, and taking care of the family’s livelihood, instead of personal development. A handmaid. A large portion of the welfare and communal services that exist today in Israel, and that often replace the state, were founded, are managed, and are even funded with private money by Haredim. Yad Sarah, Ezer Mizion, Kav LaChaim, Ezra LaMarpeh, Meir Panim, Magen LaCholeh, Zichron Menachem, and hundreds more associations currently sustain Israel’s welfare system, and most of their money comes from donations by Haredi yeshiva men who scrimp to fund this activity. We do enough. But none of this satisfies you, because we do it out of commitment to the community and not to the state and its values. It is not our deeds that are bad in your eyes but our values. With all the pluralism and the desire to include others, you want us all to share the same value system. Thus you embrace minorities or populations with differences—when those differences exist within your value framework. Anyone who challenges those values is unworthy of inclusion. The national-religious are one example. Seemingly, people who are not a burden on the state—working, educated, serving in the army—but their enlistment and participation in the workforce cannot compensate for the great ideological chasm between you. Enlistment and going to work will not hide the vast chasm between us either. Perhaps, if you want to be the responsible adult, instead of arranging us jobs and an army, demonstrate pluralism—toward us. And still, the past few weeks taught us that it is right to try to reduce the depth of the chasm, and I am also sure it is possible. But it requires a brave, honest, open, and above all respectful, non-condescending discussion on both sides. A discussion that doesn’t try to change the other side but to understand its motives. I believe that if we try, we’ll be surprised. It may be that each side will find itself softening a red line or two due to new understanding. It may be that one side will understand why something that seems esoteric to it is so significant to the other side—and will yield. Maybe. Hopefully. I found myself demonstrating with them in Gan Sacher a few weeks ago. A Haredi woman, who has nothing to do with the judicial reform. You yourselves pushed me there. Meanwhile, the way the Haredi society copes with your hatred and condescension is by separatism and seclusion. And paradoxically, with all the difficulty of bearing the filth flung at us, it’s easier for us that way. You draw the border between us, and that serves us well. The yeshiva boys who danced a few weeks ago outside MK Aryeh Deri’s house in front of the protesters against the judicial reform may not have known what differentiates them from those demonstrating opposite them. But after the hi-tech guy sprinkled money over their heads, they understood very well why they are taught to flee anything that smells of money and to yearn for the scent of Torah. And in recent months there are plenty more examples. I myself am very left-wing in my views. On most issues I am very far from the national-religious sector. And yet I found myself demonstrating with them in Gan Sacher a few weeks ago. A Haredi woman, who has nothing to do with the judicial reform. You yourselves pushed me there. Think about it, and perhaps consider a new course. The author works to promote the human rights of people with disabilities |
From her words it is clear that the author knows secular society well and its feelings toward the Haredim. There’s no doubt she is familiar with it (an ordinary Haredi woman does not write an op-ed for Haaretz). My aim here is not to enter the collection of fallacies and demagoguery you can find in the article (and in many like it), but mainly to point out one issue connected to this column. Suppose she is right. Suppose all the critics’ motives are only to unravel the chain of generations and eradicate the Haredim and eliminate Harediness. Does that mean the critics’ arguments are incorrect? Does that mean there is equality in bearing the burden—or that equality isn’t important? What has one got to do with the other? Again we witness a focus on motives in order to flee a substantive discussion of the content.
Sometimes I wonder whether the Haredi speakers now heard under every green tree don’t themselves understand the absurdity of their arguments. Their righteousness and self-confidence (if not feigned) indicate that apparently not. How is it possible that intelligent people don’t realize they are talking nonsense? How can they truly believe there is no difference between the Haredi community’s contribution to the economy and that of other communities? How do they fail to see the problem of not sharing the burden? How do they not understand that declamations about democracy not suiting them are hardly consistent with their blatant, cynical use of democracy to advance sectoral interests and to defend against harm to those interests? In my estimation not a few readers of her article will feel discomfort in the face of the mirror set before their eyes: how are we persecuting such a perfect society that cleaves to its values? Where is our liberalism? She testifies that she is left-wing, and along with her so are most Haaretz readers, so no wonder such feelings arise in her and in them. The leftist is always for the weak (excuse me: the “weakened”). He always feels pangs of conscience when weakness is presented to him. He is allergic to power. The question of justice, of course, interests him not one bit. Two assumptions always stand before his eyes: the weak is always weakened, and the weakened is always right (and therefore the weakening party, real or imagined, is always guilty).
I cannot avoid noting that in this case the author is a woman—and that matters a great deal. Haredi women are ignorant in the Torah realm, and to the extent of the ignorance so is the extent of the religious-Haredi zeal and devotion. That’s how they are raised. They have not a drop of halakhic-Torah understanding, and they are educated to think that every silly detail someone decreed descended from Sinai. A yeshiva man or just a Haredi man has at least studied Torah and can know what is essential law, what is custom, what is meta-halakhic Torah policy, and what is just the whim of some rabbi or askan. They at least can know this, even if they don’t always use that ability. But women don’t have the tools to understand any of this. They were raised to think that every Jew need only study Torah so as not to sever the chain of generations. They are required to self-sacrifice for values whose source they have no idea of, and whether they have any validity. They do not imagine that perhaps the rabbi who leads them is mistaken, or that he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. They have never studied the parameters of the mitzvah of Torah study, and I assume they don’t really know history either—otherwise they would know that such a situation never existed (the chain she doesn’t want to sever is about fifty years old, and of course it exists only thanks to the State of Israel and only within it and under its support). As a Haredi woman, she has not the faintest idea who invented the values for which she is ready to sacrifice her life (and especially others’ lives), but that doesn’t detract one whit from her zeal. On the contrary, her zeal is built on that ignorance.
Secular people’s sense that Haredi women are subjugated to male chauvinism and excluded from society arouses in those women feelings of frustration. They genuinely feel that this is not true. They strongly identify with those values and with their own exclusion. What they don’t understand is that this identification is produced by preserving their pristine ignorance and denying them the tools and possibilities to critique those demands and to shape an independent position regarding them. This is a classic case of false consciousness—see Columns 203 – 204 and 233—as much as I dislike that paternalistic term.
One can indeed debate whether this is confirmation bias or self-echo. It does not seem she adduces proof for her claims from her interpretation of secular criticism, and therefore there is no circularity. Seemingly she brings substantive (albeit absurd) arguments, and from them concludes that if one wants to impose equality on the Haredim without justification, then the motive is apparently to make them abandon their religion. There is likely confirmation bias here, but even more so the fallacy of appeal to motive. If so, she violates Michi Laws 1–2, but not necessarily 3.
Returning to our topic, all these remarks are meant to sharpen the central claim: if you are ignorant and have no substantive arguments, focus on motives. That way you can avoid engaging with substantive arguments.
Discussion
Well then, you’ve convinced Arbinka that what matters is the deed, not the doer.
And from now on that will be his motto.
But, Arbinka will tell you, all that is true, except here, since we’re talking about Bibi.
The analysis you give of these arguments makes them look ridiculous, but it may be that their real intent is more complex and less ridiculous. For example, regarding the criticism of Channel 14, it can be understood differently: we (the author of the criticism) suspect Channel 14 of being chauvinist, and indeed find that they raise claims that can be interpreted that way, which confirms the suspicion. All this even though from someone else’s mouth those same claims might not be interpreted that way. What, then, could disprove the suspicion? If their claims could not be interpreted as chauvinistic.
I’ll give an example: suppose I suspect someone of being a bank robber, and I do indeed see him hanging around banks a lot. I can interpret that as meaning he really is a bank robber (assuming, for the sake of the example, that bank robbers spend more time around banks), or that he just happens to go to the bank often for his bank account. In such a situation, each of the data points I have strengthens the other. The proportion of bank robbers among those who hang around banks is higher than their proportion in the general population. In addition, among those who hang around banks, the fact that one of them is already suspected of being a robber increases the chances that he really is one, and that this is not casual loitering but planning the robbery. So although neither consideration is sufficient on its own, the combination of the two, when each is based partly on itself and partly on the other, increases the suspicion. If one of the reasons were based entirely on the other, there would be invalid circularity here. Likewise, if the suspect hung around banks less than average, that would weaken the suspicion, so this is not mere self-reinforcement.
The argument does not lead to chauvinistic conclusions but to chauvinistic implications. The result is the exclusion of women, but that does not mean that the purpose of this trend really is the exclusion of women. This is a fallacy of diagnosing motives from outcomes.
But why be suspicious if you can simply address the arguments on their merits? They raised the claim that a male and female soldier together for long hours are liable to fail. Maybe they even claim to have information to that effect (I don’t know. I didn’t hear it. And I assume that even if it comes up in the investigation results, none of us will hear about it). So why is it relevant that they have motives of excluding women? I wrote that her fallacy exists even if she is right in diagnosing the motives.
I explained the fallacy of circularity. That is not the conclusion itself. The conclusion is actually perfectly logical from the critic’s point of view. But the question is whether it strengthens his conclusion or not. Strengthening the conclusion is circular.
I recall reading many years ago an article by Rabbi Sherlo addressing the demand of the Women of the Wall to pray in a tallit and tefillin at the Western Wall plaza. He asked whether they insist to the same degree on their right to wear a small tallit all day long as well. His intention, of course, was to prove that they had no intention of observing commandments, but rather of protesting and expressing feminism.
At first glance I thought then that this was a very sharp and apt argument. But on second thought I realized how many fallacies there are here. A. It seems to me that in those circles, independently of women, people really are careful about a large tallit and not about a small tallit (which indeed is not obligatory). B. Even if they are expressing feminism, and even if they are inconsistent, they still have a claim: they want to pray in a tallit at the Wall. That is their right, certainly if there is no prohibition involved. They are not asking Rabbi Sherlo for permission, and certainly not expecting him to do them a favor. If they are right and their demand is proper and justified, then their motives are of no importance, even if they are indeed feminist or protest-driven. When a man comes to pray with a tallit, do they check whether he is also wearing a small tallit? C. What is wrong with feminism? If there is no equality where there ought to be equality, then the feminists are right. The fact that some claim has a feminist character does not in itself invalidate it, and feminism is not in itself invalid either (feminism is a completely legitimate position, and in my view even one required by morality).
By the way, this was many years ago. I’d wager that today he would not write that, and that is a good thing.
Thanks for the column. Thought-provoking.
In Bava Kamma 92 there is an expansion on the matter of “the starling went אצל the raven.” The Gemara there judges Esau’s marriage to Mahalath daughter of Ishmael and the gathering of worthless men around Jephthah as examples of this idea (or an identical one—see the Gemara). The Gemara also cites Ben Sira: “Every bird dwells with its own kind, and a human being with his like.”
I think that even from a sober view of the theory, there is room for a practical perspective, and still room to consider the context and the indications one can gather from the surroundings.
In the Rabbi’s terminology: granted, these are “second-order arguments,” but still, they are “arguments.”
Thank you.
I didn’t understand your last remark (“I think”). What is it even referring to?
I haven’t studied Rabbi Sherlo’s writings in depth, but I assume he meant to say that the feminists are not really coming to pray. The Reform movement removed Jerusalem and the Temple long ago from their prayer books, and some of them (if not all!!!) are atheists altogether. (The Reform movement in the U.S. decided a few decades ago that ordination for Reform “rabbinate” should not be conditioned on belief in God.) So to whom are they praying? Clearly the whole monthly ceremony of the “Women of the Wall” does not come from religious devotion (whatever the religion may be), but is provocation for its own sake in order to receive media attention, and along the way perhaps to attract a few naïve people to the emptying temples and fill the dwindling coffers (which pay the rabbis’ salaries).
Years ago I hosted, as a representative of the Open University, Prof. Elsa Fornero-D’Alio (later Minister of Labor and Welfare in Italy’s technocratic government) and her husband, Prof. Mario D’Alio. They are both friends of mine and my wife’s (who was born in Italy), and are devout Catholics. We arranged a tour of Jerusalem for them, at the end of which we arrived at the Wall toward evening and parted ways—my wife accompanied Elsa to the women’s section and I took Mario to the men’s section, where I asked Mario for a few minutes for the minyan’s Mincha prayer, and he asked, “Are gentiles also allowed to pray here?” I instinctively replied with the verse from Isaiah, “For My house shall be called a house of prayer,” etc. As I was speaking, I realized the mistake I had made, but it was already too late. (I simply remembered that he prays to a Jew and not to the God of the Jews…).
What is the difference between these two pleasant gentiles and the Women of the Wall? They asked about local custom and did not try to impose their views and wishes; they accepted with understanding and consent every requirement (modest dress, head covering, gender separation, etc.) and did not think it was their “right” to put on a loud show before the media. They are genuinely religious people who came to pray to their god according to their faith, and as such respected local custom. The rest—go and learn.
That argument (that they don’t wear a small tallit) really isn’t relevant when academically examining the demand to wear a large tallit at the Wall. But the question of motive is relevant when asking how much effort should be made for them—changing existing procedures, dealing with others whom this bothers, etc. When the motives are not pure, this is simply trolling, and then there is much less incentive to make the effort. Let them first do what they can without demanding anything of others.
This may perhaps belong in an entirely different post, but one has to remember that the claim “one should address arguments on their merits” assumes a platform for fair and thoughtful discussion. But in real life, in many cases there is no real platform for such discussion, only a struggle over public opinion, which is not necessarily influenced by fair and thoughtful debates. In such cases, the question “who is the person?” has rhetorical importance. From that point of view, the world does not wait for the outcome of the theoretical debate, and therefore whoever waits for the result of the debate will find himself at a disadvantage compared to whoever does not. Addressing the person rather than the argument definitely allows for a quicker response.
Even someone who sees value in addressing arguments on their merits (like me) cannot ignore these significant practical implications.
Feminism is bad precisely because of the intentions behind those who advocate it. Feminists do not want equality; they want to rule. They want everything. Equality where it is convenient for them, and where they have preferential rights they want to preserve the existing situation. The proof is that in matters of custody or alimony, either they don’t care or they fight to preserve the existing unequal situation. Discrimination on the basis of gender is not problematic if it is justified. Where it is unjustified, the problem is that it is unjustified, not the gender basis. Gender, like race, has no special status over other backgrounds when it comes to discrimination or condescension, and is worth no more than other backgrounds. Just as there is no such thing as racism, there is no such thing as chauvinism. The background is unimportant to unjust behavior. The problem is injustice, not the background, and not even discrimination and condescension in themselves (if they are justified. With regard to condescension there is a problem because “Yours, Lord, are the greatness, the power, the glory…” and not flesh and blood, and therefore there is a sense that in all condescension there is a problem. But the Holy One, blessed be He, has no problem being exalted. So condescension in itself is not bad).
In short, the very problem with feminism is the name itself. Why not simply call themselves “justice fighters,” and that’s it? Why not simply be a fighter for justice, or just fight each case on its own merits without being a “justice fighter”? In short, this is all ego, and there is no service of God here at all. In any case, the Western Wall plaza is a synagogue and holy with the sanctity of a synagogue, and they are violating the Jewish custom (which is halakhah) of thousands of years that women do not lay tefillin and wear a tallit. And they violate it in the House of God itself. So their demand is unjustified. If the Reform movement cared about the Wall, then after the Six-Day War they could have demanded some piece of space there for a Reform plaza (which also would not have been justified, since they weren’t even in the country and had no part in the war, nor in the Temple which they despised—and therefore they also did not demand such a part). Now it is already too late.
The very fact that he doesn’t understand this on his own is problematic…
Yes. That’s what I meant.
"Clearly the whole monthly ceremony of the ‘Women of the Wall’ does not come from religious devotion"
That’s “clear” because of a logical fallacy. It seems to me you didn’t read this column.
What I meant to say was that although it is obvious that I agree with the Rabbi that one should not judge the deed by the doer, nevertheless I do not necessarily see a difficulty in the Gemara’s words in Bava Kamma, even though it deals with human beings and not animals. In my opinion, some weight can be given to the knowledge we already have about the doer himself even before we judge the deed on its own merits—and in this respect I wonder whether what I’m saying agrees with the Rabbi’s approach.
One can use prior experience and knowledge in order to form some preliminary conception regarding the deed (this idea may be compared to second-order decision-making, as opposed to forming a position by investigating first-order sources).
Your logical fallacy is that you didn’t read my response (which was much shorter…).
I explicitly stated what my conclusion is based on—the removal of Zion and Jerusalem from Reform prayer books and the atheism of most of them. What have they to do with the Wall? Do they yearn for the rebuilding of the Temple and the return of the sacrificial service? To whom are they praying at all? To a God in whose existence they do not believe?
So before you correct my fallacies (many thanks), correct your own.
Excellent column, Michael, thank you very much 🙏
No, it is not relevant. Nobody is doing them a favor. The procedures are meant to serve the general public, and they do not belong to anyone’s father. Equality is not some special privilege that you, as an enlightened ruler, grant to someone. This whole discourse is absurd. Suddenly a person has to be worthy in order to receive his rights.
Sure, the Women of the Wall want to rule, and heaven forbid it be the one who forcibly denies them a right that is granted to them like to all of us. A glorious reading of a chauvinistic reality.
I didn’t understand the remark. After all, this is exactly what I wrote in the column. It is certainly reasonable to judge the deed also by the doer, but with two reservations: 1. that this indeed be a reasonable judgment of the deed (not forcing the judgment, and not ignoring substantive arguments just because of your opinion of the doer). 2. that you are not using that judgment in a circular way to reinforce your a priori position.
Then we might as well stop all critical and rational discourse and focus on arm-twisting. That is indeed what is usually done, and that is what I am writing against on this site, and especially in this column.
A few years ago the Reform movement requested funding for mikvehs in the same proportion the Orthodox receive. It turned out there were hardly any mikvehs in Reform communities in the U.S., meaning the request here was trolling. Should financial resources be allocated to them? Administrative resources? Any attention at all?
Procedures are meant to make the allocation of resources efficient. Part of that is preventing parts of the public from twisting others’ arms just because they can.
By the way, I have to add that I never understood whom it bothers that a few women put on tallitot. But if that is the status quo, and violating it sincerely disrupts the order of prayer, then that is the situation.
What does the sabbatical year have to do with Mount Sinai?! If there is no real need, then don’t allocate resources. But if people want to pray, that is their right. This is not about resources.
By the same logic, Jewish ascent to the Temple Mount also violates the status quo and bothers the Muslims. Not to mention that the number of Jews who want to ascend is negligible compared to the Muslims. Moreover, there too it is clear that the main motivation is not religious but protest and a nationalist agenda. Therefore, on all these grounds, Jews should be forbidden to ascend the Mount. Best of luck to us.
Mordechai, I wondered whether you yourself believe the nonsense you wrote here. Then I suddenly thought that, horrifyingly enough, maybe you actually do.
1. Factually, it is not only Reform women.
2. The removal of Zion and Jerusalem from the prayer book happened a very long time ago, and I assume even you know that things have changed since then. You know, quite a few days have passed, and in the meantime there was Zionism and a state was established and so on. Maybe you haven’t been updated on these events. Surely these things are relevant to Reform Judaism in Israel. You can read on Wikipedia that tefillin, tallitot, and tzitzit also acquired a different status among them over the years. You may like or dislike Reform Jews, but it is not advisable to distort things and tell half-truths.
3. It does not seem to me that Reform Jews in Israel are trying to fill temples in America. Moreover, it seems to me that Orthodox temples are also emptying somewhat, and sometimes I feel these idiotic struggles over the Wall are meant to fill them. And by the way, even if they do want to fill temples that way—that too is their right. Does every Orthodox person who comes to pray at the Wall do so from lofty motives? And does everyone who ascends the Temple Mount do so only מתוך a desire to serve God (or perhaps out of protest and nationalist aims, etc.)? See my comment to Avi below (from 23:04). The Wall is theirs exactly as much as it is yours, and a state is supposed to ensure freedom of worship for its citizens. Therefore they do not owe you an account of their motives.
4. The question of whom they pray to is their business. You do not get to decide that for them. By the way, neither do I (I too am astonished every time anew by the prayers of atheists, but it is very fashionable lately). If an atheist wants to hold a ceremony at the Wall, that is his right. The IDF holds ceremonies there too, and they are not done for religious reasons either.
5. Even if you were right about everything, I explained in the column that they still have the right to pray there.
6. I assume that the subtle difference between Catholics at the Wall and Jews who think and believe differently from you at the Wall—even you can understand that one (maybe after a few months of study and thought). Jews do not demand to pray in a church, and if they get there I assume they will respect local custom. But if there were Christians in that community who thought things there should be run differently, it is entirely possible they would not respect the place. Especially since here we are dealing with a national site, not my synagogue or yours or Smotrich’s grandmother’s, and as such it belongs to all Jews (and in fact to all citizens of the state).
I recall, when I was a child, that one of the despicable debate techniques of the prophet Isaiah L., when cornered by questions he had no answer to (and my elder brother, may he live long, and his friends enjoyed asking him such questions…), was an outburst of rage accompanied by insults, mockery, and abuse. Even then I noticed that these theatrical eruptions (which in my judgment, at least some of them were contrived and staged) had a magical-suggestive effect of paralyzing every critical faculty among his foolish devotees, after which they eagerly ate the spaghetti (lokshen in the vernacular) with which he fed them. Perhaps I am a fool, but not a devotee, and I eat spaghetti only from the excellent kitchen of my Italian wife, may she live long. Mockery, cynicism, sarcasm, and smugness do not turn nonsense into wisdom in my eyes.
As a gesture of fraternity to a citizen of the Hungarian Empire (szervusz), I will explain to your honor your nonsense according to the order in which it appeared in your holy words of emptiness. (Many thanks, but I do not charge friends.)
1. So what? Every person is required to respect the customs of houses of worship he visits. That is the ABC of being a civilized human being.
2. So what, part 2? Does the crime expire with time? Zionism was established? Really now. Don’t you know that the Reform and the ultra-Orthodox (in Munich or Frankfurt, I don’t remember at the moment) joined hands to sabotage the First Zionist Congress, until Herzl had to move it to Basel? Don’t you know they tried to sabotage rescue operations during the Holocaust and U.S. recognition of the state? Have they meanwhile become lovers of Zion?
Well then, let me reveal to you that even today the Reform movement is bitterly hostile to Zionism and the State of Israel, and its leaders (rabbis in the vernacular) not only encourage assimilation and marry mixed couples in Christian churches, many of them also hold distinguished positions in BDS organizations and other properly anti-Semitic organizations.
Indeed, the Reform adopted some Jewish symbols, and so did Christians and Muslims (there are citations in the Qur’an—usually distorted—of verses and rabbinic midrashim that Muhammad apparently heard from Jewish merchants in Mecca). Missionaries of various religions have always tried to present their religion as the “authentic” continuation of Judaism. So what, part 3?
3. Reform interest in the State of Israel began simultaneously with the emptying of the temples (a result of the assimilation they joyfully encourage). The thinning of income sources forced them to look for new grazing grounds, and this is an old story. You too should update yourself, and first correct yourself, etc. etc. And still, this is an extreme anti-Zionist movement.
Orthodox people also do improper things at the Wall (parties, begging, and more). Whoever profanes the sanctity of the Wall plaza (which according to most decisors has the status of a public synagogue) should be dealt with without discrimination. So what, part 4? How long will you burden us with your whataboutism?
By the way, the Wall is not “mine,” not “yours,” and not anyone’s. The Wall has been a Jewish place of prayer for thousands of years (except during periods when gentiles blocked Jewish access to it), and as such it is consecrated property. It is strange to read this worn-out demagogic claim from your keyboard, and stranger still that one needs to explain to you (a rabbi in Israel) the halakhic status of the Wall. As said above, everyone entering a synagogue is required to respect local custom, just like someone visiting a church, mosque, Buddhist monastery, etc. When it became clear to me that anyone entering the Sistine Chapel is required to remove his head covering from his bald spot, I gave up the visit, although as an enthusiastic art lover I very much wanted to see Michelangelo’s “Last Judgment.” Is this complicated?
4. I do not care to whom they pray, so long as they do not try to impose their customs on synagogues, including the Western Wall plaza, and conduct themselves like civilized people (like the pleasant gentiles I once hosted). By the way, from the corner of my eye I followed Mario D’Alio as he prayed (to whomever he prayed) opposite the stones of the Wall, and in my heart I greatly appreciated that he refrained from crossing himself. Another difference between a religious and civilized man and the provocative Reform hooligans.
And no, not every person has a “right” to conduct any “ceremony” at the Western Wall. Where did you get this nonsense from? Indeed the IDF holds ceremonies there. So what, part 5? (And indeed it would have been better if the “national” ceremonies were held elsewhere, though it is worth noting that the IDF confines them to the upper plaza, perhaps because its commanders think that it is not a place of prayer, and this requires examination.)
5. And even if you were right (and I dispute all this “rights discourse,” though this is not the place for that discussion), they are obligated to respect local custom, as above, etc.
6. Indeed, there is a subtle difference between Catholics and Reform Jews. The former believe in a wayward religion that split off from Judaism about 2,000 years ago, and the latter in a wayward religion (if it can be called that) that split off from Judaism “only” about 200 years ago. I am not a rabbi and decisor (nor are you, but let us pass over that), but even by your own approach, the Reform are not “Jews who think differently” but apostates. For even by your own approach, that Judaism is only halakhah and nothing else—they deny even that. Their wine is libation wine, their slaughter is carrion, and were I not afraid, I would say that one does not desecrate the Sabbath to save their lives. They are members of another religion exactly like Catholics and the other gentiles, and they should not try to impose on us the customs of their idolatry. Their genetic origin (which today may be only that of a minority among them) is irrelevant.
As stated, the Wall plaza is first and foremost a Jewish place of prayer. Even if the state sees it as a “national site,” that does not revoke that status, and all who enter it are required to respect the customs of the synagogue when they come there. Yes, also the Reform, your dear beloveds (and also my ultra-Orthodox brothers, the secular, the hardalniks, and my other dear fellow Jews). I will repeat: the Wall does not “belong” to anyone. It is consecrated property.
By the way—your enthusiastic briefs in defense of the Reform, which you produce from time to time (as opposed to the hatred you pour on the ultra-Orthodox and other Orthodox groups), connect in my mind with the third book in your trilogy of horrors, which contrary to many people’s opinion—I regard as the most threatening and terrible of the three, and much more could be said, and the discerning will understand.
After all, the state (with the approval of the holy Supreme Court) invested millions in preparing “Ezrat Yisrael” so that they could “pray” there. That plaza is opposite the same Wall (the remnant of the Temple, the object of their yearning). Why is that plaza empty, while these hooligans insist on coming with photographers and making a scene דווקא in the Orthodox prayer plaza?
Mordechai,
We are waiting for your counter-trilogy. And if not, then at least a sharp and clear critique of the arguments presented.
My mistake. I missed it in the column. Because in the paragraph “The starling and the raven: the relation between judging the deed and judging the doer,” it seems that the Rabbi objects in principle to any sort of “mention” and association between the person and his actions (otherwise why would the Rabbi need that dictum at all?—and according to the above there is no difficulty in it).
The response is unnecessary. There is not a single substantive engagement here with my arguments, as will be clear to anyone who bothers to read. So I will stop here.
I think you’re not quite getting what I mean. I am not claiming that we should all stop conducting critical and rational discourse; I am claiming that when analyzing discourse, one should remember the things I brought up above. For example, you say: “Sometimes I wonder whether the Haredi speakers now being heard under every leafy tree do not themselves understand the absurdity of their arguments.” But you yourself provide the answer later in the paragraph: “I estimate that quite a few readers of her article will feel uncomfortable in the face of the image placed before their eyes: how are we persecuting such a perfect society that clings to its values? She testifies about herself that she is left-wing, and together with her also most of Haaretz’s readers, so it is no wonder that such feelings arise in her and in them.”
That is, if one analyzes discourse not according to the quality of the arguments, but according to their effectiveness, then there is no problem at all with such arguments. One can think of this as a kind of rhetorical pragmatism—a good argument is an argument that influences and persuades, not necessarily one with reasonable premises and systematic inference.
Of course, one can reject this concept of rhetorical pragmatism (and I don’t like it much either), but it is important to recognize it as a phenomenon when trying to analyze reality. Let us take the example you gave above, of Rotem Izak’s criticism of Channel 14. On the face of it, you can say: Channel 14 raised an argument, and Rotem Izak did not deal with the argument but attacked Channel 14 over its motives. The question now is how we understand the phenomenon. There could be several possibilities here (not mutually exclusive):
A. Rotem Izak does not know how to deal with Channel 14’s argument.
B. Rotem Izak did not understand Channel 14’s argument in the first place.
C. Rotem Izak hates Channel 14 and does not want any discussion with them, only to vent her anger at them.
D. Rotem Izak thinks Channel 14 are just trolling and do not themselves believe their own argument, and therefore there is no point in trying to refute it.
E. Rotem thinks her audience understands that the argument is absurd, but does not understand Channel 14’s motives, and that is what she wants to reflect to them.
And so on and so forth. The point is that understanding the social dynamics behind the argument is important in order to explain why people debate as they do, and to avoid leaping to far-reaching conclusions about why they say what they say. You are welcome to look at the possibilities I raised and think for yourself—which of the possibilities I suggested (or some combination of them, or none of them) seems most plausible to you, and how you know.
P.S. It may be that you simply do not care at all about the motives behind the discussion, only about the quality of the arguments. That is of course perfectly fine, except that in that case the entire column seems a bit pointless to me, since the question underlying the column, as I understand it, is “why aren’t the arguments good / why don’t they address the argument itself,” and not “are the arguments good.”
I am familiar with the phenomenon, and it is precisely against it that I am speaking out. Rhetorical pragmatism is a fallacy and a deception, and it is against that that I write. Calling fraud “rhetorical pragmatism” does not change its being fraud. An argument that does not hold water but persuades is deception, not “rhetorical pragmatism.”
I said that what strengthens my claim is that the Haredi arguments on the substance of the matter are very weak, and against that background the fallacy of appealing to motives is much more blatant and conspicuous. If I pointed to flaws in the other side’s words and inferred from that that he has dark motives, that would be perfectly fine. But to argue against him on the basis of the motives themselves—that is a fallacy.
I was talking about feminism in general, not about the Women of the Wall. And what right is granted to them here in the first place? They are demanding a right that they do not deserve. (There is a synagogue with rules of conduct within it, and by force they want to squat in that synagogue and act contrary to its rules of conduct.) And again, there is no such thing as chauvinism at all. I certainly do not hide that I think men should generally lead (though personally I do not have enough respect for the led to want to lead them, nor the motivation to deal with nitty-gritty details). As someone of that sort, I know how to identify who is really power-hungry and who is truly seeking what he deserves by justice. Maybe you’ll be surprised, but you yourself are power-hungry like everyone else; you just don’t have the strength (quite rightly, it must be said) or the motivation to deal with people whose only thing in life is lust for power (political fixers). You simply want to be part of the “Council of Torah Sages” like any Torah scholar who is a bit more than some yeshiva high-school rebbe. That is, to give general instructions that don’t require too much effort and without getting down to the small details (that’s for politicians). Maybe you’re not aware of it. You are not Rabbi Kook.
Maybe Jewish converts to Christianity will also want to hold a baptism ceremony or a prayer to Jesus there. That is their right, isn’t it?
I read it. What you wrote is unserious evasion.
Instead of writing a vague and general statement and sending me off to write scrolls that have no point (in my view), I suggest that you present here one example of one of his arguments that is relevant to the matter and has not already been answered in my previous remarks. You know what? Choose the first argument you find in his words that meets those conditions (relevant to the matter and unanswered), and then we can discuss it. And then, if you like, we can move on to a second argument, if for some reason you find one, and so on. I did not find even one such argument. Good luck to you.
Michi,
I think the main difficulty with your defense of the Women of the Wall’s rights is that it entrenches itself in an overly formalistic position. A certain degree of formalism is proper and even necessary (certainly in defending rights), but the wisdom lies in knowing when to apply it. Of course, there are no unequivocal “formal” rules for the question of when to give greater weight to formal rights and when to give it to “content,” but there is common sense, life experience, intuitions, and the like.
In this case, my basic intuition is that the Women of the Wall (the Reform women) have no real value-commitment to the Temple Mount, and therefore their demand is much more an act of provocation than a central value. Of course, this does not mean they do not have authentic feelings toward the Wall, but that is something else. Therefore, allowing them to realize their desire in the name of that formalism seems a bit problematic to me.
In any case, even the darkest opponents of the Women of the Wall do not want to forbid them from coming and praying (albeit on “their” terms). Here formalism as a defense of rights is shared by everyone, and everyone agrees to it. You are proposing to stretch that same formalism one step further.
A little thought experiment (and in my opinion not very detached from reality): would you, in the name of that same formalism, agree to allow worship at the Wall in improper dress? A bathing suit, for example.
I divide Rabbi Michi’s teaching into two: the thought itself (noumena) — “I ate the fruit,” and the thought of phenomena — “I threw away the peel.”
In short, I’m addicted to your thought!!!
Thank you…
This thought experiment is indeed called for. I would object for two reasons (two distinctions from our case): 1. Because those wearing swimsuits have no principle that requires wearing such clothing. Let them come in other clothes. But here they do have a principle of wrapping themselves in a tallit. 2. Because a bathing suit disturbs the public and causes them to sin (it is halakhically forbidden to pray opposite such sights and even to look at them). But there is no prohibition, and it should not bother people to see women with a tallit. This is just plain conservatism wanting to impose my norms on others. It is none of your grandmother’s business whether I am wearing a tallit.
It is worth considering the reverse perspective: if you ate the fruit, you should examine why you want to throw away my peel. Is the problem with me or with you? Plainly, the peel is a necessary outgrowth of the thought itself (especially in my case, where my whole purpose is to formulate a coherent picture and derive from it conclusions for our world and our thinking), and your conservatism does not allow you to recognize this. In my opinion that is the correct description of the situation. For your consideration, of course.
Michi,
I think that in your response to the thought experiment I suggested, you are backing away from the radical and, in my opinion, problematic formalism in whose name you argued earlier. In doing so, you strengthen my criticism that your position here is inconsistent.
1. The claim that there is not (currently) a principle for wearing bathing suits is an appeal on your part to a test of reality and to common sense, not to formalism (in whose name you argued). On the contrary, the sect of “bathing suits at the Wall” will answer you in the same coin you used in your reply to the criticism and say that your approach is patronizing.
2. Likewise regarding the halakhic prohibition against praying in front of distracting sights. As best I understand, the core of your argument was not based on halakhah but on an abstract formal principle that in your opinion applies equally to all inhabitants of the world (including the Reform women, who do not care a whit about halakhah…). By the way, I have a feeling that most opponents of the Women of the Wall—and among them there are very benighted people—do not rely only on halakhic arguments. On this matter they understand that there is a problem here that is not susceptible to a sweeping formal solution….
- You are reading into my words a formalism that is not there. I am talking about natural rights, not something formal.
- If it causes halakhic disturbance, then there is the good of the others and not only that of the Women of the Wall, and therefore the situation is symmetric. But if it does not disturb, then they have the right to pray according to their understanding, and this should not be prevented.
If by “natural rights” you mean freedom of worship (which would seemingly secure the Women of the Wall’s right to pray at the Wall in their own way), that is still not enough. A “natural” right is valid only when it is interpreted and applied within a concrete state of affairs. For example, no one would allow a Christian—even if he is an Israeli citizen—to come pray at the Wall with a cross, even though on the formal level he too has “freedom of worship.”
The claim against you is exactly this: on a “formal” level one might think that the Women of the Wall have an equal right. In practice, and when taking into account the concrete local reality, that is not so.
I didn’t understand your second answer.
Again we’ve returned to formalism? I already wrote that I do not know where you saw that in me.
I pointed out exactly where in my last response, and I also explained it.
You did not point it out, because there is no basis for it in my words, and you also did not provide any such basis. And by the way, even regarding Christians I am not sure it is not due to them as well.
Well, when you present it like that, I’m convinced.
In the first example, I think the fallacy is a different one: begging the question, not ad hominem.
You wrote: "How do I know that this argument is incorrect? Because the person making it is a chauvinist and because his argument leads to chauvinistic conclusions."
But in my view it is actually: "How do I know that this argument is incorrect? Because it leads to chauvinistic conclusions. How do I know that the person making it is a chauvinist? Because his argument is chauvinistic."
I think this based on arguments I’ve had with people who are usually on my side, when I argue for something that leads to a conclusion that contradicts my own belief. They infer from that that I’m in the other camp.