Moral Judgment of a Person According to His Own Approach (Column 372)
A few days ago a question was raised on the site about the moral judgment of the Nazis. In the course of the discussion, the question arose regarding the moral judgment we pass on a person’s (or a group’s) behavior: should it be made according to that person’s own approach, or according to the judge’s approach (according to mine)? For some reason I thought I had already addressed this more than once, but a search on the site did not turn up a systematic discussion. I told myself that this lacuna ought to be filled as soon as possible (after all, the whole world is waiting to finally hear the truth about how one should properly judge behaviors and people). The time has come to deal with this important, painful, and murky topic, and perhaps this column will also be a natural place for my revered Rabbi Metolginus, may he live long, to offer his reflections and critiques on the subject (in that thread they surfaced only in brief).
The Nazis
Let us begin by honoring our host and go straight to Godwin’s Law. The bluntest example to discuss, of course, is the Nazis, may their names be blotted out. Seemingly it is obvious to any sensible person that they were utterly wicked, and that every enlightened person is commanded to eradicate them from the face of the earth—preferably while they’re still small. Why is it so clear in that case that there is no room to judge them by their own approach? After all, unlike many other criminals who act out of a momentary impulse, the Nazis did have a coherent system they followed (and of course they were not the only ones. Even “the Jordanians had a method,” though this is not the place).
The assumption is that in the Nazi case it is patently clear that we are dealing with a perverse system. A racist conception that permits and even mandates killing living beings of various kinds (Jews, homosexuals—“as per the Torah,” of course—Roma, the disabled, regime opponents, communists, and more) is illegitimate; therefore it is not reasonable to judge those who hold it by their own lights. On the contrary, holding such a twisted system is itself a moral blemish. From this perspective, the Nazis were systematic felons rather than offenders driven by momentary urges, and that is a consideration for stringency, not leniency. Moreover, if we judge the Nazis by their own approach, it would follow that we cannot judge anyone strictly. Every person who does something acts according to his own approach. True, one could (in principle) conclude that we really cannot judge people at all; but anyone unwilling to accept that conclusion—i.e., anyone who believes in morality and its significance—cannot forgo moral judgment of people and behaviors. For such a person, it would seem the option of judging people by their own approach is off the table. One might, at most, treat the existence of a “system” as a mitigating circumstance (“we followed orders”), but certainly not as a full exoneration. And even seeing a “system” as a mitigating circumstance is not simple; intuitively, it argues for stringency, as I already noted.
But I nonetheless disagree with all this. In my view, every person, or group—including the Nazis—should be judged by their own approach, however perverse, and not by mine. To clarify, let me state already here that this has nothing whatsoever to do with moral relativism. Before getting into that, I must preface with a necessary note about moral judgment in general.
Judgment vs. Self-Defense
When I judge a person or a person’s act morally, I must decide whether he is a good person or not, or whether he acted well or not. The implications of that judgment can be varied. Sometimes there are legal consequences (imposing punishment, as in the case of the Nazis). Sometimes I want to know whether I must defend myself against him, or simply whether I want to have any dealings with him (friendship, neighborhood, diplomatic relations, and the like). And sometimes I judge a person only to learn how I should behave (and how not to). I may ask whether I want my children to associate with him (an educational consideration), and so on.
For my purposes here, the goal of the judgment doesn’t matter, but its character does. If I want to know whether I should defend myself against him or deter him (or others) from such actions in the future, that is a technical consideration, and the moral judgment itself is marginal. In such cases, I am not truly judging a person or an act morally; I am simply deciding whether I want the act to occur or not. That decision can be made for reasons of convenience, self-protection from threats, and the like. I can imprison or kill a murderer because I do not want him to kill me. Such a decision does not necessarily involve a moral judgment of his actions. It could be that the person is a dangerous robot that has gone out of control and poses a threat to me; therefore I will destroy it or lock it away. That does not imply that, in my view, that robot deserves punishment because it acts immorally. In such a case I am not judging; I am defending myself. The same applies to a human being. One can decide to imprison someone without determining that he acted immorally—simply because he is dangerous and I must protect myself. I am not dealing here with that kind of “judgment,” for it is not truly a moral judgment of the person or the act. Our topic here is judging the person and his deeds.
Judgments aimed at self-defense or deterrence—even if I must reach conclusions about what is fitting or unfitting—are certainly made according to my approach and not the “offender’s.” I must determine whether the act is dangerous and should be prevented; therefore, here, my own approach is obviously decisive. The same holds for deciding whether I want my son to share a classroom with him. I want my son to grow up with proper values and to keep away from a bad neighbor so as not to be influenced. Here, the evil of that prospective neighbor is determined by my approach. After all, I am deciding how I want my son educated; I am not judging that person in himself. As stated, my discussion in this column is not about such judgments. Here I deal with judging a person or act to determine whether it was moral or not. I want to determine whether he is a good or bad person. One might ask: to what end—why do I need to judge people at all, beyond practical questions (like self-defense and education)? But the fact is that we do judge, and I seek to examine the nature of such judgment.
Judging the Person or the Act
Even when I judge the person, if in my approach murder is forbidden, then a murderer is a bad person. Even if in his own approach there is no prohibition of murder—he is a bad person. In fact, if he believes there is no prohibition of murder, he is even worse: he holds a bad ideology, and is not merely someone who stumbled. So where can one even hesitate about whether to judge a person according to his own approach?
It is no accident that up to now I spoke about judging a person and judging an act. The act of murder is certainly a bad act, even if the murderer thinks it is good. But when I ask whether the person is bad, here one can argue that the judgment should be made according to his own approach. The distinction between judging the person and judging the act could be interpreted as distinguishing between judging a specific act and judging a person’s overall conduct (across his life). That is not what I mean. Here I intend to distinguish between two kinds of judgment of the very same act: judgment of the act (the cheftza) and judgment of the person who performed it at that moment (the gavra). My claim is that I can decide that the act of the Nazi who murdered a Roma person is bad (the cheftza of the act is bad), but if the Nazi truly believed that he was doing a good deed—then he is not a bad person, and did not act as a bad person (the gavra was not bad). In such a case, I claim it is proper to judge the person as mistaken but not wicked. My contention is that a person’s wickedness is determined according to his own approach.
Consider an extreme example: Reuven sees Shimon running with a rifle and thinks Shimon is firing in all directions and endangering people. Reuven shoots Shimon dead under the law of a “pursuer.” An act that unquestionably demands moral evaluation. It then turns out he was mistaken, and Shimon was actually using a device that disperses a pleasant scent in the area. The act Reuven committed was, of course, bad—he killed an innocent person. But it is very hard to say that Reuven behaved as a bad person. On the contrary, he did what he was obligated to do from his point of view. In this case, the act is bad (in the cheftza) but Reuven (the gavra) is mistaken, not wicked. This is a case of a factual mistake. I contend that a mistake in an ethical worldview is similar in this respect to a factual mistake. A Nazi who truly and sincerely believes that Jews are harmful and must be exterminated from the face of the earth is not a bad person but mistaken—assuming he truly believes this. From his perspective, the moral imperative is to kill all Jews. In the Radbaz’s terminology, one would say he “erred in his reasoning,” and is therefore coerced. Note well that I fully agree that the act itself is manifestly evil, and that the ethical position that led to it is clearly evil (the generalization that all Jews are dangerous and malicious). My claim is that the person who did it is not a bad person. The reasoning is very simple: if he truly believes all this, what do we expect him to do—act in a way that seems bad to him?
My principal claim here concerns the judgment of the gavra as I have defined it, and only that. I argue that such judgment should always be made according to his approach, not mine.
Weakness of the Will
Here the key question arises: who, then, is a person it is proper to judge as a bad person (in the gavra)? Seemingly everyone believes in what he is doing (even if his values are bad in my view), and if we judge him by his own approach, he is never a bad person.
Not so. In many cases we act in ways that—even according to us—are bad. A religious believer sometimes commits religious transgressions even though he himself thinks the act is wrong. A person committed to morality commits moral transgressions even though he knows the deeds are bad. These are phenomena of weakness of the will (see Columns 172–173), and in religious terminology we often refer to them as the overpowering of the evil inclination. Such a person is one it is proper to regard as wicked also in the gavra, not only in the cheftza.
Consider someone who steals another person’s property. The thief believes in people’s right to property and in the prohibition against violating it (“Do not steal”), but he lacks money, or simply has an urge to harm another or to gain more money. How should we judge such a person? I see him as a bad person, since the way he acted is bad even according to his own approach. True, in his value hierarchy, the desire to make money stands above respecting others’ property rights; thus, ostensibly, he did what is right according to his approach. But it is clear that his desire to make money is not a value—it is an urge or an interest. One who places an interest or urge above his values is a bad person. When I speak of judging a person by his own approach, I refer to someone for whom, according to his system of values, there is nothing wrong in failing to respect others’ property rights. He is not acting out of urge or self-interest against morality; rather, his set of moral rules differs from mine. If I were persuaded that this is indeed the case, I would judge him favorably (in the gavra), even though his act is, of course, bad.
It seems to me that what usually happens is that we simply find it hard to believe that a person truly holds such a morally preposterous system. When we see someone stealing from someone or murdering someone, we assume that he too understands the act is bad, but his urge overpowered him and he succumbed to desire or interest. Therefore we view him as a bad (immoral) person. But if Elijah the Prophet came and told us that, in fact, the prohibitions of theft or murder are not recognized in his value system, we would have to judge him differently. This also applies to the Nazis. In my opinion, we judge them unfavorably only because it is clear to us that it is impossible that people truly believe in such a morally distorted system. We assess that they too understand that murder is bad, but their desire overpowered them. If that is the case, then indeed they should be judged unfavorably. But if, hypothetically, I were convinced that they truly and sincerely believe that this is how one ought to act, I would have to relate to the gavra differently. My general claim (that wickedness must be determined according to the “wicked person’s” own approach) is to be taken as a theoretical one. Practically, such a judgment depends on whether I believe the person truly holds a value system so different from mine.
Factual Error vs. Value Error
Let us return to the Nazis. I explained that if they acted in a way that—even by their own account—was morally bad (for example, out of lust or fear), then they should be judged culpable. In that case, by their own lights they are bad people (in the gavra). But there are two other modes of action that can lead to Nazi-like behavior: (1) a factual error—for example, suppose they thought the Jews were plotting to take over the world and destroy everyone else; (2) a value error—they truly and sincerely believe that killing Jews is good (even if the Jews are not plotting to take over the world; akin to “you shall purge the evil from your midst”).
Both of these are claims for leniency, since coercion regarding beliefs is coercion in every respect (see, for example, Responsa Radbaz IV §187, 1158), yet there is still a practical difference between these two possibilities:
- In possibility (1), given their factual premise, they are right in the stance that the Jews should be exterminated. What is more, if we had reached that conclusion, we would probably have done the same. The value system that one should eradicate evil is correct, and it is not unique to the Nazis. In such a case, their error was a factual one, since the Jews were not actually plotting to take over the world.
- By contrast, in possibility (2) we are dealing with a value error. They act on the basis of an incorrect moral system; that is, they are mistaken regarding the prohibition of murder (again, in this possibility I assume they truly and sincerely believe this, and it is not the counsel of desire). There is a difference in how we treat these two possibilities.
Above I noted that when it comes to a value error, we have a (not always justified) tendency to think this cannot be. I do not believe a Nazi who claims he truly thought there is nothing wrong in murdering a Jew or a Roma. Therefore I judge him unfavorably. But if, theoretically, he truly believed it, and if I were convinced that this is indeed the case (if Elijah came and told me so), then I would indeed judge him favorably. By contrast, in a case of misapprehending reality, it is certainly possible that this is really what the person thinks. After all, in principle it is possible that there is a group of people plotting to take over the world. In such a case, it is easier and more reasonable to accept the claim that they made a factual mistake, and therefore to judge them favorably. Here I would not even say I judge them favorably; rather, I see them as people acting with dedication on behalf of morality. They invested effort and resources into cleansing the world of a group that seeks to destroy it. Not only do they not deserve condemnation; they deserve appreciation. The fact that they erred in assessing reality changes the judgment of the act itself, of course, but it does not change the judgment of the gavra.
The Meaning of Coercion
Usually, when a claim of coercion (ones) is raised regarding a person’s act (the exemption under “you shall do nothing to the girl”), it is a claim intended to exempt him from responsibility for his actions. If he acted under coercion, his responsibility is reduced, if it exists at all. This claim does not arise at the stage of determining the verdict (guilty or not), but when we reach sentencing (the punishment). My claim here is that the coercion claim also has a role in the discussion of the verdict itself. The very question whether the person is a wrongdoer (in the gavra) depends on his conception of reality and his moral system. That is, not only are errors in understanding reality and in the moral system claims of coercion; they also affect the very seeing of the person as a wrongdoer, not merely the degree of his responsibility (and the punishment he deserves). The claim is that he deserves no punishment at all—not that he is a wrongdoer exempt from punishment.
Irresponsibility in Forming One’s View of Reality or Values
It is, however, possible to level a charge against a person who errs in his value conceptions or his view of reality, if the formation of those conceptions was done irresponsibly and without sufficient thought. If a Nazi were to tell us that, in his view, Jews are plotting to destroy the world, we could ask him what evidence led him to that conclusion. Especially if he takes such drastic measures against them, he is obligated to examine thoroughly the factual and value underpinnings on which those measures are based and which justify them. Irresponsibility in forming a moral system and a view of reality is also grounds for a moral claim.
There are situations where it is harder to establish blame, when a person grows up and lives within a social atmosphere in which those assessments of reality and moral conceptions are taken for granted. Think of a Haredi or religious person who lives within a conception in which the gentile is a kind of animal who behaves like an animal and never acts for moral reasons. This is indeed nonsense that does not withstand factual scrutiny, but we know the religious apologetics and pilpul that harmonize the dogmas (with a cholem…) against any reality whatsoever. Even if he sees a gentile acting properly, he can explain that the behavior is intended to achieve some interest, to gain honor, to look good, and so forth. And a Jew who does not act properly—well, of course, that is the “leaven in the dough” (whatever that odd statement may mean). The gates of excuses are never closed.
How far can we find a person like that blameworthy—for behaving toward a gentile according to the absurd assumptions on which he was raised and which everyone he respects keeps pumping into him? The matters are presented to him as a direct instruction from the Creator, and who is he—“a worm and not a man”—to disagree?! This is a very difficult question. True, such a person is not exercising his critical faculties regarding what is presented to him as “principles of faith,” but it seems that almost any reasonable person in such a situation would act this way. Very few permit themselves to be critical of foundational positions accepted in the society in which they live (this is one of the main aims of this site).
The same applies to societies that are, ostensibly, less closed. Readers of Haaretz are considered a more open community than the Haredi community. I am not at all sure that is correct, but setting that aside, we must think about someone who lives within such a cultural environment and is nourished by the processed information it presents to its believers. Is it reasonable to demand that he exercise a critical sense and recognize that these folks are talking nonsense? I hear intelligent people from that camp who say such nonsense that one’s ears should be shielded from hearing it. The same holds, of course, for the Right. The same holds for the dispute around the LGBTQ community and its supporters or opponents. Here too, on both sides there are categorical judgments, and people are unwilling to judge their opponents according to the opponents’ own approach.
Again, in most of these cases we are not dealing with horrific deeds (although a murder at a pride parade, or persecuting people on the basis of sexual orientation, are of course grave acts; see below on extreme cases), yet there is certainly judgment being made by both sides—even in the gavra. We not only disagree with the other side’s views and actions (in the cheftza); we also regard them as wicked. Right-wingers are convinced left-wingers are wicked, and vice versa. The same for liberals and conservatives. But if we judge them by their own approach, the picture changes. Even if we do not change our view of the opinions and actions themselves (in the cheftza), the judgment of the gavra certainly changes. Again, there is room to examine how they formed their positions (both value and factual), the logic and evidence underlying the stances they express, and still it is hard to see full culpability here. A reasonable person who grew up in such an atmosphere will likely think that way.
I think that in these cases we tend not to believe that people truly hold these positions. We tend to see them as wicked who adopt such a stance for various dubious reasons (what reasons?). But I think that is merely our bias. I am inclined to think that usually these people do indeed believe the positions they express. At most one could say these are foolish positions, and that they did not examine them responsibly and properly. But there is, at least, diminished culpability here.
I will note that the degree of blame for irresponsibly examining values and facts depends on the severity of the outcomes. If the outcome is horrific, then there is a stronger demand to examine the counter-arguments thoroughly before forming a position, and therefore culpability in such cases is graver. This brings me to especially extreme groups, such as ISIS (or the Nazis).
Extreme Cases
It is relatively easy for us to require judging the gavra according to his own approach in questions of Left and Right, since the outcomes are not horrific. And in general, Haredim usually do not commit horrific acts against gentiles or secular people (if only because they lack the power and ability to do so). But what would you say about the disciples of al-Baghdadi of ISIS? They grow up on conceptions that the West and the infidels are evil, and it is a commandment to exterminate them. Thus says God Himself through His prophet al-Baghdadi. Do we expect a simple, God-fearing person, whose spiritual leaders instruct him to decapitate a Western journalist, to exercise his critical faculties and refuse to do so? Perhaps I do expect that, but how realistic is the expectation? It is easy to agree that there is no full personal responsibility here. He truly and sincerely believes that beheading infidels corrects the world and leads it toward its telos. We must remember that the matters are presented to him as the very word of God, and we cannot comprehend or critique them.
True, we can demand of him to examine his stance and the arguments of his leaders, and certainly to distinguish between the word of God and the interpretations those words receive from human mouths. I repeat again and again in the Trilogy and here: almost nothing in the Torah that reached us is the direct word of God untouched by an interpreter’s hand. Almost everything is human handiwork; therefore every halakhah we have, biblical or rabbinic, can be mistaken. And even if there are considerations of authority (we lack the authority to determine that halakhot established by the Sanhedrin or the Talmud are mistaken), it is nevertheless clear that I would not kill on the basis of a mistaken halakhah just because of a lack of authority.
In practice, we all know this is a very demanding requirement. Go and see, in the moderate religious world, how willing people are to examine foundational assumptions, and how they defend religious dogmas with all their might—even when it turns out to be utter nonsense.
Personal Responsibility
I will conclude with a story. A year or two ago I was invited to a gathering of religious leaders at Ort Ramla High School, which serves an Arab population from Lod and Ramla. Religious leaders from all accessible religions were invited: Christian priests, Muslim and Druze imams, and Jewish rabbis. We all spoke before the students in various classes, then they asked questions and a short discussion followed.
Incidentally, I cannot refrain from expressing my impression of the event. It was most impressive. I do not think I would encounter as interested, respectful, and polite an attitude in Jewish schools as I saw among the students there. It was quite surprising to me, especially when I learned that this is a comprehensive high school without selection of students. The principal was also a very impressive figure. In general, it was an interesting encounter and dialogue among us as well.
I note that the religious leadership present was very moderate, and one of the main goals of the talks was to prevent extremist actions and views. Their main message was the duty to obey the religious and spiritual leadership, and they all assumed that this way they would prevent extremist actions usually committed by unruly youth.[1] In my own talks I tried to convey to the students in the various classes quite the opposite message. I called on them to form their positions themselves and not to follow any spiritual or religious leader, moderate or extreme. I told them that in my opinion this prescription leads overall to a more balanced situation than collective following of a leader, even a moderate one. Beyond the inherent value I see in a person’s autonomous conduct, tying the conduct of an entire group to a single person is dangerous. A single problematic instruction from him suffices to change the whole picture of the group. By contrast, when people form their conceptions themselves, each pulls in a different direction, and together they produce a better social balance (this is essentially a capitalist “invisible hand” conception versus centralism).
I told them that in my religious outlook (and I added that I say and write this to religious Jews as well), a person will ultimately be held to account for his actions, and he cannot hide behind obedience to his leadership. In the end, each of us is responsible for his deeds. You can consult and hear arguments—certainly if we are talking about wise people older than you—but in the end the responsibility is yours and the decision is yours. So they told the Nazis at the Nuremberg Trials, and so shall it be told to every person, Jew or Muslim or of any other faith, when he comes before the Heavenly Court. I told them that ISIS members justify beheading by saying it was their leader’s command, and in my eyes this is a problematic justification (beyond the fact that the directive itself is wrong). In the end you are required to think and form your own position. Choosing the leader is also your decision, of course; thus, following him is also a step rooted in your own choice, and you are responsible for it. This is true for Jews (cf. “the annihilation of Amalek”)[2] and for Muslims, for Right and Left, and for every person. Even if you truly and sincerely believe in the rightness of your path—especially when that path involves extreme steps—you must examine carefully its basis and hear contrary facts and arguments. You must exercise your intuition, even if you are not an outstanding religious scholar. In the end, the decision is yours and the responsibility is yours. Choose well the leader who guides you, and it is best to examine both him and his directives with sevenfold scrutiny.
It was instructive to see the shock that most of the religious figures present expressed upon hearing my words (to be sure, there were a few who supported what I said). It really looked like the reactions I am used to when I say and write these things in the Jewish context.
A Note on Moral Relativism
In the thread linked above, Doron repeated again and again that my words imply moral relativism. I already noted above that this is not correct. My claim about judging the gavra by his own approach has nothing to do with moral relativism. On the contrary, throughout my remarks I assumed that there is right and wrong in the moral domain, and the discussion is only about how we should judge a person who behaves in a morally improper way. That is, I assume there is a correct moral system that everyone is obligated by; in this sense I am decidedly not a moral relativist. My claim is that although what is morally correct (what is fitting) is clear, nonetheless the judgment of the person (the gavra) must take into account what he himself considers fitting. The act (in the cheftza) is evil by virtue of a binding, universal moral system (in my view), yet the judgment of the acting person (the gavra) depends on his own conceptions. In short, my claim is not a claim about moral values, but about the proper manner of moral judgment of the gavra.
Conclusion
Bottom line, the picture is complex and I have no clear criterion. I truly believe that judgment of the gavra must be made solely according to his own approach (whereas judgment of the cheftza is only according to mine). But around this there are mitigating and aggravating circumstances. The question of how responsibly the person weighed the position he formed is important. And even if he did not, there is the question of how much it is reasonable to demand that a reasonable person in his situation form a position independently.
All this is mainly on the theoretical plane, since, practically, we saw that judging the gavra depends on how much I believe that these are indeed his positions, and how I assess his capacity to judge his values and his perception of reality, and that of the society in which he lives and its leaders. Therefore, despite the categorical nature of my position, it is important for me to qualify and say that such judgment must always be made with caution; none of us examines kidneys and hearts. On the one hand, it is improper and even dangerous to be overly forgiving of evil deeds or to over-understand them; on the other hand, one cannot ignore the circumstances surrounding the person and the act under discussion.
[1] According to many of them, most Muslim religious leadership is moderate, and the loud, extreme voices are a small minority. I do not know how true this is. I suppose most readers here have a firm position on the matter (they no doubt think this is mere outward apologetics), and to me this is yet another example of forming a position on an issue about which we have no serious information, solely from a general impression.
[2] I am sure that if and when the matter becomes practical and relevant, every person must form a position on whether to annihilate Amalek or not, and the justification that “so it is written in the Torah” will not suffice. The feeling of whether it is fitting or not fitting to do so is important—even if it is the feeling of a layperson. The person himself is responsible for his actions, and there is no room for a justification based on obedience to authority. If this is true for the Nazis and for ISIS, it must also be true with respect to us.
Discussion
See Leibowitz’s statement here:
https://ic.pics.livejournal.com/status_constr/17745759/19558/19558_original.jpg
It seems that he means what I wrote here, although in his forcefulness he ignores several reservations that I raised in the column itself.
There is something similar to a radius of tolerance with respect to morality as well. That is, there are mistakes in a person’s moral outlook that would define him as mistaken, and if he acts according to that view then he is mistaken but not immoral. But there is a kind of such mistakes that would not define him as mistaken but rather as lacking any view at all (say, if he thinks murder is not bad), if he really believes that. In such a case he is worse than wicked. That is, indeed, he is not immoral—but it is worse than that. It is not that he is moral. He is simply a predator or an animal. A wicked person or an immoral person can repent. And someone who errs in his moral outlook but is within the radius of tolerance can also discover that he is mistaken (because morality is an objective reality that can be observed). But an animal cannot do anything.
As for the Nazis, they really did see something evil in the Jews that obligated them to eradicate that evil from the world (what evil is there that ought not be eradicated from the world?). The problem was that they did not understand that this evil cannot be eradicated by killing human beings (either because killing the people was a greater evil than that evil, or because it would not really succeed, since in the end they would have had to destroy all human beings including themselves, because after the Jews someone else would move to the top of the magazine. After all, there is no human being in the world who has no evil in him). And they would have understood this had they reflected. But they chose not to reflect—that is, they chose lack of judgment—they chose to be animals. In that choice they acted as wicked people, but afterward they really were animals and not wicked people (unless they retained a choice to continue reflecting at every moment, even when the horse within them was leading them—and not they it—then they were wicked all that time).
So there are four levels here:
1. Someone with a correct moral outlook who acts accordingly – right and moral.
2. Someone with an erroneous moral outlook (an error in judgment, not an elementary error) who acts accordingly – mistaken and moral.
3. Someone with a moral outlook (whether correct or not) who does not act accordingly – wicked and immoral.
4. Someone with an erroneous moral outlook in an elementary matter—or one who lacks any moral outlook at all – an animal – worse than wicked – worse than immoral (perhaps we should call this sub-moral).
It is worth discussing whether the one in second place ought to be ranked below the one in third place because he has more judgment (it is not just that he is smarter; he has a better grasp of good and evil than the one in second place). That is because he has a greater chance of repenting than the second one. Let us say that in the question of who is better, a fool or a wicked person (and I say a wicked person is better), in this case third place ought to be located in second place. But this still requires further thought, because the second one’s mistake is a mistake in judgment. It is hard to detach the question of who is more moral from the question of who is smarter.
This is actually my deep problem with the left (in the world generally)—because some of its mistakes are elementary mistakes (infantile errors—foolishness), and some of its mistakes are errors in judgment, and even that does not always help. As stated, the left’s emotionalism with respect to its mistaken moral outlook (folly and stupidity are characteristics of the fourth type) moves it over time more and more toward the fourth type rather than the second (or, as noted, the third—depending on the ranking method).
A small correction: in the second line: “…and if he acts according to his view then he is mistaken and not ‘immoral.’”
Who would have thought to tell Abraham that besides all the other benefits here one can also ask about missing columns. This is truly filling lacunae in accordance with the principles of honesty and justice. I am of course not qualified and have nothing of my own to contribute, but in my opinion, quite the contrary, this column explains very well why judgment according to his own view is not really meaningful. For it is made very clear that this very judgment is itself unclear and uninteresting and has no valid implications. And from this it also follows that there is no problem agreeing emptily with whatever someone wants to say about such a nebulous concept. And it is made clear that any judgment that has real substance, is interesting, and has implications is not made according to his view but according to my view.
What is this judgment? You have peeled judgment so thoroughly of everything that has content that nothing remains at all. Not self-defense, not deterrence, not a determination of worthy or unworthy, not where my son should be educated, not black hairs or white ones, not gray or brown ones, and in the end from all this judgment we got a bald heap of rocks. The whole situation is known—he erred in the facts, or erred in values, or erred in some side definition, or yielded to his urge—so what is the meaning of the additional question “does a moral stain adhere to him”? Are we dealing here with the application of the label “stain”? And I also do not understand the discussion of the sublime waterfall in the previous column, and if you connect that to this I will try to present my view. And I also do not connect to discussions of moral luck. I admit I have a vague sense of what is being discussed here, but I treat it as one should treat such a defective remnant and weed it out forcefully (please note: I come from the seed of Joseph, who said, “Did you not know that he would surely divine?”).
And what are the implications of this judgment? One implication appears in your words, namely regarding punishment, and that fits the position that punishment contains an element of “desert.” But in my view this “desert” is a grave moral wrong (really baseless hatred), and therefore it is hard for me to use it to clarify what the judgment is. I am a caricature of a consequentialist who recognizes only punishment of the types self-defense, deterrence, and revenge, and it makes no difference to me whether inwardly the punished party is a human being or a robot (and whoever permits himself to punish because of “desert,” I would throw him in jail, pardon me, along with his family and friends). Revenge is justified because of the strange psychological fact that people suffer when the wicked person is not punished (and there are various prosaic explanations for this). By the way, this is the place to formulate Newton’s third law with respect to opinions: when I think a certain opinion is absurd, then presumably the holder of that absurd opinion also thinks my opinion is absurd, because the distance really is great (but unfortunately, that is what there is).
Another question. You explained that you judge the person according to his own view leniently, meaning that someone who innocently holds a morally mistaken position and acts on it, you judge favorably. Do you also judge according to his own view stringently? That is, if someone innocently holds a morally mistaken position but fails to act on it and instead does what in your opinion is morally right, do you apply negative judgment to him? And if you do apply negative judgment to him, is that also a sufficient condition for punishment?
Absolutely yes. For example, I judge stringently those who thought like Yigal Amir and did not act. As for liability to punishment, I am not sure, because here there is an element of objective truth (did he actually do evil). Just as I do not punish a person for a plan to do evil that did not materialize for side reasons (not because of his own decision). Punishment as sanction/desert has an element of rectification and atonement, that is, there is a connection to the outcomes.
Already in the column itself I wrote that one can ask why there is any need to judge the person at all, and I said I was not addressing that. I assume people do judge, and I ask how one should judge.
In response to your question, I will add here that such judgment also has significance within your own theory, according to which punishment contains no element of desert. Think of a situation in which murder is rampant in society and you need to deal with it: to deter potential murderers and protect society from murderers. You have three possible courses of action: 1. For every murder, execute ten randomly selected people. 2. Kill ten members of the murderer’s family. 3. Kill one out of every ten murderers.
Let us assume for the sake of discussion that all the measures will bring the same deterrence and the same benefit in preventing danger to the public (deterrence and protection). Do you not see an advantage to the third proposal? I do, and the reason is that in the third proposal the suffering is inflicted on someone who “deserves” it, and not on innocent people. That is, judgment of the person also plays a role in punishment for deterrence and protection of society (even without desert). When you punish a person in order to deter or protect society, you are not making only the consequentialist calculation, for otherwise you could just kill random people to deter. You also take into account the question whether he deserves it. And the reason is that there is no justification for punishing a person even if the punishment will bring benefit, unless he deserves to be punished. The judgment whether he deserves punishment is judgment of the person that I discussed here.
Let me perhaps sharpen the point further. Would there be an advantage, for purposes of deterrence, in punishing a murderer who himself thinks murder is forbidden and nevertheless commits it, over a murderer who thinks murder is permitted? In my opinion it is preferable to deter by punishing the former, because he is wicked as a person.
By the way, in light of your remarks in the parallel thread (https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%d7%90%D7%AA%d7%99%d7%A7%D7%94-%d7%A8%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%98%D7%95%D7%98%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%90%D7%9D-%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%95%D7%99-%D7%9C%D7%94%D7%96%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%A7-%D7%97%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%95#comment-48282) about pushing the fat man off the bridge, I am not sure you would agree, but to me it seems as plain as day.
Just regarding pushing from the bridge, I will add two things.
There is a problem with pushing, but it is a psychological matter within the consequentialist framework: if, as a matter of general law, pushing people from bridges is allowed, then every person every day fears lest someone push him, lest they take his money, lest they take his organs, and so on and so forth. Even though all the acts above are moral duties, like pushing from the bridge. Therefore removing protection from uninvolved people would greatly damage peace of mind in the world. And in my view that is also what lies at the root of some people’s instinctive opposition to throwing someone off the bridge.
Another thing: I do not presume to act according to the laws of morality properly speaking. Morality, God bless it, is very, very demanding, and one cannot live up to what it requires (from its point of view, my feelings are in no way preferable to other people’s feelings. But I do price my own feelings very highly, and especially more highly than those of others). I do only as much as I manage, subject to all sorts of psychological traits.
I don’t think the Nazis thought that what they were doing was good or moral. If I’m not mistaken, they despised Judeo-Christian morality.
They really wanted to be evil. They are not like ISIS or Hamas or Joshua son of Nun or Samuel.
Their goal was the abolition of morality. Exactly like a criminal who uses violence in a protection racket so that people will fear him, and invests in this as though it were a religious commandment…
Eitan,
What you are saying reinforces precisely the opposite view from your own. The Nazis took their ideology seriously and were willing to pay very high prices in order to achieve what they identified as good. The opposite of a criminal running a protection racket, whose entire concern is measurable profit and not an abstract ideal.
Of course not all Nazis were like that, but certainly many of them were.
I mistakenly posted this here instead of as a continuation of your reply regarding judging stringently and Yigal Amir. If possible, please delete it here and I’ll repost it there, or something of that sort.
It depends what that Ashraf thought: if he did it for money but understood that he was in the wrong, then I do indeed condemn him. And in my opinion that certainly fits people’s intuitions, although I do not attach much importance to them. Moreover, sometimes people have contradictory intuitions and one has to clarify for them what exactly their intuitions are. For example, many people feel that the Nazis were obviously wicked and have not taken into account the possibility that perhaps they believed in what they were doing.
As for Arafat, I find it hard to believe that he thought he was entirely in the right. We are talking about a mass murderer around the world (he cooperated with terrorist organizations not only here). He was corrupt, stole money, lived a life of wealth at the expense of his people, and killed quite a few of them as well. If he really believed all this on the moral plane, then you are right. I very much doubt that.
Tolginus wrote about this:
So then you judge stringently and condemn, for example, the Egyptian spy Ashraf Marwan (assuming he really was a spy and not a double agent) for betraying Egypt, violating trust, and supplying Israel with information of inestimable value, because he wanted money and was full of feelings of frustration and anger? It seems to me that if so, then we are already getting into territory where you are moving away from your home port of relying on people’s intuitions and offering a justification and grounding for them.
In the column on Ruth Dayan you wrote that friendship with a murderer like Arafat is something you find hard to accept. It is quite clear that Arafat, by his own lights, thought he was 100 percent right, exactly like an Israeli general who thinks he is right. So what is the meaning of this aversion to a friendship that confers no worldwide legitimacy and so on? (I really relate to Arafat like any leader of a rival state, such as Egypt for example. I cannot distinguish between terror and war. And this is, it seems to me, a familiar phenomenon: when rival leaders meet, they develop bonds of friendship on some level; they really do have a lot in common.) By the way, I would have been happy to let the late Arafat smell the flowers from the roots a bit earlier (because all in all he was a fairly successful enemy Palestinian leader), but I do not see any principled problem, as distinct from a mere feeling, in going to the movies with him.
And here is my response:
It depends what that Ashraf thought: if he did it for money but understood that he was in the wrong, then I do indeed condemn him. And in my opinion that certainly fits people’s intuitions, although I do not attach much importance to them. Moreover, sometimes people have contradictory intuitions and one has to clarify for them what exactly their intuitions are. For example, many people feel that the Nazis were obviously wicked and have not taken into account the possibility that perhaps they believed in what they were doing.
As for Arafat, I find it hard to believe that he thought he was entirely in the right. We are talking about a mass murderer around the world (he cooperated with terrorist organizations not only here). He was corrupt, stole money, lived a life of wealth at the expense of his people, and killed quite a few of them as well. If he really believed all this on the moral plane, then you are right. I very much doubt that.
Regarding note 2, do you have a sufficiently convincing reason why it is moral to wipe out Amalek? Or do you hold that one must not obey that?
That is certainly not moral (at least with respect to someone who did not sin, or an infant), but there is such a religious command. I do not currently have the tools to decide as long as it is not on the agenda. I assume that if and when it is on the agenda, the issue will come up and then a decision can be made. I am almost certain that at the very least, in practice they will not kill infants.
Between the lines there is criticism of (certain cases of) systematic conduct like that of the Nazis and the Jordanians. From the context I am guessing that the point is that a system petrifies a person in two senses—both that he follows it in an absolute way because he supposedly proceeds by principle and does not bother to get feedback from the cases and reconsider whether perhaps the whole system is problematic, and also that a blindness develops toward things that do not fit the system (or they are forced by interpretive/apologetic pressure into the Procrustean bed of the system). Thus the Jordanians acted rigidly according to their doctrine, and the Israelis exploited the blind spots in that doctrine. You wrote that “this is not the place”; if not here, then where? (Whether my guess has anything to do with what you meant or not.)
Don’t dig too deeply. It was just an associative play on words (a joke), without any very deep intentions.
They did not want to be evil. They despised what is called “slave morality,” which indeed deserves to be despised. They were in favor of “master morality.” It just does not seem to me that Nietzsche meant one should kill everyone who has a slave morality. At most one should separate from him and distinguish oneself from him. I would have been in favor of the Germans separating from the Jews. That is, that the Europeans would allocate the Jews of Europe some territory and let them live there by themselves (of course with all the property they had and compensation for the real estate that was in their possession). Jews really are, in that respect, an unbearable people. They latch onto the gentiles among whom they live and lack responsibility for those peoples’ national fate (if they are not loyal to their own people, how will they be loyal to the peoples among whom they live? The idea of “be a German when you go out” really was a bluff from the land of bluffs). A people whose individuals care about nothing except their own personal advancement. This is true of all peoples and all human beings (and in that sense nationalism too is a fake thing, like everything connected to human beings), only among Jews it is one level above and very conspicuous. This is actually the deep source of antisemitism.
With God’s help, 11 Adar 5781
The question of evaluating a person “by his own lights” is addressed in column 244, “Evaluating a Person in Matters Subject to Dispute,” devoted to Yigal Amir.
Regards, the site tradition
It seems that in evaluating a person “by his own lights,” one can reach the level of “not knowing the difference between ‘cursed be Haman’ and ‘blessed be Mordechai’” 🙂
You cannot distinguish between a leader of terrorists who deliberately murder specifically children, women, and civilian populations, and the leader of a theoretical state? Or are you saying that people like Ruth Dayan sometimes do not make that distinction?
Or perhaps you are presumably saying that in fact every leader of an enemy Arab state ultimately wants what the terrorist wants—to destroy the State of Israel that represents the people of Israel. And that if he had the power in his hands he would act by the same means as the terrorist leader himself. And in that you are quite right. There really is no essential difference between Arafat and Nasser in their hatred of Israel and desire to destroy it. And if Nasser had had the ability, he would undoubtedly have slaughtered Jewish children as well. But I do not think that is what you are hinting at. Rather, you keep getting closer and closer to a position that insists on seeing the enemy’s “narrative” always objectively, even though it is clear to every sensible person which side here has justice on its side and which side has wickedness on its side. In the past, in your articles, you stood against all the damage caused by this blurring of boundaries. It is a pity that today you are moving more and more toward those regions.
You are attacking my response (I posted it by mistake somewhere else and so it was copied here) and not Rabbi Michi’s remarks. In my opinion you have not said anything, but I don’t feel like opening that front now as well.
Sorry if I did not read carefully enough, in your replies to the comments above, but it seems to me that you did not answer the question that was asked: according to your view, is there any point to this kind of moral judgment, or did I not understand your answer?
True, you wrote that one can, for example, use such judgment for deciding whether to kill a murderer out of ideology or a murderer out of appetite, but I did not understand why not simply examine what would better prevent the bad outcome in my eyes (in which case it may very well be preferable to kill an ideological murderer, since he is more determined and harder to deter by other means)?
Is this moral judgment really just sophistry about who is worse than whom?
Also with regard to memorializing or exalting people whom I believe erred in their views and as a result committed “bad” acts—or alternatively denouncing them—I can use the test of the outcome I desire, namely what will promote the spread of the moral system that I regard as correct.
Perhaps in the next world this judgment has significance or a place. In our world, I do not find any real point in not judging people and their actions according to the moral system that in my eyes is the correct one.
In the column itself I wrote that it does not matter to me whether or not there is any point in judging the person. I am discussing the question of how to judge him if someone wants to judge. I also mentioned that this has implications for punishment on grounds of desert. But in the talkbacks above I explained to Tolginus that it also has practical implications for punishment for deterrence (even without desert).
With God’s help, 11 Adar 5781
Haman really was judged “by his own lights,” according to the value system he himself set up. He determined that a people who bring no benefit to the king should be destroyed. According to the system Haman set up, the value of human life depends on the benefit it brings to the king.
According to this view, Esther proved that Haman himself was causing damage to the king’s treasury, in that he had ordered the Jews destroyed instead of selling them as slaves, male and female. Harbonah added the damage Haman sought to cause by killing the man who had spoken well of the king. Therefore the king ordered him killed in accordance with his own principle that one who brings no benefit to the king’s treasury is liable to death.
Thus the wiping out of Haman was required both according to Mordechai’s value system—because of his desire to destroy the people of God—and according to Haman’s own value system—because he was harmful to the king’s treasury.
The people of Israel too are found worthy of life according to both systems: both as the people of God who proclaim His faith in the world through the reading of the Megillah, and because of our economic benefit to the treasury of the King of the universe, in our support of the poor, whom the King of kings desires to honor.
So Haman and Mordechai are found to agree “in the final analysis,” and there is no dispute between them “in practice” 🙂
Regards, Shimshon Hersheleh HaLevi Ostropoler
On the other hand, Haman also merits being judged according to Esther’s view, which holds that punishment by sale into slavery is preferable, whereby the punished person is directed into a life of bringing benefit. Therefore in Haman we fulfill the verse: “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl, and he shall serve him forever.” Piercing Haman’s ear, folding it, and filling it with sweets contains an aspect of “sweetening the judgments” 🙂
Regards, Menashe Fish”l HaLevi Zochmir
Indeed, Haman merited that specifically his ear would be remembered for generations favorably, for he followed the counsel of the Sages to consult with one’s wife in ordinary matters and household matters (Bava Metzia 59), and by virtue of listening to his wife’s voice and counsel, he merited to bring salvation to the people of Israel.
The very shape of “Haman’s ear,” bent from all sides toward its center, also symbolizes the saying of the Sages: “If your wife is short—bend down and whisper to her.” The ear bent inward from all sides symbolizes inclining the ear to listen and obey the voice of the mistress of the house, “whose glory is inward” 🙂
Triple regards, Mazal”p
With God’s help, 12 Adar 5781
Haman’s failure came from the fact that his sense of self-worth derived from the honor he received from others. In that state, it was enough that one person did not treat him with respect to bring him to the feeling that “all this is worth nothing to me.”
A person’s correction comes when he receives his self-worth from within. When a person feels full of taste and value-based meaning in his life, he will have no need at all—or in any case much less need—for validations and honors from outside.
One whose ear is attuned inward, to the heavenly “manna” within his soul, and not to the honor he expects to receive from the “multitude”—his life is full of good flavor like the sap of oil, and sweet as honey cake.
And these things are especially true this year, when the main part of Purim joy will be inward gathering and not mass outward display, as the king and his law command: “that every man should rule in his own house” 🙂
,With blessings for a happy Purim and a healthy year, Simcha Fish”l HaLevi Plankton
I hope they also won’t kill adults, youths, and women who all in all just want to live quietly and never in their lives thought of destroying Jews, and only because of some historical story they would put them to death in gas chambers…
It horrifies me to imagine them kicked around and terrified on the day some researcher discovers and tells them that they are Amalekites (just as the Nazis discovered and told many Jews that they were Jews).
With God’s help, 12 Adar 5781
To Dvir — greetings,
The Amalekites have a simple way to be saved: by accepting the Seven Noahide Commandments, as explained in the words of Maimonides. This also follows from Samuel’s words to Saul, who was commanded: “Go and proscribe the sinners, Amalek.” This implies that when they abandoned the ideology of evil and accepted the foundations of faith and the moral values of the Torah, they are accepted. And as explained in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 97): “Among Haman’s descendants were those who taught schoolchildren. And who was that? Rav Shmuel bar Shilat” (thus in the version of Rabbi Aharon Hyman, Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, entry Rav Shmuel bar Shilat).
Rav Shmuel bar Shilat was a student of Rav and became known as a devoted educator who did not divert his attention from his pupils even after many years. That same trait of devotion that Amalek and Haman displayed in hatred—their descendant Rav Shmuel bar Shilat channeled into a teacher’s devotion to his students.
Regards, Yaron Fish”l Ordner
Maimonides also wrote regarding the Seven Nations that if they accepted the Seven Noahide Commandments, they are accepted. And this too fits well with the verses, which explained that the obligation to destroy them is “lest they cause you to sin.” It is therefore understood that one who takes upon himself the Noahide Commandments out of faith in the Torah is among the righteous of the nations of the world.
By the way, it is likely that today the highest probability of finding descendants of Amalek is among… the people of Israel, for Yohanan Hyrcanus converted the Edomites, and they remained loyal Jews even some two hundred years later, when they participated with the Jews in the Great Revolt against the Romans.
All this is only if the great Torah authorities rule like Maimonides. Because as you know, when there are dissenting views, decisors use rules of halakhic decision. And according to those rules, it is not certain that they will accept only Maimonides’ view.
And besides, throughout the exile various excuses and explanations were invented for why murdering Amalekites is the most moral thing imaginable (after all, the Torah commands it. They did not read Rabbi Michi’s writings, and if they did, they would claim that if Rabbi Michi said it, then it is probably heresy).
In short…
Who disagrees with Maimonides? Samuel says: “Go and proscribe the sinners, Amalek.” And in the Gemara it is explained that with respect to the Seven Nations, one first offers peace before war? David killed the Amalekite son of a convert only because his own mouth testified against him that he had put the anointed of the Lord to death, and not because of his Amalekite ancestry.
Regards, Menashe Fish”l HaLevi Zochmir
See for example here: https://ph.yhb.org.il/05-14-08/#_te01ftn14_10
note 10
You are bringing reasonings, verses, and passages from the Gemara against the Rishonim; I agree with you, but surely you understand that the halakhic authorities will be shocked by your audacity? And they certainly will not rule on the basis of reasonings but according to rules of decision, for we are not to insert our heads between the great giants of the world, etc. etc.
I am quoting you from column 290
“The picture that emerges in the world (literally—not only in Israel) is horrifying. A desecration of God’s name unlike anything else. People in Israel and around the world are simply exploding when they hear and see these things. The rage is tremendous, and if we were in nineteenth-century Russia or Ukraine, in my opinion massacres and pogroms would break out here. Suddenly I begin to understand how that happened back then (and I still do not quite understand why it is not happening today). The world sees before its eyes a herd of infantile fools by will and by choice, lacking understanding and lacking solidarity, and at the same time puffed up with self-importance and devoid of any capacity for self-criticism. A collection of small, irresponsible children mouthing slogans that they themselves do not believe in and also live by them (until the test comes, and then it becomes clear what they really believe). No wonder people feel that this society is stuck somewhere in the prehistoric era, and the main problem is that they themselves make an ideology out of it.
One must understand that in the age of global media everything is filmed and everything is known. People feel that there is here a wicked, stupid, and ungrateful population, despite the inconceivable consideration and help that general society gives to these phenomena. Therefore it is hard for me to say they are making too great a mistake. The things sound almost antisemitic (except for the fact that they are completely justified), but it seems to me that one viral image is worth a thousand words:”
Can one write such sharp criticism in accordance with the current column?
Absolutely. Why not? I assume that many of those people are not wicked as persons, but this society is wicked as an object and irresponsible in terms of the examinations it carries out by its own standards and the conclusions it reaches, especially when this causes it to become a burden on the rest of the public that does not identify with it.
With God’s help, 13 Adar 5781
To Dvir — greetings,
The discussion there concerns Maimonides’ statement in Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah that an Amalekite can convert and become like an Israelite by accepting the 613 commandments, and on that later authorities discuss Rabbi Eliezer’s words in the Mekhilta that the Lord swore by His glorious throne that converts from Amalek would not be accepted (set against the testimony of the Gemara in Sanhedrin that descendants of Haman taught Torah.
It should be noted that even regarding full conversion—no Rishon is mentioned as disputing Maimonides, and the later authorities too limited the prevention of full conversion according to Rabbi Eliezer’s view in various ways, so that it would not conflict with the Gemara in Sanhedrin.
But I was speaking about acceptance of the Seven Noahide Commandments, which exempts the Amalekite from the law of “blotting out,” and in this matter no one among either the Rishonim or the later authorities is heard to dispute Maimonides in Hilchot Melakhim, who says this.
As I noted from the law of the Seven Nations, to whom peace was offered before the war against them. There is no source in the words of the Sages that an Amalekite who accepts the Seven Noahide Commandments would not be accepted as a resident alien; and in the days of David there was “the son of an Amalekite convert,” who was killed because of his participation in killing Saul and not because of his Amalekite origin.
And so it is explained in Avnei Nezer (there) that an Amalekite is accepted as a resident alien. The Hida raises the reasoning that an Amalekite who becomes a resident alien can at the next stage convert fully, and that Rabbi Eliezer’s words in the Mekhilta negate only a “direct leap” from Amalekite to full convert. And according to the Chazon-Ish-Ark, during wartime there is a bar to converting an Amalekite fully, but not during wartime—the Amalekite can convert and become fully Jewish in every respect.
Regards, Yefa”or
But I am surprised at you, who are versed in the teaching of the Maharal of Prague, for the Maharal says that “the Lord swore” is not a halakhic statement but a statement of reality (that is how he explains the “three oaths”).
According to this, Rabbi Eliezer is describing a reality. Formally one can convert an Amalekite, but it will not work. In the end his Amalekiteness will emerge and he will sin a grave sin that will lead to his rejection (as happened to the son of the Amalekite convert).
And Maimonides has already taught us that free choice is not absolutely taken away. Even according to Rabbi Eliezer’s words, that the chances of success for an Amalekite convert are very small—still, if he exerts himself, he can overcome the evil traits ingrained in him, and Haman’s descendants who taught Torah prove it.
All this, of course, concerns full conversion to become Jewish, but to be a decent person who keeps the Seven Noahide Commandments—clearly an Amalekite can do that, and therefore he is punished when he stubbornly insists on his rebellion and refuses to accept the Noahide Commandments.
By the way, the yahrzeit of the Hida and the Avnei Nezer falls on 11 Adar (the Hida in 5566, the Avnei Nezer in 5670).
Hello!
If the whole world is waiting for your column in order to learn what the truth is, then I suppose that you are waiting to learn my opinion of your opinion :), and therefore let it be known that my opinion is entirely the same as yours.
And I will expand a little tangentially regarding Holocaust denial. It is customary to say that one who justifies the Nazis and claims that in essence they were good, even though their deeds were evil, is denying the Holocaust and its horror. But in my opinion he is the very one who best internalizes the memory of the Holocaust. After all, the main purpose of commemorating the Holocaust is so that the horror will not happen again. So long as we keep pumping the message that the Nazis were scum, cruel and evil-hearted, we are actually missing the main point. For then we are not preventing the emergence of new and updated systems that morally and ethically justify the possibility of murdering nations, ethnic groups, or genders. If we shout at members of this modern party that they are Nazis, they will be deeply offended. After all, they are world-improvers, not hateful evildoers.
If we internalize the fact that although the Nazis wanted to improve the world in their goodness, they erred in the path, they erred in judgment, they erred in their grasp of reality, and therefore we establish a moral duty to investigate reality very carefully before making absolute determinations that lead to far-reaching conclusions—we will commemorate the Holocaust, and better ensure that it is the last.
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Another point. In the past you fumed and raged against Haredi leaders regarding their conduct on coronavirus matters. I believe you that you think their actions are wrong in the object, and I assume that insofar as self-defense and the like are concerned, this column has no connection to that issue; but it seems that you did not judge them as persons by their own lights. And I mean both with respect to the leaders and with respect to those led. The punishment of exile, it seems, is according to all opinions not revenge and the like, but atonement for an incorrect act. It seems to me that in this matter one should take their own view into account, and I will not speak of Rabbi Kanievsky’s view [about whom you claimed that he should be blamed for failing to clarify properly a matter involving danger to life. Although again, there is here a factual error, because his lenses on life are through certain channels, and I do not think he already knows the reality today], but there are several Haredi leaders who cling to their position and are convinced they acted correctly, despite the blood-price well known to them, and close at hand.
Your harsh criticism of them stems from the fact that you find it hard to believe that they really think this is the right way to act. You can of course ignore Haredi defensive claims and argue that this is narrow dogmatic thinking, but I think you should take into account that there are people there who know the leaders themselves and are convinced beyond any doubt that there is no evil here as you defined it here—weakness of will, or putting interest before values; but at most a different scale of values, which you as someone belonging to the strong majority group in the state are allowed to crush, but which should not lead you to state categorically claims about their level of morality.
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And back to the first matter. It is customary to be very shocked when those who are kicked and trampled under the hooves of mounted special police officers shout at the loyal police carrying out the regime’s orders the epithet: Nazis.
I really do not think these gullible youths ever thought about what they were shouting, but in general, according to what is said in this column, from the perspective of the Jew persecuted by an SS officer and by an Israeli police officer there is no difference at all in his judgment of his tormentor. Both alike thought they were doing good, and both alike are doing something that is evil from his point of view and according to the scale of values of the one shouting. The fact that the routine outraged observer thinks that the German did something bad and that the Jew is doing something good should not affect the judgment of the one shouting. And even if we succeed in proving to that fool that the policeman’s intentions are good (he only wants to protect the public’s health), he will slap this column of yours in your face, in which it is explained that the Nazis’ intentions too were good (he only wanted to protect the purity of humanity). Whereas with respect to judging the acts, he is in no way obligated to your values.
I did not think, and do not think, that the Haredi leaders are wicked as persons. My claim is that they are negligent and ignorant. Especially when a person gives instructions to a large public, the duty of clarification rests on him all the more. As a reminder, exile is the obligation of an inadvertent murderer (though here, in my opinion, it is inadvertence close to intentionality). Beyond that, I have a claim against Haredi society as a whole for allowing all this to happen.
A. On the claim of negligence and ignorance, perhaps you are right, and you probably mean Rabbi Kanievsky, whom you attacked at the time.
Haredi society as a whole holds a scale of values that says the rabbi is always right. Suppose you are right and this method is mistaken and distorted, that it does not represent Judaism, that it can lead to insane extremism. So what? One still cannot claim that Haredi society is evil as persons. If so, what is your claim against them? In this column you write under the heading “Irresponsibility in Forming a View of Reality or Values” and defend Haredim who would treat a gentile like an animal, or readers of Haaretz who would speak nonsense—because one cannot really expect a person living within a closed society to think differently from the way he was educated. So indeed, it would be good for you to write trilogies and columns that will shine bright light to Haredim who nevertheless browse your site, but the anger and fury you displayed then seemingly indicate a moral judgment of Haredi society as persons.
B. I drew your attention to other leaders (not those you referred to back then) who have a different scale of values that prioritizes certain activities over danger to life, and they do not retract even when it happens in their close surroundings. (Incidentally, regarding your claim about the faulty argument: what, have you no heart?!)
Of course one can insist and claim that this is a matter of narrow personal interests overriding values, but then we are not judging them by their own lights but by ours.
I did not understand what the dispute is about. Regarding my claim against Haredi society, I am claiming negligence and ignorance and less wickedness (that exists only at the margins). But claims against a society are not like claims against an individual. If you treat society as a given and examine only the individuals, you can see them as not guilty. But someone created the society too, and that someone is the totality of its members. Therefore they have responsibility for the norms that prevail in society. If they are sure the rabbis are right, and the rabbis too are sure they are right, then they are blameworthy for this folly which again and again proves mistaken and they do not take it to heart. That is my claim. Especially since their views lead to parasitism with respect to the society that carries them on its palms, which requires from them an additional examination of their positions. When you demand that others bear the costs of your conduct, your obligation is doubled and redoubled.
And indeed my claims are against Haredi society as a whole. There is no point in dividing among rabbis because when dealing with a society one must discuss it as a whole. And this is its face as a whole. In every society there are good people and even some who try to improve things, and still this is the face of the society and all its members are responsible for that. Exactly as I argue regarding the Arabs, where too there are good people and good intentions, but the general face of Arab society is very problematic.
As for the trilogies and columns I write, it seems to me that this is what I do here day and night. So what is the claim? On the contrary, because of the closure and censorship of Haredi society, it is careful to preserve the ignorance and unwilling to expose its members to counterarguments, and therefore not only is its condition miserable, but it also makes attempts to change and improve it much harder, so the problem only worsens. Of course there are those who are exposed (like you), and that is excellent. I hope I may make some contribution to improving Haredi society.
In addition to Dvir’s correct reply (according to Rabbi Eliezer Melamed, no one disputes that one need not kill an Amalekite who accepted the Seven Noahide Commandments),
1. Assuming (rather strangely) that Amalekites would be identified by research, we could rely on the positions of the decisors who do not decide halakhah based on scientific research but specifically require tradition (and it seems that regarding tekhelet this is the view of many decisors, even though there there is not much harm in wearing tekhelet out of doubt).
2. If Amalekites were identified by a prophet, it is possible that the prophet would also give a temporary prophetic ruling as to what to do with them (and of course it would be necessary to verify carefully that the prophet is really a prophet).
3. It also seems likely that there would be a Sanhedrin at that time, and then there would be no flaw in disagreeing with the Rishonim.
4. I do not know whether there is any consensus as to how Amalekite identity is determined in the case of mixing with other peoples, and presumably they have all mixed already (recently I heard that it follows the father, but I do not know whether that is agreed upon), and that will add further doubts.
Bottom line: the moral problem in wiping out Amalek is an important question for reflection and clarification in matters of faith and morality, but practically speaking almost certainly no one will be killed merely because he is descended from Amalek.
It seems that the future research that identifies descendants of Amalek will be rejected with the claim: “Amalek” 🙂
At any rate, in the future to come all humanity will be compelled to accept and observe the Seven Noahide Commandments, so there will be no practical difference between one descended from Amalek and others.
And with God’s help everyone will accept the Noahide Commandments “with LIKE”
Regards, Yefa”or
I just saw the following article:
https://news.walla.co.il/item/3419367
The deceased woman’s brother-in-law regrets having set up anti-vaccine groups. When the problem reaches your own backyard, your perspective changes. How should we relate to him? At the time he really thought one must not get vaccinated. On the other hand, the fact is that when it reached his own backyard he changed his mind. That means there was apparently some rashness in the way he formed his original position, and that is where the criticism lies.
I didn’t understand what he meant when he said he was “at peace with himself” about this.