More on the Hierarchy between the Commandments and Life (Column 421)
In the previous column I concluded the discussion with a nuanced conclusion about the relationship between the commandments and life:
Commandments without life are not commandments, but life without commandments is not life either. It seems that the hierarchy between life and the commandments is not unequivocal.
There I noted that this connects to the tension between two rationales cited in the Yoma sugya regarding pikuach nefesh (saving life) overriding Shabbat. In this column I would like to touch further on the relationship between these two rationales and to examine that conclusion from a different angle.
The Yoma Sugya
The Talmud in Yoma 85a–b discusses the source for the rule that saving a life overrides Shabbat:
It once happened that Rabbi Yishmael, Rabbi Akiva, and Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah were walking along the road, with Levi the arranger, and Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah walking behind them. This question was posed before them: From where do we know that saving a life overrides Shabbat?
Several tannaitic sources for this law are then brought, and at the end appears the source of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya:
[…] Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya says: “And the children of Israel shall keep the Shabbat.” The Torah said: Desecrate one Shabbat on his account so that he will keep many Shabbats.
At the end of the sugya the amora Shmuel arrives and proposes his own source:
Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shmuel: Had I been there, I would have said my source, which is superior to theirs: “and live by them” (Lev. 18:5)—and not die by them. Rava said: All of them have refutations, except for Shmuel, whose source has no refutation…
Shmuel’s rationale receives Rava’s praise, for it alone is unrefuted. Seemingly, this is the rationale that remains as the conclusion.
The sugya ends with further praise for Shmuel’s rationale (in contrast to the others, which have refutations):
Ravina—and some say Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak—said: One sharp pepper is better than a basketful of gourds.
Shmuel’s words are like a pungent pepper seed, preferable to a heap of bland gourd seeds.
Is the Halakha Indeed like Shmuel?
At first glance there is no halakhic dispute here, only a question of the source of the law (“the import of the derivations”). Yet the poskim did find practical ramifications (e.g., whether to save a gentile’s life, someone who does not keep Shabbat, a person with only moments to live, and the like). The Talmud in Shabbat 151b explicitly brings the rationale of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya as the halakha—indeed, it brings only that:
It was taught: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: For a one-day-old infant who is alive we desecrate Shabbat; for King David of Israel who is dead, we do not desecrate Shabbat. For a one-day-old infant who is alive we desecrate Shabbat, for the Torah said: Desecrate one Shabbat on his account so that he will keep many Shabbats. For King David of Israel who is dead, we do not desecrate, for once a person dies he is exempt from the commandments; and this is what Rabbi Yoḥanan said: “Among the dead [he is] free”—once a person dies, he becomes free of the commandments.
Desecrating Shabbat for a one-day-old infant is permitted by virtue of Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s reasoning. This is a baraita—a tannaitic source—and there they apparently were not yet aware of Shmuel’s rationale (he being an amora). In any case, the second rationale is brought here, implying that it too (and perhaps only it) is the halakha. Moreover, some commentators explained that it is no accident that only the second rationale is brought here, since the case concerns desecration of Shabbat to save an infant who does not yet keep commandments and thus does not “live by them”; therefore, for him only Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale is relevant (because in the future he too will keep many Shabbats).
So too we see in the words of the Meiri as cited in the Bi’ur Halakha, Orach Chayim 329:4, where the Shulchan Aruch rules that we desecrate Shabbat even for a person with only moments to live:
And even though the rationale “Desecrate one Shabbat so that he will keep many Shabbats” does not apply here—because it is not specifically about Shabbat; the same applies to other commandments—so wrote the Meiri in Yoma: “Even if it has been clarified that he cannot live even a single hour, in that hour he will repent in his heart and confess.”
The Meiri explains that we desecrate Shabbat for a person with only moments to live even though the consideration “he will keep many Shabbats” is not present (for he will not live to keep many Shabbats). He explains that this is because it is not specifically about keeping Shabbat, but about any commandment; even if he lives one minute, he can repent or perform some commandment, and therefore we desecrate Shabbat to save him.
However, the Bi’ur Halakha there rejects his words:
In truth it appears that all this is merely a rationale, but as to the ruling it does not depend on the commandments at all. The reason is not that we set aside one commandment for the sake of many commandments; rather, we set aside all the commandments for the life of a Jew—as Shmuel derives it from “and live by them,” and as the Rambam writes (Hilkhot Shabbat ch. 2) that the laws of the Torah are not vengeance in the world but mercy, kindness, and peace in the world. Likewise, for all those Tannaim who derive it from the altar, from circumcision, and from the burglar [who tunnels in], it is compelled that the Merciful One is concerned with human life (aside from that [source] of “Desecrate one Shabbat,” etc.).
If, in the conclusion, the source for the law is Shmuel’s “and live by them,” then there is no need to speak specifically about Shabbat or other commandments (such as confession). We desecrate Shabbat for someone with only moments to live because life has immense value regardless of its length and regardless of the commandments that might be fulfilled within it.
The Bi’ur Halakha also proves his point from the law of a foundling (Ketubot 15):
So too it is necessary according to Shmuel, who says regarding a foundling in a place where most are gentiles that we [still] do [life-saving] desecration—even though by law he would be a full gentile and would not fulfill any commandment; nevertheless, since in matters of saving life we do not follow the majority, we worry that perhaps he is from Israel. Accordingly, it is clear that even for a crushed minor we also desecrate, even though he will not keep Shabbats, will not confess, and will not reach adulthood; nevertheless, we desecrate. And likewise for a deaf-mute and one of unsound mind—although they are not obligated in the commandments, nevertheless we desecrate for them, for the fact that they do not fulfill commandments is due to their circumstances.
The Gemara there says that if the majority are non-Jews, the presumption is that he is a gentile; yet we still desecrate Shabbat to save him (because of the possibility that he is Jewish). If he is presumed a gentile, then in practice he will not perform any commandment (out of doubt), and yet we desecrate Shabbat on the factual concern that he might be a Jew. We see that the permission to desecrate Shabbat is not conditioned on the performance of commandments but on the value of life—evidence against the Meiri.[1]
But of course the Meiri himself is not content to leave it at that, and contrary to the Bi’ur Halakha’s remark he does find it necessary to explain the law of someone with only moments to live even according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. It seems that according to him Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale also remains in force alongside Shmuel’s, and therefore all the laws must be explained according to his view as well.
This indeed also emerges from the progression of the Yoma sugya there. When one looks at the various refutations, one sees that the refutation that ultimately strikes all the tannaitic sources is the following:
All of them we have found [to permit desecration in a case of] certainty; for doubt—from where do we know? And Shmuel’s [source] surely has no refutation.
That is, all the tannaitic sources can teach us that certain life-threatening danger overrides Shabbat, but not doubtful danger. Only Shmuel’s rationale provides a source that even doubtful danger to life overrides Shabbat. We see that the other rationales remain standing; they just serve as sources for the rule that certain danger to life overrides Shabbat, not doubtful danger. But regarding certainty, they constitute a valid source alongside Shmuel’s rationale. Moreover, if that rationale had ramifications with respect to someone with only moments to live—namely, that there would be no permission to desecrate Shabbat to save him—the Gemara should have attacked the tannaitic rationales on that ground as well. Therefore the Meiri concluded that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale also remains the halakha (as we also saw in Shabbat 151), and the law must be explained according to his view as well.
A Further Look at the Two Rationales
On further reflection, however, it seems hard to hold both rationales together, because at first glance there is a direct contradiction between them. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s rationale is based on the assumption that the commandments are the goal, and the value of life derives from the fact that life enables the performance of commandments. Life is a means to the performance of commandments; therefore the entire permission to desecrate Shabbat in order to save a life does not stem from the value of life but from the fact that life enables observance of the commandments. By contrast, Shmuel’s rationale from “and live by them” seems to assume the opposite: there is value to life in and of itself, as the Bi’ur Halakha proves from Ketubot. One could even say that according to Shmuel the commandments are a means to life (to proper life), and not that life is a means to observing commandments, as Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya holds.
If so, there appears to be a direct contradiction between the two rationales, since they are based on opposing value conceptions about the relationship between life and the commandments and about the very value of life. How, then, can the Meiri hold both conceptions at once? As we saw, both the Yoma and Shabbat sugyot indicate that both rationales remain in the conclusion. This would seem to be precisely the basis of the Bi’ur Halakha’s view, and thus he rejects the Meiri’s words and leaves only Shmuel’s rationale.
Is There Really a Contradiction?
I think this contradiction is only apparent. To see this, let us examine the situation. Seemingly we are to compare two alternatives:
- Desecrate Shabbat and save a life.
- Do not desecrate Shabbat and do not save a life.
Let the value of a human life be X, and the value of keeping Shabbat be Y. If I choose option A I gain the (axiological) benefit X; choosing option B yields the benefit Y.[2] To determine which is preferable I must decide which value is greater, X or Y. In other words, it would seem that I must decide which is higher in the hierarchy—life or Shabbat/the commandments—and construct a scale of values. As we saw, this is ostensibly the substance of the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. I will now try to show that even if I cannot determine a hierarchy between the two values (whether X is greater than Y or vice versa), Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s reasoning can still be invoked, and the conflict can be decided according to his consideration.
In fact, I claim more than that: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya seeks precisely to bypass the need to decide which value stands higher on the halakhic scale of values. His contention is that even without ranking X against Y, the comparison yields a clear result in favor of desecrating Shabbat. His claim is based on the fact that if we save the person’s life, he will be able to keep many additional commandments that will offset the Shabbat that was desecrated to save him. We can present this arithmetically as follows. Suppose saving his life will lead him to keep many additional Shabbats (in fact, we saw that on his view it is about many commandments, not specifically Shabbat, but for simplicity I will speak of Shabbats), say their number is n. Then choosing option A gives us, in addition to the value X, also Y(n−1), for in addition to life we gained many Shabbats (and lost one that was desecrated).[3] In contrast, if we do not desecrate Shabbat, we have gained one Shabbat that we kept and that is all; that is, the total benefit is Y.
To decide the conflict we must compare the benefits of these two options. But of course, regardless of the relationship between the values of X and Y—indeed, regardless of the value of X (so long as it is positive)—we always have (as long as n>2):[4]
X + (n−1)Y > Y
If so, the benefit of desecrating Shabbat outweighs, irrespective of our value scale, because—as Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya observed—in saving we gain not only life but also many Shabbats.
In other words, the conclusion that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya assumes a hierarchy between Shabbat and life (that life is a means to the keeping of Shabbat) is incorrect. He may accept or reject Shmuel’s view that the commandments are a means to life and are of lesser importance than life; either way he can still say what he said. The inequality above does not depend on Y<X (indeed, it does not depend on X at all). Thus the Meiri is correct that both rationales/sources can be held together; there is no contradiction between them. On the contrary, from the fact that the halakha is like Shmuel—that is, we adopt his conception that X>Y—we can infer that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya agrees to that as well; but unlike Shmuel he contends that there is no need to rely on it, because even without it the decision is to desecrate Shabbat and save a life.
A Note on Doubtful Danger to Life
What about a doubtful danger to life? This is indeed unclear. According to Shmuel it seems the Gemara assumes that X/2 > Y. But according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya, it would seem that even here we should desecrate Shabbat, for even if we erase X entirely, the comparison between the two sides of the inequality still favors the left-hand side (at least when n>2). It seems there is no refutation to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya.
Perhaps here the difference needs to enter between desecrating Shabbat and not keeping it; that is, it is not (n−1)Y but rather nY − Z, where Z is the “cost” of desecration. Still, it remains unclear why in a case of certain danger to life this inequality would decide according to him. He needs to assume something about the relation between X and Z. This brings us to the next note.
Incommensurability of Values
In analytic moral philosophy there is discussion of the incommensurability (the absence of a common measure) of values. The claim is that we have no way to compare values and determine which is more important. Consider an example Sartre gives. During World War II, one of his students in occupied Paris came to consult him about a dilemma. His elderly mother lived in Paris alone and needed help. He himself wanted to flee Paris and join the Free French to fight the Nazis. What should he do? Which outweighs which—the value of aiding one’s elderly mother, or the value of fighting evil? It seems there is no practical way to establish such a hierarchy, that is, a scale of values. Beyond the practical difficulty, the claim is that there is a principled difficulty.
Leibowitz wrote and said in several places (see, for example, the last essay in his collected writings, Faith, History, and Values, where he discusses disconnecting a patient from machines) that a value, in its essence, cannot be reduced to or grounded in another principle (reduction or rationalization). That is essentially the definition of a value. Every ethical directive is based on certain values, but the values themselves are not based on anything outside them. The first step in any ethical justification is the adoption of a value; therefore the value itself cannot be justified (otherwise we fall into an infinite regress). Leibowitz describes this as an arbitrary act, but in my view he means an act that cannot be grounded in a logical argument (which is not the same thing. See, for example, here). But if there is no way to justify or rationalize a value, then there is also no way to measure it against another value.
We can put it this way: to establish a hierarchy between two values we must ground them on a common basis, measure each of them in those shared units, and then see which one scores higher. For example, if I hesitate whether to drive fast in an ambulance—even though it endangers lives—because speed might save the patient’s life, this is a consideration entirely within the framework of saving life and the value of life; therefore, in principle, one can weigh and determine where the value of life is better served—by driving fast or slowly; the question is what will save more life. But desecrating Shabbat versus saving life, or fighting evil versus helping an elderly mother—these are conflicts between different values that have no common measure; therefore there is no way to measure them on a shared scale to build a hierarchy and resolve the conflict.
It must be understood that if indeed a conflict between values is incommensurable, then even if we find an explicit verse telling us that saving a life overrides Shabbat—or the reverse—that will not help. The problem of incommensurability is not that we are not smart enough to know the answer, but that there is no answer. If I ask you what there is more of in the world: water in the Indian Ocean or human kindness—this is not a question that is difficult to answer; it is a question that has no answer. In such a case, even an explicit verse cannot teach us that there is more water or more kindness. A verse can help when there is an answer and we lack the tools to reach it; but a verse cannot answer a question that has no answer.
Back to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya
I will not enter here into solving this problem,[5] but will only say that perhaps Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya seeks to bypass it. He rejects all the sources his colleagues bring, because a source cannot answer a question that has no answer. Instead of a source he proposes an answer based on reasoning—but a reasoning that bypasses the need to build a scale of values (for reasoning too cannot build such a scale when there is no relation between its rungs). As we saw, his answer resolves the conflict without needing to rank X against Y, even if there is in principle no way to do so.[6]
However, as we saw, if we try to explain the refutation to him from doubtful danger to life, this forces us to assume that there is a common measure—that is, room for comparison—between X and Z. That does not accord with the assumption of incommensurability, and this requires further thought.
Back to the Previous Column
The conclusion we reached here indeed dovetails with the conclusion of the previous column. The hierarchy between life and the commandments is not unequivocal—neither according to Shmuel nor according to Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. We saw there that without the possibility of keeping commandments there is no point to life (and therefore the commandment of procreation lapses), and at the same time Shmuel says that without life there is no point to the commandments.
[1] The Chatam Sofer in his novellae to Ketubot there also makes this point against Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya. However, the Meiri in the Yoma sugya cited above writes that the reason we do not save a gentile’s life on Shabbat is that they are not bound by “the norms of the nations” (they do not keep the seven Noachide commandments to which they are obligated, which are essentially moral and human norms). It is clear from his words that regarding people who belong to nations that are indeed bound by norms (such as the Christians in the Meiri’s time—about whom he writes that their status is different; see my essay here)—there is an obligation to save their lives even at the cost of Shabbat desecration by Torah law, just like for a Jew. If so, the Bi’ur Halakha’s argument against him collapses of itself, for according to the Meiri, even with respect to a gentile who is obligated to keep his own commandments, one can apply Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya’s reasoning—that is, to desecrate Shabbat for him so that he will keep (other) commandments, from among his seven, many times.
[2] In principle there is an asymmetry between the two sides of the equation: keeping Shabbat contains a prohibition and a positive commandment; therefore there is value to keeping Shabbat and a negative value to desecrating it. By contrast, saving life has a positive value, but not saving it is not a negative (for I did not murder him; there is no transgression here). Of course there is a loss of the life itself, but it seems hard to say that this has a negative value and not merely the absence of a positive value. See on this in columns 415–416.
[3] Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya ignores the fact that desecrating Shabbat is not merely the loss of keeping one Shabbat; it also has a negative value. Perhaps because of the high value of n he thinks this is insignificant. Even if we include the loss involved in desecrating Shabbat, it would not change the relationship between the two sides of the equation.
[4] Recall that n is the number of commandments, not the number of Shabbats.
[5] See my video and audio lectures on Torah and morality (there are several series on the site), and also the beginning of the third book in my trilogy.
[6] Indeed, from the very fact that X and also Y both appear in the same inequality, it would seem they share units; otherwise there would be no way to compare them. But we can read the plus sign in the inequality as a symbol expressing that beyond the advantage on the left-hand side in terms of the number of commandments/Shabbats (which suffices to decide), one must also add the value of life (measured in entirely different units). Even without assuming a common measure, one can see that this inequality is decided in favor of desecrating Shabbat. The problem arises in the case of doubtful danger to life, for there we see that the value of X does play a role in the decision; that is, there is no assumption of incommensurability. I noted this just above.
Discussion
By the way regarding section A: I hinted that if R. Shimon were a consequentialist, then of course he would offset desecration of Shabbat against keeping it. But that is of course not necessarily so. By analogy, even a consequentialist does not necessarily price suffering and pleasure on one axis. I, for example, with all my consequentialism, when I came to the distinguished story “Those Who Turn Their Backs on an Unhoused Person” https://www.sf-f.org.il/sf-f/old_site/story_1155.html began to hesitate. There the happiness of many depends on the immense suffering of one individual. And in that case my heart does not let me accept that one girl should suffer immensely while the others feast luxuriously on fat. If the immense suffering of the one saves many from immense sufferings, then it goes without saying that it is a great mitzvah to inflict that immense suffering on the individual with our own hands. But suffering versus pleasures is already a different opera, and there pricing is difficult, and I for one do not know what to say. Presumably there is some small measure of suffering for an individual that is “worth less” than some larger measure of certain pleasures for many, and for example one expropriates a person’s home for the sake of a public road, even though nowadays people like to prattle that a person’s home is interwoven with the thread of his life, and even if you fill his pockets with gold he suffers great anguish; but to set a price here is indeed very problematic.
A. As for a positive commandment overriding a negative one (in one person and at the same time, unlike R. Shimon ben Menasya who innovated that future positive commandments override a present negative commandment in different people), it is not entirely clear that there is pricing there. Because it is a derivation and part of the system of commands. One can view the whole Torah as one commandment with 613 details and definitions, and all the rules of override fit in as part of the system. So too in honoring one’s father by committing a transgression, where they say “both you and he are obligated in My honor”—apparently the meaning is that the mitzvah of honoring one’s father itself is limited only to what is permitted.
A. Regarding consequentialism, you already qualified it yourself. As for your basic question, I myself asked it (in the discussion regarding Z).
B. R. Shimon ben Menasya is not speaking specifically about desecrating Shabbat but about all transgressions (except for the three severe ones). As for your claim itself, I am not sure I understood it. But insofar as I did understand, I do not see what is unique about R. Shimon ben Menasya. I completely agree with your consideration regarding the Holy One (and so does Maimonides in his discussion that every mitzvah certainly has a reason), but I do not see why this pertains specifically to R. Shimon ben Menasya. Especially since he is not really measuring the value of Shabbat against life, as I explained in the post.
[In parentheses I will add that in my view it is not necessarily true that one who repents is punished by court-imposed penalties. But this requires much elaboration, and things I have written and taught on the matter have not yet been published. And there is more to say.]
C. You may perhaps challenge his distinction between restrained and unrestrained gentiles from the Gemara, but according to his own view one cannot prove from there that in order to desecrate Shabbat to save someone there need not be any expectation that he will observe mitzvot.
As for your argument itself, I did not understand it. According to the Meiri, the Gemara assumes that this is an unrestrained gentile, and therefore one does not desecrate Shabbat for him. That is when he is certainly a gentile. But in a case of doubt whether he is a gentile or a Jew, one does desecrate Shabbat. According to the Meiri, who holds that the desecration stems from expectation of mitzvah observance, this can be explained in several ways. Here are two of them: 1. In the future the doubt will be resolved, and there is some chance it will turn out that he is Jewish and will observe many mitzvot. This is not a matter of his repenting, which we do not take into account (the present presumption), but rather that it will become clear retroactively that from the start he was a proper son of our father Abraham. 2. Even an unrestrained gentile fulfills some commandments. It is not necessary that he violate all seven of his commandments. On the contrary, usually that is the case. Therefore even in a place where most gentiles are not restrained, you can equally say that a very large majority of them observe some of their commandments. Therefore the Biur Halakhah’s question, which assumes that one saves him even though he is not at all expected to observe mitzvot, is incorrect according to the Meiri’s own position.
A. I apologize. I do not know how I missed that as a reader of the letter. But a note is not enough, and it burdens the whole discussion.
C. The answer that perhaps the doubt will be resolved applies even if, according to the Meiri, one does not desecrate even for a restrained gentile, so that case must be discussed separately. The answer that even an unrestrained gentile fulfills something—I did not understand what that answers, since in the Gemara if he is certainly a gentile one does not desecrate.
With God’s help, Friday eve of the holy Sabbath, Parashat Ve-Hayah Berakhah, 5782
From the discussion between the tannaim about the derivation, it appears that the law itself—that saving life overrides Shabbat—was agreed and accepted by all, and the discussion is only about “what meaning is derived”. For that reason, since there is no dispute here about the definition of the law, it is understandable why the Gemara does not reject Shmuel’s words on the ground that an amora has no authority to dispute tannaim.
The halakhah requiring desecration of Shabbat for the sake of saving life was not easy to carry out for a Jew accustomed to the idea that observance of Shabbat is one of the gravest mitzvot; and the discussion is educational—how to persuade him to desecrate Shabbat. This was especially difficult in a “time of persecution,” when Jews had become accustomed to self-sacrifice for observing the mitzvot of the Torah, and the tannaim sought the arguments that would persuade the public to fulfill the halakhic requirement to set aside Shabbat for the sake of saving life.
And as I pointed out also in the previous post, it is difficult to assume that “reasons for the commandments” meant to arouse motivation reflect real differences in the parameters of halakhah.
Regards, Hanokh Henekh Feynshmaker-Palti
There is a similarity between Rabbi Ishmael’s argument here—that one who refrains from desecrating Shabbat in order to save is like one who assists a pursuer—and the reasoning that Rabbi Ishmael puts there, ironically, in the mouth of those who maintain the prohibition against marrying in a time of decree: that the purpose of the prohibition is that the seed of Abraham our father should come to an end on its own. Rabbi Ishmael’s view is that there must not be a situation in which excessive punctiliousness in mitzvot leads to existential danger for the community or for the individual.
A Good Sabbath blessing, Hofesh Palti
Yet despite the importance Rabbi Ishmael attached to preserving life—when the matter touched on the “appurtenances of idolatry,” Rabbi Ishmael stood firm and prevented his sister’s son, Rabbi Elazar ben Dama, whom a snake had bitten, from being healed in the name of a certain man, and when Ben Dama died Rabbi Ishmael praised him: “Fortunate are you, Ben Dama, for you departed the world in peace and did not breach the fence of the sages” (Avodah Zarah 27b).
Regards, Hofesh Palti
On Wikipedia there are those who identify Rabbi Ishmael stam (the great tanna whose halakhot are numerous) with Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha (from whom we have not found halakhot), as you do, but this sounds very odd to me (because of the above difference).
And his words (those of R. Ishmael ben Elisha) regarding the seed of Abraham are, on the contrary, the opposite—that one should be punctilious about the mitzvot even if there is existential danger; so how did you turn his words upside down and say that he spoke ironically?
To T.G., a good Friday
And is it not obvious that the rationale for the halakhah—”that the seed of Abraham should come to an end on its own”—was said ironically?
Regards, Hofesh Palti
Especially since these words are said in an aggadic baraita, where Rabbi Ishmael’s words are conveyed ceremoniously in his full name and title. This is not an ordinary halakhic statement.
Regarding repentance in a lower court, it turns out that part of it was published in post 91 https://mikyab.net/posts/4735 and in the links there (and there you concluded: “But according to this, the words of the Mishnah in Makkot 13 and of Rashi and Ramban there still require examination, for they clearly imply that repentance does not help with punishments administered by a lower court”; and then you set up an interpretation that only formal repentance does not help, as distinct from substantive repentance. I have not, however, gone deeply into your beam there, and it requires much checking whether the beam is a beam of the olive press or a beam of satisfaction).
C. For a certain gentile one does not desecrate, not because he will not observe anything, but because what he does not observe outweighs in its harm what he does observe (and again, one must draw some line. See the next post). The Meiri’s claim is that the permission to desecrate Shabbat stems from the fact that he will observe mitzvot, but one should not infer from this that for everyone who observes some mitzvot one desecrates Shabbat.
I did not remember.
A1. Even so, I will return to it, because one cannot ignore a difficulty even if it is noted. If R. Shimon ben Menasya knows how to place a ladder on the ground and measure desecration of Shabbat against observance of Shabbat, and according to the Meiri he also measures other mitzvot and transgressions, and the sages readily said that a transgression extinguishes a mitzvah (and also that a positive commandment overrides a negative one, in its plain sense), then why think that specifically the value of life he cannot measure and therefore looks for gimmicks? Presumably he sees the value of life as something internal to halakhah, not that he brings it in from outside as a sevara and sets it against a transgression. It was not exactly clarified for me from the post how you understand R. Shimon ben Menasya’s conception of the value of life—whether within the halakhic framework or not.
Why not understand his words simply: that he measured with a bucketful and found that the value of life is less important than keeping Shabbat (by reasoning, or from the fact that the mitzvah of preserving life is after all just the prohibition “Do not stand idly by your fellow’s blood,” and as is known from the book of Maccabees, at first they let themselves die rather than desecrate Shabbat), but that even without assigning importance to the value of life one must desecrate because of his own calculation.
And we can still also uphold Shmuel’s reason, and there is no contradiction, because according to us, as with Shmuel, the value of life is important and that covers everything; but in truth even if the value of life is less important than Shabbat, there is still R. Shimon ben Menasya’s consideration. And perhaps there is a practical difference, for example whether to save someone from becoming mentally incapacitated or vegetative, such as by supplying him oxygen. From the perspective of “and live by them,” he will live even without the rescue; but from the perspective of “desecrate one Shabbat for him so that he may keep many Shabbatot,” if he is not saved he will not keep many Shabbatot and is considered like dead. Besides, it is not necessary that the Meiri rules like R. Shimon ben Menasya in practice; perhaps he only explains that in temporary life one also saves according to R. Shimon ben Menasya, because the Gemara did not present this as a practical difference, as you wrote.
A2. And if he is already measuring desecrations and observances, where did you get the assumption (expressed in the equation) that one desecration against one observance comes out as a perfect cancellation? What appears in his words is only that the expected observances are more valuable than one desecration.
A1. Beyond the difficulty about Z, which was already discussed, I did not understand your words. After all, that inequality shows that the decision does not depend on the value of life (X). The result is obtained solely from considerations of Y, with no connection to the value of X (at least so long as it is positive and n is above 2). So why claim that R. Shimon ben Menasya assumes something about the value of life? There is no hint of such an assumption in his words. That is my whole claim here.
A2. You are right. In principle it need not be that there is a one-to-one cancellation, but from the words of R. Shimon ben Menasya that is what emerges. He compares desecrating one Shabbat to keeping many Shabbatot. This implies that the decisive parameter is quantity.
A1. Because the assumption that there is something immeasurable is a bit strange given that every other thing that moves within halakhah has indeed been measured, and he himself measures observances and desecrations. So I assume he does measure; and from the fact that he did not say that life overrides, it follows that in his view life is overridden because it was measured and found cheaper than Shabbat (a known view, as mentioned, in Maccabees). In any case, if that too is a possibility acceptable to you, then fine.
In my remarks in the previous post, I also suggested another direction: that the statement “and thus the seed of Abraham will come to an end on its own” is the reasoning of the pietists, for whom life without doing the will of God is valueless, and therefore we must be prepared “to be blotted out for the sanctification of His Name.”
Rabbi Ishmael says to them: “Even according to your own view—that all Israel should follow the path of the pietists and give up their lives rather than marry—at least concede to me that even though in your view all Israel are acting improperly, one should refrain from rebuking them for this, because ‘it is preferable that they remain inadvertent rather than become deliberate transgressors.'”
Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha himself follows his own line that the existence of Israel is a “divine need,” and therefore when the Master of the Universe asks him, “Ishmael, My son, bless Me,” Rabbi Ishmael blesses his Creator that He should have compassion on His people, for the very existence of Israel is a blessing to its God. For that reason it is plausible that he would not agree with the pietists’ reasoning that there is room “to be blotted out for the sanctification of the Name” where the Torah did not require it.
Regards, Yefa’or
It also seems that Rabbi Ishmael, who knew the political reality, understood that the Romans had no problem with the existence of the Jewish religion as such, for the empire contained countless strange religions. What disturbed the Romans was Judaism’s proselytizing influence, and their decree was more “for their own benefit” than “to force abandonment of the religion”; and once they understood this, the decree concerning the Jews would be rescinded—as indeed happened in the end.
A. [What leads you to think that Rabbi Ishmael is Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha? Is it not strange that Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha is cited for aggadic statements and customs, whereas Rabbi Ishmael’s teachings are scattered all over halakhah? The character of the figures appears completely different.]
B. If the decrees were specifically against the Jewish religion (not certain), one can simply explain them by saying that uprooting the unifying ethos of the Jews would break them apart and prevent rebellions. In a successful revolt the Jews certainly did stand apart. I did not understand why, once the Romans realized that what they feared was proselytizing influence, they would rescind the decrees. More likely, after they saw that matters had calmed down and the Roman peace had returned to prevail, they no longer saw any benefit in exerting themselves to oppress the subjects.
See at the beginning of the third book regarding the measurement of values.
Beyond that, I explained that nothing in his words implies any measurement of life versus Shabbat.
According to the Meiri, even regarding a gentile the rationale applies: “Desecrate one Shabbat for him so that he may observe many commandments.”
And since a gentile who keeps Shabbat is liable to death—one could say regarding a gentile:
“Desecrate one Shabbat for him so that he may desecrate many Shabbatot.”
Good tidings
The value of life is your invention. (And not only that, but there it explicitly spoke about the life of an Israelite, and you omitted that and added the invented notion of the value of life.)
“And live by them” means that the statutes and judgments are meant to sustain a person’s life, and if they do not desecrate Shabbat then it will come out that the statutes brought about the person’s death, contrary to what the Torah said: “and live by them.” And not because of the value of life.
And how do we see that life has no value? There are many laws of capital punishment for a person who breaks laws.
B. (An attempt with improved wording.) I tried to infer from R. Shimon ben Menasya that there are reasons for the commands. For after all, Rashbam agrees that in the end one who desecrates in order to save has violated no command at all. And had he asked the Holy One, He would have told him: desecrate. If so, the point of his calculation (which computes desecration against observance, like that neglected Z issue) is to calculate the rationales or utilities of the commands.
You said that in any case this is also the view of Maimonides and your own. Still, a proof from a halakhic Gemara has value.
And you said there is nothing unique to Rashbam. But I felt a difference—someone who discusses categories such as whether pickling is like cooking deals with the category of cooking and does not really need the rationale (and in parallel, for Rashbam, the utility), whereas Rashbam did not find an internal category either in desecration or in observance (again, that Z), but weighed them all together, and that is impossible except on the basis of assuming utilities exist and can be measured. Now I thought that this is exactly what you said—whoever measures two commands by reason assumes something shared by which they are measured, and from here it is already reasonable to assume that there is something prior to the command, on account of which the command was given or which it is meant to improve. It follows that Rashbam in particular assumes utilities for mitzvot.
I understand. Nice point.
With God’s help, 13 Heshvan 5780
To T.G.—greetings,
There was a “Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha the High Priest” who was killed by the Romans during the suppression of the revolt together with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel (Sotah 48b; Avot de-Rabbi Natan 38:3). And apparently he is the one who “entered to burn incense in the innermost sanctuary” (although some conjecture that his entry to burn incense took place during the brief period when Temple service was renewed in the days of Bar Kokhba; Wikipedia, entry “Rabbi Ishmael,” note 13).
But there was also an “R. Ishmael ben Elisha” who had been taken captive in Rome and whom Rabbi Yehoshua redeemed, saying, “I am certain that this one will be a decisor of law in Israel” (Gittin 58a). And likewise the Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha who said, “I will read and not tilt,” and then read and tilted, and wrote in his notebook that when the Temple is rebuilt he would bring a fat sin-offering (Shabbat 12b). That was certainly after the destruction, and in the parallel in the Jerusalem Talmud (ch. 1, hal. 3) he is mentioned simply as “Rabbi Ishmael.”
Certainly the Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha who speaks about refraining from meat and wine after the destruction is not the High Priest from Temple times, for he was killed at the destruction; rather, he is the second Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha, who was also a priest, for they said of him, “A priest supports a priest.” R. Avraham Hyman, in his entry in Toldot Tannaim ve-Amoraim, conjectures that he was the grandson of the High Priest.
Regards, Hasdai Betzalel Duvdevani Kirshen-Kvas
The decree against circumcision, in the view of many scholars, preceded the Bar Kokhba revolt. Circumcision was regarded as mutilation, considered a grave prohibition, and was forbidden to all peoples. The purpose of the ban was to prevent the proselytizing influence of the Jews, which had reached the point described by Roman historians that “there is no house in Rome without a Jew in it.”
One of the causes of the Bar Kokhba revolt was the decree against circumcision, and when the revolt was suppressed the decrees against the Jews were intensified and they forbade observance of the communal commandments. With the calming of the situation, the Romans’ attitude toward the Jews softened. Not only were they permitted to observe commandments—they were even given permission to circumcise their sons, while the prohibition of circumcision remained fully in force for gentile citizens of the empire, preventing the legal conversion of gentiles.
I asked how you know to identify Rabbi Ishmael, the great tanna, colleague of Rabbi Akiva and uncle of Ben Dama, with Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha. You said there were two Rabbi Ishmael ben Elishas, but you did not argue in favor of that identification.
And why two? You said one, after the destruction, said that he would bring a sin-offering, and one was High Priest before the destruction. But what is the proof here? A person lives over a span of time. It is entirely possible that there was one Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha: before the destruction he was High Priest, then the Romans came and destroyed, then he said he would bring a fat sin-offering, and a few years later the Romans killed him.
Regarding the decrees and the revolt, it seems you are right.
To T.G.—greetings,
Rabbi Ishmael ben Elisha, who said (Shabbat 12) that he would bring a fat sin-offering, is called in the parallel in the Jerusalem Talmud simply “Rabbi Ishmael.” He certainly is not the High Priest who was killed with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel during the suppression of the revolt at the destruction.
Regards, Chabad Ki”k
Similarly, “Rabbi Akiva ben Yosef” is usually called simply “Rabbi Akiva,” and Rabbi Yehudah bar Ilai is called simply “Rabbi Yehudah,” and Rabbi Yosei bar Halfta—”Rabbi Yosei,” and so on and so forth.
Regards, Shatzal bar Shaddah
“And it shall be, if they do not believe the voice of the first posek, they will believe the voice of the last posek.”
And if they do not believe the voice of these two poskim either?
Rather, apparently “the final posek” meant what is called in the foreign tongue “the ultimate posek”—and that can be debated.
The writer “Final Posek” writes: “the statutes and judgments are meant to sustain a person’s life”—
That is the meaning of “human life has value”—otherwise, why “to sustain a person’s life”?
With God’s help, 13 Heshvan 5782
Even from the Mishnah in Horayot—that a priest precedes a Levite, a Levite an Israelite, and a man a woman for preserving life (whereas for clothing and redeeming captivity the woman comes first)—it would seem at first glance that the level of obligation in mitzvot determines the value of life. But there is room to say that as far as the value of life itself is concerned, there is no room to say that one person’s blood is redder than another’s; rather, with respect to the obligation of rescue, priority is given to one whom the rescuer is more obligated to honor (just as one’s father and teacher take precedence).
It should also be noted that according to Maimonides, “to preserve alive” means to support financially, and here too the Mishnah in Horayot was not ruled in accordance with, since it follows the first tanna in Ketubbot that in the case of limited assets the sons are fed because they are obligated to study Torah. But in practice the halakhah follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that where assets are limited the daughters are fed and the sons must go begging; and likewise regarding “to preserve alive,” meaning “to support,” the woman comes first, because it is not fitting for a woman’s dignity to go begging (see the supplements to R. Hanoch Albeck’s commentary to the Mishnah on Horayot).
Tosafot also asked against the Mishnah in Horayot from the Gemara in Ketubbot, which ruled in accordance with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel that the daughters are fed and the sons must go begging; and they innovated a distinction between supporting with food, where the woman comes first (as with clothing) because of her dignity, and “to preserve alive” in the sense of “to save,” where the man comes first because of his greater obligation in mitzvot.
Regards, Nehorai Shraga Agami-Psissovitz
I have a thought, according to my feeble mind—that the rule of priority in rescue was stated only because of the reasoning
of “Who says this blood is redder than that blood?”
So that a person should not be like Buridan’s donkey and save no one at all, they gave him an immediate criterion
so that he will act at once.
Good tidings
Priority in rescue is derived from R. Akiva’s rule that “your life takes precedence,” and therefore also the one to whom you owe more honor takes precedence over one to whom you owe less honor; and therefore a Torah scholar, a priest, or one who is obligated in more mitzvot takes precedence.
According to Ben Petora, that “one should not see the death of his fellow,” there is no room even for “your life takes precedence.” Interestingly, Maimonides did not decide the dispute between R. Akiva and Ben Petora, and he also says nothing about priority in rescue, since he interprets “to preserve alive” in the sense of “to feed.”
Regards, Nasa”f
A. Even on the accounting of R. Shimon ben Menasya there is an evaluative measurement of desecrating Shabbat and keeping it. He assumes that the harm of desecrating Shabbat is offset by the benefit of keeping Shabbat. But how does he know that? (Did R. Shimon ben Menasya become confused in his old age and turn into a consequentialist, Heaven forbid.) From the side of the prohibition of Shabbat there is no benefit at all in observing it, only harm in desecrating it; and from the side of the positive commandment of Shabbat there is almost no harm in desecration, only mainly benefit in observance. All the more so according to the Meiri, that the same applies to all commandments: how does R. Shimon ben Menasya know that desecrating Shabbat is offset against any other commandment (or against some sum of other commandments).
In the Gemara there is the idea that a transgression extinguishes a mitzvah, meaning (apparently) that reward and punishment in the World to Come (for in any case there is no reward for mitzvot in this world) are calculated net, and each person has either only reward or only punishment. That really implies that transgressions and mitzvot lie on the same axis. But R. Shimon ben Menasya not only said they are on the same axis; he also knew how to price them. If all R. Shimon ben Menasya wants is to avoid measuring values, then it is rather strange that mitzvot and transgressions he knows how to place on one axis and also price so neatly (and how to price them? Equal! What is special about the equilibrium point more than any other point? Perhaps the next post will solve it).
B. Perhaps this is trivial. Is it true that in R. Shimon ben Menasya we clearly see that mitzvot also have benefits and harms (metaphysical, apparently) apart from the command itself, meaning that there are full-fledged reasons for commandments and transgressions? Violating the command by desecrating Shabbat is more severe than the value of life, since one who desecrates Shabbat is sentenced to death, even if Elijah were to come and say that the Knower of Secrets testified about him that he had fully repented and would never return to this sin. Therefore it is clear that R. Shimon ben Menasya is trying to uncover that the rescuer is not commanded to refrain from desecrating Shabbat. He penetrates to the ultimate intention of the Omnipresent and discovers what He commands us to do; it is not that he sits outside halakhah, sees two conflicting commands or desires, and decides in some extra-halakhic way what he, R. Shimon ben Menasya, thinks is right to do. And when the Holy One Himself is, כביכול, deliberating what to command (whether to desecrate and save or not), then before Him there really is no issue of command, because He is not subject to His own commands, but only the benefits and harms that emerge from the mitzvah and the transgression. If all there were was command, then it would make no sense to penetrate to the ultimate intention of the Holy One regarding what He commands in a given situation. Clearly, according to R. Shimon ben Menasya, in the end the one who saved committed no transgression at all and accrued no desecration to his liability, because the command addressed to man is one. But the Holy One weighs matters even before the command, and there there is nothing to weigh unless there are reasons that precede the command itself.
C. In note 1 you rejected the Biur Halakhah’s difficulty on the Meiri and said that according to the Meiri one desecrates Shabbat even for a restrained gentile. I did not understand. In the Gemara there, regarding an abandoned infant, if he is certainly a gentile one does not desecrate Shabbat for him. So this infant has an extant majority that he comes from gentiles who are not restrained (and there is a non-extant majority that he will grow up like them, not restrained), and nevertheless one desecrates Shabbat for him. And if you say that perhaps he will grow up and restrain himself, then likewise regarding an adult gentile perhaps he will repent and restrain himself. Rather, we do not take account of possible future change, and by logic the same should apply to a child in a city that is not restrained: what can the youth do and not sin, and we should not be concerned that the spirit of God may begin to stir him.
And perhaps you will say that an adult gentile who is not restrained, meaning he has sinned and acted perversely, is already in principle liable to death, and therefore one does not save him (and apparently the same would be true of a Jew who has become liable to death, for example strangulation: do we clear away a heap from upon him and then kill him? You would say we do not clear it away. And, to distinguish, I seem to recall once seeing something that seemed absurd to me: in the U.S., if people sentenced to death are ill, they wait for them to recover and treat them medically in all kinds of ways, and then seat them in chairs for judgment). This is unlike an infant, who has not sinned.
[D. By the way, you explained karei as pumpkin seeds, like Rashi explained pilpel as a seed. But Rashi did not explain karei as a seed. Apparently specifically hot pepper is discussed as a seed, because that is how the plant bears fruit (as shown in a picture on Wikipedia), while green pepper, which is discussed regarding orlah, perhaps Rashi did not know whether it was hot or not, and therefore he explained it regarding black pepper. But squash is an ordinary vegetable and its seeds are secondary to it.]