On One Who Intentionally Takes His Own Life, and on Converts in Our Time (beginning on page 60)

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On One Who Deliberately Takes His Own Life, and on Converts in Our Time

A. Rabbi Harlap, in his article on the question of the suicide of King Saul (‘HaMa’ayan’ 49:4 [Tammuz 5749], p. 20ff.), opens with an introduction about the value of brief life, and there he assumes as agreed and writes (p. 21): ‘The value of life therefore does not depend on its length, its quantity, or its quality.’ In my opinion this claim is incorrect, at least in two of the three respects: the value of life certainly does depend on the question of its length (brief life as against long-term life); it is not clear whether it depends on the question of quantity (how much ‘brief life’ there is); but the value of life certainly does depend on the question of its quality.

Regarding quality, I would answer him from his own starting point: after all, he himself wrote that some explained the

3 Formerly a member of the leadership of Mizrachi Youth and deputy director-general of the Midrashiat Noam institutions. [Without in any way contradicting Mrs. Stern’s response, I wished to note that in the above-mentioned book ‘Nezer Yisrael,’ in the article ‘The History of Midrashiat Noam’ by Prof. Mordechai Bar-Lev, of blessed memory (p. 287ff.), mention is made of the close ties between Israel Sadan and Rabbi Meltzer, which led them to work together on the plan for establishing the joint educational enterprise (it is also noted there that in 5706, two years after the establishment of the Midrashiya, when Rabbi Meltzer and his yeshiva moved to Rehovot, the practical partnership of Kletzk Yeshiva and its head in the administration of the institution came to an end, although Rabbi Meltzer remained a senior member of its governing board). Israel Sadan himself wrote as follows in ‘Niv HaMidrashiya’ 5723 (cited there, p. 381): ‘From the synagogue of Pardes Hannah, and from the nucleus of Kletzk Yeshiva beside it, the Midrashiya arose and developed. Its founders contributed greatly, first among them our friend, the chairman of our governing council, the eminent rabbi R. Tzvi Yehuda Meltzer, of blessed memory. The cooperation with Kletzk Yeshiva in Pardes Hannah will constitute an important chapter in the history of the Midrashiya, and a milestone in its sacred path.’ As stated, there is nothing in these words that contradicts the fact that the main pillar of Midrashiat Noam, from its founding until his last day, was Israel Sadan, of blessed memory, and his many merits remain his. Editorial note, Y.K.].

permission granted to King Saul to take his own life by reference to the quality of life that awaited him (because of the sufferings), in the sense of ‘My death is better than my life’; see there several sources on the matter. As for their length, we have an explicit passage in Avodah Zarah 27b, ruled as law in Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 155:1 (and see also Ahiezer, Yoreh De’ah 16:6, and Iggerot Moshe, Yoreh De’ah III, no. 36, and many more), that long-term life, even when only possible, takes precedence over brief life. From here all the decisors permitted one whose remaining life is brief to undergo a dangerous operation that might grant him long-term life. Most far-reaching of all is the author of Tiferet Yisrael in Boaz on the Mishnah, Yoma ch. 8, who wrote that a person may actively take the brief life of another in order to save his own long-term life from a possible danger (and he explained by this the incident of Ulla, who bared the place of slaughter; see there; and see also my article, ‘Organ Donation,’ ‘Tehumin’ 29 [5769], p. 329).

And as for their quantity, it would seem indeed that the value of life does not depend on quantity, for Ahiezer and Iggerot Moshe cited above wrote that a brief life of days is no different from a brief life of months. However, whoever studies there will see (and this is also inferred in Iggerot Moshe) that a brief life of a year or more is considered long-term life, and therefore quantity too has significance. Put differently: the distinction between brief life and long-term life does not depend only on whether the process of dying is already present in the person or not (see Iggerot Moshe there), but also on the amount of time he has left to live (and therefore, according to his conclusion there, even if the process of deterioration is already present in him, if he will live more than twelve months it is considered long-term life).

And as for the Jerusalem Talmud, Terumot, from which the author proved (p. 21) that ‘one should make no distinction between the life of a private individual and the lives of many people,’ there too the matter is not at all simple. First, several decisors did distinguish between the life of an individual and the lives of the many, and wrote that an individual may, and is even commanded to, give up his life to save the many. They explained in this way the incident of the martyrs of Lod, and this has long been discussed. Second, there we are dealing with lives that will be taken in any case (for if they do not hand him over to the gentiles, all of them will be killed, including he himself), and therefore that case is not a problem of the life of an individual versus the lives of the many. And see my article ‘Separating Siamese Twins’ (‘Tehumin’ 27 [5767] p. 144), where I brought the words of Prof. Enker, who explained Maimonides and the Jerusalem Talmud in a completely different way – that this law concerns the laws of the profanation of God’s name and not the laws of murder, and it is obvious to me that this is indeed the intention of Maimonides here (for this law is brought by him in Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah, and not in the laws of murder and safeguarding life). By this all the difficulties raised by the commentators in this grave discussion are removed.

Another point woven throughout the article is the connection the author draws between the question whether one mourns a suicide and the question whether his act is prohibited or not. In my humble opinion, that connection is not at all necessary: there may be a situation in which the act is prohibited, but when it is done under some degree of compulsion the person is not regarded as such a grave wrongdoer that one does not mourn him; after all, not every sinner with respect to every transgression is denied mourning, which is obvious. Something similar is found in Maimonides, who wrote that one who transgressed rather than be killed in the case of the three cardinal sins is not punished, since he is considered under compulsion, even though he of course violated a prohibition. From this there is room to say that one who takes his own life out of fear of suffering does indeed commit a transgression – and yet one should still mourn him. And thereby

Rabbi Harlap’s difficulty (p. 32) with Tosafot, who wrote that Saul’s act was indeed prohibited according to Jewish law, is removed, for he challenged them from Yevamot 78b, where the Holy One rebukes David because they did not eulogize him properly; but according to our approach there is no difficulty at all. The same is true at several other points in the article, but I cannot elaborate here.

B. Rabbi Mordechai A. Brali (there, p. 36ff.) set out to discuss the question whether nonobservance of the commandments nullifies conversion or not. He brought several important sources on this matter, but in my opinion what was lacking was a discussion of the application of these sources to our own day, namely whether the intention of converts nowadays is like their intention in the past – or not. For the entire law depends on the presumption regarding what is in the convert’s heart, and the whole question whether ‘the end proves the beginning’ depends on reality: a decisor who ruled in the past that the conversion is not retroactively nullified may have assumed that there is no presumption that the convert’s intention is not for the sake of Heaven, but if in our time the situation is different, and in his heart and in the heart of every person it is clear that he has no intention whatsoever of accepting the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven, then all his words do not touch our case. I find it appropriate to make this remark, because in my opinion most discussions of conversion in recent years suffer from just such an anachronism: various sources are cited regarding whether to accept converts, what and how much is required in accepting the commandments, when and whether the conversion is void, but without discussing the assessment of what is in the convert’s heart – an assessment that changes according to time, place, and circumstances. This applies even to one converting for the sake of marriage, for in a world in which Judaism means commandment observance, it is reasonable to assume that if he converts he will observe commandments, except that perhaps he will do so not for its own sake; but nowadays one who converts for the sake of marriage (and also many of those who do not convert for the sake of marriage) has a high likelihood of not observing commandments at all, for for most converts ‘Judaism’ does not mean commandment observance (and I elaborated on this in my article ‘Gates of Conversion – On Violence and Good Intentions,’ ‘Akdamot’ 22 [5769] p. 197).

Thus the author brings a dispute between Rabbi Yitzhak Isaac Herzog and Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook over the question whether, when it is proven that at the time of conversion the convert did not intend to accept the yoke of the commandments, the conversion is void or not. But he himself also writes that if in his heart and in the heart of every person it is clear that he has no intention of keeping the commandments, the law changes; and there are those who argue that this is the situation today. If so, that dispute has no practical significance at all. In general, ‘the end proves the beginning’ is a question that is fundamentally factual, and by its very nature it may change with changing circumstances. Therefore, more than a discussion of the sources, one must discuss the underlying assumptions and presumptions that the Sages and the early authorities laid down at the basis of their words, so that it will be possible to discuss the application of these matters to our time and place.

It should also be noted that Rabbi Uziel’s distinction, which the article describes as more lenient than all the others, casts an entirely different light on the whole earlier discussion. Rabbi Uziel argues that acceptance of the yoke of the commandments is a necessary condition for conversion, but actual observance is not at all required as a condition for conversion. That is, the convert must know and accept upon himself the obligation and the responsibility, and understand that if he does not observe the commandments he will be punished; but even if it is known to us that he will not observe even a single commandment, and even if that is his plan from the outset, it is perfectly acceptable, and he is a Jew. According to this, all the sources cited earlier require discussion as to whether they were speaking about obligation to the yoke of the commandments or about actual observance of the commandments.

This is not clear from what is written in the article, and it is an exceedingly important foundation for practical law. In truth (as I wrote in my aforementioned article), in my opinion it is obvious that all these sources were speaking about actual observance and not about obligation, for actual observance, even by a Jew from birth, is never complete, so how could we demand more of the convert than that? Moreover, it is impossible to understand the disputes among the decisors as revolving around the undertaking and not around the actual observance, for the undertaking cannot be only partial, since acceptance of the yoke of the commandments except for one commandment is worth nothing at all (especially in light of Bekhorot 30b concerning ‘except for one matter’). Only partiality due to lack of knowledge can be accepted, in accordance with the well-known view of Ahiezer.

We are forced to conclude that all the disputes concern only actual observance, but every convert must accept upon himself the yoke of the commandments entirely and without reservation. Note well: the intention is not that he must undertake in advance actually to observe them (except insofar as he may fail), but rather that he need not even undertake to observe them; he need only accept upon himself the yoke and the obligation, and with them also the responsibility if he does not observe. Even if it is known from the outset that he will observe nothing at all, so long as he has accepted that obligation, we have no objection.

Michael Abraham