חדש באתר: NotebookLM עם כל תכני הרב מיכאל אברהם

Jewish and Democratic – On Nationhood and Religion, Conversion, and the Separation of Religion and State

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)The (ridiculous and hysterical, it must be said) controversy over the Nation-State Law that went on until the government’s fall reopened the question of the relation between nationhood and religion in Judaism, and of course the question of the state’s Jewishness. Everyone shouted at everyone else and expressed firm positions on the question whether the state’s Jewishness should be enshrined in law, and whether it is even desirable for it to be Jewish. Yet for some reason no one bothered to examine, let alone try to define, what a ‘Jew’ actually is from his point of view. Suppose we all agree that the state ought to be Jewish. If there is ambiguity about what and who a Jew is, what exactly is the meaning of the debate and the agreement about this? Are we debating whether all the state’s residents should speak Hebrew or read Amos Oz and David Grossman? Are we debating whether everyone should pay taxes and serve in the army, or whether everyone should eat kosher and marry through the rabbinate according to the law of Moses, Israel, and Yonah Metzger? Or perhaps we should debate the need to produce a signed pedigree tracing back to Abraham our father? Amid all the shouting, we failed to notice that this debate is almost empty of content. It is therefore no wonder that everyone understood it as a political dispute. The issue was not the state’s Jewishness but its non-Arab character. The Jewish identity crisis was placed on the table here in truly grotesque form. The only thing well defined here (supposedly) is who is a Palestinian, and the proposed law determines that the state is not his. Thus the problem of who is a Jew was solved: a Jew is whoever is not a Palestinian. No wonder people on the Left went into their customary hysteria (the destruction of democracy, a black stain on the history of the state and of Judaism, racism, Nazism, and the rest of the rhetorical flourishes and pathetic cries of anguish that are their stock-in-trade). Why is all this happening to us? Here I must return to my previous article. There I argued that Judaism is defined on the religious plane, and its core is commitment to Torah and commandments. Even morality and religious experience, for all their importance (if any), are not criteria for Jewish religiosity or for Judaism as such. I further argued there that every other definition betrays the concept’s true meaning and in effect turns it into a caricature. What is presented as secular ‘definitions’ of Judaism (‘A Jew is someone who is not a Palestinian.’ ‘A Jew is a pluralist and a moral person who is considerate of others.’ ‘A Jew is someone who serves in the army and acts according to the morality of the prophets.’ ‘A Jew is someone who studies the Bible or feels some connection to it.’) usually falls into one of two categories: 1. a circular definition, and therefore an empty one. 2. rhetoric about morality and liberalism that suits any thoroughly decent non-Jew just as well (one who feels one sort of connection or another to the Bible). It is clear that even those who propose these ‘definitions’ (preferably while furrowing their brow and wearing an intellectual, tormented, or smug expression, with an entire ‘Jewish’ and universal library photographed behind them) inwardly understand their futility and hollowness. But what will people not do in order to offer an alternative ‘full Jewish wagon’ in place of that of the Orthodox? If this involves presenting pure vacuum as alternative fullness, that is a small price to pay. One must remember that the alternative is to admit that Judaism is necessarily also a religion and not merely a culture or a nationality, and that, of course, is out of the question. All this is done under heavy armor of political correctness. Who would dare claim a monopoly over Judaism or criticize the Judaism of others (‘Who are you to define Judaism, which belongs to all of us, as everyone knows?! What arrogance!’)? So now everything is clear. If there really is no other definition of Judaism, how can one precede the stormy political debate over the Nation-State Law with definitions of the very concept the debate concerns? Most of us have no such definitions. Alternatively, if we all understand (some only in the secrecy of their hearts) that Judaism has only a religious definition, then when the law defines the state as the nation-state of the Jewish people, it really does look like religious-political takeover, and justifiably so. Hence the need to separate the plane of Jewish law from the civic plane. The title of my previous article was ‘Who Is a Jew and What Is Judaism? An Introduction to the Question of Conversion.’ Having surveyed the concept ‘Jew,’ it is time to ask what this picture really implies for conversion. At first glance, the obvious conclusion is that conversion is a religious act that must be performed by a rabbinical court according to purely legal criteria within Jewish law. Certainly there is no place for the state and its secular institutions to touch this issue. On the other hand, the liberal mind cannot tolerate a secular public that does not recognize the authority of Jewish law nevertheless subjecting itself to it and to its institutions without any ability to influence all this. Why should a secular individual or a secular society accept the mechanisms and criteria of Jewish law precisely in this sensitive area? Why should Jewish law and its representatives define for them whom they are to marry and whom they are to admit into their society? The above conclusion does not really follow from the picture I have described. The logical conclusion that does follow is that conversion in the sense recognized by Jewish law(!) must indeed be performed by a rabbinical court (not necessarily that of the Chief Rabbinate, of course). Does this mean that the secular public and state institutions must act this way as well? Certainly not. There is no obstacle at all to defining Jewish and Democratic—On Nationhood and Religion, Conversion, and the Separation of Religion and State. Michael Abraham. Rabbi Michael Abraham holds a PhD in physics and works in general philosophy, Jewish philosophy, and logic. Mosaic, Shevat 5775, February 2015 26

a civil-secular conversion in law, as is customary in other countries of the world. Israeli identity will be defined in law flexibly according to national-secular criteria, just as Frenchness or Italianness are. The civil convert will not be Jewish according to Jewish law, but that does not prevent Israeli society from seeing him as fully Israeli. Just like Druze citizens of Israel, Arab citizens of Israel, or new immigrants from various countries who come here even though they are not Jews under Jewish law. All of them are as fully Israeli as I am, so why drag them into a debate about Judaism that has only a religious meaning? This in fact means a certain form of separating religion from the state (and perhaps also from the nation) in two senses: privatizing the rabbinate (that is, abolishing the Chief Rabbinate as the state’s religious arm), and separating religion and nationhood (Jewish) from citizenship (Israeli). The definition of Judaism, which lies entirely on the plane of Jewish law, will be carried out as it has always been carried out, by various kinds of rabbinical courts (not state ones). A Jew is one who is born to a Jewish mother or who converted according to Jewish law (even if he does not observe the commandments, of course). Each community will decide on the mode of definition it accepts (and in making that decision, each community will also take into account that there will be those who do not recognize its conversions or marriages, and it may wish to compromise. But everything will be by consent and not by coercion). The definition of Israeli citizenship, by contrast, will be made by the state’s civil authorities, as in most civilized countries. Just to avoid misunderstandings, I see myself as part of the Jewish religion and nation, which are defined by Jewish law, and at the same time as part of the Israeli nation, which is defined openly and imprecisely (or in fact not defined at all), as nations generally are. My purpose here is only to sever the identity between those two, not to sever myself from either of them. We have already grown accustomed to struggles over the methods of conversion (the conversion-court system versus the ultra-Orthodox), over the authority to convert (Reform, liberal, and ultra-Orthodox conversions, or the law recently passed concerning the decentralization of the authority to convert to city rabbis). All this smuggles in an assumption that, for some reason, is accepted by all sides: that the state is supposed to control all this, and in effect that there is no difference between Judaism and Israeli identity. The combination of these two leads to the imposition of the rabbinic establishment on the civic definitions in the state—indeed, to its imposition on all of us. This combination leads to many distortions and harms, both to the secular-civic (and democratic) state and to Judaism as a religion. On the one hand, the monopoly that the state rabbinate is constantly trying to obtain over conversion leads to criteria not accepted by the public as a whole (nor even by parts of the religious public). On the other hand, others see Jewish law as an instrument that is supposed to serve them in correcting social problems, and they demand that it be lenient with converts without addressing the question of the logic and basis in Jewish law for these leniencies. We have many new immigrants who, under Jewish law, are not Jews, and therefore it seems self-evident that it is the duty of the rabbinic establishment to find a way to be lenient and convert them, in order to prevent intermarriage and solve various social and identity problems. Needless to say, the state itself created these problems, for under the Law of Return it grants immigration benefits even to those who are not Jews under Jewish law. After creating this problem, the rabbinic establishment is expected to clean up their excrement (that is, to help solve a problem created against its will), in the spirit of ‘Let the cow come and clean up the filth of its calf.’ Why should Jewish law be a handmaiden of the secular establishment in solving problems that it itself creates? Let Israelis—secular and religious, non-Jews and Jews—kindly define for themselves their Israeli identity and even their Judaism (if they can do so), and act accordingly. Jewish law is not supposed to provide us with this service. Will you say that I am a purist? Indeed. I acknowledge the facts in advance but deny the charge. Secular people prefer that the ultra-Orthodox manage religious affairs in the state. A similar phenomenon exists in the area of personal status. Here too the state entrusts the fate of its citizens to a rabbinic establishment that operates according to criteria not accepted by a considerable part of the public (some of them are not accepted even by the religious public). Here too various problems arise (women unable to obtain a divorce and extortion, marriage between a divorced woman and a priest, non-Jews and Jews, and so on), and here too Jewish law and the rabbinic establishment are supposed to solve. Photo: Government Press Office. Abolishing the Chief Rabbinate as the state’s religious arm. The Chief Rabbis with the President of Israel. Mosaic, Shevat 5775, February 2015 27

the problems that were created against their will (for example, by being lenient in divorce and the like). No wonder many of our ignoramuses suddenly become ‘Jews’ themselves (even when no fear of the Jews has fallen upon them), and every snot-nosed ignoramus expresses firm views on what Jewish law ought to do in every such situation. After all, Jewish law is the arm of the state for solving social problems and problems of self-definition. The conclusion is that here too the same solution is required: separation, and again on the two planes mentioned above—privatization of the rabbinic institutions (abolishing the Chief Rabbinate and returning authority to various religious communities, each according to its faith), and a severance between the rabbinic establishment and the plane of Jewish law with which it deals, and the secular-democratic civic plane, with which the secular government is supposed to deal. What causes this distortion? The conflation of Judaism with Israeli identity, and our collective unwillingness to distinguish between them, stems from a convergence of interests that is itself tied to the emptiness of the secular Jewish wagon. The religious want an instrument through which to impose their way on the public at large (that people should marry and convert according to Jewish law), an instrument that will also give the public sphere of the state a Jewish-religious character, as religious Zionism desires (and the ultra-Orthodox as well, though they will not admit it). The secular, by contrast, are looking for someone to do for them the work they cannot do themselves (even if they do not admit it), namely, to define Judaism for them and even preserve it for them. As noted, they too understand that the hollow ‘definitions’ offered as an alternative to the religious definition, and the circularity of those alternatives, have no substance. Therefore they prefer the definition: ‘A Jew is the person I hate, but am not willing to part from or stop seeing as the ultimate authentic Jew.’ This is the coalition that created the problematic identity between the Israeli nation and the Jewish religion. As a result of this convergence of interests (usually unconscious and unspoken), religious society erects over itself and others unnecessary, decadent, and corrupt institutions such as the Chief Rabbinate and the religious councils, and thus honestly deserves all the abuse it gets. All of this is only in order to save the secular from themselves and provide them with a consistent and reliable definition of Judaism. The secular, for their part, care about being considered Jews. But how on earth? In what sense are they Jewish? Not everyone is content with the fact that their grandparents were murdered in the Holocaust (and in any case, what about those poor ones who survived, God forbid? In what sense are they Jewish?). Therefore it is convenient for them to have someone carry the torch of Judaism, manage marriage and conversion, and in effect define Judaism for them. And if at the same time one can also hate him and shout and protest against conservatism and religious coercion, what could be better than that? The religious, as said, accept all this gladly, since this is the price to be paid in order to receive the authority to manage Judaism and religion through state institutions and save the secular from themselves. And so, through wondrous cooperation accompanied by mutual cries of anguish, this secular-religious coalition continues to provide perfect protection for an irrelevant Chief Rabbinate that manages conversion and personal-status matters for all of us (those of us who still marry there). The mire that all of us absorb because of this is exactly what we deserve. But this coalition is even more surprising than what I have described thus far. You might have thought that this was a coalition between the secular and religious Zionism, both of whom advocate an identity between state and religion. Mistake. This is mainly a coalition of the secular with the ultra-Orthodox and the Hardalim (ultra-conservative religious nationalists). The more liberal religious sometimes join it out of inertia (they were educated to see the identity between the state and the Jewish religion, or between Israeli identity and Judaism, as a supreme value, and do not trouble to examine it critically). The secular, who are aware, even if only implicitly, of the emptiness of their Jewish wagon, see the ultra-Orthodox man as the more authentic Jew. He is the keeper of their flame, and he defines their Judaism for them. The God in whom the secular Israeli does not believe is only the ultra-Orthodox God. Of course, this does not prevent them from crying out and protesting the religious coercion and conservatism exercised by the ultra-Orthodox, and his evasion of military service and contribution to society and the economy. But just try to harm the ultra-Orthodox establishment that does all this, and you will immediately feel the force of the secular public’s representatives, who defend it with self-sacrificing zeal. A long black frock coat or sandals and a knitted skullcap? On the night of Shavuot, about two years ago, I met with a group of students (most of them secular) who live in Lod, for a discussion of the question of the Chief Rabbinate and religious coercion. I was invited under a rabbinic banner, and it was taken for granted that I would defend the Chief Rabbinate. I assume they were very surprised by the attack. Mosaic, Shevat 5775, February 2015 28

with which I opened against them. I argued to them that the secular—and only they—are to blame for religious coercion. Those who give power and authority to the Chief Rabbinate, and above all to its ultra-Orthodox conservative character, are the secular. So let them make complaints only against themselves and leave me in peace. In the Knesset and in the public there is a secular majority, and it zealously guards the character of the Chief Rabbinate and its powers. They are the ones who make sure that those who fill its central rabbinic positions (chief rabbis, city rabbis, rabbinical judges, and so on) are only ultra-Orthodox (and in pressing circumstances, also Hardalim). More liberal and open candidates cannot be elected because the secular majority (in coalition with the ultra-Orthodox/Hardal minority) will not allow it. Reform? Who would even mention them. They prefer to see ultra-Orthodox figures there as the keepers of their flame, and then they can also enjoy self-definition services while simultaneously protesting and crying out about religious coercion and conservatism. Thus the secular left hand creates the problem, and the right hand blames the religious for it. Many think this is the result of a political configuration of interests (politicians’ obligations to the ultra-Orthodox parties). The public is indeed sick of all this, they explain to us, and only its representatives do not really act in accordance with its views. In my opinion, if that were the answer, it could not have lasted so long. How is it possible that the representatives do not understand the will of their voters and yet pay no price for it? Therefore I think there is a much deeper trend here, the one I described above. The ultra-Orthodox are the keepers of the flame for the secular. They provide them with a solid (and irritating) definition of their Judaism, and thus deliver the goods. Any change in a more liberal direction, not to mention separating religion from the state, will not be accepted by the secular majority. I would wager that if a proposal in this spirit were brought before the Knesset, it would be rejected by a large secular majority, just as candidates who present a more pleasant and liberal Judaism cannot be elected to rabbinic office. Try to think how the ordinary Israeli citizen of every shade (that is, most of us) relates to a Jew wearing a long black frock coat as compared with a rabbi wearing sandals and a knitted skullcap. Thus a Knesset whose great majority is secular, representing a public most of whose members are secular in one shade or another, barely manages to pass a trivial law—one that no reasonable person opposes—such as decentralizing conversion to city rabbis. This law is presented as an ‘anti-religious’ law that harms the very foundations of the state’s Judaism, since it damages the centralism and sacred monopoly of the Chief Rabbinate and of the ultra-Orthodox and Hardal keepers of the seal. No one there is troubled by the fact that the city rabbis operate under the Chief Rabbinate and are appointed by it, or that from time immemorial conversion in Judaism has been conducted by community and city rabbis and not controlled by one center or another, certainly not by a center appointed by an avowedly secular authority. The ultra-Orthodox/Hardal/secular coalition accepts these foolish and self-interested claims with Olympian calm. The reason is that this is the price of their quiet and their self-definition. Those who wear the black coats are, after all, the authentic Jews, and therefore the definition of Judaism is entrusted to them. Whoever disconnects from them is as one who disconnects from his Judaism, and whoever strikes at them is practically suffering from a patricide syndrome. Therefore a Jew is one who funds Torah students, and/or does not enlist in the army, and of course does not permit the sale of land during the sabbatical year or forbids women from serving in public office. Thus a rabbi is only someone who acts according to the instructions of detached ‘great Torah sages,’ provided that they wear long coats and live in the back alleys of Bnei Brak or in the old ultra-Orthodox community in Jerusalem (an additional necessary condition: lack of identification with and familiarity with society and the state, and complete indifference to everything that happens outside their own society). Anyone who dares to think and act differently is not a Jew and/or not a rabbi, and certainly cannot define Judaism for the secular. Therefore he is disqualified for any rabbinic office. Mark this well: all this happens not because of the religious, but because of the secular. The ultra-Orthodox, as noted, oppose a Jewish state framework. So why are they too partners in this coalition? Again, interests. They zealously guard the status of the Chief Rabbinate, without eating food under its kosher certification (for they themselves are the principal source of the problems that exist in it; by the way, I get the impression that this is improving) and without recognizing it, of course. The reason is that it is an unfailing source of livelihood for their own people (especially for their sons), of nepotism and other assorted evils, and also a wonderful means of imposing Jewish law in its most ultra-Orthodox and conservative meanings on the public at large. The Hardalim, true to form, shrouded in feelings of inferiority (justified, and more on that another time) toward the ultra-Orthodox and their leadership, harness their burning Zionism to this marvelous coalition that is industriously nurturing the first flowering of our redemption. It is no wonder that the demands to abolish and close the Chief Rabbinate (or at least update it), or the demands to separate religion from the state (there are almost no demands to separate Israeli identity from Judaism), come mainly from the liberal part of the religious public, and certainly not from the secular majority that merely complains (aside from a negligible minority, mainly those who have suffered at the hands of the rabbinic establishment). This is that part of the religious public that has sobered up and grown tired of this unholy coalition. It is the part of the religious public that is no longer willing to offer itself and secular citizens as a sacrifice on the altar of self-definition services for the secular. If they do not want it, so be it. I, as part of this segment of the public, am not prepared to pay the price within Jewish law of subordinating it to the arms of government, am not prepared for others to pay the civic price of that subordination, and certainly am not prepared to absorb the abuse for doing so. Privatizing the rabbinate and separating religion from the state will also enable the religious public to act according to more sensible criteria than those practiced in the rabbinate on questions of divorce and personal status, as well as conversion. This monopoly imposes baseless stringencies and anachronistic, absurd conceptions of Jewish law on the public as a whole, all under the state’s legal and coercive protection. At the same time, Jewish law is asked to adopt leniencies no less baseless and unfounded in order to fulfill its social role. I too oppose that, as a proud purist. So what will happen after such separation and privatization? It seems to me that they will hold up a mirror to the secular public. It will have to give itself an accounting of in what sense it is Jewish, and it will no longer be able to rely on the services of the ultra-Orthodox keepers of the seal to define this for it. If this leads broader Israeli society to the explicit recognition that there is no Judaism other than the one defined by Jewish law, and that it is prepared to accept its yoke and pay the price, then it will be possible to return and apply the criteria of Jewish law to the public as a whole (and even then only after adapting and updating legal thinking within Judaism, without surrendering to the bizarre conservative standards that prevail today). Even conversion and marriage will remain for each of us to decide. Whoever understands the danger to himself and his society and is prepared to do these within a framework of Jewish law need only ask. But then, please, let him not complain about coercion. This is an interesting and important experiment, and it seems to me worth trying. I am quite convinced that Judaism will not come out the loser. The ultra-Orthodox zealously guard the status of the Chief Rabbinate without eating food under its kosher certification and without recognizing it, of course. The reason is that it is an unfailing source of livelihood for their own people, for nepotism, and for other assorted evils. Mosaic, Shevat 5775, February 2015 29

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