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Cheftza-of-Torah.pdf

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191 Rabbi Michael Abraham

‘Cheftza’ of Torah

(A response to Rabbi Yehuda Rock’s article, ‘Tzohar’ 17)

In issue 17 of ‘Tzohar’, two articles were published, by Rabbi Shmuel Ariel and Rabbi Yehuda Rock, dealing with the assumptions of the strata method. Both articles unpack this method in detail, examine it substantively, and separate the grain from the chaff within it. In the background of their discussion, the authors emphasize the need for substantive and systematic criticism of claims generally, and that is indeed what they do.

First, this substantive response deserves praise, for it examines things on their merits, systematically and thoroughly. Here (in addition to the articles by Rabbi Shmuel Ariel and Dror Fixler in issue 15, which initiated this mode of response) we have the first sprouts of a systematic yeshiva-world critique of academic methodology and its conclusions—something that has long been necessary and called for. We ought to broaden responses of this kind and commend the authors for their incisive remarks.

I would now like to address two points raised in Rabbi Rock’s article, one local and one broader.

A. The ‘Something Is Missing’ Formula in the Gra’s Method

Among researchers it is commonly accepted that the Gra’s remarks, cited in the introduction to ‘Pe’at HaShulchan’, regarding the formula ‘something is missing’, mean that a ‘something is missing’ emendation is an attempt to dispute what is stated in the original Mishnah, rather than to interpret it. Rabbi Rock writes (p. 68) that he does not agree with this approach as a general phenomenon, apart from a few isolated cases. It is unclear whether he means to disagree with the Gra, or whether he claims that the Gra himself did not hold this view. Rabbi Shmuel Ariel wrote similarly in his article in issue 15.

In a written controversy with Prof. David Henshke about the meaning of ‘something is missing’, ‘tevara’, interpretive construals, and the like, published in installments in the Yeruham Hesder Yeshiva bulletin ‘MiMidbar Matana’ (Parashat Chukat, Tammuz 5760), I argued that this is not the Gra’s intention at all.

The Gra speaks of ‘midrashic interpretations’ in the Mishnah just as Scripture is expounded. Researchers tend to understand that even such ‘midrashic interpretation’ is not the original intention of Scripture. With respect to the halakhic midrashim, however, this simply cannot be said; and the same is true regarding the ‘exposition’ of the Mishnah.

B. What Is ‘Torah’?

Rabbi Rock contrasts two conceptions of the authority of the Oral Torah: the ontological-interpretive conception (correspondence to the source, to the word of God, beginning at Sinai), as against a conception that sees the authority of Torah in God’s providence as manifested in every generation through the sages of the Oral Torah.

For purposes of clarification, he begins with the question what the ‘cheftza of Torah’ is. Seeking God is a broad concept, and it can also be pursued through the study of the natural sciences, or in any other way. All this is still not Torah study in the full sense. This is not Torah as a ‘cheftza’ (see my article in ‘Tzohar’ 6).

Rabbi Rock argues that ‘Torah’ is the normative part of God’s will, but he adds that even this is not a sufficient definition. We take it as given that the rules of natural morality are likewise norms required of us by the Holy One, blessed be He,

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[ 192 ] Rabbi Michael Abraham ‘Cheftza’ of Torah (A response to Rabbi Yehuda Rock’s article, ‘Tzohar’ 17)

yet they too are not a ‘cheftza of Torah’. Therefore he argues that beyond the criterion of normativity there is an additional criterion: ‘Torah’ is God’s speech addressed directly to man and demanding of him the fulfillment of these norms. Thus, according to Rabbi Rock, ‘Torah’ is anything that is both God’s will and God’s word. From this conception Rabbi Rock concludes that the source of the authority of the Oral Torah lies in the sanctity of its contents and their divine origin. Therefore the authority of the Oral Torah depends on the authenticity of the interpretation (its correspondence to God’s will) and not on divine providence. Divine providence guarantees that the conclusions of the Torah sages are norms required of us, but there is no aspect here of direct speech to us. Rabbi Rock maintains that, according to the conception that sees the authority of the Oral Torah in providence, the Oral Torah is like natural morality.

1. The Source of the Authority of the Oral Torah

In my article in ‘Akdamot’ 9 I argued at length in favor of the providential approach. I should note that my argument did not rest on providence over the personalities of the Oral Torah, but on the books that were accepted by the whole of Israel as canonical. I have no doubt that Maimonides as a human being could err (just as any sage of our own day can err). But providence guarantees that in his ‘Mishneh Torah’ there is no error—generally speaking. The errors that have been found were in fact not accepted, and therefore they are not included in the canonical status of the book. Therefore, when there is a contradiction in these books, we look for a resolution; at most we remain with ‘it requires further study’, but we do not conclude that something escaped the author. Even when medieval authorities use the expression ‘and this escaped him…’, it is usually treated merely as a rhetorical flourish.

There is here a principle akin to ‘we do not presume that an agent is sent to cause a mishap’. A book on which all Israel relies—providence will not allow a stumbling block to come about through it (for surely this is no less than the animals of the righteous, concerning whom the Holy One, blessed be He, does not bring about a mishap through them). But beyond this corrective point, one must add that the meaning of providence is that the books of Maimonides and our other sages are an interpretation of God’s will. Providence ‘ensures’ that what is written in the canonical books does indeed correspond to God’s will. Beyond that, the Holy One Himself speaks to us through them. This is not like natural morality, which we know to be required of us, but which indeed lacks the dimension of direct speech to us. In the canonical corpus of the Oral Torah, divine speech to us is also present¹. In my article there (n. 20) I showed that for this reason these books possess the intrinsic sanctity of holy books.

1. This principle is connected to a claim that arises in light of Rabbi Goodman’s article in ‘Tzohar’ 11. There (p. 42) he cites the Riach on Tractate Chagigah, who writes that a person may be murdered intentionally and thus be killed without justification—’perishing without justice’—simply because the murderer has free choice. By contrast, in the case of an inadvertent killer, the well-known rabbinic statement applies that the Holy One, blessed be He, brings the murderer and the victim to the same inn (Makkot 10b). That is, in the case of an inadvertent killer, one cannot perish without justice.

The difference is that in human action the determining force is usually free choice. But if a person acts unintentionally, then in practice this is a divine act using the person for its own ends. Therefore an unintentional human act is in effect a divine act. It operates exactly like a lot, which, although cast by human beings, through its randomness allows providence to determine the result. On this point see my book ‘Shtei Agalot VeKadur Poreach’, pp. 407-411, where I connected this to a dispute among medieval and later authorities regarding the presumption of prior status.

So too providence operates with respect to the books of the Oral Torah. The sage who wrote the book can err, for these are his words. But the book that was accepted is under providence, and therefore contains no errors (at least in its canonical portion). Thus the canonical book is, as it were, written by the Holy One, blessed be He, and not by Maimonides. It is a divine act that uses human beings as instruments.

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[ 193 ] Rabbi Michael Abraham ‘Cheftza’ of Torah (A response to Rabbi Yehuda Rock’s article, ‘Tzohar’ 17)

2. ‘Cheftza’ of Torah

From his argument above Rabbi Rock concludes that anything that is not an authentic transmission of God’s word cannot be called ‘Torah’, since it lacks the dimension of direct speech from the Holy One, blessed be He, to us. On this point I wish to disagree. I shall do so by pointing to three implications of Rabbi Rock’s position.

A. In my article in issue 15 I proved that according to Maimonides the term ‘de’oraita’ means what appears in the Written Torah. Therefore, according to Maimonides, even a law given to Moses at Sinai is not included in the concept of ‘de’oraita’, nor are laws generated through exegetical derivation. Hidden here is a conception that all these kinds of laws are not commanded in the Torah in the strict sense; rather, they are extensions of what is written there (and of course they too are included in God’s will), and therefore they cannot be treated as ‘de’oraita’. But according to Rabbi Rock, it would seem that in Maimonides’ view these laws are not even entitled to the designation ‘Oral Torah’, for they do not arise from direct speech by the Holy One, blessed be He, to us, either in the Written Torah or orally (perhaps a law given to Moses at Sinai would count as Oral Torah, since it was said to Moses at Sinai in the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He). According to this, a considerable portion of the words of Torah that we study in the study halls are not entitled to the designation ‘Torah’. In my view, this is something the mind simply cannot accept.

B. And what of rabbinic enactments, decrees, or customs? Is there direct speech from the Holy One, blessed be He, to us in them? When did the Holy One, blessed be He, say them to us? Seemingly, according to Rabbi Rock, all these too are not entitled to be called ‘Oral Torah’, for the criterion of authenticity is simply irrelevant to such laws.

C. And what of the aggadot of the Sages? Is there direct normative divine speech to us there? Here the requirement of direct divine speech is not met, but neither is Rabbi Rock’s first requirement, namely that they be norms demanded of us. Aggadot are not norms established through speech, though it is clear that practical demands and modes of conduct can be learned from them indirectly. In this respect they resemble natural morality. Incidentally, even in the Written Torah there are many verses that are not normative and are not commandments. To be sure, that is not the Oral Torah but the Written Torah; but the aggadot of the Sages certainly belong to the Oral Torah. According to Rabbi Rock, it follows that the aggadot are not part of the Oral Torah for two reasons: they are not norms, and they are not the result of divine speech addressed to us.

It therefore seems obvious that the definition of a ‘cheftza of Torah’ need answer only one requirement: the Holy One’s speech to us. As stated, this speech can also take place through the sages of the Oral Torah and its literature, as explained above. From what was argued above it clearly follows that normative content is not necessary in order to define ‘Torah’².

3. The View of the Author of ‘Nefesh HaChaim’

In this context I found striking remarks in the book ‘Nefesh HaChaim’ by R. Chaim of Volozhin. In Gate 4 (at the beginning of chapter 6) he notes that engaging in God’s will is cleaving to God Himself, for He and His will are one (in Maimonides’ language), and ‘the Holy One, blessed be He, and the Torah are one’ (in the language of the Zohar). At first glance there is here an identification between ‘Torah’ and God’s will; that is, Torah is the normative component of Torah. This would seemingly support Rabbi Rock.

1. As for the works of Jewish thought written by our early sages, there is room for hesitation. See my above-mentioned article in issue 6. In truth, the criterion is not completely clear to me.

I would further note that the requirement of normativity appears in Maimonides’ introductory principles, but only as a criterion for counting the commandments, not as a criterion for the term ‘Torah’. See his remarks in the Fifth Root.

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194 Rabbi Michael Abraham | ‘Cheftza’ of Torah (A response to Rabbi Yehuda Rock’s article, ‘Tzohar’ 17)

However, later in that same chapter it seems that he senses this difficulty, and therefore he writes:

And even if he is engaged in aggadic teachings that have no practical bearing on any law, he is still cleaving to the speech of the Holy One, blessed be He; for the whole Torah, in its general principles, particulars, and fine points, and even what a young student asks his teacher, all of it issued from His mouth, may He be blessed, to Moses at Sinai… And in Exodus Rabbah (47:1): ‘And write for yourself these words’—when the Holy One, blessed be He, was revealed at Sinai to give the Torah to Israel, He said to Moses in due order: Scripture, Mishnah, laws, and aggadot, as it is said: ‘And God spoke all these words’ (Exod. 20:1), even what a student asks his teacher.

R. Chaim of Volozhin means to say that aggadic teachings, although they are not included in the category of God’s will (for what is learned from them is in practice implicit, and not direct normative speech addressed to us), are nevertheless included in the name ‘Torah’. And even mistaken things—questions posed by a young and mistaken student—are included in the category of ‘Torah’. To this end R. Chaim establishes that there are two concepts of ‘Torah’: one is ‘God’s will’, and the second is ‘God’s speech’; and both are united with the Holy One Himself. The Holy One and His will are one, and the Holy One and His speech are one. So he writes explicitly later in the chapter. R. Chaim repeats these points at the beginning of chapter 10, writing as a simple matter that God’s speech is one with Him, and therefore anyone engaged in His speech, even if he is not engaged in the normative part of Torah (= God’s will), cleaves to the Holy One just as one who engages in His will.

The basis of these remarks is the midrash (Exodus Rabbah 47:1) cited by R. Chaim, that the Holy One, blessed be He, showed Moses at Sinai everything that a young student would in the future ask his teacher. These words are very difficult; after all, the student’s words in his question are mistaken, and certainly are not included in God’s will (God’s will is the true law). Many have therefore explained that there is a difference between what the Holy One, blessed be He, transmitted to Moses at Sinai, which Moses transmitted to Joshua, and he to the Elders and the Prophets, etc., and what the Holy One, blessed be He, showed Moses, but did not transmit to him as part of the transmission of Torah.

It seems to me that R. Chaim’s intention, in citing the midrash, is to explain that the Holy One, blessed be He, showed Moses the students’ questions in order to define even the non-normative part as a ‘cheftza of Torah’. It is a ‘cheftza’ of God’s speech and not of God’s will. Accordingly, a student who asks his teacher is not neglecting Torah study, nor is he engaged only in preparatory means for a commandment (which enable him to understand the true will); rather, he is engaged in the ‘cheftza of Torah’, in the word of God.

What emerges from this is that Torah has two parts: God’s word and God’s will. Admittedly, it seems that a greater cleaving is achieved by engaging in God’s will, since that is of course included both in God’s speech and in God’s will, as opposed to aggadot or mistaken initial assumptions, which are included only in God’s speech. This also accords well with the age-old yeshiva custom of engaging mainly in ‘the word of the Lord—this is law’. In any event, it is clear from R. Chaim’s words that one cannot define only the normative part as a ‘cheftza of Torah’, contrary to Rabbi Rock’s view.

And so he writes in summary at the beginning of chapter 10 there:

At the time of engaging and delving into Torah, certainly there is then no need at all for the matter of cleaving, as explained above. For through engagement and study alone one cleaves to His will and His speech, may He be blessed, and He, may He be blessed, and His will and His speech are one.

In light of these marvelous words, I cannot refrain from citing what ‘Nefesh HaChaim’ continues there:

Moreover, at that very time when a person is engaged in Torah below, every word that he utters with his mouth—those very words, as it were, also issue from His mouth, may He be blessed, at that very moment; as we find in the first chapter of Gittin (Gittin 6b) regarding the concubine in Gibeah: ‘And his concubine played the harlot against him’ (Judg. 19:2)—Rabbi Evyatar said: he found a fly on her; and Rabbi Yonatan said: he found a hair on her. R. Evyatar later met Elijah and said to him: What is the Holy One, blessed be He, doing? He said to him: He is engaged in the concubine in Gibeah. And what is He saying? Evyatar My son says thus, Yonatan My son says thus. That is because R. Evyatar and R. Yonatan were engaged with one another in the matter of the concubine in Gibeah, and therefore at that very time He, may He be blessed, was literally repeating their words.

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[ 195 ] Rabbi Michael Abraham ‘Cheftza’ of Torah (A response to Rabbi Yehuda Rock’s article, ‘Tzohar’ 17)

It seems to me that R. Chaim offers here a very novel interpretation of the principle ‘these and those are the words of the living God’. The difficulty inherent in this is well known, for how can two opposites go together? It seems to me that on this point R. Chaim offers a new explanation: these and those are the words of the living God, but not necessarily the will of the living God. That is, there is only one correct will, but speech breaks into several fragments, like a hammer that shatters rock (Jer. 23:29). This is the point of the passage in Gittin: to show that there can be divine speech even when there is no law involved. The Holy One says these words together with the sages who study them, and thereby the words become ‘Torah speech’. One should note that the passage discussed here is aggadic and not legal (it concerns clarifying the facts of the concubine in Gibeah)³.

The conclusion of the discussion in ‘Nefesh HaChaim’ there is⁴:

Therefore the entire Torah has equal sanctity, without any distinction or change whatsoever, because it is all literally the speech of His blessed mouth…

And with this we return to the title of Rabbi Rock’s article: ‘The Torah of the Lord is perfect’ (Ps. 19:8). Nothing further need be added.

1. This admittedly contradicts the accepted understanding that both views are correct, and not merely that both are the words of the Holy One, blessed be He. Perhaps R. Chaim means this only in the passage in Gittin, where the dispute concerns facts, and therefore only one of the two can be correct on the factual plane (and the plain conclusion of the passage there does not turn both into equally correct views; examine it carefully).

1. It does appear from his language later in that paragraph that here he intends only the words and verses of the Written Torah, but the statement of Maimonides cited there, together with the course of the chapter, makes it clear that he means the Oral Torah as well.