Rabbi Michael Abraham: Supports the surrogacy law; opposes the law barring same-sex marriage; criticizes the Ministry of Health warning

Interview Content

Rabbi Michael Abraham: Supports the Surrogacy Law; Opposes a Law That Prevents Same-Sex Marriage; Criticizes the Health Ministry Warning | Exclusive / First Publication

9 Cheshvan 5775, 02/11/2014

There is no prohibition on granting rights to a gay couple * The Health Ministry’s warning regarding psychological treatments is part of aggressive liberal propaganda * The rabbinate behaves like a bully when it refuses to convert the child of a homosexual couple * Gay people should be an inseparable part of society, even more than Sabbath desecrators and those who eat non-kosher food * I do not make light of the difficulty, but I know of no solution in Jewish law to the issue * I hope that in another 20 years Jewish law will be more flexible on the matter * Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham, a man of Torah and science, in a comprehensive and exclusive interview with Kamocha on Jewish law, research, philosophy, and education in relation to homosexuality

For Rabbi Michael (Miki) Abraham, formerly a senior Talmud instructor at the Yeruham yeshiva and today a senior Talmud instructor at the Institute for Advanced Torah Studies at Bar-Ilan University, it is important not to devote ‘a gram of energy to self-definitions,’ as he put it in an interview with BeSheva. ‘That is wasted energy, and it is exactly right. I do not place myself anywhere. I do what I think is right; sometimes that fits here and sometimes there.’

But if I nevertheless try to define him (the responsibility is mine, of course), he is a rabbi, a Ph.D., someone who once left religious observance, someone who returned to it, ultra-Orthodox, Zionist, and also none of these. However that may be, he lives between worlds and knows how to contain them well, and he has interesting views on complex questions, such as the separation of religion and state, the attitude toward the Chief Rabbinate, and of course the subject for which we have gathered here – homosexuality and Judaism.

Question: What is your view of the effectiveness of psychological treatments aimed at helping gay men become attracted to women? And as a rabbi, do you think there is an obligation to try such treatments?

‘The question of the effectiveness of these treatments is a scientific question, and to the best of my judgment there as well the information is not clear and agreed upon. Precisely because the sensitivities are so great, it is difficult to trust even scientific studies, since there is reason to fear that many of them are ideologically biased – in both directions.

‘If there is indeed a chance that such treatment will help, it seems to me that there is an obligation in Jewish law to try it, in order to avoid reaching the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse and in order to fulfill the commandment of procreation within marriage. If this involves harm or a risk of harm, one should consult a professional who can say what the expected risk is – and not every risk justifies such an attempt, nor does every risk justify canceling the obligation to try. After that assessment, an authority in Jewish law can attempt to say whether there is an obligation to try treatment. I have not examined the data and cannot give a concrete answer. I am not sure anyone today can.’

Question: What is your opinion of the Health Ministry’s warning regarding these treatments?

‘The term warning, as distinct from prohibition, expresses an alert regarding risks and not a categorical determination. And indeed, if this warning merely pointed to possible risks, it would certainly be in place. It is quite clear that in certain cases damage can result from such treatment, just as from treatments in other fields. But the wording of the warning implies that there is no indication whatsoever that the treatment is beneficial. Minister Yael German’s remarks following the warning state this explicitly, since she says: “This constitutes further proof that sexual orientation, by its nature, is not something that can or should be changed. Sexual orientation is part of a person’s identity and does not require ‘treatment’ or ‘conversion.’” This is an implicit categorical determination, even though the wording of the position paper on which the warning is based explicitly states that the propaganda of political correctness prevents a balanced discussion of this issue.

‘Minister German’s position is of course a legitimate one in public discourse, but it belongs to the realm of values and not to the health-scientific realm. Beyond the position itself, the logic of the Health Minister’s reasoning is based on the same misunderstanding shown by many liberals. They ground their value position in scientific findings – even if such reliable findings existed.

‘On your Kamocha website I read about a clarification by Yamima Goldberg, the chief psychologist and the official in charge of licensing psychologists at the Health Ministry, according to which the warning refers only to treatments that involve brainwashing. That strikes me as a bit odd, since refraining from treatment because of counter-brainwashing, like any other brainwashing in any other context, would also deserve a similar warning. For some reason I do not think that is what the Health Ministry intended.

‘In summary, as best I understand it, this warning says nothing beyond the value judgment embedded in it. It is part of the aggressive and emotional liberal propaganda on this issue. Propaganda and emotionalism always interfere with the conduct of discussion; that is true here just as it is in other cases. As for the formulation of the values to which each of us is committed, I would not recommend turning to the Health Ministry or any other government ministry, nor to the Council of Psychologists, and least of all to the Health Minister.’

Question: What is your opinion of rabbis, mainly ultra-Orthodox ones, who tell gay men: get married and it will pass?

‘Again, it seems to me that scientifically this is probably incorrect. That is, factually it is not true that every homosexual who marries will have his inclinations changed. Perhaps there are such cases – I have not checked – probably only people who are mistaken in their self-diagnosis, but again I have no verified data on the matter. One thing is clear: even the rabbis who say this cannot say it without examining the data and the scientific findings. My impression is that some rabbis say it a priori, simply because in their opinion the very fact that the Torah prohibits something means it can be overcome. I strongly reject that absurd approach. It is worth considering the example of kleptomania, which is conduct forbidden by Jewish law whose source is organic.’

Question: Is there a ‘marriage entered into under false pretenses’ when a gay man marries a straight woman without telling her, and she discovers it afterward?

‘In my humble opinion, unequivocally yes.’

A gay man is subject to the prohibitions on intimate conduct associated with forbidden sexual relations

Question: Can you specify what is included in the prohibition? Only the act of intercourse itself? Also the ancillary prohibitions of forbidden sexual relations, the prohibition against drawing near, seclusion?

‘As a rule, all prohibitions of forbidden sexual relations include ancillary prohibitions involving intimacy that leads toward them (see Maimonides, Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 353, and Shulchan Arukh, Even HaEzer, sections 20-23). I know of no other opinions and no arguments pointing in another direction. It is true that in Shulchan Arukh there, section 24, it is written that seclusion with a male was not prohibited because Jews were not suspected of this, but in the case of a homosexual he certainly is “suspected” of it, and I do not see how it can be permitted. At most one could say that this is not included in the original category of the prohibition of seclusion – if one understands that prohibition as rabbinic – but there are other prohibitions of intimacy leading to forbidden sexual relations. I do not see a way to permit this under Jewish law.’

That is, two men living together as a couple without violating the act explicitly prohibited by the Torah (penetrative intercourse) – that too is completely forbidden. Are there any grounds for leniency? Let us not forget that in any case they are in an almost impossible situation from the standpoint of Jewish law.

‘I do not understand why living together would make things easier for them. It only increases the likelihood of reaching the prohibition, and therefore it makes things more difficult rather than less. It is like a person who desires forbidden sexual relations and whom we would therefore permit seclusion. That is even less permissible, and it does not ease matters but rather makes them more difficult. About this the Talmud says: “Should he converse with her from behind the fence? He should not converse.” That does not mean I do not recognize the difficulty. Of course there is a difficulty. But the difficulty is not in preventing life together; it is in preventing the act itself. As to that, I find no permission in Jewish law.’

Question: So what is the solution in Jewish law to this issue? What should a religious gay man do if he tried treatments and they did not help – must he remain single all his life?

‘I do not know of a solution in Jewish law to this problem. Again, it seems to me like the case of kleptomania. What is the solution for a kleptomaniac? What is the solution for a cancer patient? Some problems are insoluble. And I do not make light of this terrible difficulty, but I have no solution for it. Just as in cancer or kleptomania I do not make light of it, but I have no solution. And I should note that I am not making a comparison in the sense that all of these are diseases.

‘There is a remote interpretive possibility that the prohibition applies only to someone whose transgression is driven merely by desire – without a homosexual orientation – but even that argument is extremely difficult. Without a serious consensus and a ruling by an authorized rabbinical court, it is difficult for me to permit – much as I would like to – what is explicitly prohibited in the Torah and by all the sages of the generations down to the present. A substantive change in Jewish law requires an authoritative court, that is, the Great Court.’

Question: Do you think that in twenty years Jewish law will be more flexible on this matter?

‘I hope so, but it is far from certain. As stated, a consensus is required.’

Father, Child, Family

There is no obstacle to converting the surrogate-born child of a religious gay couple

Some time ago Rabbi Abraham made a statement that is far from the rabbinic consensus: ‘There is absolutely no prohibition on a same-sex couple raising a child,’ he said in a column he wrote for Psifas magazine. In that column Rabbi Abraham discussed the meaning of religious Zionism today, and he criticizes the claim made by certain circles in religious Zionism that the state is experiencing a wave of anti-religious legislation. One of the examples Rabbi Abraham presents in his article is the surrogacy law. Rabbi Abraham attacks that claim and argues that there is no connection at all between the law and the assertion that it has an ‘anti-religious’ dimension. In his view, this is humane and sensible legislation, and therefore unavoidable.

Rabbi Abraham: ‘There is no problem with this, as I wrote in the column. Is there any prohibition on two transgressors raising a child? I know of no such prohibition. Are Sabbath desecrators, or those who eat non-kosher food, or those who have intercourse with menstruating women, allowed to raise a child? If so – then homosexuals are allowed as well. And if it is allowed, then it cannot be denied to them. In my opinion this should be anchored in law in a democratic state. In a state governed by Jewish law it is a different question, because there policy considerations come into play – an attempt to restrict the room for maneuver of transgressors and make things harder for them.’

Question: In Israel there is no separation between religion and state. If The Jewish Home had consulted you, would you have advised them to support a same-sex marriage law and a same-sex surrogacy law?

‘What would the law say about such marriages? If it means recognizing such a partnership as a marriage for the purpose of granting legal rights, that is possible. The act is prohibited, but there is no prohibition on granting them rights. Would we prohibit by law giving rights to a couple that desecrates the Sabbath? The same applies to surrogacy. Moreover, even if there were a vote in the Knesset on whether to prevent such marriages – that is, to prohibit them themselves – I would advise opposing it.’

Question: Do you distinguish between surrogacy – which is not a religious issue – and recognizing a same-sex couple as ‘married’ – which also includes a question of Jewish law?

‘I did not understand the question. Surrogacy is full of issues in Jewish law. There are many aspects that require examination, regardless of homosexuality. Still, I do not see anything unique in surrogacy for homosexuals – see my previous answer. Recognition of a same-sex couple as married is not a matter of Jewish law at all. Jewish law does not see them as a married couple, while the law may see them as a married couple. What is the problem with that? The law does not change Jewish law and is not supposed to express it. The same term is being used, but with different meanings and for different purposes – legal eligibility for next-of-kin benefits, as against the obligations and prohibitions of a married couple in Jewish law.’

The problem is that we are a Jewish state. The question is whether the State of Israel, in which there is no separation between religion and state, should recognize such marriages when they are not in the spirit of Judaism.

‘First, I am very much in favor of a separation between religion and state, and I regret that such a separation still does not exist. Second, I do not know what a Jewish state is. I know what Jewish law is, and I try to observe it. But I also know that others, regrettably, do not observe it. According to the approach reflected in your remarks, by the same logic a Jewish state should legislate compulsory Sabbath observance and eating kosher food, or honoring parents and redeeming a firstborn donkey. I cannot understand this obsession specifically with the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse, which the state is supposed to prevent in order to preserve its supposedly Jewish character – a character that does not in fact exist. How is this different from all the other prohibitions of Jewish law that are openly violated here by most of the public? That is simply beyond me.’

Question: The rabbinate does not convert a child born through a non-Jewish surrogate when the parents are a same-sex couple. What is your opinion of this move – bullying, or a positive move intended to protect the Jewish people?

‘Such a conversion is problematic, since it is very likely that the child will not be raised to observe Torah and commandments. In such a situation one generally does not convert. If there is a religious homosexual couple living in transgression but maintaining a religious way of life, there is no obstacle at all to converting the child. The rabbinate as a whole is nothing but one large act of bullying. I do not see anything here that departs from its very nature.’

The Torah cannot say whether homosexuality is natural or not

As noted, Rabbi Abraham is a unique figure in the religious landscape – he studied in institutions of the religious-Zionist world (the state religious school system, a religious high school, the Har Etzion hesder yeshiva), served in the army, moved closer to secular views, returned to religion and began studying in ultra-Orthodox yeshivot (the Netivot Olam yeshiva in Bnei Brak, the Ponevezh yeshiva kollel, and the Hazon Ish kollel), and also pursued academic studies (he holds a degree in electrical and electronics engineering, a master’s degree and doctorate with distinction in theoretical physics, and a postdoctoral fellowship in the Department of Chemical Physics at the Weizmann Institute of Science and in the Department of Physics at Bar-Ilan University). Today the rabbi combines Torah and science – he is a senior Talmud instructor at the Institute for Advanced Torah Studies at Bar-Ilan University and works in general philosophy, logic, and Jewish philosophy.

Question: Why did God create same-sex attraction? How does natural selection not reject homosexuality?

‘The scientific question is not in my field. But it is clear that there are deviations from the regular evolutionary course (for which neo-Darwinians almost always offer ad hoc explanations). There is evolutionary drift, and perhaps there is some benefit in this as well (or in the factor that causes it, which has other benefits alongside it).

‘As for the theological question, this is no different from any other evil that exists in the world. I do not have a good explanation for it. It is possible that God desires the laws of nature that exist – after all, He created them – and homosexuality is a necessary product of them, and therefore it cannot be avoided even if God does not desire it. That is a possible answer to all the evil that exists in the world, although of course it requires us to enter the question whether God can be subject to constraints. In the opinion of many medieval authorities, He is certainly subject to logical constraints, even if not to scientific constraints. The question now is whether a system of laws could exist that would suit His plans and from which homosexuals would not arise. I do not know. Clearly He can depart from those laws and specifically prevent the formation of such an inclination in a particular person, but He generally does not intervene in the laws – just as He did not prevent the Holocaust or any other evil and suffering.’

In your opinion, is homosexuality a mental illness? Is it something natural? And in general, what is the definition of natural – whatever occurs in nature? After all, there is homosexuality among animals.

‘The question of what counts as illness is very confusing. The determination that something is an illness is nothing but a normative determination. With physical illness, most of us agree that tonsillitis is an illness because it creates an unpleasant sensation. Other illnesses are illnesses because they are life-threatening. What defines a mental phenomenon as an illness? One of two criteria: 1. It is unpleasant for the person afflicted by it. 2. It leads to behavior that is problematic from the standpoint of society.

‘There is no scientific criterion for the question of what an illness is. Science can address the question whether this condition is changeable, whether its source is genetic or something else, and so forth. But the determination whether something is an illness or not is in no way connected to science. It is a normative determination of society or a subjective determination of the individual.

‘When the American Psychiatric Association decided in the 1970s to remove homosexuality from the DSM (the list of conditions defined as mental disorders), this was not done בעקבות new scientific information, but because of a change in social norms. Therefore that decision, which is widely quoted by all sorts of self-appointed “experts,” says nothing beyond the setting of a social norm. Hence, if there is a society that views homosexuality as something forbidden, it will view such an inclination as an illness. Exactly like kleptomania, which as stated is also antisocial behavior whose source is organic. Therefore, in religious society many tend to view homosexuality as an illness, because in their view it is improper behavior (or forbidden, from the standpoint of Jewish law).

‘The determination that this is an illness is a normative determination, and therefore there is nothing wrong with it, but there is also no importance, no significance, to it. The meaning is that this is forbidden behavior (from the standpoint of that society) whose source is not simple choice but probably an inclination of organic or psychological origin (perhaps one can cope with it and overcome it, but it is certainly not simple). All the heated arguments over whether this is an illness arise from misunderstandings on both sides. It is a needless and merely semantic argument.’

The question whether homosexuality is natural or not is not superfluous, because many homophobes rely on that claim that it is a deviation and an illness.

‘If someone considers nonsense important, that does not mean it is not nonsense. Even if it were very important to someone to determine whether every fairy has three wings or four, or whether abracadabra is beautiful or broad, there is still no way to answer that. The concept of “illness” means either that it is bothersome (and that is for each person to decide) or that it is forbidden (and Jewish law indeed forbids it). That the act itself is prohibited by Jewish law is clear, and that is what matters.

‘The Torah cannot have a statement about whether this is natural or not, just as no one else can have such a statement. The concept of “illness” has no meaning beyond the fact that it is either bothersome or forbidden. “Bothersome” is factual and has nothing to do with the Torah, and “forbidden” is normative, and the Torah indeed forbids it.

‘There are, however, long-standing taboos, some of them of religious origin but not only that, which cause people to recoil from those who have such inclinations. The term “illness” is sometimes used to express that feeling. That kind of taboo should be discarded. Nor is it connected to the prohibition in Jewish law, since Sabbath desecrators do not receive similar treatment. And I see no difference between homosexuality and Sabbath desecration – both threaten the path of Jewish law to the same extent: a Jewish home is built from a man and a woman no less than on Sabbath observance. Therefore it is clear that beyond the prohibition in Jewish law there is also a kind of taboo, which incidentally is weakening as legitimacy grows in the surrounding society.

‘The question whether it is natural also requires definition. If natural means something whose source is organic, then this is a scientific question which, to the best of my knowledge, has not yet been answered. I assume that at least some of its sources are organic, but to this day it is not known whether those organic sources determine this inclination unequivocally. But in any event, in my opinion this question too is unimportant. Why is it important whether it is natural or not? It is a scientific question, and scientists will research and investigate it. It has no connection whatsoever to the question whether it is permitted. As far as I know, kleptomania too can be natural in that sense (that is, caused by an organic source). Does that make the kleptomaniac’s theft permitted or tolerable? At most it leads to a more forgiving attitude toward him. That is certainly also true regarding homosexuals. It does not seem to me that anyone chooses this freely or merely out of temptation (the inclination itself is an inbuilt trait).’

There is no obstacle to calling a gay man up to the Torah

So far we have spoken about the legal aspect and the research and philosophical aspect. Now I ask Rabbi Abraham about the social and educational aspect.

Question: Is it right to discuss the issue of homosexuality in the educational system as well?

‘It is certainly worthwhile to speak about the subject, as about any subject. Of course, in a way appropriate to the age. The attitude toward homosexuals in religious society is very problematic, and the indication of this is the contrast with the attitude toward Sabbath desecrators or those who eat non-kosher food.

‘In truth it ought to be the opposite, since the homosexual is in a very difficult situation, and the fact that he fails is completely understandable – after all, which of us could cope all his life against his sexual inclinations? Whereas Sabbath desecration or eating non-kosher food is something that is unrelated to inclinations, but rather to worldviews or to a transgressive impulse, and therefore it deserves less understanding and empathy.

‘It is very important to distinguish between the prohibition involved and the attitude due to people who fail. They face an almost impossible trial, and therefore the fact that they have failed says nothing about how we should relate to them. They should be an inseparable part of our society, far more than Sabbath desecrators or those who eat non-kosher food, and so on. I have already mentioned that the rejecting attitude is the result of a social taboo and not of Jewish law in any way whatsoever. This is something that should be uprooted. It seems to me that this is improving over the years, because the surrounding society has changed its attitude, and this filters into religious society (the taboo seems less threatening, though the prohibition of course remains in force), and that is very good.’

Question: You said, ‘They should be an inseparable part of our society.’ How, for example? Can a gay man serve as a prayer leader? Be called up to the Torah? And can he be part of the community even if he is out of the closet and everyone knows he has a male partner?

‘Being part of society means that they should not be treated differently from Sabbath desecrators or those who eat non-kosher food. On the contrary, as I explained, those transgressors are more serious than homosexuals, because their situation is less difficult. But that does not mean the prohibition in Jewish law and in principle disappears against appointing as our prayer leader someone who commits transgressions – especially if this is declared and public. All the rules of Jewish law and its meta-legal principles remain in force despite the empathy. Therefore one should not appoint such a person as prayer leader, just as I would not appoint any other transgressor. By contrast, regarding being called up to the Torah I see no obstacle at all. If a person commits one transgression, is he thereby prevented from performing commandments? Again, how is this different from a Sabbath desecrator or someone who eats non-kosher food? On the contrary, regarding being called up to the Torah, in my personal view one should not give an aliyah to someone who does not believe in God – and perhaps also not to someone who is not committed to Jewish law – because those blessings are in vain. In my opinion, even if such a person was called up, he is not counted among the seven called. But someone for whom this is difficult and who has failed in a transgression should certainly be given aliyot. After all, he believes and is committed to Jewish law; he has simply failed. Does that disqualify him from an aliyah to the Torah? This is not comparable to appointing a prayer leader, who according to Jewish law, and even apart from it, ought to be a person free of transgressions (at the principled and declarative level, of course; no one is completely free), and not merely someone who is not blameworthy or who finds it difficult.’

You noted several times that there is no difference between gay men and Sabbath desecrators. Yet there is a difference – male homosexual intercourse falls under the rule that one must be killed rather than transgress, whereas Sabbath desecration does not. So this is a much graver transgression, and the attitude toward the subject is different.

‘Relative degrees of severity are not relevant to this discussion, and your assumption about those degrees of severity is not necessarily correct.

I did not make the comparison in terms of severity, but at the principled level of the attitude toward transgressors. In most contexts of Jewish law we do not find a distinction in the treatment of more severe and less severe transgressors. The question whether a declared transgressor is called up to the Torah or not is a general question with no connection to the gravity of the transgression. Apostasy is of course another matter, but precisely there Sabbath is the most severe – one who repudiates the Sabbath is like one who repudiates the whole Torah.

‘Beyond that, even your assumption about the relative severity is not necessary. First, “one must be killed rather than transgress” does not always express severity, but rather a type of transgression. For example, some medieval authorities apply that rule to the ancillary acts of the three cardinal prohibitions, such as intimacy leading to forbidden sexual relations or publicly humiliating a person. Yet those ancillary prohibitions are certainly not more severe than full transgressions such as Sabbath desecration. For example, the ancillary acts carry no punishment at all, whereas Sabbath carries stoning.

There is a special stringency in Sabbath prohibitions, for one who repudiates Sabbath observance is considered as having repudiated the whole Torah. In particular, one who violates them does not do so out of desire – ‘for appetite’s sake’ – like the homosexual, but rather out of defiance, in the terminology of Jewish law. There is no innate drive toward Sabbath desecration. Even from the standpoint of punishment, the penalty for intentional violation in both cases is the same – stoning. And I have already noted that precisely in this respect the homosexual is in a better position because of his urge and the difficulty of overcoming it throughout life.’

No response requested.