Murder in the Name of God (Haaretz Books – 1999)

I would like to respond to Ehud Sprinzak’s review of ‘Murder in the Name of God – The Conspiracy Against Yitzhak Rabin’ (20.10.99).

It seems to me that in this review, beyond the contents of the book under discussion, several statements by the reviewer himself (who is presented as a scholar of the Israeli right) are interwoven, and they raise a number of problematic points that reflect a discriminatory and unfair mode of analysis. The systematic dripping of these points goes on constantly and on every platform. I do not wish here to compare expressions from the two sides of the political spectrum and ask who is inciting and who is not. Nor will I point to legitimate expressions from the period before the murder (and after it as well) that are usually, and unjustly, classified as incitement. I will comment here only on a small portion of the points raised in the above article. Beyond that, there are several fundamental misunderstandings regarding the background assumptions of the analysis of these events, and I would expect anyone who deals with this matter, certainly anyone who specializes in it professionally, to clarify the facts for himself.

1. The ‘scheme’ of the Yesha Council to break Rabin psychologically. Sprinzak claims that he was persuaded by the book that Rabin’s epithets (‘propellers’ and the like), which aroused the anger of the right against him, were the result of a calculated scheme of psychological warfare that used provocations aimed at Rabin’s fiery temperament, all merely in order to inflame the conflict. He adds that this cannot be compared at all to what the left did to Menachem Begin in the wake of Sabra and Shatila, since in that case there was no prior planning by any organized body.

I do not see any relevance whatsoever in the question whether there was prior planning or not. Perhaps that has implications for the evaluation of those involved in such planning, but not for the broader publics in the political arena. I also think that no one has seriously examined whether there was no such planning in Begin’s case as well. In addition, from my acquaintance with the social atmosphere of right-wing circles and the people involved, I also doubt the description of a ‘well-oiled incitement machine.’ This description also makes use of a kind of psychological determinism, as though everything had been calculated in advance and only the planners/programmers were guilty. A manipulative group programmed the public, then Rabin, and finally the public’s reaction in return. Perhaps Yigal Amir, too, is not guilty, since psychological provocations were planned for him? No determinism exempts an offender, nor does it exempt a provocateur. And if such an unjustified exemption is nevertheless granted, why is it granted only to one side of the barricade? There is a childish argument here, saying that Rabin is exempt from blame for his provocations and the people of the right are not, because ‘they started it.’

In my view, the people of Yesha should not have had to endure the delegitimization Rabin directed at them, even if it is true (and I doubt it) that some of their leaders tried to cause Rabin to express himself as he did. A ‘fiery temperament’ is not, in my eyes, an adequate reason for a man in the decision-making position of prime minister to mock an entire ציבור that will pay with its homes and communities and suffer forced removal, or people who are hurting from a profound ideological rupture, all as a direct and exclusive result of his own decisions. Why is the public guilty for the provocations of several of its leaders (if there were any), which clearly did not stem from a decision of the ציבור as a whole.

Let the reader imagine someone who now mocks those mourning Rabin and calls them ‘propellers’ for whom he could not care less, especially if he himself were the cause of their mourning, and especially if he were in the decision-making position of prime minister and continued to make decisions against the peace process that, in their opinion, could lead to wars and terrorism. When such a person is acting through means of psychological warfare, does he not have the obligations of a prime minister toward the entire public? Would such a person not be regarded as a provocateur?

I also fail to see what is wrong with planning an information campaign by psychologists. Is that not the proper way to plan such a thing? Do Karpin and Sprinzak wish to claim that this is not done in other circumstances (usually far less fateful ones)? If only they were right. Are decisions not made in such circumstances to focus on the personality of the rival, or on similar matters? A grim result, however grim it may be, does not automatically invalidate every step that preceded it. I wonder whether the interpretation of a ‘well-oiled incitement machine’ is not itself based on the same foundations as the assertion that there were rabbis who issued a ruling based on the law of the pursuer, though to this day no one knows who they are. To my mind, all his determinations, and especially the interpretations of the above-mentioned one-sided book, are suspect for the same bias.

2. The rabbis’ ruling. The banal treatment of the legitimate rabbinic ruling, even if in my view mistaken, concerning the evacuation of settlements had already become nauseating to me. Parallel statements about the transfer of Arabs from their land (see Yossi Sarid) are perceived as noble. I also find no difference whatever between this act and conscientious objection (which Sprinzak too recognizes in his article as legitimate). All the arguments I have heard to date on this subject have been foolish and ridiculous.

3. The law of the pursuer. It is worth clarifying once and for all: the law of the pursuer exists in every culture that respects itself. When someone sees a person pursuing another in order to kill him (or pursuing a woman in order to rape her), he is obligated to intervene, even if he must kill the pursuer. There is nothing uniquely Jewish-legal about this determination; it is a basic moral obligation. The only question in this context is whether that is indeed the situation. The answer to that is for the rescuer alone to decide, and for no one else. The law of the pursuer is not the result of rabbinic rulings but exactly the opposite. A person who decides that this is his assessment of the situation is morally obligated to act.

4. ‘It is the law, but one does not instruct accordingly.’ Sprinzak apparently does not understand the context of ‘it is the law, but one does not instruct accordingly.’ The law of the pursuer is always taught, and as noted above, in all cultures. The striking down by zealots of one who commits certain transgressions is the law to which this phrase applies, and it has no connection at all to our matter. That is punishment by an individual (without the decision of a competent court), not the prevention of a crime (or harm), as in the case of a pursuer. Even in a case where the law says, ‘it is the law, but one does not instruct accordingly,’ the meaning is that the person who knows the law should act as it says, but it is not stated to the broad public. One who is truly a zealot is indeed permitted, and perhaps even performs a commandment, when he harms the offender. There are contexts in which the meaning of the phrase ‘it is the law, but one does not instruct accordingly’ is ostensibly a law that is not intended to be implemented. Even there I doubt whether that is the intent, for Jewish law has clear mechanisms for suspending laws that are not suitable at a given time (enactments, suspending a rule through passive inaction, and the like), but this is not the place to discuss that.

I will further note that there are opinions in Jewish law according to which the law of the pursuer applies even to someone who is not guilty and has no malicious intent, as in the case of the permission to kill a fetus that endangers its mother. This common argument, too, is irrelevant.

It is clear that I do not mean to argue that the act of murder, or any incitement whatsoever (if any occurred), was justified. But a person must possess sufficient intellectual integrity to discuss these matters soberly, and not dismiss everything merely in order to be politically correct. It should be noted here that some of these errors are spread among the public by the words of religious Jews, and sometimes even rabbis, and I strongly suspect that what underlies their statements is not a desire to disseminate the Torah but a desire for political correctness (see the absurd ‘rabbinic ban’ of recent days against Yigal Amir).