Natural Sciences and Torah (Tzohar – 2001)
With God’s help, fifth day of Hanukkah 5761
Torah Study: Objective Status versus Personal Status
Response to the article ‘Natural Sciences as an Aid in the Study of Divine Science’
In Dror Pixler’s article (hereafter: the author) in issue 4 of ‘Tzohar,’ whose title is quoted in the heading, several points are discussed, some of which seem problematic to me, and each of them requires separate discussion. Given the limited space, I will address mainly the principal, ideological, and in my view most problematic claim, which is presented as the conclusion emerging from the overall discussion: the author argues that the study of natural science is part of Torah study, and perhaps even the Account of Creation (as part of what Maimonides calls ‘Gemara’). In response to the obvious question of how these secrets have today become common knowledge to schoolchildren, the author suggests that he is referring to issues situated at the frontier of current research, and these are of course not known to everyone (see note 4 there).
I would like to respond to these remarks for two main reasons: a. Some of the points in the article under discussion are based on an article I published at the time in the philosophical quarterly ‘Iyyun’ (vol. 46, 1998). b. I have the feeling that non-specialists in the fields under discussion are sometimes not equipped with the tools needed to criticize the approach in question, and may adopt it as a legitimate (and perhaps even necessary) Torah-legal, and certainly scientific, interpretation. I therefore thought that the fact that I have some background in the field under discussion might be helpful on that level as well.
In my view, the approach that emerges from the article runs entirely counter to intuition, both with regard to Torah study and with regard to the nature of modern science. Some of the points might perhaps serve as a possible interpretation of Maimonides’ remarks concerning the science known to him (and even of that I am by no means certain), but certainly not concerning contemporary science. For these reasons, I wish to discuss the matter from intuitive angles, without detailed engagement with sources and their interpretation, and so I begin, with God’s help.
These claims are astonishing from every angle one examines them. First, the issues at the frontier of research are at present known to no one. Do the ‘Accounts of Creation’ constantly shift so that they remain permanently in the one place human knowledge has not yet reached? I am amazed. It seems far more plausible that ‘the Account of Creation’ is a given field of study, one in which one can indeed delve ever more deeply, but whose content does not change over time. Of course, as time passes one may perhaps think that additional things are being discovered within it, but to define only the frontier of research as ‘the Account of Creation’ seems to me exceedingly strange.
I wonder what, in the author’s view, are those matters ‘that may not be expounded before two’ (see Mishnah Hagigah 2:1). Is it Schrödinger’s equation, or the principles of relativity? Does anyone seriously think that the Mishnah determines that it is forbidden to prepare for a physics exam in pairs? And conversely: did the Sages and the prophets, who were expert (each according to his own level and spiritual stature, not scientific stature) in the Account of Creation, know quantum theory? If not, which part of what they knew would still today be considered the Account of Creation? Or perhaps in truth they did not know the Account of Creation?
Moreover, what spiritual preparations and moral virtues are required in order to attain understanding in modern physics? Were all the physicists, hundreds of whom I met when I worked in this profession, all righteous people (some of them hidden, and in my view even very well hidden, and most of them of course non-Jews, who according to the author apparently trample rather crudely on the prohibition against a non-Jew studying Torah)? I had no idea.
Does the author think that books, articles, or drafts in which we made scientific calculations must be placed in genizah, and that it is forbidden to throw them away disrespectfully?
Can one seriously imagine that the discussions of Abaye and Rava are a minor matter, and Schrödinger’s equation a major one? This is a conceptual and evaluative confusion. Even if Maimonides intended this (and in my view he did not), his words would require very careful scrutiny. Certainly there is no room to derive legal conclusions from such a puzzling approach, and even if such an opinion did exist, the law would certainly not follow it (see Tosafot and the commentators on the passage in Hagigah there). To the best of my knowledge, not a single legal decisor has ever written that one fulfills the obligation of Torah study by studying any science whatsoever.
According to this conclusion of the author, it is not at all clear why we should engage in the discussions of Abaye and Rava (as he himself writes), if science as such is also a Torah discipline. Everyone would be entitled to choose for himself the Torah field on which he wishes to concentrate.
Since I cannot expand here, I will briefly return to that simple and clear distinction according to which science tries to find a description of the world, whereas Torah offers a way to understand it. The field of inquiry called ‘the Account of Creation’ is apparently grounded in understanding, not in description, and therefore it seems to me that it has nothing whatsoever to do with scientific inquiry. Ancient science, as Maimonides knew it, had the pretension and the goal of understanding the world (for example, unlike modern science, its explanations were teleological and purposive, not causal). This was also the source of its weakness, which prevented it from advancing. The scientific progress of our own time arose mainly because of the willingness to give up understanding and settle for description. Maimonides, of course, refers to science as it was conceived in his time, and therefore his remarks are no proof for the issue before us.[1]
The article under discussion, by virtue of its very attempt to apply scientific methods and results in the realm of Torah study, is characterized by the approach called ‘reductionism,’ that is, extending the knowledge and method of some discipline (scientific, in this case) beyond its natural bounds, or reducing different disciplines to one another. This approach generally leads to absurdities in various contexts.[2] By way of example, in my view there is no need at all for scientific explanations of free will (and incidentally, to the best of my understanding and knowledge, there are in fact none!!), because the human spirit is not subject to the laws of physics.
That concludes the criticism. From here on, an alternative proposal, also in brief.
The author himself points to two Torah values that underlie scientific activity: a. a path to love of God. b. a path to knowledge of Him. As for science as a path to His love, that is something worth discussing, and it has indeed been discussed at length in the various issues of ‘Tzohar,’ בעקבות Rabbi Aviner’s article. But as for science as a path to knowledge of God, which is the core of the article under discussion, in my view there is much less room for debate, for the reasons that will be clarified below.
I agree that engagement in science can be helpful on several planes to Torah activity, and certainly not only in designing devices for indirect action on Shabbat, or as an aid in calculating the circumference of a beehive or of a sukkah shaped like a kiln, and the like. Science contains points of departure for a good many important insights that can illuminate several legal and philosophical aspects, as also appears in the above-mentioned article. Even so, science is at most a preparatory means for a commandment, and in no way part of the commandment of Torah study itself. I would like to propose here a formulation that will clarify this distinction, and perhaps also point to practical consequences.
First, I will touch on point a (science as a path to love of God).[3]
One who truly draws faith and love of God from engagement in science certainly assigns Torah value to that engagement. But for someone who does not draw such benefits from science, there is no doubt that for him it has no religious value at all. By contrast, the study of the Talmud and the legal decisors, in depth and with breadth, has value in itself, regardless of what a person derives from it (of course, motives do matter: for its own sake and not for its own sake, but I cannot expand on that here). If so, science is in the category of Torah only if the person engaged in it in fact derives Torah benefit from it. The Oral Torah, in the accepted sense of studying the Talmud and the legal decisors, has objective value, regardless of the person who studies it; that is, it is Torah in the object. I therefore propose the following formulation: science is ‘Torah in the person,’ and Torah in its classical sense (the Talmud and the legal decisors) is ‘Torah in the object.’
A simple practical consequence is that pages containing scientific calculations do not require genizah (as for pages with calculations for Torah purposes, it is well known in the name of the Hazon Ish that they do indeed require genizah). Despite the benefit that the writer and reader, the person, derived from these papers, they are not an ‘object’ of Torah. It therefore also follows clearly that one who engages in science as such is not studying Torah, and therefore if he wishes to fulfill the commandment of Torah study he must also engage in the discussions of Abaye and Rava. In addition, if anyone has any doubt, one may prepare for a physics exam both alone and in a group (yes, physics may indeed be expounded in pairs). In short, a minor matter: the discussions of Abaye and Rava. An even smaller matter: Schrödinger’s equation. A major matter: the Account of Creation and the Chariot.
It is important to add that I do not intend to argue that engagement in science has no human or cultural value. Quite the contrary: I certainly agree that scientific engagement has such value, and my sole purpose here is only to deny its classification as Torah study. So much for the role of science as a means to love of God (point a).
Another important note concerns point b (the role of science within the framework of knowing God).
Almost all the points to which the author refers concern engagement with the meaning of science and of its results, not engagement with science itself. For example, the approach that interprets the uncertainty principle as a cognitive limitation, which is quoted there in my name, is a matter of philosophical dispute among those who work in the field, and it is therefore clear that it does not belong to the domain of science, and certainly not to its results. The same is true regarding the nature of time, or the meaning of a process, matters I discussed in my article cited there (which is of course also the reason that the article was published in a philosophical forum and not in a scientific one). As for free will, in my view the common links drawn between it and quantum theory are nothing more than speculations, most of them based on a misunderstanding either of the concept of free will or of the concepts of quantum theory. In any case, it is clear that in these matters we are not dealing with scientific results themselves, that is, with scientific inquiry, but with the meaning (interpretation) of those results.
Unlike the domain of scientific inquiry, the domain of the meaning of scientific results is not the scientist’s direct concern, although naturally he too can of course engage in it. It seems entirely plausible to me that this domain can indeed sometimes enter the category of Torah study. That depends on the methods, the goals, the assumptions underlying the discussion, and the modes of thought involved. Here there is also room to argue, at one level or another, for some connection to the Account of Creation.[4] After engaging in science and acquiring the knowledge itself, one can try to understand it in various ways. In this sense, scientific engagement can serve as a preparatory means for the commandment of knowing God (and not only of loving Him). As stated, the interpretation of scientific knowledge, as distinct from scientific engagement itself, can sometimes be considered direct engagement in the commandment of knowing God itself. It is important to note that in this context one can regard the study of sciences as a preparatory means for a commandment only when one is dealing with the foundational principles of the sciences, and not with one or another of their details (which is what the overwhelming majority of researchers deal with).
Summary: engagement in science has important value on the human-cultural plane. From a Torah perspective, it is at most an instrument enabling the commandment of loving God, if that. If one continues and engages in the meaning of scientific knowledge, then the engagement with that knowledge becomes an instrument enabling the commandment also with respect to the commandment of knowing God (subject to the qualifications above). Of course, from a Torah perspective there is no difference whatsoever between issues at the frontier of research and known results, and neither of these is related in any way to the Account of Creation. As stated, these matters require much broader clarification, both in the scientific aspect and in the Torah aspect, and this is not the place.
I will now add three further concluding remarks:
1. A person’s excitement when he encounters the innovations of modern science is very familiar to me, and I also think that it is blessed, proper, and healthy. Yet it seems to me that before drawing hasty conclusions from it, one ought to collect oneself a little, and perhaps also seek a bit of advice.
2. Another remark concerns the educational conclusions that appear at the end of the above article. It seems to me that the path to creating profound and innovative Torah thought passes much more through deepening the Torah realm than through deepening the scientific realm. To the best of my understanding, the problem is absolutely not the absence of knowledge in physics. In any case, neither kind of deepening can be accomplished in high school (or in a yeshiva high school). There is no doubt that a change is needed in the attitude toward, and emphases within, the subjects currently taught in high schools (on this see at length my article in the jubilee volume of Midrashiyat ‘Noam’), but this does not depend at all on the number of hours devoted to secular studies, and I cannot elaborate here.
3. A final remark concerns a point that troubles me quite a bit, and I will take this opportunity to raise it for discussion before the Torah scholars who read these pages. There is room to discuss the Torah significance of studying philosophy, which is also the field that deals, among other things, with the interpretation of scientific knowledge. The question of the Torah status of this field seems to me far more relevant than the question concerning the scientific field (for the reasons listed above). It does not seem plausible to me to assume that Kant is less holy than Aristotle, and if Maimonides permits himself to ‘convert’ Aristotle and turn his determinations into Jewish law and thought, why, then, should Kant fare worse?
One may ask even more than that: is the status of the Guide of the Perplexed, at least in its philosophical sections (usually Aristotelian), and perhaps in others as well, essentially different from the status of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason? And what about the other books of Jewish thought? Is it merely accidental that the classical yeshiva world does not engage in these areas, and concentrates mainly on the discussions of Abaye and Rava?
There is a sense that the discussions of Abaye and Rava are an ‘object of Torah,’ and that anyone who studies them is studying Torah that was given at Sinai (not necessarily the content, some of which is of course rabbinic or later midrashic material). By contrast, the realm of thought is drawn primarily from the inner world of the sage who wrote the book, and it does not arouse the sense of Torah transmitted from Sinai. It would seem to be ‘Torah in the person.’ The main thrust of the realm of thought is not a direct attempt to understand the Torah sources, and much of it is based on the author’s own speculative reasoning, sometimes a priori.
It is important to emphasize that there is not necessarily any statement here about the importance of engaging in these fields, and the discussion concerns more their very nature: does one who studies the Guide of the Perplexed, even if the content does not ‘speak’ to him (it yields him no spiritual benefit, and he gains no insights into questions that trouble him), receive reward like one who studies Ketzot HaChoshen when its content does not ‘speak’ to him?
It may be that the order of importance is even reversed. The Account of Creation is a major matter, but it is subjective, in the person, in certain respects, whereas the discussions of Abaye and Rava are a minor matter, but objective, in the object.
These matters still require further examination for the present, and I would be glad to hear responses.
[1] It seems to me that it is no accident that the esoteric tradition uses an Aristotelian conceptual world (such as the four elements, air, water, and fire, and their properties). The reason is not only the use of concepts current in that period, but primarily the use of concepts of understanding rather than concepts of description.
[2] For an illuminating, though somewhat eclectic, discussion of the ‘praises’ of reductionism, see the book by Henri Naftali Atlan, ‘These and Those,’ Afikim series, Am Oved.
[3] Anyone who wishes may detect here the fingerprints of the approach of Rabbi Hayyim of Volozhin, author of ‘Nefesh HaChayim.’
[4] It seems to me that this is what the editor intended in his addition to note 4 in the above-mentioned article; see there. The plain sense of the Gemara in Hagigah 11b, and the views of all the early authorities there, also point in this direction.