Does Anyone Claim That There Is a ‘Torah View’ in Non-Halakhic Matters?

The rabbi’s opening post

Does anyone claim that there is a ‘Torah View’ in non-halakhic matters?

Posted on 11/10/2012

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Does anyone claim that there is a ‘Torah View’ in non-halakhic matters?

Today I received a letter with two questions regarding the criticisms of the ultra-Orthodox conception of ‘Torah View.’ For your consideration and comments:

A. In academia and scholarship, it is customary to “accuse” ultra-Orthodox society of an “invention” that arose in the twentieth century, namely, that there is a concept called ‘Torah View’ in matters that are not halakhic.

However, so far I have not found any of the leading Torah authorities of recent generations who made this claim, the one that has drawn all the indignation. I wanted to know whether you are in fact aware of any sage in recent generations who actually said that even in matters that have no connection whatsoever to halakhah one must listen to the sages.

The closest formulation I found to the above claim is in the Chazon Ish (Kovetz Iggerot, vol. III, no. 92; the letter was printed in full in Pe’er HaDor, vol. V, p. 52), where he wrote: “The method of making the Torah into different parts—rulings about what is forbidden and what is permitted, part one; and guidance in the marketplace of life, part two—of being subject to the guidance of the sages of the generation in the first part while leaving freedom of choice in the second part, is the old method of the heretics during the decline of Judaism in Ashkenaz, who drove the people of Israel astray until they assimilated among the nations and no remnant remained.”

However, on the face of it, the Chazon Ish’s intention when he wrote that one must be subject to the sages also in their guidance in the marketplace of life is not that even in non-halakhic matters there is an obligation to obey them, but rather that guidance of this sort almost always touches on halakhah. And if there were no halakhic aspect to it, then the presumption is that the sages themselves would not issue rulings on it [and in fact, in the very case about which the Chazon Ish wrote these words, that was indeed the case: it was a question from the marketplace of life that had very major practical ramifications, as explained there in Pe’er HaDor regarding the decree to draft girls]. See further there in the continuation of the Chazon Ish’s remarks printed in Kovetz Iggerot, where he wrote: “The distinction between rulings about what is forbidden and permitted and rulings about boundaries and decrees—this distinction is a brazen distortion of the Torah and a disgrace to Torah scholars, and such people are counted among those who have no share in the World to Come and are disqualified from testimony.”

It seems that this is also what the Chazon Ish means in Emunah U’Bitachon (ch. 3, sec. 30), when he wrote about the sages that “the Torah has equipped them to judge and to instruct, and this includes the entire conduct of the world in the matters that arise day by day.” Here too the intention is not that in matters involving the conduct of the world that have no connection whatsoever to halakhah one must necessarily follow the words of the sages; rather, the point is that the conduct of the world in matters that arise day by day is entrusted to the sages because one can scarcely find such a matter in which there is no halakhic question.

For example, I never understood the great controversy that once surrounded the issue of territories in exchange for peace, when some claimed that the leading Torah authorities should not intervene in questions that are not halakhic. And I am astonished: are the laws of not granting them a foothold and the laws of preserving life not halakhic questions? In truth, if the foremost Torah authority of the generation were to tell me to paint the closet in my house a certain color, that would be a non-halakhic question, and regarding that, as stated, I have not found anyone who says that one is obligated to obey him. Only a prophet must be obeyed even in such matters, as Maimonides wrote in Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah. But regarding the above issue of territories in exchange for peace, how can one say that this is a non-halakhic question? [At most, one might argue whether rabbis have sufficient data to express an opinion on such a subject; in my humble opinion they do, but this is not the place to elaborate. But how can one say that this is a non-halakhic question in which they ought not to intervene?]

And similarly regarding whom to vote for in elections, and the like. B. Another claim made in academia is that in ultra-Orthodox society it is accepted that the leading Torah authorities cannot err. Here too I have found no source for this in the writings of the leading Torah authorities, and I would be glad to know whether you have in fact encountered such a claim.

The closest thing I found to this is in Michtav MeEliyahu (vol. I, p. 75, a letter on faith in the sages), where he wrote against someone who claimed that the leading Torah authorities before the war were mistaken, and that because of them the Jews of Europe did not immigrate to the Land of Israel and would therefore have been saved. Rabbi Eliyahu Eliezer Dessler wrote to him that heaven forbid one should say that all the great sages erred, and that it is forbidden to listen to such things, all the more so to say them. He wrote there: “Our Sages already told us to heed the words of the sages even if they tell us that left is right, and not to say, God forbid, that they certainly erred because I, the insignificant one, can perceive their error clearly with my senses. Rather, my senses are null and void like the dust of the earth in comparison with the clarity of their intellect and their divine assistance. Indeed, no court can annul the ruling of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number. Without that, it is quite likely that what they imagine to be perception is nothing but imagination and vexation of spirit. This is the Torah’s view of what faith in the sages means.” See there as well, where he brought support for his words in the name of Rabbi Shlomo Zalman in the course of the discussion in Megillat Esther, and he concluded there in Michtav MeEliyahu: “A failure to recognize the need for self-effacement before our teachers—this is the root of every sin and the beginning of every destruction, God spare us; and all merits do not compare with the root of everything, namely, faith in the sages.”

But even he did not write that, in reality, it is impossible for the leading Torah authorities to err, only that it is a remote and strange thing for an ordinary person to be more correct than they are. Usually, when it appears to a person that they are mistaken, this is imagination and delusion. But it would be absurd to say that sages cannot err. Was an entire section of the Torah and an entire tractate of the Talmud written for nothing about the High Court erring in its ruling?

Source (forum ‘Stop Here, We Think’): http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=2979741&forum_id=1364