On Traitors and Betrayal

The Rabbi’s Opening Post

On Traitors and Betrayal

Posted on 10/9/2012

Efraimben, in the thread of links to articles, linked to an article by Moshe Ratt (full disclosure: he is a former student of mine), and wrote the following substantive response:

Apparently Moshe Ratt, the author of the “article” that Wise unto Himself linked to, has watched too many programs by Christian priests calling people to repent; otherwise his obsession with Satan cannot be understood.

In the following link as well he deals with Satan and demons. Note the comments, which save me the trouble..

http://www.kipa.co.il/family/48883.html

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Another doctoral student from Bar-Ilan who will presumably, in a few years/months, bear the title: Doctor of Philosophy.

Since I know Moshe Ratt well, and he is a very intelligent, educated, and thoughtful man, open-minded and independent in his views, who will certainly deserve the doctorate he receives, I went to read his article (advertising has always worked on me. And when someone is mocked without arguments being offered, that is a sign that his words are worth reading).

Ratt writes there that abandoning religion is a betrayal of the heritage of the generations who gave their lives for the Torah and the like. He argues that although one can sometimes understand it and its motives (the person who has left religion thinks all this is untrue, or does not suit him), nevertheless it cannot be forgiven, because betrayal is not forgiven even when it is justified.

He gives the example of a soldier who deserts and/or acts on behalf of Hamas because he has become convinced that they are right. Even if we believe in his sincerity, would we understand him and forgive him?

That is the crux of the argument.

And here I am as well, one of the primitives of Bar-Ilan. אצלנו, מה לעשות, מנסים ללמד שיש להתייחס עניינית לטיעונים, גם אם הם נראים לנו שגויים. באוניברסיטה שנותנת דוקטורט לאפריםבן-ים כנראה מעדיפים להסתפק בלגלוג מתנשא וריק מתוכן, שנישא על גבי שיח אופנתי ופופוליסטי. זה תחליף הרבה יותר נוח. שם כנראה גם נוהגים להוסיף ללגלוג את האמירה שהטיעונים הם אך למותר, ולהפנות לטוקבקים שמייתרים את הדיון. ובסוף תמיד כדאי להזכיר את בר אילן. זו ערובה בטוחה לקבלת דוקטורט ולקידום אקדמי.

Therefore, forgive me if, contrary to the proper sort of engagement exemplified by Efraim, I have, in my sins, chosen a different path, one invalid from the outset. Although I do not agree with Ratt’s words, and although our talkback sages have already exhausted the subject, I nevertheless thought it proper to discuss what he wrote. Well, that is how it is among the primitives at Bar-Ilan.

My claim against Ratt’s words is that in truth the motives are what matter, not the act. One must distinguish between the danger and evil in the act and the guilt and evil in the person who performs it. When I judge the act, I judge the consequences and the meanings of that act as I see them, and then I genuinely dislike and condemn what appears to me to be betrayal, and I even act to thwart it. But when I come to judge the person who acted, I must relate to his motives, views, and considerations, not to mine. It seems to me that Moshe Ratt is unwilling to make that distinction, and on that point I disagree with him. [I am not sure. It may be that he intends to speak only about the act and not about the actor, in which case I have no disagreement with him at all]

In my view, if a person who has left religion acts this way because this is what he thinks, then that is certainly forgivable and even acceptable, despite the criticism I have of the mistaken and harmful position (in my view) that he holds.

But we should note one point with respect to which Ratt is certainly correct: the ‘price’ of such a position is adopting the conclusion that the soldier who acts on behalf of Hamas, or Vanunu and the like, deserve exactly the same treatment (assuming they are sincere). The same applies to participants in the flotilla to Gaza, anti-fence anarchists, Machsom Watch women, and on the other side Baruch Marzel, Yigal Amir, Baruch Goldstein, Ami Popper, and so on. And if we take this one step further (Godwin’s law), then even someone who would act on behalf of the Nazis or on behalf of Comrade Osip Vissarionovich Stalin because he is convinced (sincerely) of their righteousness and of the Jewish / reactionary danger, that too would be acceptable and forgivable on the personal level. Again, I would judge the consequences and the acts separately, and of course I would try to prevent all of this, but I am speaking about judgment of the person himself (whether he is wicked/guilty or not).

Let me clarify here that there is room to distinguish between wickedness and guilt (although below I will not do so, for the sake of simplicity). A person who chooses murder is perhaps wicked. But if he truly thinks that this is what ought to be done, then he is not guilty (in the moral sense of guilt, which requires awareness of values and commitment to them, and action against them). Therefore, in fact, there may perhaps be three planes of judgment and not two. As stated, for the sake of simplicity I will ignore this distinction in what follows.

Now for the final stage of the discussion. I really do think this way, and therefore I really am willing to draw all the necessary conclusions regarding all the above examples, from all directions. This truly is my position.

But anyone who objects to the conclusion regarding Hamas or the Nazis, or Baruch Goldstein or Yigal Amir and the like, must explain why he disagrees with the claim regarding those who have left religion. If he is indeed unwilling to separate the act from the actor, then why does he do so in the case of those who have left religion?

To prevent mistakes or irrelevant tendentious agitation (though a very predictable one): I am not comparing a person who has left religion to a terrorist or a Nazi. I am speaking on the level of principle. One should remember that this is the claim of a religious person, made within religious society, of course—a society that sees this act as a kind of harmful and problematic betrayal. Why is what he says different from claims about Goldstein or about Vanunu? If one does not distinguish between the person’s guilt and the consequences of the act, I do not see any difference. And if one is willing to distinguish, as I myself think one should, then one must also draw the rest of the necessary conclusions.

For some reason I have a feeling (which is also based on many reactions I have encountered in the past, including on this forum) that many of those who disagree with Moshe Ratt will nevertheless judge at least some of the examples I have given by his criterion. That is, they will not be willing to distinguish between the act and the actor.

If I were to write that being a neo-Nazi is an unforgivable betrayal of morality, even if that neo-Nazi is indeed convinced of the justice of his path, would I receive the same non-substantive mockery devoid of arguments? If I were to say this about Yigal Amir / the anti-fence anarchists, would that happen? I am quite convinced not.

Why, really? Why this lack of honesty? I see two main reasons for it:

A. Because this is a society in which it is very fashionable to denounce Yigal Amir / Machsom Watch women, and no less fashionable to side with those who have left religion.

B. Perhaps even apart from fashion, it apparently depends on the position itself. Someone who believes that abandoning religious commitment is a disaster for the people of Israel will tend to agree with Moshe Ratt regarding those who have left religion. Someone who opposes that will also oppose his words. Even though these are two independent questions (the actor and the act), as I explained above. This is a clear example of spurious correlations (where people mark the target and then shoot the arrow).

I will bring here an example I once used in this connection. During Rabin’s second government, the controversy arose (again) over whether to make a peace agreement with Syria and hand them the Golan, or not. Two types of argument were raised there: 1. A claim connected to morality: Rabin promised before the elections that he would not return the Golan. A prime minister elected on a certain platform is not permitted to change his policy (what one sees from there is not what one sees from here). He must return to the public and receive a renewed mandate. 2. A security-ideological claim: it is not right (from the standpoint of security and/or ideology) to return the Golan.

These are two independent claims, and to the best of my primitive judgment there are good arguments on both sides of each. One can agree with 1 and oppose 2, and vice versa. If so, I would expect four groups to emerge in the public: (1,2) (2-,1) (2-,1-) (1,2-). And yet, to my great ‘surprise,’ the public split into only two groups and not four. Guess which two groups were absent? Hint: those in which the absolute value of the difference between the components of the vector was greater than 2. I am sure that even someone who has never heard of vectors and absolute values can easily give the answer.

And the rest—go and study…

Source (forum “Stop Here, Think”): http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=2976136&forum_id=1364