A Further Look at the LGBT Phenomenon (Column 744)
Dedicated to my dear son, Yosef,
a devoted member of Rabbi Elaluf’s community
A few days ago I was sent a lecture recording by Rabbi Guy Elaluf (interestingly, there is still no Wikipedia entry about him; for anyone interested, it’s high time). The lecture dealt with the LGBT phenomenon. Over the past few months I’ve become acquainted with this fascinating figure (he has many classes and talks on YouTube), so the lecture piqued my curiosity. He is a young rabbi (around forty), highly original and learned, a lecturer in the study of religion at Tel Aviv University, a person of impressive integrity and candor, and in particular I appreciate that he does not fit into conventional sociological boxes—and perhaps because of that I feel a certain kinship with him and his ideas. After listening to the lecture, I realized that this is also the case in the LGBT realm. I identify both with his critique of the phenomenon and with his (implicit) critique of its conservative detractors. Even so, I felt that this lecture contained many points presented imprecisely, and precisely because I value the man and identify with the lecture’s direction, I thought it worthwhile to write a detailed critique here in order to sharpen matters.
In the past I have addressed the LGBT phenomenon more than once, and I recommend, to those who have the stamina, to go back and read what I wrote in columns 497, 504, and 701 – 702 (the second deals only with halachic applications). There will be no novelties here on that topic. My aim here is mainly to practice critical thinking—somewhat about the phenomenon, but mostly about the lecture itself. This column follows the lecture in the order it was delivered. As always, I suggest listening to the lecture before reading my critique.
On Facts and Their Interpretation
In the first six minutes of his talk, Rabbi Elaluf presents two assumptions on which he intends to build his remarks:
- The world exists. There is reality. He apparently intends to push back against extreme postmodernism and say that not everything is our hallucinations and interpretations. There are also objective facts.
Along the way he adds, almost offhand, that his remarks pertain to the material world, but here I neither accept nor understand why he needs this caveat. It implies that in what is non-material there are no objective facts. What about the existence of will, emotions, the soul? Or of God? One can also wonder about morality and values, though that is a more delicate discussion.
- There are facts, which are solid and objective and bind us all, and there are interpretations of them that depend on each of our perspectives. For example, when you release a pen in the air it falls to the ground. This is an objective fact that cannot be denied. There is an interpretation of this fact, namely that there is a force of gravity that causes the fall. In this case it is a scientific interpretation. Rabbi Guy argues that the law of gravity is by no means a fact. He adds that the interpretation does not necessarily exist (?). At the same time he adds that this does not mean all interpretations are correct. For instance, I meet someone on the street, greet him, and he does not answer. I can interpret that he is angry with me or that he is mute. That interpretation can be wrong or right. The fact (that he did not respond) is not disputable, but the interpretation is.
Even regarding this introduction I will note a few comments. What he calls “interpretation” is nothing but facts. If that person who did not answer me is indeed angry with me and therefore did not answer, then that interpretation is a fact. The state of the world is that this person is indeed angry with me and therefore did not answer. In short, a correct interpretation is a fact.
The same holds for the scientific interpretation of the pen’s fall. If the law of gravitation is a correct interpretation, then it is a fact. There is a law of gravity in the world. One can of course claim that the law of gravity is only a description of reality and not an entity. There is no object in the world called “the law of gravity,” just as there is no object that is the speed of the car in front of me. That is a property of the car, not an object. But the law of gravity, like the car’s speed, are facts in every sense. One can further distinguish between the law of gravity, which is just a description, and the force of gravity, which is a kind of entity (at least if we are talking about the gravitational force acting between two concrete bodies at a given moment). Thus, for example, one can analyze the gravitational force and predict the existence of gravitons (the particles that carry this force, just as photons carry the electromagnetic force). These particles are already full-fledged entities, and they result from the existence of a gravitational force but not from the law of gravity. The description of the phenomenon of attraction is not supposed to be carried by particles. It is a description, not a fact. But the force is a fact, and it is carried by particles called gravitons (which have not yet been observed in the lab, because we still lack sufficiently delicate and precise instrumentation).
Viewing science as subjective descriptions rather than facts characterizes an approach in the philosophy of science that I have previously called (following Ze’ev Bechler—see, for example, the article this one and many others) “actualism” (as opposed to “informativism”). But this approach is untenable, and I showed there why it cannot be true. Ironically, this approach is itself part of the same intellectual nihilism that Rabbi Guy opposes in these preliminaries, what is called “postmodernism,” or “the New Critique.” He is essentially expressing a positivist position, one willing to recognize only the existence of material objects observed by the senses or logically deduced, with unambiguous definition, from sensory observations. I have written more than once that, despite the scientistic appearance of this view, in essence it is precisely this view that underlies the “New Critique,” which undermines science as a “true” description of reality and heralds postmodernism (just as Hume’s empiricism heralded such skepticism in an earlier era; see columns 494 – 496).
I assume that Rabbi Guy’s intention here was to say that there are facts that are directly present before our eyes and about which there is no dispute, and there are facts subject to interpretation and about which there are disputes (but only one side is right—what he calls a “correct interpretation”). That is closer to the truth, but even that statement is not entirely precise. One can argue about what the senses show. There are illusions of sight (like a Fata Morgana), hearing, touch, taste, and smell. Moreover, there is an approach called “philosophical idealism” (or solipsism), which denies the existence of an external world and sees our senses as a kind of subjective (or inter-subjective) imagining. Therefore, the trust we place in the senses is itself the result of interpretation and not a pure fact. True, regarding that interpretation there is far broader agreement than for most other interpretations, but I think that regarding the law of gravity and the laws of physics there is almost the same breadth of agreement (at least among those who have studied and understand them).
Rabbi Guy concludes his introduction with another example of a fact that should not be disputed, which begins to hint at the direction of his argument to come: the biological division of human beings into male and female is a fact. He clarifies that this is not only about reproductive organs (a person may be born with different or missing organs—this is a disability, like any other organ that might be missing). Primarily he is talking about the genetic aspect, that is, genes found in every cell of the body, XX or XY (which also have typical hormonal expressions: different body structure, the capacity to give birth, hairiness, physical strength, height, and the like). This is a fact that should not be denied.
Sexual Orientation, Gender Dysphoria, and Gender Identity
He now moves to the distinction between sexual orientation and gender identity. Sexual orientation (to whom you are attracted) is a fact. Already here I must note that this does not fit his definition above. There is nothing material or tangible here that can be examined empirically. You rely on the person’s report and your trust in that report. By his definitions above, this is interpretation, not fact. For example, there are not a few rabbis who deny this fact. In their view, this orientation is an evil inclination, not a biological fact, and one can overcome and neutralize it. I disagree, but the very existence of such statements indicates that this is not a fact according to Rabbi Guy’s own definitions. Unlike him, I do think it is a fact, since it is what he would call a “correct interpretation.” That a person has a certain sexual orientation is a fact (psychological, not material), even if none of us has direct access to that fact, only through his report. It is a fact like the force of gravity or the anger of the person who did not answer me.
Another fact he presents is gender dysphoria, i.e., a mismatch between a person’s sex and their gendered feelings. This is a person born male who feels female, or vice versa. According to Rabbi Guy this too is a fact (which fits my view, but not his).
Already here I must point out an important point arising from this description. Dysphoria presupposes that there are feminine and masculine feelings; otherwise there would be no room for the phenomenon of dysphoria. Once there are feminine feelings, if a person whose genome is XY feels feminine feelings, we can define this as gender dysphoria. In other words, if you think dysphoria is a fact, then gender is also a fact. The feelings and experiences characteristic of males are male gender, and those characteristic of females are female gender. Later he denies that gender is a fact, but to my judgment that does not cohere with his claim that gender dysphoria is a fact.
My claim is that recognizing gender mismatch as a fact essentially means there are two kinds of facts—sex (genetic) and gender (feelings)—and that they are logically independent (though of course there is a very high correlation between them). In my columns I noted this distinction and described it in terms of eight groups spanned by three axes: sex, gender, and sexual orientation. In this description, each person is represented by a length-3 vector, each component of which can take one of two values. Thus, for example, {1,1,1} can describe a female who feels gender-wise as a female and is attracted to males (a regular straight female). By contrast, {2,2,2} is a straight male (one whose sex and gender are male and who is attracted to females). These two are cis-gender heterosexual groups. Of course there are eight such groups (I explained there that this description is binary, but I have no problem with the claim that there are groups beyond the ones I described here. For ease and clarity of discussion I use these eight). Any group where there is a mismatch between the first two components of the vector describes gender dysphoria.
Note that in Rabbi Guy’s view (with which I fully agree here) all these are facts not to be disputed. There is an implicit critique of LGBT opponents who deny some of these facts. But Rabbi Guy devotes his lecture to an explicit critique of the LGBT phenomenon, while accepting all these as agreed facts—and here too I am with him. He explicitly labels only two of them as facts (sexual orientation and sex), but his remarks on dysphoria implicitly presuppose that gender is also a fact (even though he later denies it); therefore, in essence, there are three facts in his words: sex, gender, and sexual orientation. These distinctions are important for what follows.
He now continues and says that although these two (actually three) are facts, they do not in any way touch what is called “sexual identity.” In practice he focuses on LGBT identity or community. His claim is twofold:
- That there is a fusion there of entirely different things, so it is implausible to see this amalgam as a single identity. What connection is there between a homosexual and a transgender person? What do they share that can forge a common identity?
I think the answer is very simple. Both oppose the conventional social cataloging in these domains; that is, they argue there are eight groups and not just two, and they work for equal rights for the (six) additional groups. Why can that not constitute a shared identity basis? Why can communism, which works for equality for weaker strata, be an identity, but LGBT—which works for equality for these groups—cannot? Naturally, those who work for equality are mainly those who possess these traits, but they certainly invite others to adopt a queer identity. Queer identity seeks to blur the importance of prevailing distinctions and stand against male or female identity (and of course one can also argue that those are not identities).
- Beyond that, Rabbi Guy also claims that sexual orientation, even if shared by different people, is not a parameter that can establish their group identity. That is, not only is there nothing common among queer identities, but each one individually is also not a relevant parameter for generating identity. It is not reasonable to create an identity of people 1.70 meters tall, or those wearing yellow pants, or irritable people. In his view, homosexuality is a similarly random trait.
Here too I disagree, for several reasons. First, he does not offer a definition of what can constitute identity. Why do nationhood, or a religion such as Judaism, constitute identity? Presumably because they occupy a significant share of the group members’ thought and activity. That is also true of LGBT people, at least in a world where their rights are not yet equal to other people’s. In an egalitarian world, communism would not be a relevant identity either, but as long as equality is lacking and the group works to achieve it, that is an identity parameter. So too for queers. In the present situation they produce queer literature, queer films, queer art, queer groups, clubs, and various organizations—so why is it not correct to say they have an identity of their own?! He himself says that being a Gur Hasid justifies identity (why? because I wear a spodik and behave in primitive, foolish ways?), but Mozart aficionados do not. Yet immediately afterward he notes that if there is a community for whom Mozart is the essence of their existence and occupies a significant portion of their time and energy, there would be room to define them as an identity-based community. So why not the LGBT community?
He further argues that sexuality is usually an intimate matter and therefore cannot serve as the basis for a public, communal identity. But that is precisely the claim of queers. They build an identity that makes sexuality visible (and much of the criticism against them revolves around this). So why should the fact that sexuality is intimate in existing identities invalidate the claim that one can fashion a different identity on a sexual basis? That is roughly like claiming that religion is intimate and therefore one cannot build identity on a religious basis. There are religions that are personal and intimate—and that is certainly their right—but one cannot invalidate other religions that want to fashion a public, collective religious identity. Even on the purely logical plane, I would wonder whether, in his view, one can fashion an identity for a group that acts to make sexuality private and banish it from the public square. Perhaps we could call it “the ascetic identity.” I assume that is possible, since it advances intimacy. But that too would be an identity based on an attitude toward sexuality. Is it reasonable that the identity of sexual modesty is legitimate but that of sexual display is not? That sounds almost oxymoronic to me.
In short, I heard in Rabbi Guy’s words no proposal for a substantive definition of traits that can or cannot constitute identity. All you will find there is the claim that not every trait constitutes identity. That is, of course, true. But he has neither definition nor criterion for traits that do deserve to constitute identity. Therefore it is unclear on what basis he argues against queer identity. In my view, this discussion is, at best, ill-posed—and actually, I think it is empty. There is no point in conducting it.
He then distinguishes between the community’s demands for communal rights and demands for individual rights. He mostly opposes the LGBT community’s collective demands. In his view, they demand recognition as a community, not just personal rights. But here he errs twice: First, as I explained, I see no reason they cannot define themselves as a community and demand collective rights. If they are a community, collective rights may be due to them. One can, of course, oppose that for various reasons, but one cannot say the demand is logically absurd. Second, in practice, they do not actually demand collective rights. They work for personal equality, not communal equality. They want recognition as a married couple, the ability to adopt and use surrogacy, recognition of sex-reassignment surgeries in the health basket, and the like. All these are personal rights. It is clear that in order to achieve these personal rights they create a movement, clubs, activities—and these require recognition and funding of their own—but those are instruments, not ends. This is not about a community’s collective rights. At bottom, their goal is to achieve personal rights, and the communal organization is a means to that end.
To conclude this section, note that Rabbi Guy’s claim here presupposes that the discussion concerns facts. That is, he implicitly assumes that identity is a fact; otherwise, how can he claim that it is improper to forge identity on a queer basis?! The queers interpret the concept of identity differently, and if it is not a fact, what is the problem?! He can, of course, argue that the claim that religion can ground identity but LGBT cannot is not a fact but a correct interpretation of the facts—but earlier I explained that this distinction is empty, and substantively these are synonyms. Bottom line, he asserts that there is a right and wrong here, and that is what matters. He is essentially telling them they are inventing ex nihilo something non-factual—but his claim that it is non-factual is itself factual. Very odd. Even if I adopt his terminology and assume he claims it is an incorrect interpretation, I did not see in his words a criterion or a good argument explaining why the queer interpretation of identity is incorrect. On the contrary, it seems to me to pass all the tests I can think of.
A Historical Look at LGBT Identity
Now (minute 19:00) Rabbi Guy moves to a historical description of the emergence of the LGBT community (not of homosexuality). In his view, it arose from a (lethal) combination of two ideas prevalent in the twentieth century: 1) Postmodernism—a view that advocates that there is no single truth. We each live within our own narrative. Therefore, everyone has the right to define themselves as they see fit, and there is no right or wrong. 2) Marxism—a stance that always seeks subversion and hidden interests behind people’s moves and statements and refuses to accept the explanations and positions presented openly. Behind them always stand power relations and the desire to seize positions of control. Marxism expanded into a worldview that sees everything as an expression of relations between oppressor and oppressed. The oppressor disciplines the oppressed. On Marxism and its implications see columns 178 – 183.
Judith Butler applied these approaches to the world of gender. In her view, gender is a social construct and has no basis in reality itself. It is a tool of the powerful to discipline the oppressed. The prevailing conceptual system is also a tool for this purpose. This is an expression of those two twentieth-century currents, which naturally lead to the queer world. In Rabbi Guy’s view, this is the mode of thinking that currently dominates the academic world of gender departments and other “junk studies.” It has essentially become a religious dogma not to be questioned or doubted.
An A Priori Critical Examination
Before turning to Rabbi Guy’s claims, I must recall a distinction I made in my columns (mainly in column 504) between sober queerness and extreme queerness. Sober queerness says there are eight groups (or more) in terms of sex, gender, and sexual orientation. The view that there are only two groups is factually incorrect. Extreme queerness says there are no groups; each person self-defines at will. We have neither permission nor basis to criticize a person’s self-definition. Note that only the second view is the fruit of those two intellectual currents. It is important to sharpen this point.
Postmodern thought begins with a critical deconstruction of prevailing thought and conceptual world. It exposes their presuppositions and sets alternative possibilities against them. Up to this point there is nothing new, since analysis of concepts and principles of thought has been a tool of rational thinking since forever. Ideas did not begin to develop in the twentieth century, and conceptual and philosophical analysis is not necessarily postmodern. What characterizes postmodernism is not the question (“Who says you’re right—there is an alternative?”) but the answer: you are indeed not right, because all alternatives are necessarily equal to one another. That is postmodernism’s novelty. Therefore, deconstructing concepts and re-defining concepts like gender and sexual orientation are not, in themselves, postmodern. They are also not based on the assumption of power games, etc. They are simply legitimate, logical conceptual analysis—and in my view entirely correct. It revealed to us something we had not been aware of until now. That is sober queerness, based on postmodernism’s question (which, as noted, contains nothing postmodern in itself), a question I fully embrace. Extreme queerness goes with the postmodern answer. In its view, there are not eight groups but infinitely many. Moreover, no such group is characterized by any objective or subjective attribute; a person’s self-declaration alone suffices to determine who and what they are. Regarding sex and sexual orientation I think this is less blatant, since there everyone agrees there is an objective truth (not always easy to diagnose). This comes up mainly with respect to gender, which is seen as something to which no outsider has access and which is a matter of a person’s inner feeling about themselves. Yet, as I explained above, those feelings do exist, and so here too we are dealing with a fact. Even if none of us can diagnose the inner contents of another’s consciousness, there is nonetheless a consciousness there. Therefore this too is a fact, though it is not accessible to us (as I explained above). This is what the debate between sober and extreme queerness is about. It is important to understand that many queers ostensibly assert the extreme claim but actually mean the sober one. They demand that I respect another person’s self-definition, but not because it is arbitrary; rather, because I must trust his report about himself. It is a matter of respecting the other person. A perfectly legitimate demand in my opinion. Because they are not sharp in their thought, they tend not to be precise and to couch this in the language of extreme queerness: “Who are you to decide? Each person decides for themselves. Disciplining by the powerful,” etc. But in many cases they actually intend sober queerness.
In column 504 I explained the logical folly of the second view, for it effectively empties the very concepts it uses of content. According to that view, when a person defines themselves as a woman, they can do so with no dependence on what is happening within them. It is entirely arbitrary and entrusted solely to them. But in that case, what does the term “woman” mean? What does the person mean when he says his gender is “woman”? What is supposed to be in his mind? Nothing. It is merely an empty word. Therefore, the demand to recognize a person’s self-definition cannot be presented within the picture of extreme queerness. It is empty verbiage using contentless concepts. Such a demand can be presented only within a picture of sober queerness. We saw that this is essentially the crux of the marvelous film “What Is a Woman?,” which simply tries to clarify the meaning of the expression “woman” in the queer world. It shows various confused queers (academics in gender studies—unbelievable!) who could not answer the question and in fact did not even understand it.
Rabbi Guy’s Critique
Rabbi Guy now turns to a critical examination of queer identity. Sex is a matter of fact (XX or XY). Beyond this fact, until not long ago all humanity agreed on another claim concerning gender: males are men and females are women. For a long time it has been understood that these two are not the same (this is genetic, that is phenotypic), but the prevailing view was that they go together. It is this view that the LGBT community challenges. It claims that “man” and “woman” are fictions, social constructions, but there is no impediment for a male to see himself as a woman and a female to see herself as a man.
Already here it is important to note that it is unclear whether he means sober queerness, which merely asserts a factual claim, or whether he means extreme queerness, which asserts nothing at the factual level (except that there are no facts). From his phrasing it seems he means the extreme queerness that I already explained is self-contradictory. But he ignores the possibility of sober queerness, which, as we have seen, can assert very similar things.
He brings several absurd consequences of queerness, such as a male-female (a male who identifies as female) entering women’s restrooms, women’s sports competitions in which males participate, and the like. All these are consequences of extreme queerness (and even there this is a totally deranged extremity that applies its conceptual nihilism not only to gender but even to sex and sexual orientation). Sober queerness would not demand that male-females compete in women’s sports or enter women’s restrooms—or at least it is not necessary there. Even extreme queerness should not demand that unless it ignores sex and sexual orientation as facts and sees them, too, as social constructions and power games (i.e., that power games and constructions changed a person’s genome and phenotype). You understand this is a laughable minority within the queer world, to which some confused sober queers are attached, unable to understand that they themselves do not actually think so and are swept along to extreme formulations, as I explained.
He summarizes by saying that transgender people (he apparently means the ideologues of queerness; not all trans people are such) claim there is no link between sex and gender. But this is an incorrect summary. Only very extreme queerness claims that. Moderate queerness says there is a link, but they are not identical, and therefore there may be people for whom dysphoria arises. They do demand that this phenomenon be accepted as normal (not in the statistical sense but in the normative sense), but that is a normative demand that does not challenge the facts. There is no principled problem with that demand, even if someone disagrees with it.
Rabbi Guy now arrives at the claim made in the film “What Is a Woman?” But I must emphasize that this claim applies only to extreme queerness, not to the sober kind. He essentially argues that gender exists—woman or man—whereas queerness denies it. But that is true only of extreme queerness, an esoteric, albeit loud, minority among queers. Note that here gender is perceived by Rabbi Guy as a fact, whereas earlier he treated it as interpretation. It seems he now intends the visible traits of women or men, which he considers facts, whereas when I say gender I mainly mean their inner experience (which in my view is also a fact, though inaccessible to others—and in his view, apparently not).
For example, at minute 38:30 he declares that sex is a fact and gender is not, and therefore once queers want to sever the link between sex and gender, they render gender entirely empty. His claim is that you cannot speak of gender if you do not base it on sex, because only sex is a fact. But that is, of course, incorrect. Gender is also a fact, except that it is an inaccessible fact (the bundle of experiences, such that whoever experiences them is a man or a woman). Hence, even if one severs it from sex—as I, for example, think—this does not empty it of content in any way. Its content is that experiential bundle, whether or not it is connected to sex. And in general, why, if it is connected to sex, can one speak about it? Seemingly that is just another name for the same phenomenon, no? If you accept that the term “gender” signifies something, then whatever it signifies exists even if entirely detached from sex. In short, there is no impediment to thinking that a person with an XX genome may experience male experiences and have a psyche akin to men’s psyches. This is simply a logical error on Rabbi Guy’s part, stemming from the misunderstandings I described at the start of the column. It shows the discussion there is not merely semantic. It has consequences—at least for the arguments that arise in the discussion. Incidentally, he repeatedly conflates this (mistaken) argument with the (entirely correct) conceptual argument of “What Is a Woman?,” and they are not the same. These are two entirely different arguments: the first is wrong, the second right. The mistake arises because he ignores the possibility of sober queerness.
A Note on Psychology
Incidentally, the very existence of gender dysphoria means that a person is troubled by a dissonance between sex and gender. That means he himself understands that there should be a match between sex and gender, and the mismatch bothers him. Defining dysphoria as a disorder itself seemingly supports Rabbi Guy’s position. But to me this is not a disorder—unless, for some reason, it disturbs the person. This is not a matter of philosophical conception but of psychology. Some people are disturbed by buttons, or by hats, and some people are disturbed by male sex with female gender or vice versa. This does not necessarily indicate their philosophical or conceptual position.
This seems to me similar to OCD. A person who is meticulous in every halachic detail is considered God-fearing and worthy of respect. But it can also stem from an obsessive disorder, which causes him to fear he has not fulfilled his duty and therefore chase every detail. I once asked a friend who specializes in treating OCD (and who has often sent me his patients with obsessive questions in belief and halacha) how he distinguishes between fear of Heaven and OCD. How do we know that the Brisker Rav was God-fearing; perhaps he had OCD? He answered that there is no way to tell, and the clinical criterion is whether it interferes with functioning. Note that well. Here too there is a tension between the evaluative-philosophical conception and psychology.
Critique of Religious Conservatism
Within his remarks now (minute 33:00 and onward) he inserts two critical comments about religious conservatism, with which I fully agree: 1) Even if gender is a fact, that does not mean we must coerce those of a given gender to anything. There are exceptions, such as women who are more masculine. There is no reason to force them into feminine behavior (not to study Torah, or to wear high heels) in the name of gender factuality. 2) If someone has a contrary sexual orientation (toward members of the same sex), that is a problem—but it exists, and we are obligated to respect and assist them. This is a religious problem no different from desecrating the Sabbath or eating non-kosher food.
He does, however, qualify that this pertains only to assisting the individual, not to supporting LGBT identity, etc. Of course I disagree—even if only because the two are one and the same—but I noted this above.
He adds (minute 39:00) that a person may refer to himself however he wishes. That is part of freedom of expression. But he cannot demand that others refer to him accordingly. If they see him differently, it is their right, just as it is his right to speak and think as he understands. As I have written more than once, I fully agree with that as well. He also likens this to a person in Israel today who would demand that others treat him as a German prince of the Middle Ages. That is absurd, and the demand is unacceptable. But that comparison is problematic. Here we are dealing with a factual error and an arbitrary assertion, whereas regarding gender we are dealing with a true claim (that male truly experiences female experiences). Therefore, even if I accept the claim that another person may refuse to accept his testimony and not respect his claim about queer identity, it is very different from the claim that I must respect someone who says he is Napoleon. In the latter there is a clear factual error, which is not the case in the former (and in my view it is not an error at all—gender can indeed be detached from sex). In equating the two, Rabbi Guy again falls into the same fallacy that ignores the possibility of sober queerness.
Surgery for Trans People
From minute 43:00 Rabbi Guy argues that if a person does not want his hand (there is a psychiatric phenomenon in which people do not see a certain limb as part of themselves and do not want it), no surgeon will agree to amputate it. From here he wonders why, regarding genitalia, this is acceptable. Why do we operate and change the sexual organs of one who suffers from gender dysphoria?
This comparison is problematic for several reasons. First, being without a hand is an objective disability in the most straightforward sense. By contrast, being female or male is not a disability (even the neutralization of the capacity to procreate is not a disability for one who does not want to procreate or give birth). Second, why indeed not amputate his hand? If it were clear that this would improve his mental state, I would fully support amputating it—provided we ascertained that this is indeed the case. That is true for sex and for other organs. It is no different from other cosmetic surgeries and is even more necessary (since there it is just a desire to look good, whereas here it is a dramatic change in mental state).
At minute 44:00 he continues with the example of a person who wants to die, and the law does not allow us to assist him. His claim is that sometimes we know better than you what is good for you, when it comes to facts. That two hands are better than one is a fact; therefore we do not accept your request to amputate. A very strange claim. Two hands are more useful than one for various functions. But “better” is a matter for the person. His mental state is no less important to his quality of life than the functioning of his hands. What is good for me is by no means a fact in Rabbi Guy’s sense; it is the person’s subjective assessment about himself (and in my view that is an inaccessible fact). Even the “fact” that living is better than dying is not truly a fact. Even Beit Hillel and Beit Shammai debated and concluded that it would have been better for man not to have been created. And surely there are people who suffer greatly and would prefer to die (there is a philosophical issue here discussed, for example, in column 270 and elsewhere—but I will not go into it here).
He concludes with the claim that the procedure is irreversible and that it is hard to determine its benefit (perhaps the person will regret it later and we will not be able to help; certainly if it is a child). Even scientifically, what is accepted today may change tomorrow (see the example he brought regarding the theory of eugenics). I agree in principle, and yet two comments: 1) An adult is still entitled to take the risk. 2) This is a technical claim. Assuming I can indeed determine the benefit of this procedure, there is justification to perform it. Our discussion here is only at the principled level. In general, reliance on science is a very sensible rule, even though our scientific knowledge may change. We have no better tool. And in general, the decision to let a person continue to suffer lest he regret the intervention or lest it fail to help is problematic, for the current state also carries a price. On the contrary, the minimal cost is certain and the fear that the benefit will dissipate is doubtful—and a doubt does not overturn a certainty (see the previous column on minimal-cost considerations).
A Forecast for the Future
At minute 51:00 Rabbi Guy expressed firm confidence that the LGBT phenomenon will fall, since facts have the annoying property of refusing to submit to our dictates. He claims that facts will always win, and there is no way to derive gender except on the basis of biological facts (sex). He of course assumes there is a factual problem here, and, as he says, these are biological facts. But again he falls into the same fallacy. Sex is a biological fact, but sexual orientation and gender are non-biological facts (and by his definition perhaps interpretations), and they are certainly not derived from sex. The fact that in the past gender was derived from sex is a scientific error we learned about in recent generations. Therefore his claim may be true regarding extreme queerness, which denies facts (and even it usually does not deny biological facts), but certainly not for sober queerness. On the contrary, precisely because of his consideration, it is clear to me that sober queerness will remain with us, since it is entirely based on facts (albeit not accessible—at least for now). This queerness is nothing but an addition of factual knowledge that had eluded us until a few decades ago.
On Facts and Shouting
From minute 58:00 he explains why LGBT literature and art arise. His claim is that if you are cut off from facts you must shout loudly, and the greater the disconnect from facts, the more you need storms and commotion. This is already a very poor derash. As I explained above, queerness is not cut off from facts. On the contrary, it is based on facts. The need for institution-building, literature and art, and LGBT identity is rooted in the lack of recognition of those facts. For that purpose one founds a movement, a community, and an LGBT identity, which, as I explained, serve the goal of achieving equality for individuals. In his concluding lines he ignores the fact that equality is still far from here, and therefore refuses to accept that the collective identity arose to achieve it.
In conclusion he says that the facts are that a man and a man cannot reproduce. A fact is unchangeable, and no shouting will change it. These are of course biological facts that no one denies, and he returns to them repeatedly instead of focusing on the facts regarding gender that are at the heart of the dispute. Beyond that, this categorical tone seems to me astonishingly rash. Who can guarantee that medicine will not find a way for a man and a man to reproduce? Even today we can create offspring with two fathers and a mother, and so on. Even today there are experiments that can indeed lead, in the end, to men being able to give birth and women to beget. In our turbulent era it seems odd to me to insist categorically on facts that are in the midst of great change. I see no necessity that science will succeed in turning a man into a woman in every respect. But, as noted, this is only a side remark. The argument is not here, for in my view even if biological facts are indeed unchangeable, that says nothing about the factuality of gender and of queerness (in the sober sense).
Discussion
It appears at the beginning of the column.
There was some expectation that you’d write your opinion about Rabbi Guy Allalouf and his content.
Largely because you deal with overlapping topics.
Your approach and your intellectual, open motivation are quite similar.
Though the content and the framing are essentially different.
That is very evident in his debates (for example, both of you faced Yaron Yadan on the same topics.
He, for instance, does not make the distinction between morality and halakha).
And I think it’s important to give you credit: especially on issues related to morality and Judaism, authority and tradition,
despite the overlap, there is something about your approach that feels more exhaustive and convincing.
He “gains” from being supposedly more consensus-oriented (although relative to other rabbis and thinkers, he really isn’t),
but as I said, yours is more convincing and better reasoned.
More power to you for the column.
I listened to his debate with Yadan. Yaron spoke nastily and got stressed, but I could understand why (though certainly not justify it). In my view, Rabbi Guy dodged some of his questions.
Wonderful analysis, I really enjoyed reading it. Thank you!
“He claims that the facts will always triump.” It should be “triumph.”
Many thanks. Corrected.
I really was wondering what the rabbi thinks about Rabbi Guy. There are points where he overlaps with the rabbi, and on the other hand there are still fundamentalist points that he clings to tooth and nail and performs acrobatics so as not to give them up, whereas the rabbi gave them up long ago (and rightly so). Maybe extremism comes with age (or sharpness?)
Thank you for the column.
Two questions:
A. Are you saying that sober queerness must come with psychophysical dualism? That is, gender dysphoria is a woman’s soul in a man’s body.
Because it seems that the materialist approach runs into a problem. A person with male chromosomes (XY) who claims his gender is female is basically saying that he identifies the totality of his behaviors, experiences, and feelings as feminine behavior (that is, behavior characteristic of XX chromosomes). But if he admits that a certain kind of behavior is a characteristic of members of a certain sex (feminine behavior is behavior that generally characterizes those with XX chromosomes), then he can say he behaves like a woman, but he is not a woman.
And then one can define the “feminine behavior/experience/feeling” as “the gender woman.” It just doesn’t sound like a feature of identity. I can behave like Napoleon and define Napoleonic behavior as “the identity Napoleon.” Good for me, but that’s just a linguistic game meant to make people treat me as though I were Napoleon. If that is what sober queerness says, there is not much novelty in it. There have always been men with more feminine behavior and women with more masculine behavior. Giving it the name “gender” is just a linguistic game. There is also a bit of the sorites paradox here: how much masculine/feminine behavior is needed before it becomes a different gender and not just a personality trait somewhat outside the norm. It seems that the only way this can be an ontological claim about the world and not just a change in language is a dualist belief.
B. Would sober queerness claim that there are only 2 genders (and therefore 8 groups)? Why not say there are infinitely many genders? There is the gender woman, man, cat, and Napoleon, and so on…
All this was explained in the columns I referred to.
1. It has nothing to do with materialism. Dysphoria is possible if there is something in the brain or genome that causes a feminine feeling even though you have XY.
2. I commented on the number of groups and wrote that 8 is only for convenience of discussion. If there were a Napoleonic group that genuinely felt that way, one could talk about a Napoleonic identity. At the moment, there isn’t.
Surrogacy/fertility treatments for gay men from the public purse?
Why?
That is supposed to be intended for standard couples who cannot conceive because of some illness.
Is being gay an illness?
Did I write that this should be funded from the public purse? What do you want from me?
Besides, it is no different from plastic surgery or anything else that troubles a person. How is it different from a standard couple that cannot conceive? Then let them not conceive. Does it bother them? It bothers these people too.
Thank you very much for the column.
Looking forward to hearing a debate / conversation between you.
I just watched his debate with Yaron Yadan and was disappointed. Full of ad hominem attacks. If you watched it too, I’d be happy to hear your opinion.
See the end of the message above yours.
I agree as well.
Please don’t censor the comment. You changed it a bit at the end.
I would be glad if the rabbi would be so kind as to explain to me the logic of the invented concept of “gender”:
The rabbi is trying to argue that there is such a thing as “queerness” (a ridiculous word in itself) that is sober. But I do not see how. After all, for thousands of years the terms man and woman were reserved for the adult male and the adult female of members of the human species. That was, as stated, a constitutive definition (the word “man” was invented to shorten the long expression “adult human male”). Not a stipulative one. This is not a renewed and more successful definition (which, as noted, belongs only to a stipulative definition) for a basic concept that existed before the definition and was vague enough that one could try to find a definition for it, like “art,” for example. In any case, any attempt to apply the terms man and woman to something different from that is empty (and counterfeit) semantics. If there is any importance at all to the feelings and behaviors of some man that, for some reason, characterize the female sex as a whole, then whoever thinks it proper to give them a name should do so, and should give the man who feels them an original name like “woman-feeler,” and not the name “woman” (and a woman who feels masculine feelings should be called “man-feeler,” and not “man”). Then the gender would be that of “woman-feeling men” and “man-feeling women.” Of course, in that case there would no longer be any gender dysphoria. After all, there was never supposed to be any correspondence in the first place between “woman-feeling women” and men; it would simply be the marking of a neutral fact.
Likewise, it is still not clear what feelings are being discussed. After all, this is not about a man who “feels he is a woman,” because, as stated, that is empty of content. He cannot testify about his identity from his inner feelings, only about his perception of the external world. Moreover, by his own claim he has no idea how a man is supposed to feel, so how would he know that he feels not a man’s feelings but a woman’s? A person simply experiences the world, that’s all, and assumes everyone else experiences the world as he does. Women do not feel that they are women. They simply live and experience the world as it is, that’s all. It may be that he notices that he has feelings in common (and a view and perception of reality in common) with women and not with men, but that is simply a neutral fact and has nothing to do with his being a man (an adult human male). It does not make him a woman. So what remains is only the matter of behaviors. And here too he would simply be a “feminine man.” But he would not be a woman. Just as an adult who behaves like a child is not actually a child.
To me it is quite clear that this whole attempt to falsify the concepts of man and woman is only meant to smear over and whitewash the fact that a feminine man is simply a man with some kind of mental problem, or an underdeveloped man (like a childish man, for example). There is no dysphoria here, only a problem that the left, as usual, tends to whitewash and erase by means of invented terminology instead of solving the real problem. And from here we already arrive at allowing the cutting off of limbs so that a person will not suffer mentally, instead of solving that suffering by addressing the real problem at its root. As lawyers like to do, one can call every mutilation “plastic surgery” and there goes the common sense that for some reason is shared by all human beings throughout the generations… Interesting why here the definitions of illness and health become relativistic and dependent on subjective feeling. Everything happening here is madness, plain and simple.
Let me preface by saying that every single time I deliberate whether not to block every message of yours indiscriminately. I do not work for you, and I am not supposed to spend my time weeding out expressions or doing editing work on your messages and your repeated messages. Only because of my allergy to censorship have I not done so so far. Therefore, in the future please be careful; otherwise I will simply delete everything and not respond to any message from you.
Now to your questions, although almost all of them were well explained in the columns that dealt with this, so this is just a waste of time.
The concept of ‘gender’ is not invented, no more than any other word. Concepts like ‘soul,’ ‘God,’ ‘will,’ ‘love,’ and the like are also not amenable to objective scientific testing, and yet we all use them, and sometimes rely only on people’s reports or on definitions and philosophical analysis.
What happened for thousands of years does not really interest me. For thousands of years people also thought time was Newtonian, that there was no electricity and magnetism, and they did not know quantum theory. So what? For thousands of years people thought blacks were a kind of apes and half-human beings, and that women were inferior creatures intended for male use.
Gender consists of feminine/masculine feelings (which do not have a neatly formulated and closed definition, as with many psychiatric and mental phenomena in general, but they certainly exist). These feelings absolutely exist and are not invented at all. What happened was that because of a correlation between masculine gender and male sex, over thousands of years people thought gender necessarily went hand in hand with sex. They thought it was actually a result of sex and therefore identified the two. Today people have reached a different conclusion. The correlation still exists, but these are two different things, and therefore it is appropriate to distinguish them, if only in order to give expression to that minority who suffer from dysphoria (dissonance between sex and gender). Likewise, for thousands of years people thought women could not engage in intellectual study, and today it turns out that they can. People thought women could not manage, and it turns out they can. Many things have changed compared to previous millennia. So are you suggesting that a woman who runs a corporation should not be called ‘a woman’ because for thousands of years people thought that was not a feminine field?
As for the vagueness of the definition, I have explained this more than once, both in this context and generally (see, for example, in the series on defining poetry). The fact that the definition is hard to formulate and conceptualize, or that it is based on different combinatorial sets of several out of several traits, does not mean it does not exist. See, for example, ‘quality’ in the book Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance.
The concept of gender fully exists and is not empty at all. You are talking about unsober queerness, where indeed the concepts are empty of content. That is what I explained in the column on the film What Is a Woman? and here as well, and I will not repeat that again.
Your concluding section clearly points to the root of the problem. Contrary to your accusations against them, you are disqualifying others by your own flaw. You are driven by an agenda (you see everything as a leftist progressive plot, madness) and therefore refuse to accept completely logical arguments. Notice that this is Marxism in all its glory. It is precisely because of such conservative zealotry and fundamentalism that I wrote those columns. But Marxists are hard to deal with, because even my own words are perceived by them as part of that same plot and as surrender to the forces of darkness and to the protocols of the Elders of Progress. Try discussing things in the face of statements like that.
What is happening here (that is, in the sober camp) is really not madness. The madness is mainly on the zealous side of yours that is unwilling to listen and think, and insists again and again on identifying sober queerness with extreme progressivism despite the sharp and total difference between them. You refuse to listen and keep repeating recycled and unfounded claims, and you are not willing to accept any reasonable and logical argument. It is your right not to accept it, but be aware that you are driven by an agenda and use Marxist methods that accuse the people making an argument of hidden conspiracies instead of addressing their arguments on the merits. It is hard to conduct a discussion that way, especially when you revile and curse. One conducts a discussion with people by means of arguments, not with stigmas by means of abuse.
And finally, the definitions of illness and health do not become relativistic and dependent on subjective feeling. They simply are such, and always have been. That is the situation with every illness of every kind, as I have explained more than once.
By the way, on the margins of this discussion between Rabbi Michi and David, I would just note that there is historical evidence (and contemporary evidence too) of cultures that have a third gender between male and female. So it seems that, similar to homosexuality and LGBT in general (regardless of the question of how much such phenomena can in principle be tolerated religiously, and how socially legitimate they should be), this is probably not an “illness” in the sense of a human deviation with no trace of it throughout history.
When I speak of an “invented” concept, I mean the renewed use of the words man and woman, not for what they were intended for over thousands of years but for a new meaning relating to feelings (whose existence, as stated, I do not dispute). In other words, I criticize the progressives (and you) for insisting on using the words man and woman, rather than new dedicated words for matters of feeling (woman-feeler and man-feeler, for example). That is, let there be a “woman-feeling” gender and a “man-feeling” gender. But not man and woman. Even you yourself suddenly call it masculine gender or feminine gender in a roundabout way…
The claim that you do not care what happened over thousands of years is beside the point. What changed over thousands of years was our perception of reality. But that has nothing to do with the issue of word usage, which, as stated, was not a theory about reality but a broad agreement marking a defined reality of adult human males and females. No one disputes that there are men who feel and behave like women. But your insistence, and that of the progressives, on calling them women (and not “woman-feelers,” for example) is the problem. I do not care what you call feminine men, but they are not women. Do not call them women. This practice (of reusing the meaning of words for things people did not mean when they created those words and on which they did not agree until the moment of this invention) is the practice of lawyers and swindlers who twist the language of the law to achieve victory in court. And the High Court went even further, turning the language of the law into a joke through “purposive” interpretation in order to impose their agendas without embarrassment. You yourself have already written about conventionalism versus essentialism, and you’re going to tell me that this is not what is going on here?
I see a clear connection between the High Court’s purposive interpretation and the progressive religion in this discussion. And you yourself did not even notice that in one of the columns you wrote, “For thousands of years we thought that man and woman were male and female, and now it has become clear to us that they are not.” Well, no. We did not “think” anything about man and woman, because from the outset they were not basic concepts with respect to which the definition constitutes a theory that we can say has changed. They were non-basic concepts created as shorthand for the phrase “adult human male and female.” That definition is a constitutive definition, and therefore there is no reason it should ever change.
And that is exactly the madness here. I myself am not a fundamentalist conservative. I am actually closer to being a liberal than a conservative (I studied at Gush). Because this is not just a discussion in semantics. I promise you that a world war would break out if you told transgender people who are men (and their helpers…) that they are not women but something else. Say, “woman-feelers.” They would rise up to kill you. What bothers them is that I see their femininity as an illness. They are allowed not to see it as an illness, but that is not enough for them. They will fight me over my freedom to think, define, and act according to my own conception of the truth. That is what is really happening here, and it is beyond me (actually not; after all, that is why I was censored…) why you are joining that side that wants to deny my freedom of thought (and my freedom to act accordingly). People who tell me what I am supposed to think through lawyers’ tricks—I call that madness. My agenda is freedom.
Also on the matters of illness and health, I (and most of the world) disagree with you and think these are fairly objective things. I hope you can respect that.
All right, I’ll try once more with these insistences, and with this I’ll stop.
Not that semantics is important, but they are using the words in precisely their original sense. Man and male were never synonyms. Male deals with sex, and man with gender. It is just that people once thought there was identity, or at least derivation, and today they think not. That point, which has already been explained here again and again, answers almost all your questions.
Where you studied is not really of interest. You are a fanatical and hysterical conservative, and it shows in every word you write. By the way, that is of course perfectly fine, just don’t deny who you are.
I am not in the business of deciding which positions deserve respect and which do not. I respect people, not positions. Positions are judged solely by whether they are true or not, not by whether they are worthy of respect. Your positions regarding illness and health (and other things) are plainly mistaken, as is clear to every reasonable person. Anyone who thinks as you do is simply confused about the concepts. I can of course respect you regardless of that. But respect has to be earned.
That’s it. I’m done.
I do not understand what “people thought” means. Man and male were not synonyms because man was the adult male of the human species, and male was a general word for all male animals among species with sexual dimorphism. Nobody “thought” anything because there was nothing to think about. The word man was a shorthand. Why this stubbornness? Am I mistaken here about something? What I am writing here is very simple. Historically it is not true? Is there anyone who disputes me on this historically? Who exactly was called a man in the ancient world? What did the word point to? If I were a child and asked my father what “man” meant in the past, what would he point to? Shorthands of this kind exist throughout mathematics, when one sees that certain patterns (certain combinations of words) recur frequently, and because of their importance they are given a shorter word; that is what happened here. Do you disagree with me on this? Was the word “man” created differently and independently? These are very simple matters.
On illness and health too, you are mistaken. There is a concept of bodily wholeness and proper functioning in an objective sense that arises from observation. From the same kind of observation by which we see what is good and bad. To be a liberal does not necessarily mean to believe that only morality exists, and aesthetic morality, in your terminology, does not exist, but rather a kind of tolerance for the process by which human beings are given time to arrive at the truth on this matter (as opposed to ethical morality, with respect to which tolerance in principle is impossible). If you are unable to understand why people think this way, then you have a real problem. I can understand the position that illness and health depend only on feeling, but I know that this is a mistake. Are you incapable of understanding the opposite position? That is the respect I am talking about. You speak as though this position cannot even be conceived (that is, as though it were absurd), not merely that it is incorrect. As for me, thank God, I have no need of fake respect from people (that is their choice and has nothing to do with my life).
And if because of this issue I am considered a fanatical conservative, then I am a proud fanatical conservative, because most of sane humanity is fanatically conservative like me… My “hysteria” is because of this madness that for some reason you insist on holding onto.
What connection is there between the evidence about those cultures and the claim that a feminine man has a mental disorder or is an underdeveloped man? This is purely an observational matter. I observe that this is a deviation from the norm, and a bad deviation, and that is all. And like me, billions of other people observe the same thing. Why should I care how a certain culture viewed certain things for the purpose of how I see reality?
Your third gender will be something in between man and woman, but not a woman, and that’s that. The language of the culture in which we developed is what determines things for us, because that is the language we speak.
Michi, I owe you gratitude. I happened once to see Rabbi Allalouf interviewing the Christian bishop here בארץ and thought he was nothing more than a pleasant interviewer, and now I’ve discovered that he truly has extensive and impressive knowledge. But the point of gratitude is not that, because knowledge still does not impress me as a lecture in history; perhaps, true to his name, he is indeed a champion, but that still proves nothing to me—for example, whether he is good in debates with heretics, which also requires talent and analytical ability and several other virtues. For example, if my choice had to be between you, with less knowledge than his but with your brilliant abilities, or him, I would choose you with my eyes closed, although in truth, as a Haredi, neither of you really represents me, but rather the rational core in faith where we have a shared point. So for what exactly do I owe you gratitude? That because you sent us to get to know him, I came across online an interesting Jew, apparently a Lithuanian, named Rabbi Feivelson, who happens also to relate in an unusual way to Rabbi Allalouf. But he, for the first time, is the realization of your dream of respectful dialogue and openness, even though he is apparently very far from your views. But for the first time I finally got to see a moderate, thoughtful, wise, and non-belligerent person, accepting and inclusive, who is willing and even encourages discussion of all the hard questions—a pleasant conversation—and apparently his influence can even seep into secular ears without his giving up his Haredi identity. Many thanks to you, rabbi.
That there is no connection at all, in my opinion at least, between a phenomenon that is morally and halakhically wrong and insanity or immaturity. The very existence of ancient cultures with a third gender, which is between male and female and includes masculine women and feminine men as a gender unto themselves, shows that there is no illness in being such a person. It is not some schizophrenic insanity or a mutation that did not exist until today. Of course, that does not mean it has halakhic and moral legitimacy. Cannibalism, idolatry, and sexual promiscuity are also the most natural phenomena imaginable. And all three are forbidden by halakha and considered sins against Heaven. But they are certainly not a rare illness. I do not see why the two planes need to be linked.
My entire discussion is from the standpoint of common sense and has nothing to do with halakha or morality (including aesthetic morality). My claims arise directly from observational reality. The very existence of those cultures says nothing except that they thought it was not an illness. And even that is not clear. After all, even among Hazal there is the androgynos (in connection with sex, that is, male and female—which is not specifically among Hazal but actually in the entire Western world of that time; it is a Greek word), and it is quite clear that the world saw this as a problem. Precisely among Hazal it was said that it is doubtful whether this is a creature unto itself.
But the overwhelming majority of the world today thinks (some of it secretly, while outwardly saying otherwise) that an androgynos is something that is not right. And I think the same is true for feminine men (and the opposite). This has no connection to morality or halakha. It is connected to the view that the state of health and sickness is something objective in reality, and not merely a matter of not feeling suffering (or feeling pleasure), or of feeling suffering and pain. That is all.
Michi,
I think you are not addressing David’s claim that semantically “man” was indeed a word synonymous with an adult male of the human species. It seems to me he is right, at least that that is how it has always been. Don’t you think so?
So I didn’t understand. Are you talking about the physical plane or the mental one? Earlier you said that the mental trait of femininity in men and masculinity in women is an illness. I thought you meant the mental plane. Here you moved to the physical plane by bringing the rare phenomenon of an androgynos, which is not related to the issue at all. Clearly there it is seen as a problem because it is an undesirable condition (a fetus with mixed sex signs that does not experience gender dysphoria). Of course this will constitute something uncomfortable in adulthood, and therefore of course it is defined as an illness in the sense of a certain deviation from the ideal state. With trans people, we are dealing with a value dispute. Not a dispute about sanity or insanity, because no one denies that an artificial physiological surgery indeed causes medical complications and physical danger. No one claims that the organs implanted in the body are authentic or biological (science has not yet advanced that far). Rather, trans men and women see a mental/value benefit in this change despite the dangers—according to them, it is mental wholeness when there is correspondence between mental feeling and outward appearance. And here one can argue purely on the value plane: between the human-value plane and the religious-value plane. Many will assume that circumcision is an illness because it involves a defect with regard to sexual pleasure and the wholeness of a human organ—so what? According to this definition, fasting on Yom Kippur is also an illness, because there is deprivation of vital bodily needs for a full day. The prohibition on intermarriage is an illness because marriage only within the “Jewish tribe” can in some cases encourage a risk of disease because of genetic closeness (a phenomenon that exists according to studies?)-no. Because there is nothing wrong/abnormal in a mental or bodily sanction if it serves a justified purpose. Here I agree with Rabbi Michi—on the value plane, the moral plane, the public plane, and the religious plane. The question whether some trans man or woman is sick is devoid of importance and foolish.
I was speaking about the mental plane. I brought an additional example from the physical plane. Transgender is mental. Androgynos is physical.
Dysphoria is a mental illness or mental problem, regardless of sex-change surgery, which of course also changes no sex at all but is simply mutilation (and on this too Rabbi Michi disagrees with me).
There are those who see circumcision as mutilation, and I understand them very well, but I have a tradition from my forefathers that it is precisely a correction of the body. As for me, I really do see it as damage to the body (despite certain health advantages, I have been convinced that there is indeed damage here to bodily wholeness. Even so, I also believe that in the words of Hazal—that this is in fact a completion of the body—there is genuine depth that I do not currently grasp), but in addition also a completion of the spirit or psyche or soul according to that tradition from my forefathers. It is a tiny bodily price in order to merit great spiritual wholeness. From Rabbi Michi’s perspective, even androgynos is not a defect or physiological problem in the eyes of someone whom it does not bother. I actually see that you do not think like him on this matter.
The question whether transness is an illness has implications at the level of state and family health policy. It is not a question devoid of importance, and certainly not a foolish one. First of all, so as not to fund “sex-change surgeries” as “medical treatment” at the public’s expense, as is happening now in the IDF. And also in order to outlaw such things. Just as I would forcibly prevent my son from committing suicide, I would forcibly prevent him from undergoing mutilation. And I would also work to find an effective psychological treatment for this problem. Rabbi Michi thinks illness is not an objective thing, so in practice one can abolish the Ministry of Health, or let it deal only with things that cause physical pain and suffering to everyone without exception, and not with things over which there is dispute whether they are even called medical problems.
Of course the discomfort of dysphoria is a problem. But it cannot be eliminated by surgery that does not truly change the sex of the transgender person but only mutilates him (and I doubt that even if there were a surgery that really did change sex and turn a male into an actual female, it would not solve the problem. Just as I think plastic surgery does not solve mental problems, only aesthetic ones). And until that happens, we have a man with a feminine personality, which is of course a mental problem—it really does create mental suffering. But just as there are people who feel that a body part is not theirs (and they want to cut it off because of that), and here most of the world agrees that this is a mental problem and the problem must be solved in the mind and not by cutting off the limb (and Rabbi Michi disagrees with most of the world on that too), so it is here. This is a simple observation. Sometimes pain points to life. When an organ is alive (like a tooth), then it feels pain. The moment it is unable to feel pain (as after a root canal or death of the dental pulp), that is a sign that it is dead. You may not know this, but a tooth that is still alive (the pulp of the tooth—the blood vessels and nerves inside the tooth—still exists and is alive and healthy) is capable of healing cavities in it (sometimes on its own if they are small cavities, provided that the inflammation heals and the body gets the minerals and vitamins needed to reseal the cavity by means of saliva. And sometimes it needs help from outside by means of a scaffold and external mold in the case of large cavities—on which there is a beginning and groping work and ideas in the world of biomedical engineering, though as yet there is nothing like that in practice). So erasing pain is sometimes death, not healing, as Rabbi Michi thinks.
On what is the assumption based that man and woman are terms expressing behavioral traits?
The source of these terms in the Torah speaks about male and female members of the human species (“She shall be called Woman, because she was taken from Man”). That is also how it appears in every dictionary I checked, in Hebrew and in English.
First of all, David, on this issue I indeed disagree both with the position presented in your name and with the position presented in Rabbi Michi’s name. Unlike Rabbi Michi—with respect for his Torah learning, for he is an enormous talmid hakham and I am an ignoramus who tries to set fixed times for Torah—I think the phenomenon of transness is contrary to the spirit of the sages and halakha. But unlike you as well, I do not see anything in their identity more severe than any other modern cultural identity a Jew chooses to adopt and that clashes with halakha. In my eyes it is no more severe than enthusiasts of trans-Atlantic travel who, as part of their work or regular hobby, dine on and hunt lobsters and snakes for a living. Nor is it more severe than sexual promiscuity in the form of partner-swapping/open relationships, or an ideology of not bringing children into the world, for example. And I think that on the public plane, in a liberal state, trans people are allowed to exist as they please. And from my point of view it is neither proper nor reasonable to persecute them, discriminate against them in being hired, or mock them. A value dispute can be resolved through education, panels, persuading public opinion on the merits. That said, even on this plane I have a dispute with trans activism, which I reject not only on the plane of Torah but also on the plane of basic decency—for example, it is impossible to force a workshop for women who have undergone assault or rape, or simply a workshop in which it is important to the participants that only women be present, to accept trans women by force. The same goes for women’s sports and women’s services/facilities—I completely believe there must be some compromise and limitation in these areas. And now regarding the plane of illness or not illness, I would say this: you yourself say that even if something is indeed an illness, that is negligible if the value you believe in requires you to sacrifice your physical or mental health, like the example of circumcision. So accordingly, the argument with trans men and women over surgeries, for example, is not about whether it is an illness or not, because they too can say, on their view, that such surgery is indeed mutilation. Rather, the mental gain from it is much greater, similar to circumcision—and so we are back to a value dispute, within which the question of illness or not is negligible.
I do not deal with identities. All the things you mentioned are also bad in my eyes (even apart from halakha), except for people who eat lobsters and snakes. I only pointed out that transness is a problem (apparently mental) in my eyes. An objective problem. There is no moral problem with a trans person as such (except for denial of reality, as stated). That has nothing to do with my coercion regarding a ban on sex-change surgeries. That is because this is irreversible harm. It is like the way I would force a person not to commit suicide. But I would only force someone I regard as family and care about. If this is a liberal state in which the rest of the people are not part of my family, then I would not force anyone who is not in my family. On the other hand, I also would not take care of anyone who is not in my family. It comes together. I would not coerce over partner-swapping, because its damage is not irreversible. And likewise with the other things.
I am also against persecuting trans people, discriminating against them in employment, or mocking them. But on the other hand I am not willing to let them impose their view of reality on me and make me refer to a man as a woman, even if he is offended by it. And it is not that I would do this deliberately. But regardless, I do think progressives are bad people, and trans people are usually progressives.
Just a small and important correction: he interviewed a cardinal, not a bishop.
“Sexual orientation (to whom you are attracted) is a fact. Already here I should note that this does not fit his definition above. There is nothing material or tangible here that can be empirically examined.”
You could use less philosophy and more familiarity with science. I did not want to dig into it too much, so I asked ChatGPT to answer (its answer is fairly correct, so I am bringing it here).
The part where you say “There is nothing material or tangible here that can be empirically examined” is not entirely accurate, because there are several scientific ways to examine aspects of sexual orientation, although it cannot always be measured as absolutely as one measures length or color.
Some examples of scientific approaches:
Surveys and questionnaires – researchers use standard tools in which people report sexual attraction, sexual history, and behavior. These provide empirical data on the distribution of sexual orientations in the population.
Physiological measurements – psychophysiological studies examine physiological responses to a variety of stimuli (for example skin responses, pulse, or blood flow to the genitals) in order to assess sexual attraction.
Neurological and genetic studies – the use of brain imaging (fMRI) and examination of family inheritance or certain genetic influences in order to understand potential links between brain structure or genes and sexual orientation.
Evolutionary and behavioral research – the study of sexual behaviors in humans and animals provides insight into patterns of sexual attraction and the variety of orientations.
In summary: sexual orientation is a real biological and social fact, and some of its aspects are scientifically investigable, even if perfectly precise measurement is difficult because of the complexity of psychology and society.
I dug a bit more and found the article:
“We examined the pupil dilation of 325 men and women with different sexual orientations in response to erotic stimuli of men and women. The results supported the hypotheses: in general, self-reported sexual orientation corresponded with pupil dilation toward men and women.”
https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2012-22703-001
There are various limitations and problems with this, but to claim that “there is nothing material here” is simply incorrect.
The definition of sex – defining sex as XX or XY is a partial definition. First, it is a modern definition based on genetics (which was discovered only in the middle of the twentieth century, among other things as a result of attempts to reconcile Darwinian evolution with Mendelian genetics).
But one who adopts scientific definitions must adopt all of science, and not only the parts that suit him. For example, he should also look at the sexuality research of the Kinsey reports, and all the scientific research that has grown from then until today, in various fields.
Why do XY and XX matter to human sexuality at all? And in what can they differ from sexuality?
Genes are rather like a recipe for “making a living creature” during pregnancy (and also afterward, when the body undergoes different maturation processes). A recipe, as opposed to a blueprint, say (for a building blueprint is a kind of reduced model of the building itself, and one can show a one-to-one correspondence between the blueprint and the building—which is not the case with a recipe and a cake, or between genes and a living creature—for more on this, see the relevant chapter in The Greatest Show on Earth or appropriate chapters in Wikipedia on embryonic development). The genes give instructions for cell division and, together with the presence of a suitable environment in the womb—including various enzymes and hormones—supervise different foldings that create tissues and organs (the example is “inflatable origami”—different stages of tissue folding that create, say, the intestine). But if you change the concentrations of hormones in different places, you will get undesirable effects on the pregnancy—therefore it is dangerous to be exposed to teratogenic substances.
During pregnancy, some of the organs—the external sex organs, internal sex organs, sex glands, and also the brain—undergo change. The default is female. In most creatures that have XY (among species that have such genes—mammals), all the organs become “male” in correspondence with one another—but in some there may be differences, perhaps because of hormone-mimicking substances in the uterine environment, so that sometimes the external sex organs do not match the internal sex organs, or—when you remember that the brain is also an organ in the body—there can be a mismatch between brain development and the development of the other organs, among other things because such differentiation occurs at different stages of pregnancy.
In fact, when we look at a “female” or “male” bird, we are looking at different genes—female: ZW, male: ZZ. We make a projection—we have a definition in our heads and we project it onto other species in nature that do not have the same sexuality as humans or other mammals.
A third note. Both homosexuality and LGBT gained strength from several parallel sources – 1. Liberalism and civil rights (it is forbidden to kill “sinners”; every person as a person has basic rights that the government or majority cannot take away from him) 2. Anti-conservatism (following persecutions of gays/LGBT people, including executions, imprisonment, chemical castration, indifference to murder, discrimination, ostracism from the family, coercive conversion therapy, conversion therapy under social pressure, and more) – an example of police indifference to murder and of imprisonment can be seen in the film Milk, which depicts the life of Harvey Milk. 3. Queerness/postmodernism. 4. Feminism (and more generally, more rights for those who are not rich white men). 5. Science.
To give some background on the subject of science and LGBT, here are two Wikipedia entries to refresh memories –
1. John Fryer’s speech in 1972 (and note the studies that appeared before the speech), as well as the studies carried out after it
https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%92%27%D7%95%D7%9F_%D7%A4%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%99%D7%A8
2. Conversion therapy – the entry includes a partial survey of research in psychology and other fields, and of the refutation of prejudices that existed on this subject, as well as harms resulting from insisting that it is possible and desirable to “cure” homosexuality (and later also trans people). Note, for example, the APA position papers.
https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D7%98%D7%99%D7%A4%D7%95%D7%9C_%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%94
3. Regarding the question—what is sex, what is gender, and how should one address trans people—one can go to the moral rule: treat others as you want them to treat you. If you say your name is religious Jews, most people will say you are religious Jews and not “people who believe in an imaginary friend.” You address people who are XXY as men or women according to their external appearance, which they chose to present, and not according to genetic tests you conduct on them. Many people who have “androgen insensitivity syndrome”
look like women—and you are not going to start taking off their clothes to understand the biology in order to address them “correctly.” So too with trans people—most of you have not studied biology or psychology—and until you do learn about it, perhaps it is worth suspending the fundamentalist claims in questions like “what is a male” or “what is a woman,” or whether sex or gender are binary or not—casting doubt on them (go read Kinsey, for example)—and simply respecting the person.
4. As for why LGBT people organize together—only someone very far from that world could ask that. In significant parts of the world, being gay means a death sentence, or “only” imprisonment and sanctions. Even in Western countries their situation is not great—even today—for example, one cannot marry in Israel. Regarding trans people—there is severe discrimination against them even in Western countries—there is discrimination in hiring, and there are plenty of prejudices and attempts to humiliate them—on the part of politicians, rabbis, and ordinary people in the street.
I see that you have moved from Wikipedia (in your comment on my column about fundamentalism) to ChatGPT. But one thing has not changed: a supreme faith in the religion of scientism. You say we have scientific “tangible” ways to examine sexual orientation: questionnaires. Amazing. I really must touch a questionnaire sometime. It could be a fascinating scientific experience.
As for neurological indications and genetic connections, they do indeed provide some indication, but that is far from being “tangible” in the sense of hard science. The fact is that you yourself speak about questionnaires. If we were to subordinate our attitude toward LGBT issues to scientific measures, all the queerness that speaks of a person’s self-definition would evaporate. Maybe that would be a good thing.
I am also pleased by the repeated sermon that I should know more science. I will only repeat my conjecture from my previous response that I have no bad acquaintance with science and, if I may sin by speculation, much more than you do.
But the issue is really marginal to the discussion in the column, and therefore I see no point in dealing with it here.
With apologies, I will allow myself not to respond to your next messages, which are an integral part of your scientistic fundamentalism. They convey to us a great deal of knowledge, almost all of it irrelevant to the discussion. This column was not an introductory lesson in LGBT science but a conceptual analysis and a separation between different planes of discussion. Whoever wants to learn the whole subject in its scientific aspect or in its other aspects should go to a university.
Nonsense
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If that organization is incapable of distinguishing between our case and the case of Biafra or Vietnam, then its people are fools and wicked. I believe more wicked. Whatever they do, they do for themselves. (their sense of self-importance, like all the other world-fixers of the species who lack self-awareness), and if it had been Jews, they would not have lifted a finger to help us; they would even have rejoiced.
And no normal person here (normal Jews do not have especially high expectations of Gentiles) cared about the Red Cross’s silence, but rather about the fact that they refused to carry out their role with respect to the hostages and only with respect to the Gazans.
The link to Rabbi Allalouf’s specific lesson was not sent.